United Aircraft Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 27, 1967

168 N.L.R.B. 480 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
United Aircraft Corporation (Pratt& Whitney Divi-
sion ) and Local Lodge #1746, International As-
sociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO
United Aircraft Corporation (Hamilton Standard
Division) and Local Lodge #743, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO. Cases 1-CA-5245 and 1-CA-5372
Corporation (Hamilton Standard Division), Wind-
sor Locks and Broad Brook, Connecticut, their of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order.3
' Delete from par 2(b) that part which reads to be furnished" and sub-
stitute "on forms provided "
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
November 27, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 17, 1966, Trial Examiner Thomas
A. Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the General Counsel, the Charging Par-
ty, and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs; the
Respondent filed an answering brief and the Charg-
ing Party filed a reply brief. I
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that the Respondents, United Aircraft Cor-
poration (Pratt & Whitney Division), East Hartford
and Manchester, Connecticut, and United Aircraft
The Charging Party filed a motion to reopen the record to submit
evidence relating to certain contract negotiations between the parties
which occurred subsequent to the date of the hearing The Charging Party
offered the proposed evidence as proof that, but for the violative conduct
found herein, the Respondent would have accepted the last contract offer
Thus, the Charging Party attempts tojustify the remedy it seeks, namely,
an order reinstituting the then existing contracts retroactively The
Respondent filed a response in opposition to the Charging Party's motion
The motion is denied, as the evidence which the Charging Party offers is
deemed irrelevant to a determination of whether the Respondent would
have accepted the Charging Party's last contract offer
The Charging Party also requested oral argument The request is
hereby denied, as the record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately
reflect the issues and positions of the parties
2 While we find that the General Counsel has alleged certain conduct to
be independent violations of Sec 8(a)(5) rather than "cumulative evidence
of underlying bad faith" as found by the Trial Examiner, we believe, con-
sidering the entire record and the Order we are issuing, that it is adequate
here to adopt the Trial Examiner's 8(a)(5) finding based upon Respond-
ent's withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bargain thereafter
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci , Trial Examiner : A hearing in the
above-entitled proceeding was held between July I 1 and
21, 1966, at Hartford , Connecticut . The complaint rests
on separate charges, Case 1-CA-5245 against United
Aircraft Corporation ( Pratt & Whitney Division), and
Case 1-CA-5372 against United Aircraft Corporation
(Hamilton Standard Division), the two divisions here
together called the Respondent , or the Company. The
charges were filed by Local Lodge # 1746 and Local
Lodge #743 of the International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. The principal
issue litigated is whether the Respondent illegally refused
to bargain with both of the above -named local unions.
Briefs were received after the close of the hearing from all
parties.
By agreement of all parties there was received-in
evidence the entire transcript of testimony taken at a
hearing in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut on June 20, 24, and 28, 1966. This
was a proceeding wherein the General Counsel petitioned
the court for a temporary injunction against the Respond-
ent pursuant to Section 10(j) of the National Labor
Relations Act , as amended. The parties stipulated that
that testimony is to be considered here as though those
witnesses had offered the same testimony before the Trial
Examiner . The -General Counsel filed motions; after
the close of the hearing requesting that the Trial Ex-
aminer take official notice of certain documents related
solely to the injunction proceeding , and that they be
received in evidence here The motions are all denied;
there must be an end to litigation of any one case.
A motion by the Respondent to correct the record,
unopposed by any party, is hereby granted and the mo-
tion document hereby received in evidence as Trial Ex-
aminer's Exhibit 3
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses , I make the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1 THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
United Aircraft Corporation, a Delaware corporation,
is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
aircraft engines, helicopters, aircraft, and related parts,
with plants in a number of cities in the State of Connec-
ticut. During the past year it has purchased and received
from points located outside that State goods and materials
valued in excess of $1 million for use in Connecticut, and
shipped from those plants to points located outside the
State goods and materials valued in excess of $1 million.
I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein
168 NLRB No. 66
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 481
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Lodges 1746 and 743, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Principal Question
This is a refusal-to-bargain case, in which the fact of
refusal, conceded, serves as starting point for considera-
tion of the evidence said to prove a violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the statute. Four bargaining units are involved,
in each of which collective-bargaining relations date back
to original Board certification In the Pratt & Whitney
Division, certification of IAM Local 1746 followed an
election among the East Hartford plant employees in
1945 and an election among the Manchester plant em-
ployees in 1957. In the Hamilton Standard Division, cer-
tification of Local 743 followed similar elections among
the employees of the Windsor Locks plant in 1941 and
the Broad Brooks plant in 1954. Except for rare and short
interruptions, all four bargaining units have over these
many years been covered by contracts between the
Respondent and the two local lodges. The most recent
long-term agreements expired on November 30, 1965
(Lodge 1746), and April 21, 1966 (Lodge 743). A short-
term contract with Lodge 1746 was terminated by proper
notice as of March 18, 1966. After more than 5 months
of continuous bargaining-October through March-to
agree upon further 3-year agreements, in March 1966 the
Respondent unequivocally withdrew recognition from
both local unions and filed petitions with the National
Labor Relations Board requesting elections in each of the
bargaining units
The essential allegation of the complaint is that this was
bad-faith rejection of the principle of collective bargain-
ing, without reasonable basis to justify the Respondent's
action, and therefore a violation of the basic statutory
mandate compelling recognition of, and bargaining with,
"the representative of his employees."
The Respondent does not effectively deny the further
and more precise complaint allegations of asserted affirm-
ative reasons for its withdrawal of recognition, none re-
lated to the authority of these local lodges to represent the
employees in the bargaining units. It defends primarily on
the ground that in the spring of 1966 neither local
represented a majority of the employees on whose behalf
it sought to speak, indeed that neither had enjoyed such
agency status for several years. Based on this contention,
the Respondent argues that it was not obligated to recog-
nize the Unions at all, even during what period it may
have carried on negotiations looking to contract renewals,
and that therefore in no event can there be a finding of il-
legal refusal to bargain within the intendment of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
There is no meaningful dispute as to the basic facts
upon which both the complaint and the answer rest. The
more significant events are established by docu-
ments-contracts, letters, papers, proposals, minutes of
meetings, etc. - whose authenticity was stipulated. As to
what the parties said to one another- speaking through
various agents-the conflicts in testimony are variances
of shading, emphasis, the use of one word instead of
another, and not disagreements of substance. The critical
statements, here subject to attack, were the withdrawals
of recognition , and they were articulated clearly enough
in letters from the Company. Subordinate to this is the
further allegation that while discussing the terms of new
contracts , in the give-and -take talk about proposals and
counterproposals , the Respondent ' s negotiators took
"adamant " positions , " insisted " too strenuously , and bar-
gained too "hard."
Ralph Oehler, Grand Lodge representative sent to
Hartford by International IAM President Roy Siemiller
to act as chief negotiator , gave one version of the lan-
guage used ; Personnel Director Morgan Mooney, one of
the two principal spokesmen for the Company , gave a dif-
ferent recital . Understandably each colored his story to
fit his purpose. There were also received in evidence,
however , fairly comprehensive notes written shortly after
most of the meetings, one set by a company team member
and another by a union committeeman . These, plus docu-
ments changed between the two groups at the time, show
quite clearly what the negotiations were about , and the
heckling and irritating descriptive phrases, however
colorful, used by the negotiators either at the conferences
or on the witness stand, cannot obscure the verities.
There is a background situation affecting these parties
that must be considered in this case because its very ex-
istence was discussed as an integral part of their bargain-
ing negotiations and influenced the actions taken by both
sides. In 1960 these two local lodges called a strike at all
four plants involved in this proceeding (East Hartford,
Manchester , Broad Brook , and Windsor Locks); in con-
sequence of the strike and of a strike settlement agree-
ment made in 1960 , unfair labor practice charges were
filed by the Unions and complaint issued by the General
Counsel (Case 1-CA-3355). A hearing before a Trial Ex-
aminer in that proceeding started in 1963 and was still in
progress - temporarily in adjournment-when , in the fall
of 1965, negotiations between the Company and the local
lodges began. In general Case 1-CA-3355 involves al-
leged illegal discrimination in employment , said to have
violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, against upwards of
3,000 strikers in 1960, and a claim for backpay reaching
into a very large figure. Out of the same labor dispute of
1960 there also emerged, and were still very much alive
late in 1965, two private lawsuits, one in the Federal dis-
trict court by the Union against the Company claiming
heavy money damages for alleged violations of the strike
settlement agreement , and one by the Company in retalia-
tion against the Union in the State court seeking $15 mil-
lion compensation for claimed damages to its business
caused by misconduct on the picket line.
B. The Critical Events in Sequence
The contracts of Local 1746, executed on November
1, 1962, for the Manchester plant, and on December 1,
1962, for East Hartford, were by their terms due to expire
on November 30, 1965, and provided for automatic
renewal thereafter absent written notice of intent to ter-
minate. On September 23, that Union sent written notice
of intent to terminate both agreements and requested a
bargaining conference. A meeting was set for October 1.
In anticipation, Siemiller, IAM president, and Brunner,
an International IAM vice president in charge of the
Northeastern States, sent Ralph Oehler, a Grand Lodge
representative whose office is in New York City, to take
charge of the negotiations. He was also authorized by
these high officers to act as the chief negotiator in all
respects in the bargaining which was contemplated for
482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
Local Lodge 743, whose current contract for the Broad
Brook and Windsor Locks plants extended through April
21, 1966, and in the bargaining, also imminent, fora third
IAM lodge-1746A. Lodge 1746A is the bargaining
agent for the employees of the Company's Southington,
Connecticut, plant, and its then contract was due to ex-
pire on December 6, 1965. The bargaining unit at
Southington was not concerned with the 1959-60 strike
and is not involved in any substantial sense in Case
1-CA-3355, or at all in this proceeding. Siemiller also as-
signed Richard Thurer, another Grand Lodge representa-
tive stationed in New York, to act together with Oehler
in Hartford.
Concomitant but separate negotiations took place for
the two locals, generally on alternate dates, between Oc-
tober 1 and December 3, 1965. When bargaining for
Local 1746 Oehler and Thurer were assisted by the of-
ficers of that lodge and by a negotiating committee of em-
ployees; when discussing proposals for Local 1746A
(Southington) they were always accompanied by its of-
ficers and its employee committee. For the Company it
was always the same group of spokesmen, led by Martin
Burke, vice president in charge of industrial relations, and
by Morgan Mooney, the personnel director. Seven
meetings were held with Local 1746 and eleven with
Local 1746A.
On the union side the written proposals advanced were
virtually the same-as to economic matters and union-
security aspects-for each group. And when, about
November 24, the Company presented its proposals - in-
cluding both economic matters and union-security details
of procedure-it made exactly the same offer to both
Local 1746 and 1746A. Because the contract of Local
743 (Broad Brook and Windsor Locks) continued until
April of the next year, there were no separate discussions
directly applicable to that situation in this early period;
nevertheless, when the Company made its offer of
November, the principal negotiators-Burke, Mooney,
Oehler, and Thurer-agreed it should apply also to the
employees represented by Local 743, and that the
benefits so offered should be brought to the attention of
the officers of Local 743, so that they could in some way
at least be kept abreast of the negotiations that in effect
were going on in their behalf also.
Apace with these successive meetings, where the local
officers and committees carried on the usual form of bar-
gaining, and which Oehler called the "official" negotia-
tions, he and Thurer, the other Grand Lodge representa-
tive, were meeting regularly with Burke and Mooney, the
same company officers who were dealing with the com-
mittees, and with Joseph Wells, the company lawyer.
Wells is the principal attorney who has been representing
the Respondent in all of the litigation detailed above these
past years. In these meetings, in Wells' hotel suite or in
another hotel room, two subjects were discussed at
length: settlement and final resolution without further
litigation of all the pending lawsuits, including Case
1-CA-3355 before the Board, and the substantive provi-
sions of contracts to be signed with the various IAM lo-
cals. On this latter subject of their talks-proposed
clauses for contract renewal - the great emphasis appears
to have been placed on matters relating to the functioning
of the Union as bargaining agent, such as union security,
checkoff, grievance procedures, and steward participa-
tion and privileges in the shops.
As noted below, there were at the time close to 18,000 employees at
East Hartford, and only about 150 at Manchester
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Oehler insisted at the hearing that all of this collateral
bargaining was "off the record," and, as will be explained
below, the General Counsel would have it that all of these
meetings have nothing to do with the case. In fact, these
face-to-face conferences, and uncounted telephone con-
versations which supplemented them, interspersed from
time to time between the regular roundtable meetings
with the local committees, were arranged in the Washing-
ton office of the president of the IAM, where Burke was
invited to consider the mutual advisability of such at-
tempts to reach amicable accommodation of all issues
between the contending parties.
Apart from any vague knowledge of these simultaneous
communications between company and union central of-
fice agents, the local bargaining committees were kept in
the dark of what was going on there. Oehler admitted he
honored the understanding among the central figures that
their high-level talks should remain secret Without
question the attempts to settle the pending litigation were
made behind the backs of IAM general counsel, Plato
Papps, and of Mozart Ratner, the special counsel for the
suits in progress. The final fillip in this cloak-and-dagger
drama came when, in the middle of the duplex negotia-
tions, Siemiller and Brunner conferred with Burke and
Mooney in New York City to check on what progress
was being made, with Siemiller requesting the company
officers to say nothing to Oehler and Thurer of his private
consultation with them.
Agreement was reached on all economic issues at the
beginning of December. With the 1962 contract of Local
1746 due to expire on November 30, 1965, on that very
day this local and the Company executed an extension
agreement for the old East Hartford plant contract, con-
tinuing all of the terms of the old agreement to midnight
of December 6.1 On December 6 they agreed upon a
further extension of that contract, this time to January 7,
1966, with provision for continuous automatic 2-week
further extensions thereafter indefinitely in the absence
of 3 days' notice to terminate the agreement by either par-
ty This contract reaffirmed all of the old agreement ex-
cept for the economic terms, as to those the contract was
modified with 27 pages detailing an 8- to 14-cent hourly
increase in wage rate for each of 3 years, paid sick leave,
and increased benefits in vacations, insurance, pension,
and retirement. This agreement also specified that, in
consideration of these economic concessions, from that
day to November 30, 1968, the Union would suspend
"meetings in collective-bargaining negotiation with the
Company" on any economic subjects, and that:
It is further understood and agreed between the com-
pany and the union that the purpose of this extension
of the December 1, 1962, agreement is to enable the
parties thereto to enter into a new agreement to
become effective as of December 1, 1965, for a
period of at least three (3) years until midnight
November 30, 1968, which shall reflect therein
agreement already reached between the company
and the union on (1) wages; (2) vacations; (3)
holidays; (4) paid sick leave and funeral leave; (5)
group insurance; and (6) retirement for all employees
now covered by the aforesaid agreement dated
December 1, 1962....
As also called for in the agreement itself, the supple-
ment was submitted to a ratification vote of the member-
ship of Local 1746 (a separate meeting for each of the
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 483
three shifts), approved by a majority and then signed.
The parties having agreed that they were bargaining for
the Windsor Locks and Broad Brook plants as well as
East Hartford and Manchester, Oehler, with the consent
of the Company, went to the officers of Local 743 during
a workday on December 8, told them of the economic
package agreement made for Local 1746, and explained
that what bargaining was going on was intended by both
sides to apply equally to the employees represented by
Local 743. The officers of that local approved what was
going on.
On December 8 a new 3-year contract was also made
with Local 1746A for the Southington plant. It contained
the same economic improvements won by the other lo-
cals; in all other respects-among which the union func-
tion matters are significant here-the new contract simply
continued all the provisions of the old. And there was an
understanding, admitted at the hearing by all parties, that
in the event the bargaining which they intended to con-
tinue should produce agreement to alter the union con-
tractual participation in grievances, arbitration, and mat-
ters of that type-presumably improvements-such
things would later be added to the contract of Local
1746A also.
The economic issues thus finally resolved in all areas,
Oehler and Thurer continued, between the first week of
December and March 2, 1966, their "off the record" con-
ferences with the company officers and their lawyer.
Now the real subjects were settlement of pending litiga-
tion and the union-security clauses of the contracts. Ap-
parently no records were kept of the discussions at these
conferences-at least none was offered into evidence; the
record in general, however, shows that concessions came
grudgingly from each side, and that in essence the more
salient bones of contention which persisted to the end
were a union demand for a union-shop provision of some
sort, largely resisted by the Company, and some accepta-
ble arrangement for reinstatement, reemployment, or
possible seniority rearrangement for strikers with respect
to the old 1960 strike. In any event, the parties were una-
ble to come to terms, and at their final meeting Oehler
showed Burke a list of 21 items sought by the Union,
most of them far in excess of what he had up to that mo-
ment indicated might satisfy him. One critical demand
was for some form of compulsory union membership
Another was for quick payment of $22-1/2 million in set-
tlement of Board Case 1-CA-3355. Oehler knew the
Company would not compromise on that basis, and the
negotiators admitted to one another no useful purpose
would be served by discussing those proposals any
further. Although once again the local bargaining commit-
tees knew little, if anything, of what the Grand Lodge
representatives were saying to the company officials dur-
ing this period, they did know the effort at an overall set-
tlement was being made. After his final talk with Burke
and Mooney, Oehler reported to the two locals that there
would be no agreement. The next day, March 3, Herman
Muise, president of Local 1746, sent the following tele-
gram, reiterated verbatim by letter the same day, to the
Company:
Since settlement negotiations have collapsed, it is
necessary that the parties agree upon contract terms
to govern their current relationship until the Board
and the Courts have resolved the legal issues on
which the parties are divided, supplying the con-
trolling guide line. We, therefore, propose that the
current economic package accepted by Lodge 1746
on December 6, 1965, be substituted for the
economic terms of the expiring agreement and that,
with this modification the whole contract be renewed
for a period of 3 years, subject to any final ruling of
the N.L.R.B. and the reviewing courts in the cases
now pending before the Board.
The new contract should incorporate specific lan-
guage indicating its purpose and effect. We propose
the following: "It is recognized that the parties are in
disagreement concerning their legal rights in many
areas covered or affected by this agreement, which
differences are being litigated before the Board and
the Federal courts. Provisions in the areas so
covered or affected shall remain in effect pending
final disposition of N.L.R.B. cases 1-CA-3355 and
1-CA-5245."
We are prepared and hereby offer to execute such a
new agreement instantly, before the extension of the
current contract expires. We would appreciate the
favor of your immediate written reply.
By letter of March 4 the Respondent acknowledged
receipt of the message and suggested a meeting for March
10 "for the purpose of discussing these matters." On the
same day the Company also wrote to Local 743. Local
743 on February 14 had given notice to modify its con-
tract-due to expire on April 21 -with an invitation to
contract negotiation. The Company's letter to this local
on March 4 suggested a meeting on March 11 with its
representativies "for the purpose of discussing your
proposals." The suggested meetings took place, with
Local 1746 on March 10 and with Local 743 the next
day. At each the Company handed to the union officials
virtually identical copies of a six-page letter setting forth
in detail the Respondent's version of the history of its
relations with the two locals reaching back to 1960. The
document can fairly be called a white paper; starting with
the strike of 6 years before, it relates how misconduct,
broken promises, and deliberate obstructionist tactics by
union agents caused the employees to turn against the
Union, how the Company, in contrast, in successive con-
tracts agreed to mounting benefits for the employees in
the sea'ch for harmonious coexistence with the locals,
that it would withdraw all recognition from each of them,
and closes with an invitation to the Unions to request
Board-conducted elections to prove their right to
represent the employees at all four plants. Simultaneously
the Company served written notice upon the Local 1746
committee terminating the contract then in effect. This
was the requisite 3 days' notice whereby the successive
2-week automatic extensions of the December 6 contract
would cease. The union committees accepted the letters
but said they would not file representation petitions.
The following facts were stipulated. Early in March
there were 18,000 production and maintenance em-
ployees at the East Hartford plant and 150 at
Manchester; of these-both groups were represented by
Local 1746-about 2,500 paid dues during December,
January, and February, almost all by checkoff. In April
there were 4,150 employees at the Windsor Locks plant
and 350 at Broad Brook, all covered by Local 743 con-
tract, of which approximately 1,000 paid dues, again al-
most all by checkoff, from December through April of
1966. No employees of the Respondent have been
required by collective-bargaining contract in recent years
to join or remain a member of a union , or to pay union
dues as a condition of employment. Immediately upon
withdrawal of recognition the Company wrote a letter to
336-845 0 - 70 - 32
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
everyone of the many employees in the four plants advis-
ing them of the fact. The letter in the Hamilton Standard
Division said that Local 743 had terminated its contract,
that the local represented very few employees, and that
the Company would file its own petitions with the Board
to give the employees an opportunity to vote. On the 15th
every employee of the Pratt and Whitney Division
received a letter saying the Company had already filed
petitions for elections, stressing the fact only 13 percent
of the 19,000 employees were paying dues anyway, invit-
ing approval of the Company's action, and adding "an ef-
fective procedure for resolving employee complaints will
be placed in operation following the expiration of the
present union agreement at midnight, March 18, 1966.
Details of this procedure will be announced in the next
few days." An enclosure with all the letters was a copy of
the comprehensive white paper letter delivered to the
union officers a few days earlier
The Respondent filed its separate representation peti-
tions with the Regional Director for each of the four
plants represented by Local 1746 and 743 (Cases
1-RM-571 and 574). The Regional Director dismissed
the petitions and issued the complaint herein. The Com-
pany never responded to the letter from the president of
Local 1746 dated March 3, 1966, proposing immediate
execution of a 3-year agreement incorporating the
changes in working conditions already agreed upon and
placed in effect, and in all other respects continuing the
provisions of the old agreement.
C. A Threshold Theory of Illegality
The heart of the case rests squarely in the announced
decision by the Respondent, on March 10 and 1 1 , to
withdraw recognition from these two locals and to refuse
to bargain further with either of them until such time as
they could again prove their majority representative
status in Board elections. Was such refusal a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act? For an affirmative answer the
General Counsel argues that the objective and un-
disputed facts may be viewed in more than one light, any
one of which suffices to support an unfair labor practice
finding and an order against the Respondent to bargain
forthwith.
The General Counsel contends, as a matter of funda-
mental law, that merely because there was pending
against this Employer an unfair labor practice charge, the
Company "had no standing" to question the Union's
majority status in March 1966, and may not now, in
defense against this complaint, claim or attempt to prove
otherwise. On this theory the General Counsel moved at
the start of the hearing to strike from the answer the al-
legation that at the time of the withdrawal of recognition
the locals were not authorized to speak on behalf of a
majority of the employees. Because I find no merit in this
contention, I denied the motion to strike that portion of
the answer.
The earlier charge, of which the General Counsel
speaks, is the one filed sometime in 1960 and which
resulted in the complaint (Case 1-CA-3355) on which
testimony was still being heard by a Trial Examiner at the
time of the events giving rise to this proceeding. No
reliance is placed on the merits of that first complaint in
this theory of law, as indeed there can be none, first,
because no decision of any kind has yet been reached in
Case 1-CA-3355, and second, because the General
Counsel successfully opposed the Respondent's motion
here to consolidate that proceeding with this one. It is the
sole fact that the Company has previously been charged
with unfair labor practices, charges as yet totally un-
resolved, that, according to the General Counsel, today
dictates an order for immediate bargaining in this case
without regard to whatever may have occurred in 1965 or
1966. Consistent with this position, the statement is then
made that the entire question of whether or not the
Unions-either Local 1746 or 743-in fact represented
a majority in the bargaining units in March 1966 is "ir-
relevant," or " immaterial" to the issues of this case. And
it is also adherence to this theory of law that prompted the
General Counsel to concede, in the district court hearing
on petition for injunction, that the Unions did not
represent a majority. What he meant, of course, as he
quickly specified, was that "the Union does not have a
majority of members of employees. We, of course, assert
that they do represent a majority."
Apart from passing descriptive decisional phrases
taken out of context, the Board and court cases cited in
support of this broad contention are inapposite The
Board's Regional Director dismissed the Respondent's
RM petitions because of pending charges and this does
mean that in the Board's opinion no reliable inquiry could
be made at this time into the question concerning
representation. It does not follow from that rule, how-
ever, that the Board does, will, or necessarily must also
order the employer to bargain with the claiming union off-
hand, in the complete absence of any finding that unfair
labor practices have been committed. Where the leader of
an organizational campaign is discharged and a charge en-
sues, the Board refuses to poll the employees at the em-
ployer's request, but it will hardly order him to bargain
simply because of the possibility there may have been an
illegal discharge. To rule here as the General Counsel de-
mands would be tantamount to automatic prejudgment of
guilt by the Respondent in the contemporaneous, but as
yet uncompleted, prosecution of an unrelated case. There
is an error in reasoning that is fatal to the entire theory.2
The bargaining orders issued on the basis of the cited
decisions rest upon determinative factors that are foreign
to the situation here. In Franks Bros. Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
321 U.S. 702, the Supreme Court ordered a respondent
employer to bargain immediately with a union despite ad-
mission that at that moment the labor organization did not
represent any of the employees in the bargaining unit.
What the Court was doing, however, was enforcing a
Board order based upon an earlier finding that the em-
ployer had sometime previously illegally refused to bar-
gain with the union at a time when it in fact did represent
a majority of the employees. The distinction between the
two situations -one involving a final order of the Board
following an unfair labor practice finding, and one barren
of any such facts-also so clearly remove from this case
the other asserted precedents set out in the General
L The following proposition stated in one of the General Counsel's
briefs is the base premise said to support the whole superstructure of
ideas
The necessary corrolary of power to decline to conduct an election
until pending unfair labor practice charges are resolved is power to
compel the employer to honor an outstanding certification and main-
tam the bargaining relationship pendente tie
The suggested equation significan tly blurs the very real distinction
between doing nothing and doing something Refusal to conduct elections
means "hold", affirmative bargaining orders mean "hit "The negative and
the positive are not one and the same
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 485
Counsel's brief, that they require no further discussion.
D. Bad-Faith Refusal to Bargain
The clearest fact emerging from this record as a whole
is that when the Respondent severed its relations with the
Unions and filed representation petitions, its reason for
doing so was not any concern with how many employees
were paying dues or how many desired to have the local
unions continue representing them in collective bargain-
ing. If the essence of any refusal-to-bargain case under
this statute is, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly said,
the question of good or bad faith in the employer's at-
titude towards the union and towards the very principle
of collective bargaining, there is no escape from the con-
clusion that in telling the local committees it doubted their
majority status, and in saying to all the employees this
was the Company's true motivation in rejecting their
established representatives, this Respondent acted in bad
faith.3 With Local 1746 the Company has had regularly
negotiated contracts for about 10 years; with Local 743
for more than 20. With each, contracts had been executed
3 years previously, and for 3 months-October through
February last-company agents made continued efforts
to settle all terms of employment for the employees
through the Unions' officials. When, at the hearing in July
of this year, the Respondent offered to prove that it had
reasonable grounds to question, and in fact had doubted
the majority status of the locals in the yeai s preceding
1962, the offer was rejected. Against the compelling sig-
nificance of its more current conduct, those ancient facts
revived are too remote and nebulous to bear upon this
question now. To consider such evidence might lead to a
charge of hypocrisy against the Company, and this would
be unfair 4
Were there no affirmative evidence of motivation, it
would be difficult enough to support the defense of good
faith based upon a suggested inference to be drawn from
the limited number of employees who were paying dues
to the Union., The fact of concurrent bargaining alone
might well suffice to offset the implication. Moreover,
with pertinent circumstances concededly unchanged
within the last year or two, the Respondent raised no
issue of majority status at moments when such an honest
doubt would normally have been expressed.
But the most significant fact of all is, and the Respond-
ent does not even claim otherwise, that had the Unions
agreed to whatever terms Burke or Mooney were de-
manding-at any time between December 6 and March
2-the Company would have signed regular 3-year con-
tracts with each local. That this was the Company' s inten-
tion appears in writing on the very first page of the interim
agreement of December 6 with Local 1746, in express
language awaiting only final details before being made ef-
fective until 1968. And the • substance of the accord
reached on all economic matters early in December was
understood by all parties without question to apply
equally to the employees represented by Local 743. In-
deed, the Company took pains at the time to have Thurer
and Oehler go to the Hamilton Standard plants to keep
the officers and committee of Local 743 advised of the
negotiations and agreements reached, even though its
contract still had over 3 months to run. If there be any
remaining doubt on this score, it is dispelled entirely by
the Company's letters of March 10 and I I to the locals
and placed in the hands of each and every employee The
history of bargaining related there depicts the Union as
advancing its interest as a concern apart from the welfare
of the employees, and the actions of the Employer instead
as directed towards their economic interest and inde-
pendence. The point of the letter is driven home by
special emphasis on the Union's refusal, characterized as
unfair by the Company, to agree with the Respondent's
final offer, which is detailed in six specified enumerated
proposals for settling all pending litigation and the
remaining contract issues. Thus, in effect, the Company
was asking the employees to agree with its position that
the Unions ought not have disagreed with management,
and that it was just and proper for the employer to discon-
tinue bargaining for that reason.
It will be recalled that about a week before the Com-
pany's white paper letters of March 10 and 11, and only
I day after the final meeting of Oehler and Thurer with
Burke and Mooney, Local 1746 proposed continuation of
the entire contract of December 6 for 3 years, with all
legal questions in litigation to await the outcome of offi-
cial court decisions. But the Respondent never deigned to
answer the proposal which, at the very least, removed
any real obstacle to contract renewal and certainly broke
any temporary impasse that may have been reached.
Respondent's brief to the district court in the injunction
proceeding literally stated why recognition was
withdrawn "Respondent replied to this proposal by ter-
minating the extension of the old contract with Local
1746 ... and informed Lodge 1746 and Lodge 743 ...
that it would not bargain further with either of them."
The details of the extended discussions on just how the
competing parties wished to dispose of the court litiga-
tion, or of their opposing concepts of appropriate
grievance procedures or other forms of union security,
were many, and no doubt all entered in the decision
finally reached by the Company. Clearly, however,
among them two of the more unpalatable musts which the
union representatives threw at the Company at the
beginning of March were positive insistence upon a union
shop and $22-1/2 million now to settle pending litigation.
The causal relationship between these unacceptable de-
mands and the Company's "reply" on March 10 is clear
and has nothing to do with majority representative status
or dues checkoffs.
The law is clear The duty to bargain is not dependent
upon the Union's position on lawful bargaining issues,
and no employer may condition continued recognition of
a majority representative upon its yielding to one point or
another. The real substance of the defense to the entire
complaint rests upon the assertion that at the moment of
the refusal to bargain, now called illegal, neither of the
two locals in fact represented a majority of the employees
in the bargaining units, or at least that the Respondent
had reasonable cause to believe this was so. With stale
facts relating to the strike of 6 years before having
nothing to do with the Respondent's 1966 state of
mind-what with all the intervening bargaining and the
successive regular contracts-the only record evidence
said to require a finding of minority authorization to bar-
gain is the fact only 13 percent of the employees for
whom Local 1746 spoke were paying dues, and about 22
percent of those represented by Local 743. The Re-
spondent would have the Board consider the question of
majority status with reference to this fact, and only this
IN L R B v American National Insurance Co 343 US 395
4 Shamrock Dairy, Inc , I i9 NLRB 998
N L R B v Gulfmont Hotel Company, 362 F 2d 588 (C A 5)
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fact, without regard to any of the other equally pertinent
factors appearing in the record as a whole. On why it
recognized the locals back in 1960, the Company at-
tempted to explain its position on grounds other than the
Unions' right to speak for employees, although its offer
was rejected as untimely. Nothing was offered to picture
the 1962 agreements, the 1965-66 negotiations, or the
new December 6 contract with Local 1746, as anything
other than pure admission that the Unions did represent
a majority of the employees throughout the period. The
Respondent argues as though none of these contracts had
ever been made, as though they had been kept secret from
the employees, or as though the progressive wage rate in-
creases and other improved economic benefits had been
concealed from them.
It is not without reason, or in the absence of expert ex-
perience in this field, that the Board, with court approval,
has repeatedly emphasized that stabilization in industrial
relations, the ultimate objective of all the provisions of
this statute, is best achieved by final execution of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement. And stablization in this
sense means not only amicable adjustment of the relation-
ship between union and employer, but also peaceful
resolution of the question concerning representation, or
of the continuing doubt, with its concomitant
disturbances to employer-employee relations, in the
question whether or not the employees in fact desire to be
represented by a union The rule of Ray Brooks v.
N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96, deals with the presumption of
continuing majority flowing from the fact of certification
by the Board, conclusive for a period, rebuttable
thereafter. But the entire purpose of the certification, and,
indeed, of all the representation proceeding before the
Board preliminary to the certification, is to encourage col-
lective bargaining, and, when the parties so decide, to
bring into being the collective-bargaining contract. Once
this has been achieved, the importance of the certificate
wanes, and it becomes the contract which stabilizes in-
dustrial relations, and quiets both the frinction between
employer and union and the question of representation or
authority of the union as exclusive agent of the em-
ployees.6 The Board's contract-bar rule, precluding elec-
tions during the life of an effective, valid agreement, is no
different in purpose from the rationale that precludes
elections during the first year of the original certification.
So long as the contract is in effect, the presumption of
continuing majority is virtually conclusive; thereafter it
becomes rebuttable. Has it been rebutted in this case? I
think not.
Of prime importance is the fact that evidence of
dissatisfaction with a collective-bargaining agent duly
selected and long accepted and utilized as the means for
obtaining successive improvements in conditions of em-
ployment must properly come from the employees them-
selves, if it is to carry any weight, and not from the em-
ployer on their behalf.7 There has not been and there is no
such evidence in this case. Lukewarm with their pocket-
books they may have been, but there is not the slightest
indication of any dissident group, or of any move, how-
ever limited, to unseat the exclusive bargaining represent-
atives. Two thousand copies of its last 3-year contract
Fay v Douds, 172 F 2d 720, 24 (C A 2)
N L R B v Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc, 195 F 2d 350 (C A 5)
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp , 159 NLRB 1757, 1764
at fn 15
Congress could not have intended the 9(b)(I) requirement to be
were printed by Local 1746 and all distributed among the
employees. There were 40 Local 1746 stewards operat-
ing in the Pratt and Whitney Division; 110 separate
grievances were filed and processed there through these
stewards during the calendar year 1964, and 219 during
1965. That 181 of this last number involved a single issue
does not detract from the significant fact that that many
individual workmen consciously joined with the Union in
their grievance against the Employer. In the Hamilton
Standard Division, where Local 743 functioned, there
were 154 grievances in 1964 and 149 in 1965. That the
employees were at least tacitly in agreement with the
lodges that the locals should continue bargaining for them
is the minimum that must be said in these circumstances.
They also knew-and there certainly is no evidence to
gainsay the fact-that a ratification meeting of the mem-
bers of Local 1746 was a prerequisite to all the improve-
ments in their pay and the fringe benefits which came to
them in December. Not many went to union meetings and
only a percentage paid union dues. In view of the direct
effect which the representation activities had upon the
employees' working conditions, it can hardly be said that
the widespread inertia bespoke rejection of the locals as
their spokesmen. With the successive contracts imposing
no obligation upon them to join the Union at all, a more
persuasive inference is that the employees found matters
to their liking, and were perfectly willing to remain free
riders, having the Union as their agent without cost.
There is no requirement, in this statute, that employees in
fact be members of a union , or contribute at all to its ex-
penses, before a labor organization may be authorized to
act as exclusive bargaining agent. The statutory authori-
ty, or, as customarily alleged in refusal-to-bargain com-
plaints, the majority representative status of the claiming
union, may be shown in any number of ways. Here, it is
proved by the fact of the successive contracts regularly
executed and implemented, by the presumption of majori-
ty status of the locals flowing from the stable contractual
relationships, by the collective-bargaining negotiations
uninterrupted for months up to the very moment of sud-
den cutoff by the Respondent, and by the total absence of
any indication of dissatisfaction emanating from the em-
ployees themselves.8
The rule in point was clearly articulated by the Board
only recently in United States Gypsum Company, 157
NLRB 652, 655, 656, where an employer's representa-
tion petition, filed when a contract ceased having effect,
was dismissed. The case stands for the principle that
when, at such a moment, an employer attempts to place
the union's majority status in issue, it "must demonstrate
by objective considerations that it has some reasonable
grounds for believing that the union has lost its majority
status since its certification." And the test is the same
whether the employer files a representation petition, or
refuses to bargain, for the Board also said "the relation of
an incumbent certified union to an employer that .
declines to bargain without a good-faith doubt of the
union's majority status may turn on whether the employer
refuses to bargain and thereby subjects itself to an 8(a)(5)
charge or chooses to file a petition and forces the union to
an election ... in either case the rights of the employees
applied in such a manner as to provide a shield behind which one par-
ty, after having benefited from the bargaining relationship for so many
years, may with impunity in mid-negotiations, for whatever tactical
advantage it hopes to secure, seek to shatter the bargaining structure
it has itselfjoined to create
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION ` 487
to be represented are jeopardized, and the union is put to
the choice of utilizing the time-consuming unfair labor
practice route or submitting to the employer's use of the
petition and being compelled to engage inendless election
campaigning...." Implicit in this language is the thought
that the Board will apply the same rule in an unfair labor
practice proceeding when the identical issue is presented
in the posture of a refusal to bargain as distinguished from
an employer petition.
The only "objective consideration" advanced by the
Respondent here as "a reasonable grounds" for its as-
serted good-faith doubt is the fact that only a minority of
the employees were paying union dues, a situation that
has been unchanged for several years. Alone, particularly
in the total picture revealed here, it cannot constitute a
sufficient affirmative defense.9 What the Respondent re-
lies upon more heavily in its brief-a ground which in
reality is neither an "objective consideration" nor
evidence-is a statement made by the General Counsel
during the injunction proceeding 4 months after the
refusal to bargain, during discussion of his theory of law,
that the Union did not "represent" a majority in March.
In the context of the record as a whole, of course, what
the General Counsel admitted was that less than half of
the employees were union "members," and in this sense
the Union only represented a minority. He also made
quite clear, consistent with the basic complaint allegation,
that each lodge was indeed the exclusive majority
representative.
I find that by withdrawing recognition from Lodges
1746 and 743 on March 10 and 11, 1966,10 respectively,
and in refusing thenceforth to bargain with these lodges
with respect to the employees up to that moment
represented by them in all four of the plants here in-
volved, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
statute, as alleged in the complaint.I I
E. Further Contentions: The Remedial Order
The conclusionary finding here made that the Com-
pany's complete rejection of both locals and its
unqualified refusal to bargain after March on any subject
whatever, constituted a direct violation of Section 8(a)(5),
means, of course, that it must be ordered to recognize the
Unions again as the exclusive bargaining agents, and,
upon request, bargain with them in good faith. The
affirmative injunction is necessarily as broad as the full
scope of Section 8(d) of the Act.12 If, as the complaint
further alleges, anything that the Company's agents said
or did during the negotiating sessions which preceded the
final severance of the bargaining relationship , also evi-
dence the Respondent's breach of faith, a finding to that
effect adds nothing to the concluding finding nor gives
any added vitality or significance to the affirmative
remedial order. The whole includes the sum of its parts.
And this is equally true of unilateral action, such as
processing of grievances directly with employees without
union representatives, taken after exclusion of the locals
from the picture. Unqualified recognition of the locals
hereafter-and nothing less will satisfy the order-in-
cludes, among other things, participation, consistent with
Board law, in the continuing bargaining process by union
agents, and an end to unilateral dealing with employees
behind the back of their exclusive representatives.
Despite the fact the essential burden of the complaint,
fairly read in its entirety, is that the ultimate and
unequivocal refusal to bargain further with the two locals
in March was a pure act of bad faith and therefore an un-
fair labor practice , the complaint also lists a number of
things the Company is alleged to have said or done, and
then avers that "by each of the activities" so enumerated
the Respondent "refused to accord full statutory recogni-
tion." Among these specific charges are such things as
refusing to agree to contract language obligating the Com-
pany to furnish certain wage data or merit ratings, refus-
ing to agree that it had the burden of disproving the merits
of a grievance filed, refusing to agree that there should be
so many stewards, or that they should be paid so much by
the Company for time devoted to investigating
grievances, or that there should be a full arbitration
clause. These are essentially allegations of evidentiary
matters, and could as well have been omitted from the
pleadings. Indeed the overall charge of bad faith could be
proved, as in fact, the General Counsel argues he has
proved, by conduct other than precisely set out in the
complaint.
That these pinpointed factual assertions in the
pleadings were intended as cumulative evidence of under-
lying bad faith , and not as independent allegations of
specific violations of the statute, was admitted by the
General Counsel at the hearing . He made clear this is not
a case of wrongdoing in refusing to furnish data, or in
refusing to sign a contract already agreed upon . It is sole-
ly in the fact that the Respondent resisted the union de-
mands "too adamantly " that the fault is to be seen. In his
brief, however, the General Counsel asks that "the
Respondent should be ordered to grant the Union 's statu-
tory rights, including the rights to information." The
request is carried further in greater detail by the Union in
its brief; it requests that the Respondent be ordered to
sign a new contract setting out substantially the very con-
tract proposals advanced by Local 1746 during the
1965-66 negotiations.
Attention is also focused upon another precise allega-
tion of the complaint by the stress placed upon the
question of checkoff in the remedial orders suggested.
They both argue extensively and persuasively that the
Respondent must be directed to resume the checkoff ar-
rangement which ended with termination of the contract
with Local 1746 on March 18 and with Local 743 on
April 21. The Complaint alleges that the Respondent
° See Gulfmont Hotel, supra
10 This is the date of the effective violation of the Act, of the literal
refusal to discuss contract terms with the Unions, and of publication to the
employees of the Respondent 's attitude It is of no moment in this case
that a unilateral grievance procedure was not placed in effect until the con-
tracts with the locals had expired, or even that the Company continued to
check off dues in favor of Local 743 into April
11 There is no dispute with respect to the composition of the, appropnate
bargaining units for any one of the four plants involved - East Hartford,
Manchester, Windsor Locks, and Broad Brook Accordingly, it is found
that those bargaining units as precisely set forth in the complaint are ap-
propriate for purposes of collective bargaining
12 Sec 8(d) reads
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages , hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment , or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder , and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession
488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"unlawfully terminated the contract" with Local 1746,
and "unlawfully terminated the contract" with Local
743.13 If this language, at least with respect to the Local
1746 contract, be read together with the many other
evidentiary factual allegations, it stands as but further as-
serted "evidence" of overall bad faith. A confusion arises
from the fact that in asking that the Company be com-
pelled to restore the checkoff provided for in the contract,
the General Counsel says that "in contemplation of law"
the company notice was "ineffective to terminate the con-
tracts ... in legal contemplation, the contracts were
never terminated and remain in effect." And counsel for
the Union claims that the situation "requires artificial ex-
tension" and that the contracts must be treated "as if they
had never expired." Clearly, however, neither brief in-
tended that this language be taken literally, for they also
request simultaneously that the Respondent must be or-
dered to abandon its insistence that the grievance
procedure, and other clauses relating to union activities
in the plant (those that are set out in the terminated agree-
ment) remain as in the past, but instead sign now, in a new
agreement, quite different clauses to replace them.
Whatever may have been intended by all this-be it to
make additional unfair labor practice findings, or order
restoration of old agreements, or simply to fashion a spe-
cial and unconventional remedy here on the basis of the
out-and-out unlawful refusal to bargain in March - it does
not seem appropriate on this record to do other than order
the Respondent to bargain in good faith now, as the
statute commands.
Throughout the argument advanced in support of the
request for extraordinary positive directives in this
remedial order, two pervasive stories are pressed, one
that must fall in the face of the evidence, the other inter-
woven with a history of the parties' relationship that has
been removed from consideration in this case at the
request of the government. The first is that the Respond-
ent conditioned sincere bargaining with either local upon
withdrawal, or settlement on the Company's terms, of all
pending litigation - particularly Board Case 1-CA-3355.
The other is that the "hard" position taken by the Com-
pany in the bargaining sessions must be appraised in the
light of its past conduct-including illegal violations of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in the thousands, and a cam-
paign of antiunion activities over many years. Comment
is therefore required on certain aspects of activities oc-
curring during the fall and winter of 1965-66.
On its face, the story of the collateral "off the record"
discussions belies any assertion that participation was
forced upon the Union by the Respondent. The first "offi-
cial" conference occurred on October 1, 1965, between
the Company and representatives from Local 1746,
several hours in the morning and several after lunch. The
next bargaining meeting was with the committee and of-
ficers of Local 1746A (Southington) on October 12.
Grand Lodge Representative Oehler was present at both.
When the parties adjourned for lunch at noon, on the
12th, he went to the hotel room of Wells, the company
lawyer, and suggested they get together to talk settlement
of pending cases. Wells said he was not authorized, and
asked Oehler would he speak to Vice President Burke.
Oehler said yes, Burke came, and for over an hour the
three talked. It was agreed that an effort would be made,
and the afternoon session with Local 1746A was called
off. Here and there in his long recital Oehler suggested
the Company wanted to keep these talks quiet; the fact is
he made it a point to bind the others to secrecy. It was he
who first used the phrase "off the record" in that room;
he admitted having "requested" that the conversations be
kept so, and that the talks were not "for general consump-
tion." Did Burke and Mooney say to him that day they
"were very reluctant to meet with you in an off-the-
record discussion"? Oehler answered that they "could
have said it." Burke and Mooney, his personnel director,
were in the Washington office of IAM President Siemiller
the next day. Brunner, IAM vice president, had that
morning telephoned Burke in Hartford and asked as a
favor that he fly Grand Lodge Representative Thurer
down with him in the company plane.
Oehler was on the witness stand for over 2 days during
the hearing, and tried to create the impression that the
Company's spokesman made him understand settlement
of the pending litigation and negotiation of new contracts
were intertwined and could not be separated. His
testimony as a whole is unpersuasive on this score. Only
two meetings had taken place before he made the over-
ture himself. The second, with Southington Local 1746A,
had nothing to do with the court cases, except for a very
minor and tangential aspect. Oehler admitted no one told
him plainly and directly that settlement talk must go hand
in hand with bargaining. He said again and again he "in-
ferred" this was the Company's position. "I said I got the
feeling that the litigation in all these cases were involved
in the negotiations." "My feeling was that settlement
could be reached on all matters if we applied ourselves."
In the course of the October 1 negotiating session,
Burke and Mooney, and even other company agents, did
refer to the pending Board case many times. Oehler's oral
testimony, substantially consistent with a record of that
meeting made by the Company, shows that reference to
the subject may as well have been provoked by union
proposals for a new contract, as by an independent pur-
pose. There was very much discussion during the day of
a new "witnesseth" clause which the Union wanted in a
new contract; this was intended to replace the recognition
clause of the old agreement. In pertinent part, it asked the
Company to agree, in writing, that "it is the intent and
purpose of the parties to this agreement, in accordance
with the National Labor policy, to eliminate arbitrary
management control over terms and conditions of em-
ployment and to provide effective safeguards against ar-
bitrary management decisions and actions thereby
enhancing the dignity and security of employees ...",
that the Company would act "subject to the terms of this
agreement and all obligations imposed upon the Company
by law," and that "the Company acknowledges the
requirement for security inherent in the nature of the
Union's operations and the need for a feeling of job
security on the part of its maintenance and production
employees which places a responsibility upon the Com-
pany to avoid the assignment of presently established bar-
gaining unit work to nonbargaining unit employees, which
would have the direct result of undermining the bargain-
" This last assertion is error On February 14, 1966, Local 743 wrote
to the Company that in conformity with Article X11, Sections I and 4 of
the contract," it gave "written notice of its intent to modify certain por-
tions and terms" of the agreement The contract, by its terms, was to
remain in effect until April 21, 1966, and provided for automatic annual
renewal thereafter "unless either party hereto shall give written notice of
its intent to modify any portion or any of the terms hereof " This
contract was terminated by the local, not by the Respondent
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 489
ing agent, diluting the bargaining unit, and checking its
natural growth."
The Union also proposed unlimited binding arbitration
on all matters involving application and construction of
the contract. In the course of the discussion Thurer, for
the Union, explained that by unlimited arbitration he
meant final arbitration also on such questions as
"management function" and other phrases appearing in
the "witnesseth" clause. The negotiators that first day did
speak of assignment to employees outside the bargaining
unit, to contractors, to trainees who were excluded from
the old contract. Generally, however, the discussion
deteriorated into a hassle over what was "arbitrary,"
what was "legal," what "dignity" had to do with shop
problems. Asked to sign a pledge of legality, Burke and
Mooney spoke of Case 1-CA-3355, and charged the
Union with having wrongfully accused the Company of
illegality. And the suggested "witnesseth" language did
carry an implication of past wrongdoing by the Company.
This led to the question of arbitration, and the company
spokesmen, reluctant to agree, justified their position on
the ground the Union had reneged on a 1960 arbitration
agreement and instituted litigation when dissatisfied with
the outcome. With the tenor of the conversation set in this
fashion by the Union's proposals, if the thought of settling
the entire dispute then in the air-Board proceeding,
private lawsuits, and contract disagreement-arose in
Oehler's mind quite apart from what the Respondent may
have wished, it would not be surprising. He could well
have concluded that with the litigation out of the way he
might do better at the bargaining table. More likely the
thought simply occurred to Oehler after one and a half
meetings, that with multilitigation of such magnitude en-
veloping the parties, it was unlikely there could be fruit-
ful, calm, and reflective collective bargaining at all.
In any event, as a minimum it must be said that neither
party was less desirous than the other to talk "off the
record" about the pending suits, and to find an area of ad-
justment. The best Oehler could offer at either the hear-
ing before the Trial Examiner or before the district judge
in the injunction proceeding, to support his position that
he had been forced against his will into talking settlement
of the litigation, was that when, during the talk about the
"witnesseth" clause drafted by union counsel, Burke did
say "We ought to let the lawyers negotiate," he [Oehler]
"took it different," and "inferred" this was insistence that
Case 1-CA-3355 must be withdrawn before there could
be any bargaining.
There is affirmative indication that Oehler and the
Union did not feel coerced. The Union's lawyers knew
nothing of what was going on; a client subjected to im-
proper pressure by his opponent in law is not likely to
conceal the fact from the very specialists hired to protect
his interests. In Siemiller's office in Washington, on
October 13, the question arose whether agreement
reached by the Company with Oehler and Thurer would
be agreeable to the local lodge officers and committeemen
in Hartford. Thurer said openly that if necessary he and
Oehler would "ram it down their throats." 14
There came a time when the "off the record" discus-
sions could no longer be kept from Papps, the IAM
General Counsel, or Ratner, the attorney who was
prosecuting Case I-CA-3355 for the Union, because the
hearing in that proceeding was scheduled to resume on
November 30. Oehler agreed with Wells and Burke that
the case should be postponed so that settlement talks
could continue He asked Wells to advise Papps by
telephone. When Papps learned of what had been going
on, he objected to any postponement and filed a charge,
accusing the Company of bargaining in bad faith. In a
telegram to the Company at that time the lawyer said
"Company is not negotiating in good faith or even accord-
ing full statutory recognition to the Union. Yesterday
Company conditioned so-called Southington `package' on
withdrawal of Board and Court cases. Company refused
to renew checkoff in order to break union in reprisal
against continuation of these cases."
Oehler tried to restrain the union lawyer. "I was trying
to establish a settlement and that was my prime purpose.
Mr Papps for whatever legal reasons he had was trying
to stop me as far as trying to wipe out things without
justification." At the district court hearing on injunction
Oehler testified he first learned of the charges filed by
Papps from Wells, and that he and Thurer were "embar-
rassed by not knowing something that was going on in the
structure of our organization. And we were quite per-
turbed about it."
THE COURT: But on that date you said that par-
ticular charge embarrassed you; that you yourself
weren't convinced that there was any bad faith at
that point?
THE WITNESS: I wasn't aware of it. I was con-
cerned about trying to make a resolve of the whole is-
sue.
THE COURT: You were the chief negotiator?
THE WITNESS: Yes
THE COURT: You hadn't complained to anybody
that there was any bad faith?
THE WITNESS: No, I never complained to my side
that there was bad faith bargaining.
THE COURT: Wouldn't you be the source of such
a complaint? You were the chief negotiator?
THE WITNESS: I should have been.
I'HE COURT: On what basis then was the com-
plaint brought?
THE WITNESS: I have no idea, sir.
There is more in the record, especially from Oehler's
own testimony, proving his and the Union's hope that an
amicable settlement could be reached. No useful purpose
would be served by repeating it all here. I find the
Government contention that the Respondent made settle-
ment or withdrawal of the charges in Case l-CA-3355,
a condition precedent to bargaining negotiations, unsup-
ported by the record as a whole. In the end meeting with
the committee of Local 1746A, for the Southington
group, the Company's economic offer to them was an
hourly raise of 7 to 13 cents per hour, for each of 3 suc-
cessive years, plus other benefits. At the same time,
Burke had made known to Oehler, in the "off the record"
talk, that he was really going to offer 8 to 14 cents instead,
plus 5 days' paid sick leave, an innovation which the local
a From the testimony before the Trial Examiner A Yes
Q (By Mr Wells) Do you recall at this meeting of October 13, Q Do you remember Mr Thurer saying that, yes, you could, if
Mr Oehler, Mr Burke inquiring whether if they worked out an agree- necessary you would ram it down their throats"
ment with you and Mr Thurer, you would be able to sell it to the A Mr Thurer made the statement, a statement similar to that
committee, the local people9
490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
committee had been demanding. It is Oehler's story that
when the Company asked how he wished to handle this
added offer, his answer was: "I said I don't want any part
of it." But the record also shows clearly that there then
followed an "official" meeting, with the lesser offer only
placed before the committee by the Company, a caucus
of the union people where they held firm to their demand
for more, a private talk between Oehler, Burke and Mo-
oney, and finally Oehler's return to the committee where
he told them he had obtained this added raise plus the
paid sick leave. I credit the testimony of Mooney, where
he testified that when Oehler was asked how he wished to
handle the extra pay and paid leave, he said "he could use
it, himself."
It is true that when the Respondent finally decided to
stop all the negotiations, it did so because it seemed im-
possible to reach agreement; and this meant a failure of
accord on both the new contract terms and settlement of
pending litigation. It is immaterial how the motivation be
phrased, for either ground falls short of adequate defense,
and the bad-faith finding remains the same.15 In view of
the Union's uninhibited participation in the "off the
record" discussions, enthusiastic at least, it cannot be
said that the position taken by the Company at the bar-
gaining table must be viewed with special suspicion
because they were also attempting to solve a pending
proceeding before the Board.
The second element of proof assertedly showing a cal-
culated and unlawful motive in the Respondent's election
to terminate the December 6 agreement and in its entire
attitude towards the Union's proposals is the way the
parties discussed the various aspects of a revised
grievance procedure and related matters. As explained
above, it is the fact that the Union lost the checkoff
benefit when the contract ended that constituted the
greatest hurt to it, considering the total absence from that
agreement of any substantial union-security provisions.
In reality it is restoration of the checkoff that the General
Counsel seeks as a pinpointed material remedy, and full
reestablishment of the entire contract only as means for
achieving the checkoff again.
In fact, there was little talk of checkoff as such during
the discussions, whether "official" or "off the record."
The loggerhead on union security centered on compulso-
ry union membership. Without variance the Respondent
insisted it would not agree to a union shop or maintenance
of membership, which, somewhat generally, was the
starting point voiced by Siemiller back in October when
it was first decided to have side talks. There were times
when Oehler hinted, at least, to Burke that he might settle
for maintenance of membership plus what he called the
"Lockheed" letter, whereby newly hired employees
would be advised by the Company that there is an exclu-
sive bargaining agent and that they could "consider" join-
ing it. And on March 2, when, as Oehler testified, he
"blew the settlement" by presenting a list of 21 demands
which he knew the Company must reject, the real bone of
contention was the Union's insistence at that moment
that there had to be some form of union security, some
measure of membership requirement as a condition of
employment. It does not appear that the question of
checkoff was discussed between them at that time.
A reading of the minutes of meetings placed in
evidence, some made by the Company and some by union
participants in the "official" negotiations, reveals very lit-
tle discussion of the checkoff. There were very extensive,
bitter, and inconclusive arguments over union proposals
to modify the grievance procedure and to provide greater
latitude for its stewards' activities in the plant during
working hours. It sought more paid time for stewards and
greater privilege for them to speak to employees at the in-
vestigation stages, plus more information from the Com-
pany when needed. The Company fought against inter-
ruptions in production and added expense. Towards the
end it agreed to a somewhat more generous 30-minute
paid period for stewards' duty at the end of the work shift,
and to a greater number of stewards provided the Union
paid them. The briefs emphasize the Company's proposal
to eliminate step 1 from the grievance procedure al-
together. It also appears, however, that this suggestion
was in response to the Union's initial proposal that there
be no more step 2, because it seldom resolved grievances.
A fair appraisal of what is reflected in the recorded
minutes and of what the witnesses recalled of the conver-
sations would be that the Company certainly bargained
"very hard" about this entire matter of grievance
processing.
There is a subtlety in Oehler's testimony on this point.
What he was really saying at the hearing is that the too
firm position taken by Burke and Mooney in the official
conferences with Local 1746 amounted to a threat to
deny the checkoff in the future if pending litigation were
not ended. And he may have smelled it correctly, for he
is expert in bargaining. From the record evidence, how-
ever, it is difficult to make the finding.16 This is especially
so because Oehler admitted that while meeting privately
with the Company he encouraged its officers to stand firm
against the local committees in order to facilitate their
later acceptance of what settlement he might ask them to
ratify.
The following is all from Oehler's testimony: "In the
hotel ... we were talking about the court case and the
checkoff and the union contract, and I believe I indicated
to the Company that the committee didn't believe that the
court cases and negotiations were a separate item, that
they were intertwined as far as the negotiations were con-
cerned. They didn't believe that the Company would
remove the checkoff. Mr. Burke responded, `Well, they
are out of their minds if they think that.' So I said to Mr.
Burke he ought to tell this committee hard and fast, put it
on the table and let them know. I thought they had a right
to know." The least that must be said of this testimony is
that Oehler encouraged the Respondent to resist the de-
mands of the local committees. The phrase "they had a
right to know," in the context of what Oehler later in-
sisted was good-faith bargaining by the Company, is no
different from an invitation to pressure the locals in the
"official" negotiations. Oehler and Thurer were not
passing observers of the negotiations, and if the company
spokesmen were indeed being unfair to them their duty
was to resist, not to egg the enemy forward.
On two items there is merit in the General Counsel's
contention that the Respondent thereby revealed union
animus. The first was its very firm insistence that the
' Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, 149 NLRB 1487, N L R B v Wooster
Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 356 U S 342
16 Oehler testified as follows
Q (By Mr Wells) The Company hadn't threatened to withdraw
checkoff if you didn't settle these cases, had it, not in the discussion
with you?
A in answering in the light of your question, no
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
Union agree grievances in certain areas could only be
processed by the Union after individual signature of the
employee involved . A majority representative has a statu-
tory right to represent any employee in grievances
without the requirement that it reestablish its authority to
do so in a given instance ." The Respondent also insisted
throughout the negotiations that the Union agree to a
blanket no -strike clause while at the same time refusing
to concede an arbitration provision coextensive with the
breadth of the no-strike proscription . The one is fairly the
quid pro quo of the other , and the Company 's arbitrary
position on this point could only have been intended to
preclude truly harmonious relationships. 18
Much of the argument that the Respondent should be
ordered to agree now to contract provisions which it ada-
mantly refused to concede before is based upon illegal
conduct charged to it in the past . In successfully resisting
the Respondent ' s motion to consolidate this case with the
earlier proceeding in Case 1-CA-3355-the one in which
the alleged past misconduct is still in issue -the General
Counsel effectively removed all that history from con-
sideration here. In any event , there is virtual admission in
the briefs of the General Counsel and the Union that the
Board cannot itself write the contract which the Respond-
ent must sign to evidence its good faith in future bargain-
ing. The General Counsel specifies that "the employer
should be ordered to grant the Union 's statutory rights."
The Union starts with : " It is incumbent upon the Board
... to establish guidelines for a relationship consistent
with the statutory scheme," and then adds the Company
must be prohibited "from inventing new excuses or
justifications for rejecting proposals," ordered to agree to
"a reasonable number of stewards ," "a reasonable
amount of working time" for stewards to process
grievances , "reasonable access" to the plant , and told to
articulate " intelligible" standards in place of "subjective
evaluation" by rating foremen . But this is the very sub-
stance of collective bargaining which the parties must be
free to negotiate across the conference table.19 If there
should come a day when the Respondent 's behavior in
complying with the bargaining order below is subject to
judicial review, it will be time enough to appraise its con-
duct with respect to any insistence that employees must
sign union grievances , or any refusal to yield an arbitra-
tion clause while demanding a no-strike limitation upon
the Union.20
There is a final reason, sufficient in itself, why the
request that the Respondent be ordered to reactivate the
December 6 agreement with Local 1746 must be denied.
The Union had agreed , when the extension contract was
made, that it would end in the event developments should
lead to exactly what later came to pass. A first page
clause reads : "It is further understood and agreed
between the company and the union that the purpose of
this extension of the December 1, 1962, agreement is to
enable the parties thereto to enter into a new agree-
ment...... Read together with the further literal arrange-
ment for cancellation on 3 days' notice-the exact
procedure later followed by the Company-this language
can only mean all parties knew that failure to come to
terms on the remaining issues meant no contract at all.21
And Oehler admitted this clear intent:
"Bethlehem Steel Company, 133 NLRB 1347, 1364
18 Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co, 369 U S 95, Cummer-
Graham Co, 122 NLRB 1044, 1072
is See American National Ins 343 U S 395
Compare United Steelworkers of America [H K Porter Co ] v
491
TRIAL EXAMINER : Was that said that the reason
for going 2 weeks at a time was so that in the event
nothing was finally resolved about other matters, the
parties could exercise the prerogatives stated in the
contract?
THE WITNESS : That' s right.
It was the Respondent which gave the written contract
notice to forestall further automatic renewal of the
December 6 agreement beyond March 18. In a real
sense, it can also be said it was the Union which threw the
gauntlet when Oehler asked for over $22 million in settle-
ment and "blew the whole deal" on March 2. It will not
do for the General Counsel to insist that the Respond-
ent's good faith be tested only in the setting of the "official
meetings," and that all the negotiations which Oehler
and Thurer carried on behind closed doors be ignored. If
there is one thing justice demands where an employer or
a union is accused of dishonest or sham conduct while
ostensibly engaged in collective bargaining , it is that all
the pertinent things said and done, particularly those
shedding rational light on questionable facts, must be con-
sidered.
As to discontinuance of the checkoff after the two con-
tracts - with Local 1746 and Local 743 - were by their
terms terminated , the Board has ruled that with the sup-
porting contracts no longer in effect , it is not an unfair
labor practice for the employer to discontinue the prac-
tice.22 It is also to be noted that the checkoff authorization
cards signed by the employees expressly limited the
deductions to what period collective bargaining might be
in effect.
Like other disputes that arose during the bargaining,
there was much disagreement over what type of data con-
cerning the work , rating, and shop status of employees,
the Respondent should furnish to the Union during the
life of the new contract , and to what extent . Here too the
Company bargained hard and yielded very little to the
Union ' s demands . The complaint says only that this
miserly attitude is further indication of an intent in the
Respondent to weaken the Union's capacity adequately
to represent the employees, and therefore cumulative
proof of its bad faith . The General Counsel expressly
conceded there is no contention the Respondent violated
the statute in the sense of having refused to produce data
upon request . The Union ' s counsel nevertheless con-
tends that the Respondent should be ordered affirmative-
ly, as an integral part of the remedial provision of this
Decision , either to furnish the disputed data which the
Union demanded , or to agree , in the collective bargaining
which must be ordered , to contract language obligating it
to do so in the future.
This is substantially one of the issues litigated in Case
1-CA-3355 now being heard before another Trial Ex-
aminer , the very proceeding instituted in 1960 which the
General Counsel insists has nothing to do with this case.
Indeed, as a collateral aspect of Case 1-CA-3355, the
Respondent has for some time been furnishing wage data,
pursuant to an injunctive order of the United States Dis-
trict Court , all pending the Board ' s final decision on
precisely what information the Respondent is legally
bound to produce. In the light of the many relevant con-
siderations in this complex situation, but particularly the
N.L R B, 363 F 2d 272 (C A D C)
21 See Communication Workers ofAmerica v N L R B , 215 F 2d 835
(C A 2)
22 Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America
[Bethlehem Steel Co ] v N L R B 320 F 2d 615 (C A 2)
492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
limited allegation of this complaint , there is little persua-
sion in the Union 's suggestion that two Trial Examiners
should simultaneously pass on the same question , albeit
on different records.
F. Section 8(a)(4) Allegation
Without explaining how the refusal to bargain also
amounts to "discrimination" against employees so as to
constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act, the
complaint makes the specific allegation . Assuming, but
without deciding , that this contention is correct, the
remedial order would remain exactly the same on this
record . I therefore see no reason to pass upon the
question.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with its operations
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the record in its entirety , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(2) of the Act.
2. Local Lodge 1746 and Local Lodge 743 are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. Local Lodge 1746 was in March 1966 and at all
times since has been the exclusive bargaining agent of all
the Respondent ' s employees of its East Hartford and
Manchester , Connecticut, plants, in the bargaining units
as set out in the complaint , within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act. Local Lodge 743 was in March 1966 and
at all times since has been the exclusive bargaining agent
of all Respondent's employees at its Broad Brook and
Windsor Locks, Connecticut, plants, in the bargaining
units set out in the complaint , within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By withdrawing recognition from Local 1746 and
Local 743 in March 1966, and by refusing to bargain with
them thereafter, the Respondent has engaged in and is en-
gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend
that United Aircraft Corporation, Hartford, Connecticut,
its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from-
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local Lodge
# 1746 and Local Lodge #743, both affiliated with Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tives of all employees in the bargaining units set out in the
complaint.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request , bargain collectively with Local
Lodge # 1746 and Local Lodge #743, International As-
sociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representatives of
all employees in the appropriate units set out in the com-
plaint , with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of em-
ployment, and other terms and conditions of employment
and, if understandings are reached , embody such un-
derstandings in signed agreements.
(b) Post at its plants in East Hartford and Manchester,
Connecticut , copies of the attached notice marked "Ap-
pendix A."23 Post at its plants in Broad Brook and Wind-
sor Locks , Connecticut, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix B."24 Copies of said notices to be
furnished by the Regional Director for Region 1, after
being signed by the Respondent 's representative , shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to in-
sure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision , what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.25
23 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order " shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
24 Seefn 23,2upra
Lo In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the poli-
cies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we
hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Local Lodge #1746, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive representative of employees in our
East Hartford and Manchester , Connecticut , plants,
in the bargaining units as described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner inter-
fere with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with
Local Lodge #1746, International Association of
UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 493
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive representative of all our employees in
the bargaining units described below with respect to
rates of pay , wages, hours of employment , and other
terms and conditions of employment and, if un-
derstandings are reached , embody such un-
derstandings in signed agreements . The bargaining
units are:
All production and maintenance employees at
Pratt & Whitney ' s East Hartford Plant (includ-
ing the DE Lab and the Willgoos Lab) including
inspectors , crib attendants , material handlers,
factory clerks and working leaders, but exclud-
ing the timekeepers , engineering and technical
employees , laboratory technicians , foremen's
clerks, salaried office and clerical employees,
medical department employees , first -aid em-
ployees, plant protection employees , executives,
plant superintendents , division superintendents,
general foremen , foremen , assistant foremen,
group supervisors , watch engineers , and all
other supervisory employees with authority to
hire, promote , discharge , discipline, or other-
wise effect change in the status of employees, or
effectively recommend such action , and all other
supervisors as defined in the Act.
All production and maintenance employees at
Pratt & Whitney's Manchester , Connecticut
Plant (Cheney Mills Buildings 1, 2, 3, 19, the
Finishing Mill and the Weaving Mill) including
inspectors , crib attendants, material handlers,
factory clerks and working leaders, but exclud-
ing all timekeepers , professional employees, en-
gineering and technical employees , laboratory
technicians , foremen 's clerks, office and clerical
employees , medical department employees,
first-aid employees , plant protection employees,
executives , plant superintendents , division su-
perintendents , general foremen , foremen,
assistant foremen , group supervisors , watch en-
gineers, and all other supervisory employees as
defined in the Act.
UNITED AIRCRAFT COR-
PORATION [ PRATT & WHIT-
NEY DIVISION]
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, 20th Floor,
John F . Kennedy Federal Building , Cambridge and New
Sudbury Streets, Boston, Massachusetts 02203,
Telephone 223-3353.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner
of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to ef-
fectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended , we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Local Lodge # 743, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive representative of employees in our
Broad Brook and Windsor Locks, Connecticut,
plants, in the bargaining units described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner inter-
fere with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively , upon request, with
Local Lodge #743, as the exclusive representative
of all our employees in the bargaining units described
below with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of
employment , and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment and, if understandings are reached, em-
body such understandings in signed agreements. The
bargaining units are:
All production and maintenance employees at
Hamilton Standard's Windsor Locks , Connec-
ticut plant , including working leaders and all
hourly-rated technicians in the Chemical,
Rubber, Metallurgical , Vibration and Elec-
tronics Laboratories , but excluding executives,
professional employees , salaried technicians in
the Engineering Department , foremen ' s clerks
who have access to confidential information,
draftsmen , plant protection employees , medical
department employees , salaried office and
salaried clerical employees , outside servicemen,
truckdrivers , watch engineers , group super-
visors, and all other supervisors as defined in the
Act.
All production and maintenance employees at
Hamilton Standard 's Broad Brook , Connecticut,
plant , including working leaders and hourly-
rated technicians in the Electronics Laboratory,
but excluding executives , professional em-
ployees, salaried technicians in the Engineering
Department , foremen's clerks who have access
to confidential information , draftsmen, plant
protection employees , medical department em-
ployees, salaried office and salaried factory cler-
ical employees , timekeepers , outside ser-
vicemen, truckdrivers, watch engineers, group
supervisors and all other supervisory employees
as defined in the Act.
UNITED AIRCRAFT COR-
PORATION [HAMILTON
STANDARD DIVISION]
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office , 20th Floor,
John F . Kennedy Federal Building , Cambridge and New
Sudbury Streets, Boston , Massachusetts 02203,
Telephone 223-3353.