United Assn. Pipe Fitters Local 455Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsSep 27, 1967167 N.L.R.B. 602 (N.L.R.B. 1967) Copy Citation 602 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD United Association Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 455 and United Association Plumbers & Gasfitters Local Union No. 34, both affiliated with the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, and St. Paul As- sociation of Plumbing, Heating and Mechanical Contractors, Inc., et al . and United Association Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 455 and United As- sociation Plumbers & Gasfitters Local Union No. 34, both affiliated with the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada , AFL-CIO, and Upper Midwest Piping, Incorporated and United Association Pipe Fitters Local Union No . 455, affiliated with the United As- sociation of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada , AFL-CIO (D. W. Hickey Co., Inc., and Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company) and American Boiler Manufacturers Association . Cases 18-CE-4, 18-CE-6, and 18-CC-143 September 27, 1967 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER On August 5, 1965, the National Labor Rela- tions Board issued a Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding,' finding, inter alia, that (1) no issue was presented concerning the legality, under Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, of the fabrication clause in the 1963 collective-bargaining agreements between Respondent Local Union No. 455 and Respondent Employers because the General Counsel had not al- leged in the complaint, nor urged at the hearing, that this clause was per se unlawful; (2) certain ad hoc agreements entered into between Local Union No. 455 and various Respondent Employers construing, interpreting, and applying the fabrication clause were not violative of Section 8(e) of the Act; (3) the conduct of Local Union No. 455 in connection with these ad hoc agreements was not violative of Sec- tion 8(b)(4)(A); and (4) Local Union No. 455 vio- lated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by its conduct on one project, but did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(B) in any other respect. 2 On October 6, 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion 3 in which it affirmed the Board's findings of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violations at the one project, but vacated and set aside the Board's findings that there were no 8(e) or 8(b)(4)(A) violations and that the Respondent Union did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by its conduct in the Pierre Aircon Company incident. The court remanded the case to 1 154 N LRB 285, Member Fanning concurring in part, Member Brown dissenting in part the Board with directions to determine the legality of the fabrication clause , an issue which the court held had been fully litigated ; to reexamine, in the light of such determination, the issues appealed to the court by the Charging Party; and for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in the court ' s opinion . In connection with the issues remanded , the court noted in its opinion that "Cer- tiorari has been granted in National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n , supra, 384 U. S. 968 , and helpful guidelines from the Supreme Court upon the troublesome issues here presented may reasonably be anticipated." The Board has reconsidered its original Decision and Order with respect to the issues remanded in the light of the opinion of the court of appeals and the opinion of the Supreme Court in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association et al. v. N.L.R.B., 386 U. S. 612. The Supreme Court in that case held that "just as ... Section 8(b)(4)(B) did not reach employees ' activity to pressure their em- ployer to preserve for themselves work traditionally done by them, Section 8 (e) does not prohibit agree- ments made and maintained for that purpose." The Supreme Court accordingly found the "will not han- dle" clause in a contract between the Carpenters Union and employer Frouge not violative of Sec- tion 8 (e), and the refusal of that union to permit car- penters employed by Frouge to handle prefitted doors manufactured by the charging party not viola- tive of Section 8(b)(4)(B ), and stated in its opinion that the determination whether such a clause and its enforcement violated those sections- ... cannot be made without an inquiry into whether under all the surrounding circum- stances, the Union ' s objective was preserva- tion of work for Frouge 's employees, or whether the agreements and boycott were tac- tically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere . Were the latter the case , Frouge, the boycotting employer , would be a neutral bystander , and the agreement or boycott would, within the intent of Congress , become secondary . There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer , here the door manufacturer , for the activity to fall within this category , so long as the tactical object of the agreement and its maintenance is that em- ployer , or benefits to other than the boycotting employees or other employees of the primary employer thus making the agreement or boycott secondary in its aim. The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contract- ing employer vis-a-vis his own employees. [Footnotes omitted. ] The Supreme Court indicated that the circum- stances to be considered , in determining the union's ' No review was sought of the Board's disposition of other issues S 366 F 2d815 167 NLRB No. 79 UNITED ASSN. PIPE FITTERS LOCAL 455 objective, might include the remoteness of the threat of displacement by the banned product or services, the history of labor relations between the union and the employers who would be boycotted, and the economic personality of the industry. The Supreme Court, in a companion case issued the same day, 4 summarized its holding in National Woodwork as follows: National Woodwork Mfgrs., ante, holds that collective activity by employees of the primary employer, the object of which is to affect the labor policies of that primary employer, and not engaged in for its effect elsewhere, is pro- tected primary activity. With these Supreme Court rulings in mind, we turn to the issues remanded herein. 1. THE FABRICATION CLAUSE This clause, as incorporated in the 1963 agree- ment between Local Union No. 455 and the Con- tractors Association, provided as follows: As a primary working condition, it is agreed that all pipe formations, systems, or controls, or component parts thereof, included within the nonpurchase list attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit 1, as amended from time to time as provided in this agreement, shall be fabricated on the job site or in the shop of an Employer within the bargaining unit who is bound by this agreement, except as other- wise mutually agreed upon with relation to any particular job. The agreement also established a fabrication com- mittee, composed of representatives of Local Union No. 455 and the Contractors Association, to apply, interpret, and enforce the fabrication clause. As directed by the court of appeals, we have con- sidered this clause on the basis of the entire record herein and in the light of the guidelines established by the Supreme Court, and find that the clause was not violative of Section 8(e) of the Act as its object was to preserve for employees in the unit work traditionally done by such employees, who are represented by Local Union No. 455, not for mem- bers of the Union generally nor to satisfy union ob- jectives elsewhere. The clause, as set forth above, provided, "As a primary working condition," that the fabrication work of attaching trim piping was to be done "on the job site or in the shop of an Em- ployer within the bargaining unit who is bound by this agreement." The clause therefore applied only to work performed by employees of employers who were in the contractual multiemployer unit, and em- ployees whose employers had agreed to this clause in their individual contracts with Local Union No. 455. Moreover, the record establishes that the work ' Houston Insulation Contractors Association v N L R B, 386 U S 664 The fact that the fabrication clause might be read as contemplating 603 of attaching trim piping to boilers had traditionally been performed by employees in such units represented by Local Union No. 455; that the ad- vent of packaged boilers had a direct impact on the amount of such work available to them; and that the Union's sole objective in obtaining agreement to the fabrication clause was to preserve and to reacquire such work for the unit employees of the contracting employers. It is apparent, therefore, under the tests laid down by the Supreme Court, that the clause met the "touchstone" of being "addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees," and that the evidence does not show that the "tactical object" of the clause was the packaged-boiler manufacturers or any other second- ary employers. Accordingly, we conclude that the fabrication clause was a primary work-preservation clause, and therefore outside the scope of Section 8(e) of the Act. 5 II. THE AD HOC AGREEMENTS APPLYING THE FABRICATION CLAUSE A. The 3-M Incident Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, herein called 3-M, ordered three packaged boilers from the manufacturer, and engaged D. W. Hickey Co., Inc., a member of the Contractors Association, to install the boilers in a building which 3-M was remodeling. Thereafter, Mooney, a business representative of Local Union No. 455, informed Hickey and 3-M, in effect, that the packaged boilers were a violation of the fabrication clause and his men would not install them. On August 27, 1963, the members of the fabrication committee, established to carry out the terms of the fabrication clause, agreed that Hickey's contract with 3-M to install the packaged boilers was a violation of the fabrication clause and work on this building would cease unless the packaged-boiler problem was resolved. 1. The alleged violation of Section 8(e) As the Board found in its original Decision, the members of the fabrication committee on August 27 entered into a new ad hoc agreement to which Local Union No. 455, the Contractors Association, and Hickey (by virtue of its membership in the As- sociation) were parties, to the effect that the instal- lation of the packaged boilers in this building was prohibited by the fabrication clause. We have found above that the fabrication clause was a lawful clause designed to preserve and reacquire trim-pip- ing work traditionally performed by employees in the Contractors Association unit. To the extent that that trim-piping work could be performed by unit employees in the shop of a signatory employer does not change its primary nature See Houston In- miatton, supra 604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the ad hoc agreement had the same lawful object as the fabrication clause, it was, under the guidelines established by the Supreme Court, a primary work- preservation agreement outside the scope of Sec- tion 8(e). We note, however, that neither the Con- tractors Association nor any of its members, includ- ing Hickey, which contracted merely to install packaged boilers ordered by 3-M, was in a position to assign the trim-piping work at this project. Even if, in these circumstances, the Contractors Associa- tion and Hickey were regarded as secondary em- ployers, and the August 27 ad hoc agreement as a "hot goods" agreement within the scope of Section 8(e), because these employers had no control over the assignment of the work,6 we would find, nevertheless, that as the trim-piping work in dispute was to be performed at the site of the construction, the August 27 agreement was protected by the con- struction industry proviso to Section 8(e), and was therefore lawful. 2. The alleged violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A) In view of our finding that the August 27 ad hoc agreement was not prohibited by Section 8(e), we affirm the finding in our original Decision that Local Union No. 455 did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(A) by this conduct.7 B. The Pierre Aircon Incident The fabrication committee required Pierre Air- con Company, on October 22, 1963, to pay $100 for violating the fabrication clause by "entering into a contract ... with the Deluxe Check Company for the installation of a ... boiler [which] arrived with the trim on." Pierre Aircon Company paid the $100 and installed the packaged boiler in the Deluxe Check Building. piping work traditionally performed by employees in the unit. The ad hoc agreement of October 22 was therefore an interpretation and application of a lawful clause, and had the same lawful objective. Pierre Aircon Company was a signatory to the 1963 contract, its employees were in the Contractors As- sociation unit, and, as members of Local Union No. 455, had traditionally performed trim-piping work. We therefore find that the October 22 ad hoc agreement was a primary work preservation agree- ment outside the scope of Section 8(e).8 2. The alleged violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) As we have found that the October 22 agreement was lawful, and as there is no evidence that Local Union No. 455 sought any agreement other than the one reached, we find that its conduct in securing this ad hoc agreement was not violative of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A). 3. The alleged violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) The Board in its original Decision found that the fabrication committee's requirement of reasonable compensation by Pierre Aircon Company for its breach of contract constituted a peaceful method of resolving this dispute, and, therefore, that Local Union No. 455 did not threaten, coerce, or restrain employers by its conduct in connection with this project within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii). We have again considered this matter and are of the same view. Moreover, even if the fine were con- sidered coercive, it was directed toward Pierre Air- con, which was the primary employer as far as the record shows, and was for the purpose of preserv- ing unit work. It therefore was not prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(B). C. The Upper Midwest Piping Incident 1. The alleged violation of Section 8(e) As the original Board Decision found, the fabri- cation committee's action on October 22 con- stituted the entering into of a new ad hoc agreement between Local Union No. 455 and the Contractors Association (of which Pierre Aircon Company was a member) to the effect that the installation of the packaged boiler at this site constituted a violation of the fabrication clause. We have found above that the object of the fabri- cation clause was to preserve and reacquire trim- 6 Three-M, which ordered the packaged boilers, is not a member of the Contractors Association, was not named in the complaint as a respondent, and no agreement between it and Local Union No 455 is alleged as a violation of Sec 8(e) In its decision in National Woodwork, supra, fn 15, the Supreme Court stated that the Board's "right of control" test was not before the Court in that case ' See Northeastern Indiana Building and Construction Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apartments), 148 NLRB 854, reversed and remanded on other grounds 352 F 2d 696 (C A D C ) Upper Midwest Piping, Incorporated, a member of Mechanical Contractors Association of Min- neapolis, Inc., had a collective-bargaining agree- ment with Local Union No. 539, a sister local of Local Union No. 455, which agreement contained a fabrication clause similar to the one in the Local Union No. 455 agreement. Although both the Min- neapolis and St. Paul agreements contained recipro- cal clauses covering employer-members working in either area, when Upper Midwest Piping obtained a contract to install two packaged boilers in a school in St. Paul, it signed the Local Union No. 455 " Unlike the 3-M incident, the record does not show who ordered the packaged boiler to be installed at this project The evidence therefore does not establish that Pierre Aircon had no control over the work, and there- fore was a secondary employer See fn 6, supra In these circumstances, we find it unnecessary to deal with the alternative finding, in the Board's original Decision , that this ad hoc agreement , to the extent that it fell within the scope of Sec 8(e), was protected by the construction industry proviso thereto UNITED ASSN. PIPE FITTERS LOCAL 455 605 agreement. On September 9, 1963, Upper Midwest Piping ordered two boilers of the type specified in its contract through Heinen Company, the manu- facturer's agent in St. Paul. Early in October, Busi- ness Representative Mooney told Sorensen, vice president of Upper Midwest Piping, that, under the fabrication clause, "the trim piping and the gas train, etc. shouldn't be on these boilers when they came in," and that it was "our work." Mooney testified as to this conversation that: "Mr. Sorensen isn't the kind of man that you have to come up with a threat.... Merely a matter of explaining to him what the labor agreement was all about." Shortly after this conversation, Sorensen instructed Heinen not to deliver the boilers at the jobsite with the trim piping attached. Although Heinen passed Soren- sen's instruction along to the manufacturer, the boilers were delivered in packaged form and were being installed at the time of the hearing by Upper Midwest Piping employees who were members of Local Union No. 539. 1. The alleged 8(e) violation In its original Decision, the Board found it un- necessary to determine whether Local Union No. 455 and Upper Midwest Piping, by the above con- duct, entered into an ad hoc agreement interpreting the fabrication clause, because such agreement would, in any event, be protected by the construc- tion industry proviso to Section 8(e) of the Act.9 However, the Supreme Court held in Houston In- sulation, supra, that a union's conduct toward a pri- mary employer does not become secondary because such conduct is for the benefit of em- ployees represented by a sister local. We find, therefore, on reconsideration of this matter, that it is not necessary to consider the impact of the con- struction industry proviso because any agreement that might have been entered into would have been primary. As Upper Midwest Piping was signatory to contracts with both locals, the fabrication clauses in both were substantially identical, and the object of both was the preservation of traditional unit work,10 Upper Midwest Piping was the primary em- ployer, whether Local Union No. 455's object was the Company's labor relations with members of Local Union No. 455 or of those of its sister Local Union No. 539. 2. The alleged 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) violation As the ad hoc agreement, if any, would not have been unlawful, we find that the conduct of Local Union No. 455 to achieve such an agreement was not violative of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A). ORDER Accordingly, we conclude, upon reconsideration of all the issues remanded by the court of appeals, that the fabrication clause was lawful, and that the Board's original dismissal of the complaint with re- gard to the other issues remanded should be, and hereby is, affirmed. ' See also fn 16 of the Board's original Decision and Order 10 See the Board's finding with regard to the fabrication clause in the Local Union No 539 contract in the companion case, United Association Pipe Fitters Local Union No 539, et al (American Boiler Manufacturers Association), 167 NLRB 606 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation