806 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices
of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the
United States and Canada , AFL-CIO Local No.
198 (Delta Mechanical, Inc.) and Gerald J.
Matherne and Rueben Keller , Jr. Cases 15-
CB-3389 and 15-CB-3389-2
January 31, 1989
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT
On May 18, 1988, Administrative Law Judge J.
Pargen Robertson issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the Respondent filed a brief in support of
the judge's decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative
law judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed
in its entirety.
' We agree with the judge that the complaint allegations here are gov-
erned by NLRB V. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 340, 481 U.S. 573
(1987). There, the Supreme Court held that, when a union has no collec-
tive-bargaining relationship with an employer, and does not seek to estab-
lish one, union discipline directed at supervisor-members does not violate
Sec. 8(bx 1)(B).
Here, the judge found , and the record shows, that the Respondent had
no collective-bargaining agreement with the Employer and that at the
time of the alleged unfair labor practices was not seeking to represent the
Employer's employees . In this latter regard , we note that the record
shows that the Respondent abandoned its efforts to persuade the Employ-
er to sign a contract and was taking no action toward organizing the em-
ployees at the time the alleged unfair labor practices occurred. In these
circumstances we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge's discussion of
the role of Charging Parties Matherne and Keller in the adjustment of
personal grievances.
Lee J. Romero Jr., Esq. and Kenneth A. Williams, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Louis L. Robein Jr., Esq. (Gardener Robein and Healey),
of Metairie, Louisiana, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
J. PARGEN ROBERTSON, Administrative Law Judge.
This matter was heard in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on 24
March 1988. A consolidated complaint issued on 22 Jan-
uary 1988 and was amended on 9 March 1988. That
complaint was based on charges filed on 18 and 21 De-
cember 1987.
In its answer and through stipulation, Respondent ad-
mitted the commerce and labor organization allegations
of the complaint. Although Respondent denied the em-
ployer allegation regarding Delta Mechanical, Inc., its
answer, stipulation, and the entire record show that
Delta is now, and has been at all times material, an em-
ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
The issue framed by the complaint is: Did Respondent
violate Section 8(b)(1)(B) by fining and expelling the
Charging Parties, two superintendents of the Employer,
because they continued to work for the Employer, a
nonunion contractor.
On 21 December 1987, pursuant to internal charges,
Gerald Matherne and Rueben Keller Jr. were tried and
found guilty of working for a nonunion contractor. On 4
January 1988, Respondent's members voted to expel and
fine Matherne and Keller. The fines were $10,000.
By letter dated 15 September 1987, all Respondent's
members, including Matherne and Keller, were notified
by the International Union that a member working for a
nonunion employer violated Section 200(a) of the
Union's constitution:
Dear Member:
The United Association recently became aware
of a December 15, 1986, general notice to all mem-
bers issued by Local Union 198 concerning mem-
bers working non-union . A program of reporting to
the Union Hall of employment with non- union con-
tractors was established in that notice and made ef-
fective January 2, 1987.
This is to advise you that performing UA work
for a contractor who is not a party to a collective
bargaining agreement with a UA local union or the
UA is specifically prohibited by Section 200(a) of
the UA Constitution which states:
SEC. 200. (A) A member shall not perform any
work that comes within the work jurisdiction of
the United Association for an employer who is,
not a party to a collective bargaining agreement
entered into either by a Local Union or the
United Associations.
Any member who violates Section 200(a) is subject
to internal union discipline, including fines, suspen-
sion and/or explusion.
In view of this specific prohibition in the UA
Constitution, I have advised Local Union 198, and
you are hereby advised, that the program an-
nounced in its notice of December 15, 1986 is termi-
nated immediately. If you accepted a job with a
non-union employer doing UA work jurisdiction,
you have a 30 day grace period from the date of
this letter to leave that employment to avoid being
charged with violating Section 200(a) of the UA
Constitution. If you continue such employment after
30 days, you will be charged under Section 200(a).
The very existence of Local 198 as a viable and
effective labor organization and bargaining agent is
292 NLRB No. 85
PLUMBERS LOCAL 198 (DELTA MECHANICAL) 807
threatened by the ever increasing growth of the
non union sector However, we cannot stop this
non union growth if we permit our skilled members
to work for non union contractors doing UA work
Fraternally,
/s/ Robert D Lowe, Sr
Robert D Lowe Sr
International Representative
United Association
Since September 1987, Respondent has taken action
against a number of members allegedly for violating sec
tion 200(a) of the constitution Those actions included
penalities similar to the penalities imposed against Math
erne and Keller There is no issue about whether Math
erne and Keller were discriminatonly treated nor is there
an issue about the factual basis for Respondents actions
against Matherne and Keller
Around 1 December 1987, the Baton Rouge Building
and Construction Trades Council established a picket
line at the James River job of Delta Mechanical, Inc
Despite the warning contained in the Union s 15 Septem
ber 1987 letter and despite the 1 December 1987 picket
line, Matherne , Keller and at least one other member
employee continued to work for Delta Mechanical, Inc
According to record testimony, some seven members of
Respondent honored the 1 December 1987 picket line
and refused to continue working for Delta Mechanical,
Inc None of those seven was disciplined while all three
members who crossed the picket line were tried and dis
ciplined by Respondent
The sole issue concerns whether Respondent is justi
fled in disciplining Matherne and Keller in view of their
superintendent positions with Delta Mechanical Inc
Discussion
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act
reads
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor orga
nization or its agents to restrain or coerce (B) an
employer in the selection of his representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjust
ment of grievances
Dexter Folse an owner of the Employer, Delta Me
chanical Inc, admitted that neither Matherne nor Keller
has been a representative of the Employer `for the pur
pose of collective bargaining Therefore the question of
the status of Matherne and Keller relates to whether
either acted as a representative of the Employer for the
purpose of adjustment of grievances
A determination of that issue and the one other ques
tion presented in this matter-whether Respondent s
action against Matherne and Keller restrained or coerced
Delta Mechanical Inc -was recently considered by the
Supreme Court in the case NLRB v Electrical Workers
IBEW Local 340, 481 U S 573 (1987)
In this decision, the Court sustained the refusal of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to grant enforcement of
the National Labor Relations Board s decision cited at
271 NLRB 995 (1984)
In refusing to grant enforcement the Ninth Circuit
found
There are two prongs to our analysis of a Section
8(b)(1)(B) violation in such a case of union disci
pline First we must determine the employment
status of the disciplined union members because
there can be no Section 8(b)(1)(B) violation unless
the employees are supervisors and representatives of
their employers for the purposes of collective bar
gaining and grievance adjustment Second , we must
determine whether the union discipline restrained or
coerced the employer in the selection of its repre
sentatives [NLRB v Electrical Workers IBEW Local
340, 780 F 2d 1489, 1491 (9th Cir 1986) ]
The circuit court then found that regarding the su
pervisor status issue, the Board was correct in its hold
ing The court held that supervisory status does not nec
essarily mean that an employee is a representative of his
employer for collective bargaining purposes (i e , Sec
8(b)(1)(B) of the Act makes it unlawful for a union to re
strain or coerce an employer in the selection of his rep
resentative for the purposes of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances )
In this case , two employees were involved, Albert
Schoux a superintendent, and Ted Choate, a vice presi
dent and estimator
The circuit court found that the Board correctly ap
plied two legal principles in determining the representa
tive status of Schoux and Choate Concerning Schoux
the Board broadly interpreted grievance adjustment to
include adjustment of personal problems Schoux was
found to be a representative because he occasionally han
dled employees personal problems on the job
To find Choate a representative, the Board ap
plied its reservoir doctrine which states that
anyone who is a supervisor within the meaning of
§ 2(11) is a part of the logical reservoir from
which-an employer is likely to select his representa
tives for collective bargaining or grievance adjust
ment [780 F 2d at 1491 ]
However, concerning the restraint and coercion
question the circuit court disagreed with the Board
Fines imposed on representatives may constitute
prohibited coercion because the effect of the disci
plane may be to deprive an employer of the services
of his representative ABC, 437 U S at 433-437, 436
n 36 The general rule of ABC was announced
in the context of an ongoing strike, and this court
has held that when a union does not represent or
intend to represent the complaining company s em
ployees there can be no Section 8(b)(1)(B) violation
when a union disciplines members even if they are
designated bargaining representatives NLRB v
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 714
F 2d 870, 871-72 (9th Cir 1980) (Chewelah) We be
lieve Chewelah controls and is diapositive of the
issue in this case [NLRB v Electrical Workers
808 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IBEW Local 340, 780 F.2d 1489, 1492 (9th Cir.
1986).]
The circuit court found that the Board was wrong in
its determination that the Union "demonstrated an intent
to represent" the employees. The court concluded:
We deny enforcement of the NLRB's order be-
cause although we agree with the Board's determi-
nation of Choate's and Schoux' s status as represent-
atives of their employers, we do not find sufficient
evidence of the Union's intent to represent the em-
ployees in this case . [780 F.2d at 1493.]
On 18 May 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed (NLRB
v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 340, 481 U.S. 573
(1987)). However, the Supreme Court decision took issue
with the Board on both the "supervisor status" and "re-
straint or coercion" issues.
As to the supervisor status , or, as characterized by the
Supreme Court, the "employer-representative" issue, the
Court stated, inter alia:
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA provides:
It shall be- an unfair labor practice for a labor or-
ganization or its agents (1) to restrain or coerce
(B) an employer in the selection of his repre-
sentatives for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing or the adjustment of grievances.
This section was enacted to prevent a union from
exerting direct pressure on an employer to force it
into a multiemployer bargaining unit or to dictate
its choice of representatives for the settlement of
employer grievances S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 21 (1947). [Id. at 580.]
Accordingly, we conclude that discipline of a su-
pervisor-member is prohibited under § 8(b)(1)(B)
only when that member is engaged in § 8(b)(1)(B)
activities-that is, collective bargaining, grievance
adjustment, or some other closely related activity
(e.g., contract interpretation as in Oakland Mailers).
[481 U.S. at 585-586.]
We therefore reject the NLRB's "reservoir doc-
trine," on which the Court of Appeals relied. As
stated above, the rationale of the doctrine is that
§ 2(11) supervisors constitute: a reservoir of workers
available for selection at some future date as collec-
tive-bargaining agents or grievance adjusters. [Id. at
586.]
The Court further stated:
The NLRB held in the alternative that because
Schoux did adjust personal grievances-as opposed
to contract grievances-he qualified as a
§ 8(b)(1)(B) supervisor, even without application of
the reservoir doctrine. As a consequence of our
conclusion in Part III, infra, we need not decide
whether the Board's broad definition of grievance-
and hence of "grievance adjustment,"-is consistent
with the narrow purpose and scope of § 8(b)( 1)(B).
We observe, however, that in Florida Power the
Court said that grievance adjustment is a "particular
and explicitly stated activity." 417 U.S., at 803. See
also D. Bok & J. Dunlop, Labor and the American
Community 220 (1970) ("grievance is a disput[e]
over the application of the contract"). Other sec-
tions of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, similarly suggest a narrow meaning. See
§§ 203 and 204, 29 U.S.C. §§ 173-174. See also
Comment, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. at 879 ("In Florida
Power the Supreme Court appears to have defined
both [collective bargaining and grievance adjust-
ment] very narrowly"). [481 U.S. at 588-589 fn. 12.]
Regarding the issue of Electrical Workers Local 340 not
having a collective-bargaining agreement and not seeking
to represent the employees in the future, the Supreme
Court held:
[W]e find that the absence of a collective-bargaining
relationship between the union and the employer,
like the absence of § 8(b)(1)(B) responsibilities in a
disciplined supervisor-member, makes the possibility
that the Union's discipline of Schoux and Choate
will coerce Royal and Nutter, too attenuated to
form the basis of an unfair labor practice charge.
[Id. at 589.]
The Court continues:
Second the Union's discipline of Schoux and
Choate does not coerce Royal and Nutter in their
selection of § 8(b)(1)(B) representatives . Section
8(b)(1)(B) was primarily intended to prevent a
union engaged in a long -term relationship with an
employer from dictating the latter 's choice of repre-
sentative or the form that representation would take
(single-unit or multi-employer unit). See S. Rep. No.
105, 80th Cong . 1st Sess., p. 21 (1947). It was not
intended to prevent enforcement of uniform union
rules that may occasionally have the incidental
effect of making a supervisory position less desira-
ble.
The only sense in which employers (both those
with and those without a collective -bargaining rela-
tionship with the union) may be coerced in their se-
lection of § 8(b)(1)(B) representatives by the appli-
cation of the no-contract -no-work rule to supervi-
sor-members is that the employer may be left with a
smaller pool of individuals from which it may
choose its representatives . This is because some
union members will be reluctant to serve as
§ 8(b)(1)(B) representatives if the price is loss of
union membership or payment of disciplinary fines.
For example , the no-contract -no-work rule is de-
signed to prevent any union member from working
for an employer that does not pay the union wage
scale, but it does not have the peripheral effect of
making a § 8(b)(1)(B) representative less willing to
serve in that capacity than he or she otherwise
would be , see ABC, 437 U.S., at 436 , thereby limit-
PLUMBERS LOCAL 198 (DELTA MECHANICAL) 809
mg the employers selection Any discipline imposed
on a § 8(b)(1)(B) representative, however, will
affect willingness to serve in this sense
In addition, so long as there is any attraction to
union membership, this test would preclude exist
ence of union rules excluding supervisors from
membership Again this is because any union
member who valued membership would be less
willing to serve, see ABC, supra, at 436, if the cost
of service were loss of membership , and because
any reluctance to give up membership would limit
the size of the supervisor pool from which an em
ployer could select its representatives This minimal
effect on an employer's selection of § 8(b)(1)(B)
representatives is insufficient to support a
§ 8(b)(1)(B) charge It is inconceivable that every
union rule that affects a union member s willingness
to serve as a supervisor could be prohibited by a
provision as narrow in scope as § 8(b)(1)(B)
A supervisor member cannot serve both masters
without incurring some obligations to both, it is
simply unfair to require unions to accept members
who receive all of the benefits of the association
and bear none of the obligations We therefore
reject the argument that unions must both accept
supervisor members and grant them immunity from
enforcement of uniform rules
Finally, both the structure of the NLRA and
recent developments in its interpretation suggest
that employers are no longer restrained or coerced
in their selectior of representatives by union disci
pline of supervisor members The statute itself re
veals that it is the employer not the supervisor
member, who is protected from coercion by the
statutory scheme It is difficult to maintain that an
employer is restrained or coerced because a union
member must accept union explusion or other disci
plane to continue a supervisory position The em
ployer s problem-that the supervisory member
might decline to serve as a representative or align
with the union during a strike and deprive the em
ployer of services-is of its own making [Fns omit
ted ] [481 U S at 591-594 ]
Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion, argued that
there was no violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) regardless of
whether the Union intended to represent' the employ
ees of the employer
The Supreme Court in Electrical Workers Local 340
supra, relied on its earlier decisions in American Broad
casting Cos. v Writers Guild 437 US 411 (1978), and
Florida Power & Light Co v Electrical Workers, 417 U S
790 (1974) In Florida Power, the Supreme Court found
that the Board, by suggesting, inter alia that contract in
terpretation is so closely related to collective bargaining
that it too is an 8(b)(1)(B) activity (San Francisco Oak
land Mailers' Union No 18, 172 NLRB 2173 (1968)), was,
at best, within the outer limits of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
Counsel for the General Counsel argues that the in
stant case must be distinguished from 481 U S 573 on
two grounds (1) Although the Respondent did not have
a collective bargaining agreement with the Employer,
Respondent did seek to represent the employees in the
future, and (2) that Matherne and Keller exercised
8(b)(1)(B) activities by adjusting personal grievances of
employees
I find in agreement with the Respondent that the in
stant case falls within the rule of 481 US 573, supra
Concerning the General Counsel's first point, I agree
with counsel for the General Counsel that credible evi
dence shows that representatives of Respondent specifi-
cally asked the Employer to sign a collective bargaining
agreement Nevertheless, under the circumstances here,
the record shows Respondent had nothing to gain by
interferance with the supervisor members loyalty during
grievance adjustment (481 US at 590 )
Gerald Matherne admitted that he telephoned Re
spondent's business agent Raymond Zumo during No
vember 1987 regarding the Union's 15 September letter
Matherne testified that his employees at James River
were concerned about that letter Matherne asked Zumo
to contact the Employer' about signing a collective bar
gaining contract Subsequently, according to the testimo
ny of Dexter Folse, an owner of the Employer, he was
contacted by both Raymond Zumo and Eugene Pour
ciau-Respondent s business manager and business agent
According to Folse, Pourciau telephoned him on 24 and
30 November 1987 and Zumo telephoned him on 30 No
vember Both Pourciau and Zumo asked Folse if he was
interested in signing a collective bargaining agreement
with Local 198 for the James River job Folse told both
Pourciau and Zumo that he was not interested in signing
a collective bargaining agreement 2
On 30 November 1987, or a day or so before the
picket line was established, Respondent made its last con
tact with the Employer regarding a collective bargaining
contract There was no evidence that Respondent took
other steps such as card signing , a demand letter, etc, to
represent the Employer' s James River employees
In 780 F 2d 1489, supra, and 481 U S 573, supra, both
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court found that
the Union did not have a collective bargaining agree
ment with the Employer, nor did it seek to represent the
employees in the future Justice Scalia, in his concurring
opinion, expressed his view that it does not matter
whether the Union intended to represent" the employees
of the Employer (481 U S at 596)
Obviously, "seek to represent means more than a
desire to represent If not, the phrase would be meaning
less because unions desire to represent all employees
i Zumo and Matherne agreed that Matherne asked Zumo to contact
the Employer about signing a contract However the two did not agree
about the specific person Zumo was asked to contact
2 I credit Folse s testimony regarding his conversations with Pourciau
and Zumo Pourciau did not testify Zumo admitted telephoning Folse
however Zumo contended that he asked Folse to contract for another
employer-Charles Hoag Charles Hoag was during November operat
ing with only one employee Even though Charles Hoag had formerly
been party to collective bargaining contracts the full record including
Folse s uncontested testimony regarding his conversations with Pourciau
shows that Zumo was telephoning Folse about Delta Mechanical s James
River Job I also credit Gerald Matherne s testimony that Raymond
Zumo told him 3 days or so before the picket line was established that
the Union would permit its members to work if Matherne signed a col
lective bargaining agreement with the Union
810 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Here, although Respondent asked the Employer to sign a
contract , it is nevertheless important to consider two fac
tors ( 1) Respondent did nothing in furtherance of seek
ing to represent the employees after November 1987
and (2) Respondent never conducted an organizing cam
paign among the employees
Regarding factor I the record shows that the Union s
requests for a contract were emphatically rejected Al
though Respondent participated in picketing the James
River job of the Employer on I and/or 2 December, the
picket signs do not mention a desire to organize the em
ployer In fact , the picket sign language which follows
does not mention Respondent
Notice to the Public
DMI
AND
PALA INTERSTATE INC
Is Unfair
To Members of the
Baton Rouge Building and
Construction Trades Council
AFL-CIO
No Dispute With Any Other Employer
It appears that Respondent abandoned its efforts to
persuade the Employer to sign a contract in late Novem
ber 1987 At the time of Respondents alleged unfair
labor practices , 4 through 21 December 1987, Respond
ent was taking no action in seeking to represent the em
ployees
The General Counsel alleged that the 1 December
picketing constituted a recognitional picket line The
record evidence does not support that allegation The
picket line was, according to undisputed testimony as
well as the signs themselves established by the Baton
Rouge Building and Construction Trades Council Re
spondent is not mentioned in the signs nor is there a
mention of efforts to organize the Employer
It is important to recall that first the administrative
law judge then the Board , in Electrical Workers IBEW
Local 340 (Nutter Inc) 271 NLRB 995 1002 (1984)
found that the Union continued to seek to represent the
employees The circuit court mentioned the Board deter
initiation that the union had an intent to represent the
employees NLRB v Electrical Workers IBEW Local
340, 780 F 2d 1489 (9th Cir 1986) The circuit then re
versed the Board s determination finding, inter alia, that
the Union had made no organizing efforts for over a
year after termination of the bargaining relationship be
tween the employers and the union
Here there never was a bargaining relationship be
tween Respondent and the Employer and the evidence
shows that Respondent was not engaged in any effort to
organize the Employer at the time of the alleged unfair
labor practices
Respondents business manager was well acquainted
with both Gerald Matherne and Dexter Folse Folse rep
resented both the Employer and Charles Hoag As repre
sentative of Hoag , a former union contractor Folse
had dealt with Respondent in the past However, as he
testified Folse was strongly opposed to all efforts to un
ionize Delta Mechanical Inc because of his perception
that Delta Mechanical Inc would be unable to acquire
contracts due to prejudice of the contracting firms
Zumo and Matherne had known each other 15 or 20
years, having attended high school together
Contemporaneous with Respondents actions at James
River during November December 1987, Respondent
was taking steps to police jobs of other employers in
accord with the International Union s 15 September 1987
letter On at least some of those other jobs, Respondent
charged tried and fined members without erecting
picket lines The evidence failed to show that Respond
ent tried to organize any of the other employers
Respondents overall actions , beginning with the Inter
national Union s 15 September letter show that it was
motivated by a desire to police section 200(a) of its con
stitution The last paragraph of that 15 September letter
expresses the Union s motivation-to stop the ever in
creasing growth of the nonunion sector The Employer s
James River job was only a small part of the Union s
attack in late 1987 However following a request from
an old friend,3 Raymond Zumo made an effort to pull
the James River project into compliance with section
200(a)
On the basis of the record , I am convinced that Re
spondent s efforts to reach agreement with Delta Me
chanical Inc terminated around 30 November 1987 In
view of Respondent 's subsequent actions it is apparent
that after November Respondent did not seek to repre
sent the James River employees
Moreover , Respondent has nothing to gain by inter
ference with the supervisor members locality during
grievance adjustment (481 US at 590 ) Respondent s
actions herein were precipitated by the International
Union s 15 September letter There was no indication of
concern or effort to interfere with the Employers se
lection of Matherne and Keller as superintendents In
fact the overall record shows that such was not the
case Matherne was an old friend of Raymond Zumo and
Zumo did what he could to assist Matherne Rueben
Keller Jr was a young man who had done nothing to
attract Respondents attention until December 1987 when
he crossed the James River picket line Moreover Math
erne and Keller were treated in the same manner as
rank and file employees that violated section 200(a)
Only by a strained reading could this matter fall within
the scope of activity which the Supreme Court would
find justifies an 8(b)( 1)(B) finding
Regarding grievance adjustment the parties agreed
that Matherne and Keller , as superintendents have au
thority to adjust personal grievances A reading of 481
U S 573 supra illustrates that the Supreme Court did
not make a determination about whether personal griev
ances fall within the scope of Section 8(b)(1)(B) How
ever, in footnote 12 the Court implied that the NLRA
appears to exclude personal grievances from the scope of
grievance adjustment authority
3 Both Matherne and Zumo testified to their long friendship
PLUMBERS LOCAL 198 (DELTA MECHANICAL) 811
The record evidence illustrates that Matherne and
Keller were not grievance adjusters and Respondent did
not restrain or coerce the Employer
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record , I issue the following recommend
ed4
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 Delta Mechanical , Inc is an employer engaged in
commerce and activities affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act
2 Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint
ORDER
It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in
its entirety
* If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board s
Rules and Regulations the findings conclusions and recommended
Order shall as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur
poses
