UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 18, 2018

366 NLRB No. 111 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 111
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. and Unión De
Tronquistas De PR, Local 901, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Cases 12–CA–
159257 and 12–CA–168819
June 18, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS PEARCE, MCFERRAN, AND KAPLAN
On April 13, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Michael
A. Rosas issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
Respondent filed exceptions with supporting argument.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.1
For the reasons explained below, we reverse the
judge’s dismissal of the allegation that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by condition-
ing bargaining on the Union’s acceptance of negotiation
ground rules, including one that required proposals to be
submitted in writing and in English. We also find that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by failing to submit counterproposals. Finally, we
adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to bargain in
good faith, but we find that the unlawful conduct began
in August 2015, not December 2015, as found by the
judge.
I. FACTS
On July 29, 2014, the Board certified the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative for ap-
proximately 15 employees who work at the Respondent’s
facility in Caguas, Puerto Rico. On December 16, 2014,
the Union sent a letter to Ilka Ramón, the Respondent’s
Human Resources Director in Puerto Rico, requesting
bargaining dates. On December 19, 2014, the Respond-
ent’s counsel, José Silva Cofresí, replied that the Re-
spondent would propose bargaining dates once it re-
ceived the Union’s initial proposal. On February 18,
2015,2 Argenis Carrillo, a union representative, submit-
ted the Union’s initial 67-page proposal in Spanish to the

1 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to our
findings and amended remedy, and we shall substitute a new notice to
conform to the Order as modified.
2 All subsequent dates are in 2015 unless otherwise noted.
Respondent with a letter stating that he was available to
bargain the following week. The parties met for an ini-
tial bargaining session on April 9,3 where the Respondent
presented the Union with proposed ground rules for ne-
gotiations that stated, in relevant part, “3. The proposals
and counterproposals will be made in writing, in Eng-
lish.” The proposed ground rules were in English, but all
other communications between the parties—including all
the parties’ written correspondence, the Union’s initial
written proposal, the parties’ March negotiations over
layoffs, the bargaining session on April 9, and all subse-
quent bargaining sessions—were in Spanish.
Pursuant to its proposed ground rule 3, the Respondent
asked the Union at the April 9 session to translate its
initial proposal into English. The Union did not agree to
the ground rule and rejected the Respondent’s request.
The parties discussed the Union’s proposal but did not
reach agreement on any of the provisions.
On July 15, the parties met for a second bargaining
session. According to Union Representative Carrillo’s
uncontradicted testimony, the Union offered to submit
any future counterproposals in English but again rejected
the Respondent’s request to translate its initial proposal.4
The Respondent replied that it would pay half the cost,
but the Union rejected this offer. At the July 15 meeting
and again on July 24, the parties discussed, in Spanish,
the Union’s initial proposal but did not reach agreement
on any provisions. Also on July 15, Carillo requested
certain bargaining information that Silva Cofresí provid-
ed the next day. At the July 24 meeting, the Respondent
made a number of nonsubstantive oral counterproposals;
the record indicates these were limited almost exclusive-
ly to word choice and paragraph organization. In addi-
tion, the Respondent insisted that the Union pay half the
cost of translating its initial proposal as a “condition for
the negotiations to continue.” The Union again refused.
On August 6, Carrillo requested dates for further bar-
gaining. Silva Cofresí replied on August 7, stating that
the Respondent required proposals in English because
“these have to be verified by people in the U.S. who
speak English [and]… as part of the negotiating team,
people from the U.S. who only speak English may come
down,” and reiterated the Respondent’s offer to pay half

3 The parties met on March 26 and bargained over the effects of
layoffs resulting from the Respondent’s loss of a client, but they did not
negotiate over the initial contract at that time.
4 The judge’s finding that it is “not disputed…[that] the Union was
aware of the fact that the Company and two other Teamsters-affiliated
locals in Puerto Rico exchange written CBA proposals and counterpro-
posals in English” is not supported by the record. According to Carril-
lo’s testimony, he knew only that the other locals’ final agreements
were in English and that the parties split the cost of translation for those
final agreements.
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the cost. On September 2, the Union filed an unfair labor
practice charge alleging that the Respondent failed to
bargain in good faith by conditioning continued bargain-
ing on the Union’s translating its initial proposal into
English. There was no further communication between
the parties until November 19, when Silva Cofresí sent a
letter to Carrillo about resuming negotiations. Carrillo
replied November 20, asking whether the Respondent’s
offer meant it had abandoned its demand that the Union
translate its original proposal and explaining that the only
reason the Union had stopped bargaining was the Re-
spondent’s insistence on that demand.5
On December 8, with the issue of translation still unre-
solved, Carrillo wrote to Silva Cofresí to request bargain-
ing dates. Silva Cofresí told Carrillo that the Respondent
would not be able to meet during December because it
was the Respondent’s “high season,” and that he would
get back to Carrillo once it was over. Not having heard
from the Respondent, Carrillo called Silva Cofresí 3 to 4
weeks later to schedule bargaining sessions. Silva
Cofresí said he could not commit to any dates because
Human Resources Director Ramón was on vacation, but
that he would agree to dates once she was back.
On January 27,6 Carrillo wrote to Silva Cofresí to in-
quire again about bargaining sessions and to ask that the
Respondent not condition bargaining on translation of
the Union’s initial proposal. Silva Cofresí replied that he
thought they had agreed to wait for a decision on the
Board charge before continuing negotiations, but the
Union had not agreed to do so.7 On February 5, Silva
Cofresí wrote to Carrillo and offered to resume negotia-
tions on February 24, but reiterated the Respondent’s
demand that the Union pay half the cost of translating the
initial proposal. On February 8, Carrillo accepted the
proposed date, rejected the Respondent’s demand to pay
for translating the initial proposal, repeated his offer to
exchange any further proposals in English, and offered to
pay half the cost of translating a final agreement.8
On February 23, Silva Cofresí texted Carrillo that the
February 24 meeting was off because Carrillo had not
previously confirmed his availability, so Ramón was not

5 The record does not support the judge’s description of Carrillo’s
response as stating that the “only reason why the negotiations had been
delayed” was because of “the Board charges filed by the Company.”
The Respondent did not file any Board charges and the Union made
clear that it had stopped bargaining because the Respondent insisted on
the translation.
6 All subsequent dates are in 2016 unless otherwise noted.
7 The judge credited Carrillo’s undisputed testimony on this point.
8 Contrary to the judge’s finding, this was not the first time the Un-
ion offered to submit counterproposals in English, as the record shows
that Carrillo first proposed this during the July 15, 2015 bargaining
session.
available to attend. Carrillo replied that he had con-
firmed by email on February 8. On February 24, Silva
Cofresí emailed Carrillo to tell him that the Respondent
would next be available for bargaining March 22 or 23.
No further bargaining sessions were scheduled.
II. JUDGE’S DECISION
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as of December 10, 2015, by
delaying further bargaining. The judge did not expressly
rule on the complaint allegation that the Respondent also
violated the Act by failing to submit counterproposals.
Finally, he dismissed the allegation that the Respondent
violated the Act by conditioning negotiations on a per-
missive subject of bargaining. Specifically, the judge,
relying on Call, Burnup, and Sims, Inc.,9 found that
translation of the Union’s initial proposal was a mandato-
ry subject of bargaining. He further found that the Re-
spondent engaged in good-faith bargaining by offering to
pay half the cost of translating the initial proposal. Ac-
cordingly, the judge found that the Union’s refusal to
agree to the Respondent’s “reasonable accommodation”
of splitting the translation cost for the initial proposal
relieved the Respondent of responsibility for any delay in
bargaining until December 10, 2015, when it began to
engage in dilatory tactics.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Conditioning Bargaining on Acceptance of
Negotiation Ground Rules
As a general proposition, it is a per se violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) for either party to hold collective
bargaining hostage to unilaterally imposed preconditions
on negotiations. Regency House of Wallingford, Inc.,
356 NLRB 563, 576–577 (2011). See also Vanguard
Fire & Supply Co., Inc., 345 NLRB 1016, 1043 (2005)
(“Neither an employer nor a union can wiggle out of this
duty [to bargain] by insisting on preconditions”), enfd.
468 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 2006).
In dismissing the allegation that the Respondent un-
lawfully insisted on translation of the Union’s initial pro-
posal, the judge relied on Call, Burnup, and Sims, supra,
159 NLRB at 1661–1662, in which the Board found that
an employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by bargain-
ing in bad faith. The Board relied on the employer’s
“overall course of conduct,” which included insisting that
the parties negotiate only in English, despite the Union’s
offer to split the cost of a translator where translation was
necessary for bargaining. But that case does not support
the judge’s dismissal of the allegation here that it was
unlawful for the Respondent to insist that the Union

9 159 NLRB 1661 (1966), enfd. 393 F.2d 412 (1st Cir. 1968).
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC. 3
translate its initial contract proposal, for the following
reasons.
First, the record in this case does not show that transla-
tion was necessary for bargaining to continue between
the Respondent and the Union. If anything, the record
establishes the opposite because the parties at the bar-
gaining table communicated almost exclusively in Span-
ish: the Respondent’s December 19, 2014 request that
the Union submit an initial contract proposal was in
Spanish; in March 2015, the parties bargained over the
effects of layoffs in Spanish, and they discussed the Un-
ion’s initial Spanish-language contract proposal in Span-
ish. Nonetheless, on April 9, 2015, the Respondent pro-
posed a ground rule requiring that all proposals and
counterproposals be in English. On July 15, the Union
agreed to submit all subsequent proposals in English, but
on that date and the following session on July 24, the
Respondent conditioned future bargaining on translation
of the Union’s initial Spanish-language proposal.
Second, contrary to the judge’s finding here, the Board
in Call, Burnup, and Sims did not find that translation
was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. In fact, be-
cause negotiation ground rules do not relate to wages,
hours or other terms and conditions of employment, they
are not a mandatory subject of bargaining. Sheet Metal
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 319 NLRB 668, 670 (1995). The
judge’s finding that the Respondent’s translation request
was a mandatory subject of bargaining cannot be recon-
ciled with this well-established Board precedent, and we
do not adopt that finding.10

10 Member Kaplan believes that the language of bargaining pro-
posals, even if a permissive bargaining subject, could be inextricably
intertwined with mandatory subjects of bargaining if a party submitted
a proposal in a language that negotiators at the table for the other party
could not understand and therefore could not meaningfully evaluate and
respond to the proposals on mandatory subjects. That was clearly not
the situation in the present case. In fact, as stated above, the parties
orally discussed several provisions of the Union’s proposal at the April
9, July 15 and July 24 bargaining sessions.
Member Kaplan further notes, as stated above, that Silva’s August 7
letter represents the only evidence of the Respondent’s explanation of
its need for an English translation of the Union’s first contract proposal.
That letter states in effect that the English version was needed by uni-
dentified persons in the United States to review the contract proposal
and by unidentified persons who might join negotiations in the future.
This purported justification was too little and too late, coming over 3
months after the first bargaining session. It is true that at the com-
mencement of contract negotiations, an employer may reserve the right
for managers not directly involved in face-to-face negotiations to re-
view and approve a final agreement--and a separate ground rule submit-
ted at the first bargaining session on April 9 appeared to do this—but
the employer’s negotiators must have sufficient authority to bargain
independently in order to comply with Sec. 8(d)’s good faith require-
ment. In a situation such as this, where all current negotiators were
fluent in Spanish, the possibility that other negotiators who only spoke
English might join the negotiations is too speculative to justify insist-
For all of the above reasons, we find that the Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by insisting that the
Union translate its initial bargaining proposal into Eng-
lish.
B. Failing to Submit a Counterproposal
It is undisputed that the Respondent did not submit
substantive counterproposals, written or oral, throughout
the three bargaining sessions on April 9, July 15, and
July 24, even after the Union requested a written coun-
terproposal at this last session.11 The complaint alleged
the failure to make counterproposals as a separate viola-
tion, and the judge cited precedent holding that the fail-
ure to submit counterproposals violates the obligation to
bargain in good faith. See, e.g., National Management
Consultants, Inc., 313 NLRB 405 (1993) (employer’s
failure to submit any counterproposals tended to frustrate
further bargaining and thus constituted a clear rejection
of its collective-bargaining duty); Chalk Metal Co., 197
NLRB 1133, 1147 (1972) (same); Raynal Plymouth Co.,
175 NLRB 527, 530–531 (1969) (employer had union’s
proposals for several months, but presented no counter-
proposals and insisted on mere correction of typograph-
ical errors in the union’s proposals). However, the judge
failed to make a finding regarding whether the Respond-
ent’s conduct here was unlawful on that ground. We find
that it was.12 The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act when it failed on and after April 9 to
submit a counterproposal to the Union’s February 18
contract proposal.
C. Delaying Bargaining by Refusing to Schedule and
Canceling Bargaining Sessions
We adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent de-
layed bargaining in bad faith for the reasons stated in the
decision, but we disagree with the judge that “[t]he Un-
ion’s bargaining posture prior to December 2015 relieved
the Company [of] culpability under the Act.” As dis-
cussed above, the Respondent could not lawfully condi-
tion bargaining on the Union’s acceptance of a negotia-
tion ground rule that the Union translate its initial pro-

ence on translation of the Union’s first contract proposal. Further, if
the Respondent’s negotiators had engaged in good faith bargaining
about substantive matters, the Union had agreed on July 15 to the ex-
change of all subsequent written proposals and counter-proposals in
English. There is no apparent reason why the final agreement resulting
from this process would not have been in English and understandable to
company officials in the United States who would review that final
contract for approval.
11 As noted above, the Respondent made some minor, oral modifica-
tions but did not indicate any intention to present any substantive pro-
posals to the Union.
12 Insistence on a permissive bargaining subject, such as the Re-
spondent’s translation ground rule, clearly does not excuse the failure
to make counterproposals.
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
posal. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent unlaw-
fully delayed bargaining as of August 6, 2015, when the
Union requested further negotiations and the Respondent
refused unless the Union agreed to pay half the cost of
translating its initial proposal.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Delete the judge’s Conclusion of Law 5 and substitute
the following:
“5. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act since July 15, 2015, by conditioning fur-
ther bargaining on the Union’s agreement to translate its
initial contract proposal from Spanish to English, not-
withstanding that the Respondent’s representatives who
are negotiating directly with the Union are fluent in
Spanish.
6. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act since April 9, 2015, by failing to submit coun-
terproposals for an initial collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
7. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act since August 6, 2015, by refusing to bargain
collectively and in good faith with the Union concerning
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment, including, after December 10, 2015, by failing
and refusing to schedule bargaining sessions until Febru-
ary 24, 2016, by cancelling on one day’s notice the bar-
gaining session scheduled for February 24, 2016, and by
not agreeing to schedule another session until March 22
or 23, 2016.”
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and de-
sist from engaging in such conduct and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
Specifically, having found that the Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we order the Re-
spondent to meet and bargain in good faith with the Un-
ion, without insisting on bargaining conditions, including
its demand that the Union submit proposals in English or
pay part of the cost to translating them, and, if a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement is reached, to reduce the same
to writing and execute the agreement.
The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s failure to
impose a bargaining schedule, as sought in the com-
plaint, asserting that it is necessary to fully remedy the
Respondent’s unfair labor practices. We agree. As dis-
cussed above, the Respondent unlawfully conditioned
bargaining on the Union accepting negotiation ground
rules, refused to submit substantive counterproposals,
and delayed and cancelled bargaining sessions. Where,
as here, the Respondent has employed dilatory tactics in
contravention of its duty to bargain in good faith, we
believe that a bargaining schedule requiring the Re-
spondent to meet and bargain with the Union on a regular
and timely basis is appropriate and would best effectuate
the purposes of the Act. See Professional Transporta-
tion, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 60, slip op. at 3 (2015): All
Seasons Climate Control, Inc., 357 NLRB 718, 718 fn. 2
(2011) (ordering employer to comply with a bargaining
schedule to remedy its unlawful conduct), enfd. 540
Fed.Appx. 484 (6th Cir. 2013). The General Counsel
proposes that, upon the Union’s request, bargaining ses-
sions should be held for a minimum of 24 hours per
month, for at least 6 hours per bargaining session, or, in
the alternative, on another schedule to which the Union
agrees. We find that this proposed schedule, which will
promote regular meaningful bargaining between the par-
ties, to be appropriate here. We shall also require the
Respondent to submit written bargaining progress reports
every 30 days to the compliance officer for Region 12,
and to serve copies on the Union. See id.
For the reasons set forth in Caterair International, 322
NLRB 64 (1996), we also find that an affirmative bar-
gaining order is warranted in this case as a remedy for
the Respondent’s failure to bargain with the Union. The
Board has consistently held that an affirmative bargain-
ing order is “the traditional, appropriate remedy for an
8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful collective-
bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of em-
ployees.” Id. at 68.
In several cases, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has required the
Board to justify, on the facts of each case, the imposition
of an affirmative bargaining order. See, e.g., Vincent
Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB,
117 F.3d 1454, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1997); and Exxel/Atmos,
Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In
Vincent, supra at 738, the court summarized its require-
ment that an affirmative bargaining order “must be justi-
fied by a reasoned analysis that includes an explicit bal-
ancing of three considerations: ‘(1) the employees’ § 7
rights; (2) whether other purposes of the Act override the
rights of employees to choose their bargaining represent-
atives; and (3) whether alternative remedies are adequate
to remedy the violations of the Act.”‘
Although we respectfully disagree with the court’s re-
quirement for the reasons set forth in Caterair, supra, we
have examined the particular facts of this case and find
that a balancing of the three factors warrants an affirma-
tive bargaining order.
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC. 5
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 rights of the unit employees who were
denied the benefits of collective bargaining by the Re-
spondent, which unlawfully conditioned bargaining on
the Union’s acceptance of negotiation ground rules, in-
cluding a demand that proposals and counterproposals be
submitted in English, and engaged in a pattern of dilatory
tactics during the certification year. At the same time, an
affirmative bargaining order, with its attendant bar to
raising a question concerning the Union’s continuing
majority status for a reasonable time, does not unduly
prejudice the Section 7 rights of employees who may
oppose continued union representation because the dura-
tion of the order is no longer than is reasonably necessary
to remedy the ill effects of the violation. To the extent
such opposition exists, moreover, it may be at least in
part the product of the Respondent’s unfair labor practic-
es.13
(2) An affirmative bargaining order also serves the
policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collective
bargaining and industrial peace. That is, it removes the
Respondent’s incentive to delay bargaining in the hope
of discouraging support for the Union. It also ensures
that the Union will not be pressured by the Respondent’s
dilatory and other bad faith bargaining tactics to achieve
immediate results at the bargaining table following the
Board’s resolution of its unfair labor practice charges and
issuance of a cease-and-desist order.
(3) A cease-and-desist order alone would be inade-
quate to remedy the Respondent’s refusal to bargain with
the Union in these circumstances, because it would per-
mit a challenge to the Union’s majority status before the
taint of the Respondent’s unlawful dilatory tactics has
dissipated, and before the employees have had a reasona-
ble time to regroup and bargain through their representa-
tive in an effort to reach an initial collective-bargaining
agreement. Such a result would be particularly unjust in
circumstances such as those here, where the Respond-
ent’s initial delay occurred during the certification year
and its refusal to bargain would likely have a continuing
effect, thereby tainting any employee disaffection from
the Union arising during that period or immediately
thereafter. We find that these circumstances outweigh
the temporary impact the affirmative bargaining order
will have on the rights of any employees who may op-
pose continued union representation.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that an affirma-
tive bargaining order with its temporary decertification

13 The Respondent does not dispute its obligation to recognize and
bargain with the Union; it argues only that it complied with that obliga-
tion.
bar is necessary to fully remedy the allegations in this
case.14
In addition, the General Counsel requests that the No-
tice be posted in both Spanish and English, and we grant
this request.15
ORDER
The Respondent, UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc.,
Caguas, Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Insisting as a condition of bargaining with the Un-
ion, Unión de Tronquistas de PR, Local 901, Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters, for a collective-bargaining
agreement that the Union agree to a negotiation ground
rule that it translate its initial Spanish language bargain-
ing proposals into English.
(b) Failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with
the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the bargaining unit by fail-
ing and refusing to meet at reasonable times and failing
and refusing to submit counterproposals.

14 In light of the affirmative bargaining order, we do not pass on the
General Counsel’s exception that the judge failed to extend the Union’s
certification year under Mar-Jac Poultry, 136 NLRB 785 (1962). The
affirmative bargaining order requires the Respondent to bargain in good
faith with the Union for at least 6 months before the Union’s majority
status can be challenged. Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp., 334
NLRB 399 (2001), enfd. 310 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 2002). By contrast, a
Mar-Jac extension would only extend the certification year by approx-
imately 4 months, because the Respondent first refused to bargain on
April 9, 2015. Mercy Inc. d/b/a American Medical Response, 346
NLRB 1004, 1005 (2006) (“[T]he record must support the need for an
extension and the appropriate length of the extension”). Therefore, we
find it unnecessary to pass on the General Counsel’s exception as it
would not materially affect the remedy.
Member Kaplan does not agree with his colleagues that an affirma-
tive bargaining order, which could preclude any challenge to the Un-
ion’s representative status for up to a year from the date the parties
begin good faith bargaining, is appropriate in this case. He would
instead grant the General Counsel’s request for an extension of the
Mar-Jac certification year, which properly reflects the fact that no
bargaining violations took place during the first 8-plus months of the
certification year that began on July 29, 2014. As the Board has stated,
a certification year extension “need not . . . be the product of a simple
arithmetic calculation.” Colfor, Inc., 282 NLRB 1173, 1174 (1987). In
this case, as in Colfor, a 6-month extension of the certification year bar
would provide “a reasonable period of time in which the Union and the
Respondent can resume negotiations and bargain for a contract without
unduly saddling the employees with a bargaining representative that
they may no longer wish to have represent them.” Id. at 1175. This is
particularly so in light of the mandated remedial bargaining schedule,
which would assure at least twenty-four 6-hour bargaining sessions
within the 6-month extension period.
15 The General Counsel also requests that a management official read
the notice to employees. We deny the request because the General
Counsel has not shown that the other remedies provided here are insuf-
ficient to remedy the effects of the Respondent’s unfair labor practices.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Within 15 days of the Union’s request, bargain at
reasonable times and places and in good faith with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the following appropriate bar-
gaining unit concerning terms and conditions of em-
ployment and, if an understanding is reached, embody
the understanding in a signed agreement:
All regular full-time and regular part-time warehouse
employees who work at the Employer’s facility in
Caguas, Puerto Rico, excluding all other employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Upon the Union’s request, such bargaining sessions shall
held for a minimum of 24 hours of bargaining per month,
with minimum negotiating sessions of 6 hours each, or, in
the alternative, on another schedule to which the Union
agrees. The Respondent shall also submit written monthly
progress reports regarding the negotiations to the Regional
Director and the Union no later than the last day of each
month.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
the Caguas facility in Caguas, Puerto Rico copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 12, in English and Spanish, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consec-
utive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, post-
ing on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other elec-
tronic means, if the Respondent customarily communi-
cates with its employees by such means. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since April 9, 2015.

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 18, 2018
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
______________________________________
Marvin Kaplan, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT insist as a condition of bargaining with
the Union, Unión De Tronquistas De PR, Local 901, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, for a collective-
bargaining agreement that the Union translate its initial
Spanish language bargaining proposals into English.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of our employees in the bargaining unit by
failing and refusing to meet at reasonable times and fail-
ing and refusing to submit counterproposals.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC. 7
WE WILL, within 15 days of the Union’s request, bar-
gain at reasonable times and places and in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the following appro-
priate bargaining unit concerning terms and conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody
the understanding in a signed agreement:
All regular full-time and regular part-time warehouse
employees who work at the Employer’s facility in
Caguas, Puerto Rico, excluding all other employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Upon the Union’s request, such bargaining sessions shall be
held for a minimum of 24 hours per month, for at least 6
hours per bargaining session, or, in the alternative, on an-
other schedule to which the Union agrees.
WE WILL submit written monthly progress reports re-
garding the negotiations to the compliance officer for
Region 12 and serve copies of those reports on the Union
no later than the last day of each month.
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/12-CA-159257 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of
the decision from the Executive Secretary, National La-
bor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington,
DC 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Carlos J. Saavedra-Gutierrez and Vanessa Garcia, Esqs., for
the General Counsel.
Alicia Figueroa Llinas and Jose A. Silva-Cofresí, Esqs., for the
Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. ROSAS, Administrative Law Judge. These con-
solidated cases were tried in San Juan, Puerto Rico on March 8,
2016. The charges emanate from a disagreement during bar-
gaining as to the right of a party to insist on the translation into
English of a collective-bargaining proposal written in Spanish
in the United States Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The dis-
pute illustrates the unique implications of interstate commerce
in an American territory where its citizens communicate pri-
marily in a language other than English.1
The consolidated complaints allege that UPS Supply Chain
Solutions, Inc. (the Company, UPS or Respondent) violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act2 by:
(1) unlawfully insisting since July 15, 2015,3 as a condition of
reaching an initial collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) with
the Union De Tronquistas De PR, Local 901, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (the Union), “that the Union submit
all of its collective-bargaining proposals in English, notwith-
standing that Respondent’s representatives who are dealing
directly with the Union are fluent in Spanish and the employees
in the Unit speak Spanish;” (2) as a result of such a condition,
which is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, the Company,
since March 2, 2015, “has failed and refused to make a coun-
terproposal to the Union’s Spanish language proposal for an
initial collective-bargaining agreement;” and (3) failing and
refusing, since August 6 to meet and collectively bargain with
the Union for an initial CBA.
The Company denies the allegations that it has failed to bar-
gain in good faith and asserts the amended complaint in Case
12–CA–168819 is partially time-barred because it was not filed
until more than 6 months later, on February 19, 2016.
Procedurally, the Union filed a charge in Case 12–CA–
159257 on September 2. That charge alleged that, since “about
June 2015,” UPS has bargained in bad faith with the Union by
conditioning continued negotiations for an initial CBA on the
Union’s translation of its proposal from Spanish into English.
The initial complaint in 12–CA–159257 issued on December
30. On February 19, 2016, the General Counsel amended the
complaint to change the accrual date from June 2015 to “on or
about July 15, 2015.”
On February 1, 2016, the Union filed a charge in 12–CA–
168819 alleging that the Company failed to bargain in good
faith since January 2016, by refusing to meet and bargain be-
cause of the charges pending before the Board. On February
19, the Union filed an amended charge in Case 12–CA–168819
alleging that, since August 1, the Company has been refusing to
meet and bargain with the Union for the purpose of negotiating
a first CBA. A complaint in Case 12–CA–168819 issued on
February 23. On March 2, 2016, the Regional Director issued
an order consolidating Cases 12–CA–159257 and 168819 for
hearing.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the sole witness, and after considering the briefs
filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the
following

1 The laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico declare Spanish
and English as the “official languages of the Government of Puerto
Rico.” See, 1 L.P.R.A. § 59. It is also decreed that “[w]hen necessary,
written translations and oral interpretations shall be made from one
language to the other so that the interested parties can understand any
proceeding or communication in said languages.” 1 L.P.R.A. § 59(a)
2 29 USC §§151–169.
3 All dates are 2015 unless otherwise indicated.
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Atlanta, Georgia, is engaged in the busi-
ness of delivering parcels and providing specialized transporta-
tion and logistics services worldwide, including from a place of
business in Caguas, Puerto Rico, where it annually derives
gross revenues in excess of $50,000 from the transportation of
freight in interstate commerce and purchases and receives
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Company admits, and
I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Parties
Ilka Ramon (Ramon) is the Company’s Human Resources
Director for its operations in Puerto Rico. José Silva Cofresí,
Esq., serves as the Company’s labor counsel in Puerto Rico.4
In its daily operations within Puerto Rico, the Company’s su-
pervisors, managers and employees typically communicate with
each other in Spanish, the language primarily spoken in the
Commonwealth.5
On July 29, 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) certified the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of approximately 15 company em-
ployees. That unit is appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act (the
Unit) and is defined as follows:
All regular full-time and regular part-time warehouse em-
ployees who work at the Employer’s facility in Caguas, Puer-
to Rico, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
Since certification, the parties have not signed an initial
CBA. Lucas Alturet and Argenis Carillo have served as the
Union’s representatives during collective bargaining. The
Company has collective-bargaining agreements with two other
units in Puerto Rico, both of which are also local affiliates of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. While those locals
are operated independently of the unit of employees based in
Caguas, Carillo is familiar with their collective-bargaining
agreements. He is also aware that the Company and the other

4 It is undisputed that Ramon was at all relevant times a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) and agent within the meaning of
Section 2(13) of the Act.
5 U.S. Census Bureau data reveals that 94.9 percent of Puerto Rico’s
residents speak a language other than English at home, 79.4 percent
speak English less than “very well,” and 70.2 percent of households in
Puerto Rico have no one in the household age 14 and over who speaks
English only or speaks English “very well.” See, United States’ Census
Bureau, 2014 American Community Survey for Puerto Rico.
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.x
html?pid=ACS_14_5YR_S0501&prodType=table.
two Teamsters locals divide the cost of translating their CBAs
into English.6
B. Bargaining
In a letter, dated December 16, 2014, Alturet requested that
Ramon provide dates for collective bargaining. He also men-
tioned that the Union’s written proposal would be forthcoming.
Three days later, Silva Cofresí, acknowledged the request and
advised that as soon as he received and reviewed the Union’s
written proposals he would “be in the position to propose dates
for bargaining.7
On February 18, Carillo provided Ramon with the Union’s
67-page proposal for a CBA, typewritten in Spanish, and stated
his availability for bargaining during the following week at a
time and place of the Company’s choosing.8
On March 25, prior to a first bargaining session, Silva
Cofresí informed Carillo that “[d]ue to the loss of an important
client,” the Company intended to lay off employees. He of-
fered to meet with Carillo and bargain over the layoffs and the
effects on unit employees. Carillo agreed and the parties met
and bargained over the issue on March 26 at the Union’s office.
During that meeting, the parties reached an agreement over the
issue of layoffs. The discussions were conducted in Spanish
and there was no exchange of written proposals.9
On April 9, the parties met for the initial bargaining session.
During this and all subsequent bargaining sessions negotiations
were conducted in Spanish. In addition, with the exception of
ground rules proposed by the Company at this session, all writ-
ten communications between the parties before and after this
meeting were exchanged in Spanish. The proposed ground
rules were signed by Ramon and left blank for Carrillo to sign.
The document identified the members of the bargaining com-
mittees—Carillo, Janytza Jimenez and “any other union repre-
sentative” for the Union; and Ramon, Silva Cofresí and “any
other UPS representative” for the Company. It also stated, in
pertinent part:
3. The proposals and counterproposals will be made in writ-
ing, in English, duly identified by date and the name of the
proposing party. It may be done in handwriting.
6. The parties’ Committees have legal authority to bargain
and reach agreements. However, the agreements, upon finish-
ing the negotiation, will be subject to ratification in the as-
sembly in the case of the Union and UPS representatives, in
the case of UPS.10
The parties discussed the proposed ground rules, but the Un-
ion did not agree to any of them, including the Company’s
insistence that the Union’s initial CBA proposal be translated

6 Carillo denied that there is any relationship between the unit and
the other two Teamsters locals in Puerto Rico. However, he conceded
that Ramon was the Company’s primary connection to all three labor
organizations. (Tr. 43–44, 67–68, 74–75.)
7 Jt. Exh. 1–2.
8 Jt. Exh. 3.
9 Jt. Exh. 4.
10 The proposal was entitled an “Agreement Regarding The Norms
That Will Rule The Negotiations Of The Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment Between The Union . . . And . . . UPS.” (Jt. Exh. 5.)
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC. 9
into English. Nevertheless, the parties proceeded to discuss
every one of the clauses in the Union’s proposal. An agree-
ment was not reached regarding any of the proposed CBA pro-
visions and the parties agreed to meet again on July 15.11
The second bargaining meeting was held on July 15. Carillo
and Silva Cofresí continued discussing the Company’s pro-
posed ground rules and reached agreement on some, but Carillo
continued to resist the Company’s proposal that the Union
translate its initial CBA proposal. He suggested that if the
Company wanted the Union’s initial CBA proposal translated
into English it should pay for the cost of doing that. In re-
sponse, Silva Cofresí proposed that the Company and Union
each pay 50 percent of the translation costs. Carillo rejected
that proposal as well.
After concluding discussion of the Company’s proposed
ground rules, the parties moved to a discussion of contract lan-
guage. They discussed several provisions of the Union’s pro-
posed CBA but failed to agree on any of them. The Company
did not submit a counterproposal.
On the same day, Carrillo requested that Ramon provide the
following information: (1) disciplinary regulation; (2) medical
plan benefits book; (3) service procedure or any related docu-
ment; and (4) a breakdown of employees with an hourly sala-
ry.12 Silva Cofresí replied on July 20, providing Carrillo with
an employee list, including classification and salary, and a
summary plan description of the health plan. He also reported
that the Company did not have a disciplinary regulation in ef-
fect.13
On July 24, the parties met for a third bargaining session.
Carillo and Silva Cofresí discussed several provisions of the
Union’s proposed CBA, as evidenced by Carillo’s notations on
numerous pages throughout the draft. No agreement was
reached regarding a CBA. Carillo also requested a written
counterproposal from the Company, but received only oral
counterproposals from Silva Cofresí. The parties continued to
disagree on the Company’s insistence that the Union translate
its initial proposal into English. Silva Cofresí explained that
the Company’s insistence on an English language version of the
Union’s initial CBA proposal was based on a request by a com-
pany official based at its headquarters in Georgia and “they . . .
maintained their insistence on splitting costs . . . as a condition
for the negotiations to continue that this matter be resolved.”14
On August 6, Carrillo wrote to Ramon and informed her that
he had “not received any formal reply regarding the status of
the [negotiations], nor have I received any dates in order to

11 Carillo initially testified that item 3 of the ground rules— requir-
ing that proposals be written in English—was not discussed during the
first meeting. On cross-examination, however, he conceded that “[i]n
that . . . first meeting of April 9 . . . the Union was clear that it would
not translate the first proposal.” (Tr. 28, 49–50.)
12 Jt. Exh. 6.
13 The Union did not take issue with the adequacy of the Company’s
response. (Jt. Exh. 7.)
14 Carillo testified that the English language demand was attributed
to “a request received from the United States, somebody in the United
States.” Since the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a territory and a
part of the United States, the likely inference is to an official at the
Company’s Atlanta, Georgia headquarters. (Tr. 31–33.)
continue with negotiations.” He warned that, unless Ramon
replied with the “dates to negotiate, I will be filing in the perti-
nent forums, understanding that the employer’s demand is still
the original document (Union’s proposal) being translated into
English. I have reiterated our position on several occasions
regarding this issue and I still have not received a written re-
ply.”15 Carrillo’s warning evoked a reply from Silva Cofresí
the next day:
Our client, [UPS] has referred your August 6, 2015 letter to us
relating to the collective bargaining agreement negotiations
between the Union and UPS. As you know, we have conduct-
ed three (3) collective bargaining negotiations, the first one
being on April 9, 2015, the second one on July 15, 2015 and
the third one on July 24, 2015. You also know that since the
beginning, we asked that the Union’s proposals be in English
because these have to be in verified by people in the U.S. who
only speak English. Also, as part of the negotiating team,
people from the U.S. who only speak English may come
down. It is for the above reasons that UPS has asked, since the
beginning of negotiations, that both the proposals and coun-
terproposals be made in the English language because of the
above reasons. In fact, we went as far as to inform you that
UPS was willing to pay 50% of the cost in translating your
proposals into the English language. The Union simply re-
fused. Finally, we invite you to continue with the negotiations
as soon as possible.16
Rather than reply, the Union filed an unfair labor practice
charge on August 17. That charge was subsequently with-
drawn. On September 2, the Union filed the charge in Case
12–CA–159257 alleging that the Company had, since June,
bargained in bad faith by conditioning continued bargaining on
the Union’s translation of its initial CBA proposal into English.
There were no further communications between the parties
until November 19 when Silva Cofresí followed up his August
7 letter to Carrillo by reiterating the Company’s interest in re-
suming negotiations and urging Carrillo to contact him to
schedule bargaining dates.17 On November 20, Carrillo reject-
ed Silva Cofresí’s overture, expressed surprise and confusion,
and asked whether the Company was withdrawing its condi-
tions on the exchange of proposals and its insistence that the
Union translate its original proposal into English. He referred
to the Board charges filed by the Company as the “only reason
why the negotiation has been delayed.”18
On December 8, Carrillo wrote to Silva Cofresí requesting
dates for the resumption of bargaining.19 Silva Cofresí re-
sponded in an email on December 10, asking Carillo to call him
to schedule bargaining dates. During a telephone conversation
that day, Silva Cofresí explained that he could not schedule
bargaining during December because it was the Company’s
“high season.” He informed Carillo that he would schedule

15 Jt. Exh. 8.
16 Jt. Exh. 9.
17 Jt. Exh. 10.
18 Jt. Exh. 11.
19 Jt. Exh. 12.
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
further bargaining dates once the Company got through high
season.20
The scheduling of dates to resume bargaining, however,
proved elusive. Carillo called Silva Cofresí around the end of
December or beginning of January, but the latter explained that
Ramon would be on vacation and he could agree to dates when
she returned. On January 27,21 Carrillo wrote to Silva Cofresí,
referring to their last conversation in which the latter told Caril-
lo he would provide dates upon Ramon’s return from vacation,
but Silva Cofresí told Carrillo that he did not have available
dates and “would continue with the case pending before the
NLRB.” Carillo concluded with a request for bargaining dates
so that negotiations could resume without being contingent
upon the Union presenting its original proposal in English.22
Silva Cofresí replied the same day, acknowledging receipt of
Carrillo’s letter and suggesting there was a misunderstanding
about further scheduling:
It seems as though there was a misunderstanding between you
and me, due to the fact that the last time we spoke, we agreed
that we would wait on the result of the Board case and then
continue negotiating. I will be contacting you soon.23
Silva Cofresí’s reference in his letter to a “misunderstand-
ing” about whether or not to delay negotiations while Board
charges were pending was incorrect. Carrillo never agreed to
freeze negotiations.24
On February 5, Silva Cofresí wrote to Carrillo, reiterating the
Company’s willingness to pay 50 percent of the costs to trans-
late the Union’s proposals into English and invited the Union to
continue with the negotiations on February 24.25 Carrillo re-
sponded on February 8, accepting the proposed bargaining date
and provided an opening on the issue of translation:
In relation to your offer concerning the translation, let me re-
mind you of the following: the company has placed the nego-
tiations contingent upon the Union’s first offer being translat-
ed into English. On this condition, I have stated that yours
truly can continue exchanging proposals in English as well as
the final result of the negotiations if an agreement is reached,
and divide the translation cost in half. However, your com-
mittee has insisted on placing my proposal completely con-
tingent upon translating the first offer in order to manage your
client. Given this scenario, my position has not changed be-
cause it is an illegal, burdensome imposition that lacks practi-
cal sense. I will continue addressing this condition at the per-
tinent forum. I believe that your letter is only intended to con-
fuse the administrative agencies relating to the pending charg-
es and not seek a solution to the negotiation in good faith. We
will be there on the day that you offered to see how the condi-

20 Jt. Exh. 13.
21 Dates hereinafter refer to 2016.
22 Jt. Exh. 14.
23 Jt. Exh. 15.
24 This finding is based on Carillo’s credible and undisputed testi-
mony that he never agreed to delay negotiations. (Tr. 38.) It was con-
sistent with his November 20 letter declaring his availability to contin-
ue bargaining while at the same time attributing the delay to the pen-
dency of Board charges. (Jt. Exh. 12.)
25 Jt. Exh. 16.
tions that were imposed by the company have changed and
the negotiation development.26 (emphasis supplied)
On February 23, Silva Cofresí sent a text message to Carrillo
asking whether the latter “was coming to negotiate tomorrow.”
Carrillo promptly replied “yes.” Later that afternoon, however,
Silva Cofresí texted again to state that since Carrillo had not
provided prior confirmation, Ramon “can’t come. So we can’t
negotiate tomorrow. Call me to schedule other dates for nego-
tiation.” Carrillo replied that his “confirmation has been in
writing for a while” and he would consider further legal ac-
tion.27
Carrillo responded in an email a short while later. The email
referred to an attached letter in which he confirmed the Febru-
ary 24 bargaining date. He also referred to a telephone conver-
sation they had earlier that day confirming bargaining on Feb-
ruary 24. On February 24, Silva Cofresí rejected Carrillo’s
assertion, insisting that Carrillo “didn’t attach the letter that was
supposedly sent to me.” He offered to resume bargaining on
March 22–23.28
Legal Analysis
i. the company’s timeliness defense
Preliminarily, the Company contends that the amended com-
plaint in Case 12–CA–168819, alleging that it has failed to
bargain in good faith since August 1, 2015, is partially time-
barred. The amended charge was indeed filed more than 6
months later, on February 19, 2016. The timing defect, howev-
er, is not fatal if the conduct alleged occurred within 6 months
of a timely filed charge and is “closely related” to the allega-
tions of the charge. Fry’s Food Stores, 361 NLRB 1216, 1217
(2014), citing Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115 (1988).
The initial charge in Case 12–CA–168819, filed on February
1, 2016, falls 6 months and 1 day after the August 1, 2015 ac-
crual date in the amended charge. However, the timely-filed
complaint in Case 12–CA–159257 alleges that the Company
has, since July 15, 2015, unlawfully insisted that the Union
submit all proposals in English and since March 2, 2015, failed
and refused to make a counterproposal to the Union’s Spanish
language proposal. That complaint contained more specific
theories than the more general claims of failing or refusing to
meet and bargain in Case 12–CA–168819. However, the evi-
dence produced at trial revealed the common threads in both
consolidated cases—the alleged bargaining delays attributable
to the translation dispute that rolled over into February 2016;
and the bargaining delays alleged since either August 1, 2015,
or January 2016, are allegedly attributed at least in part to the
translation dispute and failure to provide a counterproposal
since March 2015. The Company’s defenses are the same in
both cases.
Under the circumstances, the Union’s charge that the Com-
pany has, since August 1, 2015 failed and refused to bargain in
good faith defect is deemed “closely related” to the timely filed
charges and amended complaint in Case 12–CA–159257. See
Alt. Energy Applications, Inc., 361 NLRB 1203, 1203 (2014)

26 Jt. Exh. 17.
27 Jt. Exh. 18.
28 Jt. Exh. 19–20.
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC. 11
(claims closely related where the events involved the same
sections of the Act, arose from the same sequence of events, the
events were part of the same chronology and involved the same
people.). Accordingly, the Company’s affirmative defense
based on Section 10(b) of the Act is dismissed.
ii. the language issue as a subject of bargaining
The complaint alleges that since July 15, 2015, as a condi-
tion of reaching an initial collective-bargaining agreement, the
Company has unlawfully insisted “that the Union submit all of
its collective-bargaining proposals in English, notwithstanding
that the Company representatives dealing directly with the Un-
ion, as well as the unit employees, are fluent in Spanish.” It is
further alleged that as a result of such a condition, which is not
a mandatory subject of bargaining, the Company, since March
2, 2015, “has failed and refused to make a counterproposal to
the Union’s Spanish language proposal for an initial collective-
bargaining agreement” in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. In addition, the complaint alleges that the Company
has failed and refused, since August 6, 2015, to meet and col-
lectively bargain with the Union for an initial CBA.
The Company denies the allegations and contends that the
“parties have historically negotiated in the English language
and exchanged all proposals and counterproposals in the Eng-
lish language.” That defense lacks merit since the evidence
reveals that the parties have always conducted bargaining ses-
sions in Spanish. The Company also insists, however, that it
has bargained in good faith with the Union by offering to pay
half the costs of translating the Union’s Spanish language pro-
posals, informing the Union about and bargaining over planned
layoffs, and providing information requested by the Union.
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the rep-
resentatives of his employees.” Section 8(d) of the Act defines
the duty to bargain collectively as “the . . . mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wag-
es, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”
Subjects deemed to relate to wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment are considered mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner,
356 U.S. 342 (1958). When negotiating over a mandatory top-
ic, a party cannot condition participation on either acceptance
of its proposal or withdrawal of a demand by the other side.
While a party can take a position that might ultimately result in
a bona fide impasse, it cannot refuse to continue negotiations or
discuss other issues. Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 NLRB 1116
(1948) (employer unlawfully insisted on an agreement regard-
ing wages as a precondition to bargaining over other subjects);
Heider Mfg. Co., 91 NLRB 1185, (1950) (employer’s insist-
ence on omitting from renewal contract benefits included in the
most recent contract, including seniority, arbitration and griev-
ance provisions, evidenced bad faith).
In contrast, parties are not required to bargain over non-
mandatory, or permissive, subjects of bargaining. NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg–Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 348–349.
Thus, a party violates section 8(a)(5) of the Act by insisting,
even in good faith, on a nonmandatory subject as a precondition
to reaching agreement on mandatory subjects. Id; NLRB v.
Pennsylvania Telephone Guild, 799 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir.1986).
In this case, the parties actually met and bargained in Span-
ish over an initial collective-bargaining agreement, negotiations
stalled when the Union proposed a CBA written in Spanish and
the Company insisted that the Union provide it with a translated
version of the proposal in English. The Union balked and the
Company offered to share the cost of translation. The Union
clung to its position, maintaining that, since the translation was
requested for the Company’s benefit, the Company should have
to bear the full cost of that task. In essence, the General Coun-
sel argues that the Company’s demand for the Union to trans-
late its initial CBA proposal entailed a preliminary issue consti-
tuting a permissive subject of bargaining.
The issue of whether to require the Union to translate its ini-
tial CBA proposal may seem like a procedural or logistical
hurdle. The reality is, however, that certain logistics issues are
“just as much part of the process of collective bargaining as the
negotiations over wages, hours, etc.,” and therefore mandatory
subjects of bargaining. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 289 NLRB 51,
58, fn. 17 (1988); Gen. Elec. Co., 173 NLRB 253, 257 (1968).
Several facts are not disputed: (1) the Union’s proposal for
an initial CBA was written in Spanish; (2) the proposal con-
tained provisions relating to unit employees’ “wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment;” (3) there is/are
company officials based in Georgia who, although not yet en-
gaged in direct bargaining with the Union, are involved in the
process through Silva Cofresí;29 (4) one or more of those Com-
pany officials are not fluent in Spanish; (5) and the Union was
aware of the fact that the Company and the two other Team-
sters-affiliated locals in Puerto Rico exchange written CBA
proposals and counterproposals in English.
Under the circumstances, it is evident that the Company’s
demand for translation of the Union’s initial CBA proposal is
one that affects the “terms and conditions of employment” em-
bodied within the document. The connection is obvious—
without a translation of the Union’s CBA proposal, one or more
of the Company’s representatives are unable to determine what
the proposed terms and conditions are. It logically follows that
if one is unable to decipher a document’s contents he/she can-
not reasonably be expected to negotiate over it.
Although the Board has not addressed this very issue, its de-
cision in Call, Burnup, and Sims, Inc., 159 NLRB 1661 (1966),
indicates that the ability of negotiators to communicate with
and understand each other constitutes a mandatory subject of
bargaining over which the parties have a duty to bargain in
good faith. In that case, which also arose in Puerto Rico, the
Board addressed a dispute regarding the language to be spoken
during bargaining. The union provided an English translation
of its initial Spanish language contract proposal and offered to
pay half the cost of an interpreter during bargaining. However,
the employer rejected the offer, refusing to bargain in Spanish
or split the cost of an interpreter. Under the circumstances, the
Board held that the employer breached its duty to bargain in

29 Although not elaborated in the record, it is reasonably inferred that
Silva Cofresí was referring to a company official(s) with some role in
the CBA approval process.
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
good faith by refusing to reach an accommodation to resolve
the language problem which was impeding negotiations. Id. at
1663.
As in Call, Burnup, and Sims, Inc. the issue here relates to
the ability of a party’s representative to actually understand the
terms, conditions and other terms of employment proposed by
the other side. In the absence of such an understanding, a party
would be unable to engage in and conclude bargaining over
those terms of employment. As such, the issue of translating a
document for the benefit of a party unable to understand it in its
Spanish language form is distinguishable from instances cited
by the General Counsel as examples of bargaining over permis-
sive subjects of bargaining. Those examples involve logistical
approaches or other issues of relevance to the proposing party.
However, if resisted or ignored by the other party, such issues
would not impede the proposing party’s ability to negotiate in
good faith over proposals relating to established terms and con-
ditions of employment. Bartlett-Collins Co., 237 NLRB 770,
772–773 (1978) (whether to use court reporters during bargain-
ing); Timken Co., 301 NLRB 610, 614–615 (1991) (same);
Local 3, International Brotherhood Of Electrical Workers,
AFL–CIO, 280 NLRB 265, 266–267 (1986) (whether to tape
record negotiations); Smurfit-Stone Container, 357 NLRB
1732, 1733–1734 (2011) (insistence on midterm cancellation of
contract as a condition to bargaining the effects of a plant clo-
sure); Salvation Army of Massachusetts, 271 NLRB 195, 198–
199 (1984) (insistence on acceptance of employer’s religious
mission as a condition for negotiations); Vanguard Fire & Sup-
ply Co., 345 NLRB 1016, 1017–1018, 1042–1043 (2005) (in-
sistence on submission of an outline of the agenda prior to bar-
gaining).
Applying the good faith bargaining obligation articulated in
Call, Burnup, and Sims, Inc., the Company took a reasonable
step towards an accommodation by offering to pay for half the
cost of translating the Union’s CBA proposal. Carillo was
aware of the practice between the Company and the two other
Teamster’s affiliates in Puerto Rico to exchange contract pro-
posals in English and split the cost of translation. The Union,
however, remained steadfast in its refusal to entertain such a
resolution enabling the Company to treat the translation issue as
a mandatory subject of bargaining, although it did not ultimate-
ly insist to impasse. Under the circumstances, the Company’s
insistence that the Union submit all of its collective-bargaining
proposals in English involved a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing over which it attempted to bargain in good faith with the
Union.
Accordingly, the claim in Case 12–CA–159257 regarding
the Company’s insistence on an English translation of the Un-
ion’s CBA proposal as a condition to further bargaining is dis-
missed.
ii. the company’s failure to make proposals and failure to
meet and bargain
The consolidated complaints also allege that the Company
failed to make written bargaining proposals since March 2,
2015, intentionally delayed negotiations, and failed to meet and
bargain since August 1, 2015 due to a host of spurious delays
and excuses.
The Board has long held that an employer’s failure to submit
a counterproposal to a union’s proposal violates Section
8(a)(5). National Management Consultants, Inc., 313 NLRB
405 (1993) (employer’s failure to submit any counterproposals
tended to frustrate further bargaining and may thus constitute a
clear rejection of its collective-bargaining duty); Chalk Metal
Co., 197 NLRB 1133, 1147 (1972) (same). In this context,
even cursory responses have been deemed insufficient. See
Pioneer Astro Metallics, Inc., 156 NLRB 468, 472–473 (1965)
(brief 1 1/3 page “Company reply” partially responding to un-
ion’s proposal, omitting any reference to wages, amounted to a
“counterproposal only ‘for the record’ and not with any genuine
intent to negotiate an agreement”). Similarly, an employer’s
ploy to refrain from submitting a counterproposal and instead
continue discussion over the language of a union’s proposal
constitutes bad faith bargaining. Raynal Plymouth Co., 175
NLRB 527, 530–531 (1969) (employer had union’s proposals
for several months, but presented no counterproposals and in-
sisted on mere correction of typographical errors in the union’s
proposals).
The evidence fails to support a finding of bad faith delay by
the Company prior to December 2015. The Union was certified
as the bargaining unit’s labor representative on July 29, 2014.
On December 16, 2014, the Union requested the Company
bargain over an initial CBA. Several days later, Silva Cofresí,
acknowledged the request, but requested a written proposal
from the Union before scheduling bargaining. That was a rea-
sonable request since the parties would waste their time at a
first bargaining session without one. On February 18, 2015,
Carillo provided Ramon with the Union’s proposal written in
Spanish and asked for proposed meeting dates. The parties’
initial bargaining session on April 9 was preceded by a March
25 meeting to bargain over the effects of layoffs. The parties
met for two more sessions on July 15 and 24 during which they
discussed the Union’s CBA proposal.
During the July 24 meeting, Carillo also requested a written
counterproposal, but received only oral counterproposals from
Silva Cofresí. The latter also reiterated the Company’s need for
an English version of the Union’s initial CBA proposal as a
“condition for the negotiations to continue.” On August 6,
Carrillo warned that the Union would file charges unless the
Company dropped its demand that the Union’s initial CBA
proposal be translated into English and provided dates for the
resumption of bargaining. Silva Cofresí responded the follow-
ing day, reiterating the Company’s position regarding the need
for translation, and essentially retracted his previous comments
by inviting Carillo “to continue with the negotiations as soon as
possible.” Rather than accept Silva Cofresí’s offer to resume
bargaining, Carillo filed a charge on September 2. As previ-
ously discussed, that charge lacked merit because the Company
sought a reasonable accommodation by offering to pay for half
the costs of translating the Union’s initial CBA proposal.
There were no further developments until November 19,
when Silva Cofresí again urged Carrillo to resume bargaining.
Carrillo responded the next day. He attributed the delay to the
filing of Board charges and rejected Silva Cofresí’s request to
resume bargaining unless the Company withdrew its request for
an English translation of the Union’s contract proposal.
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC. 13
On December 8, however, Carrillo had a change of heart.
He wrote to Silva Cofresí and requested dates to resume bar-
gaining. On December 10, Silva Cofresí and Carillo spoke by
telephone. Silva Cofresí explained that he could not schedule
bargaining during December because it was the Company’s
busy season. He told Carillo that he would schedule further
bargaining dates once the Company got through high season.
That did not happen.
After a few weeks elapsed, Carillo contacted Silva Cofresí
around the end of December or beginning of January. Howev-
er, Silva Cofresí explained that Ramon was going on vacation
and he would provide dates when she returned. About a month
elapsed without Silva Cofresí contacting Carillo. Carrillo fol-
lowed up again on January 27, but this time Silva Cofresí took
a different tack, stating that he was unable to meet and “would
continue with the case pending before the NLRB.” Carillo
concluded with a request for bargaining dates so that negotia-
tions could resume without being contingent upon the Union
presenting its original proposal in English. Silva Cofresí re-
plied the same day and suggested that there was a misunder-
standing between them as to whether or not to delay negotia-
tions while Board charges were pending. Carrillo, however,
never agreed to freeze negotiations.
On February 5, Silva Cofresí reiterated the Company’s will-
ingness to pay 50 percent of the costs to translate the Union’s
proposals into English and invited the Union to resume negotia-
tions on February 24. Carrillo accepted the offer to resume
bargaining on February 8 and, for the first time, provided a
basis for further bargaining over the translation issue. Alt-
hough once again rejecting the Company’s offer to share in the
cost of translating the Union’s initial contract offer, Carillo
proposed to “continue exchanging proposals in English as well
as the final result of the negotiations if an agreement is reached,
and divide the translation cost in half.”
On February 23, Silva Cofresí sent a text message to Carrillo
requesting confirmation of bargaining the next day. Carillo
provided the confirmation shortly thereafter, but Silva Cofresí
texted him later that afternoon, stating that Ramon would be
unavailable because Carillo had not provided prior confirma-
tion. He urged Carillo to call to schedule new dates. Carrillo
responded in a text message rejecting Silva Cofresí’s excuse as
a ploy. The next day, Silva Cofresí disputed Carrillo’s asser-
tion but offered to resume bargaining on March 22 or 23.
The Union’s bargaining posture prior to December 2015 re-
lieved the Company from culpability under the Act. On De-
cember 10, however, responsibility for the bargaining delays
shifted to the Company when Silva Cofresí began a pattern of
delay tactics by failing to offer any future bargaining dates
based on his client’s unavailability during the “high season.”
See Diversified Bank Installations, Inc., 324 NLRB 457, 467
(1997) (employer’s failure to respond to union’s requests for
meetings were tantamount to a refusal to continue bargaining
with the union during the term of the parties’ contract).
When Carillo contacted him a few weeks later, Silva Cofresí
failed again to provide dates for bargaining, declaring his client
unavailable because she was on vacation. He assured Carillo
that he would provide dates upon her return but another month
elapsed. When Carillo contacted him in late January, Silva
Cofresí shifted course, first refusing to meet because of the
pending Board charges and then falsely representing that the
parties agreed to freeze bargaining for that reason. See Fred
Meyer Stores, Inc., 355 NLRB 179, 179 fn. 1 (2010) (condi-
tioning bargaining on pending litigation constitutes bad faith
bargaining); and Richard Melow Electrical Contractors Corp.,
327 NLRB 1112, 1116 (1999) (employer failed to respond to
request to meet which had been agreed to as part of a settlement
of prior unfair labor practice charges).
On February 23, Silva Cofresí cancelled bargaining sched-
uled for the next day on a baseless excuse that Carillo had not
confirmed more than 1 day in advance of the scheduled Febru-
ary 24 session. See Calex Corp., 322 NLRB 977, 978 (1997).
Under the circumstances, the totality of the Company’s con-
duct since December 10, 2015, caused delays in bargaining
through March 2016, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company, UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce with the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
512, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. The following employees constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
All regular full-time and regular part-time warehouse em-
ployees who work at the Employer’s facility in Caguas, Puer-
to Rico, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
4. At all times since July 28, 2014, the Union has been, and
continues to be the certified exclusive bargaining representative
of the employee in the above-described unit.
5. The Company has failed and refused to meet and bargain
with the Union, and, has by its overall conduct, failed and re-
fused to bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of the Unit in violation of
Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by (1) on or about December
10, 2015, failing and refusing to schedule bargaining sessions
until February 24, 2016; and (2) on February 23, 2016, cancel-
ing a bargaining session scheduled for February 24, 2016 and
not agreeing to schedule another session until March 22 or 23,
2016.
REMEDY
Having found the Company has engaged in certain unfair la-
bor practices, I find it must be ordered to cease and desist and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. It is recommended the Company be or-
dered, upon request of the Union, to meet and bargain in good
faith with the Union, and, if a collective-bargaining agreement
is arrived at to reduce the same to writing and execute the
agreement. The General Counsel also seeks a remedy affording
the Union an additional year during which time its majority
status cannot be questioned. Such relief is typically granted
where the employer has, during the year immediately following
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
certification, failed and refused to bargain in good faith with a
certified union. Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785 (1962).
Under the circumstances, the Company failed and refused to
bargain during a 4-month period. However, that unlawful con-
duct did not commence until 5 months after the expiration of
the initial year following certification. Accordingly, there is no
basis for an additional remedy extending the Union’s initial
certification year for purposes of withstanding any challenges
to majority status.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended30
ORDER
The Respondent, UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc., Caguas,
Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to meet at reasonable times and bar-
gain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative for its employees in the following
appropriate bargaining unit:
All regular full-time and regular part-time warehouse em-
ployees who work at the Employer’s facility in Caguas, Puer-
to Rico, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
(b) Canceling previously agreed upon bargaining sessions.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 15 days of the Union’s request, bargain with the
Union at reasonable times and places in good faith as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of its employees in the above-
described bargaining unit with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment until a full agree-
ment or a bona fide impasse is reached, and if an understanding
is reached, embody the understanding in a written agreement.
Dated: Washington, D.C. April 13, 2016
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.

30 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to meet at reasonable times and
bargain in good faith with the Union De Tronquistas De PR,
Local 901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the Union)
as your exclusive collective-bargaining representative in the
following appropriate bargaining unit:
All regular full-time and regular part-time warehouse em-
ployees who work at the Employer’s facility in Caguas, Puer-
to Rico, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT cancel previously agreed-upon bargaining ses-
sions.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 15 days of the Union’s request, bargain at
reasonable times and places and in good faith with the Union as
your exclusive bargaining representative with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment until a
full agreement or a bona fide impasse is reached, and if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a written
agreement.
WE WILL meet with the Union on agreed upon and scheduled
bargaining dates.
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/12-CA-159257 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half
Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–
1940.