Valley Health System, LLC d/b/a Spring Valley Hospital Medical Center, Valley Hospital Medical Cente

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 5, 2016

363 NLRB No. 178 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

363 NLRB No. 178
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Valley Health System LLC d/b/a Spring Valley Hos-
pital Medical Center and Centennial Hills Hos-
pital Medical Center and Desert Springs Hospi-
tal Medical Center and Valley Hospital Medical
Center and Summerlin Hospital Medical Center
LLC d/b/a Summerlin Hospital Medical Center
and Kathy Morris and Katrina Alvarez-Hyman.
Cases 28–CA–123611 and 28–CA–127147
May 5, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS HIROZAWA
AND MCFERRAN
On March 18, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Lisa D.
Thompson issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the Re-
spondents filed an answering brief, and the General
Counsel filed a reply brief. The Respondents also filed
limited and contingent cross-exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions,1 cross-exceptions, and briefs
and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2
and conclusions3 only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order.4

1 The Respondents request that the Board disregard the General
Counsel’s exceptions and supporting brief because they fail to comply
with the requirements of Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regula-
tions. Specifically, the Respondents contend that the documents are
deficient because the legal arguments in the General Counsel’s brief
fail to reference the exceptions to which they relate. We find that the
General Counsel’s filings substantially comply with Sec. 102.46. We
therefore deny the Respondents’ request. See, e.g., Solutia, Inc., 357
NLRB 58, 58 fn. 1 (2011).
2 In deciding the issues before us, we do not rely on the judge’s cita-
tions to administrative law judge decisions that had not been subject to
Board review.
3 There were no exceptions to the judge’s findings that the Respond-
ents violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining rules that prohibit employees
from (1) engaging in conduct that “brings discredit on the System or
Facility”; (2) speaking negatively about a coworker or Respondents; (3)
disclosing the confidentiality of business-related and employee infor-
mation, including written, verbal or electronic information; and (4)
communicating in a language other than English.
4 We shall amend the judge’s conclusions of law consistent with our
findings herein, modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to
the Board’s standard remedial language and the violations found, and
substitute new notices to conform to the Order as modified.
1. For the reasons stated below, we find, contrary to
the judge, that the Respondents violated the Act by main-
taining a rule in their Employee Handbook that prohibits
conduct that is “offensive” to fellow employees. That
rule provides, in relevant part:
Certain rules and regulations regarding employee be-
havior are necessary for the efficient operation of the
System and the Facility and for the benefit and protec-
tion of the rights and safety of all. Conduct that inter-
feres with System or Facility operations, brings dis-
credit on the System or Facility, or is offensive to pa-
tients or fellow employees will not be tolerated.
The General Counsel alleged that the Respondents violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining that portion of the
rule prohibiting employees from engaging in conduct that
“brings discredit on the System or Facility” and that “is
offensive to . . . fellow employees.” The judge found a vio-
lation based on the “brings discredit” language, but recom-
mended dismissing the complaint allegation based on the
language prohibiting conduct “offensive” to fellow employ-
ees.
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if it
maintains workplace rules that would reasonably tend to
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
See Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998),
enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The analytical
framework for assessing whether maintenance of rules
violates the Act is set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). Under Lutheran Herit-
age, a work rule is unlawful if “the rule explicitly re-
stricts activities protected by Section 7.” Id. at 646 (em-
phasis in original). If the work rule does not explicitly
restrict protected activities, it nonetheless will violate
Section 8(a)(1) if “(1) employees would reasonably con-
strue the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the
rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3)
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Sec-
tion 7 rights.” Id. at 647.
The rule at issue here is not alleged to explicitly re-
strict protected activities or to have been promulgated in
response to or applied to restrict Section 7 activities.
Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether employees would
reasonably construe the challenged rules to prohibit Sec-
tion 7 activity. In construing rules, Lutheran Heritage
teaches that they are to be given a reasonable reading,
and are not to be considered in isolation. Id. at 646. Fur-
ther, any ambiguity in the rule must be construed against
the drafter—here, the Respondents. Lafayette Park,
above at 825.
Applying the Lutheran Heritage standard, the judge
found that employees would not reasonably construe the
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
bar on conduct that is “offensive” to fellow employees to
prohibit Section 7 activity. See Lutheran Heritage,
above at 646.5 Specifically, she found that the rule at
issue here is similar to a civility rule that the Board found
lawful in Palms Hotel & Casino, 344 NLRB 1363
(2005). We disagree. Considered in context, the rule in
Palms Hotel was clearly directed at egregious and unpro-
tected misconduct, banning conduct that is “injurious,
offensive, threatening, intimidating, coercing, or interfer-
ing with” employee or patrons. Id. at 1367. The accom-
panying context for the term “offensive” in that case
helped to define the type of conduct being targeted,
providing sufficient clarify for workers to understand
that the object of the rule was to target egregious mis-
conduct, not to encompass conduct protected under the
Act.
In contrast, in this case the broad prohibition against
conduct “offensive” to coworkers stands in relative isola-
tion. “Offensive” does not appear among a list of serious
forms of objectively clear misconduct that would help
employees understand its contours. It is not accompa-
nied by any other descriptive language that would help
employees interpret what types of “offensive” conduct
the rule is targeting. As previously explained, employees
“should not have to decide at their own peril what [con-
duct] is . . . subject to such a prohibition.” Hyundai
America Shipping Agency, 357 NLRB 860, 871 (2011),
enfd. in part and reversed in part, 805 F.3d 309 (D.C.
Cir. 2015). Yet this is precisely the situation the Re-
spondents’ rule places employees in.
In this regard, the rule is similar to other work rules
that the Board has found to be unlawful. See, e.g., First
Transit, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 3 (2014)
(finding rule prohibiting “inappropriate attitude or behav-
ior . . . to other employees” unlawful due to its “patent
ambiguity”); Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB No. 148, slip
op. at 3 (2014) (finding rule prohibiting “insubordination
or other disrespectful conduct” unlawful as phrase “dis-
respectful conduct” so ambiguous that employees would
reasonably read the rule as encompassing Section 7 ac-
tivity); 2 Sisters Food Group, 357 NLRB 1816, 1817
(2011) (finding rule subjecting employees to discipline
for “inability or unwillingness to work harmoniously
with other employees” unlawful as phrase “work harmo-
niously” was “sufficiently imprecise” that it could en-
compass any disagreement or conflict among employees,
including interactions protected by Section 7).
But, here, we need not rely exclusively on the inherent
ambiguity of the term “offensive” because its placement

5 We find no merit in the Respondents’ contingent exception con-
tending that we should apply an alternative legal standard in analyzing
whether the rule at issue is facially valid.
within the context of the rule further supports our find-
ing. The rule’s restriction on conduct that is “offensive”
to fellow employees appears in the same sentence as, and
immediately follows, the prohibition on conduct that
“brings discredit on the System or Facility,” which the
judge found, and we agree, is unlawfully overbroad.
This sequence makes it more likely that a reader would
reasonably interpret the rule to target workplace discus-
sions of terms and conditions of employment that—while
potentially bringing “discredit” on the Respondent or
otherwise being subjectively “offensive” to fellow em-
ployees—clearly fall within the ambit of the Act’s pro-
tections.
To be sure, the rule also contains introductory lan-
guage setting forth an intention to promote “efficient
operation” and protect “the rights and safety of all.” But
this language does little to cure its ambiguity or
overbreadth. These references do not provide sufficient
context for an employee to determine what types of “of-
fensive” comments or behaviors the rule is targeting, or
how the rule would or would not be applied in the con-
text of Section 7 activity (which often involves contro-
versy, blunt criticisms, and disagreements that may well
be deemed “offensive” by management or fellow em-
ployees). As a result, employees would likely refrain
from engaging in certain Section 7 activity due to a rea-
sonable concern that their conduct could be perceived as
running afoul of the rule. See, e.g., Whole Foods Mar-
ket, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 4 fn. 11 (2015)
(“Employees, who are dependent on the employer for
their livelihood, would reasonably take a cautious ap-
proach and refrain from engaging in Sec. 7 activity for
fear of running afoul of a rule whose coverage is un-
clear.”).
For these reasons, we reverse the judge and find the
Respondents’ maintenance of this rule violates Section
8(a)(1).
2. We also reverse the judge’s recommended dismis-
sal of the complaint’s allegation that the Respondents
violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining provisions pro-
hibiting class and collective actions in their Alternative
Resolutions of Conflicts Program (arbitration agree-
ment). In Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72
(2014), enf. denied in part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015),
the Board reaffirmed its earlier decision in D. R. Horton,
357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part 737
F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), which held that an employer
violates the Act “when it requires employees covered by
the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an
agreement that precludes them from filing joint, class, or
collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other
working conditions against their employer in any forum,
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 3
arbitral or judicial.” Id. at 2277. Such agreements im-
properly interfere with the substantive right of employ-
ees, under Section 7 of the Act, to engage in collective
action to improve working conditions.
Although the Respondents’ arbitration agreement pro-
hibits employees from bringing class or collective ac-
tions in all forums, the judge found that the opt-out pro-
vision of the agreement placed it outside the prohibition
against mandatory individual arbitration agreements in
Murphy Oil and D. R. Horton. Subsequent to issuance of
the judge’s decision, however, the Board rejected this
rationale, holding that an opt-out procedure still imposes
an unlawful mandatory condition of employment that
falls squarely within the rule of D. R. Horton and Mur-
phy Oil. See On Assignment Staffing Services, 362
NLRB No. 189, slip op. at 1, 4–5 (2015). The Board
further held in On Assignment, slip op. at 1, 5–8, that
even assuming that an opt-provision renders an arbitra-
tion provision nonmandatory, an arbitration provi-
sion/agreement precluding collective action in all forums
is unlawful even if entered into voluntarily because it
requires employees to prospectively waive their Section
7 right to engage in concerted activity. See also Nijjar
Realty, Inc., d/b/a Pama Management, 363 NLRB No.
38 (2015). Accordingly, we reverse the judge and find
that the Respondents’ maintenance of the provisions pro-
hibiting class and collective actions in the arbitration
agreement violates Section 8(a)(1).6
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondents are employers engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act and are health care institutions within the mean-
ing of Section 2(14) of the Act.
2. By the following acts and conduct the Respondents
have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

6 In cross-exceptions, the Respondents contend that Murphy Oil was
incorrectly decided. We reject the Respondents’ argument for the
reasons set forth in Murphy Oil.
In addition, the General Counsel argues that the judge erred in fail-
ing to find that the arbitration agreement interferes with employee
access to the Board and its processes under U-Haul Co. of California,
347 NLRB 375 (2006). We reject this argument. Neither the com-
plaint nor the parties’ stipulation of facts alleges that the agreement
would restrict employee access to the Board. Nor did the parties file
statements of position to accompany the joint stipulation that would put
the Respondents on notice that the General Counsel was pursuing this
additional theory. The Board has long held that a stipulation is conclu-
sive on the parties making it and prohibits any further dispute as to the
stipulated matters. E.g., Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 741 (2000)
(General Counsel could not allege a basis for unfair labor practice
findings that went beyond parties’ stipulation). Accordingly, we find
that the issue of whether the arbitration agreement unlawfully interferes
with employee access to the Board is not properly before us.
(a) Maintaining a rule that prohibits employees from
engaging in conduct that brings discredit on the System
or Facility or is offensive to fellow employees.
(b) Maintaining a rule that prohibits employees from
speaking negatively about a coworker or the hospital.
(c) Maintaining a rule that prohibits employees from
disclosing business-related and employee information.
(d) Maintaining a rule that requires employees, while
on duty, to communicate only in English with other em-
ployees, staff, customers, and visitors in all work and
patient-access areas.
(e) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that
requires employees, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, unless employees
individually opt out of the waiver.
3. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents, Valley Health System LLC d/b/a Spring
Valley Hospital Medical Center and Centennial Hills
Hospital Medical Center and Desert Springs Hospital
Medical Center and Valley Hospital Medical Center and
Summerlin Hospital Medical Center LLC d/b/a
Summerlin Hospital Medical Center, Las Vegas, Nevada,
their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a rule that prohibits employees from
engaging in conduct that brings discredit on the System
or Facility or is offensive to fellow employees.
(b) Maintaining a rule that prohibits employees from
speaking negatively about a coworker or the hospital.
(c) Maintaining a rule that prohibits employees from
disclosing business-related and employee information.
(d) Maintaining a rule that requires employees, while
on duty, to communicate only in English with other em-
ployees, staff, customers, and visitors in all work and
patient-access areas.
(e) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that
requires employees, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, unless employees
individually opt out of the waiver.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind or revise the rule in their Employee Hand-
book that prohibits employees from engaging in conduct
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that brings discredit on the System or Facility or is offen-
sive to fellow employees;
(b) Rescind or revise the rule in their Service Excel-
lence Expectations Handbook that prohibits employees
from speaking negatively about a coworker or the hospi-
tal;
(c) Rescind or revise the rule in their Employee Hand-
book that prohibits employees from disclosing business-
related and employee information;
(d) Rescind or revise the rule in their Employee Hand-
book that requires employees, while on duty, to com-
municate only in English with other employees, staff,
customers, and visitors in all work and patient-access
areas;
(e) Furnish all current employees with inserts for the
current Employee Handbook and Service Excellence
Expectations Handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful
rules have been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of
lawful rules or publish and distribute a revised Employee
Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations Hand-
book that (a) do not contain the unlawful rules or (b)
provide the language of lawful rules;
(f) Rescind the Alternative Resolutions of Conflicts
Program (arbitration agreement) in all of its forms, or
revise it in all of its forms to make clear to employees
that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiv-
er of their right to maintain employment-related joint,
class, or collective actions in all forums;
(g) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign or otherwise become bound to the arbi-
tration agreement in any form that it has been rescinded
or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the
revised agreement.
(h) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post a
copy of the attached notices, in English and Spanish,
marked “Appendix [A through E]” at the respective facil-
ity named in each notice.7 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 28, after
being signed by the Respondents’ authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondents and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other
electronic means, if the Respondents customarily com-
municate with their employees by such means. Reason-

7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notices reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
able steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. If the Respondents have gone out of
business or closed the facilities involved in these pro-
ceedings, the Respondents shall duplicate and mail, at
their own expense, a copy of the notices marked “Ap-
pendix [A through E]” to all current employees and for-
mer employees employed by the Respondents at any time
since September 3, 2013.
(i) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 28 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondents have
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 5, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
engaging in conduct that brings discredit on the System
or Facility or is offensive to fellow employees.
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 5
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
speaking negatively about a coworker or the hospital.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
disclosing business-related and employee information.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that requires you, while
on duty, to communicate only in English with other em-
ployees, staff, customers, and visitors in all work and
patient-access areas.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires you, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, unless you opt
out of the waiver.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits you from engaging in conduct
that brings discredit on the System or Facility or is offen-
sive to fellow employees.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Service Ex-
cellence Expectations Handbook that prohibits employ-
ees from speaking negatively about a coworker or the
hospital.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits employees from disclosing
business-related and employee information.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that requires you, while on duty, to communi-
cate only in English with other employees, staff, custom-
ers, and visitors in all work and patient-access areas.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the current Em-
ployee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
Handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful rules have
been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful
rules or publish and distribute a revised Employee Hand-
book and Service Excellence Expectations Handbook
that (a) do not contain the unlawful rules or (b) provide
the language of lawful rules.
WE WILL rescind the Alternative Resolutions of Con-
flicts Program (arbitration agreement) in all of its forms,
or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbi-
tration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your
right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or col-
lective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
arbitration agreement in all of its forms that the agree-
ment has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE
WILL provide them a copy of the revised agreement.
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC D/B/A SPRING
VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
engaging in conduct that brings discredit on the System
or Facility or is offensive to fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
speaking negatively about a coworker or the hospital.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
disclosing business-related and employee information.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that requires you, while
on duty, to communicate only in English with other em-
ployees, staff, customers, and visitors in all work and
patient-access areas.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires you, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, unless you opt
out of the waiver.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits you from engaging in conduct
that brings discredit on the System or Facility or is offen-
sive to fellow employees.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Service Ex-
cellence Expectations Handbook that prohibits employ-
ees from speaking negatively about a coworker or the
hospital.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits employees from disclosing
business-related and employee information.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that requires you, while on duty, to communi-
cate only in English with other employees, staff, custom-
ers, and visitors in all work and patient-access areas.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the current Em-
ployee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
Handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful rules have
been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful
rules or publish and distribute a revised Employee Hand-
book and Service Excellence Expectations Handbook
that (a) do not contain the unlawful rules or (b) provide
the language of lawful rules.
WE WILL rescind the Alternative Resolutions of Con-
flicts Program (arbitration agreement) in all of its forms,
or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbi-
tration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your
right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or col-
lective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
arbitration agreement in all of its forms that the agree-
ment has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE
WILL provide them a copy of the revised agreement.
CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL
CENTER
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
engaging in conduct that brings discredit on the System
or Facility or is offensive to fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
speaking negatively about a coworker or the hospital.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
disclosing business-related and employee information.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that requires you, while
on duty, to communicate only in English with other em-
ployees, staff, customers, and visitors in all work and
patient-access areas.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires you, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, unless you opt
out of the waiver.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits you from engaging in conduct
that brings discredit on the System or Facility or is offen-
sive to fellow employees.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Service Ex-
cellence Expectations Handbook that prohibits employ-
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 7
ees from speaking negatively about a coworker or the
hospital.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits employees from disclosing
business-related and employee information.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that requires you, while on duty, to communi-
cate only in English with other employees, staff, custom-
ers, and visitors in all work and patient-access areas.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the current Em-
ployee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
Handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful rules have
been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful
rules or publish and distribute a revised Employee Hand-
book and Service Excellence Expectations Handbook
that (a) do not contain the unlawful rules or (b) provide
the language of lawful rules.
WE WILL rescind the Alternative Resolutions of Con-
flicts Program (arbitration agreement) in all of its forms,
or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbi-
tration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your
right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or col-
lective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
arbitration agreement in all of its forms that the agree-
ment has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE
WILL provide them a copy of the revised agreement.
DESERT SPRINGS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX D
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
engaging in conduct that brings discredit on the System
or Facility or is offensive to fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
speaking negatively about a coworker or the hospital.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
disclosing business-related and employee information.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that requires you, while
on duty, to communicate only in English with other em-
ployees, staff, customers, and visitors in all work and
patient-access areas.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires you, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, unless you opt
out of the waiver.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits you from engaging in conduct
that brings discredit on the System or Facility or is offen-
sive to fellow employees.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Service Ex-
cellence Expectations Handbook that prohibits employ-
ees from speaking negatively about a coworker or the
hospital.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits employees from disclosing
business-related and employee information.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that requires you, while on duty, to communi-
cate only in English with other employees, staff, custom-
ers, and visitors in all work and patient-access areas.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the current Em-
ployee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
Handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful rules have
been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful
rules or publish and distribute a revised Employee Hand-
book and Service Excellence Expectations Handbook
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that (a) do not contain the unlawful rules or (b) provide
the language of lawful rules.
WE WILL rescind the Alternative Resolutions of Con-
flicts Program (arbitration agreement) in all of its forms,
or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbi-
tration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your
right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or col-
lective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
arbitration agreement in all of its forms that the agree-
ment has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE
WILL provide them a copy of the revised agreement.
VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX E
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
engaging in conduct that brings discredit on the System
or Facility or is offensive to fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
speaking negatively about a coworker or the hospital.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits you from
disclosing business-related and employee information.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that requires you, while
on duty, to communicate only in English with other em-
ployees, staff, customers, and visitors in all work and
patient-access areas.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires you, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, unless you opt
out of the waiver.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits you from engaging in conduct
that brings discredit on the System or Facility or is offen-
sive to fellow employees.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Service Ex-
cellence Expectations Handbook that prohibits employ-
ees from speaking negatively about a coworker or the
hospital.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that prohibits employees from disclosing
business-related and employee information.
WE WILL rescind or revise the rule in our Employee
Handbook that requires you, while on duty, to communi-
cate only in English with other employees, staff, custom-
ers, and visitors in all work and patient-access areas.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the current Em-
ployee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
Handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful rules have
been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of lawful
rules or publish and distribute a revised Employee Hand-
book and Service Excellence Expectations Handbook
that (a) do not contain the unlawful rules or (b) provide
the language of lawful rules.
WE WILL rescind the Alternative Resolutions of Con-
flicts Program (arbitration agreement) in all of its forms,
or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbi-
tration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your
right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or col-
lective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
arbitration agreement in all of its forms that the agree-
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 9
ment has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE
WILL provide them a copy of the revised agreement.
SUMMERLIN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER LLC
D/B/A SUMMERLIN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Randy M. Girer, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Bradley W. Kampas and Keahn N. Morris, Esqs. (Jackson Lew-
is, P.C.), for the Respondents.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LISA D. THOMPSON, Administrative Law Judge. This matter
is before me on a stipulated record. On March 3, 2014, Kathy
Morris (Charging Party Morris or Morris) filed a charge in
Case 28–CA–123611 against Valley Health System LLC
(VHS) d/b/a Spring Valley Hospital Medical Center (Spring
Valley) and Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center (Centen-
nial) and Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center (Desert
Springs)1 and Valley Hospital Medical Center (Valley) and
Summerlin Hospital Medical Center LLC (Summerlin) d/b/a
Summlerin Hospital Medical Center (collectively, Respond-
ents).2 This charge was amended on April 29, 2014.3
On April 23, 2014, Katrina Alvarez-Hyman (Charging Party
Hyman or Alvarez-Hyman) filed a charge in Case 28–CA–
127147 against Respondents.4 This charge was amended on
June 19, 2014.5 On July 19, 2014, the Regional Director for

1 The parties jointly moved to correct the name of Desert Springs
Medical Center by deleting the phrase “NC-DSH, d/b/a, LLC” from the
name. The joint motion is granted.
2 Jt. Exh. 4. Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Jt.
SOF” for the parties’ Stipulation of Facts, Joint Motion to Submit Case
on Stipulation and Joint Motion Requesting Permission to Forgo Sub-
mission of Short Position Statements; “Jt. Exh.” for the parties’ Joint
Exhibits; “GC Exh.” for the General Counsel’s Exhibits; “R. Exh.” for
Respondents’ Exhibits; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; and
“R. Br.” for the Respondents’ brief.
3 Jt. Exh. 5.
4 Jt. Exh. 6.
5 Jt. Exh. 7.
Region 28 consolidated both cases and issued a complaint and
notice of hearing.6 Respondents filed their answer, denying all
material allegations and setting forth their affirmative defenses
to the complaint.7
Regarding Case 28–CA–123611, the consolidated complaint
alleges that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act (the NLRA or the Act) when Respond-
ents maintained overly broad and discriminatory work rules
that prohibit employees from: (1) engaging in conduct that will
“bring discredit on the System or Facility or is offensive to
fellow employees;” (2) speaking negatively about a co-worker
or Respondents; and/or (3) disclosing the confidentiality of
business-related and employee information, including written,
verbal or electronic information. The complaint also alleges
that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by main-
taining an Alternative Resolution for Conflicts Agreement
(ARC or Agreement) prohibiting employees from engaging in
class or collective legal activity (collectively, the Morris allega-
tions).
Regarding Case 28–CA–127147, the consolidated complaint
alleges that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act when they maintained an overly broad and discriminatory
work rule that requires all employees to communicate only in
English (the Hyman allegation).8
On September 8, 2014, the parties submitted their joint stipu-
lation of facts, motion to submit case on stipulation and joint
motion requesting permission to forego submission of short
position statements. I granted the parties’ motion and directed
them to submit posthearing briefs by October 24, 2014. How-
ever, upon the parties’ request, the posthearing brief deadline
was extended to November 14, 2014. On November 14, 2014,
the parties submitted their posthearing briefs in this case.
Upon the stipulated record, and in full consideration of the
briefs submitted, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The parties stipulated to the following facts as to the nature
of Respondents’ business and jurisdiction:
1. At all material times, Respondent Summerlin has been a
limited liability company with an office and place of business
in Las Vegas, Nevada. It has been operating a hospital and
medical center providing medical care.9
2. During a 12-month period ending October 30, 2013, Re-
spondent Summerlin purchased and received at its facility
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside
the State of Nevada. During the same 12-month period, Re-

6 Jt. Exh. 1. Case Nos. 28–CA–115963, 28–CA–120097 and 28–
CA–120294 were also included in the complaint. However, the parties
entered into non-Board settlements regarding all of these cases. The
undersigned approved the settlements on the record, severed and dis-
missed the complaint regarding the charges on July 22, 2014. See Jt.
Exhs. 2–3.
7 Jt. Exhs. 8, 14.
8 Jt. Exh. 1, ¶¶ 4(l)-(m) and 6; see also, Jt. Exhs. 5, 7, and Jt. SOF ¶
3.
9 Jt. SOF ¶ 5(a).
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent Summerlin derived gross revenues in excess of
$250,000.10
3. Respondent Summerlin admits, and I find, that it is an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act and that it has been a health care institution within the
meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act.
4. At all material times, Respondent VHS has been a limited
liability company with an office and place of business in Las
Vegas, Nevada. It has been operating Spring Valley, Centenni-
al, Desert Springs and Valley, which are hospitals and medical
centers in Las Vegas providing medical care.11
5. During the 12-month period ending March 3, 2014, Re-
spondent VHS purchased and received at its Spring Valley,
Centennial, Desert Springs and Valley facilities goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Ne-
vada. Also during that same 12-month period, Respondent VHS
derived gross revenues in excess of $250,000.12
6. Respondent VHS admits and I find that it is an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and
that Spring Valley, Centennial, Desert Springs and Valley have
been health care institutions within the meaning of Section
2(14) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Morris Stipulated Background Facts
1. Charging Party Morris was hired by Respondent
Summerlin on September 10, 2011.
2. It is undisputed that Respondents maintain an Employee
Handbook as well as various policies and procedures on Re-
spondents’ internal employee website or Intranet.13 During new
employee orientation, employees are required to sign and
acknowledge receipt of the Employee Handbook.
3. Failure to comply with the Employee Handbook as well
as Respondents’ personnel policies and procedures may result
in discipline or discharge.
4. Respondents also maintain a Service Excellence Expecta-
tions Handbook outlining standards of performance for their
employees.14 Like the Employee Handbook, employees must
sign a “commitment” form acknowledging receipt of the stand-
ards. Failure to adhere to the standards outlined in the Service
Excellence Handbook may result in disciplinary action.
5. It is also undisputed that, since about September 3, 2013,
Respondents have maintained the following rules in their Em-
ployee Handbook:
(a) . . . Conduct that interferes with System or Facility opera-
tions, brings discredit on the System or Facility, or is offensive
to patients or fellow employees will not be tolerated;15
(b) In addition to disclosures of health information, employ-
ees have an obligations to maintain the confidentiality of busi-
ness-related and employee information, which includes, but is

10 Id.
11 SOF ¶5(b).
12 Id.
13 Jt. Exh. 9.
14 Jt. Exh. 10.
15 Jt. Exh. 9, p. 19.
not limited to all written, verbal and electronic information;16
and
(c) Don’t speak negatively about a patient, co-worker, or the
hospital.17
6. It is further undisputed that Respondents have maintained
an Alternative Resolution of Conflicts (ARC) Agreement.18
The ARC Agreement is applicable to all employees employed
by Respondents. The relevant provisions of the Agreement
provide:
You (the employee) and the Company agree to bring any dis-
pute in arbitration on an individual basis only, and not on a
class, collective or private attorney general representative ac-
tion basis. Accordingly,
(1) There will be no right or authority for any dispute
to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a class action (“Class
Action Waiver”). The Class Action Waiver shall not be
severable from this Agreement in any case in which (1)
the dispute is filed as a class action and (2) a civil court of
competent jurisdiction finds the Class Action Waiver is
unenforceable. In such instances, the class action must be
litigated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction; and
(2) There will be no right or authority for any dispute
to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a collective action
(“Collective Action Waiver”). The Collective Action
Waiver shall not be severable from this Agreement in any
case in which (1) the dispute is filed as a collective action
and (2) a civil court of competent jurisdiction finds the
Collective Action Waiver is unenforceable. In such in-
stances, the collective action must be litigated in a civil
court of competent jurisdiction…19
7. The Agreement allows employees to bring claims before
administrative agencies, including, but not limited to the
NLRB.
8. It is also undisputed that employees may opt out of the
ARC Agreement entirely. To do so, the Agreement provides:
Arbitration is not a mandatory condition of Employee’s em-
ployment at the Company, and therefore an Employee may
submit a form stating that the Employee wishes to opt out and
not be subject to this Agreement. In order to Opt Out of Arbi-
tration, the Employee must submit a signed and dated state-
ment or, a ‘‘Alternative Resolution for Conflicts Agreement
Opt Out Form” (“Form”) that can be obtained from the Com-
pany’s local or corporate Human Resources Department. In
order to be effective, the signed and dated Form must be re-
turned to the Human Resources Department within 30 days of
the Employee’s receipt of this Agreement. An Employee who
timely opts out as provided in this paragraph will not be sub-
ject to any adverse employment action as a consequence of
that decision and may pursue available legal remedies without
regard to this Agreement. Should an Employee not opt out of

16 Id. at p. 20.
17 Jt. Exh. 10, p. 8.
18 Jt. Exh. 12.
19 Id.
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 11
this Agreement within 30 days of the Employee’s receipt of
this Agreement, continuing the Employee’s employment con-
stitutes mutual acceptance of the terms of this Agreement by
Employee and the Company. An employee has the right to
consult with counsel of the Employee’s choice concerning
this.20
9. Depending on the circumstances, employees were (and
still are) introduced to the ARC Program either during the new-
hire process (for employees hired after July 15, 2013) or during
the roll-out of the program in November 2013.
10. In November 2013, Respondents designed a communi-
cations campaign to introduce the ARC program to existing
employees. Information about the ARC Program was provided
to all employees online. Employees were given an ARC
Acknowledgement, ARC Agreement, and ARC Opt Out Form.
These forms were also posted on Respondents’ Intranet for
employees to review.
11. Employees were also advised of their right to opt out of
the ARC Program. To that end, employees can voluntarily opt
out of the ARC Program by submitting a completed Opt Out
Form by fax or mail, or by delivering it in person to their re-
spective human resources department. Once it was received, the
Opt Out form was date-stamped by a representative of Re-
spondents’ human resources department.21
12. If an employee did not sign the Opt Out Form within 30
days of receipt of the materials, the employee is bound by the
Agreement.
13. The ARC Program is applicable to all employees em-
ployed by Respondents Summerlin and VHS (at its Spring Val-
ley and Centennial facilities) except those who opted out.
14. The ARC Program is applicable to approximately 747 of
Respondent VHS Valley’s employees. Of those employees, 38
voluntarily signed Opt Out Forms.
15. The ARC Program is applicable to approximately 392 of
Respondent VHS Desert Springs’ employees. Of those employ-
ees, 76 voluntarily signed Opt Out Forms.
16. The ARC Program is applicable to approximately 1319
of Respondent Summerlin’s employees. Of those employees,
343 voluntarily signed Opt Out Forms.
17. The ARC Program is applicable to approximately 1004
of Respondent VHS Spring Valley’s employees. Of those em-
ployees, 196 voluntarily signed Opt Out Forms.
18. The ARC Program is applicable to approximately 658 of
Respondent VHS Centennial Hills’ employees. Of those em-
ployees, 117 voluntarily signed Opt Out Forms.
19. On November 8, 2013, Morris chose not to participate in
the ARC Program and voluntarily signed an Opt Out Form.22
B. The Alvarez-Hyman Stipulated Background Facts
1. It is undisputed that, since about September 3, 2013, Re-
spondents have maintained a work rule in their Employee
Handbook where employees are required to communicate only
in English in the work environment, when conducting business
at Respondents’ hospitals or with each other, and when patients

20 Jt. Exh. 12, p. 108.
21 Jt. Exh. 12
22 Jt. Exh. 13.
or customers are present or in close proximity. 23
2. Employees are also required to communicate only in Eng-
lish when communicating between staff and patients, and visi-
tors or customers unless interpretation or translation is request-
ed or required.24
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Morris Allegations
The first issue is whether Respondents violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining various work rules on “dis-
crediting” and “offensive” conduct, negative speech and dis-
closing confidential information.
1. “Discrediting” and “Offensive” conduct
Citing the Board’s decision in Lafayette Park Hotel, 326
NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
counsel for the General Counsel (CGC) asserts that Respond-
ents’ work rule prohibiting conduct that “interferes with System
or Facility operations, brings discredit on the System or Facili-
ty, or is offensive to patients or fellow employees” violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The CGC avers that the rule is un-
lawful, because it is overbroad and ambiguous such that it
could reasonably be construed as prohibiting employees from
exercising their Section 7 rights. Respondents maintain that the
code of conduct rule is lawful because it is clearly and unam-
biguously aimed at supporting Respondents’ legitimate busi-
ness interest of maintaining a peaceful and healing hospital
environment.
Determining the legality of work rules requires a balancing
of competing interests: the rights of employees to organize or
otherwise engage in protected activity and the right of employ-
ers to maintain a level of discipline in the workplace. To that
end, the Board set out a framework for evaluating whether an
employer’s work rule, such as those in Respondents’ Employee
Handbook and Service Excellence Expectation, violate the Act.
First, the rule must be examined to determine whether it ex-
plicitly restricts Section 7 activity. If it does, the rule is unlaw-
ful.25 If the rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity,
the rule must be evaluated to determine whether: (1) the rule
was promulgated in response to union activity; (2) the rule has
been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights; or (3)
employees would reasonably construe the language in the rule
to prohibit Section 7 activity. 26 The Board must give the rule a
reasonable reading and refrain from reading particular phrases
in isolation or presume improper interference with employee
rights.27 However, “where ambiguities appear in employee
work rules promulgated by an employer, the ambiguity must be
resolved against the promulgator of the rule rather than the
employees who are required to obey it.”28
On page 19 of their Employee Handbook, Respondents set

23 Jt. Exh. 11, ¶ IV(C) – (C)(2).
24 Id.
25 Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004); Lafa-
yette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 828 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
26 Lutheran Heritage, supra.
27 Id.
28 Norris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245 (1992).
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
forth rules prohibiting “discrediting” and “offensive” conduct.
The rule states:
Certain rules and regulations regarding employee behavior are
necessary for the efficient operation of the System and the Fa-
cility and for the benefit and protection of the rights and safety
of all. Conduct that interferes with System or Facility opera-
tions, brings discredit on the System or Facility, or is offen-
sive to patients or fellow employees will not be tolerated.29
Respondents argue that their rule prohibiting discrediting con-
duct is entirely proper and lawful citing the Board’s decision in
Ark Las Vegas Restaurant, 333 NLRB 1284 (2001). I disagree.
In Ark Las Vegas Restaurant, the employer promulgated and
maintained a work rule prohibiting employees from “participat-
ing in any conduct, on or off duty that tends to bring discredit
to, or reflects adversely on, yourself, fellow associates, the
Company or its guests, or that adversely affects job perfor-
mance or your ability to report to work as scheduled.”30 The
General Counsel in that case argued that the rule, as stated, was
so overbroad and vague that the rule could encompass conduct
protected by the Act. However, the Board, agreeing with the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), found that the rule, when
viewed in the context with other language in the employer’s
Handbook, was aimed at prohibiting conduct related to “crimes
or other misconduct, such as giving proprietary information to
competitors.” Given that context, the judge concluded that he
“doubt[ed] that there would be any uncertainty . . . whether any
employee, guided by knowledgeable union officials, would
harbor uncertainty over the scope of the rule.”31
While the judge in Ark Las Vegas Restaurant found corre-
sponding language in the Handbook that led him to resolve the
rule’s ambiguity, I do not find any such language here. In fact,
nothing in the preceding sentence or anywhere else within the
rule tells employees anything about the type of “discredit[ing]”
conduct Respondents intend to prevent. It is possible that the
conduct being regulated is related to behavior considered dis-
ruptive, but without other clarifying language, an employee
would be left speculating as to Respondents’ true intention.
Such ambiguity must be resolved “against the promulgator of
the rule.”32
Respondents also point to Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330
NLRB 287 (1999), where the Board found that the employer
did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a rule prohibiting
“off-duty misconduct that materially and adversely affects job-
performance or tends to bring discredit to the Hotel.”33 Howev-
er, like in Ark Las Vegas Restaurant, the language in the em-
ployer’s work rule in Flamingo Hilton was sufficiently descrip-
tive to decipher what type of conduct the employer intended to
prohibit. That description is absent in this case. Rather, I find
Respondents’ rule is so overbroad and ambiguous that there
would be “uncertainty . . . whether any employee . . . would

29 Jt. Exh. 9, p. 19.
30 Ark Legas Vegas Restaurant, 333 NLRB 1284, 1291 (2001) (em-
phasis added).
31 Id. at 1291.
32 Norris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245 (1992).
33 Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287 (1999).
harbor uncertainty over the scope of the rule.”34 Accordingly, I
conclude that Respondents’ rule prohibiting conduct that dis-
credits it is unlawful as it would reasonably be construed as
touching on conduct protected by the Act.
With respect to second half of rule prohibiting “offensive”
conduct toward patients or fellow coworkers, Respondents
assert that this language is lawful, because, on its face, it cannot
reasonably be read or interpreted to interfere with Section 7
activity. Here, I agree.
The Board addressed a work rule similar to Respondents’ in
Fiesta Hotel Corp d/b/a Palms Hotel & Casino, 344 NLRB
1363 (2005).35 In Palms Hotel & Casino, the employer main-
tained a standard of conduct which prohibited employees from
engaging in “any type of conduct, which is or has the effect of
being injurious, offensive, threatening, intimidating, coercing,
or interfering with fellow Team Members or patrons.”36 Alt-
hough the ALJ found that the rule was facially violative of the
Act, the Board disagreed. In so doing, the Board determined
that the handbook prohibition against using threatening, offen-
sive, or abusive language was not inherent to Section 7 activi-
ties. As such, the mere fact that the rule could encompass or
reasonably be interpreted as barring Section 7 activity did not,
by itself, render the rule facially invalid. Thus, without evi-
dence that the rule either touched on, had been applied or in
tended to apply to situations that relate to Section 7 activity, the
Board held that an ambiguously worded rule barring threaten-
ing, offensive or abusive conduct will not, on its face, be
deemed unlawful.37
Like in Palms Hotel, in this case, I do not find that Respond-
ents’ rule prohibiting offensive conduct violates the Act. First, I
conclude that the language prohibiting conduct offensive to
patients is lawful due to Respondents’ legitimate business con-
cerns for patient care and maintaining a safe healing environ-
ment. Second, although the CGC argues that the language is
overbroad, ambiguous and fails to provide examples of the
prohibited versus acceptable conduct, the Board specifically
rejected this argument in Palms Hotel. In fact, like in Palms
Hotel, the CGC in this case failed to present any evidence that
Respondents applied or intended to apply the ambiguously
worded rule to conduct protected by Section 7. Without such
evidence, the fact that Respondents’ rule could touch on con-
duct related to the Act does not render the rule facially invalid.
Moreover, I decline to “engage in such speculation in order to
condemn as unlawful a facially neutral work rule that is neither
aimed at . . . adopted in response to. . . nor enforced against”
Section 7 activity.38 Although Respondents certainly could
(and should) have used more descriptive language to describe
the “offensive” conduct they sought to prohibit (i.e., like in
Palms Hotel, where Respondent prohibited “conduct . . .which
is or has the effect of being injurious, offensive, threatening,
intimidating, coercing, or interfering with . . .”), the fact that

34 Ark Las Vegas Restaurant, 333 NLRB at 1291.
35 Palms Hotel & Casino, 344 NLRB 1363 (2005).
36 Id. at 1367.
37 Id. at 1367–1368.
38 Palms Hotel & Casino, 344 NLRB at 1367.
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 13
Respondents’ rule does not specify what it deems offensive
does not automatically render the rule invalid.
The CGC also contends that Respondents have no business
justification for promulgating the rule. This argument is also
without merit. In fact, Respondents’ business justification is set
forth in the opening paragraph (i.e., patient care, hospital opera-
tions, and a safe healing environment). Indeed, as a hospital,
Respondents have special business concerns (i.e., patient care
and promoting a quiet, comfortable and healing environment)
that justify tipping the balance in favor of maintaining the code
of conduct.39 Simply put, the CGC has failed to demonstrate
that a reasonable employee reading Respondents’ rule prohibit-
ing offensive conduct would construe it to prohibit conduct
protected by the Act.
Accordingly, I find that Respondents’ rule prohibiting “dis-
crediting” conduct violates Section 8(a)(1) as alleged but rec-
ommend that the charges as to Respondents’ rule prohibiting
“offensive” conduct be dismissed.
2. “Negative” speech
Another of Respondents’ rules prohibit employees from
“speak[ing] negatively about a patient, co-worker, or the hospi-
tal.”40 Specifically, Respondents’ rule states:
Our patients place their trust in use [sp] during some of the
most vulnerable periods of their life. We have an obligation
based on this relationship to treat them with respect. The
community trusts us to care for their loved ones and negative
discussions about colleagues or the hospital erodes the
trust.”41
The CGC asserts that this rule is unlawful as it is overly broad
and ambiguous such that a reasonable employee would under-
stand that such language would prevent Section 7 activity.
However, Respondent counters, arguing that their rule is law-
ful, unambiguous and, when read in conjunction with the ex-
planatory and other language in its Service Excellence Expecta-
tions, would not reasonable be construed to restrict Section 7
activity.
The Board distinguishes work rules prohibiting false, pro-
fane, and vicious statements that lack malice (lawful)42, rules
prohibiting “abusive or threatening language” that seeks to
maintain basic civility (lawful in most instances)43 from rules
that restrict “negative speech.” In Roomstore, 357 NLRB 1690,
1691 at fn. 3 (2011), the Board found a rule prohibiting “any

39 See St. John’s Hospital, 222 NLRB 1150, 1150 (1976) (in review-
ing respondent hospital’s blanket no solicitation rule, the Board recog-
nized a presumption that a hospital’s work rule prohibitions may be
presumptively lawful, because the “primary function of a hospital is
patient care and that a tranquil atmosphere is essential to the carrying
out of that function. In order to provide this atmosphere, hospitals may
be justified in imposing somewhat more stringent prohibitions on solic-
itation than are generally permitted”).
40 Jt. Exh. 10, p. 8.
41 Jt. Exh. 10, p. 86.
42 See Amercan Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234 NLRB 1126, 1131
(1978)(false and inaccurate statements that are not malicious are pro-
tected).
43 See Palms Hotel & Casino, supra at fn. 35 and Lutheran Heritage,
343 NLRB 646, 647 (2004).
type of ‘negative energy or attitudes’” unlawful.44 Also, a rule
prohibiting “negative conversations” about managers was
found unlawful, as it had no clarifying language.45 Similarly, in
Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287 (1999), the Board
found unlawful a rule that prohibited loud, abusive, or foul
language, as it was so broad that it could be interpreted as bar-
ring lawful union organizing propaganda.46 The Board also
found unlawful an employer’s work rule that subjected em-
ployees to discipline for the “inability or unwillingness to work
harmoniously with other employees.”47 In that instance, the
employer neglected to define those terms; the prohibition was
merely one of a laundry list of rules and “was sufficiently im-
precise that it could encompass any disagreement or conflict
among employees including those related to Section 7.”48 In all
of these instances, the rules were ambiguous, and those ambi-
guities were resolved against the employer.
In this case, I find Respondents’ rule prohibiting negative
speech regarding patients lawful as it is clearly directed toward
Respondents’ legitimate business concerns of patient care and
providing a safe and healing environment. This aspect of the
rule cannot reasonably be read to prohibit protected activities.
In making this finding, I note the special circumstances afford-
ed hospitals where it may be appropriate to permit Respondents
greater latitude to restrict union activities in patient-care areas
in order to promote a “pleasing and comforting [environment]
where patients are principal facets of the day’s activities . . .
[such that patients and their families] need a restful, unclut-
tered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere, rather than one remind-
ful of the tensions of the marketplace in addition to the tensions
of the sick bed.”49 However, the remaining parts of Respond-
ents’ rule violate the Act.
Although not determinative, ALJ Susan Flynn’s decision in
Williams Beaumont Hospital is instructive on this issue. In that
case, Respondent promulgated several codes of conduct rules,
one of which prohibited “negative or disparaging comments
about the moral character or professional capabilities of an
employee or physician made to employees, physicians, patients,
or visitors.”50 Judge Flynn found this rule lawful because it was
unambiguous (as to the type of comments prohibited) and could
not be interpreted as prohibiting lawful discussions protected
by the Act since it was legitimately directed toward Respond-
ents’ duty to provide a safe and healing environment (as a hos-
pital).51
Unlike in Williams Beaumont Hospital, where the targeted
“negative” comments referred to the “. . . moral character or
professional capabilities” of employees, physicians or others,
Respondents’ rule is unlawful because it is ambiguous and ill-

44 357 NLRB 1690, 1691 fn. 3 (2011).
45 Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 NLRB 832, 836 (2005).
46 330 NLRB at 295.
47 2 Sisters Food Group, 357 NLRB 1816, 1817 (2011).
48 Id., slip op. at 2.
49 See St. John’s Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., 222 NLRB
1150 (1976), enf. in part 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977); see also,
NLRB v. Beth Israel Hospital, 437 U.S. 483, 509 (1978).
50 See William Beaumont Hospital, Case JD–04–14 (Jan. 30,
2014)(emphasis added).
51 Id.
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
defined even when read in conjunction with the explanatory
paragraph. Moreover, it fails to describe with any particularity
what type of “negative” comment is prohibited. Even the sen-
tence that “negative discussions about colleagues or the hospi-
tal erodes the trust” fails to clarify what type of conduct is pro-
hibited. Although Respondents have legitimate concerns re-
garding appropriate staff comments around patients and in
promulgating work rules to maintain a safe atmosphere, par-
ticularly in patient care areas, I find that this portion of the rule
so overbroad and ambiguous that it reasonably encompasses
lawful discussions or complaints that are protected by Section 7
of the Act.
The Board has found similar prohibitions on “negative
speech” unlawful. Specifically, in Hill & Dales General Hospi-
tal,52 the Board found respondent hospital’s rules prohibiting
“negative comments about fellow team members,” “engag[ing]
in or listen[ing] to negativity,” and requiring employees to
“represent [the hospital] in the community in a positive and
professional manner in every opportunity” overbroad, ambigu-
ous and unlawful. Similarly, in Claremont Resort & Spa, 344
NLRB 832 (2005), the Board found the employer’s rule prohib-
iting “negative conversations” about managers, without any
additional clarifications, unlawful, since such a rule would
“reasonably be construed by employees to bar them from dis-
cussing with their coworkers complaints about their managers
that affect working conditions, thereby causing [them] to re-
frain from engaging in protected activities.”53
Respondents attempt to distinguish their rule from “negative
speech,” arguing that their rule is geared toward prohibiting
“negative attitudes.” Respondents rely on the Board’s decision
in Cooper River of Boiling Springs, 360 NLRB No. 60, slip op
at 25 (2014) to support their contention.54 However, Cooper
River is inapposite. In Cooper River, the Board, through the
ALJ, distinguished rules prohibiting “negative conversations”
(unlawful) because they “cut to the very essence of activity
which the Act protects because all other actions contemplated
by the statutory scheme flow out of employees’ discussions
about their wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment . . .” from rules that restrict one from displaying a
“negative attitude” (lawful), which do not limit an employee’s
right to have conversations about certain subjects.55
Here, Respondents’ rule seeks to restrict “speech,” (i.e., “do
not speak negatively about . . . employees or the hospital”) and
as such, I find it akin to prohibiting negative “conversations”
which goes to the heart of an employee’s Section 7 activity.56
Moreover, Respondents’ rule is vague, overbroad (i.e., applies
whether in patient or non-patient care areas), ambiguous, and
contains no clarifying language such that it reasonably encom-
passes discussions that are otherwise protected by the Act.
Finally, Respondents assert that their rule is lawful due to the
special circumstances afforded hospitals.57 But here, Respond-

52 360 NLRB No. 70, slip op. at 1 (2014).
53 344 NLRB at 836 (2005).
54 360 NLRB No. 60, slip op at 25 (2014).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See generally St. John’s Hospital, 222 NLRB 1150, 1150 (1976)
(generally hospitals entitled to presumption that work rules prohibiting
ents set forth an interesting theory. According to Respondents,
under the Affordable Care Act, their Medicare payments are
directly related to their participation in federally sponsored
surveys to improve patient outcomes. These Federal surveys
have shown that patient outcomes are improved when hospitals
create a positive environment for employees and patients. As
such, Respondents contend that they must participate in these
surveys and implement their code of conduct rules that main-
tain a positive patient experience in order to receive Medicare
funding through the Affordable Care Act.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Respondents’ theory is cor-
rect, they fail to set out this explanation in their Handbook or
Service Expectation and cite no case law or Board precedent
that tips the balance in their favor based on these funding con-
siderations. Moreover, Respondents’ rule would be applicable
in patient and non-patient care areas; thus, the Board has not
given hospitals like Respondents’ latitude to implement such
broad work restrictions.58 While I agree that Respondents’ re-
strictions on speaking negatively about patients are justified,
the restrictions on speaking negatively about employees and/or
the hospital would reasonably be interpreted to include com-
ments/conversations protected by the Act.
Accordingly, I find Respondents’ rule that prohibits speaking
negatively about employees and the hospital violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. However, I recommend that the charges as to
Respondents’ rule prohibiting speaking negatively about pa-
tients be dismissed.
3. Prohibiting confidential information
Lastly, the CGC alleges that Respondents’ confidentiality
rule violates the Act, because it is overbroad, ambiguous, and,
as such, employees would reasonably interpret this provision as
precluding their discussion of wages and other terms and condi-
tions of employment. I agree.
The pertinent part of Respondents’ confidentiality policy
states:
In addition to disclosure of health information, employees
have an obligation to maintain the confidentiality of business-
related and employee information, which includes, but is not
limited to, all written, verbal and electronic information.59
“Business-related” and “employee” information is not defined.
Respondents argue that their confidentiality policy is lawful
because it is geared toward protecting patient information.60

solicitation and insignias in patient and non-patient care areas are law-
ful because such activity “might be unsettling to patients— particularly
those who are seriously ill and . . . need quiet and peace of mind”).
58 See Handicabs, Inc., 318 NLRB 890, 896 (1995), enfd. 95 F.3d
681 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997)(Board, agreeing
with ALJ, found the employer’s work rules unlawful which limited
employee speech in order to protect clients and vulnerable adults who
were unable to handle stress).
59 Jt. Exh. 9, p. 69.
60 See e.g. Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center v.
NLRB, 81 F.3d 209, 212–213 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (local hospital’s confi-
dentiality rule preventing employee from discussing patients’ medical
information and grievances “within earshot of patients” found lawful
due to importance of hospital’s interest in protecting patients from
disturbances).
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 15
But Respondents clearly intended to protect more than simply
patient information because they included the phrase “in addi-
tion to disclosure of health information” in their policy. In fact,
Respondents distinguish confidential patient information in the
preceding paragraph which states: “All patient health infor-
mation is to be maintained confidentially and the release of
such sensitive patient information must comply with all state
and federal laws as well as Facility policy(s).”61 So the lan-
guage in question was intended to protect something more.
The problem with Respondents’ confidentiality policy is that
the terms are ill-defined. I dealt with a similar confidentiality
provision in MUSE School CA, JD(SF)–43–14 2014 WL
4404737 (Sept. 8, 2014), affd. 2014 WL 5338539 (Oct. 20,
2014). In that case, the employer maintained a confidentiality
policy that required all employees, “both during and after the
time that [they] provid[e] services to MUSE, [to] maintain the
confidentiality of all Confidential Information.” Confidential
information included “. . . any material or information about
MUSE, MUSE employees, MUSE students, the families of
MUSE students, including but not limited to the Cameron Fam-
ily, and the Cameron Entities that is not generally known to the
general public or business competitors.” It also included “. . .
information, however acquired, relating to: MUSE’s financial
and business affairs, budgets, compensation paid to MUSE
owners and employees. . . ”
Because MUSE failed to clearly define the “prohibited con-
duct” it sought to restrict, and in fact, precluded, without limita-
tion, any discussion about any nonpublic information regarding
its founders, clients and employees, I determined that the rule,
as written, encompassed “various kinds of information about
employees, including their wages.” Accordingly, I found
MUSE’s ambiguous confidentiality rule unlawful because it
“could reasonably be construed to include a prohibition on
discussing employee wages” such that it tended to chill protect-
ed activity.
Like in MUSE School, Respondents’ confidentiality policy is
equally vague and ill-defined on the meaning of confidential
“business-related” or “employee” information. Such a broad,
undefined prohibition of confidential information, which in-
cludes information in written, verbal and electronic formats,
without clarification, violates the Act as it could reasonably
encompass discussion of and information related to employees’
wages and terms and conditions of employment.
Accordingly, I find that Respondents’ confidentiality policy
preventing disclosure of “business-related” and “employee”
information violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The ARC agreement
Next, I turn to the “more difficult question” left unanswered
by the Board in D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012).
That is—whether Respondents’ violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by requiring employees to sign their ARC Agreement that
prohibits all class and collective actions and requires employees
to individually arbitrate all employment related disputes but
allows employees to opt-out of the agreement altogether.
In D. R. Horton, the Board found that the employer violated

61 Id.
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it required its employees, as a
condition of employment, to sign an “agreement” that any and
all future employment claims against the company would be
determined on an individual basis by final and binding arbitra-
tion. The Board held that the mandatory arbitration “agree-
ment” was unlawful because: (1) it did not contain an exception
for unfair labor practice (ULP) allegations, and thus would
reasonably lead employees to believe that they could not file
charges with the Board; and (2) it required employees to waive
their substantive right under the NLRA to pursue concerted
(i.e., classwide or collective) legal action in any forum, arbitral
or judicial. The Board recently reaffirmed its holding and rea-
soning from Horton in Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No.
72 (2014).
However, in this case, Respondents’ arbitration agreement
allows employees to file ULPs with the Board and permits
them to opt out of arbitration entirely, thereby preserving their
right to pursue future claims in court on either an individual or
collective/class basis. Respondents argue that this is a signifi-
cant difference because, as found by numerous Federal and
State courts, it renders their arbitration procedure truly volun-
tary, and as such, lawful.
The CGC, on the other hand, argues that the ARC Agree-
ment is unlawful, despite the opt-out provisions, because: (1)
the agreement prevents employees from engaging in collec-
tive/concerted activities; (2) the agreement is effectively a
mandatory condition of employment for employees; and (3) the
opt-out provisions do not render the ARC Agreement “lawful,”
because those employees who opt out are denied the opportuni-
ty to engage in collective/class activities with those employees
who opt-in.
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments and cited
cases, in agreement with Respondents, I find Respondents’
ARC Agreement is voluntary, thus it is distinguishable from the
agreements decided in Murphy Oil and D. R. Horton. In Mur-
phy Oil and D. R. Horton, the Board held unlawful an employ-
er’s mandatory arbitration program that requires, as a condition
of employment, individual arbitration of all employment related
claims and precludes class/collective actions of those claims
without the ability to opt out of the program. However, here,
because there is a written opt-out provision in Respondents’
Agreement, I find that Respondents’ ARC Agreement is volun-
tary. In fact, Respondents’ policy falls “squarely within foot-
note 28 of the Board’s decision in D. R. Horton” where the
Board left open:
[W]hether, if arbitration is mutually beneficial means of dis-
pute resolution, an employer can enter into an agreement that
is not a condition of employment with an individual employee
to resolve either a particular dispute or all potential employ-
ment disputes through non-class arbitration rather than litiga-
tion in court.62
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in Johnmohammadi v. Blooming-
dales, Inc., found a similar arbitration agreement with a written
opt-out clause lawful, reasoning that:
If [an employee] wanted to retain [the right to file a class ac-

62 D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 at fn. 28, see also R. Br. at 22.
16 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion] nothing stopped [him or her] from opting out of the arbi-
tration agreement. [The employer] merely offered [the em-
ployee] a choice: resolve future employment-related disputes
in court, in which case s/he would be free to pursue [their]
claims on a collective basis; or resolve such disputes through
arbitration, in which case [they] would be limited to pursuing
[their] claims on an individual basis. In the absence of any co-
ercion influencing the decision, we fail to see how asking em-
ployees to choose between those two options can be viewed
as interfering with or restraining their right to do anything.63
I find Respondents’ Agreement almost identical to the one
ruled lawful in Johnmohammadi.
The CGC argues that Respondents’ Agreement, on its face,
“binds employees to an irrevocable waiver of prospective Sec-
tion 7 rights . . . [which] precludes [them] from making [a
choice] as to . . . future claim[s].” In essence, the CGC contends
that Respondents’ Agreement effectively does not give em-
ployees a choice to waive their Section 7 rights. But it does.
Indeed, the language in the ARC Agreement clearly and une-
quivocally allows the employee to choose to participate in the
class action waiver or opt out. Thus, as the Ninth Circuit found,
asking employees to choose between participation in the class
action waiver/arbitration program or opting out of it does not
interfere with or restrain an employee’s Section 7 rights.64
Simarily, as to the CGC’s argument that Respondents’
Agreement is a mandatory condition of employment, particular-
ly for those who do not “affirmatively extricate [themselves]
from the policy,”65 again, I disagree. Nor does the very act of
requiring employees to decide to opt in or out render the
Agreement mandatory. Here, the CGC borrows from ALJ Wil-
liam Cates’ reasoning in Pama Management, JD(ATL)–31–13
2013 WL 6384517 (2013). Although not precedent, Judge
Cates found that the company’s arbitration program that con-
tained an opt-out provision:
. . . has a reasonable tendency to chill employees from exer-
cising their statutory rights because they are required to take
an affirmative action simply to preserve Section 7 rights they
already have. State differently, the . . . waiver unlawfully
compels, as a condition of employment, employees to affirm-
atively act (check an “opt-out” box at the end of a long para-
graph, with little explanation, as to its far reaching effects) in
order to maintain rights they already have under Section 7 . . .
Judge Cates also found the company’s waiver invalid, because
it imposed “a waiver of Section 7 rights, or to ‘opt-out’ at a
time when the employees are unlikely to have an awareness of
employment issues that may now, or in the future, be best ad-
dressed by collective or class action.”
However, ALJ Jeffrey Wedekind found otherwise in Bloom-
ingdale’s Inc., JD(SF)–29–13 2013 WL 3225945 (June 25,
2013). Again, while not precedent, Judge Wedekind found, and
I adopt his rationale, Bloomingdale’s individual arbitration

63 Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s Inc., 755 F.3d at 1076 (effec-
tively affirming ALJ Jeffrey Wedekind’s decision in Bloomingdales,
Inc., JD(SF) –29–13 2013 WL 3225945 (Jun. 25, 2013))
64 Johnmohammadi, 755 F.3d at 1076.
65 See GC Br. at 43.
program, such as the one here, voluntary, because it adequately
notified employees about the class action ban, and gave em-
ployees, particularly, new hires, 30 days in which to learn more
about the “benefits and limitations” of arbitration and opt in or
out. Judge Wedekind also found no allegation or record evi-
dence that Bloomingdales threatened employees with reprisals
or retaliated against them for opting out.
Like in Bloomingdales, I am persuaded that Respondents in
this case adequately notified employees in writing about the
class action ban; gave employees a 30-day window to opt in or
out of the program; and advised all employees to consult with
an attorney if necessary for further explanation of the terms of
the agreement. Moreover, record evidence reveals CP Morris
opted out of the program and was never retaliated against for
doing so. I find no evidence, and the CGC has not alleged, that
Respondents have threatened any employees with reprisals for
opting out of the program.
As to the CGC’s argument that Respondents’ Agreement re-
stricts employees who opt out of the program from engaging in
concerted activity (i.e., pursuing collective/class actions) with
those who opted into the program, here again, I find it does not.
What it does do is require employees to choose whether to par-
ticipate in the program. While those who “opt-in” are bound by
the Agreement, and thus, are prohibited from filing
class/collective actions (i.e., engaging in concerted activity), the
important factor which the CGC ignores is—those employees
chose to forego that right. Although the CGC argues that the
voluntariness of the Agreement “misses the point,” the fact that
employees are allowed to opt out of the program is the point
that distinguishes Respondents’ Agreement from those found
unlawful in Horton and Murphy Oil.”66
The CGC further contends that Respondents’ opt-out proce-
dure is onerous and unlawfully burdens employees. However, a
one-time requirement that employees must either notify Re-
spondents in writing (in their own words) that they intend to opt
out of the arbitration program or sign and deliver a preprinted
form of their intent to opt out, seems a minimal administrative
burden, and no authority is cited holding otherwise. Similarly,
the ARC Agreement, and particularly the opt-out provision, is
not so burdened with legalese that employees, including new
employees, cannot read and understand their right to choose
between participation and opting out. Moreover, if they find the
language difficult, employees are advised to consult an attor-
ney. I further find that the 30-day notice to opt out is a suffi-
cient period of time upon which an employee can determine
whether s/he intends to be subject to the Agreement.67
Alternatively, the CGC contends that Respondents’ class ac-

66 Johnmohammadi, 755 F.3d at 1076.
67 See e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199-
2000 (9th Cir. 2002) (mandatory arbitration agreement was not proce-
durally unconscionable because it only allowed employees to opt out
during the first 30 days of employment), Bloomingdales, Inc., JD(SF)-
29–13 2013 WL 3225945 (Jun. 25, 2013) (ALJ Jeffrey Wedekind held
employer’s 30-day opt out procedure sufficient to render employer’s
arbitration program voluntary), see also, Nielsen v. Machinists Local
2569, 94 F.3d 1107, 1116 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S.Ct. 1426
(1997) (“life is full of deadlines, and [there is] nothing particularly
onerous about this one.”)
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 17
tion waiver unlawfully burdens employees by requiring them to
prospectively trade away their statutory right to engage in col-
lective or class actions, including litigation in any forum. How-
ever, I am again persuaded by Judge Wedekind’s rationale
when he spoke on why this argument has little merit. When
faced with a similar argument by the General Counsel, Judge
Wedekind explained that, if the Board intended to find arbitra-
tion agreements unlawful because they trade away substantive
Section 7 rights even in the face of an opt-out clause, then
[T]he Board’s comment in Horton that voluntary agreements
presented a “more difficult question” would have to be con-
sidered gratuitous. What makes the issue here “more difficult”
is that there is no “emphatic federal policy” in favor of em-
ployees getting severance pay, a raise, or a parking space . . .
[However], there is . . . such a policy in favor of arbitrating
disputes. In short, arbitration is not just any benefit; it is a fed-
erally favored and supported benefit. The question, therefore,
is whether it is a benefit of such overriding Federal im-
portance that the Board must or should look away when em-
ployees voluntarily enter into mandatory arbitration agree-
ments, even if they are conditioned on employees completely
and irrevocably relinquishing their right under the NLRA to
engage in collective legal action against their employer.”
Like the General Counsel in Bloomingdales, the CGC pro-
vides no real answer to this question. Rather, she simply con-
tends that concerted activity is a substantive right and Board
precedent and Supreme Court opinions indicate that arbitration
agreements may not require a party to forgo such rights. How-
ever, again, if the answer were so straightforward, there would
be nothing “more difficult” about this case than D. R. Horton.
Finally, because I have determined that Respondents’ ARC
Agreement is voluntary, and thus lawful under the Act, it is
unnecessary to address the CGC’s remaining arguments con-
cerning the Agreement’s savings clause or Respondents’ af-
firmative defenses.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, I find that the
CGC has failed to carry the burden of proof and/or persuasion
regarding Respondents’ ARC Agreement, and I am persuaded
that Respondents did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining their Agreement. For that reason, I recommend that
the charges as to Respondents’ ARC Agreement be dismissed.
B. The Alvarez-Hyman Allegations
Lastly, the CGC alleges that Respondents’ “English-only”
rule violates Section 8(a)(1), because it is overbroad and, thus,
would reasonably chill employees from engaging in Section 7
activity.
Respondents rule requires all employees to speak and com-
municate only in English “when conducting business with each
other,” “when patients or customers are present or in close
proximity,” and “while on duty between staff, patients, visitors
[and/or] customers . . . unless interpretation or translation is
requested or required.” The CGC argues that Respondents’ rule
is so overbroad, it inhibits employees, particularly non-native
English speaking employees, from being able to freely com-
municate (in their native language) about working conditions
and/or other terms and conditions of employment.
However, Respondents contend that their English-only rule
is lawful relying on the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission’s (EEOC) guidance that allows for English-only rules
if justified by business necessity.68 While not binding on the
Board, EEOC’s guidance provides that a rule prohibiting em-
ployees, at all times in the workplace, from speaking their pri-
mary language or the language they speak most comfortably
“disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities be-
cause of [their] national origin.”69 Accordingly, EEOC will
presume that such a rule, like the one in this case, violates Title
VII, unless the employer can show that requiring employees to
speak only in English at certain times is justified by business
necessity.70 An English only rule is justified by business neces-
sity if it is necessary for the employer to operate safely or effi-
ciently.71 Situations where business necessity will justify an
English-only rule include those: (1) “in which business necessi-
ty would justify an English-only rule,” (2) where “workers
must speak a common language to promote safety,” (3) where
cooperative work assignments require an English-only rule to
promote efficiency, or (4) “to enable a supervisor who only
speaks English to monitor the performance of an employee
whose job duties require communication with coworkers or
customers.”72
Before delving into Respondents’ English only rule, I note
two important points. First, both parties admit that the Board
has not addressed this issue in any of its decisions; thus, it is an
issue of first impression.
Second, the Board disfavors adopting precedent from other
administrative tribunals unless the Board finds it is materially
related to the goals and purposes of the NLRA.73 Although I
find EEOC guidance instructive, I will follow Board precedent
and analyze Respondents’ English-only rule under the doctrine
set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia and its proge-
ny.74 That is—whether Respondents’ English only rule would
reasonably tend to chill employees from exercising their Sec-
tion 7 rights. Under this standard, Respondents’ English-only
rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity. Nor is there
any evidence that the rule was promulgated in response to un-
ion activity. Thus, if the rule is unlawful, employees must rea-
sonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity.
In this case, I conclude that employees would reasonably
construe Respondents’ English-only rule to restrict them from
engaging in concerted activity. To that end, I find Respondents’
rule akin to rules that infringe upon an employee’s right to en-
gage in “negative speech” and “negative conversations.” Be-

68 See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b); EEOC Compliance Manual Section 13,
“National Origin Discrimination,” No. 915.003 (Compliance Manual
on National Origin Discrimination), at 13–22 (Dec. 2, 2002).
69 29 C.F.R. §1606.7(a).
70 Id. § 1606.7(b).
71 EEOC Compliance Manual, at 13–22.
72 Id. at 13–23.
73 See HTH Corporation, Pacific Beach Corp., and KOA Manage-
ment, LLC, 361 NLRB No. 65 (Board adopts front pay remedies from
precedent under Title VII because it is materially similar to afford make
whole relief under the NLRA.)
74 343 NLRB 646 (2004); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 828
(1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
18 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cause Respondents’ English-only rule is vague as to time and
location (i.e., must use English in patient and non-patient areas,
in patient access areas, and between employees, staff, custom-
ers, patients and visitors), it infringes on an employee’s ability
to freely discuss and communicate about work conditions, wag-
es and other terms and conditions of employment. As such, I
find that Respondents’ language restrictions would prohibit
speech that “cut(s) to the very essence of activity which the Act
protects because all other actions contemplated by the statutory
scheme flow out of employees’ discussions about their wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment . . .”75
Even assuming EEOC’s standard is applicable in this case, I
find Respondents’ rule is not justified by business necessity.
Here, Respondents argue that their rule is justified in order to
maintain hospital efficiency and minimize disruption in patient
care by employees speaking in languages other than English.
This argument is similar to the Board’s special circumstances
presumption afforded hospitals when their work rules restrict
union activity.76 However, Respondents’ English-only rule goes
far beyond patient-care areas, where courts have afforded hos-
pitals latitude in restricting Section 7 rights. Instead, Respond-
ents’ rule requires employees to speak only English while on
duty, between themselves, staff, customers, visitors, and in non-
patient areas.
Respondents also contend that their English-only provision
specifically allows “[e]mployees who speak languages other
than English [to] speak to each other in their language on their
own time, i.e., before and after their designated work schedule
and on breaks and lunch.”77 As such, Respondents compare
their English-only rule to “presumptively lawful” no-
solicitation rules which allow employers to restrict union relat-
ed solicitation except during non-work hours (i.e., such as dur-
ing breaks and before and after work). Respondents rely on the
Board’s decision in St. John’s Hospital.78
In St. John’s Hospital, the Board, agreeing with the ALJ,
found that, while the hospital’s no solicitation rule may be law-
ful in patient care areas even during nonworking time, (due to
its need to have patients “free of the disruption which might
result from solicitation and distribution of literature in any pub-
lic area”), its “broad [no-solicitation] restrictions . . . [were] not
justified . . , insofar as they apply to other areas.” Specifically,
regarding the hospital’s restrictions in visitor access areas (oth-
er than those involved in patient care), the Board determined
that the “possibility of any disruption in patient care resulting
from solicitation or distribution of literature was remote.”79 The
Board further determined that the hospital’s no-solication rule
in “patient access areas such as cafeterias, lounges, and the
like” was unlawful particularly since the Board could “not per-

75 Id.
76 See generally St. John’s Hospital, 222 NLRB 1150, 1150 (1976)
(generally hospitals entitled to presumption that work rules prohibiting
solicitation and insignias in patient and non-patient care areas are law-
ful because such activity “might be unsettling to patients—particularly
those who are seriously ill and…need quiet and peace of mind”).
77 Jt. Exh. 11, p. 102.
78 See St. John’s Hospital, 222 NLRB 1150 (1976).
79 Id.
ceive how patients would be affected adversely by such activi-
ties.” 80
Like the Board found in St. John’s Hospital, I fail to see how
patient care would be disrupted by Respondents restricting
employees to speaking only English in non-patient care areas
and even between employees, staff, visitors, and customers,
particularly if a non-native English-speaking employee desires
to converse with another non-native English speaking employee
about their respective working conditions. More importantly,
communication, unlike solicitation and distribution, is different.
Rather, requiring employees to speak only English infringes on
an employee’s ability to exercise their Section 7 rights since
concerted activity hinges upon effectively communicating with
other employees about working conditions, wages and/or terms
and conditions of employment. Thus, employees cannot be
restricted from communicating in their native language in
nonpatient and patient access areas where patient disruption
would be minimized. In this case, Respondents’ language re-
strictions are not sufficiently limited in time and location, and
as such, employees, especially non-native English speaking
employees, would reasonably believe that they could not en-
gage in concerted activity.
Accordingly, I find that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1)
by maintaining an unlawful English-only rule to the extent it
requires employees to speak and communicate only in English
in all areas to which patients and visitors have access, other
than immediate patient care areas.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents Valley Health System LLC d/b/a Spring
Valley Hospital Medical Center and Centennial Hills Hospital
Medical Center and Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center
and Valley Hospital Medical Center and Summerlin Hospital
Medical Center LLC d/b/a Summerlin Hospital Medical Center
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and is a health care institu-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act.
2. Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by:
(a) Promulgating, maintaining and/or enforcing an ambigu-
ous and overly broad rule that prohibits conduct which discred-
its Respondents.
(b) Promulgating, maintaining and/or enforcing an ambigu-
ous and overly broad rule that prohibits employees from speak-
ing negatively about employees and Respondents.
(c) Promulgating, maintaining, and/or enforcing an ambigu-
ous and overly broad confidentiality rule that prevents disclo-
sure of “business-related” and “employee” information.
(d) Promulgating, maintaining and/or enforcing an overly
broad English-only rule to the extent it requires employees to
speak and communicate only in English in all areas other than
immediate patient care areas.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find that the Respondents must be ordered to

80 Id.
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 19
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended81
ORDER
Respondents, Valley Health System LLC d/b/a Spring Val-
ley Hospital Medical Center and Centennial Hills Hospital
Medical Center and Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center
and Valley Hospital Medical Center and Summerlin Hospital
Medical Center LLC d/b/a Summerlin Hospital Medical Center,
Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Promulgating, maintaining and/or enforcing overly broad
and ambiguous work rules that prohibit or may reasonably be
read to prohibit employees from engaging in conduct that may
discredit Respondent.
(b) Promulgating, maintaining, and/or enforcing overly
broad and ambiguous work rules that employees could reason-
ably understand would prohibit them from participating in con-
certed activity by speaking negatively about other employees or
Respondents.
(c) Promulgating, maintaining, and/or enforcing overly broad
and ambiguous provisions in its confidentiality policy that em-
ployees could reasonably interpret to prohibit them from exer-
cising their Section 7 rights if they disclose of “business-
related” and “employee” information.
(d) Promulgating, maintaining, and/or enforcing an overly
broad English-only rule that prohibit or may reasonably be read
to prohibit employees from engaging in concerted activity by
requiring employees to speak and communicate only in English
while on duty, with other employees, staff, customers and visi-
tors, and in all work and patient access areas.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind or revise their Employee Handbook and Service
Excellence Expectations to remove any language that prohibits
or may be read to prohibit employees from engaging in conduct
that may discredit Respondents;
(b) Rescind or revise their Employee Handbook and Service
Excellence Expectations to remove any language that prohibits
or may be read to prohibit employees from speaking negatively
about other employees or Respondents;
(c) Rescind or revise their Employee Handbook and Service
Excellence Expectations to remove any language that prohibits
or may be read to prohibit employees from disclosing “busi-
ness-related” and “employee information;
(d) Rescind or revise their Employee Handbook and Service
Excellence Expectations to remove any language that requires

81 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
employees to speak and/or communicate only in English while
on duty, with other employees, staff, customers and visitors,
and in all work and patient access areas;
(e) Furnish, publish and/or distribute to all current employees
a new Employee Handbook, Service Excellence Expectations
and confidentiality agreement that: (1) does not contain the
unlawful provisions noted in paragraph (a)-(d) above; (2) ad-
vises employees that the unlawful provisions above have been
rescinded; or (3) provides lawful language that describes, with
specificity, which types of conduct or communication is pro-
scribed by the Handbook/Agreement and the con-
duct/communication that is protected by the Act. Respondents
also may comply with this aspect of my Order by either: (i)
rescinding the unlawful provisions noted in paragraphs (a)–(d)
above and republishing the new rules without the unlawful
language; (ii) supplying employees at all of their Nevada facili-
ties with an insert to the Handbook and Service Excellence
Expectations stating that the unlawful rules have been rescind-
ed; or (iii) supplying employees with new and lawfully worded
rules on adhesive backing that will cover the unlawful rules
until Respondents republish new rules without the unlawful
provisions;
(f) Notify all current and former employees in writing that
the relevant provisions detailed in paragraphs (a)-(d) above,
contained in the Employee Handbook and Service Excellence
Expectations, that were promulgated and/or distributed since
September 3, 2013, have been rescinded, are void and that Re-
spondents will not prohibit employees from engaging in pro-
tected concerted activity as described in paragraphs (a)-(d)
above;
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all fa-
cilities, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix”82 in
both English and Spanish. Copies of the notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 28, after being
signed by the Respondents’ authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondents and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical post-
ing of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electroni-
cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondents custom-
arily communicate with their employees and former employees
by such means. Respondents also shall duplicate and mail, at
their expense, a copy of the notice to all former employees who
were affected by Respondents’ unlawful conduct. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the notic-
es are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondents have gone out of business or closed the facility
(ies) involved in these proceedings, Respondents shall duplicate
and mail, at their expense, a copy of the notice to all current

82 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
20 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since January 1, 2011.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondents have taken to comply.
Dated: Washington, D.C. March 18, 2015
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from engaging in conduct which
could be viewed as discrediting us.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from speaking negatively about us
or other employees.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad confidentialty rule that prohibits you from disclosing
“business-related” or “employee” information.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that requires you to speak and/or communicate only
in English while on duty, between your fellow employees, staff,
customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access areas.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL notify you in writing that the unlawful provisions in
our Employee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
that was implemented since September 3, 2013, are void and
rescinded and/or modified and will not be enforced to prohibit
you from engaging in protected concerted activity by: (1) en-
gaging in conduct which could be viewed as discrediting Re-
spondent, (2) speaking negatively about other employees or
Respondent, (3) disclosing “business-related” or “employee”
information and/or (4) requiring you to speak and communicate
only in English while on duty, between your fellow employees,
staff, customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access
areas.
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC D/B/A SPRING VALLEY
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from engaging in conduct which
could be viewed as discrediting us.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from speaking negatively about us
or other employees.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad confidentialty rule that prohibits you from disclosing
“business-related” or “employee” information.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that requires you to speak and/or communicate only
in English while on duty, between your fellow employees, staff,
customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access areas.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL notify you in writing that the unlawful provisions in
our Employee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
that was implemented since September 3, 2013, are void and
rescinded and/or modified and will not be enforced to prohibit
you from engaging in protected concerted activity by: (1) en-
gaging in conduct which could be viewed as discrediting Re-
spondent, (2) speaking negatively about other employees or
VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC 21
Respondent, (3) disclosing “business-related” or “employee”
information and/or (4) requiring you to speak and communicate
only in English while on duty, between your fellow employees,
staff, customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access
areas.
CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from engaging in conduct which
could be viewed as discrediting us.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from speaking negatively about us
or other employees.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad confidentialty rule that prohibits you from disclosing
“business-related” or “employee” information.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that requires you to speak and/or communicate only
in English while on duty, between your fellow employees, staff,
customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access areas.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL notify you in writing that the unlawful provisions in
our Employee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
that was implemented since September 3, 2013 are void and
rescinded and/or modified and will not be enforced to prohibit
you from engaging in protected concerted activity by: (1) en-
gaging in conduct which could be viewed as discrediting Re-
spondent, (2) speaking negatively about other employees or
Respondent, (3) disclosing “business-related” or “employee”
information and/or (4) requiring you to speak and communicate
only in English while on duty, between your fellow employees,
staff, customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access
areas.
DESSERT SPRINGS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX D
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from engaging in conduct which
could be viewed as discrediting us.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from speaking negatively about us
or other employees.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad confidentialty rule that prohibits you from disclosing
“business-related” or “employee” information.
22 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that requires you to speak and/or communicate only
in English while on duty, between your fellow employees, staff,
customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access areas.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL notify you in writing that the unlawful provisions in
our Employee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
that was implemented since September 3, 2013, are void and
rescinded and/or modified and will not be enforced to prohibit
you from engaging in protected concerted activity by: (1) en-
gaging in conduct which could be viewed as discrediting Re-
spondent, (2) speaking negatively about other employees or
Respondent, (3) disclosing “business-related” or “employee”
information and/or (4) requiring you to speak and communicate
only in English while on duty, between your fellow employees,
staff, customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access
areas.
VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX E
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from engaging in conduct which
could be viewed as discrediting us.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that prohibits you from speaking negatively about us
or other employees.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad confidentialty rule that prohibits you from disclosing
“business-related” or “employee” information.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain or enforce an overly
broad rule that requires you to speak and/or communicate only
in English while on duty, between your fellow employees, staff,
customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access areas.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL notify you in writing that the unlawful provisions in
our Employee Handbook and Service Excellence Expectations
that was implemented since September 3, 2013, are void and
rescinded and/or modified and will not be enforced to prohibit
you from engaging in protected concerted activity by: (1) en-
gaging in conduct which could be viewed as discrediting Re-
spondent, (2) speaking negatively about other employees or
Respondent, (3) disclosing “business-related” or “employee”
information and/or (4) requiring you to speak and communicate
only in English while on duty, between your fellow employees,
staff, customers and visitors, and in all work and patient access
areas.
SUMMERLIN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER LLC D/B/A
SUMMERLIN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28–CA–123611 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.