Teamsters Local 328 (Blount Bros)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 20, 1985

274 N.L.R.B. 1053 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 328 (BLOUNT BROS)
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local
Union No. 328 (Blount Brothers Corporation)
and Kenneth W. Quinnell , Sr. Case 30-CB-
2126
20 March 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 3 August 1984 Administrative Law Judge
Thomas R. Wilks issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel filed a letter-brief in op-
position to the Respondent's exceptions.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order. 2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, Local Union No.
328, Escanaba, Michigan, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall take the action set forth in the
Order.
i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
In sec II1,A of his decision, the judge stated that the Respondent rep-
resents from 2050 to 3000 members, 1-2 percent of whom are in the con-
struction industry, and incorrectly concluded that the Respondent repre-
sents 200-400 construction workers It is clear that the correct calcula-
tion is 20-60 construction workers This inadvertent error is insufficient
to affect the judge's findings, with which we agree, that the referral
system was operated in a subjective and discriminatory manner
2 We adopt the judge's conclusions that employee Quinnell's lack of a
required class endorsement on his driver's license played no part in the
Respondent's refusal to refer him and that it would have played no part
in his failure to obtain a job at the Blount construction site However, in
adopting the judge's recommended remedy and Order, we emphasize that
nothing therein should be construed as precluding the Respondent in the
future from requiring on a nondiscriminatory basis that applicants have
proper licenses and class endorsements for the positions to which they
seek referral
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS R WILKS, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me at Marquette, Michigan, on
March 29 and 30, 1984, pursuant to a charge filed on
1053
September 6, 1983, by Kenneth W Quinnell Sr against
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union
No. 328 (the Respondent), and a complaint which was
issued by the Regional Director for Region 30 on Octo-
ber 31, 1983 The complaint alleges, inter alia , that the
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act by refus-
ing to honor out-of-work employees' requests for infor-
mation concerning an exclusive referral system allegedly
operated by the Respondent and by refusing to refer the
Charging Party to employment at a construction site be-
cause of the application of that system which discrimina-
torily referred employees for employment based on the
length of the employees' membership in the Respondent.
The Respondent, by its duly filed answer, denied the
existence of an exclusive hiring system and the allegation
of discrimination At the trial all parties were afforded a
full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
to adduce any competent, relevant, and material evi-
dence, to argue their positions orally, and to file posttrial
briefs. The General Counsel and the Respondent filed
written briefs about May 25, 1984. On June 11, 1984, the
Respondent submitted a letter of objection to the Gener-
al Counsel's requested remedial order as set forth in his
brief On the record as a whole, on my observation of
the testimonial demeanor of the witnesses, and on analy-
sis of the oral presentations and posttrial briefs, I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I JURISDICTION
At all times material herein, Blount Brothers Corpora-
tion (the Employer or Blount), a Delaware corporation
with an office and place of business in Montgomery, Ala-
bama, has been engaged in the construction business
During the fiscal year ending February 28, 1983, a repre-
sentative period, Blount, in the course and conduct of its
business described above, performed services valued in
excess of $50,000 in States other than the State of Ala-
bama.
It is admitted, and I find, that Blount is now, and has
been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
II LABOR ORGANIZATION
It is admitted, and I find, that the Respondent is now,
and has been at all times material herein, a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A Background
The Respondent represents from about 2050 members
currently to about 3000 members during periods of high
employment throughout the upper peninsula of Michigan
and five adjacent Wisconsin counties in a variety of serv-
ices and industries of which approximately 1-2 percent
of its members constitute construction workers, i e , driv-
ers and warehousemen utilized at construction sites.
274 NLRB No. 160
1054 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Thus, it appears that the Respondent currently represents
from 200 to 400 construction drivers and warehousemen,
but has in the past represented as many as 300 to 600
such workers. Unemployed members usually apply for a
membership withdrawal status. The Respondent is aware
and does not object that some of its unemployed mem-
bers have applied for work at nonunion construction
sites. Thus, the evidence reveals that at the times materi-
al herein apparently there was a pool of actively em-
ployed construction driver-warehousemen members of
about 200-400 in number and at least about 100-200 un-
employed construction drivers and warehousemen and
an unknown number of nonmember construction drivers
and warehousemen employed and unemployed in the
Union's jurisdiction.
According to the Respondent's business agent, George
Dunlap, there were so many unemployed members look-
ing for work that he could not even count them. Ac-
cording to Dunlap, the area within the Union's jurisdic-
tion was economically depressed. Thus, it is reasonable
to infer that a substantial number of nonmember con-
struction drivers and helpers were also unemployed and
looking for work in the same area.
• Normally, the Respondent utilized the services of four
business agents, but on Business Agent Dale Gibson's
termination in December 1982 the Respondent was serv-
iced thereafter by only three agents, including George
Dunlap, who assumed Gibson's duty of managing the
Respondent's construction work referral activities. How-
ever, from March 16, 1983, to the present, according to
Dunlap, only one employer, Blount, has resorted to the
Respondent for job applicant referrals. Thus apparently
the high rate of unemployment was not relieved by job
openings in 1983 other than at Blount, as we shall see.
The Respondent is party to a May 1982 effective
though 1984 agreement with the Michigan Chapter of
the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. re-
ferred to as (the AGC) and also is party to a February
1981 "project agreement" with Blount. That agreement
covered wages, hours, and employment conditions of
employees engaged in work to be performed at the con-
struction project of a paper pulp mill to be built for the
owner, Champion International, by Blount, the prime
contractor, at Quinnesec, Michigan. Blount is responsible
for the requisition of project workers, which, according
to the credible testimony of Blount's industrial relations
manager, Richard O'Banion, was done since 1981 by ex-
clusive reference to the appropriate labor organization
referral system.
The Quinnesec project agreement with the Respondent
provides in subsection H of "Management of project":
When a local Union does not furnish qualified em-
ployees within 48 hours (Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays excluded), the Employee shall be free to
obtain employees from any source.
The project agreement states under the section entitled
"Intent"
The terms and conditions and rates of pay of the
applicable local and national agreement shall apply
in whole or in part only when there is no conflict
with this agreement.
Article II of the AGC agreement provides
(b) When the Employer needs additional help, it
shall give the Union equal opportunity with all
other sources to provide suitable applicants, but the
Employer shall not be required to hire those re-
ferred by the Union.
Dunlap testified that the Respondent had not attempt-
ed "to enforce" an exclusive right to refer employees to
the Blount project at Quinnesec. However, he did not
contradict O'Banion's credible testimony that with one
exception in 1983, Blount utilized the Respondent as the
sole referral source for construction drivers and ware-
housemen at Quinnesec. The exception involved driver
Douglas Flakton, whom Blount was constrained to hire
as a condition precedent demanded by the Bacco Con-
struction Company in order that Blount could rent from
Bacco a water truck. Bacco had insisted that Flakton
"went with the truck," and dispatched him to Quinnesec
with the water truck Blount therefore hired Flakton to
obtain use of the needed vehicle. Thus, there appears to
be only one occurrence, the Flakton incident, that would
have provided the occasion for Dunlap to make an overt
effort to "enforce" an exclusive referral right. Dunlap
serviced the project agreement and was therefore aware
of the fact that the drivers and helpers actually hired,
with the exception of Flakton, were referred by the Re-
spondent. In his testimony he conceded that he was not
aware of any drivers employed by Blount at the project
except those whom he had referred No "grievance" was
filed as to the Flakton hiring. The record is silent as to
any other complaint or confrontation that may have oc-
curred over the Flakton hiring. On one occasion Blount
notified Dunlap and sought a referral for an emergency
temporary job vacancy situation which required immedi-
ate referral. Thus, Blount sought out Respondent's refer-
ral services on virtually an exclusive basis, even in an
emergency situation, despite the high level of unem-
ployed drivers and warehousemen within the Respond-
ent's jurisdiction.
In the past, Business Agent Gibson had been vested
with the responsibility to make job referrals for the Re-
spondent. Upon his termination Dunlap assumed these
duties. When he did so, he succeeded to a small "spiral
notebook" that contained the names and telephone num-
bers of job applicants, i e, unemployed drivers and ware-
housemen, members, and nonmembers. Those names
were not ranked in order of referral priority The com-
mencment of referrals to Quinnesec occurred in 1981 In
that year nine drivers and three warehousemen were
hired. In 1982, work slowed and the entire project closed
down and the employees were laid off Commencing in
mid-March 1983, the project work resumed, and pursu-
ant to contract agreement the laid-off drivers and ware-
housemen were recalled as needed in sequence according
to seniority One laid-off worker on maternity leave did
not return
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 328 (BLOUNT BROS)
Dunlap testified that the heavy influx of calls from job
applicants engulfed him and that he was, after April
1983, unable to maintain the recordation in the "spiral
notebook," but that names and telephone numbers of ap-
plicants were recorded in his notes and separate notes for
calls taken by secretaries in his absence. Neither the
AGC contract, nor the project agreement, nor Respond-
ent's internal rules and regulations set forth any proce-
dures or criteria for the operation of a hiring system No
written list is maintained about the priority of applicants
for job referral. Dunlap testified that he will refer and
has referred job applicants for construction project jobs
who are "qualified," i.e, they have license authorization
to drive vehicles above certain weights, and they are ex-
perienced in construction work and are currently unem-
ployed However, neither Dunlap nor any other of the
Respondent's agents provides any formal interviewing or
application process to the jobseeker. Both Dunlap and
O'Banion assume that the driver-applicant has satisfied
state driver license requirements. Neither Dunlap not
O'Banion interrogates applicants about license require-
ments. O'Banion relies on the Respondent's judgment as
to driver qualification According to Dunlap's testimony,
he applies the test of construction driving and warehouse
experience when referring competing applicants, i e , he
testified that the individual with the greater experience
will be referred. As to applicants of equal experience in
the construction industry, Dunlap testified that he will
consider other factors as to whether the "qualification" is
diminished, e.g., rumors as to drinking problems, second-
ary reports about whether the applicant was discharged,
and impressions he has gathered about whether an appli-
cant is doing any work that sufficiently removes him
from the status of "unemployed "
As to the criteria of length of service, the only yard-
stick applied in the screening process, which in fact is
Dunlap's own mental processes, is that of his own con-
clusions as to how long the applicant has been employed
in the industry, according to Dunlap's own testimony.
His conclusions are based, he testified, on his own obser-
vations of having been a driver involved with pipeline
construction from 1951 to 1953, and from information,
i.e , hearsay, gathered by him since 1959 as a business
agent from "meetings, general conversation, talking to
people . . calls from everyone, union, nonunion, from
out of the state . . . from talking to applicants." In his
testimony Dunlap gave no indication about which tech-
nique he uses on any specific occasion. His testimony
was generalized and cryptic.
Even if Dunlap is credited, clearly his conclusions are
premised on his personal impressions of the applicant's
experience, which necessarily handicaps job applicants
who have had construction industry experience in other
jurisdictions, nonmember job applicants who, by virtue
of nonmembership, have had less exposure to him, and
members and nonmembers who have been employed by
nonunion employers and therefore also have had less ex-
posure to the Respondent's business agents Furthermore,
it is conceded by Dunlap that another business agent
who might substitute for him has no access to the subjec-
tive priority ranking of applicants made by him and
which is maintained only in his thought processes
1055
There is some generalized, unfounded testimony by
Dunlap that he had referred to Blount at the project sev-
eral drivers who have had greater driving experience in
construction in preference to other applicants who have
had greater length of union membership. From May 3,
1983, Blount hired at Quinnesec 20 drivers and 5 ware-
housemen, all of whom, except for Flakton who was
hired on May 23, had been referred to Blount by Re-
spondent. The first driver referred to Blount in 1983 was
Dale Gibson, whom Dunlap sent prior to dispatching the
next applicant, who had a somewhat greater industry ex-
perience Dunlap admittedly utilized his discretion in
sending Gibson because Gibson had been a business
agent and might be of some assistance to the job stew-
ard. The project agreement, however, provides for only
one steward.
B. The Alleged Discriminatory Nonreferral of Quinnell
The Charging Party, Kenneth Quinnell, has been a
member of the Respondent for about 10 years, and cur-
rently is on "withdrawal" status, i.e., unemployed as a
driver since December 1981. He was laid off from his
last job, a construction site job which he had obtained
through the Respondent's job-referral system. In the
spring of 1981, Quinnell testified, he had contacted either
Gibson or Dunlap and attempted unsuccessfully to be re-
ferred to the Quinnesec job which, he had heard, would
last for several years In 1982, he called again and was
told that the job was shut down. In the spring of 1983,
Quinnell had heard that the Quinnesec project was re-
suming operations. He therefore telephoned the Re-
spondent's office. According to his testimony, he called
Dunlap or Gibson weekly that spring and was told that
there was no hiring at Quinnesec. Quinnell testified that
some time in May or June 1983 in several telephone con-
versations with Dunlap he was told each time that
Blount had hired some employees and that he asked
Dunlap where he stood on "the list as far as getting
called out." He told Dunlap that he had to rank some-
where among the applicants , and asked whether he was
not about due to be referred to Quinnesec. Quinnell testi-
fied that Dunlap refused and responded that he was
"going to send the oldest members out first." In the last
such conversation Quinnell asked for the address of the
International Union and for a copy of the collective-bar-
gaining contract.
After his last telephone conversation with Dunlap,
Quinnell corresponded with Vice President Robert
Holmes of the International Union by letter dated June
28, 1983, wherein he complained, inter alia, that Dunlap
told him that he "sends out the oldest members first"
whereas Quinnell felt that the job applicant who "has
been on the bench the longest [i.e., first to apply to the
referral system)" should be first referred out. By letter
dated August 5, 1983, Holmes responded to Quinnell by
cover letter forwarding Dunlap's August 2, 1983 re-
sponse letter addressed to Holmes, which had been pre-
pared by Dunlap pursuant to Holmes' directive In the
August 2 response, Dunlap states, inter alia, that only
one construction job was then in progress, that a total of
30 "members" were employed on the job, that an "[innu-
1056 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
merable] amount of members [are] on the bench," that
the Respondent is "going to continue to send the oldest
qualified union members to work first" that of 20 coun-
ties in the Respondent's jurisdiction "an [innumerable]
amount of out-of-work teamsters [are] on the bench,"
and that the Respondent has not "signed any new mem-
bers within the last [2] years on the [Quinnesec] project."
Quinnell was not referred to the Quinnesec project.
The Respondent argues in its brief that Quinnell was re-
jected for employment as a consequence of an individual
attempt to seek hire at Blount perhaps because of his
lack of ability. There is no evidence to support an infer-
ence that Quinnell made verbal, written, or otherwise
meaningful application with O'Banion or any responsible
agent or was rejected pursuant to an independent evalua-
tion based on merit. Quinnell testified that he "thinks" he
may have telephoned the jobsite in 1982 or 1983 and
talked to an unidentified person whom he asked whether
they were doing any hiring or whether they were inter-
ested in renting his backhoe or dump truck. He did not
testify as to what the precise response was to him by this
unidentified person, nor did he testify that he identified
himself in the conversation, but only testified that he was
not thereafter hired. O'Bamon's credible, uncontradicted
testimony negates any inference that Blount accepted
and reviewed job applicants independently of the
Union's hiring hall referral system Dunlap denied that
length of the job applicant's membership in the Respond-
ent of ,the job applicant was the basis for his determina-
tion to refer one applicant in prefernece to another His
testimony with respect to conversations with Quinnell is
generalized and confused At one point he testified that
he had only one conversation with Quinnell in 1983. At
another point he testified he had several He does not
clearly contradict Quinnell's testimony about these con-
versations, and I credit Quinnell.
With respect to Quinnell's request for his priority
ranking, Dunlap testified that he told Quinnell what he
has told other applicants who have asked the same ques-
tion, that he did not know where the applicants stood in
rank or job expectancy The only explanation he gave
for this response was that he did not expect to fill more
than 24 positions when the project started to resume.
Clearly, the rank of an applicant in relation to other ap-
plicants who were seeking referral can be determined by
objective comparative standards, if such exist If Quinnell
was the 25th ranking applicant or lower, Dunlap certain-
ly could have told him so
On direct examination, Dunlap attempted to explain
that his August 2, 1983 letter reference to "oldest quali-
fied union members" did not really mean what common
sense compels as its meaning, i e., qualified applicants
with more years of union membership would be given
priority Rather, he testified in a most disingenuous and
unconvincing demeanor that it meant that the applicant
with the greatest amount of time spent in actual con-
struction driving or warehouse duties would be given
priority i I find Dunlap's self-servicing testimony mcon-
' A standard which he admittedly deviated from when he referred an
exbusmess agent as the first referral after the laid-off employees were re-
called In such situation he used discretion
sistent with the clear meaning of the letter as revealed by
its context, i e, references to innumerable "out-of-work
teamsters ," "innumerable members on the bench," and
the closing words of that letter "[W]e will continue to
take care of our older members first." The only conceiv-
able ambiguity that could arise is that the phrase "oldest
member" or even "oldest qualified member" encom-
passed the meaning of chronological age which, of
course, is precluded by the context herein I discredit
Dunlap and conclude that he did indeed mean to state
what he did state in that letter, that length of member-
ship was the priority factor in referring Quinnell and
others to the Blount job
There is some testimony, much of it hearsay or other-
wise inconclusive, adduced by the Respondent to the
effect that Quinnell was rumored to have had employ-
ment problems and that he had some other jobs that
might disqualify him from being considered "unem-
ployed " It is admitted by Quinnell that at material times
herein his driver's license was temporarily suspended and
he thereafter lost the special driver's license "endorse-
ment" to enable him to lawfully drive the type of vehi-
cles necessary to be driven at the Blount project. The li-
cense deficiency was not known to Dunlap until well
after the nonreferral. Also, Dunlap conceded that the
other matters supposedly relating to Quinnell's qualifica-
tions were either not known to him, or were not investi-
gated by him because they, like the driver' s license
matter , did not play any factor in his decision not to
refer Quinnell Aside from the license issue, these other
factors would only have come into consideration had
Quinnell been competing with other applicants of other-
wise equal priority He further admitted that these nonli-
cense matters would not disqualify Quinnell. It is there-
fore unnecessary to discuss and factually evaluate these
necessarily irrelevant factors.
C. Conclusions
The General Counsel alleges that the Employer
(Blount) and the Respondent have maintained and oper-
ated an exclusive hiring referral system as set forth in the
project agreement. In support of the argument of exclu-
sivity, the General Counsel cites a recent case involving
48-hour referral provisos whereby the employer reserves
the right to hire independently after 48 hours Plumbers
Local 198 (Jacobs/Wiesel), 268 NLRB 1312, 1314 (1984).
The Respondent, however, argues that the contractual
language herein is ambiguous in light of the AGC con-
tract which it incorporates by reference, and also be-
cause the project agreement language does not state ex-
plicitly the rights of the parties prior to the elapse of 48
hours. I conclude that the project language would be
rendered meaningless by any interpretation other than
that the Employer is permitted to hire independently
only after having exhausted the use of the Union's hiring
system for 48 hours The necessary and only implied
concomitant imperative in the explicit language is that
the Respondent must use the hiring referral system ex-
clusively for 48 hours. I find that the language sets forth
an exclusive hiring arrangement I find that the AGC
contract referral is clearly contradictory to the project
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 328 (BLOUNT BROS)
agreement referral language and therefore, by the terms
of the project agreement, void. I conclude that no ambi-
guity arises in contract language
Furthermore, I conclude that Blount and the Respond-
ent, regardless of any ambiguity in contract language. es-
tablished an exclusive referral arrangement by practice
and operation. The Flakton situation was an aberrant epi-
sode involving the rental of a needed vehicle. The Board
has held that where there is consistency in hiring those
applicants referred by the union and where the union is
aware of such practice, and exclusive hiring arrangement
exists . Plumbers Local 17 (FSM Mechanical), 224 NLRB
1262, 1263 (1976); Carpenters Ohio Valley Council (Cata-
lytic, Inc.), 267 NLRB 1223, 1226 ( 1983) (involving con-
tract language requiring the employer to first seek em-
ployees through the union referral system). I conclude
that sufficient consistency of practice existed in this case
to warrant a finding that an exclusive hiring referral ar-
rangement existed when Quinnell, as well as others,
sought a job referral to the Blount jobsite after mid-
March 1983.
The General Counsel argues that the operation of an
exclusive referral system which favors older members is
unlawful because it discriminates against newer members
and nonmembers of the Respondent, and cites appropri-
ately, Seafarers Atlantic District (American Barge), 244
NLRB 641 (1979), and Bricklayers Local 7 (Masonry
Builders), 224 NLRB 206 (1976), for the proposition that
such discriminatory objectives are unlawful. The Re-
spondent contends that the operation of the referral
system was not proven discriminatory by the General
Counsel The Respondent asserts that applicants were re-
ferred on the basis of experience in driving or warehous-
ing in the construction industry
The above factual findings demonstrate that the Gen-
eral Counsel has established a prima facie case that the
Respondent refused to refer Quinnell to a job, for which
other applicants were hired, that the Respondent main-
tained no written or other objectively fixed and demon-
strable criteria for determining priority of reference, and
that the Respondent informed Quinnell that the basis for
his nonreferral was its intent and practice of referring ap-
plicants with longer membership.
The mere absence of written rules and standards for
referral priority is not per se violative conduct, but it is a
factor to be weighed in the analysis. Stage Employees
IATSE Local 592 (Saratoga Performing Arts), 266 NLRB
703 fn 2 (1983) The Respondent' s business agent
Dunlap admitted in testimony that he made no determi-
nation that Quinnell was disqualified by virtue of reasons
of his work record, ability, work conduct, and employ-
ment history, but that he referred someone else to whom
he attributed higher priority Thus, Quinnell met the ap-
parent test of qualification, i e, ability, experience, and
unemployed status. Having met the apparent standard of
qualification, and in light of the lack of any written rules
and standards, I conclude not only that the General
Counsel adduced a prima facie case of 8(b)(1) and (2)
violative conduct, but that the Respondent had the
burden of proving that Quinnell was not referred for un-
lawful reasons Cf Carpenters Ohio Valley Council (Cata-
lytic, Inc.), supra at 1229 fn. 13, citing Seafarers Atlantic
1057
District (American Barge), supra; and Boilermakers Local
433 (Stoker Corp.), 266 NLRB 596, 599 (1983). 1
I find that the Respondent did not rebut the General
Counsel's prima facie showing that Quinnell was refused
job reference in preference to other applicants of greater
chronological membership in the Respondent. The testi-
mony of Dunlap adduced to rebut the General Counsel's
evidence of motivation, i.e., the admission of Dunlap to
Quinnell and in the correspondence, was self-serving, un-
documented, generalized , vague and ultimately unfound-
ed and incompetent as there was no proper or cogent
foundation laid for his conclusionary testimony relative
to other persons ' work experience. Moreover, I found
Dunlap 's disingenuous attempted explanation of his letter
to Holmes to have deprived him of credibility. I there-
fore find that the General Counsel has sustained the
burden of proving the complaint allegations with regard
to the nonreferral of Quinnell and other job applicants.
But, in any event, I find that even if I were to credit
Dunlap and accept his testimony that membership tenure
alone did not determine priority of referral, I would nec-
essarily find that the criteria as suggested by his testimo-
ny establish that the referral system was discriminatorily
operated and that Quinnell and others were subjected to
discriminatory criteria whereby they were not referred
to the Blount job.
It is well established that in operating an exclusive job-
referral system , the union must apply objective criteria
and standards . Carpenters Ohio Valley District Council
(Catalytic, Inc.), supra at 1226; Laborers Local 394 (Build-
ing Contractors), 247 NLRB 97 (1980); Teamsters Local
174 (Totem Beverages), 226 NLRB 690 (1976)
According to Dunlap, if credited, he referred appli-
cants based on his subjective impressions and hearsay re-
ports about the nature and length of an applicant's work
experience . Such standard inherently handicapped non-
members and any other applicant who did not have ex-
posure to the business agent . Furthermore, such a system
would vary in application depending on the impressions
of the particular business agent who might happen to
make the referral at any given time Still further, the
system allowed for the utilization of personal discretion
as when Dunlap referred his ex-fellow business agent
Gibson. Thus, under Dunlap's purported criteria, the op-
eration of the hiring hall discriminated in favor of not
only the older union members, but union members and
particularly active union members, i.e, those who had
exposure or access to the business agent The operation
of the system was therefore violative of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.2 I conclude that, at the very least,
it has been established that Dunlap referred job appli-
cants, pursuant to a discretionary application of the crite-
ria of length of union membership mitigated by his own
subjective impressions of their work experience, in any
event, equally violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
The Respondent argues that even if it is established
that Section 8(b)(1)(A) was violated by virtue of the op-
2 The complaint alleges such conduct as violative of Sec 8(b)(2) and
apparently inadvertently fails to allege it also as violative of Sec
8(b)(l)(A) The issue of 8(b)(1)(A) violation was clearly litigated, argued,
and briefed
1058 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
eration of a discretionary referral system, it has not been
established that Quinnell or anyone has been actually dis-
criminated against, thus militating against a finding of
violation of Section 8(b)(2). The Respondent cites in sup-
port thereof the following cases where 8(b)(1)(A) but not
8(b)(2) violations were found Polis Wallcovermg Co., 262
NLRB 1336 (1982), enfd. in part, denied enf. and re-
manded in part sub nom. Painters Local 277 v. NLRB,
717 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1983); and Plumbers Local 619
(Bechtel Corp.), 268 NLRB 766 (1984). In Polls, however,
where the business manager relied on his subjective im-
pressions regarding experience of applicants whom he
knew, there was no evidence that nonmembers and mem-
bers ever competed for an actual job opening. In the
Bechtel case, it was found that the alleged discriminatee,
under an arbitrary referral system, did not in fact request
referral, and there was no evidence of any other dis-
criminatory application, i e., when previously abundant
work slackened off, it was specifically found that the
union actually made referrals in accordance with objec-
tive standards.
The evidence in this case establishes that since mid-
March 1983 the Respondent applied discriminatory crite-
ria to more than 100 job applicants for 25 jobs that were
actually filled The Respondent has failed to meet the
burden of proving that the referrals were made pursuant
to justifiable standards. I have found that the Respond-
ent's practice discriminated against nonmembers and
members of lesser membership length and/or other arbi-
trary, inconsistent criteria. It is clear from the record
that applicants of varying membership tenure did apply.
There is sufficient evidence in the record to infer that
nonmembers, as well as members, were employed and
had sought job referrals. I must therefore conclude that
the evidence establishes that subsequent to mid-March
1983 an unknown number of applicants for jobs at the
Quinnesec site, in addition to Quinnell, were discriminat-
ed against by virtue of the application of a referral
system not based on objective, consistent criteria and
standards in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
The complaint also alleges that the Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by Dunlap's refusal to
honor employee requests for information relative to the
referral system
The Board has held that it is a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation of job applicants to fail to
"keep them informed about matters critical to their em-
ployment status." Operating Engineers Local 406 (Ford
Bacon & Davis), 262 NLRB 50 (1982); Plumbers Local
198 (Jacobs/Wiese), supra I have found that Dunlap in
May or June 1983 refused to inform Quinnell and other
applicants as to relative ranking among applicants seek-
ing job referrals through the Union's referral system to
the Blount project Dunlap's explanation for his conduct
was patently specious A lawful, nondiscriminatory, non-
discretionary referral system based on objective criteria
and standards must necessarily entail objective rankings
of priority of applicants. To claim that he had no such
information is in itself an admission by Dunlap that no
clear standards were maintained and that Quinnell and
others had been and were to be referred upon the busi-
ness agents ' impromptu discretion If Dunlap had no
ranking for Quinnell and other applicants when they
asked for their rank, Dunlap was obliged to make such
ranking and to tell Quinnell and any other applicant who
asked what it was. By Dunlap's conduct, in refusing to
provide this information to Quinnell and other appli-
cants, I find that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is a labor organization and the Em-
ployer is engaged in commerce, all within the meaning
of the Act.
2. The Respondent and the Employer have been par-
ties to a collective-bargaining agreement whereby the
Union operates an exclusive hiring hall and referral
system for the referral of employees by the Union to
work at the Employer's Quinnesec, Michigan jobsite.
3 The Respondent in the operation of its exclusive re-
ferral system has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
by refusing to honor the requests of job applicants con-
cerning their ranking among those job applicants seeking
work at the Employer's Champion International pulp
mill construction site at Quinnesec, Michigan, through
Respondent's exclusive job-referral system.
4. The Respondent in the operation of its exclusive
system with the Employer at the Champion jobsite at
Quinnesec, Michigan, has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and
(2) of the Act by-
(a) Discriminating against Kenneth W. Quinnell Sr.
and other job applicants seeking referral for employment
because of the length of their membership in the Re-
spondent or because of other arbitrary reasons not based
on objective criteria and standards, causing the Employ-
er to discriminate against employees in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act.
(b) Failing to use objective, consistent criteria and
standards not based on union membership in referring ap-
plicants for employment to the employer's Champion
jobsite at Quinnesec, Michigan, since March 16, 1983.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(l)(A) and (2) of the Act, it is recommended that the
Respondent be required to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain actions designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act
It having been found that the Respondent unlawfully
refused to refer Kenneth W Quinnell Sr. and other job
applicants for employment at the Blount job subsequent
to mid-March 1983, it must be decided if Respondent
must be required to cease and desist from discriminating
against him as well as all other job applicants similarly
situated The Respondent argues that, with respect to
Quinnell, no remedial order should issue and the com-
plaint allegations about him be dismissed or, alternative-
ly, that no backpay be allowed inasmuch as he was ineli-
gible for referral due to the loss of a class endorsement
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 328 (BLOUNT BROS)
to his driver's license required by the State of Michigan.
The Respondent cites in support of this argument Boiler-
makers Local 433 (Stoker Corp.), supra, and Uniform
Rental Service, 161 NLRB 187 (1966), cited therein by
Administrative Law Judge Gritta Also to be noted is
Service Garage, 256 NLRB 931 (1981), cited by the
Board in a footnote. The Respondent acknowledges that
the cited cases deal with the issue of whether backpay
should be withheld on the grounds of conduct of the dis-
criminatee warranting forfeiture In those cases discrimi-
natory conduct was found to be a violation and a reme-
dial order issued sans backpay The Service Garage and
Uniform Rental cases involved discriminatory conduct by
employers different in nature from that involved herein.
The Stoker Corp. case indeed involved the issue of a dis-
criminatory refusal to refer a job applicant in compliance
with objectively determined standards which in that case
were determined by a contract No remedial order issued
about the only discriminatee in that case because it was
held by Judge Gritta that the discriminatee's "very eligi-
bility for the referral of which he complains is the result
of his violation of the hiring hall rules by deceit and de-
ception," and that a normal remedy would "reward [the
discrimmatee] for his planned prostitution of the hiring
hall rules." In particular, the discriminatee "concealed"
the nature of his separation from the previous employer
and wrongfully entered his signature on an out-of-work
list He would not have been referred had the Union
been aware of his conduct However, the complaint was
not dismissed, a finding of 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) violation
was made, and a cease-and-desist order issued to remedy
future discrimination against the discriminatee "or any
other employee" The facts in the instant case do not
reveal overt fraudulent conduct by Quinnell. The Union
did not subject him nor did it subject any applicant to an
interrogation about whether they were in compliance
with state laws regarding licensing It is a matter of ret-
roactive speculation as to whether a job applicant who
had the proper driver's license endorsement, but who
currently had it suspended, would have been rejected for
referral, or would have been referred with or without a
warning to correct the problem.
The Respondent argues further that the referral of
Quinnell would have been futile because Blount would
not have accepted him for employment. In support the
Respondent cites Painters Local 277 v. NLRB, 717 F 2d
805 (3d Cir 1983), which reversed a Board finding of
discriminatory 8(b)(2) conduct on the grounds that there
had been no requests from employees who would have
accepted the discriminatee The Respondent also cites
Plasterers Local 32 (McCrory & Co.), 223 NLRB 486
(1976), wherein the Board , in a case not involving an ex-
clusive referral service, found no 8(b)(2) violation on the
grounds of lack of probative evidence "that but for [the
union 's] action, [the alleged discriminatee ] would have
been hired by the Employer, or indeed that any jobs
were available." The Board noted that there was "no
forseeable employment available for the [alleged discri-
minatee] and that the [union's] conduct did not disrupt
either an existing or prospective employment relation-
ship."
1059,
As the General Counsel correctly asserts, the evidence
establishes that the lack of the appropriate class endorse-
ment to his license would have played no factor in Quin-
nell's failure to obtain a job at the Blount Construction
site had he been referred by the Union Like the Re-
spondent, Blount simply assumed that all referred appli-
cants met their individual responsibility and possessed
up-to-date valid necessary class endorsements to their
drivers' licenses. Had the Respondent referred Quinnell
he would have been hired along with other applicants
who were not interrogated as to the status of their li-
cense endorsements, and of whom it is uncertain whether
they also were in total compliance with state driver's li-
cense requirements
I find that with respect to Quinnell a remedial Order is
clearly warranted in accordance with my finding that the
Respondent unlawfully discriminated against him, as well
as other applicants for employment.
In light of a recent Board decision, I find it unneces-
sary to evaluate the fairness of penalizing Quinnell by
subjecting him to greater scrutiny than other applicants
hired, nor do I find it necessary to evaluate Quinnell's
driving record and speculate about the wisdom and' pro-
priety of providing a remedial order to a person in non-
compliance with state licensing requirements. In the case
of Fischbach/Lord Electric Co., 270 NLRB (1984), the
Board held that it was an error for the administrative
law judge to fail to order backpay for employees who
lost employment due to a discriminatory refusal of the
union to dispatch them to jobs. The judge refused to
order backpay because the applicants failed to possess
electrician licenses during the periods of nonreferral,
which fact would have rendered their employment in
violation of state law. In that case the Board found that
the union 's "understanding" with the employers to refer
only licensed electricians was vague and not credible,
and the union was aware of the lack of licenses at other
times when it did refer the discriminatees. The pivotal
element in the Board's decision was not the awareness or
nonawareness of the union in the lack of licenses, but
that the lack of a state-mandated license was not an oper-
ative factor in the failure by the union to refer the discri-
minatees Thus, the Board provided for a make-whole
remedy as to backpay despite the possibility that, had the
discriminatees been referred to jobs, their employment
would have violated state law. The only distinction with
respect to this case is that the Respondent was unaware
of Quinnell's lack of license However, any understand-
ing about license qualification between Blount and the
Respondent was unstated and vague The Respondent
apparently had been oblivious to that factor of qualifica-
tion in making all referrals and now raises a concern
only when it has discovered it in preparing a defense to
the complaint. Since Quinnell's driver's license status was
never an operative factor in this case, I conclude that in
light of the Fischbach case the Respondent be ordered to
make whole Quinnell for any loss of wages he may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
The General Counsel, in the posttrial brief, seeks a re-
medial order to extend to "other employees who are
similarly situated," and cites Plumbers Local 198
1060 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(Jacobs/Wiese), supra, wherein a finding of an 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) discriminatory hiring practice violation was or-
dered to be remedied by extending that remedy to all
discriminatees regardless of their identification in the
complaint (id at 1323 ). He also cites the very recent de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in NLRB Y.
Iron Workers Local 480, 116 LRRM 2289 (1984). In that
case, the Court dealt with the issue of the Board 's delay
in calculating backpay due to certain nonmembers who
were discriminated against in the referral system and
"similarly situated " employees.
Subsequent to the General Counsel 's brief, the Re-
spondent submitted to me a letter protesting the General
Counsel 's request for backpay for employees "similarly
situated." The Respondent asserts that the complaint
only alleges a discriminatory refusal to refer the Charg-
ing Party as a violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act,
that no evidence was adduced to identify any other dis-
criminatee , and that therefore an expanded backpay
order is unwarranted and violative of due process , citing
Longshoremen ILA Local 851 (West Gulf Maritime Assn.),
194 NLRB 1027 (1972)
The case cited by the Respondent dealt with an un-
lawful refusal to grant members classification cards, and
the evidence in that case did not reveal that any identifi-
able members , other than the named discriminatees, at
any time applied for such cards. The instant case, how-
ever, is distinguishable in that the evidence reveals that
numerous employees sought job referrals by registering
with the Respondent and that their names were recorded
in the Respondent 's notebook in notes and on slips of
paper since retained in the Respondent's custody. These
persons are identifiable , and they were subjected by the
Respondent to an evaluation by an arbitrary and unlaw-
ful criteria when they sought the jobs that were available
and filled by applicants referred subsequent to mid-
March 1983
With respect to the Respondent ' s suggestion that it
was taken by surprise in that the complaint only alleged
an 8(b)(2) violation, I find that argument to be nonmeri-
torious. At the outset of the trial , the General Counsel
clearly explained the theory of the case , i.e., that Quin-
nell was discriminated against in consequence of a dis-
criminatory pattern of conduct which discriminated
against all employees who were denied referral pursuant
to unlawful criteria . He clearly stated , in response to my
query, that to prove Quinnell 's discrimination he had to
prove a pattern of discrimination against other employees
who did not satisfy the Respondent 's unlawful hiring re-
ferral criteria. The Respondent at that time expressed no
surprise , nor did the Respondent ask for time to formu-
late any new defense . Finally, although the complaint is
not one of the most artful and careful phrasing , it clearly
advises the Respondent of the conduct of which it is ac-
cused, i e, discriminating against Quinnell as one of
many employees it had discriminated against by oper-
ation of a discriminatory referral system. The Respond-
ent in its letter of protest alludes to paragraph 7 which
states Quinnell 's nonreferral and which is referred to in
paragraph 9 as conduct violative of Section 8(b)(2) of the
Act. But paragraph 7 is incomplete in and of itself and
must be read in conjunction with paragraph 8, which
states that the Respondent discriminated against Quinnell
"because Respondent has discriminatorily referred em-
ployees for employment by the Employer based upon
the length of said employees ' membership in Respond-
ent." That allegation was argued and litigated It was the
Respondent who adduced evidence of the Respondent's
referral system use of other nonobjective and arbitrary
criteria as evidence to rebut the allegation that employ-
ees (plural) were referred to jobs based on length of
union membership
I conclude that the Respondent was adequately put on
notice about the allegation of unlawful discrimination,
i.e , that Quinnell and numerous other similar applicants
were discriminated against by operation of its referral
system I find that the Respondent litigated that issue.
The Board has in the past found it appropriate to extend
remedial orders to those employees found to be similarly
situated subsequent to litigation of such discrimination
even though they were not explicitly named in the com-
plaint , nor identified as discrimmatees at the trial, as it
did in the Plumbers Local 198 (Jacobs/Wtese) case and
cases cited therein and discussed by Administrative Law
Judge Schwarzbart.
Although I consider it better practice for the General
Counsel to set forth precisely in the complaint a specific
prayer for relief, such practice by the various Regional
agents of the General Counsel is rare, but is not a condi-
tion precedent to due process . Having litigated the issue
of discrimination , the appropriate remedy is determined
by the nature of the violation found and, according to
published Board precedent , not by my discretion. The
Respondent's failure to address the issue of remedy,
whether due to inadvertence or miscontruction of state-
ments by the General Counsel , has no bearing on the
issue of whether it had been afforded due process in
being given the opportunity to litigate the merits of the
issue, which it did so herein . Accordingly , I conclude
that the General Counsel 's requested remedy that the re-
medial order extend to Quinnell and to all other employ-
ee applicants similarly situated is appropriate and in
accord with Board precedent.
In the absence of the maintenance of an applicant re-
ferral register based on objective priority ranking, it is
impossible for me to determine at what date Quinnell or
other applicants would have been referred to the Em-
ployer 's Quinnesec jobsite had objective criteria and con-
sistent standards been applied. I shall therefore recom-
mend that backpay determinations be left to the compli-
ance stage of these proceedings . However, I shall recom-
mend that the Respondent be ordered to make whole
Kenneth W . Quinnell Sr . and all other employee job ap-
plicants similarly situated for any loss of earnings they
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination prac-
ticed against them subsequent to March 16 , 1983, with
interest , to be computed in the manner provided in F W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel
Corp., 231 NLRB 651 ( 1977). See generally Isis Plumbing
Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Further , I shall recommend that the Respondent be di-
rected to maintain and operate its exclusive job-referral
system for the Employer 's Quinnesec , Michigan project
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 328 (BLOUNT BROS)
in a nondiscriminatory manner based on objective, con-
sistent criteria and standards and that an adequate writ-
ten recordkeeping system be maintained for the duration
of the Quinnesec project which will reflect all available
jobs, referrals , and an objectively ranked applicant regis-
ter The Respondent should be required to place the ap-
plicant register or a copy of it conspicuously within its
hiring hall for easy access and inspection by all appli-
cants on completion of each day 's entries in the register
Finally, the Respondent should be ordered to post an ap-
propriate notice
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed3
ORDER
The Respondent, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, Local Union No 328, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to honor the requests of job applicants
concerning their ranking among those job applicants
seeking work at the Blount Brothers Corporation, Cham-
pion construction site at Quinnesec , Michigan, through
the Respondent 's exclusive job-referral system or who
seek employment with any other employer with whom
we maintain an exclusive job-referral system.
(b) Discriminating against Kenneth W Quinnell Sr.
and other job applicants seeking referral for employment
through its exclusive referral system at the Blount Broth-
ers Corporation , Champion International pulp mill con-
struction site at Quinnesec , Michigan, because of the
length of their membership in the Respondent, or be-
cause of other arbitrary reasons not based on objective,
consistent criteria and standards , thereby causing Blount
Brothers Corporation to discriminate against employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
(c) Failing to use objective , consistent criteria and
standards not based on union membership in referring ap-
plicants for employment through its exclusive referral
system to the Blount Brothers Corporation , Champion
construction site at Quinnesec, Michigan , or to any other
employer with whom it maintains an exclusive job-refer-
ral system
(d) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act
(a) Make whole , with interest , Kenneth W Qumnell
Sr. and all other job applicants similarly situated for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered since March 16,
1983, by reason of the discrimination practiced against
them in the manner set forth in the above section entitled
"The Remedy "
3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations , the findings , conclusions , and recommended
Order shall , as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules , be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
1061
(b) Maintain and operate its exclusive ,lob-referral
system for the Blount Brothers Corporation , Champion
International pulp mill construction site at Quinnesec,
Michigan, in a nondiscriminatory manner based on objec-
tive, consistent criteria and standards , and refer there for
jobs Kenneth W Quinnell Sr and all other applicants
similarly situated if they qualify accordingly
(c) Maintain for the duration of the Quinnesec jobsite,
referred to above, a recordkeeping system that will re-
flect all available jobs and referrals and which will fully
disclose the basis on which each referral is made and the
objective priority ranking of each applicant on a register
of applicants , of which copies will be placed conspicu-
ously within its hiring hall for easy access and inspection
by all applicants on completion of each day's entries' in
such register
(d) Preserve and, on request , make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying , all payi
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,'
personnel records and reports , and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under, the
terms of this Order
(e) Post at its main hall or office in Escanaba , Michi-
gan, and its meeting places for members or applicants for
referral, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix "4 Copies of the notice , on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 30, after being signed by
the Respondent 's authorized representative , shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to members are cus-
tomarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply. '
4 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had a chance to give evi-
dence, the National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and
has ordered us to correct and remedy these violations
and to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against Kenneth W. Quln-
nell Sr . or any other job applicant who seeks referral for'
employment through our exclusive referral system at
Blount Brothers - Corporation , Champion International
pulp mill construction site at Quinnesec , Michigan, be-
1062 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cause,of the length of their membership in our Union or
because of any other arbitrary reasons not based on ob-
jective, consistent criteria and standards
WE WILL NOT operate an exclusive job-referral system
with Blount Brothers Corporation or with any other em-
ployer which gives priority to the length of membership
in our Union, or is in any other manner not based on ob-
jective, consistent standards.
WE WILL NOT refuse to honor the requests of job ap-
plicants concerning their ranking among those job appli-
cants seeking employment at the Blount Brothers Corpo-
ration, Champion International pulp mill construction
site at Quinnesec, Michigan, through our exclusive refer-
ral system, or who seek employment with any other em-
ployer with whom we maintain an exclusive job-referral
system.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make whole, with interest, Kenneth W.
Quinnell Sr . and all other job applicants similarly situat-
ed for any loss of earnings they may have suffered since
March 16, 1983, by reason of the discrimination we prac-
ticed against them
WE WILL maintain and operate our exclusive job-refer-
ral system for the Blount Brothers Corporation, Champi-
on International pulp mill construction site at Quinnesec,
Michigan, in a nondiscriminatory manner based on objec-
tive, consistent criteria and standards and will refer Ken-
neth W. Quinnell Sr. and all other applicants similarly
situated if they qualify accordingly.
WE WILL maintain for the duration the above-stated
Quinnesec jobsite a recordkeeping system that will re-
flect all available jobs and referrals, and which will fully
disclose the basis on which each referral is made and the
objective priority ranking of each applicant on a register
of applicants, of which copies will be placed conspicu-
ously within our hiring hall for early access and inspec-
tion by all applicants on completion of each day's entries
in the system.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAM-
STERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION
No. 328