Standard Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 11, 1975

219 N.L.R.B. 93 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

WELSH PLASTICS, LTD.
Welsh Aircraft , Inc., d/b/a Welsh Plastics , Ltd., a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Industries,
Inc. and International Union, Allied Industrial
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and Its Local
Union No. 454 . Case 7-CA-11549
July 11, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On March 31, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Ar-
nold Ordman issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief '
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Welsh Aircraft, Inc., d/b/a
Welsh Plastics, Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Standard Industries, Inc., Vassar, Michigan, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
i Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied since the re-
cord , the exceptions , and the brief adequately present the issues and posi-
tions of the parties.
2 Respondent's motion for the receipt of additional testimony or admis-
sion of the transcript in the Michigan Employment Security Commission
hearing held after the hearing in the present case is hereby denied . Respon-
dent contends that such testimony would show that its refusal to execute the
contract was not the sole reason for the strike , and that the implementation
of the wage portion of the new agreement is not an admission that there was
agreement to the entire proposed contract because the increase was granted
during negotiations to keep peace and allow it to continue its operations
We would find the strike herein to be an unfair labor practice strike whether
the sole reason for it was Respondent 's refusal to sign the contract or wheth-
er such refusal was a reason for the strike . And we would find a complete
agreement had been reached between Respondent and the Union even with-
out reliance upon evidence of implementation.
Additionally , after the close of the hearing , Respondent filed a motion to
strike pleadings , order new hearing, censure General Counsel, and disquali-
fication of Administrative Law Judge . We hereby deny the motion as com-
pletely lacking in merit . We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that
there was no violation of the attorney-client privilege in allowing Bernard
Fieger to testify , and that there was no impropriety committed by either the
Administrative Law Judge or the General Counsel in this connection
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE I
93
ARNOLD ORDMAN, Administrative Law Judge: Pursuant
to an unfair labor practice charge filed on October 31,
1974, by the Charging Party, herein called the Union, Gen-
eral Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board on
December 12, 1974, issued a complaint against Respon-
dent . In essence , the complaint alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, by refusing to execute a written
contract embodying a collective-bargaining agreement
which Respondent and the Union had previously made.
The complaint further alleges that a strike engaged in by
Respondent's employees, beginning October 16, 1974, was
in protest against that refusal and, hence, is an unfair labor
practice strike. Respondent's answer to the complaint, dat-
ed December 19, 1974, challenges the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over Respondent's enterprise and puts the General
Counsel to proof on the major substantive allegations of
the complaint.
Hearing was conducted before me on the controverted
issues on February 12, 1975. Following the close of the
hearing, General Counsel and the Union submitted written
briefs. Upon the entire record, my observation of the wit-
nesses, and due consideration of the briefs, I make the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Prefatory Statement: The Due Process Issue
Before dealing with the jurisdictional and substantive is-
sues here presented, it is appropriate at the outset to rule
upon Respondent's claim that it was deprived of due pro-
cess in the instant hearing by violation of the attorney-
client privilege.
The relevant facts can be succinctly stated. Bernard
Fieger, an attorney, not of counsel for the Respondent in
this proceeding, was the principal negotiator for manage-
ment in numerous bargaining sessions with the Union. As
noted, General Counsel urges that a collective bargaining
agreement was consummated at these bargaining sessions
which Respondent later refused to execute. Accordingly,
General Counsel issued a subpena for Bernard Fieger and
presented him as its first witness in the prosecution of its
case at the instant hearing. Before Fieger took the stand,
Respondent's counsel announced on the record that it was
instructing the witness "not to answer any questions or
make available any documents under attorney-client privi-
i Shortly after the hearing opened, under circumstances more fully de-
scribed hereunder, counsel for Respondent withdrew from the hearing.
I Respondent did not submit a brief but instead mailed a document ad-
dressed to the Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor
Relations Board, the office where the complaint herein originated . The doc-
ument is entitled "Motion to Strike Pleadings , Order New Hearing, Censure
General Counsel and Disqualification of Administrative Law Judge." Put-
ting aside questions as to the propriety and sufficiency of this action,
Respondent 's motion and a supporting memorandum filed therewith will be
considered as a brief for purposes of this proceeding
219 NLRB No. 19
94 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
leges ." Fieger then took the stand . Following a few prelimi-
nary questions , General Counsel asked Fieger to identify a
letter the latter had written on February 26, 1974, to Rob-
ert Kellerman , Regional Representative of the Union, stat-
ing that the writer had been retained by Respondent to
represent it in bargaining negotiations with the Union.
Counsel for Respondent immediately renewed his objec-
tion to violation of the attorney -client privilege , indicated
that he was prepared to lodge a complaint against the wit-
ness with the Bar Grievance Committee and stated that the
undersigned was acting improperly in permitting violation
of the attorney -client privilege . The undersigned stated his
ruling that the particular matter under inquiry , namely,
identification of the letter written by the witness to the
Union, was not improper , and that no ruling as to other
matters was being made . Nevertheless , counsel for Respon-
dent withdrew from the hearing , repeating his objection as
to violation of the lawyer -client privilege . Testimony by
Attorney Fieger was completed and the hearing was pro-
cessed to completion with no further participation by Re-
spondent or its counsel of record.
The legal issue posed herein is simple and straightfor-
ward . Absent a waiver , an attorney 's testimony as to confi-
dential communications between himself and his client is
privileged against disclosure , and a proper objection
lodged against such disclosure must be sustained. On the
other hand , the essence of the privilege is that the commu-
nications in question are confidential . Where a third per-
son or persons are present , who are not agents of the client
or of the attorney, the essential element of confidentiality
disappears . 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2311 (McNaughton rev.
1961). In the instant case no questions were directed to
Fieger and no testimony was given by him relating to pri-
vate communications or instructions between him and his
client nor were any documents sought or produced which
were of such a nature . The sole content of the examination
of Fieger was the identification and introduction of the
letter written by Fieger to the Union stating his role as
negotiator for Respondent and the recital of what tran-
spired and what was said and done at bargaining sessions
attended by Fieger and other representatives of Respon-
dent together with Kellerman and employee representa-
tives of the Union . The element of confidentiality essential
to invocation of the attorney -client privilege is wholly ab-
sent . In essence , the question here posed is , as General
Counsel phrases it (Brief , p. 5), "whether a bargaining ne-
gotiator who is also an attorney can testify to events equal-
ly within the knowledge of union representatives ." Here,
no evidence was sought or elicited to which the attorney-
client privilege attached and Respondent 's contention in
this regard is wholly without merit . See Wigmore, supra. See
also N. L.R.B. v . Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 903-906 (C.A. 4,
1965), and cases and authorities there cited.
We now turn to the substantive issues in the case.
1. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Respondent is a Michigan corporation with its only office
and place of businesses in Vassar, Michigan, where it is
engaged in the business of providing custom decorating
services on parts for the automotive industry. The issue as
to whether Respondent does sufficient business affecting
interstate commerce to justify the Board's assertion of ju-
risdiction in this proceeding is, however, sharply contested.
The complaint, as initially issued, alleged that during the
year ending December 31, 1974, Respondent sold and dis-
tributed products valued in excess of $60,000 of which
products valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped from its
place of business in Michigan directly to customers to
points outside that state. Pursuant to information received
as a result of a pre-hearing subpena served upon Respon-
dent by General Counsel, General Counsel served notice
that it intended, at the opening of the hearing, to amend
the foregoing allegation by further alleging indirect out-
flow, i.e., the shipment of goods to facilities in Michigan
which, in turn, were engaged in interstate commerce. That
motion was made at the opening of the hearing and grant-
ed.
In this connection all parties agreed to the introduction
into evidence of an affidavit executed by Frank Ferko,
Respondent's vice-president and general manager.3 The af-
fidavit revealed, inter alia, that Respondent made sales val-
ued in excess of $156,000 to Chevrolet Motors, a division
of General Motors, which clearly is in interstate commerce
and over which the Board has consistently asserted juris-
diction. In addition, the affidavit reveals that Respondent
made direct sales in excess of $30 ,000 to Kusan, Inc., an
out-of-state employer.
On this showing alone, I find that the Board's assertion
of jurisdiction is warranted. Square Binding and Ruling Co.,
Inc., 146 NLRB 206, 208-209 (1964), and cases there cited.
The Board has uniformly ruled that where direct outflow
does not total in excess of $50,000, jurisdiction may be
asserted by combining direct and indirect outflow. R. E.
Smith, et al., 129 NLRB 1342, 1343-1344 (1961), and cases
there cited.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act. I find further, as amply demonstrated in the
record, that the Union is an organization which admits
employees to membership and deals with employers con-
cerning grievances and terms and conditions of employ-
ment , thus qualifying as a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Evidence
In 1965 Robert Kellerman, Regional Representative for
the Union, conducted a successful organizing campaign
among the employees at the Vassar plant involved herein,
which was then known as Welsh Industries. A Board certi-
fication resulted and a series of collective bargaining agree-
ments were entered into, the most recent of which expired
on April 30, 1974. The appropriate unit of employees is
alleged, and I find it, to be as follows:
3 This stipulation was entered into before Respondent 's counsel withdrew
from the hearing.
WELSH PLASTICS, LTD. 95
All employees employed at the Company's plant in
Vassar, Michigan; but excluding all professional em-
ployees, technical employees, sales employees, ac-
counting employees, industrial relations employees,
confidential employees, office clerical employees, and
all guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
On March 13, 1974, about 1-1/2 months before expira-
tion of the most recent collective bargaining agreement, the
Local Union president, Estella Johnson, was informed by
management that the name of the enterprise was being
changed from Welsh Industries to Welsh Aircraft, Inc.,
d/b/a Welsh Plastics, Inc., and that all employees were
being fired but would be called back in a few days to work
under the new name. A notice posted in the plant the fol-
lowing day read as follows:
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Effective 7:00 a.m. March 14, 1974, operations will
cease . Welsh Industries will no longer exist. All em-
ployees connected with Welsh Industries are terminat-
ed.
This facility will re-open Monday, 3/18/74 at 7:00
a.m. as Welsh Plastics, Ltd., a new Michigan Corpora-
tion. All employees will be automatically rehired, se-
niority rights shall carry forward and the present con-
tract between Management and Union shall be
honored until it's [sic] expiration date.
I would like to take this opportunity to wish the hearti-
est success to this new enterprise. It will require co-
operation [sic] between Management & Union and a
100% effort by all to insure success and long life.
John L. Canu
Gen. Mgr.
All employees were given two days off and operations re-
sumed on March 18, 1974. All employees returned on that
day to the same job and the same shift. There was no
change in seniority, in job content, in product line, in serv-
ices provided, or in customers serviced. There was also no
change in the manner of processing grievances , and man-
agement continued to recognize the Union as the collective
bargaining representative of the employees not only with
respect to the processing of grievances but also with respect
to negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement.
Indeed, so far as operations, employee relations, and em-
ployer-union relationships were concerned, there was no
change whatever except the change in the name of the en-
terprise.
In the meantime, as noted, bargaining negotiations be-
tween management and the Union were being instituted.
Following an exchange of correspondence in February,
1974 between Kellerman and Fieger in which the latter
made known that he was authorized to serve as bargaining
representative for management,' a series of bargaining ses-
sions took place between representatives of the Union and
representatives of management. These meetings were de-
voted to negotiating a new agreement to succeed the agree-
4 Indeed, Fieger testified that he had been employed by Respondent's
parent company, Standard Industries , Inc., to represent it in connection
with the negotiations with employees in several subsidiary enterprises in-
cluding Welsh Industries.
ment expiring on April 30, 1974. The bargaining sessions
were held on April 11, 23 and 24 and on May 1, 1974.
Fieger, accompanied by other representatives of manage-
ment including John Canu, manager of the Vassar plant,
attended all but the first of these sessions and was the prin-
cipal spokesman for management. Kellerman, accompa-
nied by the employees comprising the Local Union com-
mittee , was the principal spokesman for the Union.
All testimony as to the negotiations, that given by Fieg-
er, by Kellerman, and by Johnson and Taylor, as Local
Union committee members, was in accord that on the final
meeting in this series , the meeting on May 1, 1974, full
agreement was reached on all the terms of a new collective
bargaining agreement and that Fieger and Kellerman, as
the respective principal spokesmen, shook hands on the
"deal." An arrangement was also made that Fieger would
draft the written contract embodying the agreement made.
Two days later, by agreement with management, the em-
ployees were released from work for a Union meeting at
which the membership ratified the agreement made at the
May 1 meeting.
A few days after May 1, 1974, John Canu was killed in
an airplane crash. He was succeeded as general manager
by Frank Ferko who had not attended any of the prior
bargaining sessions.
Fieger did not prepare the written contract as had been
arranged. Repeated requests for that contract by Keller-
man over the next few months, made to Fieger, to Ferko
and to Fuller, another management official, were unsuc-
cessful . Finally in late August of 1974, Kellerman, with the
acquiescence of management, prepared a draft of the con-
tract which had been agreed upon utilizing his own notes
from the negotiating meetings and the predecessor con-
tract, much of which was unchanged.
On October 8, another meeting was held with manage-
ment at which Kellerman submitted the new contract to
management for signature. Ferko, the new manager, re-
fused to sign it and expressed his dissatisfaction with sever-
al of its provisions. Ferko made no claim that the contract
submitted for signature did not reflect the agreement
reached at the prior bargaining sessions . His objection was
merely that he would not have agreed to the provisions he
found unacceptable, had he been present at the prior bar-
gaining sessions.
On October 16, 1974, Respondent's employees went on
strike , a strike which was still current at the time of the
hearing herein. The sole reason for the strike was the pro-
test against Respondent's refusal to execute the contract
embodying the collective bargaining agreement previously
made . Mediation efforts to resolve the dispute were insti-
tuted and representatives of Respondent and the Union
met on October 28, and November -14, 1974. At the No-
vember 14 meeting, Attorney Stockier, who had never ap-
peared at any prior meeting, submitted a new contract pro-
posal by Respondent which varied substantially from the
terms previously agreed upon. Stockier also stated, the first
time any such statement was made, that the prior negotia-
tors for Respondent had no authority to negotiate any such
agreement and any arrangements they made were subject
to approval by the home office of the Company. Ferko,
who was also present at the November 14 meeting, indi-
96 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cated that this was the first time he had learned of this
asserted lack of authority. The proposed new contract was
rejected by the Union which adhered to its position that an
agreement had already been made.
B. Analysis and Concluding Findings
Section 8(d) of the Act expressly prescribes the obliga-
tion of an employer or a union engaged in collective bar-
gaining to execute a written contract , upon request, incor-
porating any agreement reached . The evidence in this case
is undisputed that a complete collective bargaining agree-
ment was reached on May 1, 1974, and was ratified by vote
of the Union membership two days later. Indeed, the re-
cord shows that shortly thereafter , Respondent implement-
ed the wage portion of that agreement by granting the raise
therein provided retroactive to May 1, 1974, as had also
been provided.
At no time during the extensive bargaining negotiations
was it even suggested that Fieger and the management rep-
resentatives who accompanied him at the bargaining ses-
sions lacked authority to enter into an agreement or that
approval by some higher management authority was re-
quired as a precondition to such an agreement . That asser-
tion was made for the first time at the November 14 meet-
ing more than 6 months after the agreement under
consideration was consummated , and this belated assertion
even came as a surprise to Frank Ferko, Respondent's new
plant manager for the preceding several months.
I am satisfied and find that Fieger and his conegotiators,
including the then plant manager, John Canu, had com-
plete authority to negotiate a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the Union and that the belated claim of lack of
such authority was a pretext contrived to evade
Respondent's statutory obligation to execute a contract in-
corporating the agreement reached.5
To be sure, Bernard Fieger did not carry out his commit-
ment made at the May I meeting to draft the contract
implementing the collective bargaining agreement there
consummated 6 After futile efforts to obtain such a con-
tract from Fieger, the task was undertaken by Kellerman
with the acquiescence of management . No evidence was
adduced nor was any suggestion made that the written
contract which Kellerman drew-and which has been in-
troduced into evidence-did not reflect accurately the col-
lective-bargaining agreement which was finally consum-
5 This finding obviates the necessity of ruling on the contention , advanced
by the Union in its brief to me, that , even assuming arguendo the absence of
actual authority, Respondent would be estopped, under familiar principles
of "apparent authority" embodied in the law of agency , from challenging
the binding effect of the actions taken by Fieger and his conegotiators in
consummating the agreement of May 1. I believe the record in the instant
case would warrant such a finding , if required . Significant, in any event, is
the provision of Sec 2(13) of the Act that in "determining whether any
person is acting as an `agent ' of another person so as to make such other
person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts
performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be
controlling."
6 The record contains a suggestion that his failure to do so may have been
attributable to the fact that he was not paid for his services But that is
merely speculative , was not fully explored at the hearing, and a determina-
tion in that regard is not required here.
mated at the May I meeting. Indeed, the evidence is to tl
contrary. I find that that contract, submitted to Respo
dent for signature, did embody the collective-bargainir
agreement previously reached.
Remaining for consideration is the suggestion or clai
that the change occurring on May 14, 1974, when Welt
Industries became Welsh Plastics, Ltd., absolved Respoi
dent of any prior obligation or commitment to the Unioi
I find this claim, too, to be without merit. As already ind
cated, all that occurred at that time was a change of narr
and a 2-day break in employment. All business operatior
remained the same and no change in employment relatior
ships was made. Respondent even acknowledged in I
March 14 notice to the employees that all employees wet
automatically rehired, that seniority rights would be cat
ried forward and that the existing contract would be hor
ored. Furthermore, Respondent resists only the executio
of the contract. It continues to acknowledge the status c
the Union as bargaining representative of its employee
and, in the papers it most recently filed (supra, fn. 2), at
serts that it is "ready, willing and able to collective bargain
ing in good faith [sic]" with the Union.
Even more significant, however, is the fact that the bar
gaining sessions , which culminated in the bargaining agree
merit of May 1, did not begin until April 1974 after th,
change of name had taken place. Yet no mention wa
made either by Fieger, principal spokesman for manage
merit, or by his conegotiator, Canu, manager of both Welsl
Industries and Welsh Plastics , Ltd., and author of thi
March 14 notice, that the earlier change of name of thi
enterprise had any significance either with respect to tht
obligation of management to bargain with the Union of
the authority of the management representatives at the bar,
gaining meetings to enter into a binding collective -bargain
ing agreement.
In this posture of the record, no serious problem of suc•
cessorship is raised . In essence , we are dealing here with a
continuing enterprise which has merely undergone a
change of name. Settled authority confirms that on the
facts presented here, Respondent is not exonerated from
full compliance with its statutory bargaining obligation.
See N.L. R.B. v. William J. Burns International Detective
Agency, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Columbia Marine Service,
Inc., 191 NLRB 197 (1971); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Sac-
ramento, 187 NLRB 1017 (1971).
Accordingly, I conclude and find that Respondent, by
failing and refusing to execute a written contract incorpo-
rating the collective-bargaining agreement previously
reached with the Union, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. It follows further that the employees by engaging
in a strike on October 16, 1974, in protest against that fail-
ure and refusal, were engaging in an unfair labor practice
strike which, the record shows, was still in progress at the
time of the hearing. I so find.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Welsh Aircraft, Inc., d/b/a Welsh Plastics, Ltd., a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Industries , Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) the Act.
WELSH PLASTICS , LTD. 97
2. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, and its Local Union No. 454, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. All employees of the employer named above em-
ployed at its plant in Vassar, Michigan, but excluding all
professional employees, technical employees, sales employ-
ees, accounting employees, industrial relations employees,
confidential employees, office clerical employees, and all
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a
unit appropriate for bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(b) of the Act.
4. The above-named labor organization is the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in the above-
described appropriate unit within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
5. By failing and refusing to execute a written contract
with the above-named labor organization incorporating a
collective-bargaining agreement reached with that labor
organization, the above-named employer has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. By engaging in a strike in protest against the unfair
labor practice described in paragraph 5, the employees of
the above-named employer have engaged in and are engag-
ing in an unfair labor practice strike.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, the statute requires that Respon-
dent be required to cease and desist from engaging in such
unlawful conduct. Appropriate affirmative relief will also
be prescribed by requiring Respondent to execute the writ-
ten contract incorporating the collective bargaining agree-
ment previously reached. East Texas Steel Castings Co.,
191 NLRB 113 (1971). In addition, having found that
Respondent's employees have engaged in and are engaging
in an unfair labor practice strike, I shall direct that, upon
their request, Respondent reinstate them to their former
jobs. The customary notice-posting and reporting require-
ments will also be included in the remedial order.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I recommend the following:
ORDER?
Respondent, Welsh Aircraft, Inc., d/b/a Welsh Plastics,
Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Industries,
Inc., its officers, agents , successors and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to execute and give effect to the
written contract between it and Allied Industrial Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local 454, effective May 1,
1974, through April 30, 1976, and incorporating the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement previously reached.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Execute, deliver, and give effect, including retroac-
tive effect, to the above contract embodying its collective-
bargaining agreement and effective from May 1, 1974,
through April 30, 1976.
(b) Upon request, reinstate its employees, who went on
strike on October 16, 1974, to their former jobs.
(c) Post at its Vassar, Michigan, facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of the no-
tice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 7, after being duly signed by its representative, shall
be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt there-
of, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
7 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
8 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to execute, and give effect
to, a contract embodying a collective-bargaining
agreement previously reached by us with an exclusive
bargaining representative of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL execute, deliver and give effect to the con-
tract embodying our May 1, 1974, collective-bargain-
ing agreement with Allied Industrial Workers, AFL-
CIO, and its Local Union No. 454, effective May 1,
1974, through April 30, 1976.
WE WILL, upon request, reinstate our employees,
who went on strike on October 16, 1974, in protest
against our refusal to execute that contract, to their
former jobs.
WELSH AIRCRAFT, INC., d/b/a WELSH PLASTICS,
LTD., A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF STANDARD
INDUSTRIES, INC.