Tennessee Chair Co., Inc

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 30, 1960

126 N.L.R.B. 1357 (N.L.R.B. 1960)

TENNESSEE CHAIR COMPANY, INC. 1357
pose of the audit is to ascertain the degree of efficiency in administra-
tion of the wage incentive programs by local supervision. After an
audit is completed at a particular location, a "closing conference" is
held where the auditor discusses and recommends improvements in the
administration of the wage incentive program. He may also make
suggestions concerning the resolution of a grievance involving wage
incentives. In addition to these duties, the employees in question also
participate in annual engineering surveys, which is a confidential
exchange of information between many major companies concerning
salaries and classification of engineering employees. The function
of the industrial engineers is limited to summarizing returns from
other companies in graph or chart form for use by the Company.
Also, the industrial engineers may be asked for their views concern-
ing a wage incentive clause proposed for inclusion in a collective-
bargaining agreement. None of these industrial engineers is employed
in the labor relations division of the Company through which is chan-
neled the information obtained from these engineers for use by highly
placed executives of the Company, including a vice president who
formulates and effectuates management policies in the field of labor
relations.
We find that the above industrial engineers are neither confidential
nor managerial employees as the Board defines these terms.15 As
already indicated, they are included in the unit.
Accordingly, on the basis of the entire record, we find that the fol-
lowing employees of the Employer constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act: All professional engineering employees employed by
the Employer, including these in the 10 basic horizontal classifica-
tions, but excluding engineering associates, wage practices specialists,
section chief, instructors, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
15 Chapman Valve Manufacturing Co., 119 NLRB 935; The B. F . Goodrich Co., 115
NLRB 722
Tennessee Chair Company, Inc. and United Textile Workers
of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 10-CA-4128. March 30, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 27, 1959, Trial Examiner Louis Libbin issued his In-
termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, ahd recommending that the Respondent cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
126 NLRB No. 160.
1358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the
Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Members Rodgers, Jenkins, and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the modifications noted
below.'
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated
Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to furnish its financial
statement upon request by the Union. Like the Trial Examiner, we
interpret the Respondent's position that it had not made any profits
in 1958 to justify any wage increase as constituting a plea of "in-
ability to pay" a wage increase, within the meaning of N.L.R.B. v.
Truitt Mfg. C0.2
2. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent
violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to meet with
the Union except during specified hours on weekdays if other business
did not interfere.
After the Union was certified by the Board on April 1, 1959, three
meetings were held between representatives of the Respondent and
Union. The dates of these meetings were April 24 and May 13 and
22, 1959. The first meeting lasted from 3:30 until about 4:15 p.m.,
and William Howell, the union vice president, testified that the Re-
spondent's president, C. Lee Richardson, stated at that meeting that
he would meet only between the hours of 3:30 and 5 p.m. At the
second meeting, which lasted from 3:30 to 5 p.m., Everett Dean, the
Union's regional director, told Richardson that 11/2 hours a week
was not enough time to bargain, but Richardson said he could meet
only from 3 :30 to 5 p.m. on weekdays when his other business did not
interfere. The final meeting adjourned without any arrangements
having been made for further meetings.
There is no contention that Respondent ever refused any request
to meet with the Union. Since May 22, 1959, the Respondent has
'We hereby correct the following inadvertent errors in the Intermediate Report, none
of which affects the Trial Examiner's conclusions or our concurrence therein (1) The
complaint alleges that the Union was certified by the Board as the representative of the
Respondent ' s employees on April 1 , 1959 , and not , as the Trial Examiner states, on
April 19, 1959. (2 ) The Trial Examiner stated that the Respondent ' s president and
general manager , C Lee Richardson, V.as "a practicing attorney " The record indicates
that Richardson , although a member of the bar, has not practiced law since he entered
the furniture business
2 351 U S 149 , see also Tennessee Coal f Iron Division , et al , 122 N LRB 1519
TENNESSEE CHAIR COMPANY, INC. 1359
never been asked for another meeting, and Richardson testified that
he ". . . would be glad to meet with them at any time . . . when I
have the time." This is not a case where the Respondent refused a
request to meet with the bargaining representative on the ground it
was busy with other matters ,' or a case where the bargaining meet-
ings were limited to unreasonably short periods at considerable in-
tervals of time. ' Although the matter of arriving at an agreement
with the certified employee representative is at least of equal im-
portance with Richardson 's other business affairs, we do not believe,
on the facts of this case , that the Respondent 's refusal to meet except
during specified hours on weekdays violated Section 8(a) (5) and
(1) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Tennessee Chair
Company, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Textile Work-
ers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all the
Respondent's production and maintenance employees at its Eliza-
bethton, Tennessee, plant, by failing, upon request, to furnish said
Union with such record information and other probative material as
will substantiate the Respondent's claim of its inability to pay any
wage increase and will enable said Union to discharge its functions
as the statutory representative of the Respondent's employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with the efforts of
said Union to bargain collectively on behalf of the Respondent's
employees.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
. (a) Upon request, furnish said Union with such record informa-
tion and other probative material as will substantiate the Respond-
ent's claim of its inability to pay any wage increase and will enable
said Union to discharge its functions as the statutory representative
of the Respondent's employees.
(b) Post at its plant in Elizabethton, Tennessee, copies of the
notice attached hereto marked "Appendix A." 5 Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the Respondent, be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for
8 Cummer-Graham Company, 122 NLRB 1044
4C,apnon Plating and Manufacturing Company, 97 NLRB 104
5111 the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Conit of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words `Pursuant to a Decision and Order' the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order"
1360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respond-
ent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with United Textile
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative
of all our employees in the appropriate unit described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with the
efforts of the above-named Union to bargain collectively on be-
half of the employees in the unit described below.
WE WILL, upon request, furnish the above-named Union with
such record information and other probative material as will
substantiate our claim of inability to pay any wage increase.
The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees at our Eliza-
bethton, Tennessee, plant, excluding all office clerical em-
ployees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
TENNESSEE CHAIR COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed by United Textile Workers of America , AFL-CIO, herein called
the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the
Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia ), issued his complaint,
dated July 14, 1959 , against Tennessee Chair Company, Inc.,' herein called the
Respondent . With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleges, in
substance , that: (1) The Union was certified by the Board on April 19, 1959, as
the exclusive representative of all the employees in a specified appropriate unit;
(2) on or about April 24, 1959 , the Union requested the Respondent to bargain col-
1 As amended at the hearing, without objection.
TENNESSEE CHAIR COMPANY, INC. 1361
lectively with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions ; ( 3) on or about
May 13 and 22, 1959, and at all times subsequent thereto, the Union requested the
Respondent to make available necessary information and records to support its con-
tention that the Union 's requested wage increase could not be granted because the
Respondent was financially unable to grant a wage increase ; ( 4) Respondent has
refused to make available to the Union the requested information and records and
has refused to bargain with the Union at all times on and after April 24, 1959; and
(5) by the foregoing conduct Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 ( a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act.
In its duly filed answer , Respondent admits the jurisdictional allegations , the status
of the Union as a labor organization , that the Union was certified by the Board as
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in an appropriate unit, and
that Respondent refused to furnish to the Union , upon the latter 's request , Respond-
ent's financial statement . The answer affirmatively avers that the requested financial
statement was refused because the Respondent did not believe that "good business
practice" would justify the granting of a wage increase and on the further ground
that it did not feel that any person with no financial interest in Respondent was
"entitled to this information, under our democratic system of operation." The
answer further denies the unfair labor practice allegations
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held on September 24, 1959 , at Elizabethton,
Tennessee . All parties were represented at the hearing and were afforded full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses , to introduce relevant
evidence , to present oral argument at the close of the heaiing , and thereafter to file
briefs as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent's
motion to dismiss the complaint , made before the close of the hearing and upon
which I reserved ruling , is disposed of in accordance with the findings and con-
clusions made below. After the close of the hearing , the General Counsel filed a
brief , which I have fully considered.2
Upon the entire record 3 in the case , and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following-
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent , a Tennessee corporation , is engaged at its place of business in
Elizabethton , Tennessee , in the manufacture and sale of furniture . During the past
calendar year , which is representative of all times material herein , Respondent sold
and shipped finished products , valued in excess of $200,000 , directly to customers
located outside the State of Tennessee.
Upon the above admitted facts, I find, as Respondent 's answer admits, that
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that United Textile Workers
of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The sole issue in this case is whether Respondent refused to bargain in good
faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act.
A. The appropriate unit; union's status as exclusive bargaining representative
The complaint alleges, the answer admits , and I find that: ( 1) All production
and maintenance employees at the Respondent 's Elizabethton , Tennessee , plant,
2 Before the close of the hearing , the Trial Examiner set October 15, 1959 , as the due
date for the receipt of briefs in Washington , D C, from all parties . At that time counsel
for Respondent stated on the record that he was waiving the filing of a brief. The
General Counsel ' s biief was timely received in Washington , D C , on Octobei 14, 1959.
Respondent ' s counsel had filed no request for an extension of time within which to file a
brief , as required by the Board 's Rules and Regulations . On October 16, 1959 , after the
due date for the filing of briefs had expired , I received from counsel for Respondent a
letter , in which he requests peimission to file a brief in reply to the General Counsel's
brief No proof of service of this request upon the other parties has been submitted.
The Board 's Rules and Regulations make no provisions for the filing of a reply brief.
Under all the circumstances, I hereby deny Respondent 's request
3 I hereby note and correct the following obvious error in the typewritten transcript of
the testimony p 39, line 16 , " 1938" is corrected to read "1959
554461-60-vol 126-87
1362 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act; and (2) on
April 1, 1959, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of all the employees in said unit. I find that at all times material herein the
Union has been, and is, the exclusive representative of the employees in said
appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
B. The negotiations
Representatives of the Union and Respondent met on April 24 and May 13 and
22, 1959, at the office in Respondent's plant between 3:30 and 5 p in. The Re-
spondent was represented by C. Lee Richardson, who is president and general
manager of Respondent and also a practicing attorney, Superintendent Charles Taylor
and Assistant to the Superintendent Monroe Winters. The Union was represented
by Vice President William Howell, Vice President and Regional Director Everett
Dean (not present at the first meeting), and a committee of six employees. Howell
and Dean acted as spokesmen and negotiators for the Union; Richardson was the
spokesman and negotiator for Respondent. Fred Beck of the United States Con-
ciliation Service was also present at the last two meetings.
Unless otherwise indicated, the findings as to what transpired at these meetings
with respect to the wage issue and arrangements for further meetings are based on
undisputed credible testimony and the admission of President Richardson.
1. Meeting of April 24
The Union presented a proposed contract, consisting of about 21 pages. Richard-
son stated that it would take about a week to read and digest it, and inquired if
the Union was asking for a wage increase. Howell stated that the contract proposed
a wage increase of 20 cents per hour. Richardson stated that he would refuse to
agree to any wage increase; that he had hoped to put in effect a 5-cent an hour
wage increase on January 1, 1959,4 but that Respondent did not make any profits
in 1958 to warrant or justify a wage increase; that he had gone to High Point, North
Carolina, where the furniture market is located, and had raised the price on his
products by 5 percent in the hope that the increased price would enable him to
put the wage increase into effect as soon as possible but that he had not yet gotten
any results from the increased prices; and that if he did not get any results before
June 30, 1959, he would have to cut out some of the current employee benefits,
such as paid holidays, because "our company couldn't continue benefits when they
didn't show a profit to justify" them. Richardson further explained that Respondent
had had to discontinue its employee profit-sharing bonus at the end of 1958 because
"we did not have any profits"; that since that time the Respondent has had to dis-
continue its employee free loan plan; and that, unless Respondent showed better
earnings by the end of June 1959, than it had in June 1958, Respondent would have
to cut out other employee benefits. Richardson also stated that the Company was
in good financial position and had not lost any money yet but that "to grant any
wage increase would throw the company into the red"; that he did not think that
would be economically sound business; and that he therefore would have to refuse
any wage increase.
During the course of the meeting, Howell stated that he would like to see Re-
spondent's financial statement. Richardson refused, stating that he did not know
of any law that required him to produce Respondent's financial statement to an
"outsider" without a "dime's interest in our business."
Before the meeting adjourned, Howell asked that the next meeting should not
be limited to the period from 3:30 to 5 p.m., and that the Union was even willing to
meet Saturdays and Sundays in an effort to arrive at an agreement. Richardson
replied that the only time he could "possibly meet" was from 3:30 to 5 p.m., and
would not agree to any meetings on Saturdays or Sunday.
2. Meeting of May 13
United States Conciliator Beck opened the meeting with the statement that it was
his function to trv to get the parties to reach agreement. In refusing to agree to any
wage increase, Richardson stated that the Union's wage demands were more than
the Company had ever made in any 1 year. Dean replied that the Union was not
4 Howell testified that Richardson stated he planned to put such an increase into effect
on January 1, 1960 I find that Howell was mistaken as to the date mentioned by
Richardson in this connection
TENNESSEE CHAIR COMPANY , INC. 1363
necessarily wedded to its proposal of a 20-cent an hour increase and was willing to
bargain on it. Richardson stated that he had already given his position for not
granting any wage increase . He had explained that he had been to High Point,
North Carolina , and had increased the price on his product by 5 percent and hoped
that that would produce enough to enable him to do something for the employees
in the future . He stated that he was going to do as well as he could by his employees
until June 30 but that if business did not improve by that time he would then have
to cut back some of the current employee benefits . Dean asked Richardson for
Respondent 's financial statement to back up his claim that he was in no position to
give any wage increase . Richardson told Beck that he had never made the statement
that the Company could not financially pay a wage increase . He added that the
Company had never shown a loss in 23 years of operation ; that they managed to
make a little each year until 1958 when "we barely broke even "; that they could
pay a wage increase for perhaps another year without going into bankruptcy but
that such an increase would have to be paid out of surplus and not out of profits;
that that would not be good business management ; and that therefore he refused
to agree to any wage increase unless the Union could show him how to make enough
profits to pay it. Dean testified that he asked for the financial statement because of
Richardson 's claim that Respondent 's profits had not been sufficient to warrant any
wage increase . Richardson 's position was that he did not feel that "people out
on the street had any right to come in and get my statement " and that he therefore
would not produce it unless required to do so by law.
Before the meeting adjourned at 5 p.m., arrangements for another meeting were
discussed . Richardson thought he would be able to meet the following Friday at
the same time , 3:30 to 5 p.m. Dean complained that he felt that an hour and a
half 1 day a week was insufficient time to devote to arriving at an agreement, and
that at that rate "we would be there forever ." Richardson replied that he could
only meet from 3:30 to 5 p.m on days when his other business did not interfere.
Dean stated that he realized Richardson had a business to run and did not wish
to interfere with his business operations but suggested that the bargaining session
should run further into the evening or that they meet on Saturday or Sunday or
any other time that would suit Richardson 's convenience . Richardson would not
agree to meet on Saturday or Sunday , taking the position that he would be available
to meet only from 3:30 to 5 p.m. on those days when his other business did not
interfere.
3. Meeting of May 22
At this meeting, Dean again asked Richardson if he would give the Union the
Company's financial statement to support his position that he was not able to give
any sort of wage increase at that , time. Richardson again refused , stating that he did
not feel that "outsiders" had any business looking at his financial statement. Dean
thereupon reminded Richardson that "we were not outsiders , that we represented
the people who worked for him and it was information that was vital as far
as contract negotiations were concerned ." Richardson stated that he would not
produce it unless the law required him to do so . Dean testified that when he asked
for the Company 's financial statement at the last two meetings , he wanted "informa-
tion concerning profits, sales , and things like that to indicate whether or not the
company was able to pay a wage increase."
The meeting adjourned without any arrangements having been made for further
meetings; and no further meetings have been held.
C. Conclusions with respect to Respondent's refusal to bargain
The General Counsel contends that Respondent failed to bargain in good faith
within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by ( 1) refusing to furnish its
financial statement , upon the Union 's request , and (2 ) refusing to meet with the
Union except during the hours between 3 : 30 and 5 p.m . on days other than Satur-
day or Sunday, and then only if other work did not interfere . Respondent contends
that it never took the position it was financially unable to grant a wage increase
and that any person with no financial interest in Respondent is not entitled to the
requested information.
It does not follow that a claim of inability to pay a wage increase arises only when
the resultant wage increase would force the Company into bankruptcy. Here,
President Richardson told the union representatives that Respondent did not make
any profits in 1958 to justify any wage increase , that at the end of the year it had to
discontinue its employee profit-sharing bonus because it had no profits , that it had
increased the price of its products in the hope of earning sufficient profits to warrant
a wage increase , that since that time it had to discontinue its employee free loan plan,
554461-60-vol. 126-88
1364 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that if its earnings did not improve by June 30, 1959, it would have to cut out addi-
tional current employee benefits, such as paid holidays, and that to grant any wage
increase at that time would throw the Company "in the red" and would be economi-
cally unsound. A plea of "inability to pay" a wage increase, within the meaning
of N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co. (351 U.S. 149), could hardly be made in plainer
language . I so interpret Respondent's position.5
Respondent's further contention that anyone who has no financial interest in its
business is not entitled to the requested data, is foreclosed by the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the Truitt case, supra . Good-faith bargaining
required the Respondent, upon request, to furnish to the union representatives such
record information and other probative material to substantiate its claim of inability
to pay any wage increase.6 Accordingly, I find that Respondent's refusal to furnish
such information violated its statutory obligation to bargain with the Union within
the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
Respondent further indicated its lack of good-faith bargaining by refusing to
meet with the Union except during the hours of 3:30 to 5 p.m. (but not on Saturday
or Sunday), and then only if other business did not interfere. The statutory obliga-
tion to meet and negotiate with the Union is just as important and entitled to as
serious attention as other business obligations. While Respondent is not required to
ignore all other business obligations for the purpose of meeting and negotiating with
the Union, it is required to make a reasonable effort to accommodate its other
interests and to allot adequate time for such negotiations. This the Respondent
failed to do. The Union's proposed contract consisted of about 21 pages. The
union representatives protested that by limiting the meetings to the 1i/2 hours
between 3:30 and 5 p.m. on days when Richardson's other business did not interfere,
they would be there forever, and therefore expressed a willingness to meet evenings,
or Saturdays or Sundays, at Richardson's convenience. Richardson, however,
adamantly refused to meet at any other time. I find that Respondent' s conduct in
this respect did not satisfy the good-faith bargaining requirements of Section 8(a) (5)
of the Act.
I find that by refusing to furnish to the Union, upon its request, any record
information or data or other probative material to substantiate its claim of inability
to pay any wage increase and by refusing to meet with the Union except during the
hours from 3:30 to 5 p.m., excluding Saturday and Sunday, and then only if other
business interests did not interfere, Respondent has failed to bargain with the Union
in violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. I further find that by such conduct
the Respondent has also interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section
8(a)(1).1
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In particular,
I will recommend that, upon request by the Union, negotiations between it and the
Respondent be renewed and the Respondent furnish to the Union such record
information and other probative material as will substantiate the Respondent's claim
of its inability to pay any wage increase and will enable the Union to discharge its
function as the statutory representative of the employees in the unit found appro-
priate herein.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
s Tennessee Coal & Iron Division , et al., 122 NLRB 1519; B. L. Montague Company,
116 NLRB 554.
6 N L R B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U S. 149, 152-154; Tennessee Coal & Iron Division,
et al and B. L Montague Company, supra.
7 Tennessee Coach Company, 115 NLRB 677, 678,679.
TRAMMELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INCORPORATED 1365
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent 's Elizabethton,
Tennessee , plant , excluding all office clerical employees , professional employees,
watchmen, guards , and supervisors as defined in the Act , constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
3. At all times since April 1, 1959, the Union has been, and is, the exclusive
representative of all employees in said appropriate unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 ( a) of the Act.
4. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of its employees in said appropriate unit , the Respondent has engaged and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
5. By said conduct the Respondent has interfered with, restrained , and coerced its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Trammell Construction Company, Incorporated I and East
Tennessee Building & Construction Trades Council, AFL-
CIO, Petitioner. Case No. 10-RC-45921. March 30, 1960
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before David L. Trezise, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Rodgers and
Fanning].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. The Employer contends that no election should be held on the
grounds that (1) it does not have a stable work force and (2) its
current operations are coming to an end.
Since 1951, the Employer has been engaged in various commercial
construction projects in eastern Tennessee and southwestern Virginia,
encompassed in the counties enumerated by the Petitioner in its re-
quested unit. It has about five regular employees who act as a nucleus
for the formation of construction crews at new projects. Although
the Employer at the time of the hearing was engaged solely in three
' The name of the Employer appears as corrected at the hearing.
126 NLRB No. 163.