In Bourne, we held that interrogation which does not contain express threats is not an unfair labor practice unless certain "fairly severe standards" are met showing that the very fact of interrogation was coercive.
In Texas Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 336 F.2d 128 (5 Cir. 1964), the court held that charges filed by the Union that alleged generally that the company had "engaged in * * * unfair labor practices within the meaning of" Section 8(a)(1) and (3), and then alleged specifically various acts of coercion against a named employee was sufficient to include unfair labor practices by the company against other employees which were not mentioned in the charges.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.1953), for example, an assistant supervisor in his employer's accounting department was, upon a consideration of the nature of his work, determined not to be a supervisor for purposes of litigating his discharge from employment, and, therefore, he was entitled to the protections of the National Labor Relations Act. 204 F.2d at 886.
In N.L.R.B. v. Melrose Processing Co., 8 Cir., 351 F.2d 693, also decided since this case was submitted, this court stated that if the factual conclusion of the Board is based upon substantial evidence on the whole record, this court must accept such factual determination as binding. Jas. H. Matthews Co. v. N.L.R.B., 8 Cir., 354 F.2d 432, decided December 29, 1965, adheres to these principles.
29 U.S.C. § 160 Cited 7,062 times 23 Legal Analyses
Finding that the procedures for unfair labor practice cases mandated by R.C. 4117.12 and 4117.13 are substantively identical to those established in NLRA to govern unfair labor practice cases before NLRB