Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers, Filling Station And Plat-Form Workers' Union, Local 705

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 29, 1985

274 N.L.R.B. 1176 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

1176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Truck Drivers , Oil Drivers , Filling Station and Plat-
form Workers ' Union , Local 705, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America and Kankakee -Iroquois County Em-
ployees' Association . Case 33-CB-1982
29 March 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 9 July 1984 Administrative Law Judge Ste-
phen J. Gross issued the attached decision. The
Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in sup-
port of the judge's decision. The Respondent filed
cross-exceptions, a supporting brief, and an answer-
ing brief.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and
conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order.
The judge dismissed the amended complaint's al-
legation that, by insisting that the Kankakee-Iro-
quois County Employers' Association (KICEA or
the Association) agree to terms and conditions of
employment that were the product of bargaining
with other employers, the Respondent Teamsters
Local 705 (the Union) coerced and restrained
KICEA in the selection of its representatives for
the purpose of collective bargaining in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. We agree.
We disagree, however, with the judge's conclu-
sion that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of
the Act.
The record discloses that between 1973 and 1983
KICEA and the Union agreed to adopt the collec-
tive-bargaining agreements (known to the parties as
"Area Construction Agreements") negotiated be-
tween the Mid-America Regional Bargaining Asso-
1 The complaint filed 9 September 1983, amended 1 February 1984, al-
leges that the Charging Party, the Kankakee-Iroquois County Employers'
Association (KICEA) by its component members located throughout
northeastern Illinois in Kankakee and Iroquois Counties, is engaged in the
business of heavy and highway construction and/or supplying materials
for such construction Par 2 of the complaint further alleges that the As-
sociation, through its members, annually imports goods valued in excess
of $50,000 from suppliers located outside the State of Illinois directly to
its facilities and jobsites in Illinois, annually derives gross revenue in
excess of $50,000 from performance of services directly to customers lo-
cated outside the State of Illinois, annually derives in excess of $50,000 in
revenues from persons within Illinois who in turn meet direct inflow and
outflow standards of the Board, and that the Association is and has been
at all material times an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Sec 2(6) and (7) of the Act Par 3 alleges that the Respondent is
and has been at all material times a labor organization within the meaning
of Sec 2(5) of the Act The parties stipulated to the Board's jurisdiction
at the hearing
ciation (MARBA) and a group of six Teamsters
local unions including the Respondent. In 1983 the
Association requested separate negotiations with
the Union. At the same time the Union participated
in negotiations with MARBA.
KICEA and the Union met four times-17 May,
17 June, 8 July, and 15 July 19832-with each ses-
sion averaging over 2 hours in duration. At all four
meetings KICEA stated its position that the parties'
agreement must reflect what KICEA's representa-
tives claimed were conditions unique to the Kanka-
kee-Iroquois area. Because the Union's construction
industry members were employed by contractor
members of the Association, MARBA contractors,
and independent contractors, the union sought to
obtain uniformity of labor standards.
At the first negotiating session the parties' pro-
posals were reviewed and discussed. Before the
session the Union submitted its proposal for a new
agreement. Consistent with its desire for uniform
standards, the Union's initial proposal to the Asso-
ciation was the same as its proposal to MARBA.
Some time after the first negotiating session a
union representative told KICEA's chief negotiator
during a telephone conversation that "there aren't
going to be two contracts down in Kankakee, that
is for sure."3 The remark was made in the context
of postponing the second scheduled session pend-
ing the outcome of the MARBA negotiations. The
parties agreed to reschedule the second meeting for
17 June.
At the second negotiating session a union negoti-
ator advised KICEA representatives that a tenta-
tive agreement had been reached between
MARBA and the Teamsters for an area construc-
tion agreement. The economic terms of this tenta-
tive agreement were outlined. KICEA's chief ne-
gotiator testified that the union representatives said:
[T]here wasn't going to be any deviation be-
tween the MARBA settlement and the settle-
ment the Association would have to agree to
and . . . the Association would have to agree
to all the items that had been negotiated and
concluded [with] MARBA . . . . [T]he Union
. . . would not and could not agree to any set-
tlement with the Association that was different
than what the settlement was with MARBA.4
2 All dates are in 1983 unless otherwise stated
3 The judge credited KICEA's chief negotiator's testimony concerning
this conversation Based on his finding that this conversation took place
before the first negotiating session, the judge concluded that the union
representatives had made up their minds before reaching a lawful bar-
gaining impasse that they would require KICEA to accept the same
terms that the Union negotiated with other employers, thereby violating
Sec 8(b)(3) We reject this conclusion, however, stressing that the cred-
ited witness testified that the conversation occurred sometime between 17
May and 24 May
4 See fn 5 of the judge's decision
274 NLRB No. 177
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 705 (KANKAKEE-IROQUOIS) 1177
On 26 June the area locals ratified the MARBA
settlement. The Union, however, voted against the
MARBA settlement as well as the Association's
initial contract proposal.5 At the third negotiating
session , held 8 July, the Union advised KICEA of
its membership's vote on the tentative MARBA
agreement and the Association's proposal. The
Union told the Association that its members would
not accept any reductions in the terms of the
MARBA agreement, but if the Association adopted
the terms of the MARBA agreement the agreement
could be ratified by pooling the votes of the area
members. The Union warned that failure to adopt
the terms of the MARBA agreement could result
in a strike.
On 11 July Azzarelli Construction Company, a
Kankakee contractor, entered into a collective-bar-
gaining agreement with the Union as a result of ne-
gotiations independent of the Area Construction
Agreement negotiations. The Azzarelli agreement
was identical to the MARBA agreement except for
a provision relating to pay for employees who
were asked to work during the lunchbreak. The
mealtime pay modification had been proposed by
and was favorable to Azzarelli.6 On that same day
the Union's members voted to reject the Associa-
tion's 8 July proposals, but decided to ratify the
Azzarelli agreement when they were apprised that
the area pooling of votes had resulted in overall
membership ratification of the MARBA agreement.
The final meeting between the Union and the
Association was held 15 July. Union representa-
tives informed the Association that its membership
had rejected the Association's proposals and had
authorized the union negotiators to agree to the
MARBA Area Construction Agreement with the
additional concession of the modified mealtime pay
provision. The Union advised KICEA that it
should not insist on additional concessions, recog-
nizing that by agreeing to this settlement the Union
was conceding to no wage increase in the first year
and a Monday-to-Saturday workweek, which were
reasons before for rejecting the MARBA settle-
ment. The Association's chief negotiator credibly
testified that the Union took the position that it
was either acceptance of the MARBA contract
5 The Union is a constituent local of Joint Council 25 The Council's
ratification procedure provides that , when more than one constituent
local is covered by a collective-bargaining agreement, votes from the
constituent locals are pooled to determine whether the agreement has
been ratified Moreover , all members of each local vote on the agreement
regardless of who employs them Thus , the Respondent 's members, in-
cluding those who did not work for companies that were MARBA mem-
bers, voted on the tentative MARBA agreement
6 The Association offered an identical proposal during negotiations
with the Union The proposal provided for straight time pay instead of
time-and-a-half pay for work performed during an employee's lunch-
break
with the mealtime pay modification or a strike, that
the Association's members could not afford a
strike, and that the Association therefore agreed to
abide by the terms of the MARBA contract as
modified by the mealtime pay provision. No writ-
ten contract was drafted.
The judge's finding of an unlawful refusal to bar-
gain is premised on his examination of statements
union negotiators made. The judge concluded:
[I]n light of the statements by the Union's
agents to the effect that their minds were
made up even before bargaining began and
stayed that way, and in view of the lack of
any utterances by the Union's representatives
showing a willingness to seriously consider
KICEA's position . . . [the Union's bargaining
behavior] indicates only that it was willing to
go through the motions of bargaining, not that
it was willing to bargain in fact.7
We disagree. Based on the Union's actual con-
duct during the course of negotiations, and absent
other evidence of unlawful conduct,8 we conclude
that the statements attributed to the Union reflect
the hard but real bargaining that accompanied
them. The judge found and we agree that much of
the Union's behavior, on its face, suggests an
"`open,' `accessible' position."9 The Union's repre-
sentatives agreed to bargain with KICEA about a
collective-bargaining agreement distinct from the
Area Construction Agreement. The parties met
four times in a 2-month period, with each meeting
averaging over 2 hours in duration. At each session
the Association was given an opportunity to
present its proposals, and the Union's representa-
tives listened and rationally discussed the propos-
als. The Union gave reasons for rejecting the Asso-
ciation's proposals and justified its bargaining pos-
ture.1o
' The administrative law judge premised his finding that union repre-
sentatives entered negotiations with a predetermination that KICEA
would have to agree to the terms of the Area Construction Agreement
on a statement attributed to one of the union representatives made away
from the bargaining table during a telephone conversation with the Asso-
ciation's chief negotiator As discussed in fn . 3, we do not accept the
judge's finding that this conversation occurred before bargaining had
begun
8 Cf Food & Commercial Workers Local 1439 (Food City), 262 NLRB
309 (1982), Teamsters Local 418 (Seigle's Express), 254 NLRB 953 (1981)
8 ALJD , sec entitled "The Refusal to Bargain "
10 The Union asserts and the judge found that all of the Association's
proposals amounted to requests for "take backs " from the existing terms
and conditions of employment
The judge states that the "meal-time pay modification [to the Area
Construction Agreement ] does not reflect any openness on the Union's
part to persuasion by KICEA " The judge found that the mealtime pay
modification stemmed from negotiations between Azzarelli and the
Union As previously noted in fn 6, however, the Association proposed
an identical mealtime pay provision The Union's concession regarding
the mealtime pay modification, although not necessarily reflecting "open.
ness on the Union's part to persuasion by KICEA," does not evidence
bad-faith bargaining
1178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Under all the circumstances, we conclude that
the Respondent's bargaining did not violate Section
8(b)(3). Accordingly, we shall dismiss the com-
plaint in its entirety.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
MEMBER HUNTER, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I would affirm the
judge's conclusion that the Respondent refused to
bargain collectively in violation of Section 8(b)(3)
of the Act. The judge found, and my colleagues
concede, that the Respondent's bargaining repre-
sentatives repeatedly took the position that there
would be no deviation between the MARBA set-
tlement and any agreement made with KICEA, the
Employer in this case. That the judge erred in find-
ing that the first expression of this position oc-
curred before, rather than after, the first bargaining
session is of no legal significance. Throughout the
entire course of negotiations, the Respondent's
words and deeds showed a fixed determination
never to deviate from the terms of the MARBA
agreement. In this regard, the Respondent's attend-
ance at bargaining sessions and its discussion of the
KICEA proposals indicated, as the judge found,
only that the Respondent was willing to go
through the motions of bargaining, not that it was
willing to bargain in fact.
DECISION
STEPHEN J. GROSS, Administrative Law Judge. The
Mid-America Regional Bargaining Association
(MARBA) is made up of numerous construction contrac-
tors in Northeastern Illinois. MARBA bargains on behalf
of its members with various unions, including a group of
six Teamsters local unions. Respondent Teamsters Local
705 is one of those local unions.
This proceeding involves the relationship between
Local 705 and a much smaller employer association
whose territory adjoins and to some extent overlaps
MARBA's: the Kankakee-Iroquois County Employer's
Association (KICEA or the Association). KICEA repre-
sents 12 construction contractors for collective-bargain-
ing purposes. All 12 are located immediately south of the
area in which MARBA's members are located.
For many years KICEA and Local 705 agreed to
abide by collective-bargaining agreements between
MARBA and the group of six Teamsters locals. Indeed,
although KICEA did not participate in the bargaining
leading to the MARBA agreements, and although nei-
ther KICEA nor any of its members was a member of
MARBA, the MARBA agreements specified that
KICEA was a party to them. (The agreements between
MARBA and the six locals are known to the parties as
"Area Construction Agreements," and will be referred to
as such in this decision) But in March 1983 KICEA ad-
vised Local 705 "for a new collective-bargaining agree-
ment for the employees within the bargaining unit repre-
sented by your union and the employer members of [the]
Association."
KICEA and Local 705 did meet four times, on May
17, June 17, and July 8 and 15, 1983. But according to
KICEA the Union's participation on those meetings did
not constitute good-faith bargaining. The General Coun-
sel agrees and claims that Local 705's conduct in the
course of those meetings amounted to (1) a refusal to
bargain collectively in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act), and (2) restraint
and coercion of KICEA's members in the selection of
their collective-bargaining representative in violation of
Section 8(b)(1) (B). Local 705 denies that it violated
either provision of the Act. i
The Refusal to Bargain
At all four meetings between KICEA and Local 705
reflect what KICEA's representatives claimed were con-
ditions unique to the Kankakee-Iroquois area. Local
705's preference, on the other hand, was that all employ-
ers in the MARBA-KICEA areas agree to the same
terms and conditions of employment. That kind of pref-
erence on the Union's part is legitimate: Unions may
lawfully seek "to obtain uniformity of labor standards "2
The question to be resolved here is whether Local 705's
representatives not just strove for such uniformity, but
rather had made up their minds, prior to reaching a
lawful impasse in bargaining, that they would require
KICEA, to accept the same terms that the Union negoti-
ated with other employees If they did, Local 705 violat-
ed Section 8(b)(3).
KICEA was entitled to have the Union seriously con-
sider KICEA's proposal that any collective-bargaining
agreement between it and Local 705 reflect KICEA's
particular needs - needs that KICEA believed to be dif-
ferent from those of the other employers with whom
Local 705 bargained Section 8(b)(3) requires Local 705
to be willing to explore the possibility of agreeing to
terms of employment unique to KICEA, to be "accessi-
ble to persuasion" by KICEA, to have an "open mind"
on the subject, and to have "the serious intent to reach
an acceptable common ground" with KICEA.3
Thus the crux of the matter is the state of mind of
Local 705's bargaining agents Were they "accessible to
persuasion" or weren't they. The state of someone's
mind can be inferred from that person's behavior, of
course. But the most telling indication that bargaining
agents have a closed state of mind are statements by
i This proceeding began with a charge filed on July 25, 1983, by
KICEA A complaint dated September 9, 1983, followed I held a hear-
ing in the matter in Chicago on March 14 and 15, 1984 The General
Counsel and Local 705 have filed briefs No party disputes the General
Counsel's contention that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter
2 Food Workers Local 1439 (Food City West), 262 NLRB 309, 312
(1982) See also Mine Workers v Pennington, 381 U S 657, 665 (1965) ("a
union may make wage agreements with a multiemployer bargaining unit
and may seek to obtain the same terms from other employers")
s Food City West, 262 NLRB at 312, General Electric Corp, 150 NLRB
192, 268 (1964), enfd 418 F 2d 736 (2d Cir 1969), Carpenters District
Council of Will County, 255 NLRB 530, 532 (1981), Graphic Arts Local
280 (Rosicrucian Press), 235 NLRB 1084, 1094 (1978)
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 705 (KANKAKEE-IROQUOIS) 1179
them saying that that is the case. And on several occa-
sions Local 705's agents made just such statements.
Even prior to the first meeting between KICEA and
Local 705, one of the Union's representatives told
KICEA's chief negotiator that "there aren't going to be
two contracts down in Kankakee, that is for sure.4 In
context that meant only one thing: Local 705 had deter-
mined that KICEA was going to be made to agree to the
terms of the Area Construction Agreement
Then, at the June 17 session (the second meeting be-
tween Local 705 and KICEA, but the first session to be
held after the Teamsters locals and MARBA reached a
tentative agreement), the union representatives explained
the economic terms of the new Area Construction
Agreement to KICEA's representatives and went on to
say
there wasn't going to be any deviation between the
MARBA settlement and the settlement the Associa-
tion would have to agree to and . . the Associa-
tion would have to agree to all of the items that had
been negotiated and concluded [with] MARBA
. . [T]he Union . . . would not and could not
agree to any settlement with the Association that
was different than what the settlement was with
MARBA.5
The third meeting between Local 705 and the Associa-
tion was held on July 8. During the course of that meet-
ing Local 705's representatives made it clear that
KICEA's members had three, and only three, alterna-
tives (1) a contract embodying the terms of the Area
Construction Agreement; or (2) a contract more onerous
than that; or (3) a strike. (The way the Union's repre-
sentatives put it was-"if you people keep insisting on an
independent course of negotiations you are going to have
a strike.6
A few days after the July 8 meeting a Kankakee con-
tractor that bargained separately with Local 705-Azzar-
elli Construction Company-entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement that was identical to the MARBA
agreement except for a provision relating to pay for em-
ployees who were asked to work during the lunch break
(The modification had been proposed by and was favor-
able to Azzareli.) The fourth and final meeting between
Local 705 and KICEA was held shortly thereafter, on
July 15. The Union's representatives proposed that the
Association agree to the contract that the Union had
reached with Azzarelli; that is, terms identical to the
Area Construction Agreement with the exception of the
modified mealtime pay provision. When the Association
representatives said that the proposal was unsatisfactory,
the Union representatives responded:
4 Tr 129 (KICEA representatives Grabemann's quote of union repre-
sentative Floyd) The transcript incorrectly shows "that is for sure" as a
separate sentence
5 Association representative Grabemann's quotes of union Representa-
tives Lando and Floyd, Tr at 145-46
6 Grabemann quoting Landi, Tr 152 See also Tr 151 (statement by
Union Respresentative Floyd that "You are going to have trouble if you
don't agree to the MARBA settlement")
[T]he deal was the MARBA contract. That was it
[We] aren't going to negotiate further It [is]
either acceptance of the MARBA contract [with
the meal-time pay change] or the Association will
have a strike . . [A]in't no way you are going to
change the son-of-a bitch You are stuck with the
fucking [MARBA] contract 7
Since the Association's members could not afford a
strike they thereafter abided by the terms of the Area
Construction Agreement, as modified by the mealtime
pay provision.8
Harsh statements by negotiators, however unbending
they may sound, may, depending on their context, be
nothing more than ploys made in the course of hard,
lawful bargaining. I thought about whether that could be
so here But Local 705's witness did not claim that to be
the case And the Union has not pointed to any words
uttered by its negotiators in the course of dealing with
the Association that even hint that the Union was willing
to seriously consider ways of dealing with the Associa-
tion's expressed concerns.
As touched on earlier, the state of someone's mind can
be interred from that person's behavior. And, on the face
of it, much of local 705's behavior suggests an "open,"
"acessible" position. Thus Local 705's representatives did
not complain about, or attempt to deny the validity of,
KICEA's letter stating that KICEA wanted and was en-
titled to bargain with Local 705 about a collective-bar-
gaining agreement distinct from the Area Construction
Agreement. Local 705's representatives met with
KICEA's representatives in four separate meetings, each
of which averaged over 2 hours in duration. At each of
the sessions KICEA had an opportunity to present its
proposals, and the Union's representatives listened to
those presentations and rationally discussed the proposals
with the Association's representatives. And the Union
opted to call on the services of a federal mediator at two
of the four meetings. But in light of the statements by
the Union's agents to the effect that their minds were
made up even before bargaining began and stayed that
way, and in view of the lack of any utterances by the
Union's representatives showing a willingness to serious-
ly consider KICEA's position, that behavior by Local
705 indicates only that it was willing to go through the
motions of bargaining, not that it was willing to bargain
in fact
A more important consideration is that, ultimately, the
Union did not insist that KICEA agree to terms identical
to those of the Area Construction Agreement. Rather,
Local 705's final position was that KICEA accept the
Area Construction Agreement's terms modified-in the
employers' favor - by a change in rates of pay for work
perfromed during mealtime. Moreover that mealtime pay
change pay was in accord with one of the proposals
KICEA put forward first on May 17 and then again on
July 8.
Even ignoring the Union's statements quoted above,
however, the import of the mealtime pay modification is
7 Grabemann quoting Landi , Tr 161-62
a No written contract was ever drafted
1180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ambiguous It did represent a variation from the Area
Construction Agreement. On the other hand "conces-
sions here and there" are not necessarily proof of a will-
ingness to bargain in good faith,9 and the mealtime pay
modification was one of the least significant of KICEA's
proposals. Moreover the modification was not the result
of bargaining between Local 705 and KICEA Rather, it
stemmed from negotiations between the Union and Az-
zarelli. The record shows that the reason Local 705
made the proposal was because of its agreements with
Azzarelli and that the Union considered the provision to
be "Azzarelli's proposal "
In sum the mealtime-pay modification does not reflect
any openness on the Union's part to persuasion by
KICEA. 10
Lastly, Local 705 argues that KICEA failed to bargain
in good faith in that the Association's proposals "did not
have the slightest chance of acceptance by a self-respect-
ing union."i i It is true that KICEA's proposals were all
takeaways. But the record is clear that KICEA made
them in good faith.
The Alleged Violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
Local 705 refused to bargain in good faith with
KICEA. Instead the Union insisted that KICEA agree to
terms and conditions of employment that were the prod-
uct of bargaining with other employers. The General
Counsel contends that Local 705 thereby coerced and re-
strained KICEA in the selection of its representatives for
the purpose of collective bargaining, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act
Congress' principal purpose in enacting Section 8(b)
(1) (B). insofar as its relates to collective-bargaining rep-
resentatives, was to prevent unions from coercing an em-
ployer into joining or resigning from an employer asso-
ciation which negotiates labor contracts on behalf of its
members . . . . Florida Power & Light Co. Y. Electrical
9 NLRB v Herman Sausage Co, 275 F 2d 229, 232 (5th Cir 1960)
10 The Union also suggests that the following considerations show that
it bargained in good faith (1) KICEA for many years had been willing to
adhere to the Area Construction Agreements, (2) the Union negotiators'
demands were as generous toward KICEA as the union membership
would permit, (3) KICEA's proposals all amounted to request for "take
backs," so there was nothing the Union's negotiators could trade for, (4)
the Union's interest in common terms of employment by MARBA and
the Association was reasonable since Local 705's members worked for
employees in both groups and since all of the employers competed, or
potentially competed, with one another, and (5) the Union's negotiators
clearly wanted to reach an agreement and just as clearly wanted to avoid
a strike But none of those considerations seem to me to deserve much, if
any, weight in determining whether the Union lived up to its duty to bar-
gain
11 Local 705's brief at 13, citing NLRB Y Reed & Prince Mfg Co, 205
F 2d 131, 139 (1st Cir 1953)
Workers, 417 U S. 790, 798 (1974) (quoting the provi-
sion's legislative history). With few exceptions that has
been treated as a prohibition against a union coercing an
employer into foregoing the employer's choice of its rep-
resentatives for future collective bargaining. See, e.g.,
Plumbers Southern California District Council 16 (Aero
Plumbing), 167 NLRB 1004 (1967) (union insistence that
employer appoint employer association as the employer's
bargaining agent). Accord: Retail Clerks Local 770
(Fine's Food), 228 NLRB 1166 (1977), Painters District
Council 36 Commercial Drywall), 155 NLRB 1013 (1965);
United Slate Workers Local 36 (Roofing Contractors), 172
NLRB 2248 (1968) (employer, which wanted to be re-
presentated by one association, was required by the
union to make another association its collective-bargain-
ing representative), Teamsters Local 986 (Tak-Trak, Inc),
145 NLRB 1511 (1964) (union demand that employer
remove as its collective-bargaining representative the
person selected by the employr). i 2
Here there is no evidence that Local 705 insisted that
KICEA make MARBA (or Azzarelli) its representative
for purposes of future collective bargaining. Rather, the
record shows only that Local 705 demanded that
KICEA agree to the same economic terms that MARBA
had agreed to (plus the Azzarelli modification), and that
the Union was unwilling to bargain about the Associa-
tion's proposal that the employees of its members work
under terms and conditions different from MARBA's and
Azzarelli's. That amounts to a violation of Section
8(b)(3). But to hold that it also was a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(B) would extend the scope of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
beyond Congress's purpose while adding nothing to the
Board's power to police collective-bargaining relation-
ships (given the fact that Section 8(b)(3) covers the situa-
tion at hand). And, indeed, in a case comparable to this
one the Board held that the union violated Section
8(b)(3); but the Board made no mention at all of Section
8(b)(1)(B). Teamsters Local 418 (Seigle's Express), 254
NLRB 953 (1981). My recommendation, therefore, is
that the Board conclude that Local 705's action did not
violate Section 8(b)(1)(B).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication
12 Two exceptions Laborers' Local 652 (Thoner & Brimingham Con-
struction), 238 NLRB 1456 (1978), and Food City West, supra, 262 NLRB
at 313 But Toner is unique in that while the union did not in fact demand
anything of the employer regarding future collective-bargaining repre-
sentatives, the union's demand on its face did appear to have that aim
And in Food City West the union insisted that the employer become a sig-
natory to the union's existing contract with an employer association In
contrast the contract that Local 705 proposed to KICEA (none was ever
drafted) need not have even mentioned any other employer or employer
association