United Merchants & Mfrs.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsSep 24, 1985276 N.L.R.B. 345 (N.L.R.B. 1985) Copy Citation UNITED MERCHANTS & MFRS. 345 Uniglass Industries , Div. United Merchants & Mfrs. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Work- ers Union, AFL-CIO,. CLC. Case 11-CA-. 11089 24 September 1985 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND JOHANSEN On 3 August 1984 Administrative Law Judge Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. - The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER - The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Uniglass In- dustries, Div. United Merchants & Mfrs., States- ville, North Carolina, its officers , agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth.in the Order. I The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 ( 1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings Janet M. Holland, Esq., for the General Counsel. David C. Hagaman, Esq. (Clark, Paul, Hoover & Mallard), of Atlanta, Georgia, for the Respondent. Robert E. Freeman, of Kannapolis, North Carolina, for the Charging Party. - DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HUTTON S. BRANDON , Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried at Statesville , North Carolina, April 24-26, 1984. The charge was filed • on October 19, 1983,1 by Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (the Union) and amended on December 2. The complaint and an amended 'complaint in the case issued on December 2 and 13, respectively. The com- plaint, as amended, alleges that Uniglass Industries, Div. United Merchants & Mfrs. (Respondent or the Company) All dates are in 1983 unless otherwise specified. violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).' The primary issues are whether Respondent (a) violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act in discharging its employee Jeffrey Smith be- cause of his involvement in union or concerted activities; (b) violated Section 8(a)(4), (3), and (1) of the Act by re- fusing to rehire Elaine Honeycutt, Charles Pegram, and Jeanette Pegram because of their union activities and/or because they -gave testimony under the Act in a prior proceeding before the Board involving Respondent; and .(c) independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act through statements of two supervisors to employees to the effect that the alleged discriminatees were discharged or were not rehired because of their involvement in union activities or activities otherwise protected under the Act. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and after consideration of the oral argument at the hearing by the Union and the post- hearing briefs filed by the General Counsel and Re- spondent, I make the following , FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is a corporation operating a plant in Statesville , North Carolina, where it is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic fibers. During the 12-month period preceding issuance of complaint, Respondent, at its Statesville plant, received goods and raw materials valued in excess of $50,000- directly from outside the State of North Carolina. During the same period, Re- spondent manufactured, sold, and shipped goods valued in'excess of $50,000 from its Statesville plant directly to points outside the State of North Carolina. On these ad- mitted facts, the complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that Respondent -is an employer engaged in commerce Within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The complaint also alleges, Respondent admits, and I further find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background The union activity alleged to provide the impetus for Respondent's action in the refusals to rehire and the dis- charge in this case began among Respondent's employees sometime in early 1980. All of the alleged discriminatees herein testified to various activities in behalf of the Union, and Respondent, through Carl Sharpe, its assist- ant director of industrial relations, -admitted to knowl- edge of the union inclinations and sympathies of Honey- cutt and Charles Pegram. Moreover, both Honeycutt and Charles Pegram had given testimony against Respondent in a prior unfair labor practice hearing before the Board in early 1981. That case was settled by the parties during the hearing and prior- to any decision on, the issues in- volved. Respondent's knowledge of . Jeanette Pegram's union inclinations could be inferred from the fact that she was 276 NLRB No. 35 346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD married to Charles Pegram and likely shared his views on the Union However such an inference is unnecessary because Rayford Clanton Jeanette s brother and a de partment manager and supervisor for Respondent admit ted to remarks related in more detail below revealing Respondents knowledge that Jeanette in fact shared in her husbands union support Jeffrey Smith testified that he was active in the union campaign to the extent of passing out union leaflets at tending meetings and wearing a union T shirt in the plant Respondent does not admit to any knowledge of Smith s union activity which in any event would have antedated his most recent period of employment by Re spondent beginning on March 14 However as detailed infra the General Counsel primarily relied on Smith s in volvement with known union adherent Honeycutt to supply the basis for Respondents knowledge of his likely union support and the predicate for retaliatory action against him The record indicates that the Union s campaign culmi nated in an election on July 24 1980 and the Union lost The record does not establish that the old union cam paign was continuing during the period when Respond ent took the alleged discriminatory action herein or that a new campaign had started at any relevant time B The Refusals to Rehire 1 The material facts a Honeycutt Elaine Honeycutt s first period of employment by Re spondent began in about 1973 On three separate occa sions she quit Her forth and last period of employment began in September 1978 At the time of her layoff in July 1982 she was a weaver Neither the layoff nor Hon eycutt s selection for layoff was discriminatory Under Respondents policies in effect at the time of Honeycutt s la) off laid off employees retained recall rights for a period of 6 months 2 Under this policy Hon eycutt s recall rights expired in January and it then became necessary for her to reapply for employment with Respondent She did so in January Moreover as required under Respondents policies Honeycutt updat ed her application monthly by advising Respondent s offices of her continued interest in employment Honey cutt testified herein that upon visits or calls to Respond ent to update her application she was told by Judy Lam berth then Respondent s assistant personnel manager to rest assured that when a job became available for which she was qualified she would be called Honeycutt was not recalled to work however in spite of the undisputed fact that beginning in February Re spondent began to hire new employees including six in Honeycutt s weaver classification Additional weavers were hired in March Further seven new employees were hired in February in the loom fixer classification a 2 Respondent changed this policy in July 1983 to extend recall rights for a full year position in which Honeycutt had received 13 weeks of training in 1980 3 Honeycutt testified that after becoming aware that Re spondent had employed a large number of employees she arranged a meeting with Sharpe in June At the meeting she asked Sharpe why she had not been recalled Sharpe replied that it was because Respondent had decided to enforce a previously existing policy against hiring appli cants with relatives in Respondent s management or su pervision 4 It is undisputed that Honeycutt s father George Honeycutt was at all material times employed by Respondent in a position qualifying him as supervisor within the meaning of the Act Honeycutt asked Sharpe why Randy Gardner a son of a weave room supervisor had been hired in February and Sharpe indicated that the return to the old policy did not take effect until March 1 8 The General Counsel contends that Respondents fail ure to rehire Honeycutt during February when it rehired other employee. and Respondents subsequent decision to enforce its anti nepotism policy were discriminatory actions designed to avoid reemployment of Honeycutt This contention is supported by further uncontradicted testimony of Honeycutt concerning conversations with her father about the union campaign and Honeycutt s of forts to be reemployed The remarks attributed to George Honeycutt by his daughter mark the development of a deep familiar rift caused by Elaine Honeycutt s union support Thus she testified that prior to her testimony in the earlier Board proceeding her father asked her not to testify told her that he would rather she stay out of the matter and told her if she testified she would lose her job and would have to leave the State to find another one The day fol lowing her testimony he told her that she had disgraced him that Respondent was going to close its doors that neither he Elaine nor her sister Wanda also an employ ee of Respondent who worked against the Union would have a job According to Honeycutt her father repeated these remarks and made similar remarks on several subse quent occasions More specifically about 3 weeks fol lowing her layoff he told her after what she had done and the shame she had put on him Respondent would never recall her to work He further told her that if she had not run her mouth and had not testified that she would still have been working at Respondent that her actions had put a black mark on his name that she was not worth much and probably would not get another job in town 3 Honeycutt conceded that it takes approximately 26 weeks of training to become proficient in loom fixing She was bumped back from the pose tion prior to completion of her training due to an economic layoff * The policy appearing in the employee handbook generally distnbut ed to employees is as follows To avoid misunderstandings no member of management shall employ and/or supervise any member of his or her immediate family The immediate family is defined as a parent brother or sister spouse child grandparent or corresponding in laws (This policy does not affect any situations existing when this policy was established ) 5 When it was decided that the old policy would be enforced relatives of management who were already employed were grandfathered in and not discharged UNITED MERCHANTS -& MFRS. 347 The last remark on this subject attributed by Honey- cutt to her father was made in a telephone conversation between the two a month or two prior to the hearing herein . Upon her question as to whether. she would be -recalled by Respondent, George Honeycutt ambiguously replied that he did not think she would be called back, not because of the Company but because of the Union. Further evidence of Respondent's animosity toward Honeycutt due to her union activity was revealed in the testimony, of employee Arlene Smith. She testified about a conversation she had with Raymond White, Respond- ent's weave division manager, around June 28, regarding the discharge of Jeffrey Smith, another alleged, discri- minatee and Arlene's son. According to Arlene Smith, White reported to her at her work station concerning his postdischarge efforts in behalf of Jeffrey Smith undertak- en at Jeffrey Smith's request. White told her there was nothing he could do about the discharge, but if he had known about it before it happened, he could have stopped it. However, he added that "they were saying" that Jeffrey made an implied threat to Respondent when he brought Honeycutt with him when he came to see his supervisors just prior to the discharge. Arlene Smith- re- plied that the only purpose for Honeycutt's presence was verification of Jeffrey Smith' s illness, which occasioned the absences which in turn precipitated Smith's discharge interview. Arlene Smith, Jeffrey's mother, added that her son had ' initially asked her to come and verify his illness to his supervisors rather than Honeycutt but she had de- clined, and Honeycutt who lived with the Smiths volun- teered. White replied that had Arlene Smith or Jeffrey come alone he would still be employed. White added that if one had an argument one would not go out and get one's worst enemy to arbitrate. Arlene Smith asked White if Honeycutt was his worst enemy and White an- swered, "The way she dragged our ass through-court[?]" and the conversation ended. Arlene Smith testified regarding two additional con- versations she had with White - concerning Honeycutt. The first was in January when she asked White if Hon- eycutt would be hired back. On that occasion, White said he thought a lot of .Arlene Smith,s and of Honey- cutt's father, and he would do his best but he had a lot of opposition from "across the street," a reference to the personnel office. Subsequently, in March, White reported to her that he and Wendell Cook, superintendent • of weaving, had "tried" hard to get Honeycutt back but just were not going to be able to do it. Respondent's explanation for not recalling Honeycutt in early February, as related through Sharpe, was that Respondent hired other former employees in preference to Honeycutt since they had better work records. Specif- ically, in this regard, Sharpe testified that during her em- ployment, Honeycutt had received 12 "talk. sheets" and 4 written reprimands while the others rehired did not have disciplinary records-'as bad as Honeycutt..Sharpe's expla- nation for the subsequent failure to recall Honeycutt was 'based on Respondent's decision to reinforce its antinepo- 6 It appears to have been common knowledge that , Honeycutt live in Arlene Smith 's home Further , Honeycutt identified Arlene Smith as being the grandmother of Honeycutt 's daughter ' tism policy. In this regard, Sharpe testified that his atten- tion was called to the antinepotism policy, or more spe- cifically, the failure to enforce it, when Supervisor Doug Gentle requested -him in February to' hire Gentle's son. Sharpe, then the personnel manager, resisted but learned that Randy Gardner, son of a department manager in weaving, had just been hired. He concluded that it was time to correct the problem by enforcing the existent policy. Accordingly, after conferring with Bob Rogers, Respondent 's general manager , the decision was made to enforce the antinepotism policy, and the decision was communicated to.Bob Foster, employee relations direc- tor, and Lamberth. Sharpe confirmed the determination to enforce the policy with a, memo to Rogers dated March - 1. He testified that • since reinstitution of the policy, Respondent- has made no exceptions in its appli- cation and-pointed out that in addition to Honeycutt, Re- spondent has, since March 1, declined to hire six rela- tives of management officials including the son of Doug Gentle.. Sharpe admitted talking to Honeycutt about the deci- sion not to rehire her because of reinstitution of the an- ._tinepotism policy. However, he placed their conversation in late March' or early April' rather than June as Honey- cutt had testified. - White, called as a- witness by- Respondent, acknowl- edged that he talked to Arlene Smith about Jeffrey Smith's discharge. He generally denied the remarks at- tributed to him by her on that occasion and conceded only that he told her that if she had come to see him before the events had taken place he possibly could have helped Jeffrey. b. Charles and Jeanette Pegrart Charles Pegram was employed by Respondent for ap- proximately 20 years. He worked as a-loom cleaner prior to his layoff about March 15, 1982. His wife, Jeanette Pegram, was also a long-time employee of Respondent having started work there in 1964. Like Charles, Jea- nette, a banker in the preparation department, had prior layoffs, one lasting from September 1976 to November 1979. Her last period of employment ended with- her layoff on January 25, 1982. Under Respondent's policy, already noted, the Pe- grams lost seniority and recall rights 6 months following their layoffs. However,,they put in new applications and monthly thereafter updated their applications by visits to the plant personnel office. They were never rehired al- though Respondent, beginning in late January and con- tinuing over the next several months, rehired a number of loom cleaners and bankers. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Pegrams. were never told by Respondent they were not going to be rehired or the reason they were not until October '12, -when Sharpe observed them during their visit to the plant to "update" their applications and called them into his office. There he explained to them, in effect, that they were' wasting their time, that they would not be rehired because Respondent had, on March 1, reinstituted its policy against hiring close relatives of supervisors or management. It is undisputed that Jeanette Pegram 's brothers Rayford and Buford Clanton were 348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employed by Respondent as supervisors at all material times. Respondent, through Sharpe, conceded at the hearing that the Pegrams had good work records and contended that the refusal to recall them was based solely on the decision to enforce the antinepotism policy. Sharpe in his further testimony explained the failure to rehire the Pe- grams during the period between the beginning of Re- spondent's rehiring of employees in the Pegrams' work classifications and the date of the reinstitution of the an- tinepotism policy. Thus, with respect to the one banker, -Elizabeth Steelman. rehired during that period, Sharpe testified that Steelman was selected over Jeanette Pegram because of her need for work and her advanced age. Further,' according to Sharpe, while the work records, of the two were about equal, Jeanette Pegram presented a slightly greater safety risk in view of a back injury which had caused her to lose worktime during her previous employment. With respect to Charles Pegram, Sharpe testified that one vacancy in the loom cleaner classification was filled on the third -shift around February 20, and another on the second shift sometime later but after the decision had been made to reinstitute the antinepotism policy. Charles Pegram was not considered for the first vacancy because he had asked for employment on the second shift (a fact he admits), and he was ineligible for the second-shift po- sition-when.it was filled due to the antinepotism policy and -his, relationship. to Supervisors Rayford and Buford Clanton. To support her contention that the refusal to rehire the Pegrams was based on unlawful union consideration, the General Counsel relies on the testimony of Jeanette Pegram and Ralph Clanton, another of Jeanette's broth- ers. Ralph Clanton testified about two telephone conver- sations he had with Rayford Clanton on September 18, during a visit to the Pegram home.? He called to inquire when that "hole" was going to rehire the Pegrams. Ray- ford Clanton took offense at the reference to Respondent which he perceived to be uncomplimentary, and the con- versations between the two brothers went downhill from that point. More specifically, Ralph Clanton testified that Rayford explained that the Pegrams had no recall rights and rejected a suggestion that he could do anything about getting them rehired saying that. it- was up to the personnel department. Rayford also added that had the ' Pegrams "not shown their asses by trying' to organize that stupid union, they might still have been" employed by Respondent. The brothers concluded their conversa- tions, but not before exchanging uncomplimentary re- marks and discussing a meeting for the purpose of fight- ing. Jeanette Pegram attributed a similar remark to Ray- foid - Clanton about October 12 after being told by Sharpe she and Charles would not be rehired. She tele- phoned Rayford and asked him what he had meant in the remark to Ralph Clanton about having showed "our ass." Rayford replied that it was on account of their 7 Ralph Clanton initially testified to only one telephone conversation with Rayford , but on cross-examination explained that Rayford hung up on him at one point but called him back -within a minute or two taking part in "the damn Union" and added that if they had not showed their "asses" they would have been back to-work "by now." Rayford Clanton in testifying for Respondent admitted that he had told Ralph that the Pegrams had showed their "asses" by being involved with the Union. Howev- er, he- related that it was Ralph who asked if Rayford was saying-that the Pegrams would still have been em- ployed if it had not been for their-union involvement. To this, Rayford responded that he had not said that. Ray- ford Clanton did not in his testimony respond to the re- marks attributed to him by Jeanette Pegram, and thus did not contradict them. While admitting to having an interest in seeing the Pe- grams return to work, Ralph Clanton had the appearance 'of a dispassionate witness. He impressed me as being to- tally unaffected, very straightforward, and guilelessly honest. Moreover, I find it plausible and believable that Rayford Clanton, having expressly admitted to his dissat- ' isfaction with the Pegrams' union involvement, would in a heated discussion have attributed their lack of' employ- ment • status to such involvement. Finally, Ralph's testi- mony is more probably accurate in view of Jeanette Pe- gram's uncontradicted testimony attributing an identical remark to Rayford Clanton. I, therefore, credit Ralph Clanton's testimony as well as that of Jeanette Pegram over that of Rayford Clanton who I found less persua- sive as a witness. - 2. Arguments and conclusions Initially, the General Counsel argues that Rayford Clanton's statement to Jeanette Pegram was coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) because it conveyed to an employee applicant that Respondent would not rehire her because she had engaged in union activities. Further, the General Counsel contends that White's statement to Arlene Smith similarly violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it implicitly and ,coercively - threatened an employee that employees were subject to discharge if they sought assistance of other employees or individuals who were, or had been, engaged in union activity. Re- spondent's arguments in defense of the allegations are predicated solely on the testimony of its witness Rayford Clanton and Raymond White. • The testimony of Rayford Clanton has already been rejected. herein where it contradicts the testimony of Ralph Clanton and Jeanette Pegram.'I likewise reject the testimony of White where it differs from that of Arlene Smith. Arlene Smith's recollection appeared reasonably good and her delivery was convincing and, I am per- suaded, truthful. Furthermore, her version was reasona- ble for it is,undisputed that White had admittedly agreed with Jeffrey Smith that he- would inquire into -Jeffrey's discharge and report to Arlene.. Smith. Lastly, as the General Counsel's brief points out, Arlene Smith, as a .current employee of Respondent, was testifying at some risk to her pecuniary interest so that her testimony was more likely to be true. Gold Standard Enterprises, 234 NLRB 618, 619 (1978). I -have considered,- however, the possibility of bias on the, part of Arlene Smith based on her relationship with Jeffrey Smith. However, I-have dis- UNITED MERCHANTS & MFRS. counted such bias, since it appears that as a long-time employee of Respondent she had more to lose than gain by false testimony. White's testimony in contrast to Arlene Smith was more equivocal and his recall less spe- cific and certain. Accordingly, I credit Arlene Smith where her testimony differs from that of White. Considering the credited testimony of Ralph Clanton, Jeanette Pegram, and Arlene Smith, I concur in the ar- guments of the General Counsel that the remarks of Rayford Clanton and White tended to be coercive and conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged through such remarks. With respect to the unlawful refusal to hire the Pe- grams and Honeycutt, the General Counsel contends that the reimplementation of the antinepotism policy was simply a pretext hit upon as a device to avoid the rehire of union adherents in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Thus, Respondent had noi' enforced the rule for many years, and even though during much of that time Sharpe had served as the plant personnel manager he'had not found the failure to enforce the rule to be a substantial problem. Even when the rule was'reimplemented, cur- rent employees were "grandfathered in" without causing any apparent difficulty. The General Counsel further argues that Respondent's witnesses cannot be believed regarding the date the antinepotism rule was reimple- mented and suggests that the date of reimplementation of March 1 was fabricated because Sharpe's March 1 memo refers to the application of Scott. Gentle as a motivating factor for the action even though Gentle's application was not submitted until March 1. Further in this regard, the General Counsel points to the fact that neither the Pegrams nor Honeycutt were advised of the reimplemen- tation until months after the claimed reimplementation date. Lastly, and specifically with respect to Charles Pegram, the General Counsel asserts that a loom cleaner was hired, on, February 28 before the rule was reimple- mented. The rule could not, therefore, have been a factor in the refusal to rehire Charles Pegram according to the General Counsel. Yet, . clearly it was the only factor relied on by Respondent in not rehiring him. The General Counsel argues that White 's statement to Arlene Smith clearly establishes the 8(a)(4) violation with respect to the Pegrams and Honeycutt because it reveals Respondent's animosity toward Honeycutt for dragging Respondent through the court. Such animosity may also be inferred for Charles Pegram who likewise testified against Respondent • in a prior case. 8 _ Respondent' s initial defense to the refusals to rehire Honeycutt and the Pegrams is a procedural one. In its brief and in argument at the hearing, Respondent relied on Machinists Local 1424'v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960), contending that any finding of a violation in the refusal's 8 The complaint alleged , and the General Counsel asserted, that the re- fusal to rehire Jeanette Pegram was also violative of Sec 8 (a)(4) Howev- er, the General Counsel appears to have abandoned this position in her brief Accordingly , and since Jeanette Pegram did not previously testify against Respondent or, insofar as the record shows, give any information of affidavit to the Board in relation to the prior case and because no au- thority or reasonable theory'has been advanced upon which an 8(a)(4) violation by Respondent with respect to Jeanette Pegram can be predi- cated , I shall recommend that this allegation of the complaint be dis- missed. 349 to rehire Honeycutt and the Pegrams is barred by the 6- month period of limitation set forth in Section 10(b) of the Act. More specifically, Respondent argues that the refusal to -hire Honeycutt and the Pegrams can be found to be unfair labor practices only if the pre-Section 10(b) decision to reimplement the antinepotism policy is found to be discriminatorily motivated. Respondent asserts that under Bryan, supra, "where a complaint based on that earlier event [the decision to implement the antinepotism policy] is time barred, to permit the event itself to be so used [as evidence to cloak with illegality that which is otherwise lawful] in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair labor practice." In making this argument, Respondent fails to distinguish the substantial body of Board law, however, which holds that Section 10(b) is subject to equity principles so that it may be tolled where a'respondent has fradulently concealed unlawful conduct and the person adversely affected by a respond- ent's actions is not put on notice of such-action. See, e.g., Jackson Engineering Co., 265 NLRB 1688 (1982); Drukker Communications, 258 NLRB 734 (1981); K & E Bus Lines, 255 NLRB 1022 (1981); Crown Cork & Seal Co., 255 NLRB 14 (1981); V M Construction Co.,' 241 NLRB 584 (1979); -Safety Electric Corp., 239 NLRB 40 (1978). On the ' basis of the cited cases the further authority cited in' Respondent's brief NLRB v. McCready & Sons, 482 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. `1973), and Bowen Products Corp., 113 NLRB 731 (1955), is inapposite, for in Respondent's case, the adversely affected parties had clear notice of the alleged unlawful actions more than 6 months. before the filing of the charge with the Board. - In the instant case, the 6-month period of limitations prior to filing the charge, I conclude, runs from the time that Honeycutt and the Pegrams were put on notice, actual or constructive, that they were not subject to rehire. Since the limitations period provided under Sec- tion 10(b) contitutes an affirmative defense, the burden of establishing the facts on which the defense rests is on the Respondent. St. Mary's Infant Home, 258 NLRB 1024 (1981 ). It is quite clear that the Pegrams were not told until October that they were not subject to rehire and the reason they were not, i.e., the reimplementation of the antinepotism rule.-The reason expressed for the refus- al to rehire is less important than the communication that they would not be hired. The fact remains that prior to October they were not in anyway discouraged from "up- dating" their applications. Respondent points to no sub- stantive evidence to establish actual or constructive knowledge on the Pegrams' part outside the 10(b) period that they would not be rehired. The fact that Respond- ent may, not have actively concealed its reimplementa- tion of the antinepotism policy does not constitute con- veyance of a notice to the Pegrams of their ineligibility for rehire. See ACF Industries, 234 NLRB 1063 (1978), enfd. as modified 596 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1979). . On the basis of this record until October, the Pegrams were entitled to believe that they were subject to being rehired and even that their probability of rehire was good, in light of their prior work record with Respond- ent which Respondent admits was good. Accordingly, I 350 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD conclude that the 10(b) period did not begin to run with respect to the Pegrams until they were advised by Sharpe that they would not be rehired Since that infor mation was given them on October 12 and the initial charge herein was filed on October 19 the charge was clearly timely under Section 10(b) Whether Respondents 10(b) defense is valid with re spect to Honeycutt s case depends on whether one be lieves Honeycutt or Respondents witnesses Sharpe and Judy Lamberth the assistant personnel manager at the relevant time Honeycutt testified it was in June that Sharpe told her she would not be rehired If in fact Hon eycutt received such notice any time in June then the charge with respect to Honeycutt was timely under Sec tion 10(b) However Sharpe testified he told Honeycutt that she would not be rehired and the reason in late March or early April Lamberth s testimony was that Sharpe told her in late March that he had advised Hon eycutt that she would not be rehired A March revela tion of this information to Honeycutt would make the charge untimely in her case Honeycutt s testimony on the time frame of her meeting with Sharpe on the subject of her rehire was unequivocal if not precise with respect to the exact date Notwithstanding the importance of her testimony on this point Respondent chose not to exten sively gLestion her on it during cross examination More over her testimony generally was not substantially con tradicted Sharpe s testimony was no more precise than Honeycutt s on the date of their meeting His uncertainty as to the date does not preclude the possibility that his discussion with Honeycutt took place after April 21 the earliest date the charge would be timely under Section 10(b) with respect to Honeycutt s case Lamberth also admitted uncertainty in her testimony placing the meet ing between Honeycutt and Sharpe in March Further more Lamberth when pressed was unable to convmc ingly explain exactly why she recalled March was the month that Sharpe told her Honeycutt had been told she would not be rehired Under these circumstances and be cause Lamberth admitted that Honeycutt continued to update her application after March and because there is no evidence that Honeycutt did so after June I am convinced that Honeycutt s testimony as to the date should be credited Accordingly I conclude that Re spondent has failed to affirmatively establish that Honey cuff had notice that Respondent definitely would not rehire her more than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge Turning to the merits of the complaint allegations re garding Honeycutt and the Pegrams it must initially be observed that the General Counsel under the dictates of Wright Line 251 NLRB 1083 (1980) enfd 662 F 2d 899 (1st Cir 1981) must fast prove a prima facie case suffi dent to support the inference that protected conduct was a motivating factor in Respondents failure to rehire the three employees Once the prima facie case is established the burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate the same action would have taken place even in the ab sence of protected conduct The General Counsels prima facie case with respect to Honeycutt and the Pegrams is established I conclude, by the statements I have found to have been made by Rayford Clanton and Raymond White The uncontra dicted statements of George Honeycutt to Elaine Honey cutt also support the General Counsels case Thus the statements of Rayford Clanton White and George Hon eycutt establish Respondents knowledge of the union ac tivities and inclinations of the three alleged discnmina tees Respondents hostility to the three because of such activity and inclinations and Respondents determination not to rehire the three specifically due to that hostility The other record evidence supporting the General Coun sel s case is found in the uncontradicted fact that the three were not rehired for positions in which they were qualified even though they had work records which would not bar their rehire and Respondent had vacancies in those positions Furthermore Sharpe in his testimony conceded that Respondents decision to reimplement the antinepotism policy was prompted to some extent by a desire to avoid the family riffs between management off cials and employee relatives occasioned by union orgam zation issues The General Counsels prima facie violation with re spect to the 8(a)(4) and (1) allegations concerning Charles Pegram and Honeycutt is made out by the re sentment Respondent demonstrated in White s statement regarding Honeycutt as having dragged Respondent through court The resentment to Charles Pegram for the same reason may reasonably be inferred since he also testified against Respondent in the same NLRB proceed mg Accordingly I conclude that the burden shifts to Respondent under Wright Line to demonstrate that it would not have rehired the three alleged discriminatees even in the absence of their protected conduct under the Act There can be no doubt as Respondent argues that its antinepotism policy had some very obvious and legiti mate purposes Indeed the policy was initially formulat ed and instituted many years prior to the advent of the union organization issue in the plant However it had been universally ignored for many years so that reimple mentation had the effect of creating a new policy The issue here is whether the return to the rule or policy was prompted by Respondents desire to avoid rehiring of union supporters There are several factors pointed to by Respondent which tend to support its case that the return to the old policy would have been made without regard to the rehire issue of the Pegrams and Honeycutt Thus there is Sharpe s testimony not specifically contradicted that the request of Supervisor Doug Gentle in February that his son be hired by Respondent called Sharpe s attention to the nepotism problem not the rehire applications of the Pegrams and Honeycutt And contrary to the con tention of the General Counsel Sharpe testified with corroboration from Lamberth and personnel clerk Brenda White that the decision to return to the old policy was made in late February even though the memo on the subject was not written until March 1 Moreover there is little evidence to contradict Sharpe s further tes timony that prior to the reimplementation of the antme potism policy the positions for which the Pegrams and Honeycutt were qualified were simply filled with rehires UNITED MERCHANTS & MFRS. who were better qualified. Accordingly, Respondent as- serts that the General Counsel has failed to establish dis- parate treatment. ' As further evidence of the lack of disparate treatment of the three and in support of its argument that it has re- butted the General Counsel's case, Respondent points out that all the new hires placed into the positions for which the Pegrams and Honeycutt were qualified were former employees rather than completely new hires. To the extent such rehires may not have been senior to the Pe- grams and Honeycutt, Respondent asserts that. the Pe- grams and Honeycutt like all the rehires who had been off more than 6 months did not have seniority so that se- niority was not a consideration. Finally, Respondent argues that following reimplemen- tation of the antinepotism policy, the rule has been rigid- ly enforced and presented evidence that six other appli- cants have been denied . employment under the policy since March 1.9 After careful consideration of the arguments and the record I am persuaded that the preponderance of the evi- dence supports the complaint allegations and Respondent has not successfully rebutted the General Counsel's case. The record initially would suggest that neither Honey- cutt nor the Pegrams so' distinguished themselves in union activities as to make them likely targets for dis- crimination. However, one must consider that at least Charles Pegram and Honeycutt did distinguish them- selves in giving testimony in the prior Board proceeding before Respondent. Further, one must also consider that they were distinguished in their union activity by virtue of their relationship to Respondent's supervisors: It was that relationship which served as a particular embarrass- ment to Respondent as revealed by the comments'attrib- uted to George Honeycutt by his daughter to the effect that he felt himself disgraced by her union activity. A, similar embarrassment to Rayford Clanton by the Pe- grams' union activity may be inferred from Clanton's re- marks that the Pegrams "showed their ass" in such activ- ity. Thus, the record clearly established not only the identification by Respondent of the Pegrams and- Honey- cutt as union activists and supporters but also their dis- tinction as probable objects of retaliation for such activ- ism And both George Honeycutt and Rayford Clanton directly related to the alleged discriminatees as already set forth herein that it was their union activism which would preclude or did preclude their reemployment. To the extent that Respondent admits that its reimple- mentation of the antinepotism policy was based on its desire to avoid internal family disputes brought about by union organization issues, Respondent admits a discrimi- natory purpose with respect to rehire situations. It' is one thing to return to the antinepotism policy and to apply it prospectively to new hires in order to avoid family squabbles over union issues . It is quite another thing to reimplement the policy and apply it retroactively to avoid the rehire of former employees because they un- fortunately encountered internal family disputes involv- ing members of Respondent' s management simply be- 9 None of these applicants, however, appear to be rehires as opposed to new hires 351 cause they exercised their rights under the Act to engage in union activity. In the latter case , the discrimination is clear for it-is a direct response to past union activity. A further intent to discriminate may be inferred from the result accomplished and the absence of evidence here to show that rehire applicants who were related to manage- ment but who have supported Respondent against the Union were similarly denied reemployment after the im- plementation of the antinepotism policy. That there was no great urgency or underlying con- cern of great moment in the rush-to reapply the antine- potism policy to rehires aside ' from retaliation for union considerations is demonstrated by the fact that Respond- ent "grandfathered" in its current employees. Every ar- gument Respondent advances for its decision to reinforce the antinepotism policy applies with equal force to its current employees so as to logically dictate their termi- nations . This includes an argument by Sharpe that a con- sideration for reimplementation was the establishment of a liberalized job-bidding procedure10 in the plant in July which increased the possibility that employee relatives of supervision would wind up being supervised by their rel- atives, a situation which would also violate Respondent's rules. I specifically reject Sharpe's testimony that this was a consideration because the liberalized policy proce- dure was' not initiated until 4 months after the decision to reimplement the antinepotism rule. On the basis of this record, this defense is pure afterthought. I do not agree with the General Counsel's argument that the record establishes that Respondent decided to reinstitute the antinepotism rule sometime later than March 1. That argument is based on pure speculation and goes against the clear weight of the evidence includ- ing the uncontradicted testimony'of Sharpe, Lamberth, and White that-the decision was made in the latter part of February. Nevertheless, based on the clear evidence of Respondent's clear knowledge of the union activity and inclinations of the' three discriminatees, the evidence of specific union animus against them including com- ments by management representatives already discussed which connects the refusal to rehire with the discrimina- tees '• involvement in prior union activity, Respondent's concession; that an effort to avoid internal family squab- bles between management and employee relatives due to employee union activity was a consideration in the return to the antinepotism rule, -and the disparate applica- tion of the antinepotism rule to refuse to rehire union ad- herents whose only disqualification for employment was their' relationship to management officials while Re- spondent retained in its employ employees who were rel- atives of management, I conclude that Respondent has failed to successfully rebut the General Counsel' s prima facie case. In short, Respondent has not demonstrated that Honeycutt and the Pegrams would not have been rehired in the absence of their protected conduct. I, therefore, fmd that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) '° The change in the job bidding in effect allowed bidding on the basis of plant seniority rather than department seniority as had previously been the case At the same time, Respondent extended recall rights to laid-off employees to 1 year rather than 6 months. This change was not applied retroactively and therefore was not applicable to Elaine Honeycutt. 352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and (1) of the Act in refusing to rehire the Pegrams and Honeycutt. - I further find, as alleged and argued by the General Counsel, that Respondent-violated Section 8(a)(4) and (1) of the Act in refusing to rehire Charles Pegram and Elaine Honeycutt. In reaching this conclusion, I rely spe- cifically on the remark by White reflecting Respondent's deep animosity. toward Honeycutt, and inferentially Pegram, for their temerity -in taking Respondent to "court" in prior unfair labor practice proceedings. C. The Discharge of Smith 1. The material facts Jeffrey Smith began, working for Respondent on a summer job at. the age of 16 but quit. He was rehired in December 1978 and :worked- until he again quit in July 1981. It is undisputed that,-his job performance and at- tendance record during that-period of-employment was so unimpressive that when he again sought employment by Respondent in March,.•it was necessary for Arlene Smith, a 20-year employee of, Respondent, to intercede in his behalf and persuade representatives of, management, including Sharpe, to rehire him.. Jeffrey Smith was re- hired on March 14, but conceded herein that he was told upon rehiring that, Respondent had reservations about it, that he would have to abide by all the rules and regula- tions on attendance, and that , he would be carefully watched Smith agreed that he, would be a better em- ployee. - Smith began his 90-day. probationary period as a loom cleaner but subsequently, bid into a weaver position. He missed a day of work on, April 13 due to illness. -He was absent on April 16 but was given permission for the ab- sence 11 and Arlene Smith worked in her son's place on that date.-On April 29, Smith was given a talk sheet for. poor job performance. Smith was again ill and absent on May 2, and was. given a talk sheet for` the absence. 12 On May 26, he left work due to illness, and on June '14 and 15, he again missed work 'due to' illness. WhenSmith re- ported for his next scheduled shift after June-115, he was sent home and told to come back the next day to see Weaving Superintendent Cook 'and Department Head J. C. Waugh. ' Suspecting that he 'might be' discharged,; and 'upon advice of an attorney who was representing' him in a bankruptcy proceeding to'take a witness with him to the meeting with Cook and Waugh to verify that his absence was due to illness, Smith took. Elaine Honeycutt with him to the plant•on June 16. There he-met initially with Cook in Cook's office. Cook refused to allow Honeycutt to attend even though at the outset of the meeting Smith explained that he had brought Honeycutt to verify that 11 In spite of the permiss.on to be off work on April 16 , Smith's ab- sence was not excused under the terms of Respondent 's attendance con- trol procedures In short, the absence was counted against him -.' 12 A "talk sheet" is a written recording of a critical supervisory com- ment to an employee regarding job performance Under Respondent's procedures , three talk sheets given - to,an employee within their 90-day probationary period was basis for an "automatic discharge " Attendance policies provided for a verbal warning rather than a talk sheet for the first absence of a probationary employee. he had been ill during his absence on June 14 and 15. Al- though Cook allowed Smith to bring a tape recorder into the meeting, he declined Smith's request to use' it. Cook began the meeting inquiring of Smith about any problems he was having on the job, and Smith replied that he had none, adding the one he had had previously with the loom fixers had improved. At this point,-ac- cording to Smith's testimony, Waugh entered 'the meet- ing and 'the discussion turned to Smith 's absences. Smith protested that one of those days he had been off with permission , but White responded that he did not care and asked Smith what he thought ought- to be done. Smith replied that he would do better if he was given a chance. White ended the meeting saying that he wanted to talk the matter over with Waugh. - = - Smith returned -to the plant lobby and waited. White and Waugh thereafter came and got him and 'took him to the personnel office where the three met with Sharpe. Sharpe advised Smith that his services were no longer needed because he had been out-too many days during his probationary period. Sharpe offered some suggestions to Smith regarding changes he might make before look- ing for other employment, but Smith curtly responded with his own suggestion that Sharpe mind his own busi- ness . The meeting ended after an argument over whether Smith was entitled to his paycheck on the spot and Sharpe's threat to call the police if Smith did not leave. Still, according to Smith, about a week after his dis- charge he returned to the plant to clean out his locker- and talk to White. While there he saw Waugh and asked him if Waugh thought he had been belligerent in his dis- cussion with Cook and Waugh. Waugh refused to com- ment saying only that Smith was-trying to catch him in the middle of things. Subsequently, Smith talked to White, and explained that his absences were occasioned by illness' and he could not understand why he had been treated as he was, particularly since his last 2 days' ill- ness had come beyond the completion of his 90-day cal- endar day probationary period. White's response, was that his hands were tied and there was nothing he could do, but added that if Smith had come and talked to White before talking to Cook and Waugh on the day of the discharge, -Smith would not have lost his job. Never- theless , White told Smith he would look into the matter and see if anything could be 'done and would thereafter communicate with Arlene Smith. White 's subsequent report to.Arlene Smith has already been related. Respondent's version of the discharge of Smith was re- lated through Cook and Sharpe. Cook testified that Smith was rehired for his last period, of employment only with some reluctance in view of his earlier attendance and attitude problems. Cook testified that after each ab-. sence during Smith 's last employment he talked to-Smith about the absence, and after the May 2 absence told Smith that he was exceeding the absentee guidelines and not living up to his 'commitment to better attendance he made when rehired . When Smith missed June 14 and 15, Cook discussed the matter with Sharpe and it was decid- ed that he should be called in to talk with Cook and Waugh : Cook concedes that there was no decision to discharge Smith at that point and' that that decision was UNITED MERCHANTS & MFRS. only made after the meeting with Smith when Smith flip- pantly told Cook there was no need of talking, that they should go ahead and do whatever. they wanted, that whatever Smith. had to say would make no difference, that Smith was not going back out, and . work for Super- visors Clint Billings, that all the supervisors wanted was to push employees without any concern for why em- ployees have to be absent from work. Further, Smith added, according to Cook, that there were certain super- visors he could not and did not plan to work for and complained of - the treatment of specific supervisors. Cook sent Smith back to the lobby and then proceeded with Waugh'to see Sharpe. Cook testified that he recom- mended to Sharpe that in view of Smith's attitude to the effect he did not need to be corrected and also because of his absentee record Smith should be discharged. More particularly , with respect to Smith 's absences, Cook testi- fied it was not the basis for the absences which con- cerned him -but rather the number of absences. Sharpe agreed with the recommendation and Smith was called in and discharged. Sharpe's testimony generally corroborated that of Cook. Further, according to Sharpe, the reason for the discharge "decision which he, Waugh, and Cook arrived at was Smith's failure to live up to his commitment on rehire and their belief that it would be putting off the in- evitable if he was not discharged at the point of leaving his - probationary period and before becoming a regular employee . Moreover , Sharpe pointed out that Respond- ent had grounds for automatically- discharging Smith after his May 2 absence. In this regard, Sharpe pointed out that under normal procedures , Smith should have re- ceived a talk sheet after his April 16 absence so that after his May 2 absence he would have had 'a total of three talk- sheets rather than two. Smith's failure to receive a talk sheet after the April 16 absence was simply due to " the oversight of that attendance clerk according to Sharpe. 2. Arguments and conclusions The General Counsel argues regarding Jeffrey Smith that he was discharged simply because he antagonized and provoked Respondent by bringing a known union adherent , Honeycutt , to assist him on June 16. This was demonstrated , according to' the General Counsel, by Cook's admission that no discharge decision was made until Smith reported to the plant on June 16, and by White's statement to Arlene Smith to the effect • that the presence of Honeycutt constituted an implied threat to Respondent and had it not been for that, Jeffrey would still have had his job. Further, the General Counsel argues that Cook, in. effect, admitted to Arlene Smith that Jeffrey Smith had not said anything in his meeting with Cook to demonstrate a bad attitude . Arlene , Smith's testimony in this regard was that on June 16, after Jef- frey's discharge , Cook explained to'her that he had in- tended to put him back to work but that he had come in with a "mistrustful attitude ." When she asked him what Jeffrey Smith had said-or told him, Cook replied, "Well, you can have a bad attitude without saying or doing any- 353 thing , it is more how you act."13 Finally, the General Counsel contends that Respondent 's evidence does not in fact establish that Jeffrey Smith had a "bad attitude" on June 16 prior to the time his discharge was announced. Based on the factors enumerated above, I find, that the General Counsel established a prima facie violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act with respect to Jeffrey Smith 's discharge. Respondent 's evidence and argument in rebuttal must be considered next. Respondent 's defense is based essentially on Cook's testimony already set forth regarding Jeffrey- Smith 's atti- tude on June 16. Comparison of the testimony of Jeffrey Smith and Cook shows relatively little conflict . In short, much of what each attributed to' the other is not specifi- cally denied on the record. Therefore, I conclude that Jeffrey Smith did in fact display a less than totally coop- erative attitude in the meeting with Cook and Waugh, and, subsequently in the meeting 'with Sharpe. The criti- cal issue to be resolved, however, is whether Smith was initially contrite and subsequently provoked into belliger- ency by actions or remarks by Cook reflecting the futili- ty of attempting to placate Respondent . That he was ini- tially provoked was clearly the case in the meeting with Sharpe for the evidence reflects Smith 's .impudent re- sponses were made after Sharpe announced the dis- charge. I am also persuaded this was also the case 'in the earlier 'meeting with Cook. In reaching this conclusion, I note that Cook admitted that Smith asked him for an- other chance. It would be illogical and unreasonable for Smith to assert that he was not going back out and work with his - supervisors and then shortly thereafter ask for a second ' chance . It is more reasonable to believe that the request for a second chance came first in a spirit of con- trition. It is beyond dispute that Smith had a poor attendance record, but Respondent had not seen fit to discharge him for`' either that reason or his work performance prior to June 16. Further, Smith 's last absence occurred outside this normal probationary employment period. Indeed, Respondent admits that it had no intention of discharg- ing Smith for the absences when Cook arranged to meet with him on June 16. In' view of this; and in light of Smith 's early request for another chance, and since Re- spondent had no significant "attitude" problem with Smith before June 16, Cook's recommendation that Smith be discharged, I conclude , masks a clear ulterior motivation. Any doubt as to that ulterior motivation is removed by White's remarks to Arlene Smith which unquestion- ably established that it was Honeycutt 's accompaniment and support of Jeffrey Smith and Respondent 's extreme animosity to Honeycutt as a result of her union involve- ment which prompted the discharge decision . White put it very: succinctly in stating that if someone other than Honeycutt had accompanied Smith he would have re- tained his job. " Arlene Smith 's testimony regarding Cook's comments was not spe- cifically contradicted by Cook. Accordingly , and because I found Arlene Smith to be a credible witness, I find Cook made the remarks attributed to him by her. 354 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD It is true, of course, that White did not participate in the decision to discharge Smith. Under such circum- stances, one might be inclined to dismiss his remarks on the subject as simply an opinion, albeit coercive. See, e.g., Garrett Flexible Products, 270 NLRB 1146 (1984). Here, however, it must be noted that White made his re- marks to-Arlene Smith only after he had investigated the matter.- Further, after the investigation, he specifically at- tributed to Respondent the basis for the decision by re- porting to Arlene Smith "they were saying" that Jeffrey made an implied threat when he brought Honeycutt with him on June 16. That was the "attitude" problem that Respondent found most distasteful, for White related no other "attitude" problem to Arlene Smith. Cook himself was no more specific in his subsequent conversation with Arlene Smith regarding Jeffrey Smith's, "mistrustful atti- tude." - Considering the foregoing, the elements of the General Counsel's puma-facie case, and upon evaluation of all the record evidence, I conclude that Respondent has failed to demonstrate that Jeffrey Smith would have been dis- charged without regard to his accompaniment on June 16 by Honeycutt, an individual who had incurred Re- spondent's animosity due to her earlier protected activi- ties. Accordingly, I conclude that Smith's discharge, con- stituted discrimination under the Ac_t in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) and (1). - - CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent. Uniglass Industries, Div. United Mer- chants & Mfrs. is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Amalgamated-Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent,' by ' its supervisor and agent Rayford Clanton -on October 12, 1983, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by informing employees that, they would not have been laid off and would have been rehired but, for their involvement in union activities. - , 4. Respondent, by its supervisor and agent Raymond White on June 28, 1983, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by. informing employees that certain other employ- ees, would not have ben discharged had they not sought the assistance of an eniployee involved in union or other protected 'concerted activity.. - 5. By refusing to rehire employee applicants Elaine Honeycutt and Charles Pegram because of their prior in- volvement in union activity and because they gave testi- mony under the Act,' Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4), (3), and (1) of the Act. 6.' Respondent in refusing to rehire Jeanette Pegram because of her activities on behalf of the Union violated Section 8(a)(3) and'(1) of the Act. 7. Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a)(4) of the Act in refusing to rehire Jeanette Pegram. 8. The aforesaid violations of the Act constitute unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ' ' - - THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent discriminatorily refused to employ applicants Elaine Honeycutt, Charles Pegram, and Jeanette Pegram as a result of its reimplementation of its antinepotism rule and application of that rule to the, three, it will be recommended that Respondent be -re- quired to offer these three individuals employment in po- sitions for which they are qualified and in , which they would have been employed but for the discrimination against them. It will be further recommended that Re- spondent be required to make them whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from the date that they would have been employed but for the discrimination against them to the date of a proper offer of employment, less any net interim earn- ings , as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977 ).14 Because it has also been found that Jeffrey Smith was unlawfully discharged, Respond- ent must be required to offer him reinstatement and make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits,, computed on a -quarterly basis, from the date of dis- charge to the date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any interim earnings plus interest under the authorities cited above. Consistent with the Board's decision in Ster- ling Sugars, 261 NLRB 472 (1982). it will also be recom- mended that Respondent be required to expunge from its files any reference to the discharge of Jeffrey Smith or the refusals to rehire Elaine Honeycutt and Charles and Jeanette Pegram and notify them in writing that this has been done and that evidence of the unlawful discharge or refusals to iehire will not be used for future personnel actions against them. - On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the, following recommend- edis 14 See generally Isis Plumbing Co, 138 NLRB 716, 717-721 (1962) 15 If no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations , the findings , conclusions , and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and , all objections. to them shall be deemed waived for all- pur- poses - - ' UNITED • MERCHANTS. &- MFRS. _ 355 ORDER The Respondent , Uniglass Industries , Div." United Merchants & Mfrs., Statesville , North Carolina , its offi- cers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from - (a) Informing employees that they would have been rehired but for their involvement in activities on behalf of Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. (b) Informing employees that other employees, would not have been discharged if they had not sought the as- sistance of employees previously involved in protected concerted activities. (c) Discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise' dis- criminating against any employees because of their activ- ity on behalf of `the above-named Union or any other labor organization or because they gave testimony under the Act. - (d) In any like or related manner interfering' with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the- rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. - 2. Take the following affirmative' action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. - (a) Offer Jeffrey Smith immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former job or, it that job no longer exists,-to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and previleges previously en- joyed, and make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits as a result of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (b) Employ Charles Pegram, . Jeanette Pegram, and Elaine Honeycutt into those positions -for which they are qualified and' in which they, would have been employed but for the discrimination against them, or, if those posi- tions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights or privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the remedy sec- tion of this decision. (c) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful _ discharge and notify the employee in writing that this has been done and that the discharge will , not be used against him in any way. (d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records nec- , essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its facility in Statesville, North Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." i a Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11,- after being signed by the Re- spondent's authorized. representative, shall be posted by 16 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board " the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places-. where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall, be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. - IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. ' . APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and. has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize - To, form, join , or assist any union To bargain collectively., through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT inform employees that they would have been, rehired if they had, not -engaged in activities on, behalf bf Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT inform employees that they would not have been discharged had they-not sought the assistance of other employees' who had been involved in activities on behalf of the above labor organization or other pro- tected concerted activity. • - - WE WILL NOT discharge, refuse to employ, or other- wise discriminate against any employees for supporting the above-named Union or any other labor organization, or because" employees give' testimony under the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce- you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Jeffrey Smith immediate and full rein- statement to his former job or, 'if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej- udice to his seniority or any other rights and privileges - previously enjoyed. WE WILL offer Charles Pegram, Jeanette Pegram, and Elaine' Honeycutt employment into those positions for which they are qualified and in which they would have been hired but for the discrimination against them, with- out prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges to which they would otherwise be entitled. WE WILL make Jeffrey Smith, Charles Pegram, Jea- nette Pegram , and Elaine Honeycutt whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits resulting from the discrimi- nation against them , less any net interim earnings, plus 356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD interest and WE WILL notify each of them that we have and refusals to employ them will not be used for future removed from our files any references to the discharge personnel action against them or the refusals to employ them and that the discharge UNIGLASS INDUSTRIES Div UNITED MER CHANTS & MFRS Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation