Taylor Machine Products, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 18, 2003

338 N.L.R.B. 831 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

TAYLOR MACHINE PRODUCTS, INC. 831
Taylor Machine Products, Inc. and Woodrow Fay
Singleton, Paul Edward Marguess, James
Howells and Local Lodge 82, District Lodge 60,
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace, AFL–CIO–CLC. Cases 7–CA–
33135, 7–CA–33187, 7–CA–33483, 7–CA–33583,
7–CA–33809(1), and 7–CA–33809(2)
March 18, 2003
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND ACOSTA
On March 21, 2002, Administrative Law Judge George
Carson II issued the attached second supplemental deci-
sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions,
and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Taylor Machine Products,
Inc., Detroit, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors
and assigns, shall make whole the employees named be-
low by paying them the amounts set forth opposite their
names, plus interest as prescribed in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), minus tax with-
holdings required by Federal and State laws.

James Howells $ 16,410.13
Vernadette Bader 63,787.06
Ruth Cecil 15,502.46
Josephine Mallia 10,740.51
Floria Russell 26,419.57
Rosemary Smith 14,119.57
Bonnie Warren 41,294.73
Total Backpay: $188,273.54

Robert A. Drzyzga, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David Porter and Paul Shemanski, for the Charging Party.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in Detroit, Michigan, on February 4 and 5, 2002, pursuant
to a Supplemental Decision and Order of the Board dated Au-
gust 27, 2001. Taylor Machine Products, 335 NLRB No. 56
(2001) (not reported in Board volumes). In the underlying un-
fair labor practice case the Board found, inter alia, that the Re-
spondent, Taylor Machine Products, Inc., discriminatorily ter-
minated six employees. Taylor Machine Products, 317 NLRB
1187 (1995). The Board’s Order was enforced in pertinent part
by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on February 18,
1998. NLRB v. Taylor Machine Products, 136 F.3d 507 (6th
Cir. 1998). On October 26, 1999, the Regional Director for
Region 7 issued a compliance specification that set out the
backpay due to the six discriminatees. The Respondent filed an
answer. On January 28, 2000, counsel for the General Counsel
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to which the
Respondent filed a response. The Board, in Taylor Machine
Products, supra, granted partial summary judgment upon the
allegations relating to the calculation of the gross backpay of
the six discriminatees and remanded for hearing the remaining
issues. Those issues, which were addressed at this hearing,
relate to interim earnings, medical expenses, and the job
searches of the discriminatees.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
The General Counsel, at the hearing, amended the compli-
ance specification to set out an excepted period from October
1994 through May 1995 for discriminatee Vernadette Bader, an
excepted period from August 7, 1992, until May 1, 1993, for
discriminatee Josephine Mallia, and an excepted period for the
month of June 1997 for discriminatee Bonnie Warren. Pursuant
to this amendment, the General Counsel submitted revised cal-
culations of the backpay due to these discriminatees. (GC Ex-
hibit 1(gg)). The General Counsel further amended the compli-
ance specification by deleting any claim for medical expenses
on behalf of discriminatee Rosemary Smith.
The Respondent, at the hearing, stipulated to the medical ex-
penses of Bader and Mallia and discriminatees Ruth Cecil and
Floria Russell. Expenses of $25 incurred by discriminatee
James Howells in the third quarter of 1992 are admitted in the
Respondent’s answer.
The Respondent presented Robert Ancell, Ph.D., a rehabilita-
tion consultant, as an expert witness regarding the availability
of work. Ancell’s expertise is in rehabilitating and placing
workers who have lost their employment because of some
physical disability or injury. Placement of these workers re-
quires knowing the job market and positions for which the em-
ployee is qualified. Ancell testified that he would assist em-
ployees in preparing for job interviews. He acknowledged that
citing a termination on an application would “raise a red flag”
338 NLRB No. 117
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 832
with a prospective employer, noting that he advised employees
to write “will discuss” when such information was sought. The
Respondent, through Ancell, introduced various documents
reflecting statistics relating to unemployment. Ancell admitted
that unemployment of women is generally higher than that of
men. He also acknowledged that an older employee would have
greater difficulty finding a job than a younger employee. The
Respondent did not provide Ancell’s expert assistance regard-
ing job interviews and completing applications to the discrimi-
natees at the time of their terminations. His involvement in this
matter was related only to his appearance at this hearing. Al-
though Ancell testified that he reviewed the discriminatees
personnel files, he had met none of them and was unaware of
the specific jobs that any of them had performed. Upon being
advised of the jobs they had performed, he described their work
as unskilled or low semi-skilled.
Ancell testified regarding unemployment statistics for
Wayne County, Michigan, as derived from data relating to De-
troit and its surrounding communities of which Taylor, Michi-
gan, is one. That data reports the annual average unemployment
rates for Wayne County and Taylor, Michigan. Those rates
reflect a steadily declining unemployment rate, from 10.5 per-
cent in 1992 to 4.7 percent in 1997 in Wayne County and from
7.5 percent in 1992 to 3.3 percent in 1997 in Taylor. In 1993,
the Wayne County rate was 8.3 percent and the Taylor rate was
5.9 percent. A rate of 5.9 percent reflects that one out of every
17 (16.949) persons in the statistical labor force was unem-
ployed and receiving unemployment compensation. These fig-
ures, based upon individuals receiving unemployment compen-
sation, do not reflect unemployed individuals who had ex-
hausted their entitlement to unemployment benefits. Like the
expert testimony in Delta Data Systems Corp., 293 NLRB 736,
740 at fn. 6 (1989), Ancell’s generalized statistical evidence
“did not account for a number of potentially significant vari-
ables” such as the gender of five of the discriminatees, their
ages, or their job skills. Ancell acknowledged that the statistical
data he presented reflected unemployment rates, not jobs, and
that he could not tell “which employers were open at any given
time.” There is no evidence that any discriminatee herein re-
fused any job offer. Neither Ancell’s testimony nor the statisti-
cal data establishes that any discriminatee would have been
hired if he or she had applied at any specific company.

It is well settled that the reasonableness of a discriminatee’s
efforts to find a job and thereby mitigate loss of income result-
ing from an unlawful discharge need not comport with the
highest standard of diligence, i.e., he or she need not exhaust
all possible job leads. Rather, it is sufficient that the discrimi-
natee make a good-faith effort. In determining the reason-
ableness of this effort, the discriminatee’s skills, experience,
qualifications, age, and labor conditions in the area are factors
to be considered. The existence of job opportunities by no
means compels an inference that the discriminatees would
have been hired if they had applied. The respondent’s obliga-
tion to satisfy its affirmative defense is to show a “clearly un-
justifiable refusal to take desirable new employment.” Uncer-
tainty in such evidence is resolved against the respondent as
the wrongdoer. Lundy Packing Co., 286 NLRB 144, 146
(1987); enfd. 856 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1988) [footnotes omit-
ted].

All of the discriminatees, except Mallia, applied for and re-
ceived unemployment compensation from the State of Michi-
gan. The testimony of the witnesses establishes that the State of
Michigan required that recipients of unemployment compensa-
tion seek work during each preceding 2-week period for which
the compensation checks were issued. All testified that they had
done so, and there is no evidence to the contrary. The Respon-
dent argues that several of the discriminatees should be denied
backpay because they could not recall specifically when and
where they sought employment when receiving unemployment
benefits. This argument misallocates the burden of proof. The
receipt of unemployment compensation pursuant to the rules
regarding eligibility constitutes “prima facie evidence of a rea-
sonable search for interim employment.” Birch Run Welding,
286 NLRB 1316, 1319 (1987). The Respondent did not rebut
the prima facie evidence of reasonable job searches established
by the documentary evidence reflecting the receipt of unem-
ployment benefits by all discriminatees except Mallia.
II. BACKPAY
A. James Howells
Howells’ backpay period is from June 12, 1992, until August
29, 1994, when he was offered reinstatement. Although
Howells kept no separate list of employers at which he sought
work, he received unemployment compensation and testified
that, in order to receive the compensation, he was required to
list at least three places at which he had sought work during
each preceding 2-week period. He did so and turned in those
lists. He obtained employment at Mercury Manufacturing ap-
proximately 3 months after his termination and was thereafter
employed continuously. Howells had previously worked at
Mercury and had been laid off. He continued to seek work after
obtaining this employment and left Mercury for Ameritech in
June 1993. Although the starting pay at Ameritech was lower
than his wage at Mercury, Howells testified that the benefits
were superior, that he felt like he “had more of a chance for
advancement,” and that there were rumors of impending layoffs
at Mercury and he did not “want to go through that again.” The
Respondent, in its brief, argues that Howells is entitled to back-
pay only for the period in which he was receiving unemploy-
ment compensation since his starting wage at Mercury was the
same as at Taylor Machine. The Respondent fails to note that
Howells, at Taylor Machine, regularly received overtime. This
overtime is reflected in the calculation of his gross backpay as
set out in the compliance specification. Although the Respon-
dent argues that Howells’ leaving Mercury for a lower wage at
Ameritech was unjustified, his admitted interim earnings of
$8295.76, an average of $276.53 per week over 7 months em-
ployment, June through December 1994 at Ameritech, ex-
ceeded his average weekly earnings of $211.94 a week for the
period January through May at Mercury. (Total earnings of
$4662.70 divided by 22 weeks = $211.94). In July 1994,
Howells left Ameritech to accept employment with the State of
Michigan, employment for which he had initially applied in
1989 but which was foreclosed by a hiring freeze. Having ob-
TAYLOR MACHINE PRODUCTS, INC. 833
tained this employment, he refused the Respondent’s August
29, 1994, offer of reinstatement, thus terminating his backpay
period. I find that Howells is entitled to backpay in the amount
of $16,410.13 as alleged in the compliance specification.
Howells had no medical expenses.
B. Vernadette Bader
Bader’s backpay period is from August 6, 1992, until De-
cember 31, 1997, when the compliance specification acknowl-
edges that she removed herself from the labor market. Bader
received unemployment compensation through May 21, 1993.
From October 1994 through May 1995, an excepted period,
Bader attended a vocational school and, upon completion of
that training, received a Michigan license as a manicurist.
Bader had, before her termination, sold perfume and jewelry to
augment her earnings from Taylor Machine. She continued this
endeavor after her termination, but her income tax returns re-
flect that her deductible expenses exceeded her revenue in 1992
and 1993. Bader testified that she sought work throughout her
backpay period and that she made contemporaneous notes of
establishments at which she sought work. Although undated,
the total number of contacts reflected on her notes exceeds 50.
The Respondent, in its brief, argues that Bader’s scribbled notes
constitute “a shameful attempt to manufacture evidence.” I
reject that characterization. The only evidence that the Respon-
dent adduced relating to her job search was her testimony. The
only basis for the Respondent’s argument that Bader’s search
was not reasonable is that it was not successful. I shall not
speculate as to whether Bader’s age detracted from her desir-
ability as an employee, but I do note that Bader was born on
February 26, 1932, and was 60 years old when she was termi-
nated and her backpay period began. Although several of the
discriminatees were offered reinstatement in 1994, Bader was
not.
Bader became eligible for social security benefits as a widow
when she became 60 and, after consultation with a representa-
tive of the Social Security Administration, began drawing bene-
fits. The receipt of such benefits has no bearing upon the Re-
spondent’s backpay liability so long as the discriminatee con-
tinued to seek work or engage in self-employment, as Bader
did. F & W Oldsmobile, 272 NLRB 1150 (1984).
Bona fide self-employment does not toll backpay. Cassiss
Management Corp., 336 NLRB 961, 969 (2001). When a dis-
criminatee asserts engagement in self-employment without
continuing efforts to obtain employment, the circumstances of
that self-employment must be evaluated. United Supermarkets,
287 NLRB 394, 402–403 (1987). The Respondent, in its brief,
asserts that Bader was willfully idle. The record establishes
otherwise, and I reject the Respondent’s assertion. From Au-
gust 1992 until October 1994, Bader looked for work and con-
tinued to sell perfume and jewelry, as reflected in her income
tax returns. In October 1994, this 62 year old woman, having
been unsuccessful in finding work and having not been offered
reinstatement, credibly testified that she sought and received
training and became a licensed manicurist. The time of her
training, from October 1994 until May 1995 is an excepted
period. Upon becoming a licensed manicurist, Bader sought
employment at Diane’s Hair Den where the proprietor “was
thinking of starting” a nail business. The proprietor ultimately
decided not to start a nail business. Bader also sought employ-
ment with Arleen Hair Fashions, testifying that Arleen Leeds
“wanted to start a nail business,” but she did not “have the cli-
entele for it.” When neither of the foregoing efforts succeeded,
Bader began “doing nails out of my [her] home.” Income from
this self-employment is reflected on her income tax returns in
1995 and thereafter. Furthermore, the Respondent did not es-
tablish that Bader ceased seeking other employment after she
became a manicurist.
Bader’s backpay has been adjusted due to the excepted pe-
riod in which she sought and received training as a manicurist.
Although Counsel for the General Counsel amended the speci-
fication to set out an excepted period of October 1994 through
May 1995, the revised calculations for Bader credit her with 2
weeks of backpay in the third quarter of 1994. This is inconsis-
tent with the amendment of the General Counsel. I shall there-
fore deduct 2 weeks of backpay, a total of $444.25, from the
$63,163.91 alleged in the revised specification. As revised,
Bader is entitled to $62,719.66 in backpay. Bader’s medical
expenses total $1,067.40.
C. Ruth Cecil
Cecil’s backpay period is from August 5, 1992, until De-
cember 31, 1993, when she voluntarily removed herself from
the labor market. Cecil, who was 68 years old in 1992, testified
to seeking work at various employers while drawing unem-
ployment compensation. Unemployment records reflect Cecil’s
receipt of unemployment benefits only in 1993; however, a
copy of her income tax return for 1992 reporting $2224 in un-
employment compensation confirms her receipt of benefits
during the months immediately after her termination in 1992.
Having unsuccessfully sought work throughout the period in
which she was receiving unemployment compensation, Cecil
acknowledged ceasing to look for work “[s]hortly after I quit
drawing unemployment,” noting that she went to “a couple of
places” but that she was 70 years old and “they don’t say it is
because of your age, they just don’t take you.” Cecil’s final
unemployment check was processed on November 22, 1993.
Although the Respondent admitted the backpay period as al-
leged, it argues that she should receive no backpay since she
did not specifically recall by name more than three places at
which she looked for work while drawing unemployment com-
pensation almost 10 years ago. The Respondent has not rebut-
ted the prima facie evidence of a reasonable search for interim
employment established by Cecil’s receipt of unemployment
benefits. Birch Run Welding, supra. I credit her testimony, and I
find that Cecil went to a “couple of places,” shortly after No-
vember 22, 1993. There is no evidence that she sought work
after November 1993. In the absence of any evidence that Cecil
sought work after November, I shall toll her backpay for the
month of December 1993. Cecil’s gross backpay for the 4th
quarter of 1993 was based upon average weekly earnings of
$227. I shall, therefore, deduct $908 ($227 x 4) from her back-
pay for the 4th quarter of 1993. Her backpay total, as adjusted
is $14,293.58 ($15,201.58–$908). Cecil’s medical expenses
total $1,208.88.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 834
D. Josephine Mallia
Mallia’s backpay period is from May 1, 1993, until August
22, 1994, when she was offered reinstatement. Shortly after
being terminated, Mallia underwent major surgery and an ex-
tended period of recuperation. The compliance specification
begins her backpay period in May, and she credibly testified to
beginning to look for work at about that time. Mallia recalls
working at a plant, the name of which she could not remember,
for a short period of time. She was laid off from this job. It
appears that she obtained this work through Grayrose Contract
Staffing Services. She then obtained work at Raal Corporation
on May 17, 1993. She worked there until being laid off on Au-
gust 10, 1993. She began seeking employment immediately
and, on October 7, 1993, obtained employment at Mercury
Manufacturing. Although the revised compliance specification
relating to Mallia, GC Exhibit 1(gg), includes her earnings from
Grayrose in the 4th quarter of 1993, these interim earnings,
consistent with her testimony, should have been included in the
second quarter. Mallia worked for Raal for a total of 12 weeks,
6 weeks in the second quarter (May 17 to June 30) and 6 weeks
in the third quarter (July 1 to August 10) of 1993. Thus, her
total earnings of $1911.25 should be equally divided between
those quarters. Although the foregoing revisions have no effect
upon the Respondent’s total liability, the revisions will affect
the calculations of interest upon the backpay due to Mallia.2
The Respondent, in its brief, does not dispute that Mallia is
entitled to $3,950.71 in backpay as alleged in the revised
specification, and I so find. Mallia’s medical expenses total
$6,789.80.
E. Floria Russell
Russell’s backpay period is from August 6, 1992, until Sep-
tember 4, 1994, when she was offered reinstatement. Russell
obtained work at Meijer, a department store, in June 1994.
Thereafter, she accepted reinstatement but, according to her
testimony, was laid off shortly thereafter. There is no allegation
of an unfair labor practice relating that separation. Russell
credibly testified to her receipt of unemployment benefits, regu-
larly seeking employment while drawing those benefits, and
continuing to seek employment when those benefits were ex-
hausted. Her search was ultimately successful when she ob-
tained employment at Meijer. When asked where she went
before finding work at Meijer, Russell testified that she went
“to a lot of stores,” naming Buy-Rite, formerly D & D, and
O’Briens, noting that she went to a “lot of places” but that she
did not “remember all of them.” I credit her testimony and find

2 For the second quarter of 1993, Mallia’s interim earnings were
$261.25 and $955.52, a total of $1,216.87. Her gross backpay was
$2,273.04, leaving a net backpay liability of $1056.27 for the second
quarter of 1993. Although the revised specification reports interim
earnings of $1274.16 for Mallia in the third quarter of 1993, the figure
should be $955.52. Mallia’s gross backpay for the third quarter of 1993
is $3336.08. Subtracting her correct interim earnings of $955.52 from
this figure leaves a net backpay liability of $2380.55 for the third quar-
ter. In the fourth quarter of 1993, Mallia had earnings only from Mer-
cury Manufacturing in the total amount of $2855. The $261.25 from
Grayrose was earned in the second quarter. Thus the Respondent’s net
backpay liability for the fourth quarter of 1993 is $514.08.
that Russell is entitled to backpay in the amount of $26,272.57
as alleged in the compliance specification. Russell had medical
expenses of $147.
F. Rosemary Smith
Smith’s backpay period is from August 6, 1992, until De-
cember 31, 1993, when the specification states that she volun-
tarily removed herself from the labor market. Smith’s testimony
reflects a recollection faded by time. Although the Respondent
asserts that Smith contacted no employer directly, this assertion
is contradicted by Smith’s recounting directly contacting Hori-
zon and Sterling Stamping, where she spoke with “Rick, the
owner.” Smith credibly testified that, when receiving unem-
ployment compensation, she sought work. Her recitation of
instances in which she asked friends to make inquiries on her
behalf augments that testimony. As stated in Teamsters Local
164, 274 NLRB 909, 912 (1985), “her recitation of inquiries to
friends and acquaintances regarding availability of employment
with particular establishments . . . tend[s] to show a continuing
effort to find work.” Smith, having failed to find employment
when actively seeking employment while drawing unemploy-
ment compensation, acknowledged that, when she had ex-
hausted her unemployment benefits, she ceased looking for
work. She received her last unemployment compensation check
on November 6, 1993. Although the Respondent admitted the
backpay period as alleged, Smith’s admission establishes that
she did not seek work from November 6 until December 31,
1993, a period of 8 weeks, and I shall toll her backpay for that
period. Smith’s gross backpay for the fourth quarter of 1993
was based upon average weekly earnings of $239.30. I shall,
therefore, deduct $1914.40 ($239.30 x 8) from her backpay for
the 4th quarter of 1993. Smith had no medical expenses. Her
backpay total, as adjusted, is $14,119.08 ($16,033.48–
$1914.40).
G. Bonnie Warren
Warren’s backpay period is from August 6, 1992, until Au-
gust 17, 1998, when she was offered reinstatement. Warren
received unemployment compensation through June 1993. She
began working at Mercury Manufacturing in September 1996.
Thereafter, in June 1997, she voluntarily quit this employment
in order to care for her daughter who had undergone surgery.
She began working again in November 1997. The compliance
specification, as amended, sets out June 1997 as an excepted
period. The Respondent argues that Warren’s job search was
inadequate noting various discrepancies in her testimony and
the absence of any record of where she sought work after May
1995. In April 1993, Warren began keeping notes identifying
some of the employers at which she sought work. Although she
testified that she began doing this after her unemployment
benefits ceased, this testimony was mistaken since documen-
tary evidence reveals that Warren received benefits through the
month of June. Warren’s recollection was, as might be ex-
pected, hazy regarding events that occurred almost 10 years
ago. She recalled several employers that she contacted when
she was receiving unemployment compensation after her recol-
lection was refreshed using forms that she had submitted when
she was receiving unemployment benefits. Her notes are in-
TAYLOR MACHINE PRODUCTS, INC. 835
complete. There are no entries for June 1993, when she was
still receiving unemployment compensation, or for August
1993, when she testified that she did continue to seek employ-
ment, although she did not remember where. There are no en-
tries in her notes between September 1993 and October 1994;
however, counsel for the Respondent did not examine Warren
regarding her job search during that period. Her notes reflect
contact with five employers in October 1994. Thereafter, her
notes reflect contact with Meijer, a department store, in No-
vember 1994, but no entries for the months of December 1994
and January and February 1995. When asked about the absence
of entries for those months, Warren testified, “I probably went
back to some of the places I’d already been to.” When asked
why she did not write down those contacts, she testified, “Be-
cause they still wasn’t hiring, I guess.” Despite this response,
her notes reflect unsuccessful contacts with Total Distribution
Systems and McDonalds in March of 1995 and Master Auto-
matic and Applewood Nursing Home in May 1995, all four of
which were employers at which Warren had previously unsuc-
cessfully sought work. She obtained employment “through a
friend” over a year later, in September 1996, at Mercury Manu-
facturing. She quit this employment, and the General Counsel
amended the compliance specification to specify June 1997 as
an excepted period.
Warren’s testimony and notes establish that, while receiving
unemployment benefits and for several months thereafter, she
sought work with a variety of prospective employers. Contrary
to a statement in the Respondent’s brief, Warren did not unrea-
sonably turn down work “for which she was qualified” in May
1993. The foregoing statement relates to her seeking work at a
McDonald’s that was seeking a cashier. Although testifying
that she did not like handling other people’s money, Warren
testified that she would have accepted the position if “they
would have trained me,” but that she was told “[t]hey wasn’t
hiring.” Warren was not offered and did not turn down a job.
Counsel did not examine Warren regarding her job search be-
tween September 1993 and October 1994. From November
1994 through May 1995, her notes reflect contact with only five
employers. Although testifying that she contacted other pro-
spective employers in December 1994 and January and Febru-
ary 1995, she could not name them and she did not write them
down because they were “places I’d already been to.” All of the
five prospective employers that she recorded as having con-
tacted during this period were also places to which Warren had
already been and which had also failed to employ her on one or
more previous occasions. The foregoing evidence establishes
that the breadth of Warren’s job search became quite con-
stricted. Warren named no employer at which she sought work
after May 1995, and her notes reflect no contact with any pro-
spective employer after May 1995. Notwithstanding the con-
stricted nature of her job search between November 1994 and
May 1995, I shall give Warren the benefit of every doubt re-
garding the reasonableness of her search. Having done so, I
find that Warren ceased to engage in a reasonable job search
after May 1995 and shall toll her backpay from June 1995
through August 1996. Lundy Packing Co., supra at 176 (Mary
Raynor). The compliance specification reflects that in June
1995 Warren would have earned $282.27 per week at Taylor.
Consistent with the foregoing findings, the Respondent’s liabil-
ity for the final four weeks of the second quarter of 1995 should
be reduced by $1129.08 ($282.27 x 4) to $2540.44 ($3669.52–
$1129.08). The Respondent should incur no liability in the 3d
and fourth quarters of 1995 and the first and second quarters of
1996, a reduction in liability of $14,687.04. In the third quarter
of 1996, the Respondent’s liability should be reduced by
$3551.55. The foregoing figure is derived from the compliance
specification which reflects that, in the third quarter of 1996,
Warren’s gross backpay was based upon $282.27 for the first
week and $408.66 for the remaining weeks of the third quarter,
a total of $5186.19.3 Warren began working in September, thus
her gross backpay for the last 4 weeks of the third quarter totals
$1634.64 ($408.66 x 4). Her interim earnings in the third quar-
ter of 1996 were $1201.50, leaving a net backpay liability of
$433.14. Thus the Respondents liability for the third quarter
should be reduced by $3551.55 ($3984.69–$433.14). In sum-
mary, the Respondent is liable for $2,540.44 in backpay for the
second quarter of 1995, is liable for no backpay in the third and
fourth quarters of 1995 and first and second quarters of 1996,
and is liable for $433.14 in backpay for the third quarter of
1996.
The General Counsel amended the compliance specification
at the hearing to include an excepted period, June 1997, when
Warren was caring for her daughter who had to undergo sur-
gery. Notwithstanding this amendment, the revised compliance
specification equally divides her 1997 earnings of $10, 537.60
from Mercury Manufacturing between the first and second
quarters of 1997. The gross backpay calculation took the ex-
cepted period of June 1997 into account. Gross backpay was
computed on the basis of 13 weeks in the first quarter but only
9 weeks in the second quarter. The General Counsel presented
no rationale for treating Warren’s earnings from Mercury dif-
ferently for the manner in which gross backpay was computed.
Warren’s earnings from Mercury Manufacturing should be
treated in the same manner as the gross backpay calculation, 13
weeks in the first quarter and 9 weeks in the second quarter of
1997, a total of 22 weeks. Her total earnings of $10,537.60,
when divided by 22, give an average of $478.98 per week.
Thus, in the first quarter of 1997, 13 weeks, Warren earned
$6226.74. In April and May, a total of 9 weeks, she earned
$4310.82. Both of these figures exceed the gross backpay fig-
ures for those quarters.
Regarding Warren’s quitting of her employment, there is no
evidence that her action was related to her job at Mercury
Manufacturing. Warren testified that her daughter “was having
surgery and I quit to take care of her.” There is no evidence that
her quitting was for other than this personal reason. When a
discriminatee quits interim employment “the burden shifts to
the Government to show that the decision to quit was reason-
able.” Minette Mills, Inc., 316 NLRB 1009, 1010 (1995). War-
ren’s daughter was over 18, an adult.4 The General Counsel

3 The compliance specification miscalculates gross backpay for the
last 12 weeks of the third quarter at $4,903.93, rather than $4,903.92
($408.66 x 12).
4 In November 1992, on her unemployment eligibility document,
Warren represented that she had no children under the age of 14. Thus,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 836
adduced no evidence relating to the necessity that Warren quit
her job, such as the amount of care required by the particular
surgery her daughter underwent or the unavailability of other
caregivers. No evidence was adduced relating to any attempt by
Warren to obtain a leave of absence or to obtain reemployment
at Mercury Manufacturing in July, following the excepted pe-
riod. In view of the foregoing, I find that the General Counsel
has not shown that Warren’s quitting of interim employment
was reasonable. Sorenson Lighted Controls, 297 NLRB 282,
283 (1989). Consistent with the Board’s holding in Knicker-
bocker Plastic Co., 132 NLRB 1209, 1215 (1953), I shall offset
the Respondent’s liability after the excepted period with the
earnings she would have continued to receive from Mercury
Manufacturing. Those earnings, at $6,226.74 per quarter, ex-
ceed the earnings that the compliance specification projects she
would have received from Taylor for the remainder of her
backpay period.
In summary, I find that the Respondent is liable for backpay
to Warren as alleged in the revised compliance specification
beginning in the third quarter of 1992 through the first quarter
of 1995, a total of $36,613.06. The Respondent’s liability for
the second quarter of 1995 is $2,540.44. The Respondent is
liable for no backpay in the third and fourth quarters of 1995
and first second quarters of 1996. The Respondent’s liability in
the third quarter of 1996 is $433.14 and in the fourth quarter it
is $1,708.09, as alleged in the revised compliance specification.
Consistent with my findings, an appropriate allocation of War-

even assuming her daughter was exactly 14 at that time, in 1997 she
would have been over 18.
ren’s earnings over the first 22 weeks of 1997 results in no
backpay liability to the Respondent in the first and second quar-
ters of 1997. Warren’s projected earnings from Mercury for the
remainder of her backpay period exceed her gross backpay as
alleged in the specification. Warren had no medical expenses. I
find that Warren is entitled to $41,294.73 in backpay.
ORDER
The Respondent, Taylor Machine Products, Inc., Taylor,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall,
consistent with the compliance specification as modified by the
foregoing findings, satisfy the obligation to make whole the
following employees by paying them the following amounts,
together with interest thereon accrued to the date of payment
computed in the manner described in New Horizons for the
Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), minus tax withholdings
required by Federal and State laws.

Name Backpay Medical
Expenses
Total
James Howells $ 16,410.13 0 $ 16,410.13
Vernadette Bader $ 62,719.66 $ 1,067.40 $ 63,787.06
Ruth Cecil $ 14,293.58 $ 1,208.88 $ 15,502.46
Josephine Mallia $ 3,950.71 $ 6,789.80 $ 10,740.51
Floria Russell $ 26,272.57 $ 147.00 $ 26,419.57
Rosemary Smith $ 14,119.08 0 $ 14,119.57
Bonnie Warren $ 41,294.73 0 $ 41,294.73

Total $179,060.46 $ 9,213.08 $188,273.54