Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Loc. No. 100

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 14, 1975

216 N.L.R.B. 1070 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

1070 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union
No. 100, an affiliate of the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America and Duro Paper Bag
Manufacturing Company. Case 9-CB-2608
March 14, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On October 16, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Robert Cohn issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding . Thereafter , Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and General Counsel and
Charging Party filed answering briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three -member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,'
findings , and conclusions a of the Administrative
Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent , Truck Drivers,
Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 100, an
affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Covington, Kentucky , its officers , agents,
and representatives, shall take the action set forth in
the said recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT COHN , Administrative Law Judge : This case was
heard in Cincinnati , Ohio, on June 26, 1974 , pursuant to a
charge filed the preceding March 26, and a complaint
issued May 8. The complaint alleges , in essence, that since
on or about December 8, 1973, the Respondent Union has
failed to bargain collectively in good faith with Duro Paper
Bag Manufacturing Company (herein the Employer or
Company), in violation of Section 8(bX3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, (herein the Act), when,
following negotiations , it failed and refused to execute a
collective-bargaining agreement reached the previous day.
Respondent , by its duly filed answer , denied the commis-
sion of any unfair labor practices.
Following the trial, counsel for all parties filed written
briefs, which have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record , including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses , and after due considerations of
the briefs filed by all parties , I make the following:
FINDING OF. FACT
I. COMMERCE
The employer , a Kentucky corporation , has its principal
office and place of business in Covington , Kentucky, where
it is engaged in the manufacture of paper bags, and related
products . During the past 12 months , a representative
period, the Company in the course and conduct of its
business , received gross revenues in excess of $500,000
from the sale of its products . During the same period of
time, the Company caused to be shipped in interstate
commerce, goods and products valued in excess of $50,000
directly to its Kentucky locations from points outside the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
I find, as the Respondent admits, that the Company is,
and has been at all times material, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),(6), and (7)
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
1 We are satisfied that the Respondent's assertion that the Adnunistra-
tive Law Judge was hostile during the hearing is without meet. In our
opinion there is nothing in the record to suggest that his conduct of the
hearing, his resolutions of credibility , or the inferences he drew were based
on bias, prejudice , or hostility.
2 We agree , for the reasons expressed by the Administrative Law Judge,
that the cited provision of the International Union 's constitution provides
no support for Respondent's argument that the Company understood and
agreed that any agreement arrived at during negotiations was subject to
ratification by the membership before it became binding Furthermore, the
record additionally shows that the cited provision relates specifically to
"Strike Action by Local Union" and not, as herein involved, to whether
Respondent's bargaining committee had authority to enter into a binding
collective-bargaining agreement.
Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No.
100, an affiliate of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America (herein the Respondent or Union ) is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
For several years prior to the events here at issue, the
Company and Respondent have been parties to collective-
216 NLRB No. 176
TRUCK DRIVERS, CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS, LOC. NO. 100
bargaining agreements covering the Company's truckdri-
vers .1 In the past, the Company was a signatory of the
National Master Freight Agreement which covered the
basic provisions relating to wages, benefits, grievance
procedure, and the like. To that agreement, the Company
and Respondent negotiated an "addendum" which cov-
ered local conditions such as pay for pickups, work rules,
etc.2 The master agreement expired on June 30, 1973,3 and
the Company apparently decided at about that time to
attempt to negotiate individually with Respondent respect-
ing a new collective agreement.4
Jack Rains, Director of Employee Relations for the
Company, commenced his attempt to schedule negotiating
meetings with Respondent in June, but was unsuccessful,
assertedly due to the obstinateness of the Union, until
October. At that time the Company filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board
(herein the Board) claiming that the Respondent violated
the Act by its refusal to meet and bargain with the
Company. Apparently that charge had the desired effect
since it resulted in the scheduling of the first negotiating
meeting to take place on November 17.
B. The Negotiating Sessions and Their Aftermath
Present for the Company at the first meeting was Rains;
present for the Union were the business agent, Jack
O'Banion, along with employees Claude Kidd (job stew-
ard) and Joe Underwood, a driver . At that meeting little
was accomplished other than the exchange by the parties
of their respective proposals for a new collective-bargain-
ing agreement , and the scheduling of the next meeting for
November 29. However, according to the testimony of
Rains, which I credit, the following colloquy took place
between him and O'Banion respecting the respective
authority of the two men to negotiate a contract:
Q. Did he at any time ask you whether or not you
had authority to agree to hours?
A. He asked me that the first day we met, if I had
the authority to consummate such an agreement that I
presented to him on the 17th day of November. And I
said , "Jack, if I wouldn't have it, I'd send a messenger
boy up here who we pay $1.99 an hour." And he said,
"Fine." I said , "Do you have authority?" And he said,
"Let's go on ." And we started reading the document
1 The drivers number approximately 20, and consist of both over-the-
road and local cartage drivers . Another labor organization with whom the
Company bargains , represents the Company 's production employees.
The complaint alleges , and the answer admits that the drivers are
bargained for by the Respondent in the following appropriate units:
All truck drivers employed by the Employer at its plant in Ludlow,
Kentucky , excluding office clerical employees and all guards, profes-
sional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other
employees of the Employer.
All truck drivers employed by the Employer at its plant in Covington,
Kentucky, excluding office clerical employees , and all guards,
professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all
other employees of the Employer.
2 See G.C. Exh. 13.
3 All dates hereinafter refer to the calendar year 1973, unless otherwise
indicated.
1071
that I presented to him. That was on the 17th day of
November.
A second meeting between the parties was held on
November 29, and a third and final meeting looking
toward the consummation of a collective-bargaining
agreement was held on December 7.5 The last meeting was
a rather lengthy one and substantial progress was made
with respect to agreement on most items in the contract.
However, near the close of the meeting, two major items
remained for resolution: (1) grievance procedure and (2)
wages.
As respects the difference between the parties on the
grievance procedure, it appears that under the Master
Agreement the procedure required, inter alia, that where
the parties were unable to resolve the grievance at the local
level, they were required to go to Columbus, Ohio, for final
resolution by a board composed of both management and
union representatives. This was time consuming and costly,
and the drivers apparently did not like it. The Company
therefore had proposed a grievance and arbitration
procedure culminating in arbitration at the local level, and
had proposed the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service as a source of arbitrators. When the Union balked
at the pibposal, Rains suggested that both parties draw up
a list of local arbitrators. According to Rains' testimony,
the Union was agreeable to that, and proceeded to a
discussion of wages.
As respects the issue of wages, the Union had proposed
substantial increases for pickups and deliveries.6 When the
Company balked at paying such increased rates, the Union
suggested that the drivers be paid on an hourly rate for
such work. After some heated discussion, Rains hit the
table, stood up and said "you got it (the hourly rate)."
Rains then advised the four union men that the agreement
would be typewritten and sent to them the following day.
As Rains was preparing to leave O'Banion expressed some
concern as to whether Rains' job might be in jeopardy in
view of the concession that he made with respect to the
wages, but Rains responded that he could handle that. He
then shook hands with the four men and left.?
The following day December 8, Rains had the agreement
typed. That evening he telephoned O'Banion to secure
final agreement with respect to five items upon which there
was understanding but which required the technical
language to be cleared by the Company attorney. Those
4 The addendum was scheduled to expire in October.
S At this last meeting the same people were present as previously with the
addition of Jim Brown, Shipping Superintendent for the Company, and
Jerry Rigney, a truckdriver, for the Union.
6 The previous addendum prescribed various rates for unloading
"straight one stop loads" and various stops thereafter, and other rates for
picking up loads which are less than 20,000 pounds . See G.C Exh. 13.
'r The foregoing findings are based upon the credited testimony of Rams
which was not substantially impaired by that of O'Banion . As he testified on
cross-examination , O'Banion agreed that there were two major issues still
open near the close of the December 7 meeting , i.e., grievance procedure
and wages; that Rains put in a proposal with respect to grievance procedure
and then moved on to the area of hours in which he acceded , as above
described ; that there was a general shaking of hands after which Rains left
O'Banion refrained from bluntly declaring that there was no agreement at
the close of the meeting ; however, he testified on direct examination that the
three committeemen "would not accept the grievance procedure and
therefore, would not recommend it to the other drivers."
1072 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
clauses were : ( 1) The driver protection clause, which
secured to the employee-drivers the right to haul the
Company's freight before using outside carriers ; (2) a list
of management representatives whom a driver could call in
the event that there was a problem in connection with his
work ; (3) a transfer of title clause which protected the
Union in the event of a sale of the Company ; (4) a cost-of-
living clause ; and (5) a list of management-suggested
arbitrators for the grievance procedure . These were agreed
to by O'Banion who , agar, expressed concern to Rains
respecting the latter's job.
Within the next couple of days , Rains submitted the
proposed written agreement to the Union by leaving it in
the Company 's guard house to be picked up by a Union
committeeman . He never received it back executed.
Thereafter , Rains called O'Banion on several occasions to
inquire what had happened , but was unable to reach him.
On or about December 29, according to Rains' testimony,
Superintendent Brown told Rains that job steward Kidd
had stopped in at Brown 's office and told him not to put
the new rates into effect-that if he did, there would be
trouble . Kidd related that the drivers did not like the work
rules and that they were not signing the agreement. Rains
assured Brown that this was "loose talk" and not to be
concerned about it.
Meanwhile, on or about December 15 , the Union had a
meeting in which a vote by a secret ballot was held on
whether to accept the Company's proposal . It was voted
down unanimously.
On March 23 , 1974, O'Banion came to Rains' office to
advise that "the boys don't like your contract and were not
going to accept it. I've got copies of the Master Freight
Agreement here and I want you to sign ." Rains responded
that he did not intend to sign the Master Freight
Agreement, that the Company had negotiated a binding
contract in good faith. O'Banion replied that he would
leave the Master Freight Agreement with Rains until
March 30 to decide whether the Company wished to sign
it; that if it did not, a picket line would be placed about the
Company premises . After O'Banion left , Rains asked the
drivers who accompanied him to stay for a moment, and
he interrogated them as to what they did not like. They
responded that it was the grievance procedure-they did
not like the arbitration provisions.
On March 30, there was a meeting among the parties8 to
explore what was required to achieve agreement . At that
meeting, the Company maintained that they had a binding
contract but that they were meeting in an effort to resolve
any differences which endangered the relationship should
the agreement be placed into effect. At that meeting,
according to Rains' testimony , it appeared that the drivers
and O'Banion were at odds concerning some unexplained
matter, and that the problem was not simply a resolution of
the grievance procedure .9
s Rains and Brown for the Company; O'Banion, Kidd, Underwood, and
another driver for the Union.
• There was some intimation in the record that this feeling had ripened
into a major dispute between the Union leadership and the drivers to the
extent that the latter had, hired a lawyer to represent them. However, this
was not developed on the record since it appeared to be outside the scope of
No resolution of the contract was accomplished at the
March 30, meeting. It appears that the Union was insisting
that the Company sign the Master Freight Agreement
while the Company took the position that an agreement
had already been negotiated, which the Union refused to
sign.
Analysis and concluding findings
The Respondent defends this case on the grounds that:
(1) There was never an agreement reached between the
parties as to the substantive provisions of the contract; and
(2) even if such agreement was reached, a condition
precedent to the consummation of such agreement was the
ratification by the membership , and the Company was at
all times aware of such condition precedent . Therefore,
since the Company's proposed contract was rejected by the
membership , no agreement was reached which is obligato-
ry for the Union to execute. I find that there is a lack of
substantial evidence in the record to substantiate these
contentions.
Thus, as set forth above, it is agreed between the parties
that near the close of the December 7 meeting , only two
principal issues separated them from agreement-griev-
ance procedure and wages . I have found, based upon the
credited testimony of Rains , that the Union finally agreed
to his proposal respecting grievance procedure and that he
gave in to the Union proposal respecting wages. However,
even if-as there is some record evidence to suggest-the
Union committeemen did not like the grievance procedure
proposal, there is no substantial evidence that they voiced
such objection at the close of the December 7 meeting.
Even if they did, there is no evidence that O'Banion, in his
telephone discussion with Rains the following day, indicat-
ed in any way that the Company's proposal respecting
grievance and arbitration was not acceptable to the Union.
Finally, it is evident that the Union committee considered
the Company's final, written document (G.C. Exh. 11) to
be a proposed contract which they would vote to accept or
reject in its entirety , and not piecemeal.lo
In view of the foregoing , I find and conclude that the
members of the Union's negotiating committee, on and
after December 7, concluded that they had negotiated a
binding agreement with the Company even though they
may have felt that they should submit any agreement they
negotiated to the membership for approval . '1 However,
Respondent argues that based upon (1) The constitution of
the International Union, (2) past practice at the Company's
plant, and (3) testimony of Respondent 's witnesses at the
trial, it is clear that the Company understood and agreed
that any agreement reached at negotiations was subject to
ratification by the membership before it became binding.
the issue to be resolved in this proceeding.
10 On cross-examination , Manion conceded that when Teamsters
members vote, they do so on a whole contract and not piecemeal.
11 Manion, on cross-examination, conceded that after the December
meeting had concluded, "it was the negotiating committee who suggested to
[him I to take the offer back to the members."
TRUCK DRIVERS, CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS, LOC. NO. 100
The provision of the International Union's constitution
cited by Respondent in its brief12 states in pertinent part;
(b) Contracts may be accepted by a majority vote of
those members involved in negotiations and voting, or
a majority of such members may direct further
negotiations before a final vote on the employer's offer
is taken , as directed by the Local Union Executive
Board. When in the judgment of the Local Union
Executive Board , an employer has made a final offer of
settlement , such offer must be submitted to the
involved membership and can be rejected only by a
two-thirds (2/3) vote of the members involved in the
negotiations and voting or responding to a referendum
mail ballot.
It would seem possible to construe the foregoing
quotation as much against Respondent 's position as in
favor of it since it provides that "contracts may be
accepted by a majority vote of those members involved in
the negotiations and voting ...." It is true that the
provision provides further that "when, in the judgment of
the Local Union Executive Board, an employer has made
an [sic ] final offer of settlement , such offer must be
submitted to the involved membership...." However,
there is no evidence in the instant case that the Local
Union Executive Board took any action in this matter.
Under all circumstances , I am not convinced that the
International Union's constitution provides the support of
Respondent's position that is claimed.
As respects past practice, the record shows that in prior
years the Company adopted the National Agreement and
negotiated locally only the addendum which , as above
noted , had to do primarily with the wages for pickup and
deliveries, and local work rules . It appears that the
procedure for negotiating the addendum was the for the
business agent of the Respondent to meet with either the
president of the Company or Mr . Rains and negotiate an
agreement . It was then the practice for the business agent
to go outside the Company's office where the negotiations
took place , discuss the agreement with the drivers who
congregated in another office , and secure their approval or
disapproval on the spot . This practice , argues the Respon-
dent, clearly shows that the Company was always aware
that any agreement reached in the 1973 negotiations was
subject to ratification by the membership. I cannot accept
this argument in the light of significant changes which
occurred in 1973.
Thus, the whole character of the negotiations changed.
Rather than negotiating simply an addendum to a national
contract, the 1973 negotiations involved several meetings
wherein the discussions broadened to negotiating a whole
new collective-bargaining agreement . This required a more
formalized procedure , and the Respondent appointed or
elected a negotiating committee which , as above described,
12 The provision cited in the brief is "Article XI, Section I (b);" however,
such citation must have been a typographical error since there is no such
section in art. XI. Rather, there is a sec. 1(b) in art. XII which appears to be
related to the issue involved.
13 See G.C. Exh. 12.
14 O'Banion's testimony on this point is as follows:
BY MR . FISHER:
1073
met with the Company's representative, and hammered
out, over a series of meetings , what purported to be a new
contract. It was this obvious difference in the procedure
which prompted Rains, at the first meeting, to inquire of
O'Banion whether the latter had the requisite authority to
negotiate, and he replied "Let's go on." This response
certainly constituted a clear implication to Rains that the
answer to his question was affirmative. Moreover, I deem it
significant that as of January 5, 1973, the Respondent
posted on the employees' bulletin board a notice to the
effect that O'Banion was to serve as Respondent's business
agent and that only he (with the exception of the president
and secretary-treasurer of the local) had the "authority to
conclude a collective-bargaining agreement or to alter or
waive the terms of such agreement. '13
In light of the foregoing notice and the change in the
character of the negotiations, as well as the implied
admission of O'Banion in the first meeting of the parties
above described, I conclude that past practice was not
sufficient to put the Company on notice that ratification by
the membership was a condition precedent to conclusion
of a binding collective-bargaining agreement.
Finally, the Respondent argues that the Company was
put on notice of the need for ratification by the repeated
statements to that effect made by members of the
negotiating committee during the 1973 negotiations. These
committeemen, testifying on behalf of Respondent, stated
that during the negotiations they repeatedly emphasized to
Rains the necessity for taking the matter back to the
membership. For example, the testimony of Jerry Rigney:
"We told him [Rains]-at the ending of everything we
always told him that we'd have to take those back before
the men."
Joseph Underwood testified:
Yes, it was mentioned to Mr Rains on three different
occasions by myself, that as far as the authority of the
committee, drivers' committee, that we had no authori-
ty to agree to anything. We would negotiate it and take
it back to the membership, back to the drivers for a
final approval by them... .
However, in addition to the categorical denial by Rains
of such notification, the above testimony is, in my view,
substantially impeached by the testimony of O'Banion,
who was, of course, the principal negotiator for Respon-
dent. Thus, he did not deny Rains' testimony, above
referred to, that the negotiating committee of Respondent
had - authority to conclude an agreement , and further
testified, on cross-examination that it was only after the
conclusion of the December meeting that the negotiating
committee suggested to him that the offer of the Company
be taken back to the membership.14
In the light of all the circumstances, including demeanor
considerations , I consider the testimony of the union
Q. Well, if I understand your answer to the judge previously, it
was the negotiating committee who suggested to you to take the offer
back to the members; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. They suggested it after the meeting was over?
A. Sometime-Well, yeah.
Q. After the meeting was over?
A. Uh-huh.
1074 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
committeemen to be "too good" and that while they may
have considered that any action on their part in negotia-
tions would eventually be approved or disapproved by vote
of the members, this was not made clear to the Company's
negotiator. Consequently, he, in good faith, negotiated an
agreement with the Respondent's committee which was, on
and after December 8, legally binding.15
However, Respondent further contends that the Compa-
ny was aware that no final agreement was consummated as
evidenced by its failure to put into effect the new changes
negotiated. But this is understandable in light of the threat
of Kidd to Brown on December 29 that a strike was
imminent if the Company proceeded to implement the
agreement. Moreover, O'Banion testified that there was no
particular pressure to implement the agreement because
the Company was paying the wages of the Central State's
contract as well as "picking up all the holidays, health and
welfare, pension, . . . there was no pressure on me to finish
the contract or leave it as is, as far as that goes ." Since
Rains was occupied in negotiating an agreement during
this time with the Union representing the production
employees, it is understandable that the matter of signing
the contract was held in abeyance for several months in
early 1974. Finally, in late March, Respondent formally
notified the Company of its refusal to execute the
December proposed agreement and insisted on Company
agreement adoption of the Master Freight Agreement.
In view of all the foregoing, I find that the defenses of
Respondent to the prima facie case of the General Counsel
do not withstand scrutiny, and I therefore find and
conclude that all times on or about December 8, Respon-
dent has failed and refused to execute the agreement
consummated on December 7 and 8, in violation of Section
8(bX3) of the Act. 16
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Company's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, it should be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and to take certain affirmative action to
effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the
Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the
Company as the exclusive representative of all employees
in the appropriate units by refusing to execute the
collective-bargaining agreement negotiated between it and
the Company in December 1973. As the proposed
15 1 have also taken into consideration on this point the lack of any
evidence that during the telephone conversation between Rains and
O'Bamon on December 8, the latter made any reference to the requirement
that the agreement was to go before a vote of the membership.
le Teamsters, Local 186 (Max Rudolph Trucking Company), 172 NLRB
788(1%8).
collective-bargaining agreement transmitted by the Com-
pany to the Respondent on or about December 8, 1973,
embody the terms of the agreement reached on December
7 and 8, it will be recommended that the Respondent be
ordered to execute that document.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Duro Paper Bag Manufacturing Company is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local Union
No. 100, an affiliate of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following constitute units appropriate for the
purpose of collective-bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
(a) All truckdrivers employed by the Company at its
plant in Ludlow, Kentucky excluding office clerical
employees and all guards, professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other employees
of the Company.
(b) All truckdrivers employed by the Company at its
plant in Covington, Kentucky, excluding office clerical
employees, and all guards, professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other employees
of the Company.
4. The Respondent has been, since 1970 and 1974,
respectively, the duly recognized exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of all employees in the units
described above for the purpose of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on or about December 8, 1973, and at all
times thereafter, to execute the collective-bargaining
agreement with the Company to which the Respondent
had previously agreed, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER 17
Respondent Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers
Local Union No. 100, an affiliate of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, its officers, agents, and represent-
atives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
17 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
TRUCK DRIVERS, CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS, LOC. NO. 100
(a) Refusing upon request of the Company to execute the
collective-bargaining agreement agreed to on or about
December 8, 1973, as embodied in the proposed collective-
bargaining agreement transmitted to it by the Company on
or about December 8, 1973.
(b) In any like manner refusing to bargain with the
Company in accordance with the requirements of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) If requested to do so by the Company, forthwith sign
and execute the proposed collective-bargaining agreement
transmitted to it by the Company on or about December 8,
1973.
(b) Post at Respondent's offices and meeting places
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." is
Copies of said notice, to be provided by the Regional
Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by the
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to its members
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 9 signed
copies of the notice for posting by the Company, said
Company being willing, at all locations where notices to
employees are customarily posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
18 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
1075
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL, upon request by Duro Paper Bag Manu-
facturing Company, execute the agreement reached on
or about December 8, 1973, as embodied in the
proposed collective-bargaining agreement transmitted
to us by said employer on or about that date. The
bargaining units are:
All truckdrivers employed by the Company at
its plant in Ludlow, Kentucky, excluding office
clerical employees and all guards, professional
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act,
and all other employees of the Company.
All truckdrivers employed by the Company at
its plant in Covington, Kentucky, excluding office
clerical employees, and all guards, professional
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act,
and all other employees of the Company.
TRUCK DRIVERS,
CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS
LOCAL UNION No. 100, AN
AFFILIATE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS
WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF AMERICA