The Crestline Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 21, 1961

133 N.L.R.B. 256 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. UAW, AFL-CIO and its Local 622 are labor organizations within the meaning
of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of the em-
ployees named above in the section entitled "The Remedy ," thereby discouraging
membership in the Union , the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
3. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of its employees in the appropriate unit set forth in section B , beginning May 2,
1960 , the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The Respondent did not engage in interrogation as alleged in the complaint.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
The Crestline Company and Midwestern Millmen District Coun-
cil, affiliated Local Union 1594 . Case No. 18-CA-1153. Sep-
tember 21, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 18, 1960, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Re-
port attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to
the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, except as noted hereafter.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a) (5) by unilaterally terminating its share of the employee
group insurance program and by the unilateral withholding of holi-
day pay for May 30 and July 4.
The parties began negotiations for a new agreement in March 1960
to replace an agreement due to expire on April 30,1960. The expiring
contract provided for certain paid holidays, including Memorial Day
and July 4, and also required the employer to pay 60 percent of the
cost of the employees' group insurance. The parties met and ne-
gotiated both before and after the expiration of the old agreement
and, despite some areas of disagreement, the union negotiators agreed
to submit the Employer's proposals to the employees at a meeting
133 NLRB No. 30.
THE CRESTLINE COMPANY 257
scheduled for May 14. In their negotiations, the Union had urged
that the Employer provide two additional paid holidays and liberal-
ize the insurance provisions. The Employer took the position that
the holiday and insurance clauses of the old contract should be incor-
porated into the new agreement, and its proposal, on which the em-
ployees were to vote, made such provision. The day before the
employees were to vote on the Employer's proposal, the Company
distributed a notice to all employees that it was discontinuing the
payment of its portion of the insurance premium because operations
without a bargaining (agreement had increased its costs and it was
necessary to effect some compensating savings. At the scheduled
meeting the next day, the employees rejected the Company's proposals
for a new agreement.
The parties met thereafter and negotiated but could reach no agree-
ment. The company unilaterally refused to make the holiday pay-
ment for May 30, neither notifying nor consulting with the Union in
advance of its action.' At another meeting between the parties on
June 21, an official of the Employer remarked that it did not intend to
pay for July 4, and a union representative replied that the action was
expected, an apparent reference to the Company's unilateral with-
holding of the May 30 holiday pay.
It is clear that the Employer's precipitous announcement of the
termination of payment of its share of the insurance premiums the
day before the employees were to vote on the Employer's contract pro-
posals disparaged the Union's position as bargaining representative
of the employees, and was, therefore, a violation of Section 8(a) (5).
The Employer's subsequent conduct in failing to notify or consult
with the Union about holiday pay for Memorial Day, and its failure
to pay for that holiday and for July 4, manifested the Employer's
intention to subvert the authority and representative status of the
Union. It was the Employer's position that it need not pay for the two
'holidays because its contractual commitment to do so had expired.
However, the obligation imposed on an employer by the Act to con-
sult with its employees' representative is unaffected by the expiration
of a prior agreement, and an employer who unilaterally changes pre-
vailing wages, hours, or working conditions while purporting to
bargain, reveals thereby its unwillingness to meet that obligation.
We find no merit in the Employer's contention that its unilateral
actions are not a violation of its obligation to bargain in good faith,
because they were taken to put the Union under some economic
' Although the Company contends that it notified the union negotiators of its proposed
action at a meeting on May 26, the Trial Examiner credited two union representatives
who denied that such a proposal had been made. In any event, it is clear , from the
Company's argument that its refusal to pay for the holidays was to exert pressure in
bargaining , that it did not seriously intend its proposed action to be open for discussion
or negotiation.
624067-62-vol . 133-18
258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pressure in order to obtain more favorable terms for itself in a new
agreement. The Employer relies on the recent Supreme Court de-
cision, N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union, etc. (Pru-
dential Insurance Company), 361 U.S. 477, reversing 119 NLRB 768.
The Board had held there that a union refused to bargain in good faith
by engaging in certain harassing tactics during negotiations for a new
agreement. The Supreme Court held, on the contrary, that the use of
economic pressure is part and parcel of the collective-bargaining
process and is not in itself inconsistent with the duty to bargain in
good faith. The Court pointed out that the Board is not authorized to
regulate the choice of economic weapons which parties may utilize,
or to brand certain tactics as imcompatible with good-faith bargain-
ing. The Court concluded that Section 8 (b) (3) (!and, inferentially,
Section 8(a) (5)) does not confer on the Board the power to presume
the absence of good faith by a party exerting economic pressure, if at
the same time it is engaging in good-faith negotiations for an
agreement.
We note, however, that the Court perceived no lack of harmony
between the principles enunciated in the Insurance Agents case and
those underlying its decision in N.L.R.B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills,
Inc., 337 U.S. 217.2 In the latter decision the Court had held that
the Board could reasonably infer that a unilateral change in wages
granted by an employer during negotiations signified its rejection of
the statutory requirement that bargaining on such matters must be
without derogation of the right of a bargaining representative to be
consulted. We think it clear, in this proceeding, that the Respond-
ent's manipulation of the existing terms and conditions of employ-
ment, without affording the Union an opportunity to be consulted,
was also a deliberate rejection of its obligation to discuss these matters
with the representative of its employees, and that it necessarily had
the effect of impeding the progress of further negotiations. That the
Respondent may also have intended, through these unilateral changes,
to impose economic pressure on the Union in order to force conces-
sions, does not excuse its failure to accord the Union an opportunity
to consider and to bargain with respect thereto. We do not read the
Supreme Court's Prudential decision as sanctioning the commission
of unfair labor practices by either an employer or a union as a means
of extracting contract concessions during bargaining negotiations.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that Respondent violated
Section 8(a) (5) and that a proper remedy must include reimburse-
ment to the employees for the holiday pay they lost, as well as an
affirmative order to bargain with the Union on all matters affecting
the legitimate interests of the employees. However, no affirmative
2 Both the majority and the concurring opinions of the Court refer favorably to the
Crompton -Highlands opinion , with no indication that its scope was adversely affected by
the Insurance Agents decision.
THE CRESTLINE COMPANY 259
order is necessary with respect to reinstituting the insurance program
as Respondent had done so voluntarily before the hearing in this
case.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that The Crestline Company, Wausau,
Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain with Midwestern Millmen District Coun-
cil, affiliated Local Union 1594, as the representative of all production
and maintenance employees at its Wausau, Wisconsin, plant, by ef-
fectuating unilateral changes in wages and other terms and conditions
of employment.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in their exercise of the right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the
extent that such right maybe affected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named labor
organization as the exclusive representative of its production and
maintenance employees with respect to wages, hours, and other condi-
tions of employment.
(b) Make whole the employees in the appropriate unit for their loss
of holiday pay on May 30 and July 4,1960.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, timecards,
social security payment records, personnel records and reports, and
all other records necessary to determine the amount of backpay due
employees under this Order.
(d) Post at its Wausau, Wisconsin, plant, copies of the notice at-
tached to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of
said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the
8 This notice shall be amended by substituting the words "Pursuant to a Decision and
Order" for the words "Pursuant to the Recommendations of a Trial Examiner " In the
event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there
shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Eighteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by a representative
of the Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous' places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
DiEazsER RoDxEns took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges having been filed and duly served , a complaint , amended complaint, and
notice of hearing thereon having been issued and served by the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board , and answers having been filed by the above-
named Respondent , a hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in viola-
tion of Section 8 ( a)(1) and ( 5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
was held in Wausau , Wisconsin , on September 12, 1960 , before the duly designated
Trial Examiner.
At the hearing all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to
present evidence pertinent to the issues , to argue orally, and to file briefs . Argument
was waived . Briefs have been received from General Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon the record thus made, and from his observation of the witnesses , the Trial
Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Crestline Company is a Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of
business in Wausau , Wisconsin , where it is engaged in the manufacture , sale, and
distribution of millwork, particularly wood window units and related products.
During the year preceding issuance of the complaint the Respondent shipped such
products valued at more than $4,000 ,000 from its Wausau plant to States of the
United States other than the State of Wisconsin.
The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Midwestern Milimen District Council , affiliated Local Union 1594 , is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Setting and issues
Conduct of the Respondent claimed by General Counsel to have constituted bad-
faith bargaining occurred during the course of contract negotiations which began in
March 1960 , and were still being held in mid-September at the time of the hearing.
The two specific acts cited by General Counsel are: (1 ) Notifying all employees in
May that the employer was ceasing and in fact temporarily ceasing to contribute to
insurance costs as had been its practice , without consulting with the Union; and (2)
refusing to pay employees accustomed holiday pay for May 30 and July 4, 1960,
without consulting with the Union.
General Counsel contends that both acts were performed unilaterally , without
notice during bargaining negotiations , and effectively altered existing wage rates at
a time when such rates were under discussion.
B. Relevant facts
In the first place, no issue ' is involved here concerning the Respondent 's obligation
under the law to recognize and deal with the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent
THE CRESTLINE COMPANY 261
of employees in an appropriate unit. These essential points are conceded by the
Respondent in its answer.
Current negotiations followed appropriate notification by the parties that each de-
sired to make various changes in a contract due to expire April 30, 1960, which with
amendlments had been inexistence since 1958.
Insurance plan issue: Four negotiating meetings were held before May 13, the
date when the Respondent notified all employees by means of a letter accompanying
each paycheck that it was "discontinuing" its "policy of paying the Company's por-
tion of the insurance premiums." Because General Counsel makes no claim the
Respondent declined to confer when requested or to negotiate when conferring it
seems needless to review in detail all subjects discussed or to note all points of agree-
ment or disagreement at each these four meetings.
Relevant to the Respondent's action of May 13, however, are the following
factors:
(1) The contract expiring on April 30 contained the following provision in
article IV:
The Company shall continue to pay sixty (60) percent of the premiums of the
group insurance plan consisting of lost time off the job, hospital and surgical
insurance.
(2) In its letter to the Union of February 29, requesting that certain provisions of
the then existing agreement be "revised, deleted or clarified," the Respondent cited
specific articles and sections it desired to change, but with no reference to article IV.
(3) On April 21 the Respondent submitted to the Union a proposed new contract.
Its article IV contains precisely the same language as quoted above.
(4) On May 10 the Respondent sent to the Union a document which on its face
"proposes the following changes to the 1958-1960" agreement. It contains no refer-
ence to article IV, or to the insurance plan in any other fashion.
(5) At no negotiating meeting before May 13 did any representative of the Re-
spondent consult with the union bargaining committee concerning the substance of
the letter given to employees that day, nor did the Respondent in any other manner
notify the Union of its intent or reason for an action directly contrary to its own con-
tinuing proposal of May 10, 3 days earlier.
(6) In its letter of May 13, addressed to employees and not the Union, the Re-
spondent stated, in part:
The operation of our Company without a contract has had an adverse effect
on our order intake and has also made it impossible for us to bring in raw
materials with the assurance that they could be unloaded upon arrival.
These factors are greatly increasing our costs and as a result of this, it is
necessary for us to affect some compensating cost savings. We are discontinu-
ing our policy of paying the Company's portion of the insurance premiums.
(7) At a negotiating meeting on May 18 , after employees had received their pay-
checks and the letter, the Union vigorously protested the Respondent's unilateral
action, and threatened the filing of unfair labor practice charges.
(8) Despite the Union's protest of May 18, on May 20-2 days later-the Re-
spondent notified all employees by a letter again accompanying each paycheck that
the insurance plan was being cancelled so far as the employees in the bargaining
unit were concerned. The letter said , in part:
1. We are advising Blue Cross to change the contract to show that only
salaried employees are eligible, effective June 1st.
2. We are advising Hardware Mutual to terminate our accident and sickness
plan with them as of June 1st.
(9) On May 31 the Union filed its original charge against the Respondent.
(10) On June 24 the Respondent informed the employees by letter that it was
reinstating both insurance plans-Blue Cross and Hardware Mutual. The letter
stated, in part:
It has come to our attention that some of you have interpreted this action (of
discontinuing the insurance plan) on our part as an attempt to coerce your
Union into signing a new contract with the Company. We had no such intent
and took this action only in an attempt to effect some compensating cost sav-
ings for the increased operating expenses we were incurring because of existing
conditions.
Your Union has accused us of failing to bargain in good faith . In an effort
to demonstrate the fact that this is not so and in deference to our employees
whom we do not want to deprive of the benefits of insurance , we are going
to reinstate both plans.
262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Holiday pay issue: The following factors bear upon this question:
(1) Since 1958 and in accordance with contract provisions the employees had
received "a full day's holiday pay" for certain holidays, including Memorial Day
and July Fourth.
(2) In their first proposals after negotiations began in 1960 neither party sug-
gested or sought the eliminations of either of these 2 days as paid holidays.
(3) In its later proposal of May 10 the Respondent made no suggestion that
either of the 2 days be eliminated.
(4) At no negotiating meeting before Memorial Day, May 30, did any manage-
ment official either propose or inform the union bargaining committee of its intent
to abandon its practice of paying for that day.'
(5) Each employee's paycheck following Memorial Day bore the following
notation: "This check would have been approximately $ more if our last
proposal to the bargaining committee had been accepted." The amounts inserted
varied.
(6) On June 30, at a meeting of union and company officials in the Respondent's
office, and in the presence of a Board agent, Reardon informed the union officials
that "the Company did not propose to pay holiday pay for July 4.1 12
(7) This advance announcement was not made at a negotiating meeting.
(8) The Respondent carried out its threat, and did not pay holiday pay for July 4.
C. Conclusions
The Respondent apparently does not seriously contest the fact, here found, that
both by withholding its contribution to the insurance plan and by not paying holiday
pay it effectively altered the existing wages received by employees.
The essence of the Respondent's contention, urged in its brief, appears to be that
because the "company bargained in good faith at the bargaining table," its actions
in issue cannot be found to be bargaining in bad faith-"per se." Competent evi-
dence fails to support the premise, and it is unnecessary here to reach the "per se"
issue.
As noted in the section above, the employer not only failed either to propose or
announce its action in both issues to the bargaining committee, thus permitting
possible counterproposals and negotiation, but it also took action which was pre-
cisely opposite to that which the Respondent itself had proposed and urged up to
the moment of acting. It requires blind reasoning, indeed, to reach the conclusion
that this type of somersault bargaining is in "good faith." And the Trial Examiner
declines here to undertake this exercise, as he did "mental pole-vaulting"-with
full approval of the Supreme Court-in N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International
Union, etc., 361 U.S. 477, a case which the Respondent cites on its own behalf. And
in any event, the Trial Examiner believes that Cascade Employers Association, Inc.,
126 NLRB 1014, is governing in the determination of the issues here presented.
Furthermore, in Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, the Supreme Court
concluded that a unilateral change contrary to an employer's bargaining position
undermines the collective-bargaining relationship.
In summary, and in conformity with the above-cited authorities, the Trial Ex-
aminer concludes and finds that the Respondent's unilateral action in withdrawing
its insurance contributions and in depriving the employees of their holiday pay on
May 30 and July 4, both actions being unilateral and affecting the wages of em-
ployees, and under the circumstances herein described, constituted bad-faith bar-
gaining, tended to undermine the collective-bargaining relationship, and in effect was
refusing to bargain in good faith as required by the Act.3
'As the one witness for the Respondent, Production Manager Gallagher said that "at
or near" the end of the May 26 meeting President Reardon "told the Union committee
we would not pay for Memorial Day holiday pay," and that Union Representative Zimick
"stated they expected that" The Trial Examiner cannot accept Gallagher's unsupported
testimony on this point. There is no showing in the record as to why Reardon himself
was not called. Zimick, on the other hand, flatly denied Gallagher's claim, and his
denial is supported by the testimony of Elsmore Wilde, head of the District Council
Furthermore, the circumstances set out in (5), above, militate against belief that
Reardon made any announcement on May 26.
O The quotations are from a stipulation entered into at the hearing
s The Trial Examiner notes that Respondent's arguments in his brief come from oppo-
site ends of the avenue He states that the Insurance Agents case permits such "harass-
ing tactics" as "economic sanctions " The facts in that case do not in any way coincide
with the facts here. There the union's action in withholding work was announced in
THE CRESTLINE COMPANY 263
It is further concluded and found, as the answer admits, that the Charging Union
at all material times has been and is the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of all the Respondent's employees in the following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees at its Wausau, Wisconsin, plant
exclusive of office clerical employees, watchmen, watchmen-firemen, engineering
personnel, professional employees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
Finally, it is concluded and found that by thus refusing to bargain in good faith
the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices the Trial
Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
In accordance with Board policy set out in Cascade Employers Association, Inc.,
above cited, the Trial Examiner will not only recommend that the Respondent cease
and desist from refusing to bargain by making unilateral changes in the wage struc-
ture, but also that it make all employees affected whole for loss of their holiday pay
for May 30 and July 4, 1960.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Midwestern Millmen District Council, affiliated Local Union 1594, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent at its Wausau,
Wisconsin, plant, exclusive of office clerical employees, watchmen, watchmen-
firemen, engineering personnel, professional employees, and all supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. At all times since March 1, 1960, the above-named labor organization has
been and now is the exclusive representative of all employees in the above-described
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
4. By the conduct described herein, effectively altering the wage structure, the
Respondent has refused and is refusing to bargain within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act, and has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in
the exercise of their lawful rights within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
advance, the employer was informed as to what the proposed action was designed to gain,
and In no way violated its own consistent, demands and proposals.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Midwestern Millmen District
Council, Affiliated Local Union 1594, as the exclusive representative of all
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit described below, with respect to
labor disputes, grievances, rates of pay, hours of employment, and if any
264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees exclusive of office clerical
employees, watchmen, watchmen-firemen, engineering personnel, pro-
fessional employees, and all supervisors as defined by the Act.
WE WILL NOT effectuate unilateral changes in working conditions or in any
other manner refuse to bargain collectively with the above-named labor
organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or
all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL make whole all employees in the appropriate unit for any loss of
pay they may have suffered by reason of our withholding their holiday pay for
May 30 and July 4, 1960.
THE CRESTLINE COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Daniel Construction Company, Inc. and United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, Peti-
tioner. Case No. 11-RC-1453. September 21, 1961
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Jerry B. Stone, hearing offi-
cer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer I is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. The Employer contends that no election should be held because :
(1) its employees are scattered throughout the entire southeastern
United States, their work is highly seasonal in nature, and they are
hired on a temporary basis at the jobsite; and (2) the unit sought by
the Petitioner is inappropriate.
Daniel Construction Company, Inc., is engaged in the construction
of industrial and commercial plants in the southeastern United States.
i Reference to "Employer " means the Greenville division of Daniel Construction Company.
133 NLRB No. 46.