Vaughan-Hicks Buick Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 28, 1967

163 N.L.R.B. 663 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

VAUGHAN-HICKS BUICK COMPANY
Vaughan-Hicks Buick Company' and
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers , AFL-CIO. Case
26-CA-2457.
March 28, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS , AND ZAGORIA
On December 9, 1966, Trial Examiner Thomas S.
Wilson issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action , as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner 's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner 's Decision , the Respondent 's exceptions
and brief, and the entire record in the case, and
hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Vaughan-Hicks
Buick Company, Little Rock, Arkansas, its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order, as herein modified.
In the first line of the fourth indented paragraph of
the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision, substitute the words, "in any other
manner," for the words, "in any like or similar
manner."
' The name of the Respondent is hereby corrected , pursuant to
the unopposed motion of the General Counsel , to reflect its full
name as set forth in the formal pleadings in this case.
I In view of the other findings of the Trial Examiner , which we
adopt , we find it unnecessary to, and do not, pass on the
correctness of his finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by the statement of General Manager Hicks concerning
the sponsorship of a bowling team for Respondent 's employees.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
663
THOMAS S. WILSON, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge
duly filed on June 17, 1966, by International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as the Union, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter called
the General Counsel' and the Board, respectively, by the
Regional Director for Region 26 (Memphis, Tennessee),
issued its complaint dated July 29, 1966, against Vaughan-
Hicks Buick Company, hereinafter called the Respondent.
The complaint alleged that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3)
and 2(6) and (7) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, as amended, herein called the Act.
Respondent duly filed its answer admitting certain
allegations of the complaint but denying the commission of
any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing thereon was held in Little
Rock, Arkansas, on September 15 and 16, 1966, before
me. All parties appeared at the hearing, were represented
by counsel or representative and afforded full opportunity
to be heard, to produce, examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence material and
pertinent to the issues. At the conclusion of the hearing,
oral argument was waived. A brief was received from
Respondent on October 21, 1966.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Vaughan-Hicks Company is now, and has been at all
times material herein, an Arkansas corporation with its
principal place of business in Little Rock, Arkansas,
where it is engaged in the sale and service of new and used
automobiles and the sale of related parts and services.
During the past 12 months, Respondent had a gross
revenue in excess of $500,000, and during the same period,
it purchased and received at its Little Rock, Arkansas,
location, products and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points located outside the State of
Arkansas.
The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I find
that Respondent at all times material herein was engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNION INVOLVED
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization admitting to
membership employees of Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Discharge
1. The issues
On October 28, 1966, the Board decided a prior and
' This term specifically includes the attorney appearing for the
General Counsel at the hearing.
163 NLRB No. 72
664 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
related case involving the same parties as are involved in
the instant case. The Board's Decision therein is found at
161 NLRB 587. I am taking administrative notice of said
Decision.
The Board's Decision therein adopts the decision of
Trial Examiner George Downing and, in short, finds
numerous 8(a)(1) violations by the Respondent, including
one involving employee Dexter Preston who is here alleged
to have been discriminatorily discharged on May 8, 1966,
as well as other 8(a)(3) and (5) violations.
In this Decision the Board finds that on October 13,
1965, Respondent's President Lee H. Vaughan was told by
employee Preston that he, Preston, had executed a union
authorization card and that Vaughan thereupon had
inquired if Preston realized that his job might thereby be
endangered as Preston was only a part-time employee.2
This Decision also shows that the following day,
October 14, the employees of Respondent's service
department, including Preston, went out on an unfair labor
practice strike caused by Respondent's refusal to bargain
with the Union.
A day or so after the commencement of the strike and
while Respondent's place of business was being picketed,
Respondent hired one Clyde Duck as a metal man in the
service department. Subsequently, after more employees
had been hired or reinstated, Duck was promoted to the
shop foreman of Respondent's service department.
On October 26 the striking employees made an
unconditional offer to return to work. Some of them were
reinstated. Respondent refused such reinstatement to 11
strikers, including Preston.
On January 6, 1966, the Regional Office issued a
complaint against Respondent alleging violations of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5), all of which were the subject
matter of the hearing held before Trial Examiner Downing
on March 15 through 17, 1966, inclusive, which resulted in
Examiner Downing's Decision on June 22, 1966.
Early in April 1966, Respondent offered reinstatement
to Preston which he accepted and began working for
Respondent again on April 8 when he was told by Service
Manager William Morgan and Foreman Duck that he was
to do all the painting for the used-car department.3
A couple of days before the offer of reinstatement was
made to Preston, Morgan had informed Duck that Preston
had proved to be a competent painter during his prior
employment with Respondent. In fact Morgan had
increased Preston's weekly salary during that period of his
employment from $60 per week to $75 per week with the
statement that the increased salary would continue so long
as Preston's good work continued.
Upon his return to work on April 8 Duck assigned
Preston the job of painting a 1962 Oldsmobile black. The
job turned out a complete failure-with "orange peel," dry
spots, runs, streaks, and everything else a good paint job
should not have. Although examined by experts, no
2 During the period of his employment in 1965 as well as during
the period of his employment with Respondent in 1966 involved
herein, Preston had been working 3 full days and 3 half days for
Respondent with Respondent 's permission so that he could attend
a Baptist Seminary
S Prior to the strike and at the request of the then Used-Car
Department Manager Sanders , Preston had been a combination
man, doing both the bodywork and painting for the used-car
department
a It seems that black auto paint is the hardest paint to apply
Failures with black paint are not unknown even in Respondent's
shop
explanation for this failure has been forthcoming. The best
explanation was given by Respondent' s paint salesman
and "expert" which was that occasionally even the best of
painters have "bad luck. `4 The only suggstion made by
this painting salesman and expert was to change from
Dupont black to Ditzler black paint. Thereafter Preston
stripped the auto to the metal and redid the same
satisfactorily with the new black paint. Admittedly there
was a large loss in time and money to Respondent but
there was no threat to discharge Preston.
About the middle of April Preston was assigned the job
of repainting a 1964 brown Buick which had a "gravel
pecked" front end. Preston spot painted the hood. Upon
examination of the job, Duck stated that the spot painting
was not "perfect" and, therefore, the job had to be redone.
Admittedly spot painting with brown paint is a difficult
job.5 Preston then repainted the hood.
At some indefinite time following the 1964 Buick job
Duck learned, apparently from the four employees
involved, that Preston had attempted to interest them in
the Union and in attending union meetings .6 Following the
receipt of this information, and as a result thereof, Duck
undertook an examination of the production records of
Preston and discovered that Preston's production was
"low." Duck thereupon reported to Morgan who had either
heard the reports of Preston's continued activities on
behalf of the Union or received that information from
Duck. Duck suggested that Preston should either work full
time or be replaced by a full-time painter.'
In the latter part of April a 1964 Opel which had
suffered a rear-end collision was repaired and brought to
Preston to have the rear quarter panel painted. Preston
finished the painting. Duck came into the paint shop, and
with the light shining just right on the rear panel noted that
Preston had painted over an uneven spot in the panel. This
raised spot had not been noticed by either the body
repairman nor by Preston when he prepared it for
painting . Duck criticized Preston for painting over bad
work and required Preston to do the work over without
pay. Duck thereupon called the bodyman who
straightened the bump out in a very few minutes of work
and Preston thereupon completed the painting.8
On May 5, Thursday, Preston was called into Morgan's
office where Morgan showed Preston production records
for the shop which indicated that Preston's own
production was low. Morgan suggested that Preston
double his production so that Respondent would not lose
money on him.9 Morgan assured Preston, however, that
production throughout the whole shop was low as the
figures on the production sheet he held showed. Preston
said that he would try to increase his production. Nothing
was said at this meeting about the possibility of a
discharge.
The next day, Friday, May 6, Duck again conferred with
Spot painting would have cost about $ 12 whereas painting the
whole hood was far more expensive
s So far as this record shows, this action by Preston was the
only renewal of union activities among the employees following
the termination of the stoke
Duck knew the reason for Preston's part -time hours
" The lost to Respondent on this job must have been minimal
Preston was , of course , painting used cars which automobile
dealers customarily charge off at a lower rate than they charged
for work done for customers
VAUGHAN-HICKS BUICK COMPANY 665
Morgan in regard to Preston. Duck recommended his
discharge. Morgan concurred.
However on Saturday, May 7, Duck assigned a 1966
Opel to Preston and told him to find out what needed
painting and what did not. Preston finished spot painting
the Opel except for the sanding by noon on Saturday when
his workday ended.
When-Preston reported for work on Monday, May 9, he
was met at the door of the shop by Morgan and Duck.
Morgan referred to the work on the 1961 Olds and the 1964
Opel, stating that that was "bad work" which he "could
not stand" and thereupon gave Preston his final paycheck,
acknowledging that Preston was discharged.10
2. Conclusions
It is true that during his 30 days of belated
reinstatement by Respondent, Preston was involved in
three paint jobs which in Shop Foreman Duck' s estimation
were unsatisfactory." The 1961 Olds job was admittedly a
horrible mess. But no one was able to attribute the fault for
that to Preston because no one could determine the cause.
Respondent's own expert's final analysis was that the job
was just "bad luck" which can and does occasionally
happen to even the best of painters. The 1964 Buick spot-
painting job was not "perfect" in Duck's estimation and
had to be redone before delivery to the customer. The loss,
if any, to Respondent on this job was so small that the job
was not even mentioned at the time of Preston's discharge.
On the 1964 Opel job Preston did paint over some bad
bodywork which neither the bodyman nor Preston had
been able to detect but which Duck standing at a distance
and in the right light did detect. The loss to Respondent on
this job was minimal.
It is significant that Duck acknowledged that 30 days of
observation of Preston as a painter , even with a knowledge
of the aforementioned cases of poor results, was
insufficient time for him to have formed an opinion of
Preston's ability as a painter. It is also significant that,
whereas Morgan and Duck had requested Preston to
double his production on Thursday, they decided the very
next day to discharge Preston, according to their
testimony, and thus before Preston had even had a chance
to increase his production as requested. This, of course,
makes the claim of poor production as the cause of
Preston's discharge appear to be purely pretextual.
It is even more significant that the evidence here proves
that Preston's troubles with Respondent began
immediately after the shop foreman, Duck, whose
employment with Respondent commenced during the
strike, learned that even after his reinstatement Preston
continued on with his union activities by inviting some four
of his fellow employees to join the Union and to attend its
meetings-and not because of any of the alleged bad work
noted above. This information about Preston's continued
union activities caused Duck to start investigating
Preston's salary and production record and to suggest the
discharge of Preston to his superior, Morgan, if Preston
would not work full time, which incidentally Duck knew at
the time of his suggestion that Preston would not do
because of his studies at the Baptist Seminary.
Thus I am convinced, and hereby find, that Respondent
determined to discharge Preston because of his temerity
in continuing his union activities even after his belated
reinstatement in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.
B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
On or before August 15, 1966, Service Writer12 "Dutch"
Price approached General Manager John E. Hicks with
the suggestion that Respondent sponsor a bowling team
for its employees. Hicks refused on the ground that such
sponsorship "might be regarded as an inducement to the
men to refrain from joining the Union." 13 Hicks also
mentioned the expense.
Irked by this refusal Price consulted a fellow bowling
enthusiast, Orval Chambers, who was a mechanic in the
shop and also a member of the Union, telling Chambers of
Hicks' refusal to sponsor the team and asking "if
[Chambers] would get out of the Union to help us" get
Respondent to sponsor the team. Chambers was unsure
but, at Price's suggestion, agreed "to talk to the other
[union] boys and see what they wanted to do."
Price reported back to Hicks that there was one
mechanic, mentioning Chambers by name, who "no longer
wanted to be in the Union, and what could this mechanic
do to get out of the Union." Hicks answered that this
mechanic would have to write a letter to the Union "asking
that the Union no longer represent him."
Chambers made the inquiry requested and reported
back to Price that, "they all seemed willing to go along and
try to do that [securing Respondent's sponsorship]."
Hicks thereupon consulted Respondent's attorney,
Clark, who dictated the following "petition" over the
telephone to Hicks which Hicks had typed up on
Respondent's stationery together with an envelope
addressed to the Regional Director of Region 26:
VAUGHAN-HICKS BUICK CO.
and Case No. 26-CA-2260
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHIN-
ISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO
PETITION
We, and each of us, members of International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, being a majority of the members of the
local unit in Vaughan-Hicks Buick Company, of Little
Rock, Arkansas, on our own free will and without
force, coercion, promises, or solicitation, either
express or implied, from Vaughan-Hicks Buick
Company, or any agent therefor, do hereby petition
the National Labor Relations Board for the privilege
of withdrawing their complaint against Vaughan-
Hicks Buick Company, Case No. 26-CA-2260,
10 The evidence indicates that there was no mention of the 1964
Buick nor of the 1966 Opel during this conversation
11 The 1966 Opel job is not counted here because, even if it
ultimately did turn out to have been unsatisfactory, the job had
not been completed so that the discovery of that was not made
until after Respondent had discharged Preston so that it could
have played no part in the determination to discharge him
IZ It was stipulated that a service writer such as Price was part
of the appropriate bargaining unit
11 Both the words and the logic are from the testimony of Hicks
Price was not a witness
666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
subject to the procedure set out in Section 10(a) to (1)
in the Act, for the prevention of unfair labor practices.
Dated this ..... day of August, 1966
Respectfully submitted,
In the absence of Price, Hicks then handed Chambers
the typed petition and envelope saying, "Here's a letter for
you," and departed.
That same day, April 15, apparently during working
hours, Chambers approached the union members in the
shop with said letter. Subsequently Chambers reported to
Hicks that the envelope had gotten dirty and requested a
clean one. Hicks accommodated. The next morning
Chambers mailed the petition signed by a number of the
employees to the Regional Office.
In one of his conversations with Hicks14 Price had
informed Hicks that there were a number of working
conditions in the shop which the men would like to discuss
with management. Hicks refused any such discussion "as
long as they were members of the Union." Price had also
inquired "what else could be done to bring this whole
matter to a close." Hicks mentioned that "an expression of
his interest in behalf of his feelings might be pertinent."
That same August 15 Hicks reported to Attorney Clark
that he, Hicks, had given the "petition" to Chambers.
During this conversation Clark inquired "if there were any
men who had expressed a desire not to be in the Union."
Hicks answered in the affirmative. Clark thereupon
suggested that "we send a letter and give it to Dutch Price
who had expressed an interest in not having anything to do
with the Union whatsoever." Following this conversation
Hicks had the following letter together with another
envelope addressed to the Regional Director typed up on
Respondent's stationery as follows:
VAUGHAN-HICKS BUICK CO.
and Case No. 26-CA-2260
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHIN-
ISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO
We the undersigned state that we have never joined
the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, and do not now
desire them or any other union to represent us.
Dated this 15th day of August, 1966.
Hicks handed the above letter to Price who secured the
signatures of 18 of Respondent's employees and mailed
the same that same evening.
Conclusions
In its brief Respondent argues that not only did
Respondent have the right under Section 8(c) of the Act
but even had the "duty" to give the employees "advice" as
to how to withdraw from the Union, citing N.L.R.B. v. Sun
Company, 215 F.2d 379, 381 (C.A. 9). However, under the
facts of this case, the brief is wrong on both counts.
It is quite true that the Sun case holds that it is legal for
an employer to give his employees " advice" as to how to
withdraw from union representation . But in the first place
such advice normally follows a request for it . In this case
the evidence shows that the employees made no request
for any such "advice." In fact the evidence proves that
Hicks himself initiated the whole idea of having his
employees withdraw from the Union by his statement that
he would not consider sponsoring a bowling team because,
in his opinion , such sponsorship " might be considered an
inducement to refrain from union membership " and, in
addition , his refusal to talk to individual employees "as
long as they were Union members ." Hicks followed this
very obvious suggestion to his employees that they should
withdraw from the Union by preparing not only a
"petition" requesting the "privilege of withdrawing their
complaint" for the union employees to sign but even went
further and prepared an antiunion statement for the
nonunion employees to execute . Hicks was taking no
chances that his suggestion might be too subtle for the
employees to understand . He wanted definite proof that
his blandishment had been effective.
In the second place it is quite clear that , contrary to the
lawyer -prepared letter of the union employees to the
Regional Director , Hicks offered his employees two
definite inducements to withdraw from or stay away from
unionism ; ( 1) Sponsorship of a bowling team, and
(2) actual talks with the individual employees on wages,
hours, and working conditions which Respondent was
simultaneously refusing to the Union representing the
majority of the employees . Of course the price of these two
benefits , sponsorship of the bowling team and bargaining
with the individual employees , was contingent upon the
renunciation of the union membership and of bargaining
through the union representative . To prove that these were
indeed conditions precedent , Hicks prepared the
nonunion letter for signature, at least , without any request
whatsoever having been made therefor . These promises of
benefits , implied at least by Hicks to employee Dutch
Price and passed on by him to other employees , removed
these statements from the protection of Section 8(c) of the
Act.
Accordingly , I must , and hereby do, find that by such
actions, Respondent by its officer and agent, John E.
Hicks, unlawfully assisted Respondent ' s employees in
withdrawing their designation of the Union as their
collective -bargaining representative by promises of
benefits in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate , and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices , it will be recommended that
it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
14 Which one is indefinite in this record
VAUGHAN-HICKS BUICK COMPANY 667
It also having been found that Respondent
discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of
employment of Dexter Preston by discharging him on
May 9 , 1966, I shall recommend that Respondent offer him
immediate and full reinstatement to his former or
substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges , and make him
whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason
of said discrimination against him by payment to him of a
sum of money equal to that which he would have earned as
wages from the date of the discrimination against him to
the date of his reinstatement , less his net earnings during
such period , in accordance with the formula set forth in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest
thereon at 6 percent per annum.
Because of the varying types of unfair labor practices
engaged in by Respondent, I see opposition by the
Respondent to the policies of the Act in general , and hence
I deem it necessary to order Respondent to cease and
desist therefrom and, in any other manner , infringing upon
the rights guaranteed its employees in Section 7 of the
Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By discharging Dexter Preston on May 9, 1966,
thereby discriminating in regard to his hire and tenure of
employment and discouraging union membership and
activities among its employees, and preventing its
employees from exercising the rights guaranteed to them
in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
2. By illegally assisting its employees to withdraw from
the Union through the use of promises of benefit thereby
interfering with , restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
and privileges, and make him whole in the manner set
forth in the section of this Decision entitle "The Remedy."
(b) Post at its plant in Little Rock, Arkansas, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."is Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 26, upon being duly signed by Respondent's
respresentative , shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(c) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the
Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards , personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith. 16
I FURTHER RECOMMEND that, unless within 20 days from
the date of the receipt of this Decision, the Respondent
has notified the said Regional Director that it will comply
with the foregoing recommendations, the Board issue an
order requiring Respondent to take the aforesaid action.
15 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words " a Decision and Order "
18 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify the
Regional Director for Region 26, in writing , within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to
comply herewith."
APPENDIX
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case,
I recommend that Vaughan-Hicks Buick Company, Little
Rock, Arkansas, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging union membership and activities
among its employees by discharging any of said employees
or by discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of any
of its employees or discriminating in any other manner in
regard to any term or condition of their employment in
order to discourage union membership or activities.
(b) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in any manner in order to discourage union
membership or activities among its employees , including
assisting them to withdraw from their union
representative.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Dexter Preston immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent
position , without prejudice to his seniority or other rights
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage union membership or
activities of our employees on behalf of International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by
discharging our employees or by discriminating in
regard to the hire and tenure of employment of any of
our employees or in regard to any other term or
condition of employment of our employees because of
such union affiliation or activity.
WE WILL offer to Dexter Preston immediate and
full reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges , and will make him
whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination practiced against him
together with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum.
668 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT by promises of benefits or threats of
reprisals encourage any of our employees to withdraw
or withhold from union membership or activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or similar manner
interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in
the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form
labor organizations , to join or assist International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid of protection or to refrain from any or all
such activities.
VAUGHAN-HICKS BUICK
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 746 Federal
Office Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis,
Tennessee 38103, Telephone 534-3161.
Leisure World Sales Corporation , Inc. and
Local 32 , Office and Professional Employ-
ees International Union . Case 22-RC-3422.
March 29,1967
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, a
hearing was held before a Hearing Officer of the
National Labor Relations Board. The Hearing
Officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Briefs
have been filed by the Employer and the Petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board
finds:
1. The Employer contends that the "Leisure
World Complex" is not subject to the discretionary
jurisdiction of the Board because it is engaged
exclusively in the construction, ownership, and
management of residential cooperative housing.
163 NLRB No. 87
The Employer, Leisure World Sales Corporation
(Sales Corporation), a Maryland corporation, is
engaged in selling memberships in nonprofit housing
corporations. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Leisure World Foundation (Foundation), a California
nonprofit corporation engaged in the "sponsorship"
and organization under the National Housing Act of
mutual cooperative housing projects for elderly
persons. The parties stipulated that the Sales
Corporation and the Foundation constitute a single
employer for jurisdictional purposes under the Act.
The Foundation has sponsored housing projects
known as "Leisure World" communities in Laguna
Hills and Walnut Creek, California; Olney,
Maryland; and Cranbury, New Jersey. Additional
"Leisure World" communities are planned for other
locations in the United States.
The functions of the Foundation include
negotiating insured mortgages with the Federal
Housing Administration, assisting in the
organization of mutual housing corporations which
are the owners of groups of cooperative apartments
and the cooperative mortgagors, negotiating
contracts for the construction of the projects,
advising the housing corporations in organizing their
memberships, selling equities in the mutual
cooperative units to prospective dwellers, and, after
completion of the project, acting as managing agent
for the mutual corporations.
The Sales Corporation sells memberships in the
cooperatives at the New Jersey and Maryland
projects.
All of the "Leisure World" projects have been
constructed by the Rossmoor Corporation, a
California construction company whose president
and principal stockholder is Ross Cortese.
Admittedly, there is a close working relationship
between the Foundation and Rossmoor. The
"Leisure World" concept was actually the idea of
Cortese. The Rossmoor Corporation acquires the
land which, upon approval by the Foundation's
Board of Trustees, becomes the project site.
Rossmoor has been the general contractor on all the
projects. Apart from building the cooperative
housing, Rossmoor owns, builds, and operates
shopping centers adjacent to the projects. It has also
advised the Foundation on sales policies and
practices. In addition to this direct involvement in
the projects, Rossmoor and its president, Cortese,
have in other ways been intimately involved with the
Foundation. Thus, the Foundation leases its
headquarters space in a building owned by
Rossmoor. As an individual, Cortese has guaranteed
bank loans of the Foundation. Without cost, the
Foundation uses, at its projects, the Rossmoor
trademark names "Rossmoor" and "Leisure
World," and the Rossmoor trademark "Globe"
symbol.