Unoco Apparel, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 22, 1974

208 N.L.R.B. 601 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

UNOCO APPAREL, INC.
Unoco Apparel , Inc. and International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers ' Union, AFL-CIO. Case
15-CA-4655
January 22, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On April 12, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Jerry
B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel, the
Charging Party, and Respondent filed exceptions
and supporting briefs, and Respondent filed a reply
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Unoco Apparel, Inc.,
Selma , Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns , shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
MEMBER PF,NELLO, dissenting in part:
Contrary to my colleagues, I believe that the record
shows that Respondent has engaged in a deliberate
course of surface bargaining with the Union in
contravention of Section 8(a)(5).2 Not only did
Respondent's negotiator, in effect, lack authority to
bargain in good faith, but also Respondent's intransi-
I Contrary to our dissenting colleague , we agree with the Administrative
Law Judge 's analysis of the facts and his conclusion that both parties herein
were engaged in "hard bargaining" and were merely jockeying for position
as to their main concern , wages and benefits . Our dissenting colleague
disagrees with the Administrative Law Judge 's finding that the Union, too,
had a fixed bargaining position from which it did not move throughout the
negotiations, because he finds the Union expressed a willingness to
compromise and because he would not require the Union to lower its
demands where the Respondent has failed to produce information to justify
its asserted economic position However, neither of these reasons is
persuasive The Administrative Law Judge's findings in this regard are
amply supported by the record evidence which establishes that the Union
essentially refused to agree to or even discuss any of the Respondent's
contract proposals Thus, when the Respondent 's attorney , Tahaferro, at the
fifth bargaining session, requested the Union 's attorney, Goodman, to
discuss the Respondent 's contract proposals . Goodman ignored the request
and proceeded to discuss only the Union's. In doing so, he demonstrated
that the Union would not make any concessions for which it could
601
gent position on practically all items, as shown by its
refusal to accept any changes whatsoever from the
present working conditions, demonstrates that Res-
pondent merely went through the motions of
bargaining without any sincere intention of reaching
an agreement.
The question of whether a party has bargained in
good faith is one of the most important and difficult
of the issues confronting the Board. The National
Labor Relations Act was conceived in an effort to
promote industrial relations through collective bar-
gaining since it was believed that employers and
employees (through their bargaining representative if
they have selected one) are the best parties to settle
differences in the working- place. Indeed, the Board
has recently placed a premium on stability through
collective bargaining by deferring to private settle-
ment of disputes, where possible, without outside,
governmental intervention .3 However, while the Act
encourages collective bargaining, Congress has man-
dated a concomitant duty to the Board to insure that
such bargaining is "more than the holding of
conferences and the exchange of pleasantries. The
law contemplates that both parties will approach
negotiations with an open mind and will make a
reasonable effort to reach a common ground of
agreement."4
In my opinion, the Board must examine not only
the quantity of negotiations but also the quality of
such discussions in its effort to ascertain whether the
parties have complied with the law. Admittedly, this
task is often a formidable one, inasmuch as there is a
fine line dividing lawful hard bargaining and illegal
surface bargaining. In the exception of this duty, it is
necessary to examine all the circumstances of
negotiations, including the conduct and statements
of the parties. Although the Board may not "sit in
judgment upon the substantive terms of collective
bargaining agreements," 5 ". . . at the same time it
seems clear that if the Board is not to be blinded by
empty talk and by the mere surface motions of
collective bargaining, it must take some cognizance
reasonably expect to receive a quid pro quo from the Respondent Thus, the
Union's failure to indicate any willingness to modify its proposals forced the
Respondent to take a position in which it could only reject what it deemed
to be the more onerous and outrageous ones, while accepting others with
which it felt it could live (indeed , the record evidence establishes that it was
the Respondent and not the Union that made the concessions necessary to
enable the parties to agree on the various items upon which agreement was
reached ). Accordingly , all that the evidence herein establishes is that the
Respondent refused to concede on financial matters until the Union became
less intransigent on the same and other matters contained in its proposals.
In such circumstances, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that the Employer was not engaged in unlawful "surface
bargaining," and we so find.
2 However, I agree with the majority that Respondent 's refusal to furnish
the Union the requested financial records violates Sec 8 (a)(5) of the Act.
3 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837
i Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB 35 (1934)
5 N.L.RB. v. American National Insurance Co, 343 U S. 395, 404 (1952)
208 NLRB No. 88
602 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the reasonableness of the positions taken by an
employer in the course of bargaining negotiations." 6
Furthermore, the law does not contemplate that an
employer must acquiesce to the demands of a union;
in fact, it may hold its convictions to a point of
impasse. However, employers are dutybound to
make serious proposals with a view towards "meeting
the union at least part way." 7
Here, the record shows that the first of seven
bargaining sessions was held on May 15, 1972.8 At
that meeting, the Union, through its representative,
Benny Dansavage, orally outlined its proposals,
including demands concerning wages, hospitalization
benefits, vacations, holidays, and the like, and then
presented Respondent with a complete contract
proposal in written form. At the second meeting after
some preliminary discussion, Respondent, represent-
ed by its attorney, Mark Taliaferro, Sr., offered a
written, but partial, contract proposal, stating that
additional language would be provided the following
week. In the ensuing discussion, it became clear that
Respondent's proposal basically codified the existing
working conditions on, for example, such significant
items as holidays, overtime pay, life insurance, and
the length of the workweek. In view of Respondent's
silence on the subject, Dansavage asked for its wage
proposal, but was told that Respondent had "no
wages, no increased minimums, no other fringe
benefits and no other changes to offer." Dansavage
pointed out that the election's lopsided vote should
have told Respondent something, and stated that he
was hopeful that they could come to an agreement
that was fair to both sides. When Dansavage stated
that there was to be an increase in the Federal
minimum wage, Taliaferro responded that his client
did not give him anything to offer, that it was a new
business, and that the Company did not have a
reasonable picture as of yet. Dansavage then showed
him a credit report which disclosed that Unoco was a
subsidiary of Universal Overall, and stated that as
Universal Overall was not a new company, they
certainly should know whether or not the Company
was going to make a profit. Taliaferro responded, "I
don't know that they are a part of anything." Again
Dansavage asked if Respondent had any increase in
wages or minimums, but Taliaferro replied that they
did not, that they were going to pay the $1.60-per-
hour minimum, and that he did not believe in higher
6 N.L.R . B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F .2d 131, 134 (1953).
7 Ibid.
8 After the election , Plant Manager Clyde Bamberg set the tone for the
negotiations by his statement , published in the local newspaper , that "as far
as the plant 's future , I do not know."
9 Following the second meeting , Dansavage called Taliaferro to schedule
a third session . During this telephone conversation, Dansavage asked if the
Union were going to get a contract with the Company , but Taliaferro
replied , "Well, they haven 't given me anything to offer . I told them I don't
minimums. With respect to the Union's proposed
clauses regarding a shop chairlady, assignment to
other work, and access to the shop, Taliaferro stated
that they might work something out.9
In the third session,10 Dansavage asked if Taliafer-
ro had the additional contract language promised at
the last meeting, but Taliaferro replied that he did
not have any additional language to present at this
time and that his secretary had gone on vacation.
Dansavage asked if he had any money, fringes, or
changes to offer, but was told that "there was no
money, no changes, no fringes. The Company's
position will not be altered." When Taliaferro said
that the Company did not know if it was losing
money, Dansavage mentioned that Unoco had been
in Selma for 6-7 months and that with its experience
it must have some knowledge of whether or not it
was going to have a profit. Taliaferro then stated that
it would not have any financial offer to give and that
it did not know what it could afford. At another
point in the discussions, Taliaferro reiterated his
position that "there were no changes or money to
offer." In response to Dansavage's still further
inquiry as to whether the Company had any
increases in money or fringes to offer, Taliaferro
replied that the employees came to the "wrong well
.. . the well is dry." When asked about the next
meeting date, Taliaferro said he did not object to
meeting, but the Company had no change in its offer.
The fourth session, held on August 3, 1972, began
with Dansavage again asking if the Company had
any money, fringe benefits, or contract changes to
offer, but Taliaferro answered that it did not. Again
it became evident that most of the Company's
proposals merely reflected current working condi-
tions and that others, like the management rights
clause, actually took away, according to Dansavage,
rights employees had without a contract.
At the fifth session , Union Attorney Goodman
asked if the Company had any money or fringes to
offer, but Taliaferro replied that it did not. When
asked why, Taliaferro responded "Because we don't
have any at this time." Taliaferro refused to tell
Goodman whether the Company was part of a larger
company, and later said that there would be no wage
increases in the near future. At this point, the parties
began discussing the Union's proposal 11 and, while
tentative agreement was reached on minor items,
know how they expect me to get a contract without giving me anything to
offer."
10 The record shows that at this session , as well as in subsequent
negotiating sessions , the parties discussed Respondent's proposals in detail.
Therefore, my colleagues ' statement that the Union did not "even discuss
any of the Respondent's contract proposals" is totally without foundation.
I I The version of the facts presented by my colleagues to the effect that
the Union ignored Respondent's request to discuss its proposal and
"proceeded" to discuss the Union 's is incorrect . Actually, the Union asked
UNOCO APPAREL, INC. 603
Tahaferro refused to respond at all to others and, in
effect, retracted his earlier statement that they might
be able to work out an agreement on certain clauses.
On all money items, Taliaferro consistently stated
that the Company would not pay any more than the
status quo.
At the sixth session, when again asked for a
company offer on wages, Tahaferro said that the
Company was not going to make any changes in
anything it was already doing. When the meeting
ended and Goodman asked about the next meeting
date, Taliaferro responded, "I am meeting at your
request. I would not have called the meeting. I have
nothing to offer. I have no changes to offer."
The seventh and final session, held October 23,
1972, began with Taliaferro answering several ques-
tions by Goodman to the effect that the Company
had nothing new to offer on wages or holidays and
that the Company would continue to work 40 hours.
Dansavage then reminded Taliaferro that the addi-
tional contract language promised at the second
session had not been provided. When asked at this
point if the Company had anything to propose,
Taliaferro said, "I am meeting at your request. I
wouldn't have requested a meeting, I am meeting at
your request." When Goodman asked if he had
talked to his client about any wage increases,
Taliaferro said he had checked with Bamberg, but
had not talked with Eckerling (an owner of Respon-
dent) recently.
On or about November 13, 1972, Dansavage
telephoned Taliaferro to attempt to set up another
negotiation session. Taliaferro remarked that he
understood "the Board is going to issue a complaint.
Why don't we just go and try it, try the case," and
then went on to say that he had nothing new to offer.
Finally, it should be noted that on November 27,
1972, Respondent reneged on its agreement, made
prior to the start of the negotiations, to share the
expenses of a meeting hall with the Union.
In evaluating the entire course of conduct of these
negotiations, both those aspects highlighted supra, as
well as the details set forth in the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision, it seems clear to me that Respon-
dent entered upon these discussions with a closed
mind not to reach an accord through the give-and-
take process of bargaining. From its postelection
veiled threat of a plant closure to its declarations that
the Company was not going to make any changes in
anything that it was already doing, Respondent
displayed an effort to engage in "empty talk" and to
bargain without any intention whatsoever of reach-
ing an agreement.
In my opinion, Respondent's fixed, status quo
position on major items constitutes an intransigence
that goes beyond the line of mere hard bargaining. In
addition, Respondent's entire approach to the
negotiations demonstrates an utter failure to bargain
in good faith. Respondent proffered an incomplete
proposal at the second session-one which was silent
on such a basic and crucial issue as wages-and
never fulfilled both its promise and obligation to
submit a complete proposal. Taliaferro indicated
that, as to wages, the Company did not believe in
higher minimums, thus emphasizing to the Union
that further discussions on this key issue would be
futile. Statements made by Taliaferro both during
and after the second session show that he did not
possess authority to engage in meaningful discus-
sions or to make any realistic offers to the Union. It
has been long held that such a lack of authority,
when considered in the context of these fruitless
discussions, shows that Respondent did not bargain
in good faith.12 Furthermore, Respondent was
reluctant to continue any negotiations once its fixed
position was made clear and even refused to consider
proposals on which agreement had been postponed.
Most importantly, Respondent incessantly stressed
that its position on the major items would not be
altered, conduct which is so blatantly antithetical to
good-faith discussions as to thoroughly undermine
the entire atmosphere. The tactics displayed in these
abortive discussions was also reflected by Respon-
dent's abrupt withdrawal from its agreement to share
the cost of the meeting hall. Indeed, Respondent's
motive in these discussions could best be described
by Taliaferro's own admission during the negotia-
tions that Respondent might discourage membership
in the Union and have another election.
The Administrative Law Judge, himself, reached
many of the above conclusions, yet he failed to find
surface bargaining principally on the ground that the
record showed that both parties were jockeying for
position in these discussions. The clear implication of
this conclusion is that the Union, too, made little
movement towards an agreement. I completely
disagree with this evaluation of the facts. First of all,
in each and every session, the Union sought some
ground upon which an agreement could be made
and, in so doing, clearly indicated its willingness to
compromise in order to reach a fair contract, while
Respondent displayed its deliberate strategy not to
negotiate with an open mind. Second, Respondent's
Tahaferro if he would sign each article as an agreement was reached, and but Tahaferro did not succeed as the parties then continued to discuss the
Tahaferro agreed After Goodman opened the Union's proposal, Tahaferro Union's proposal
interjected with "let's talk about the Company's proposal " Thus, it was 12 Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, 133 NLRB 877
Respondent who actually attempted to thwart this movement by the Union,
604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
refusal to disclose its financial status-itself found to
violate Section 8(a)(5)-prevented the Union from
appraising the validity of Respondent's economic
claims or from modifying its economic proposals.
Absent the Respondent's supplying sustaining figures
in support of its claims, I would not expect or require
the Union to revise its proposals downward as the
Administrative Law Judge and my colleagues seem
to imply it should have done.13
In short, it is Respondent's rigid, predetermined
adherence to its status quo position, in light of its
other conduct and the 8(a)(5) violation found by the
Administrative Law Judge, which I would find to
constitute surface bargaining. As it was so aptly put
in Reed & Prince, "the employer is obliged to make
some reasonable effort in some direction to compose
his differences with the union, if [Section] 8(a)(5) is
to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at
all." 14 Respondent simply did not fulfill that obliga-
tion.
13 C-B Buick, Inc, 206 NLRB No 10
1+ Supra at 134-135
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B. STONE, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, was tried pursuant to due
notice on February 13 and 14, 1973, at Birmingham,
Alabama.
The charge was filed on October 12, 1972. The complaint
in this matter was issued on November 20, 1972. The issues
concern whether Respondent has engaged in overall bad-
faith bargaining with the Union, and whether Respondent
has bargained in bad faith by not furnishing certain
requested financial records. Thus, the issues are whether
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding. Briefs have been filed by the General
Counsel and the Respondent and have been considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of witnesses , I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The facts herein are based upon the pleadings and
admissions therein.
Respondent, a corporation licensed to do business in the
State of Alabama, is engaged in the manufacture of jeans
and dungarees at its Selma, Alabama, facility, the only
facility involved in this proceeding.
During a I-year representative period, Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business operations described
above, purchased and received goods and materials valued
in excess of $50,000 which were shipped directly to it from
points outside the State of Alabama. During the same
period, Respondent shipped and sold goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the
State of Alabama.
As conceded by Respondent and based upon the
foregoing, it is concluded and found that the Respondent
is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO, the Union, is and has been at all times material
herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Preliminary Facts
The General Counsel's allegations for paragraphs 6, 7,
and 8 of the complaint are as set out herein:
6
All production and maintenance employees , includ-
ing packers , employed by Respondent at its Selma,
Alabama, plant ; excluding office clerical employees,
plant clerical employees , professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the
Act.
7
On April 13, 1972 a majority of the employees of
Respondent in the unit described in paragraph 6,
above, by secret-ballot election conduct in Case No.
15-RC-4815, under the supervision of the Regional
Director for the Fifteenth Region of the National
Labor Relations Board, designated and selected the
Union as their representative for the purposes of
collective bargaining with Respondent and on April 21,
1972, the Regional Director certified the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in said unit.
8
At all times since on or about April 13, 1972, and
continuing to date, the Union has been, and is now, the
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining
of a majority of the employees in the unit described in
paragraph 6, above, and, by virtue of Section 9(a) of
the Act, has been, and is now, the exclusive representa-
tive of all employees in said unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay,
I The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein
UNOCO APPAREL, INC.
wages, hours of employment and other terms and
conditions of employment.
The facts as pled by the General Counsel in complaint
paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, are established by the pleadings,
admissions therein, and conclusions to be drawn there-
from. I so conclude and find that the facts alleged in the
General Counsel's complaint paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, set
forth above, are the facts established.
The General Counsel alleged in paragraph 9 of his
complamt as follows:
Commencing on or about May 1, 1972, and at all
times thereafter to date, the Union requested, and has
continued to request, Respondent to meet and bargain
collectively with respect to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment for all employees
in the unit described in paragraph 6, above.
The Respondent denied the above allegation. The facts,
however, reveal no real issue as to the Union's requests for
bargaining. It is clear that the Union, by letter to Eckerling
(one of Respondent's owners), initiated a bargaining
request, that thereafter the Union contacted Mark L.
Taliaferro, Sr. (Respondent's attorney) and scheduled
various bargaining sessions, and that bargaining sessions
occurred on May 15 and 23, June 12, August 3 and 29,
September 13, and on October 23, 1972.
The facts reveal that around November 13, 1972, the
Union was advised that the complaint in the instant case
was going to be issued. On November 13, 1972, Dansavage
(for the Union) called Mark L. Taliaferro, Sr., and asked
for another meeting date. Taliaferro told Dansavage that
he understood that the NLRB was going to issue a
complamt, that they might as well just go and try the case,
that he had nothing new to offer, and that he did not want
to attend a union meeting or a monkey show. Dansavage
continued to seek a meeting date, and the parties agreed to
meet on November 30, 1972. Taliaferro sent the Union the
following letter on November 27, 1972.
THOMAS, TA.LIAFERRO, FORMAN, BURR &
MURRAY
Sixteenth Floor Bank For Savings Building
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Telephone 323-7711 Area Code 205
November 27, 1972
Mr. Benny Dansavage
929 Linwood Road
Birmingham , Alabama 35222
Re: Unoco Apparel, Inc
Dear Mr . Dansavage:
You called me without any knowledge of the docket
in front of me and I find it is not convenient to meet
with you on the 30th of November . I can meet on the
7th of December if this date is satisfactory with you.
605
Sincerely yours,
THOMAS, TALIAFERRO, FORMAN, BURR &
MURRAY
/s/ M. L. Taliaferro
M. L. Taliaferro
MLT/aw
P.S. In view of the union 's method of negotiating, we
will no longer be willing to share the expense of a
meeting hall.
Later the parties agreed to meet on December 11, 1972.
Thereafter, Dansavage sent Taliaferro the following
telegram.
call Letters : GQW-2:15 PM
Charge To: I.L.G.W.U.
TALIAFERRO THOMAS, ESQUIRE
1600 BANK FOR SAVINGS BUILDING
BIRMINGHAM , ALABAMA 35203
December 8, 1972
DEAR MR . THOMAS:
PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT DUE TO A PRESSING MATTER,
NOT CONCERNING UNOCO APPAREL, INC., I WILL BE
UNABLE TO MEET WITH YOU ON DECEMBER 11, 1972. I
WILL CALL YOU AT YOUR OFFICE DURING THE WEEK OF
DECEMBER IITH TO ARRANGE FOR ANOTHER MEETING.
THANK YOU,
BENNIE DANSAVAGE
STATE DIRECTOR OF ALABAMA
(REPORT DELIVERY)
Dansavage did not contact Taliaferro during the week of
December 11, 1972, or thereafter, as to another bargaining
meeting. Between that date and the date of this decision,
the Union's unfair labor practice charges and the NLRB
complaint thereon have been pending. Respondent sent to
the Union on December 22, 1972, what purports to be an
unaudited financial report. On February 12, 1973, the
Union sent to Respondent's lawyer, a telegraphic response,
concerning such unaudited financial report.
Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find that
the Union on May 1, 1972. requested Respondent to
bargain collectively with respect to the appropriate
bargaining unit, and has continuously thereafter requested
and pursued collective bargaining with the Respondent.
The last specific request for a scheduled meeting occurred
prior to December 11, 1972. However, in view of the unfair
labor practice charges, the pending complaint and trial in
this matter, the contentions of the parties at negotiation
sessions , and the mutual obligations of the parties to
bargain collectively, it is clear that the Union's overall
conduct constituted a continuing demand for collective
bargaining . I so conclude and find.
The facts are not in real dispute and may be summarized
as follows:
1. Dansavage (for the Union) and Mark L. Taliaferro,
Sr. (for the Respondent), sometime in early May 1972,
agreed that the first bargaining session would occur on
May 15, 1972. Dansavage and Taliaferro also agreed that
the parties would share the expenses of a meeting place for
the bargaining sessions . The parties thereafter met on May
606 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
15 (for approximately 1-1/2 hours), on May 23 (for
approximately 2 hours), on June 12 (for approximately 1 to
1-1/2 hours), on August 3, 1972 (for approximately 1/2
hour), on August 29, 1972 (for approximately 1-1/2 hours),
on September 23, 1972 (for approximately 40 minutes), and
on October 23, 1972 (for approximately 30 minutes). The
meetings were all held in Selma, Alabama, away from the
premises of Respondent.
2. The persons representing the Respondent at all of
the bargaining sessions were Taliaferro and Bamberg. The
persons representing the Union at the May 15, 23, June 12,
and August 3 meetings were Dansavage (International
representative), Willie Chisholm (organizer) and a commit-
tee of five employees. The same persons and Goodman
(union counsel) represented the Union at the bargaining
session on August 29, 1972. On September 13 and October
23, 1972, the same persons, plus Goodman and 10 other
employees on the employee committee represented the
Union.
3. Dansavage and Tahaferro agreed informally before
the first bargaining sessions that the parties would share
the costs of a meeting place. Thereafter, the Union paid for
the meeting place for the sessions on May 15, June 12,
August 29, and October 23, 1972. The Respondent paid for
the meeting place for the sessions on May 23, August 3,
and September 3, 1972.
At the August 29, 1972, bargaining session Goodman
(counsel for the Union) suggested that the next meeting be
held in Atlanta, Georgia. Tahaferro for the Respondent
would not agree to this, indicating that the meetings should
be held where the Company was located.
On November 27, 1972, Tahaferro (Respondent's coun-
sel) wrote Dansavage of the Union, related in effect that he
had agreed to meet on November 30 without having
knowledge of the docket that was in front of him, related
that it was not convenient to meet on November 30 but
that he could meet with the Union on December 7, 1972,
and set forth "In view of the union's method of negotiat-
ing, we will no longer be willing to share the expense of a
meeting hall."
4. At the first bargaining session on May 15, 1972,
Dansavage sketched out generally the Union' s aims as to
securing better wages, fringe benefits, and employment
conditions for employees. This discussion clearly indicated
a desired range of wages increases and may be said to have
outlined a perimeter of demand thereto. Dansavage then
presented to Respondent a written standard type contract
proposal, to be used as a guide in arriving at a contract.
This written proposal did not specify the actual wage
demands. There was thus some general discussion of
contract provisions at this session.
At the second bargaining session on May 23, 1972, the
Respondent presented to the Union a document. This
document purported to be a grouping of contractual
proposals which would constitute a substantial part of a
contract as proposed but did not purport to be a proposal
of a complete contract. Tahaferro indicated to Dansavage
(for the Union) that he would furnish additional language
for the proposal the next week. At the session on June 12,
1972, Dansavage asked Tahaferro for the additional
language for Respondent's contractual proposal which
Respondent had promised. Taliaferro told Dansavage that
he did not have any additional language to present at this
time, that his secretary had gone on vacation. Between
May 23, 1972, and February 13, 1973, the time of the trial
in this matter, Tahaferro did not furnish the additional
contractual language (in writing) that he had promised
Dansavage. At the last bargaining session on October 23,
1972, Dansavage again asked Taliaferro for the additional
contract language he had promised. Taliaferro told
Dansavage that there was no sense in giving additional
language, that the Union hadn't done anything with the
language already given. Although during the sessions there
were some agreements made concerning the Union's and
Respondent's proposals, there were no significant propos-
als made by Respondent otherwise.
5. The initial bargaining postures of the parties as
revealed by their proposals and comments thereto may be
summarized as follows: The Union's initial posture was the
presentation of a standard type contract as a guide and the
seeking of substantial wage and fringe benefits. The
standard type contract contained detailed provisions as to
employee rights and benefits and union-security and
checkoff provisions. The Respondent's initial posture was
the presentation to the Union of status quo provisions,
same wages and benefits , excepting that the management
rights clause eliminated certain rights accorded an exclu-
sive bargaining representative as a matter of law, and
excepting the fact that the conditions would be embodied
in a written contract.
There was no significant change in the bargaining
postures or positions throughout the seven bargaining
sessions and until the date of trial in this matter.
During the seven bargaining sessions , the parties
discussed the proposals and reached agreement with
respect to a number of items. As to other proposals, there
was adequate discussion and reasons offered for positions
thereto as to some of such proposals. As to some of the
proposals, Tahaferro gave a flat no, commented in effect as
to some proposals that "it stinks," and as to some
essentially refused to discuss the proposals.
Some of the Union's representatives also made com-
ments to the same effect about some of the company
proposals.
Tahaferro, throughout the bargaining sessions , took the
position that Respondent would not offer increased wage
or fringe benefits. Tahaferro repeatedly stated that the
Respondent was a new company and that it did not have
enough experience to know whether it could or could not
afford a wage increase. With respect to this, it is noted that
Dansavage, during the bargaining sessions, on May 23,
1972, pointed out that the Union had information to the
effect that Respondent was a subsidiary of Universal
Coveralls which was not a new company and that they
should certainly know whether or not the company was
going to make a profit. Tahaferro told Dansavage that he
didn't know that they "are a part of anything." On June 12,
1972, the Union requested profit-and-loss information
from Respondent. On August 3, 1972, the Union, by
telegram, again requested such information. No informa-
tion purporting to supply the above information was given
the Union until mid-December 1972. As indicated later
UNOCO APPAREL, INC. 607
herein, I find that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by its refusal to timely furnish relevant
information concerning its financial records relating to its
reasons in support of its wage offers.
The Union also requested other information from the
Respondent. I have considered all of the evidence thereto
and am persuaded that the evidence relating to such
requested information (wage rates, etc.) does not reveal
bad-faith bargaining. There is a dispute as to whether the
Union requested the average earnings of individual
employees or the average earnings of all employees
Considering the language on the Union's August 3
telegram as to average earning of all employees and the
failure to complain to Respondent as to the information
ultimately furnished, I am convinced that the totality of the
evidence supports Taliaferro's testimony and the Respon-
dent's contentions that the request was not made as to
average earnings of individuals.
6. Since the major issue of bad-faith bargaining
requires a consideration of totality of evidence, I find it
proper to briefly refer to certain other facts adduced which
came within the ambit of the General Counsel's conten-
tions but which I do not find to be sufficient to reveal
overall bad-faith bargaining.
At one of the later bargaining sessions a dispute arose
over whether Bamberg had perjured himself by testifying
in an NLRB representation hearing that there were no
supervisors, and by submitting a document at the bargain-
ing sessions indicating that there were five supervisors. No
real issue developed in the bargaining sessions as to
whether the individuals were or were not supervisors. At
the bargaining sessions Tahaferro and Goodman, the
union lawyer, argued about the Union's accusation that
Bamberg had perjured himself, about Respondent's being
cross-examined during bargaining about this matter, and
about court actions that might be involved. I do not find
this incident or argument to be indicative of overall bad-
faith bargaining since no genuine issue as to the status of
the five employees referred to on the document as
supervisors continued.
During the bargaining sessions , the parties discussed
whether Respondent had unilaterally cut some wage rates.
The wage rates cuts were rescinded, but the employees
involved were not paid back wages for the cuts. Essentially,
Tahaferro's position at the bargaining sessions was that the
wage rate cuts would be rescinded but no backpay would
be paid. The General Counsel had elected prior to the trial
not to litigate the question of the wage cuts as an unfair
labor practice. Without, at least, a background determina-
tion that the wage rate cuts were unlawful, which the
General Counsel's election not to proceed thereupon as an
unfair labor practice prevents, the evidence is insufficient
to reveal that Respondent's conduct at the bargaining
sessions as regards such wage cuts is that of bad-faith
bargaining.
The General Counsel adduced evidence relating to
remarks by Plant Manager Bamberg shortly after the
NLRB election results in the representation election. Thus
Bamberg on April 14, 1972, apparently told a newspaper
reporter that the election results were unbelievable, that
"as far as the plant's future, I do not know." I am not
persuaded that these remarks are persuasive to reveal that
the bargaining by Respondent was that of bad-faith
bargaining.
During the bargaining sessions, apparently when being
pushed by the Union's attorney as to the meaning of
Respondent's management rights proposals and as to
Respondent's discouragement of union membership there-
from, Tahaferro remarked that Respondent might try to
discourage union membership and want another election
Considering the totality of the evidence, Respondent's
proposal concerning the recognition of the Union, and the
fact that Respondent did not question the Union's status, I
am persuaded that these remarks, although ill chosen, do
not reveal a bad-faith intent as to bargaining.
There is a dispute as to whether, before the June 12,
1972, bargaining session , Tahaferro told Dansavage that he
didn't know how Respondent expected him to get a
contract since it gave him nothing to offer. I credit
Dansavage's testimony as to such remarks. Although
Tahaferro denied such remarks in his testimony, the
attitude expressed is consistent with the hard-nosed
posture he took in the bargaining sessions . I am not
persuaded that Tahaferro knowingly misstated the facts.
Rather, I am persuaded that his memory of what occurred
on such occasion is not as reliable as Dansavage's. I am not
persuaded that such remarks reveal that Respondent's
overall bargaining was in bad faith.
Conclusion
Whether or not a Respondent bargains in bad faith and
with no intention of entering into a final and binding
contract requires a consideration of the totality of all the
facts and a valued judgment based thereupon. The facts
are not in real dispute. The essential thrust of the facts has
been presented. The ultimate conclusionary factual deter-
mination that I make is that the overall facts are not
sufficient to reveal that Respondent has bargained in an
overall manner in bad faith and with no intention to enter
into a final and binding agreement.
The above conclusion is not completely free from doubt.
I have considered all of the fact, including facts which are
indicative of bad-faith bargaining. When parties are
engaged in hard bargaining, it is clear that they know that
final results will not come quickly and easily. Respondent's
withdrawal from its agreement to share the expenses of the
meeting place on November 27, 1972, is indicative of bad-
faith bargaining. The failure to give reasons for its
positions as to some of the proposals excepting to say "it
stinks" is also indicative of bad-faith bargaining. The
failure to timely furnish contract language proposals when
promised is also indicative of bad-faith bargaining.
However, as I see the facts , the bargaining sessions reveal
that neither party has altered substantially its overall
posture. The Respondent's written partial proposal offered
on May 23, 1972, included proposals covering a substantial
number of items included in many contracts. The agree-
ments made between the Respondent and the Union are
not insubstantial despite the fact that the parties' overall
postures remain the same. It is clear that wages constituted
a critical issue . It is clear that Respondent's refusal to
timely furnish relevant information relating to its reason
608 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for its wage offers has a substantial bearing upon the
question or progress of resolution of the wage issue
question. The overall facts, however, reveal that the parties
have jockeyed for position as to the main issues. Each
party has attempted to make the other party move
substantially on the wage issue without substantial move-
ment on its own position. Each party has remained
substantially fixed on its wage demands.
The Respondent's contract proposals, its revealed posi-
tion as to wages and benefits, and the agreements made are
strongly indicative that Respondent would be willing to
sign a contract consistent thereto. As to the indicia of bad-
faith bargaining previously referred to, I am not persuaded
that such are sufficient to reveal that Respondent has
bargained in an overall manner in bad faith and with
intent not to agree to or enter into a final and binding
agreement. I conclude and find that the facts do not reveal
that Respondent has bargained in an overall manner in
bad faith and with an intent not to agree to or enter into a
final and binding agreement in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
The Refusal To Furnish Information
The Respondent gave the Union its contract proposal (a
partial proposal) at the May 23, 1972, bargaining session.
The subject of Respondent's wage offer was first discussed
at this session. What occurred thereto is revealed by the
following excerpts from Dansavage's credited testimony.
After glancing through the company's proposal, I
said, I don't see anything in here that you are proposing
that you are not already doing or already paying.
I pointed out that I felt there was going to be an
increase in the Federal Minimum and that we shouldn't
have to sit around and wait until the Federal Minimum
was increased, we should go ahead and try to negotiate
higher Minimums.
Mr. Taliaferro informed me that he did not know
that there would be an increase in the Federal
Minimums, that his client did not give him anything to
offer, and, that it was a new business and that the
company hadn't received or hadn't had a reasonable
picture as of yet.
I then again asked him if he had any increase in
money or any increase in contract minimums.
Mr. Taliaferro informed me that they did not.
The subject of wages was again discussed at the June 12,
1972, bargaining session. What occurred thereto is revealed
by the following excerpts from Dansavage's credited
testimony.
Q. Tell us what was discussed next?
A. I then asked him again if he had any money to
offer, or any fringes or changes.
Mr. Taliaferro told me that the company's position
would not be altered.
He says, there is no money, no changes , no fringes.
The company's position will not be altered.
Q. Will you continue with the discussion.
A. He went on to say that the company has not
been in business long enough, that they didn't know
what was happening yet, that the company didn't know
if they were losing money but that the owner said they
were going to be in the black.
Q. Any response to that?
A. I told Mr. Taliaferro that the company was here
in Selma for about six or seven months and surely with
their experience that they should have some knowledge
of knowing whether or not they are going to have a
profit.
Mr. Taliaferro said that they wouldn't have any
financial offer to give. They don't know what they can
afford.
Q. Would you continue.
A I then asked Mr. Taliaferro if he had any money
to offer or any fringes or any increases.
Mr. Taliaferro informed me that the employees
came to the wrong well, that the well is dry.
One of the employees said, if the well is dry, one of
the Committee girls says, if the well is dry how come we
are working ourselves to death and all of those pants
are being shipped out of the back door.
There was no response to that.
At that point, I asked Mr. Taliaferro if he would
supply the Union with a copy of the Profit and Loss
Statement.
Q. You recall the response?
A. Mr. Taliaferro said he would let me know.
Taliaferro's testimony as to the position he took on
wages and his asserted reasons is revealed by the following
excerpts from his testimony:
Q. Did you ever say neither you or the company
knew what you could afford to offer?
A. No, I did not. I told them that we were not in a
position until we had further information as to how the
company was doing, and a better way of knowing
where we stood to make offers on finances. And as far
as affording it, I repeated to them that I knew nothing
of the financial condition of the company. I had no
reason to inquire, that they paid my fees and that's as
far as I needed to inquire.
Considering the total consistency of the evidence, the
greater preciseness of Dansavage 's testimony as to specific
events, I find Dansavage 's testimony more reliable as to
these events and points than Taliaferro's and so credit and
find the facts . Taliaferro 's testimony, however , consistent
with Dansavage 's, clearly reveals that Respondent asserted
as a reason for its wage offer that Respondent was not in a
position to make offers on finances until it had further
information as to how the Company was doing and a
better way of knowing where it stood.
Thereafter, and until December 22, 1972, it is clear that
Respondent did not furnish the Union the requested
information relative to its asserted reason concerning its
wage proposals. On August 2, 1972, the Union by telegram
reiterated its request for profit-and-loss information. This
telegram was received by Taliaferro on the day of the
August 3, 1972, bargaining session. In the bargaining
UNOCO APPAREL, INC. 609
session on August 3, 1972, the profit-and-loss information
request was discussed as is revealed by the following
credited excerpts from Dansavage's testimony.
A. Yes.
I asked Mr. Tahaferro if he had the information we
requested, namely the individual average earnings and
the profit and loss statement.
He pulled out a telegram and he says, my secretary
handed me this telegram as I was leaving for this
meeting in Selma and he says, I didn't know you
wanted this information.
Q. Were you told anything as to the P & L
information requested?
A. I requested copy of the Profit and Loss
Statement and Mr. Taliaferro told me that he didn't
know whether he had to furnish us a copy. He didn't
know if he would. Then he went on to say, well that he
dust wouldn't.
Q. You recall what was discussed next?
A. I believe I then again asked the company if they
had any offers in any money or fringe benefits.
Mr. Taliaferro's answer was, no. No changes.
The question of wages and the request for profit and loss
information was discussed at the August 29, 1972,
bargaining session. What occurred with respect thereto is
revealed by the following excerpts from the record and
Dansavage's credited testimony.
MR. KoRETZKY: At the August 29, 1972, negotiation
session, Taliaferro and Bamberg represented the
company and Dansavage, Chisholm, Attorney David
Goodman and the 5-member employee committee
represented the Union.
The meeting started at about 2 p.m. and lasted about
1-1/2 hours.
Goodman began the meeting by asking Taliaferro
for the mforrnation he had requested in his August 2
telegram, namely, employee earnings and a profit and
loss statement.
MR. KORETZKY: At this point, there was discussion
relative to the wage or fringe package, but this is not an
area of stipulation.
The next matter that can be stipulated is that Mr.
Goodman asked how long the company had been in
business. Taliaferro replied since November 16, 1971.
Goodman asked for information on whether the
company was making a profit or loss, that he would
like to know the financial condition of the company.
Taliaferro said this was not available to Goodman.
Goodman said he thought he was entitled to this
information, and that he may have to file charges if he
didn't get it.
Taliaferro said he didn't care what Goodman did.
and that he would not furnish any financial informa-
tion.
MR. KoRETZKY: Goodman asked if Unoco wasn't
part of a larger company-larger company.
Taliaferro replied that it was none of his business.
Goodman then asked if any of the owners would be
at the next meeting, and would he have any money to
offer.
Taliaferro said he was negotiating and that there
would be no wage increases in the near future.
* * * * *
Q. (By Mr. Koretzky) Your testimony reflects that
at each meeting there were inquiries to the Union
relative to the wages and fringe question. Would you
tell us at this meeting if you recall at least the initial
inquiry relative to wages and fringes.
A. Mr. Goodman asked Mr. Taliaferro if they had
any money to offer, any fringe benefits. Mr. Taliaferro
said, "No, we do not."
Mr. Goodman asked him why, and he said,
"Because we don't have any at this time."
Q. Do you recall whether, at any time later in this
meeting, there was any mention of wages and fringes?
A. Yes. As a matter of fact, when Mr. Goodman
came to wages and in our standard agreement, which is
Article VII, page 3, he asked him again about wages,
and Mr. Taliaferro said that no, that he had no wages
or fringe benefits to offer, that he had nothing more to
submit than what he had already submitted.
The question of wages and the request for profit-and-loss
information was discussed at the bargaining session on
September 13, 1972, and is revealed by the following
excerpts from the record (stipulation).
MR. KoRETzKY: Based upon off the record discus-
sion, I believe that the following stipulation is accepta-
ble to the parties.
At the September 13, 1972, meeting, Taliaferro
represented the company, the Union was represented
by Mr. Dansavage, Goodman, Chisolm, and an
employee committee of 15.
The meeting started at about 12:30 p.m., and lasted
a total of 40 minutes, including a short caucus.
During this meeting, Goodman asked for a profit
and loss statement, the earnings before and after the
rate cut, the individual average earnings and the figures
to check the company's averages. And also requested
them to make information available on Blue Cross,
both as to benefit and cost. As to the financial
information, Tahaferro said he would not provide the
financial information. On the other information re-
quested, Taliaferro said he didn't have it. That he may
get it to the Union. That he would write a letter to
them.
Goodman said that he felt that they were entitled to
this information to be able to negotiate, and that he
may have to file charges if he didn't provide this
information.
Taliaferro said to file any damned charges he wanted
to file.
Goodman asked how long the company had been in
business, and Taliaferro said, "It will be a full year in
November."
610 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The question of wages and the request for profit-and-loss
information was discussed at the October 23, 1972,
bargaining session and is revealed by the following
excerpts from the record (stipulations).
MR. KORETZKY: Based upon the off the record
discussion, I would like to propose the following
stipulations as to the seventh and final negotiation
session as between the parties. And it was held on
October 23, 1972, between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m.
Taliaferro represented the company, and Dansavage
and Goodman-
MR. TALIAFERRO: I have not agreed about, to any
final , final is frequently used, but it was not final.
MR. KORETZKY: The seventh negotiating session,
Mr. Taliaferro represented the employer and Dansa-
vage, Goodman, Chisolm, and the employee committee
of about 11 employees attended on behalf of the
Union.
Goodman opened by asking if Tahaferro had
anything new to offer, wages and holidays, and
Talfaferro said no.
Goodman asked if he had anything on wages;
Taliaferro said he had nothing to offer.
Goodman said, "How about hours?" And Taliaferro
said, "No, we will work 40 hours"
Goodman asked about the profit and loss statement,
and Talfaferro said he would not supply them.
The Union filed the unfair labor practice charge in this
case on October 12, 1972. Said charge averred in effect that
Respondent, since on or about May 8, 1972, had refused to
supply the Union with certain material and information
pertinent to collective bargaining. The Board's complaint
in this matter, alleging, in part, unlawful conduct on
Respondent's part by refusing to furnish relevant requested
information relating to its wage offer reasons was issued on
November 20, 1972. Respondent from June 12, 1972, to
December 22, 1972, did not furnish to the Union the
requested profit and loss information. On December 22,
1972, Respondent furnished to the Union a statement,
purporting to be an unaudited financial statement relating
to profit and loss information for the Respondent
concerning operations from November 15, 1971, to August
31, 1972.
Conclusions
Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find that
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by not timely furnishing, after proper request, relevant
information necessary for the Union to bargain intelligent-
ly concerning wages and Respondent's asserted reason for
its wage offers.
An employer does not have to furnish financial records
or profit and loss information to a union, even if
requested, if such is not relevant to the bargaining issues.
If, however, an employer asserts a reason, such as an
2 Tahaferro's remarks about the "well" being dry reveals that his
position was postulated on an assumption that Respondent could not afford
a wage increase
3 N.LR B v Truitt Manufacturing Co, 351 U S 149 (1956)
4 1 .find it unnecessary to pass upon whether the information furnished
inability to pay or a related type reason , in support of his
position on wages, the union is normally entitled to such
information as will support or disprove such assertion.
A realistic appraisal of what Talfaferro asserted as to his
reasons for his wage offers and positions is that Talfaferro
asserted that his wage offers and positions were based
upon the fact that he might be unable to afford a wage
offer other than that offered.2 If such information and
facts as were available to Respondent would support this
assertion, then the assertion would be true, and the parties
could proceed accordingly. If such information and facts
as were available to Respondent did not support such
assertion, then the assertion would be untrue, and the
Union could advocate in bargaining arguments contrary to
Talfaferro's assertions that he might not be able to afford a
wage increase, could advocate and point out specific and
supported arguments to the effect that he could make other
offers. To hold otherwise would require the Union to accept
a premise tantamount to economic justification of Respon-
dent's wage offers, even if not true.3
Respondent, by Taliaferro, on June 12, 1972, and
thereafter until December 22, 1972, after unfair labor
practice charges and complaint relating to such requested
information, took the expressed position that it did not
have to furnish the profit and loss information and that it
was not going to do so. Under such circumstances, the
refusal to furnish relevant information when requested is
violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The ultimate furnishing of profit and loss information on
December 22, 1972, even if in compliance with the request
otherwise, does not negate the fact that an unfair labor
practice has occurred. Further, for adequate reasons, the
Union can pursue relevant questions thereto relating to
reliability thereof even after receipt of such information.4
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth, in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate and substantial relationship to trade, traffic and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstruction commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has refused to
bargain collectively with the Union by refusing to furnish
relevant information and financial records to support its
asserted reason for its wage offers as being because it might
not be able to afford a wage increase, it will be
recommended that the Respondent, upon request, furnish
relevant information and financial records relating to such
asserted reason.
on December 22. 1972. if timely furnished , adequately responded to the
Union's request for information See Metlox Manufacturing Co, 153 NLRB
1388 (1965), enfd 378 F 2d 728, (C A 9, 1967). cert denied 389 U S 1037
(1967)
UNOCO APPAREL, INC.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Unoco Apparel, Inc., the Respondent, is an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO, is, and has been at all times material herein, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees, includ-
ing packers, employed by Respondent at its Selma,
Alabama, plant; excluding office clerical employees, plant
clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times since on or about April 13, 1972, and
continuing to date, the Union has been, and is now, the
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining of a
majority of the employees in the unit described above, and,
by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been, and is now,
the exclusive representative of all employees in said unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms
and conditions of employment.
5. By refusing to furnish, upon request, relevant
information and financial records to justify its asserted
reason for offering to agree to only the current wages and
fringe benefits, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER -5
Respondent, Unoco Apparel, Inc., its officers , agents,
successors, and assigns, shall-
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the unit, by
failing, upon request, to furnish said Union with such
information and other relevant material (to support
Respondent's claim that its wage offers are based upon the
fact that it might not be able to afford any wage increase)
as will enable the Union to discharge its function as the
statutory representative of Respondent's employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit set out below:
The appropriate bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees, includ-
ing packers, employed by Respondent at its Selma,
Alabama, plant, excluding office clerical employees,
plant clerical employees, professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
611
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act.
(b) In any like manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, furnish said Union with such informa-
tion and other relevant material in support of Respon-
dent's claim that its wage offers are based upon the fact
that it might not be able to afford any wage increase as will
enable the Union to discharge its function as the statutory
representative of Respondent's employees.
(b) Post at Respondent's plant at Selma, Alabama,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."6 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 15, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representatives, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by Respondent for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this
Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of unlawful
conduct not specifically found to be violative herein be
dismissed.
5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 10246 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
international Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO, by failing to furnish said Union with such
information and other relevant material as will enable
the Union to discharge its function as a statutory
representative of our employees in the appropriate unit
described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The
appropriate bargaining unit is:
612 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All production and maintenance employees,
including packers , employed by Respondent at its
Selma, Alabama , plant ; excluding office clerical
employees , plant clerical employees , professional
employees , guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
WE WILL , upon request , furnish the International
Ladies' Garment Workers ' Union , AFL-CIO, with
relevant information and other relevant material to
substantiate our claim that our wage offers are based
upon the fact that we might not be able to afford any
wage increase.
UNoco APPAREL, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board 's Office , Plaza Tower , 1001 Howard
Avenue, Suite 2700 , New Orleans , Louisiana 70113,
Telephone 504-527-6361.