The Magee Carpet Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 1, 1967

168 N.L.R.B. 39 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

MAGEE CARPET COMPANY 39
The Magee Carpet Company and Alan R. Howe, At-
torney for Textile Workers Alliance , Affiliated
with the Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO. Case 4-CA-4062
November 1, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND J ENKINS
On May 31, 1967, Trial Examiner Thomas A.
Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
also found that Respondent had not engaged in cer-
tain other alleged unfair labor practices. Thereafter,
the General Counsel and Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision with sup-
porting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings,[ conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, except as modified
herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board , adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, The Magee Carpet Com-
pany , Bloomsburg , Pennsylvania , its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Trial Examiner 's Recom-
mended Order , as herein modified:
1. Substitute for paragraph 1(b) of the Trial Ex-
aminer ' s Recommended Order the following:
"(b) Threatening or discriminating against em-
ployees in any manner including threat of suspen-
sion or discharge if they join or assist the Textile
Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO; offering to
pay employees as inducement for withdrawal from
that Union ; interrogating employees in a coercive
manner concerning their union activities ; promul-
gating, maintaining, or enforcing either (1) a rule
against union solicitation on company property dur-
ing nonworking time, or (2) a rule against union sol-
icitation while permitting other types of solicitation
during working time where a purpose thereof is to
interfere with union organization."
2. Add the following to paragraph 2(a) of the
Recommended Order: "Notify Kenneth Martz, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, of his right to full reinstatement,
upon application, in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces."
3. Delete from paragraph 2(e) of the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order that part thereof
which reads "to be furnished" and substitute
therefor "on forms provided...."
4. Delete the second indented paragraph of the
Appendix and add the following:
WE WILL NOT threaten or discriminate
against our employees in any manner including
threat of suspension or discharge if they join or
assist the Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO; offer to pay employees anything as
an inducement for withdrawal from that Union;
interrogate our employees in a coercive
manner concerning their union activities; or
promulgate, maintain in effect, enforce, or
apply either (1) a rule against union solicitation
on company property during nonworking time,
or (2) a rule against union solicitation while
permitting other types of solicitation during
working time where a purpose thereof is to in-
terfere with union organization.
' Respondent has excepted to certain of the Trial Examiner's credibility
findings As the clear preponderance of the relevant evidence does not
persuade us that the Trial Examiner 's resolution of credibility issues was'
incorrect, we find insufficient basis for disturbing his credibility findings
Standard Dry Wall Products , Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362
(C A 3).
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner: A hearing in the
above-entitled proceeding was held at Bloomsburg,
Pennsylvania, from December 13 through 20, 1966, and
on February 13, 1967, on complaint of the General
Counsel against The Magee Carpet Company, herein
called the Respondent or the Company The original
charge in the case was filed on August 8, 1966, and the
complaint issued on November 10, 1966. The issues
litigated are whether the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the statute. After the close of the hear-
ing briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the
Respondent
168 NLRB No. 11
40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following:'
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Magee Carpet Company, a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of carpets,
with its principal place of business in Bloomsburg,
Pennsylvania. During the past 12-month period it shipped
merchandise valued in excess of $1 million to customers
located outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. I
find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Charging Union , or the Textile Workers, or the
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2 (5) off the Act.2
device used to further the attempt to bring the Textile
Workers into the plant.
The essential allegations of the complaint are that in
each of these 10 situations the Respondent deprived the
employees of work because of their pro-Textile Workers
activities, and to put a stop to the entire affiliation move-
ment, all in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. There
are other detailed charges of unlawfully coercive state-
ments and acts in contravention of Section 8(a)(1). The
broad thrust of the complaint as a whole is against what
is said to be a pervasive, unrelenting, and fear-inducing
program of the Company aimed at eliminating any vestige
of hope among its employees for collective bargaining by
any labor organization other than the Alliance. The
remedy sought is to free the employees to exercise their
statutory rights to Join any union of their choice.
For the most part the defense assertion is that, except
for one or two instances, the disciplinary layoffs or
discharges were imposed as routine enforcement of a per-
missible company rule against solicitation during working
time. The Respondent denies the commission of any un-
fair labor practices.
Iii. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
For many years a labor organization called Textile
Workers Alliance of The Magee Carpet Company, its ac-
tivities and jurisdiction limited strictly to the employees
of this Company, has represented the employees in col-
lective bargaining. There was an executive board, con-
sisting of officers, and a group of committeemen, elected
periodically by the employees of the various departments.
Regular meetings were held by this board and commit-
teemen jointly, followed by meetings between the execu-
tive board and management representatives, where mat-
ters concerning working conditions of employees were
considered. The last contract between the Company and
this organization is dated December 1964, and extends to
July 1967.
In the fall of 1965 there developed among the officers
of this independent Alliance and among rank-and-file em-
ployees, a movement to associate the Alliance with some
union having a broader base, such as Textile Workers In-
ternational. There was talk of "affiliation" or "merger"
with an AFL-CIO group. With the employees divided in
sentiment on this question, the Company threw the full
weight of its influence against the desire of some to break
out of the single-company union concept. The campaign
to establish the Textile Workers as the effective bargain-
ing agent in replacement of the Alliance grew in intensity
as the spring of 1966 came. In June the Company
suspended from work, or discharged, eight employees
and on August 4 and September I released or suspended
two more. Of this total, eight had been publicized mem-
bers of the "Merger Committee," the organizational
' On January 10, 1967, counsel for the Respondent filed a motion "To
Retake Testimony of December 13, 1966," on the grounds that discre-
pancies and omissions in the stenographic transcript of testimony received
that day made it unreliable No opposition was filed by the other parties,
and the motion was granted The witnesses who had testified on
December 13 appeared again at a reopened hearing on February 13,
1967, and their testimony was fully received then Accordingly, the trans-
cript made of the December 13 hearing is no longer a part of the record
herein
B. Organizational Activities; the Respondent's Attitude
and Reaction; Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
Sometime in September or October 1965, Kenneth
Martz, an employee in the dye department, and an elected
committeeman of the Alliance, invited an agent of the
Textile Workers to his home for assistance in the
procedures that could best change the bargaining agent.
In consequence, at a subsequent meeting of the Alliance
committeemen, Martz invited the others to sign a paper
as indication of their willingness to constitute a "merger
committee," a starting point to rally the employees to the
cause; many did sign. There followed what Martz called
"mass meetings" of employees, some in his home. The
merger group placed announcements in the local Blooms-
burg newspap, inviting all to central meetings; one ap-
peared shortly before February 27, 1966, and another be-
fore May 22. On each of the newspaper notices were
listed the 27 or 28 members of the merger committee. The
May notice said that an AFL-CIO charter would be
presented.
The Respondent's opposition was intense. Among
other things it placed large notices in the town newspaper
urging its employees to refrain from joining the Textile
Workers, and to resist any attempt to move the Alliance
into a larger union. The tone of the appeal was extreme,
degrading, and deriding the AFL-CIO, instilling fear of
economic suffering if the Alliance were replaced by any
affiliated union, and generally supporting the entrenched
position of the old independent. Top officers of the Com-
pany, usually James Law, president, and Mr. Magee,
board chairman, sent a number of personal letters to each
employee at home. Again, the message was repeated that
2 The complaint alleges , and a witness testified, that among the em-
ployees of the Respondent the Charging Union also designates itself as
Textile Workers Alliance , affiliated with the Textile Workers Union of
America , AFL-CIO. The Respondent disputes the right of that Union so
to designate itself in Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania The question thus raised
more appropriately relates to an issue presented in a representation
proceeding , and is in no sense material to the questions to be decided in
this case There is therefore no reason for that matter to be considered
here further
MAGEE CARPET COMPANY 41
association with the Textile Workers, or the CIO, invited
danger.
There was a concerted effort, led by members of the
merger committee, to obtain signatures to membership or
authorization cards in favor of the Textile Workers. As a
result of these activities an election was arranged, to be
conducted by the Honest Ballot Association, with the
employees voting on the question of merger with the
AFL-CIO. About the same time officers or members of
the Alliance also arranged for a merger vote to be held by
the same association. On April 11 an election was held at
the company plant and on April 17 an election was held
at a nearby union hall. At the union hall the vote was 578
for affiliation and 71 against; at the company plant the the
vote was 441 against affiliation and 141 in favor.'
With the employees so evenly divided, the Respondent
filed a Board petition requesting a Government-con-
ducted election - Case 4-RM-553. In the course of the
hearing on that petition, however, late in May, the Com-
pany changed strategy, and instead asked that its own
petition be dismissed, on the ground that the then still cur-
rent contract with the Alliance precluded any expression
of choice by the employees. Within a matter of days, early
in June, began what appears to have been unprecedented
enforcement of a company rule, or policy, against solicita-
tion, and a pattern of disciplinary action falling heavily
upon members of the merger committee.
It is during this peak period of organizational activities,
while members of the merger committee were obtaining
supporting membership signatures in favor of the Textile
Workers, that the Company's campaign literature to com-
bat the program became most insidious. On June 4 a full-
page newspaper notice appeared over the name of Com-
pany President James Law, urging "loyal Magee Carpet
Company employees" not to sign AFL-CIO cards
because "your name on an AFL-CIO Union card is like
signing a blank check ... it can be very hard to get a card
back once it has your name on it." The notice contained,
among other things, the following statement:
This matter is of course, one of concern to our Com-
pany. It is also, however, a matter of serious concern
to you and your family. Our sincere belief is that if
this AFL-CIO Union were to get in here, it would
not work to your benefit but could work to your sen-
ous harm!
As the Board has found, this threat of harm to follow
adherence to a union the employees might choose, con-
stituted unlawful coercion upon them.4 Particularly must
the threat be deemed unlawful in this case in view of the
unfair labor practices found below.5 I find that by this
printed statement to its employees the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Another full-page open letter, signed by Harry F.
Magee, of the Company's executive board, appeared in
the June I1 newspaper. Magee announced he was going
"to get into the fracas - and to come in swinging," and
added, among other things: "This CIO union, that is try-
ing to get into our Company, has a record of strikes,
beatings, threatening phone calls, dynamiting, shootings,
etc." The notice also read: "Remember that labor dif-
ficulties and labor strife have caused over 85% of the car-
pet industry to move South. Your company is the last
remaining major carpet mill in the North. Do we want this
CIO Union to add our name to the casualty list9"
A third newspaper statement repeated the dread
forebodings of what the TWUA-AFL-CIO could bring.
It listed a number of carpet manufacturing companies of
the North which had closed or moved to the South
"because of this union ": "This union could be the major
reason for the Magee Carpet Company and other area in-
dustries being added to the casualty list ... don't kill the
goose that laid the golden egg."
Apace with the newspaper ads, Company President
Law wrote a series of letters to the employees' homes, re-
peating in consistent refrain, castigation of the
AFL-CIO, portentions of dire financial burden on the
employees, and relisting of the many companies driven
from their established locations to distant places, all with
consequent irreparable danger to those who worked. One
of these letters, dated June 1, spoke of Textile Workers
organizers as "night riders." Two days later Ruel Hart-
man, assistant supervisor in the cover and sample depart-
ment, engaged several employees in conversation while
they were working; these included Florence Woolever
and Leona Walters. During the conversation Beulah
Evans and William Stellfox also joined in. There is a little,
but not very consequential, conflict in the testimony as to
what was said. As Hartman first recalled, Walters
"stopped" him and asked about the night riders' letter of
Law. "I tried to explain to her about the letter and so
forth and how I felt about it, and interpreted it ... I went
into my explanation of my personal opinion of how to in-
terpret the letter.... I felt what was meant by night riders
was a person affiliated with the CIO or some other or-
ganization outside of the mill. If this is their job to have
cards signed, normally if they are working during the day
shift would be the only time to have cards signed because
they are not allowed to be signed during Mill working
hours."
Later in his testimony Hartman was asked: "Q. You
were stopped by Mrs. Walters? A. I stop to talk to
them." Again he said: "Either one of them stopped me or
I stopped them ...." According to the foreman, Stellfox
did not take part in the conversation, but Paul Hidley,
whose machine was nearby, did approach and join in.
As the group talked, it came to light that Walters and
Woolever had signed a CIO card. At this point, as both
Woolever and Walters recalled, Hartman said: "If you
signed a card, you are no longer employed by Magee."
The foreman did not contradict this. Walters and Wool-
ever also testified that Hartman offered them $10 for
their cards, saying: "I'll give you $10.00 if you hand me
your cards." Here the foreman's version is different in
form but not in substance. "I made a bet with them that I
would bet them ten dollars if they would get their card
back."
There then followed a further variance in the stories,
again not of great significance. The employees said Steil-
3 The election on company premises was a form of interrogation by the
Company Cf Blue Flash Express, Inc, 109 NLRB 591 The employees
were invited by the personnel manager to participate via a notice posted
over his and the Company's name throughout the plant The employees
were released by department to facilitate their balloting. In the light of the
overwhelming evidence set out below of animosity towards the Textile
Workers by the Respondent , no valid claim can be made in this case that
the purpose was merely to ascertain the desires of the employees As the
complaint does not allege this interrogation to have been unlawful, I make
no finding of unfair labor practices concerning it
Greensboro Housing Mills, 162 N LRB 1275
3 Cf Jackson Co, 160 NLRB 1781
42 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fox passed by and offered to permit Hartman himself to
select these girls' cards from the many, with Hartman
saying he wanted it from the girls, and not from him. As
Hartman told it, it was a few days later that Stellfox made
him the offer and he said his bet was not made with him
but with the women . In his final statement as a witness
Hartman admitted that when he opened the subject of
paying $10 for union cards, whatever the precise nature
of his offer, none of the employees had voiced any desire
to recall their union memberships or authorizations.
With the record in its entirety clearly showing a
widespread invitation to the employees to get back any
cards they may have signed, with Hartman's admission
he raised the subject of money inducement without any
employee having indicated a change of heart, and on the
basis of the demeanor of the witnesses , I credit the em-
ployees against the foreman. I find that by telling the em-
ployees who had signed Textile Workers cards they were
no longer employees of the Company, Hartman in effect
threatened them with discharge because of their union ac-
tivities, and thereby committed an unfair labor practice in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act chargeable to the
Respondent.
There is also testimony proving coercive statements
and unlawful intimidation by Howard Swisher, who
works in the cardroom of the spinning mill. The complaint
alleges he was a supervisor as defined in the Act at the
time of the events. In its answer the Respondent admitted
this to be true, but at the hearing its counsel withdrew the
admission and contended Swisher had not become a su-
pervisor until some time later . Leon Riggs, 30 years an
employee, testified Swisher was maintenance foreman in
June 1966 and that on the 6th "he asked me if I had
signed the CIO card or if I wanted mine back or if I knew
anybody else that might want their card back." Riggs an-
swered this was none of the foreman's business. Alfred
Budner , a finisher in the same department , also identified
Swisher as a maintenance foreman. He said that on June
8 Swisher spoke to him about 11 a.m., while the em-
ployee was working, and asked if he had signed a CIO
card and did he know what he was signing . Budner said he
had signed . About 3 p. m. that afternoon , as he was going
out, Swisher also said , as Budner continued to relate,
"that anybody signing a CIO card would be fired." Doyle
Shaffer, another finisher, testified that about May 8, be-
fore he had signed a • card for the CIO, Swisher ap-
proached him while he was working and "wanted to know
if I wanted my CIO card or if I knew anybody that signed
a CIO card and didn't know what they signed and wanted
it back."
Although still in the employ of the Respondent,,
Swisher was not offered as a witness. I credit the'
testimony of these employees. In support of its belated
contention that Swisher was not then a supervisor, there
is the testimony of Myles Katerman, the mill superinten-
dent and secretary of the Company. He said that in June
Swisher was a maintenance fixer, that he was then hourly
paid, and did not have the right to hire or discharge.
Katerman also said that there are supervisors who are
hourly paid, that fixers have always been excluded from
the collective-bargaining agreement with the Alliance,
that unlike all production and maintenance employees
they need not be members of the Alliance and that
Swisher was not a member, that fixers attend supervisory
meetings , and that as a class they are authorized to issue
reprimands . Katerman then explained that whether or not
particular fixers do issue reprimands depends upon the in-
ternal rules of "certain" divisions. It is doubtful that
Katerman, apparently the highest operational chief of so
large a plant- with about 65 fixers -really knew which
individual fixers fall in any special category. More signifi-
cant, however, is his further statement that Swisher -
even in June - did have the authority to "recommend
dismissal or recommend disciplinary action." On this
record I am satisfied that Swisher-even before his recent
promotion to assistant superintendent in the casting de-
partment - was a supervisor within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(11) of the Act. Ohio Power Company v. N.L R.B.,
176 F.2d 385 (C.A. 6). Accordingly, I find that his state-
ment to Budner that persons who signed CIO cards
would be discharged , and his questioning of all of these
employees as to whether they or others had signed such
cards for the Union, constituted unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I also find that by offering to pay them if they would
take back their union cards, Hartman was attempting to
bribe them away from their union resolve, and thereby
committed a further unfair labor practice violative of the
statute.
C. The No-Solicitation Rule
Because the acts of discrimination set out in the com-
plaint, directly or indirectly, involved purported enforce-
ment of a no-solicitation rule, it is important at the outset
to determine, on the basis of the evidence in its totality,
the exact nature of the rule, or policy, which the Respond-
ent contends underlies a number of the discriminations
in employment now said to have been illegal. The word-
ing of the printed and widely publicized rule of conduct,
the unusual work-duty arrangements in many depart-
ments precluding definitive determination of what time
was "work" time and what periods were alloted to
"breaks," "lunch," or "smoke" privileges, the nature of
a production process always permitting general discus-
sion and talk while machines are in operation, the long-ac-
cepted practice throughout the plant of solicitation and
distribution of greatly varied other subjects and things,
the concomitant efforts of management representatives
themselves to induce employees , as they worked, to re-
ject any outside union - all these are relevant factors
shedding light on what ultinitely must be a factual find-
ing as to the true motivation underlying the disciplinary
actions put in question . In a broad sense , that total picture
emerging from overall appraisal of these pertinent con-
siderations , bears a persuasive relationship to every act
of discrimination now defended - each in isolation - as no
more than separate exercises of management preroga-
tives to run an efficient business.
As written in virtually every notice of reprimand given
to employees in the spring and summer of 1966, and as re-
stated in the Respondent's brief after the close of the
hearing, the "policy" being enforced was against "sol-
icitation during working hours ." In contrast to this
phrase , there is a rule of conduct set out in precise words
in the Company's employee handbook, long the
publicized and effective regulation throughout the plant.
Indeed, company representatives at the hearing said that
the "personal conduct" rules appearing in the handbook
are by reference a part of the Company's collective-bar-
gaining agreement with the old Alliance . Here the no-sol-
icitation rule reads:
MAGEE CARPET COMPANY 43
No solicitation of any kind is or will be permitted on
the Company time or property. This includes lot-
teries, raffles, pools, tickets for benefits, collections
or any other type of solicitation. Disregard of this
rule will result in disciplinary action.
There is no evidence, nor is it claimed, that the em-
ployees were ever advised of any narrowing of this rule so
as to restrict its application to working time. Appraisal of
the realities of whatever purpose or policy concerning
solicitation the Respondent sought to enforce, must
therefore start with a finding that it has long had in effect,
and is enforcing today, an unlawful rule against union
solicitation.6 There is no contention that in this instance
the broad ban against employees discussing their union
desires, or urging fellow employees towards one view or
another on the matter, was justified for business reasons,
or production problems; in fact the total evidence
precludes any such possible attempt to defend the all-in-
clusive prohibition in this plant. All the managers ever
told employees, and all the officers said at the hearing, is
simply that the Company had a policy, and nothing more.
I find that by maintaining and enforcing this no-solicita-
tion rule, set out in its employee handbook, the Respond-
ent has unlawfully coerced its employees, and is now
coercing them, in their right to engage in unfettered self-
organizational activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
In its brief the Respondent requests that, for purposes
of judgment now, the rule it has always imposed upon all
employees be divided into one lawful, and one perhaps il-
legal part. Whatever may be said of such a defense in
other circumstances, the picture of this case as a whole
precludes artificial retroactive restructuring of the rule. In
general the plant operates three shifts -each 8 hours. The
record is replete with evidence of employees leaving their
machines a few minutes, or 5 or 10 minutes, before the 11
p.m., 7 a.m., and 3 p.m. shift change hour to punch out at
the timeclock; they often line up for a while before the
deadline moment to punch their cards. Much of the sol-
icitation of Textile Workers Union cards, or plain talking
among employees on the subject, occurred during such
moments. Whether this can be called "working time" or
not, is not quite clear, and lends confusion to the assertion
now that such talk violated a divisible part of the broad
and improper restraint upon the employees' right to talk
about union matters while not working. In many of the
departments there is no regular period of rest, or even
lunch. Many of the machines need merely to be looked at
as they run and can also be left unattended at times; the
people chat with one another, choose their own time for
smoke breaks, and eat lunch at their posts while paid time
runs on the clock. This, of course, serves the Company's
interest in having the production process function without
interruption virtually all 24 hours of the day. Nine em-
ployee witnesses, some called by the Respondent,
testified without contradiction that this is the established
system in their departments; these include the pressure
dye department, the high speed beamer section, the
spinning machine department, the buffing department,
and what was referred to as the centralized packaging de-
partment, seemingly a very large one occupying three
floors in one building.7
In recalling details of certain solicitation activities that
went on in the plant, a number of employees spoke of
being on their "breaks" when they did it, and they ex-
plained these were break periods they were free to choose
because their machines were then running smoothly. If at
the time others in the department were walking by, they
too might be going to the restroom, or for a smoke, on
"breaks" they themselves had decided to take at that mo-
ment. In such circumstances, it becomes virtually im-
possible to say with assurance whether particular invita-
tions to discuss the Union, or appeals for support, did or
did not occur during working hours. Certainly the conclu-
sionary words of certain witnesses that when so ap-
proached they, or the persons who accosted them, were
not on their breaks, falls short of positive evidence, either
that the employees suspended in fact talked to others
while they were supposed to be working, or that the su-
pervisors who disciplined them had real reason to think
so. Of course it is equally true that the denials of certain
employees themselves - that they did not seek Textile
Workers support during working time - are subject to the
same infirmities. The record is silent on whether any of
the large group of employees who worked in this continu-
ous operation had any time to themselves otherwise in the
plant. If lunch and breaktime were not theirs to use freely,
the net effect was exactly as written in the employee
handbook - no solicitation ever within the plant.
Despite the argument in its brief that in any event the
Respondent had a right to enforce a work rule -written
or not, announced in advance or sprung upon the work
force without notice -there is no serious assertion that in
this instance production problems justified a broad no-
solicitation rule, or that it was for the purpose of assuring
proper work performance that extraneous discussion
could not be tolerated. In view of the clear evidence of
general freedom to talk, especially in all these depart-
ments, the assertion would fail in any event. It is
nevertheless possible that for the very reason that break
or lunchtime must be indeterminate, an employer could
decide to prohibit any kind of solicitation or discussion of
outside activities throughout the work areas at any time.
The argument is not made in this case, but conceivably in
such special circumstances a rule so broad might even be
defensible. There are situations however, where the real
aim of an employer who seeks to quiet discussion
becomes more clearly discernible by first ascertaining
those objects or purposes which are not in the mind of
management.
Unlimited discussion among employees on almost
every conceivable subject other than unionism, whether
on or off "working time," however the phrase be applied
here, was never of concern to this Company. And this is
true regardless of how the word "solicitation" was used
in its printed rule-be it just pro and con talk, appeals for
joining any activity, contribution, or purchases. One wit-
ness atter another gave details - none contradicted - of
chances sold in world series baseball pools, money con-
tributions solicited for flowers and gifts appropriate for
outside activities of employees, membership enlisted into
a Starlight Skating Club, requests for cash assistance to
send the child of an employee to an out-of-State school,
the raffling of luggage as a prize in a money raising cam-
6 Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615 take off for smoke break when you get a chance There's no whistle that
7 Thus, employee Charles Long "We take off for lunch break and we blows or nobody comes and tells you, when you get a chance for a break "
44 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
paign , Girl Scout cookies sold and distributed, participa-
tion in a private ambulance service system sold among all
employees, etc. All of this during what the employees
constantly called "working time." Foremenjoined in the
sale, purchasing, and distribution of many articles. Within
a short period before the hearing, indeed the very Friday
before one witness appeared on the stand, employees cir-
culated a statement for employees to sign and indicated
their desire to attend a Christmas party. One foreman
sold Tupperware and made deliveries while the em-
ployees worked, as a courtesy to his wife. No word of
criticism ever, so far as appears on the record, for any of
this activity. Nor any indication that it interfered with
production. Pay is distributed to each employee in an en-
velope while they work. In each envelope the Company
at times gave each employee a written appeal for United
Fund contributions.
Clearly, therefore, whatever the rule was when the em-
ployees started their movement to bring the Textile Wor-
kers into the plant, if it can be said there was any rule at
all, it was concerned with nothing except the question of
union activities. With this, the area of interest to the
Respondent on this matter of solicitation begins to nar-
row very significantly. It becomes more pinpointed when
other activities of management representatives are con-
sidered. In October 1965, shortly after the merger pro-
gram had been launched, Personnel Director Leonard
Bason stopped Kenneth Martz, a leading instigator and a
tow truck operator, in the middle of the large work floor,
to discuss the movement with him, and to persuade him
to abandon the idea. Martz moved materials from place
to place with the truck. Bason kept him in conversation
for well over half an hour; he even offered the man a job
as watchman, a change which would have removed Martz
from union eligibility or inclusion in any bargaining unit
which the Textile Workers might represent. The delay
held up the work, and a passing foreman asked for the
truck to keep things moving. Bason said okay, the truck
went on its way with the foreman, and Bason continued
his talk with Martz. At this point the personnel director
gave no thought to the principle that "working time is for
work," as the Respondent now argues in its brief.
About June 1, only days before several employees
were suspended for talking union to others, Drew Miller,
tufting division foreman, chatted with three employees at
their work stations about the union movement:
To the best of my recollection I said that I had
worked under the CIO union for seven years and
that no union , regardless of what it was, TWA, CIO
or whatever you have is any better than the people
that ran it . I said if we didn't have Kenny Martz and
loggerheads such as him to head the union, I couldn't
see where they would be any better off than they
were right now. This was my personal opinion.
John Blackledge, assistant superintendent of the tufting
department, said he spoke to Martz many times before
the fall of 1966 about the activities of the old Alliance:
"Kenny had some misgivings about the processing of
grievances and he was dissatisfied with the way things
were going on in the union . . . there were problems that
were brought up ... I would of course, ask questions and
among them I can recall one particular time. I asked
Kenny why he did not work to do something about it. The
things he was unhappy about "
In the beginning of June, in a personal letter to all em-
ployees, the Company described the Textile Workers or-
ganizers who visited employees at home as "night
riders." This gave rise to the incident about June 3, when
Foreman Hartman engaged three or four employees in
conversation while they were at work to discuss the
Union with them and to voice his personal opinion about
things. Hartman admitted these employees were hourly
paid and that he took them from their work for discus-
sion; he spoke to them, as he himself admitted, 15 or 20
minutes. Clearly the "rule" did not prohibit talk against
the CIO, against outside unions, or against solicitation to
recover CIO cards, as distinguished from signing them in
the first place.
On this record there can be no question but that talk of
union activities did not disturb the Company provided it
was directed towards discouraging affiliation with an out-
side union. After the events set out in this complaint, the
Respondent took the position it was wrong both for em-
ployees to urge others towards a union view, and for em-
ployees to listen to others attempting to persuade them
If such were truly the case, all of the employees subjected
to these appeals by supervisors to turn against the merger
committee violated the rule, but were forgiven It follows,
by fair affirmative restatement, that the Respondent's
sole determination was to put a stop to any talk or sol-
icitation favorable to the Textile Workers as a possible
bargaining agent in its plant. If this conclusion requires
any further support, it appears on the face of the pay en-
velopes placed in the hands of each employee at work
During the peak of the merger activities, the Company
printed some small talk on the outside of the envelopes,
all designed to provoke anti-Textile Workers sentiment.
For example, the June 23 pay envelope said
Joe- Mr Law's speech gave us some things to think
about, did't it?
Bill: Sure did, Joe, I hadn't realized that over 80%
of the carpet being made today is being made in non-
union plants in the south.
On August 11.
Joe. Those Baltimore Orioles are really winning ball
games this year.
Bill- Yes, good hitting and good pitching and a real
team spirit wins ball games ... and that's what pays
off in World Series money.
Yes, that's right ... and in our game - manufacturing
carpet - harmonious relations between employees
and management have made us a team hard to beat
. and has paid off for us at profit sharing time.
We've lost a lot of grounds when the "outsiders" in-
terrupted our team spirit .. let's get back on the
ball.
On August 25•
Joe: If some people don't like their job here, I un-
derstand that their "Big Daddy" will hire them to
pass out circulars and "night ride."
Bill: Yes, I heard about that. That would be a good
job for some of them, too, just so they don't bother
us.
Aside from the fact that these envelopes in themselves
constituted pure solicitation in favor of the old indepen-
dent Alliance, and therefore complete proof that in reality
there was no rule against solicitation, they also evidence
a desire by the Company that there should be talk and
exchange of ideas among the employees during working
hours on this subject. What discussion was intended,
however, had to be in favor of the established company
union , and in discouragement of the "CIO." There is no
escaping the final conclusion, as all of the relevant factors
are considered, that the only rule emerging from all this
was a policy, throughout the Company and everywhere
MAGEE CARPET COMPANY 45
in the plant, to stop activities in favor of the Textile Work-
ers, to stop only activities in favor of that Union, and to
disregard all other activities of any kind.
D. Violations of Section 8(a)(3)
Seven of the employees listed in the complaint as un-
lawfully discharged or suspended from work were told at
the time they were being disciplined for "soliciting during
working hours " i n appraising the merits of the defense as
to these persons, a rule of Board law must be kept in
mind. The Board has held that when, with the advent of
self-organizational activities, an employer for the first
time announces and enforces rules against solicitation of
employees during working hours, if it appears that his
purpose is to curb such activities and there is no persua-
sive evidence that production necessities or disciplinary
requirements warrant the innovation, he coerces his em-
ployees unlawfully, and the presumption of validity other-
wise attaching to a rule against such activities during
working time is overcome. In William Block Co, 150
N LRB 341, the Board considered a rule of this kind, and
found it to constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, and the discharge of an employee for having violated
the rule unlawful discrimination in contravention of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3). "Since the record amply supports his [the
Trial Examiner's] findings that the rule was not necessa-
ry to maintain production and discipline and that it was
not promulgated in furtherance of an employer's legitimate
interest of serving production, order and discipline, but
specifically for the purpose of defeating union organiza-
tion, we adopt his finding that the no-solicitation rule is
unlawful."
The principle of the Block decision is persuasively ap-
plicable here.
1. Kenneth Martz, Charles Polk, Joseph Weiss, and
Charles Long
On June 6, four men were suspended from work - Ken-
neth Martz, Charles Polk, Joseph Weiss, and Charles
Long, each for the stated reason, as written on a repri-
mand slip given each man, that he had "violated conipany
policy - solicitation during working time." Each was a
member of the merger committee. At the hearing they
gave varying testimony concerning their solicitation of
others to join the Textile Workers movement, and there
is some conflict, as to some of them at least, in the record
concerning precisely how or when they went about it.
Assuming, a finding which I do not make with respect
to each of these four men, that they had in fact spoken to
other employees during working time instead of while on
their "breaks," as they said, I would conclude that in each
case the disciplinary suspension constituted a violation
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as alleged in the complaint.
That the purpose of the Company's policy was to stifle
the CIO campaign, to deny the employees their statutory
right to solicit on behalf of a union of their own choice, is
clear on the record.8 The unlawful motivation is clear
under the rule of the Block case.9 There are, however,
further facts lending support to a conclusion of unlawful
intent.
Weiss, Polk, and Kenneth Martz were called away
from work on June 6 to the office of Foreman Paul
Slusser, tufting superintendent, who told them all they
were suspended for soliciting on company time. They de-
nied having done so; Polk asked for evidence of any
misconduct, but Slusser replied there was none. The men
asked to see the personnel director, and Slusser
telephoned Bason, who said he was too busy then.
Slusser did not testify, and l • believe the employees'
testimony that he put no limitation upon the disciplinary
action, saying only "you're terminated, go home 'till
further notice." Weiss had been an employee 7 years,
Martz 12, and Polk 36 Weiss had never received a repri-
mand notice, Polk not in 30 years, and Martz only a few
days before in the circumstances discussed below. To for-
malize the action, written reprimand notices were sent to
the men a few days later, one delivered to Weiss in person
at home by a committeeman of the Alliance, the now an-
timerger group.
About June 23 there was a meeting between manage-
ment and the executive board of the old Alliance. Each of
these three men were called in separately and their cases
considered. Here Bason repeated to Polk that he had sol-
icited against company policy. Polk asked to see the
evidence, but Bason said he had statements he did not
care to reveal. Martz also pleaded innocent, and Bason
said he had "many, many many signed statements that I
had solicited on mill time," but could not tell who the in-
formants had been. Weiss' suspension was continued
through July 12; he returned to work on the 18th, when
the 2-week vacation period throughout the plant ended.
Polk was permitted to return to work on June 20. To
Martz, Bason said he would be disciplined with a further
90-day suspension. At this point Martz turned to
Telesky, a board member of the Alliance, for help
through the executive board of that group, but she said:
"That is only done when you're right." By letter dated
August 4 Martz was discharged outright.
Charles Long worked for the Respondent for 19 years;
he had last been reprimanded in 1955. When he arrived
for his night shift at I I p.m. Kessler told him, at the en-
trance to the plant, he was suspended from 2 to 4 weeks
for soliciting, and sent him home. A few days later the
usual written notice - "violating company policy - solicit-
ing on mill time" - reached his home. Long also appeared
at the June 23 conference between company and Alliance
officers. Asked what his defense was, he answered by de-
manding what proof there was. Bason, and Schwartz, the
president of the Alliance, answered there was none.
Bason then said Long was being suspended through July
18, and when Long asked the committee to process a
grievance on his behalf they replied "they didn't think
they should spend the Union's money on it." In the end
Bason said, still according to Long's uncontradicted and
credited testimony, "that I had shown a poor attitude the
fall before; and if I'd go up there again and violate the
rules again, I'd be thrown out." On the evening of July
18, the very night Long was to return to work, Foreman
" Testimony by Florence Eves, operator of a yarn twister machine,
called by the Respondent
Q Have you ever left your machine to go around to your side and
talk to somebody9
A If 1 had, to, yes, but not for the CI O
Q. You talked about something else9
A 1 ike my family, children, something like that
Lillian Foust, another company witness, who operates a cardboard tuber
machine, quoted Frank Kessler, a superintendent who later discharged
some of the employees involved in this case
Well, he [Kessler) said anytime we get one of these cards from the
CIO or anybody talks about it, we are supposed to keep and report to
him, but don't discuss this on the floor
See also Serv-Air, 161 NLRB 382, and Pepsi-Cola, 155 NLRB 527
46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Kessler telephoned him and said from 2 to 4 more weeks
disciplinary suspension had been imposed, and Long
could not report for work until August 15. He came back
that day.
I do not believe the testimony of the several company
witnesses who said these four men were suspended or
discharged in disciplinary measure for solicitation activi-
ties. There are a number of elements in the asserted affirm-
ative defense of discharge for cause that cumulatively
weaken its persuasive content against the compelling in-
ference arising from the positive evidence of union (CIO)
animus. These were old time employees; they were sent
home without advance notice, some at the moment they
arrived to start a shift-even late at night; they were de-
nied the courtesy of seeing what evidence pointed to their
improper conduct; they were punished without hearing or
opportunity to explain. The meeting between agents of
the Company and the old Alliance, euphemistically called
a grievance conference by some witnesses, was a sham,
so far as providing a fair hearing to these men By this
time the Company's uncompromising resolution to saddle
the old Alliance permanently upon the employees as their
bargaining agent regardless of the desires of the em-
ployees themselves was clear and the dissident group had
been effectively weeded out of the old union hierarchy
Katerman had asked Long some time earlier which side
he was on. A number of the old committeemen who had
joined the merger groups had been removed from office.
A most significant indication of the cooperation that was
going on between the Company and the Alliance -jointly
aimed at stopping Textile Workers affiliation - is a letter
mailed by the personnel director on May 24, only 2
weeks before the group suspension:
To: Charles Polk
Because of your public expression of interest with
T.W.U.A which we consider to be alien to the best
interests of the Textile Workers Alliance (which or-
ganization the Company still has a contract with), we
are discontinuing weekly meetings with you as an
Executive Board member until further notice.
Yours,
Leonard B. Bason
Personnel Director
Two days later, on May 26, a second letter, this time
on the stationery of the Alliance and signed by its pres-
ident , reached Long, and removed him from office
because of his "publicly declared interest in the
AFL-CIO."
Polk's testimony that although he favored the merger
idea, he did not solicit during working hours, is not con-
tradicted at all. In its brief, filed after the close of the
hearing, the Respondent says Polk's suspension resulted
from "apparent confusion," and that his suspension was
not "justified" and "he is entitled to be paid for the period
of suspension." But when Polk asked, both at the moment
of suspension and when appearing before the company
officials, what evidence there was against him, the written
statement that the Respondent now says it then had only
to learn later it was false, was not shown the employee
with 36 years' service with the Company. In the light of
the total evidence of anti-Textile Workers animus in this
case, it will not do to attempt at this late stage to remove
from consideration one of the clearest instances of unlaw-
ful discrimination.
Weiss said he did solicit for the Textile Workers, but
only on his own "break" or "smoke." He admitted solicit-
ing one Mensch, among others, in this fashion. Mensch
testified and insisted Weiss and Kenneth Martz ap-
proached him four or five times, very persistent in their
requests that he sign. Mensch said he yielded only to get
rid of them. It is entirely possible Weiss, as well as Martz,
may have spoken to Mensch, and perhaps others, even
while not in fact away from his machine for a smoke, or
just a break. People talked everywhere about everything.
But there is more in Mensch's testimony that reflects
upon the story of the personnel manager on the question
of real motivation. Bason testified that when Foreman
Slusser telephoned him about 1:30 p.m. on June 6, with
Polk, Weiss, and Martz sitting in the foreman's office and
protesting the sudden and unannounced suspensions, he,
Bason, knew nothing about the action that had been taken
or the decision to suspend these men. As he continued in
his role as principal witness to the "just cause" defense
against the complaint, Bason admitted directly he decided
to suspend these three men the day after receiving infor-
mation that they had been soliciting. He said four em-
ployees had come to him "the week before" and given
certain statements, and he named Billy Mensch and
Charles Stout among the informants. If only on the basis
of Bason's statement that he knew of the solicitation a
week before June 6 and that the decision to suspend fol-
lowed immediately, coupled with pretense of not knowing
anything about the decision to take disciplinary action,
his credibility suffers.
Mensch's testimony, read together with Bason's asser-
tions, serves all the more to weaken the affirmative
defense. Mensch said Weiss and Martz pestered him to
sign "in and-around that time," meaning when the two
elections were held, on April I I and 17, one by the Tex-
tile Workers and one by the Alliance. Mensch also
detailed how, before finally yielding, he took a blank card
given him by Martz to Buzz Segers, an employee "over
in experimental and patter," a block away from Mensch's
post, during worktime, and told Segers to bring the card
to "the front office to let them know what's going on."
Mensch did sign, and, as he continued to relate, "two or
three weeks later" he wanted the card back and went to
Bason for help. Bason asked him where he had signed this
card, and who had given it to him. Mensch told all. But
this could not have been later than the first week in May;
the suspensions came on June 6. Mensch was not
criticized for his own talk with others during his working
time; he was not criticized for having signed his own card
during working time; it must therefore be presumed this
was one of the occasions when an employee gave one of
the four affidavits Bason testified about at the hearing.
Charles Stout said that on April 26 Martz also solicited
him to sign a card, and that while he, Stout, was on a
smoke break, Martz was not at the moment. Without
specifying when, Stout later asked Foreman Slusser,his
superintendent, if he could retrieve his card. Slusser took
him to Bason's office where the personnel director asked
Stout to sign a "statement saying I wanted my card
back." As the talk continued, "they [Bason and Levan]
asked me who gave me the card to sign. I said Kenny
did." Here the emphasis was on the who, not on the
where and the when. Nobody criticized Stout for having
signed a card while Martz was on company time, if that
were the case. Apparently Stout's earlier cooperation
with Kenny on the subject of the Textile Workers could
be overlooked, now that he had joined the ranks of the in-
side unioneers.
MAGEE CARPET COMPANY 47
Long did solicit in favor of the merger group before the
clock struck; three employees testified he asked them to
sign cards, or a petition supporting the CIO. Apart from
general conclusionary statements that this was on "work-
ing time," for the most part the definitive testimony
placed it at a few minutes, or perhaps 10 minutes or so,
before quitting time. Dean Webster said he was ap-
proached several times between 6.45 and 6:55; his start-
ing time was 7 a m., the same moment Long's shift ended.
At one point Webster placed the solicitation at 6:47 Fred
Rubenstein, also a 7 a.m. starting man, said that Long
more than once solicited him about 6.50 a.m. Both
Webster and Rubenstein placed these activities of Long
back in April, and each said they immediately notified
their superiors. Webster: "I told my foreman ... each
day Mr. Long was there I told him." Rubenstein. "I cer-
tainly did ... right after he asked me to sign the card ...
maybe 5 minutes or so. I walked in our office." Ruben-
stein's testimony also leaves no doubt that the Company
was searching for the identity of CIO solicitors. The wit-
ness said he signed a statement about this in May. "I was
taken down" to Bason's office, by "my superintendent,
Mr. Kessler." Rubenstein then added "I think he
[Bason] informed Mr. Frank Kessler to have me come
down there."
Howard Long worked from 3 p.m. to II p.m. when
Charles Long started his shift. This man recalled how "in
the spring" Long talked to him about signing up "during
my working time " Pressed to be more exact the witness
then said it was always about 10 minutes before his shift
ended, "you can't clock out more than 15 minutes early,"
"I stop work about 5 minutes early, everybody lines up."
Against this Charles Long himself admitted he solicited
people while they were in line to check out, and that
otherwise he did it on his own time. This is one of the de-
partments where people eat at their machines and decide
for themselves what time is breaktime. Therefore, when
Howard Long said he was approached on "working
time," his story is necessarily ambiguous. In any event,
2 weeks later this man too ended up in the office of the
personnel director. He spoke to employee Jack Beagle,
"one of the union [old Alliance] guys," for help to get his
card back, and "he helped me get it back from Leonard
Bason and Bob Levan." In Bason's office, Levan asked
who had given Long the card, "and then I signed a paper
that said I signed one and tried to get it back. He [Levan]
would try and help me get it back."
I find that Charles Polk, Joseph Weiss, and Charles
Long were suspended from work in furtherance of the
Respondent's intent to curb their activities, and the ac-
tivities of others of its employees, in support of the Tex-
tile Workers, and therefore separate violations of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. I also find that the suspension and
eventual discharge of Kenneth Martz, effective as of June
6, 1966, was for the same reason a violation of Section
8(a)(3). In the case of Martz, as will also appear with
respect to other employees named in the complaint, the
Respondent advanced additional reasons, for the first
time at the hearing, or in its brief, as proper grounds for
discharge. Martz quarreled with Foreman Miller for hav-
ing called him a "loggerhead," and even said if the
foreman continued this sort of talking Martz would "meet
him outside." Miller had in fact spoken of Martz thusly
while discussing the CIO campaign with a number of his
subordinates and casting aspersion on the entire program.
Was it the severity of Martz' resentment against personal
offense that the Company faulted, or was it his independ-
ent spirit to pursue the CIO campaign in the face of the
foreman's contempt? On this record, it must have been
the latter, else Bason would surely have mentioned the
so-called threat at the moment of suspension. Instead he
spoke only of solicitation, repeated the phrase on a writ-
ten notice or form a few days later, and finally, when,
after 2 months, he converted a 90-day suspension into
outright discharge, still did not give any threat as a reason
for the action.
2. June Bucher and Lorraine Bredbenner
These two women were twisters under Assistant Su-
perintendent Kessler; he sent both home on June 17,
again without advance notice, without giving them the
satisfaction of knowing what evidence there was of
wrongdoing, and without opportunity to explain, or per-
haps apologize. To each woman, at the moment of
release, Kessler said, "For soliciting during working
hours." To Bucher, Kessler said , "I'm going to have to
leave you go for awhile " Kessler's testimony is that all he
told Bredbenner was "I'm sending you home," with no in-
dication that her release was anything short of a final
separation from employment. Both women were per-
mitted to return to work on July 18.
In the case of these two women the testimony in
defense is that Kessler, acting entirely on his own authori-
ty, made the decision to discipline them, carried it out,
and did so because of their solicitation activities. In part
because of the inherent implausibility of much of what he
said, and in part on the ground of his very meaningful
demeanor on the witness stand, I do not believe him.
Kessler has worked 30 years in this department, a super-
visor the past 10 years. Bucher, 7-1/2 years with the
Company, is his sister-in-law. Bredbenner has worked
with, and later under, Kessler for 23 years. Her husband,
too, in an adjoining department, has been as long an em-
ployee of the Respondent. Kessler said this was the first
reprimand he ever gave Bredbenner (neither woman had
ever before received any reprimand notice whatever), he
had issued reprimand notices before but never sent any-
one home because of them, he had never sent home an
employee as a disciplinary measure for any reason at all,
and it is not customary for an assistant superintendent to
send employees home. In the face of all this, Kessler held
firm to his story that he alone decided to do this, that he
told no one in the personnel office in advance of his deci-
sion, and that no other management representative had
spoken to him before the events on the subject at all Had
Kessler in truth arrogated to himself the prerogative of
making decisions of this kind without regard to the policy
of the front office, he would have acted contrary to the
order of the day as revealed by the Company' s witnesses
who testified about the union talk carried on by the two
ladies in question.
Florence Eves said that Bredbenner one day asked her
to sign a CIO card while the two were at work , and also
solicited her " during hours" after the April election. This
is one of those departments where employees take their
own breaks-"I go get my coffee and eat while my ends
are running," and where, still according to Eves, "we talk,
but not about the CIO." Eves said Bruce Henrie, the de-
partment supervisor, knew Bredbenner had solicited her.
As to Bucher, fair appraisal of her testimony shows that
to some extent, at least, she spoke to others on the subject
not only during whatever break period the employee
chose to take, but also when they were simultaneously at
work. But on the question of motivation, the testimony of
Lillian Foust, who said that she was solicited by Bucher,
48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
runs counter to Kessler's professed independence of any
concern in the matter by others in management of person-
nel. Foust testified that as soon as Bucher gave her a card
she went to Foreman Henrie and "I said we were in-
formed that we were supposed to tell when we get a card.
So, I said, `I got a card from June Bucher and here it is.'
And he said, `All right, what are you going to do with it '
I said, `I am going to return it,' he said, `All right. We are
supposed to let Leonard Bason know.' So he told Frank
Kessler."
Later, still from Foust's testimony: "The word got
around the floor and everybody said if we were ap-
proached by the CIO we were supposed to tell Frankie
[Kessler] right away." With this the message from the
front office as understood by the Company's own wit-
nesses, Kessler's insistence that the personnel director
did not know what he was doing must fail; he even had
the reprimand notice written before calling Bredbenner to
his office. She resented being sent home so summarily,
denied having done anything wrong, and demanded to see
Bason personally. She apparently stormed into the per-
sonnel office, picking up her husband on the way Bason
answered her protest by saying she was not "fired," but
only "suspended ... for soliciting during working hours
we have written statements that you have been."
There can be no question but that the employees were
told by company officials to keep a sharp eye for anyone
distributing Textile Workers cards, and to report any
such attempt quickly to the personnel department. This
is what happened in the case of these two ladies, Bason
had these reports before any reprimand action was taken,
and he knew exactly what Kessler was supposed to tell
Bredbenner- suspension, not outright discharge . Kessler
lied on the witness stand.
I find that by suspending June Bucher and Lorraine
Bredbenner from work on June 17, 1966, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.10
3. Wayne Martz
This is the brother of Kenneth Martz, the man who was
first suspended for solicitation and then, at the Company-
Alliance conference of June 23, given a 90-day suspen-
sion. On June 17, Wayne agreed to work 1 hour beyond
his 3 p.m. quitting time to cover an employee whose post
required attention unexpectedly. He arranged by
telephone for his wife to leave his auto near the plant so
he could travel home at the unusual hour, and left the
plant a few minutes to obtain the auto keys where it was
parked. He left the building without clearing with a super-
visor, Bason saw him from an office window, and in a
matter of minutes gave him a written reprimand notice for
leaving the premises without permission.
Martz asked Bason could he attend the June 23 meet-
ing where his brother's indefinite suspension was going to
be considered, and the personnel director said no,
because Martz was not an Alliance committeeman
On the day of the "grievance meeting," Arthur Hauk,
Martz' foreman, gave him a layoff slip and told him he
could not return to work until July 18, "for leaving the
mill last week." Later the same day he did appear at the
"' In its brief the Respondent contends that Bredbenner's suspension
was based not only upon her solicitation activities but also upon a number
of circumstances These are given as the fact she left Kessler's office
without permission after he had told her to go home, and asked her
husband to accompany her to the personnel director's office There was
conference, and was called into the room. There, as he
testified, Katerman, the mill superintendent, said "do you
know the story about a barrel of apples; he said a few will
spoil the whole barrel and we're going to pick out the
few." The next day- Friday, June 24- Bason telephoned
Martz at home and returned him to work. Wayne Martz
lost only I day's pay.
Katerman denied having made the statement about the
few bad apples spoiling an entire barrel; Bason and
Levan, who were both present, testified they did not hear
the statement. Asked why, with the incident of Martz
leaving the plant a few minutes for his car key once set-
tled with a reprimand notice, he a week later decided to
impose a suspension as a further discipline for the same
offense, Bason said'
As I recall we all know things were in a state of con-
fusion down there about that time. I wanted to be
sure that the grounds I was standing on was steady,
because of the situation for which we are here for
now. The unfair labor practices. I did discuss it with
the -the following Wednesday, with the union board,
the TWA Alliance Executive Board at our weekly
meeting on Wednesday.
I credit the employee. No charge against the Respond-
ent was filed with the Board before August 8, 1966.
Picking the few apples which proverbially spoil the barrel
is precisely what the Respondent's managers, in coopera-
tion with the Alliance officers opposed to affiliation with
an outside union, were doing at that moment. This is
when Polk, Weiss, and Kenneth Martz were appearing
before the joint conference. Wayne Martz was also a
known member of the merger committee, and he had at-
tempted to come to his brother's aid. All this, coupled
with the absence of any real reason for reconsidering
what to do about the man's brief and understandable
absence from the plant a week earlier, and all the other
evidence of animus against the union cause with which
Wayne Martz was associated, fully warrant the conclu-
sion, which I make, that the Respondent imposed a I -day
suspension on him as part of its pervasive attempt to stifle
the merger committee, and thereby violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. Derl Henrie
This man operates a high speed spinner; the machine is
of a type that runs by itself and normally can be left unat-
tended for short periods at a time. Moreover, this is one
of the departments where employees choose their own
break periods for this very reason; the operation never
ceases. Henrie has worked for the Respondent 30 years;
he was first an official of the old Alliance and then a
known member of the Textile Workers Merger Commit-
tee.
In all his years of service he was never reprimanded
until September 1, 1966, the day after he left his machine
for about 5 minutes to speak to his brother, Foreman
Bruce Henrie, about a personal matter on the floor below.
While he was downstairs he also spoke for a few minutes
to some of the girls. In some fashion the fact that he spoke
to others in an area of his department away from his own
no criticism of her for these things at the time Instead, in Bason's office,
Levan, the assistant, found occasion to ask her-and in the total circum-
stances I do not credit his denial- whether she favored "an outside
union " I deem these belated defenses too frivolous to merit further com-
ment
MAGEE CARPET COMPANY 49
machine came to the attention of management, and
Kessler, assistant superintendent of the department, gave
Henrie a written reprimand notice for being "out of work
area", the employee protested he had done no more than
speak to his brother. Later, incensed at what he con-
sidered unjust informing about himself, Henrie went to
the office and demanded that Rose Cotner, a girl in
Kessler's office, tell him who had reported him He was
angry, and asked "who the God Damn squealers were "
Cotner said she would not tell him, and Henrie went on
with "he would turn me over to the CIO and the National
Labor Relations Board and they would force me to talk.
. He went over to the door and he stood there and he
shook his finger at me and said, `I am giving you one more
chance. Remember you are not fooling with the damn car-
pet company now, you are fooling with the United States
Government. Either you talk or I am turning you in. We
have a meeting tonight with the CIO and the National
Labor Relations Board."'
Kessler was sitting in his office when this happened,
and both he and Cotner testified he said not a word. Later
in the day, Kessler gave Henrie a second reprimand slip
and suspended him from work. This notice read:
"Threatening another employee in the department office,
and using improper language." He asked Kessler at that
moment "how do you get threatening out of this," and
Kessler answered, according to Henrie's uncontradicted
testimony, "didn't you threaten Rose to report to the
Labor Relations Board " Henrie's suspension was con-
tinued to September 16.
In defense at the hearing Kessler testified he suspended
Henrie "because he was in the office and swearing and
threatening the office girl." As in the case of Bucher and
Bredbenner, Kessler again said flatly he himself wrote out
the reprimand slip and that this was done on his own
authority.
I do not believe Kessler suspended Derl Henrie for the
reasons he gave at the hearing, or that he acted on his own
and not under instructions from higher officers of the
Respondent He testified the girl did no more than refuse
to answer Henrie. She testified, instead, that when Hen-
ne left she asked Kessler could she call personnel and re-
port this, and that he said yes. She also said that she
thought the reprimand slip was made out in the personnel
office. Kessler tried to create the impression at the hear-
ing that Henrie's language offended him, and was out of
keeping with the social decorum of his office. And then,
asked was any off-color language used in his office, he
added: "I might say `s-t' or something like this. That is
about it." Besides all this, it is too late in the development
of the law of labor relations in America to look upon an
attempted resort to a union , or to the National Labor
Relations Board , as a threat justifying discharge or
suspension of an employee. Henrie had turned against the
old Alliance; he joined the merger committee without
fear; he represented a danger to the Company's anti-Tex-
tile Workers policy. It was not the truncated idea of
"threat" in his words to Cotner that annoyed Kessler, or
whoever of his superiors it was that prepared the repri-
mand slip and decided the matter. It was the fact he had
been talking to the "girls" downstairs, that he flaunted his
adherence to the "CIO," and that he intended to avail
himself of lawful procedures to protect his right to choose
his own union, that motivated the suspension. The picture
fits the pattern of the other unlawful discriminations too
closely to be overlooked on this record. I find that by
suspending Derl Henrie from employment on September
1, 1966, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act
5. Clyde Bowman and Warren Stellfox
The last two employees listed in the complaint as hav-
ing suffered illegal discrimination are Clyde Bowman,
first suspended and then discharged, and Warren Stellfox,
suspended from work for about 1 month They were
members of the merger committee, but there is no defini-
tive proof that they engaged in solicitation activities on
behalf of the Textile Workers either while at work or not,
anywhere in the plant. Unlike the disciplinary action
taken against the others , the reasons given to these two
men, oral or on reprimand slips, had nothing to do with
solicitation or any other company policy.
Stellfox's difficulties started when, on June 2, Joseph
Dunkelberger , his supervisor , told him he [Stellfox] had
been reported as being present at a meeting of supervisors
where he did not belong. Stellfox laughed and said he had
not been there . In a matter of minutes Dunkelberger
returned and admitted he had been in error . At this point,
to quote Stellfox: "Well I sort of, you might classify it as
clown around a little bit.... I took a piece of wastepaper
that was at the other end of the machine and I made a
dunce hat out of it and I walked up alongside the table,
which again was not in operation, and I put my finger in
my mouth and said, `I'm a bad little boy, I've been out of
the department '; and I kept clowning around ; I went back
to the lower end of the table and I sat on a chair that we
have down there and put it on my head like a dunce or I'd
take it off and whistle through it or hum through it. But
this was not during my production. When something
would come down the table, I would stop ." Stellfox said
he did this a number of times that day, "Maybe 5 or 6
minutes at a time." This was on Thursday. The following
Monday, June 6, he was called to the office , given a repri-
mand slip, and suspended until further notice. The repri-
mand slip read "distracting working people during work-
ing hours," and the superintendent told him "we don't
like your attitude or actions." He returned to work on
July 18, at the end of the vacation period, for which he
was paid.
Stellfox is a rolling machine operator ; his is part of a
large machine over which extensive carpeting passes and
is cut into pieces with large knives. Sometimes part of the
machine is idle while other portions operate. That care-
less inattention to work here, regardless of whether a por-
tion of the machine stands idle or not , creates a serious
danger to the workmen , was shown clearly on the record.
Stellfox virtually boasted of his clowning activities in the
department . "Well I'm just the type of guy that 's full of
the devil once in a while; so I just put the dunce cap on
and I put my finger in my mouth and said I've been a bad
little boy; my superintendent checks me to see if I'm in or
out of my department . And that was to the crew that was
at the table .... it wasn 't during out break period, no."
Bowman was a spinning machine operator , working
normally from 1 I p . m. to 7 a.m . On June 21 he started at
7 p.m., instead, to do 4 extra hours. As he recalled, about
I a.m. he was given a reprimand slip "for being away
from his machine," or ,out of his department ." He had
left his machine in operation , not an unusual thing in this
department, to go to the fountain for a drink ; he admitted
that when he returned Laubach , the superintendent,
pointed to a down end on his spinner . At first Bowman
50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
refused to accept the reprimand notice, because Creasy,
the lower foreman who attempted to hand it to him, had
not himself seen him leave his machine ; Bowman insisted
Laubach had to put the slip in his hand . He then asked
Creasy where, if not to the fountain, should he go for his
break and Creasy answered : " I don't give a damn where
you go then , but just don 't leave your machine and talk to
anybody.""
At this point Bowman, like Stellfox, went into his act.
"So after that when I left the machine , I whistled and
raised my hand to those who spoke to me.... I did the
same thing when I went to the drinking fountain or to the
restroom .... When anybody would come down the aisle
and call because of his order not to speak to them, I'd just
raise my hand and whistled right on around the machine.
... I walked like a puppet ... stiff legged ... with my left
hand extended in the air and my legs walking stiff legged.
... I was responding as a puppet."
Bowman acted in this way from the moment of his first
reprimand , at I a.m ., as he said , to 7 a.m ., when he went
home , and resumed the show at 1 1 p.m ., at the start of his
next shift. An hour after his arrival Laubach attempted to
give him a second reprimand, reading, according to Bow-
man "for raising my hand whenever I see him ," according
to Laubach "for insubordination." Again Bowman
refused to accept the paper because , as he testified , " I felt
that the reason stated on there was very foolish." Now
Laubach ordered him to shut his machine and accept the
reprimand , and still Bowman refused to do either . Finally
the superintendent told him to obey on pain of a third
reprimand and dismissal . With Bowman still refusing,
Laubach wrote a third slip, this one for refusing to accept
the first two, again ordered Bowman to shut his machine,
and now ordered him out of the plant. In the end Laubach
shut the machine and Bowman left.
The next day, June 23, at the so-called grievance meet-
ing of the Company with the old Alliance group , Bowman
appeared and told his story. Management said it would
consider the matter , and that night Personnel Director
Bason telephoned Bowman to say he was suspended for
90 days "unless I want to come in and talk it over, and I
said, no , thank you , not at this time ." On August 5 Bow-
man was advised by letter that he was discharged.
Essentially the General Counsel 's theory of illegality
in the case of both Stellfox and Bowman is bottomed
upon the clear fact that the Respondent was carrying on
a determined campaign to curb the activities of the
merger committee and of the Textile Workers even to the
extent of resorting to illegal conduct . These men were on
the merger committee and the Company knew it. In the
case of Stellfox his participation in the Textile Workers
campaign had only a day or two before his suspension
been highlighted when Assistant Superintendent Ruel
Hartman learned that Stellfox was the man who might
have possession of the union cards of Mrs. Walters and
Mrs. Woolever . There is no substantial evidence, how-
ever , apart from what might be inferred from the general
attitude of the Company, indicating an intent to hit at
Stellfox because of his individual activities.
As to Bowman , the General Counsel relies primarily
upon the fact that when giving the man the second repri-
mand - for insubordination - Superintendent Laubach
found occasion to refer to Bowman's behavior a few days
earlier when Company President Law gave a speech to
the employees on the question of unionism. On the
precise recollection of the two men as to what Laubach
said that night , I find the superintendent 's version the
more reliable of the two. According to Bowman, Laubach
said, as he was handing the reprimand slip to the em-
ployee : "I heard how you belittled Mr. Law's speech last
week.... I didn't think your mind was so small but now
that I understand it, I'm going to give you another repri-
mand ...." Laubach testified as follows: "When I took
it [the reprimand notice ] out to give it to Clyde I told
Clyde all these years I have known you and I said that I
had heard that he belittled a gentleman like Mr. Law
when he was making his speech . I was really surprised
when I heard it. I could hardly believe it. I told him at that
time I could understand now that he would do it and in
my personal opinion I said , `You act like a boy 8 or 9
years old.' So then he said he would not accept the repri-
mand."
I am satisfied that when Laubach decided to give a
second reprimand to Bowman that night it was because of
Bowman's repeated derision of the supervisor , and not
because of anything he may have done when Law was
giving his speech . Suspicion apart , I cannot find that there
is sufficient probative evidence, upon the record in its en-
tirety, to support the complaint allegations with respect
to Stellfox and Bowman . I shall therefore recommend
dismissal of the complaint as to them.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III , above, occurring in connection with the operations of
the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close , intimate , and substantial relation to trade , traffic,
and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead
to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Respondent having unlawfully suspended from em-
ployment a number of employees and discharged another,
it must be ordered to reinstate Kenneth Martz to his
former employment and to make whole both him and the
other employees illegally suspended , for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered in consequence of the il-
legal discrimination against them . Backpay shall be based
upon the earnings which the terminated or suspended em-
ployees would normally have received during the applica-
ble period, less any net interim earnings, and shall be
computed on a quarterly basis in the manner set forth in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest
thereon , Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
There is an ambiguity in Bowman 's testimony as to whether it was
Creasy or Laubach who made this statement In the light of the case as a
whole this is not a very significant matter
MAGEE CARPET COMPANY 51
The extent of the Respondent's past unfair labor prac-
tices justify and require an all inclusive injunctive order
that it not hereafter violate the statute in any other
manner.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce and the
Union is a labor organization , all within the meaning of
the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hiring and tenure
of employment of Kenneth Martz, Charles Polk, Joseph
Weiss, Charles Long, June Bucher , Lorraine Bredbenner,
Wayne Martz , and Derl Henrie , the Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
3. By the foregoing conduct , by threatening all of its
employees with harm if they joined or assisted the Textile
Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, by Foreman
Hartman ' s threat to discharge employees for joining that
Union , by Foreman Hartman 's offer to pay employees as
inducement for withdrawal from the Union of their choice,
by Foreman Swisher 's statement to employee Budner
that if he signed a union card he would be discharged, by
Foreman Swisher 's interrogation of employees concern-
ing their union activities , and by maintaining and enforc-
ing a rule against union solicitation on company premises,
both during working time and during nonworking time,
the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , it is hereby recommended that
The Magee Carpet Company, Bloomsburg , Pennsyl-
vania, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers
Union of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor or-
ganization of its employees , by discharging , suspending,
or in any other manner discriminating against them in re-
gard to their hire or tenure of employment or any terms or
conditions of employment.
(b) Threatening employees with harm if they joined or
assisted the Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, threatening to discharge employees if they
should join that Union , offering to pay employees as in-
ducement for withdrawal from that Union , interrogating
employees in a coercive manner concerning their union
activities , maintaining and enforcing a rule against union
solicitation on company premises whether during work-
ing time or during nonworking time.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to
self-organization , to form labor organizations , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in any other concerted activity for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, ex-
cept as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Kenneth Martz reinstatement to his former
or, substantially equivalent position without prejudice to
the rights and privileges enjoyed.
(b) Make whole Kenneth Martz, Charles Polk,Joseph
Weiss, Charles Long, June Bucher, Lorraine Bredbenner,
Wayne Martz, and Derl Henrie for any loss of pay suf-
fered by reason of the discrimination against them, in the
manner set forth above under the section entitled "The
Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Bdard or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(d) Notify the above-named employees if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States their
rights to full reinstatement upon application in ac-
cordance with the Selective Service Act and the Univer-
sal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
(e) Post at its plant in Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania, co-
pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."12 Copies
of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 4, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.13
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges a violation
of the statute with respect to the discharge or suspension
of Clyde Bowman and Warren Stellfox.
12 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board 's Order is entorced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 4, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps -
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
336-845 0 - 70 - 5
52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act , as amended , we hereby notify our em-
ployees that.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the Tex-
tile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or in any
other labor organization of our employees, by
discharging , suspending , or otherwise discriminating
against them in regard to their hire or tenure of em-
ployment.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees generally
with harm if they join or assist the Textile Workers
Union of America , AFL-CIO, threaten to discharge
employees for joining that Union , offer to pay em-
ployees as inducement for withdrawal from member-
ship in that Union , tell our employees that if they
sign union cards they will be discharged , interrogate
our employees in a coercive manner concerning their
union activities, or maintain and enforce a rule
against union solicitation on company premises, both
during working time and during nonworking time.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the right to self-organization , to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist the above-named Union, or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection , as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or
to refrain from any and all such activities, except as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer Kenneth Martz reinstatement to his
former or equivalent position, without prejudice to
his rights and privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make whole the following employees for
any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimina-
tion against them, in the manner set forth in the sec-
tion entitled "The Remedy": Kenneth Martz,
Charles Polk, Joseph Weiss, Charles Long, June
Bucher, Lorraine Bredbenner, Wayne Martz, and
Derl Henrie
WE WILL notify the above- named employees if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of their rights to full reinstatement upon appli-
cation in accordance with the Selective Service Act,
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces
All our employees are free to become members of, or
to refrain from becoming members of any labor organiza-
tion
Dated By
THE MAGEE CARPET
COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1700 Bankers
Securities Building , Walnut & Juniper Streets, Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania 19107, Telephone 597-7601.