Stahl Specialty Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 20, 2016

364 NLRB No. 56 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 56
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Stahl Specialty Company and International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers Local 1464 Affiliated
with the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL–CIO. Case 17–CA–088639
July 20, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS HIROZAWA
AND MCFERRAN
On September 30, 2013, Administrative Law Judge
Christine E. Dibble issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering
briefs, and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
On April 22, 2016, following an unpublished remand
order by the Board, the judge issued the attached Order
Ratifying and Adopting Decision. The Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel
filed an answering brief and the Respondent filed a reply
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2

1 The Respondent excepted to some of the judge’s credibility find-
ings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administra-
tive law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance
of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stand-
ard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d
Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis
for reversing the findings.
The Board’s Order remanding this proceeding to the judge, available
at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/17-CA-088639, rejected the Respondent’s
argument that the Acting General Counsel lacked authority to issue the
complaint in this matter.
We affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(1) of the Act by posting literature threatening employees with
permanent job loss if they were replaced by new hires during a strike.
We do not, however, rely on the failure of the posting to make clear
that it refers only to economic strikers. Statements, like those in the
posting, that strikers can “lose their jobs,” are unlawful even if they
refer only to economic strikers. See Baddour, Inc., 303 NLRB 275,
275 (1991); Larson Tool & Stamping Co., 296 NLRB 895, 895—896
(1989).
We also affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging employee Patrick Armstrong. In doing
so, however, we make the following modifications to the judge’s analy-
sis. First, we do not rely on Armstrong’s participation in the Union’s
handbilling campaign to establish that Armstrong engaged in union
activity prior to his discharge because Armstrong did not handbill until
after his discharge. As explained by the judge, however, Armstrong
engaged in a variety of other union activity prior to his discharge.
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Stahl Specialty Company, Kingsville, Mis-
souri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees for supporting the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers Local 1464 affiliated with the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO
or any other labor organization.

Second, in addition to the factors cited by the judge establishing that
the Respondent knew of Armstrong’s union activity, we find that Ma-
chining Manager Kenneth Stewart’s unlawful interrogation of Arm-
strong in late July 2012 further establishes that the Respondent had
identified Armstrong as a union supporter prior to his discharge. See
Mardi Gras Casino & Hollywood Concessions, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 59
(2014), incorporating by reference 359 NLRB No. 100, slip op. at 2
(2013). Third, with respect to the Respondent’s disciplinary investiga-
tion of Armstrong, although the parties do not agree on the number of
meetings, if any, that the Respondent conducted with Armstrong during
the course of its investigation into his conduct on August 26–27, 2012,
the judge found, and we agree, that any such meetings do not under-
mine the ultimate conclusion that the Respondent “deliberately con-
ducted an inadequate investigation into the charges against Armstrong
to justify terminating him.”
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawfully dis-
charged Armstrong, we agree with the judge that the Respondent’s
failure to follow its progressive discipline policy is evidence of animus.
We find, however, that the record is sufficient to demonstrate animus
even without relying on that evidence.
Member McFerran does not rely on the Respondent’s failure to fol-
low its disciplinary policy to demonstrate animus because it does not
appear from the record that the Respondent consistently adhered to the
progressive discipline steps within the policy when disciplining or
discharging other employees. She otherwise finds the evidence suffi-
cient to show that the General Counsel met his initial burden under
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
2 The judge cited a number of cases decided by panels that included
persons whose appointments to the Board were not valid. See NLRB v.
Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014). We do not rely on her citation to
Connecticut Humane Society, 358 NLRB 187 (2012). Instead, we rely
on Baddour, Inc., 303 NLRB 275, 275 (1991), and Larson Tool &
Stamping Co., 296 NLRB 895, 895—896 (1989). With respect to the
judge’s citation to Hoodview Vending Co., 359 NLRB 187 (2012), we
note that a properly constituted Board reaffirmed that decision at 362
NLRB No. 81 (2015). The judge also cited Relco Locomotives, Inc.,
358 NLRB 298 (2012). Prior to the issuance of Noel Canning, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit enforced
the Board’s Order, see 734 F.3d 764 (2013), and there is no question
regarding the validity of that court’s judgment.
3 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to her
unfair labor practice findings and to the Board’s standard remedial
language. In accordance with AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363
NLRB No. 143 (2016), we shall modify the judge’s recommended
remedy and Order to provide for tax compensation and Social Security
reporting remedies. We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the
Order as modified.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
(b) Placing employees under surveillance while they
engage in union or other protected concerted activities.
(c) Threatening employees with closure of their work
facility if they select the Union as their bargaining repre-
sentative.
(d) Coercively interrogating employees about their un-
ion membership, activities, sympathies, and/or support.
(e) Threatening employees with permanent job loss if
they were replaced by new hires during a strike.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Patrick Armstrong full reinstatement to his former job or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Patrick Armstrong whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of the decision.
(c) Compensate Patrick Armstrong for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and file with the Regional Director for Region 17,
within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar
years.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to Patrick Armstrong’s un-
lawful discharge, and within 3 days thereafter, notify
Armstrong in writing that this has been done and that the
discharge will not be used against him in any way.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Warrensburg, Missouri, copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
17, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous plac-
es, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading, “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since May 31, 2012.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 17 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 20, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against you for supporting the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers Local 1464 affiliated with the In-
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 3
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO
or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT place you under surveillance while you
engage in union or other protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with closure of your work
facility if you select the Union as your bargaining repre-
sentative.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you about your
union membership, activities, sympathies, and/or sup-
port.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with permanent job loss if
you were replaced by new hires during a strike.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
offer Patrick Armstrong full reinstatement to his former
job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Patrick Armstrong whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits resulting from his dis-
charge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL compensate Patrick Armstrong for the ad-
verse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum
backpay award, and WE WILL file with the Regional Di-
rector for Region 17, within 21 days of the date the
amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or
Board order, a report allocating the backpay award to the
appropriate calendar years.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful dis-
charge of Patrick Armstrong, and WE WILL, within 3 days
thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done
and that we will not use the discharge against him in any
way.
STAHL SPECIALTY CO.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/17-CA-088639 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.
Anne C. Peressin, Esq., for the Acting General Counsel.
Chris Mitchell, Esq. and Catherine Crowe, Esq., for the Re-
spondent.
Thomas H. Marshall, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHRISTINE E. DIBBLE, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Overland Park, Kansas, on January 15–18, 2013,
and March 28, 2013. The International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers Local 1464 affiliated with the International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO (the Charging Party)
filed the charge on September 5, 2012.1 The first amended
charge was filed by the Charging Party on September 18 and a
second amended charge filed on November 28. The Acting
General Counsel2 issued the complaint on November 29. The
Respondent filed a timely answer on December 5.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA/the
Act) when (1) on or about May 31, June 13, 18, and 26, July
17, 24, and 26, and August 2 and 14, the Respondent, through
Jeanne Adams, engaged in surveillance of employees’ union or
other protected concerted activities;3 (2) on or about July 26,
the Respondent, through Jim Spalding, threatened employees
with facility closure if they selected the Union as their collec-
tive-bargaining representative;4 (3) on or about July 26, the
Respondent, through Ken Stewart, interrogated its employees
about their union membership and activities and the union sen-
timents and activities of other employees;5 (4) on or about July
26, the Respondent, through Ken Stewart, solicited employee
complaints and grievances, and promised its employees in-
creased benefits and improved terms and conditions of em-
ployment if they refrained from union organizational activity;6
(5) on or about late July or early August 2012, the Respondent,
through Jim Spalding, threatened not to hire employees’ rela-
tives because the employees engaged in union or other protect-
ed, concerted activities;7 (6) on or about late July or early Au-
gust 2012, the Respondent posted literature at its facility that
threatened employees with permanent job loss if they were
replaced by new hires during a strike;8 and (7) on or about Au-
gust 30, the Respondent discharged its employee, Patrick Chris-
tian Armstrong, because he formed, joined, and assisted the
Union and engaged in concerted protected activities.9
On the entire record,10 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed

1 All dates are in 2012, unless otherwise indicated.
2 The Acting General Counsel is referenced as the General Counsel.
3 This allegation is alleged in par. 5(a) of the complaint.
4 This allegation is alleged in par. 5(b) of the complaint.
5 This allegation is alleged in par. 5(c) of the complaint.
6 This allegation is alleged in par. 5(d) of the complaint. The General
Counsel, however, admitted that no evidence was presented in support
of this allegation. (GC Br. 50.)
7 This allegation is alleged in par. 5(e) of the complaint.
8 This allegation is alleged in par. 6 of the complaint.
9 This allegation is alleged in par. 7 of the complaint.
10 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran-
script; “R. Exh.” for the Respondent’s exhibit; “GC Exh.” for General
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, engages in the manufacture
and nonretail sale of permanent mold aluminum castings at its
facility in Warrensburg, Missouri. (Tr. 16; GC Exh. 1-O.) Dur-
ing the 12-month period ending September 30, 2012, the Re-
spondent annually sold and shipped from its Warrensburg, Mis-
souri facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
points outside the State of Missouri. During the 12-month pe-
riod ending September 30, 2012, the Respondent as described
above, purchased and received at its Warrensburg, Missouri
facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
outside the State of Missouri. The Respondent admits, and I
find, that at all material times it has been an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act. (GC Exh. 1-O.)
At all material times, the Union has been a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview of Respondent’s Operation
Since 1946, the Respondent has been a privately held corpo-
ration, becoming a subsidiary of Ligon Industries on December
31, 2010. (Tr. 387.) The Respondent operates facilities in War-
rensburg and Kingsville, MIissouri, and employs approximately
270 hourly and salaried workers.11 (Tr. 406.) The Warrensburg
facility consists of several departments for the manufacture and
non-retail sale of permanent mold aluminum casting parts for
motorized vehicles. The departments are: foundry, processing,
heat treat, machining, warehouse, inspection, shipping and
receiving, and maintenance. Approximately 110 to 120 em-
ployees work at the Warrensburg facility. The Respondent’s
headquarters and administrative offices are at the Kingsville,
Missouri location. (Tr. 390.) The Kingsville location also has a
foundry with approximately 150 employees. (Tr. 405–406.)
The plant in Warrensburg is a sprawling facility with its
main entrance facing south on Stahl Drive. Management and
administrative staff park in the employee lot in front of the
building facing Stahl Drive. (Tr. 139–141; GC Exh. 2A.) The
shipping department abuts the manager’s parking lot to the east.
(Tr. 140–141; GC Exh. 2A.) Pride Avenue to the east of the
facility leads to the parking lot for hourly employees. The
hourly employee parking lot is at the end of a long driveway in
the back of the plant. (Tr. 140; GC Exh. 2A.) On the west side
of the facility is private property.
The machine operators in the machining department work on
several machines casting parts for heavy equipment automotive
and marine vehicles. (Tr. 156, 160.) The machining department
includes the following computer numeric control (CNC) ma-

Counsel’s exhibit; “CP Exh.” for the Charging Party’s exhibit; “CP
Br.” for the Charging Party’s brief; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s
brief; and “R. Br.” for the Respondent’s brief.
11 All employees referenced in the decision work in the Warrensburg
facility, unless otherwise noted.
chines: chip claimer; Okumas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; SH-1 and SH-2;
air/leak check machine; and Makinos A81 and A77.12 (Tr. 159–
160, 253–255; GC Exh. 7.) The machine operators have to
complete a predetermined number of parts per hour per shift.
(Tr. 168.) The quotas vary according to the machine they oper-
ate. (Tr. 168–169.) It has been the Respondent’s policy for two
employees to work (“run”) on three machines at the same time
(each employee runs one machine and they share duties on the
third machine). (Tr. 173, 673.)
B. Respondent’s Managerial Staff
Beginning in 2007, James Spalding (Spalding) has been the
Respondent’s president. Since the Respondent became a sub-
sidiary of Lignon Industries, Spalding has reported directly to
its board of directors and its president, Jim Delk (Delk). Spal-
ding is responsible for the Respondent’s overall operation. (Tr.
386–387.) Krishnan Venkatesan (Venkatesan) has been em-
ployed with the Respondent for approximately 4-1/2 years, first
as the technical director and later as plant manager of the
Kingsville foundry. Venkatesan is currently the plant manager
at the Warrensburg facility and reports directly to Spalding. (Tr.
643.) Courtney Wilkins (Wilkins) has worked for the Re-
spondent for more than 5 years as the human resources manag-
er and reports directly to Spalding. (Tr. 777.) From her office
in Kingsville, she administers the Respondent’s employee ben-
efits, policies and procedures, and oversees employee relations
and all other personnel activity. John McBride (McBride) has
worked for the Respondent for 18 years and has been the
foundry manager for 3 years. (Tr. 546.) He reports directly to
Venkatesan. From April 2012 through September 2012, Ken-
neth Stewart (Stewart) was the Respondent’s machining man-
ager in the Warrensburg plant. He was responsible for the ma-
chining department’s three shifts.13 (Tr. 575–576.) Vincent
Stowell (Stowell) has been employed by the Respondent for 15
years. During the past 4-1/2 years, he has been the C-shift
foundry supervisor at the Warrensburg plant. McBride was his
immediate supervisor for the period at issue. (Tr. 524.)
C. Initiation of Union Organizing Campaign
During the past 10 years, the Respondent has been the target
of three union organizing campaigns. The first organizing
campaign occurred from about 2001 to 2002 and involved the
United Auto Workers (UAW). The next union organizing
campaign was undertaken in 2006 with the Teamsters Union.
The current campaign began on April 12, 2012, with the Charg-
ing Party.
Michelle Little (Little), a machine operator for approximate-
ly 9 years with the Respondent,14 contacted the Charging Party,
through her husband, to assist with a union organizing cam-
paign at the Respondent’s Warrensburg facility.15 (Tr. 131–134,

12 The air/leak check machine is not a CNC machine. (Tr. 253.)
13 The three shifts at the Respondent’s facility are: A-shift 7 a.m. to 3
p.m.; B-shift 3 to 11 p.m.; and C-shift 11 p.m. to 7 a.m.
14 Little currently works the A-shift and her immediate supervisor is
McBride. During the period at issue, however, she worked as a ma-
chine operator on the C-shift.
15 All events occurred at the Warrensburg facility, unless otherwise
noted.
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 5
148.) As an early supporter of the organizing campaign, Little
was on the organizing committee, hosted union informational
meetings, and signed and collected union authorization cards.
(Tr. 132–134.) On or about May 1, in response to Little’s re-
quest, the Charging Party sent Jerry Gulizia (Gulizia) to serve
as the lead organizer for the union campaign at the Warrens-
burg facility. (Tr. 194.)
Patrick Armstrong (Armstrong) worked for the Respondent
for 18 years prior to his termination on August 30, 2012. (Tr.
240; GC Exh.6.) He held various positions throughout his ten-
ure with the Respondent, most recently as a production ma-
chine operator labor grade 10 in the machining department at
the Warrensburg plant.16 In addition to supporting the two
prior unionizing efforts (2001 to 2002 and 2006), Armstrong
played a dominant role in the union campaign at issue. He
attended the first union organizing meetings at Little’s house
and thereafter consistently attended the weekly meetings. Arm-
strong also joined the employee organizing committee, solicited
union authorization cards, discussed the benefits of unioniza-
tion with employees, and engaged in handbilling. (Tr. 133,
245.)
D. Respondent’s Initial Actions to Counter the Union
Organizing Campaign
On May 2, Jerry Helms (Helms), maintenance manager, and
McBride reported to Venkatesan rumors of union organizing
efforts. (Tr. 548–550, 552–555.) They told him several of the
employees in the maintenance department had been invited to a
union organizing meeting over the weekend. (Tr. 546, 556–
557.) Shortly after receiving the news about a union campaign,
Venkatesan relayed the information to Spalding. (Tr. 396, 689–
690, 711–712.) Venkatesan also met with Wilkins, McBride,
and Helms to discuss gathering information to confirm that a
union organizing campaign had begun at the plant. (Tr. 693.)
Wilkins learned from Assistant Human Resource Adminis-
trator Jeanne Adams (Adams), that an employee had reported to
her that several employees met over the weekend to discuss
unionizing the Warrensburg facility. (Tr. 398, 807–808.) On
May 2, Wilkins sent Spalding an email notifying him of the
newly discovered information. The email read, “I’d like to
spend a few minutes discussing the “news” in WB. I’d like to
gather a few thoughts from you.” (CP Exh. 2; Tr. 806.) During
the week of May 2, Wilkins also went to the Warrensburg facil-
ity to attend a meeting with several of the managers, Spalding,

16 The official title of Armstrong’s position at the time of his termi-
nation was production machine operator 10. (R. Exh. 2.) The job de-
scription set forth the purpose of the position as: “Operation of CNC
equipment to produce machined aluminum castings and insure proper
quality and quantity. Must be capable of functioning during the absence
of Supervision. Expected to train new and incumbent employees in the
proper process operations and insure that all Safety and Environmental
Policies are understood and followed.” (R. Exh. 2.) There was testimo-
ny that the machine operator labor grade 10 was commonly referred to
within the Respondent’s organization as the “lead”. (Tr. 241, 327–328,
643–645.) Since they are expected to perform other duties to ensure
their shift meets its production quota, leads infrequently operate ma-
chines. (Tr. 241, 331, 339, 583; R. Exh. 2.) It is undisputed that the lead
position is not a supervisory position within the meaning of the Act.
and the Respondent’s attorney in response to the “news” about
the union campaign. (Tr. 807–808.)
Within the first week (May 2) of being notified about rumors
of union activity, Spalding made at least two trips to the War-
rensburg facility to gather information on the union campaign
and strategize with Venkatesan and the supervisors. (Tr. 426.)
On May 2, Spalding drove to the Warrensburg location to speak
with Venkatesan about the rumors. (Tr. 396–399, 404.) During
their discussion, Spalding cautioned Venkatesan not to speak
against the unionizing campaign until he was able to convene a
meeting with the management staff and provide them with
training. (Tr. 407–408) In addition, Spalding questioned
Helms about his knowledge of the union campaign. Helms
again reported that an individual in his department had been
invited to a union informational meeting over the weekend. (Tr.
396, 410.) On a second trip to the plant, Spalding asked
McBride if he had heard employees discussing the union cam-
paign. McBride acknowledged that several workers were talk-
ing about it. (Tr. 424–425.)
On his return from the plant on about May 2, Spalding and
Wilkins consulted with Respondent’s attorney about the actions
they were legally allowed to take to advocate against unioniz-
ing the plant. Based on the feedback he received from the at-
torney, Spalding and Wilkins drafted a speech for Spalding to
read at mandatory staff meetings convened for May 8 and July
25 or 26. (Tr. 310, 422, 819; GC Exh. 5.) He also spoke with
Delk about the status of the organizing campaign. Delk re-
sponded, “Well, our philosophy about unions is we don’t need
them. . . . We run our business in a manner we don’t need that.”
(Tr. 416–417.) He told Spalding to keep him informed on the
pace of the organizing campaign. (Tr. 418.) During the week
of May 2, Spalding, Wilkins, Venkatesan, Stewart, Stowell,
McBride, Helms, Bill Bailey (B-shift supervisor), and the Re-
spondent’s attorney met to discuss the union organizing cam-
paign. In early summer, Spalding also held a second meeting
with the supervisors to discuss the widening nature of the union
organizing campaign. (Tr. 574–549.) Spalding, through a se-
ries of emails, continued to work with his management team to
encourage the employees’ to reject unionization of the plant.
(CP Exh. 9 pp. 2–6.)
E. Surveillance of Employees’ Union Activity
On or about May 1, 2012, Gulizia began working on a union
organizing effort at the Respondent’s Warrensburg facility. He
regularly attended union organizing meetings with some of the
Respondent’s employees and assisted in handbilling at the War-
rensburg facility. (Tr. 194.) Since May 2012, weekly
handbilling has occurred at the Warrensburg facility. (Tr. 783.)
During the shift changes (6 a.m., 2 p.m., 3 p.m., and 5 p.m.),
Gulizia engaged in handbilling primarily on the public road
(Pride Avenue) at the entrance to the driveway leading into the
Respondent’s hourly employee parking lot. (Tr. 195–196, 204–
206.) In late May, Gulizia began to notice that Adams, who
had been identified to him by employees, was observing the
handbilling activity from her car parked on the driveway lead-
ing to the hourly employee parking lot. (GC Exh. 2; Tr. 197.)
He saw her observing the handbilling on about 8 to 12 occa-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
sions for “a few minutes” each time.17 (Tr. 198.) Over a period
of several months, Gulizia also observed on three to five occa-
sions two men unknown to him standing in the doorway of the
facility watching him handbill. (Tr. 199–201, 207.)
Venkatesan first saw the handbilling in June. On two occa-
sions he observed a person distributing handbills on the north-
east corner of the Warrensburg facility but admits that he was
aware of handbilling occurring every Tuesday. (Tr. 727, 739–
738.) He watched the handbilling activity from the window to
the east of the foundry and subsequently retrieved about five of
the handbills to review. (Tr. 721–722, 728, 743.) He admitted-
ly was upset by the handbilling activity because he felt it was
disruptive and at least one employee, Mike Pfeifer, complained
to him about the handbilling. (Tr. 733–735.) Venkatesan in-
formed Spalding that there was handbilling in front of the facil-
ity. (Tr. 727, 732.) Spalding directed him to ensure that no one
conducted handbilling activity on company property. (Tr. 740.)
There were a series of emails from May 2 to September 1,
between Spalding, Adams, and Wilkins discussing people en-
gaged in handbilling at the facility. (Tr. 441–442.) Spalding
admitted, “. . . probably most every time there was handbilling
going on, there was an email that said somebody’s here handing
something out, just an FYI.” (Tr. 445.) On an almost weekly
basis, certain unidentified employees coming into the employee
parking lot would receive a handbill from a union organizer and
later give the handbill to a manager or human resource staff
who would forward it to Spalding. (Tr. 446; CP Exh. 9.) Spal-
ding told Adams to investigate and ensure there was no
handbilling occurring on company property. (Tr. 820.)
F. Management’s Threats to Close the Company if
Union Organizing Successful
In response to information he received that employees were
attempting to unionize, Spalding called two mandatory meet-
ings of the plant. (Tr. 449, 818.) The meetings were held at the
facility in Warrensburg for each of the three shifts. The first
meeting was held on May 8, where Spalding read a prepared
speech that he drafted with assistance from Wilkins. (Tr. 422;
GC Exh. 5.) It is undisputed that in each of the meetings Spal-
ding stated in part:
The other aluminum casting companies that do permanent
mold and low pressure are non-union. That’s no accident, be-
cause Ligon prefers not to operate an aluminum casting com-
pany where the employees choose to be represented by a un-
ion. And they run their companies in a way that they believe
their employees will realize they don’t need a union to repre-
sent them.

17 Spalding claims Adams did not watch handbilling 8 to 12 occa-
sions but was unsure about the number of times. (Tr. 835–836) I do not
credit Spaldings testimony on this point. He has proffered nothing
more than a general denial, without evidence that he had firsthand
knowledge of Adam’s role in the handbilling surveillance. The Re-
spondent did not call Adams as a witness to corroborate Spalding’s
testimony and dispute Gulizia on this point. I also do not credit Spal-
ding’s testimony that an unidentified employee complained to Adams
about people handbilling on company property. There is no evidence to
corroborate his testimony on this point.
I’m telling you that Ligon buys plants and invests in plants
that are efficient and that make a profit so that Ligon can
make a return on its investment. Unions love to have work
rules and other processes in place that create inefficiency and
make it harder to earn a profit. That is why so many union
plants close and that is why we don’t need any union here.
Ligon can invest it’s (sic) money wherever it wants and right
now its investing a lot of it right here in Warrensburg, where
we don’t have a union. I don’t want that to change. For your
future and your families’ future, you don’t want that to change
either.
The point is that the turmoil that goes along with a union or-
ganizing effort distracts all of us from our work and our pri-
orities.
I’ve already told you today the major reason that [unionizing
the plant] would be a bad idea and that is further investments
in this plant would be at risk.
If they ask you to sign a card asking for a union election, just
say no. If they ask you to attend an organizing meeting, just
say no. That will end it!
If [it] doesn’t end it, I’ll be back here talking to you again and
I’ll be talking about more of the reasons that having a union
here would be bad for you, your families and for this Plant.
[Tr. 449; GC Exh. 5.]
Shortly after the speech was given by Spalding, the written
version was posted on the bulletin board in the employee lunch-
room. On July 25 or 26, Spalding convened another mandatory
meeting of the entire plant to reemphasize the Respondent’s
desire to keep the plant nonunion. (Tr. 819.) Spalding again
read from the prepared speech that he delivered on May 8. (GC
Exh. 5.)
G. Management’s Interrogation of Employees
about Union Sentiment
Subsequent to Spalding’s speech on July 25 or 26, on the
negative impact unions would have on the operation of the
Respondent’s business, Stewart and Armstrong had a discus-
sion in Stewart’s office about the union activity. Stewart asked
Armstrong the reasons he wanted to unionize the plant, if he
had ever been a union member, and why no one spoke in the
meeting with Spalding. Armstrong responded he had prior
union membership and felt a union was needed to address em-
ployees’ issues with management. Armstrong also told Stewart
that speaking against Spalding’s points in the meeting would
have been counterproductive.18 (Tr. 248–249.) Shortly thereaf-
ter, the conversation ended.

18 Stewart denied that the conversation occurred. (Tr. 577–579, 607.)
I do not credit his testimony on this point. Stewart relied on closed
questions and answers to deny the occurrence of the discussion. On
further questioning he responded, “I don’t recall” when asked whether
he had even a single conversation with Armstrong about the Union or if
Armstrong told him about his father’s prior union membership. (Tr.
578, 607.) Armstrong’s testimony and overall demeanor were more
credible than Stewart’s denials of the conversation. Armstrong detailed
the date, location, and approximate time of the conversation. Also, his
description of the content of the discussion is believable when viewed
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 7
H. Management’s Retaliation Against Employees
Because of Union Support
In July 2012, the Charging Party held an informational meet-
ing at a local restaurant, Nathan’s, with several of the Respond-
ent’s employees in attendance. Jared Hunsburger
(Hunsburger), processing department team leader, was at the
meeting. Brandon Harrison (Harrison), an account manager at
the Respondent’s Kingsville plant, was also at the restaurant to
have dinner with friends, but not to attend the union meeting.
After the meeting, Hunsburger went to sit at the bar with Harri-
son and a conversation ensued. (Tr. 226.) Harrison commented
to Hunsburger that it looked like a serious meeting was occur-
ring and asked him what was going on. Hunsburger responded
that it was a union meeting with an IBEW (the Charging Party)
representative. In response, Harrison commented that he rec-
ognized some of the faces and asked their names. Hunsburger
gave him the names of Scott Serber, Dave Reynolds, Michelle
Little, and Mike Howell. (Tr. 213.) It is at this point the par-
ties disagree on the content of the discussion.
Hunsburger testified that their discussion continued, with
Harrison asking his opinions on the Union’s ability to run a
casting business and Spalding’s business acumen. Hunsburger
purportedly responded that he felt Spalding was a good busi-
ness man and did not believe the Union knew how to operate a
casting business. (Tr. 214.) According to Hunsburger, the con-
versation lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Spalding19 testified that Harrison came to his office and told
him Hunsburger approached him at Nathan’s restaurant where
several employees were attending a union informational meet-
ing. According to Spalding, Harrison said Hunsburger “was
just really bashing the company and telling him it was a horri-
ble place to work.” (Tr. 456.) Spalding attested that Harrison

in context. The discussion occurred almost immediately after Spal-
ding’s speech against the union campaign. It occurred in the private
office of a manager who had been part of Spalding’s efforts to defeat
the Union. Last, Stewart’s interrogation of Armstrong on his desire for
and support of the Union soon after Spalding’s speech has the ring of
truth about it.
19 Throughout the trial I found that Spalding was not a credible wit-
ness. The majority of his testimony was accompanied by smirks, eva-
sion, and pregnant pauses. He gave intentionally deceptive and often
confusing testimony. An example is Spalding’s testimony that by
August he was still unaware of Armstrong’s support for the Union.
Likewise, he refused to admit to when he became aware of the identity
of the Union. It strains credulity to believe that Spalding was unaware
of the identity of the Union or Armstrong’s role in unionizing the plant.
Spalding admitted the union campaign was an important event in light
of Ligon’s antiunion stance. (GC Exh. 5.) The evidence established
soon after he learned of rumors about a unionizing effort, Spalding
acted quickly against the unionizing action. He also worked closely
with his managers and the human resources manager to defeat the cam-
paign. Finally, Delk told him to keep him informed about the unioniza-
tion efforts. On cross-examination, however, when presented with
evidence of the improbable nature of his claim, Spalding continued to
provide evasive answers and denials. When viewed in context, it sub-
stantially weakens the overall credibility of his testimony. (Tr. 409–
411, 413, 417–418, 435, 828–831, 835.) (A few examples of Spalding’s
evasive and contradictory responses.)
tried to relay information to him about the substance of the
Union’s informational meeting but he stopped him.20 (Tr. 456.)
I find there is probably a grain of truth in both witnesses’ de-
scriptions of the conversations they had with Harrison. I have
previously made clear my dissatisfaction with Spalding’s verac-
ity throughout the hearing. I can no more credit his version of
the conversation than I can almost any other disputed fact he
has testified about. Consequently, Harrison’s testimony would
have been helpful to the Respondent by corroborating Spal-
ding’s testimony on this point. Nevertheless, I cannot fully
credit Hunsburger account of his conversation with Harrison or
Spalding because it does not have the ring of truth. It is frus-
trating for me that neither the General Counsel nor the Re-
spondent called Harrison to testify. Their testimony about Har-
rison’s statements to them is hearsay because it is offered “to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Federal
Rules of Evidence 801(c). Likewise, neither party presented an
argument for allowing the hearsay because of a qualifying hear-
say exception. Therefore to the extent that the parties presented
hearsay evidence about Harrison’s statements to Spalding and
Hunsburger, I will allow it only for the purpose of establishing
that Harrison held separate conversations with Spalding and
Hunsburger.
Hunsburger testified that a few days prior to his discussion
with Harrison at Nathan’s restaurant, he had an unanticipated
discussion with Spalding. During their conversation about a
work-related matter, Hunsburger told Spalding that his stepson,
Raul, had applied for a position with the company and asked
him to check on the status of his application. Although the
Respondent subcontracts employee hiring to a temporary agen-
cy, Spalding agreed to get information on Raul’s application.
(Tr. 235, 460.) Contrary to Hunsburger’s recollection, Spalding
claimed his conversation with Harrison occurred before he ever
spoke with Hunsburger about his stepson’s application. (Tr.
457–458.) (Emphasis added.) Spalding agreed with
Hunsburger, however, that their initial conversation involved
Hunsburger asking him to check on the status of Raul’s job
application and him agreeing.
I find that it is not material to the facts or credibility of either
witness whether their initial conversation occurred before or
after their conversations with Harrison. It is undisputed that
Spalding’s alleged unlawful statements occurred in a second
conversation with Hunsburger, which both agree happened
after the meeting at Nathan’s restaurant. The parties agree that
approximately a week after the meeting at Nathan’s, Spalding
informed Hunsburger that he had asked the temporary agency
about the status of Raul’s application. Spalding then noted that
he had spoken with Harrison who mentioned that he had talked
with Hunsburger about the union meeting held at Nathan’s.
Again the parties disagree regarding key aspects of the remain-
ing portion of the conversation. Hunsburger contends that

20 I do not credit Spalding’s testimony on this point. Spalding and
his management team admitted the rumors of a union campaign was an
important event, which justified their immediate action to counter it.
(Tr. 388, 396, 399, 407–408, 415, 417–418, 693.) Therefore, I do not
find it plausible that Spalding would not have welcomed this infor-
mation.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
Spalding then immediately launched into, “Why would we
want to hire somebody that thinks it is a bad place to work.”
(Tr. 215, 216.) He later clarified his testimony to note Spalding
allegedly said, “. . . why would the Company want to hire
somebody else that thought it was a terrible place to work.”21
(Tr. 219.) (Emphasis added.) Hunsburger inferred that Spalding
was referring to his stepson. (Tr. 215.) According to
Hunsburger, he tried to change the subject because he felt “in-
timidated” by the tone and inference of the conversation. (Tr.
221, 224–225.) It was later determined that the temporary hir-
ing agency had rejected Raul’s application and he was not of-
fered a position at either of the Respondent’s facilities. (Tr.
221, 462.)
Spalding disputes Hunsburger’s version of the discussion
and denies making the statements attributed to him. He testi-
fied that during their initial discussion he approached
Hunsburger to thank him for talking with a customer about the
process for manu-facturing the parts made at the plant. He
noted, “We talked in some detail about the part process and
some production issues regarding it.” (Tr. 458.) This aspect of
the conversation is undisputed. According to Spalding,
Hunsburger then “volunteered” that he was aware of the union
organizing activity and was not interested in becoming in-
volved in any aspect of the union campaign. He stated he re-
sponded, “Jared, I appreciate that, but that’s your choice.” (Tr.
458–459.) I do not credit Spalding’s testimony on this point. It
is a self-serving statement, which makes no sense within the
context of the overall conversation. Regardless, it is not mate-
rial to my determination of whether Spalding’s statements were
unlawful.
It is undisputed that Hunsburger told Spalding his stepson
had applied for a job with the Respondent and asked him to
check on the status of his application. To assist Spalding in
locating his stepson’s application, Hunsburger gave Spalding
his stepson’s name (Raul) and noted that Raul listed him as a
reference. Subsequently, Spalding approached Hunsburger to

21 Hunsburger provides plausible testimony that during his second
conversation with Spalding about Raul’s application Spalding stated
either, “Why would we want to hire somebody that thinks it is a bad
place to work.” or “. . . why would the Company want to hire some-
body else that thought it was a terrible place to work.” (Tr. 219.) In this
rare instance, I find that Spalding is equally as credible as Hunsburger
on this point. Although Spalding’s and Hunsburger’s iterations of the
alleged unlawful statement are similar, there is an important difference.
In Hunsburger’s version, Spalding issues an implied threat that the
Respondent will not hire Raul because of Hunsburger’s alleged com-
plaints about the company. In Spalding’s version of the statement, he
merely questions the logic of Hunsburger recommending that Raul
work at a place Hunsburger views in a negative light. Regardless,
neither version explicitly or implicitly links the statements with
Hunsburger’s union sympathies. Since the General Counsel has the
burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by a preponderance
of the evidence, I credit Spalding’s testimony. See Central National
Gottesman, 303 NLRB 143, 145 (1991) (finding that the General Coun-
sel did not meet its burden of proof because the testimony that the
allegation occurred was equally credible as the testimony that denied
the allegation); Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB 591, 591–592 (1954)
(same), questioned on other grounds Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB,
104 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
inform him that Raul had not listed Hunsburger as a reference
and he had been “’screened out’ by the temporary agency.” (Tr.
46.) He claimed he offered to be a reference for Raul but
Hunsburger did not accept his offer.22 (Tr. 464–464.) I credit
Spalding’s testimony that he told Hunsburger, “Brandon [Har-
rison] reported to me that you were very upset the other night
and you had a lot of bad things to say about the company in
public.”23 (Tr. 46.) It is at this point, Spalding testified, that
he told Hunsburger it did not “line up” for him to ask “someone
who you—who is your kin to come to work at a place that you
don’t think is a good place to work.”24 (Tr. 465.) The conversa-
tion ended a short time later. (Tr. 465.)
I. Antiunion Literature Posted by Management
Subsequent to becoming aware of a union organizing cam-
paign, the Respondent began posting literature in the workplace
noting the negative consequences of unionizing. The majority
of the literature was posted on the Respondent’s bulletin board
in the employee lunchroom. Some of the literature was also
hung on signs in the facility and distributed by hand to employ-
ees. (Tr. 861; CP Exh. 4; CP Exh. 9 pps. 9, 33; CP Exh. 10.)
Many of the postings encouraged the employees to reject the
Union and highlighted negative aspects of union membership.
(CP Exh. 10 pps. 2, 4, 5, 20–26.) Some of the literature set
forth positive aspects of working in a nonunion workplace. (CP
Exh. 10 pps.7, 8.) Nonetheless, the evidence shows that the
majority of the company postings emphasized the negative
consequences of unionizing. (CP Exh. 9, CP Exh. 10.)
The allegedly unlawful posting reads in relevant part:
Strikers often lose their jobs. The Company has the right to
continue operating during a strike and can hire new workers
to replace strikers. When that happens, strikers lose their
jobs—even if they give up on the strike and ask to come back
to work. [Tr. 472–475; CP Exh. 4.]
J. August 26 Instructions from Management to
Patrick Armstrong
During the period at issue, Armstrong worked as the lead on
the C-shift. Although Stewart was his immediate supervisor, he
would occasionally seek assistance from Stowell because he
was the only supervisor on duty in the evening. (Tr. 243, 269,
517.) Armstrong would also call the manufacturing engineer,
Richard Moore (Moore), at home if he needed advice on resolv-
ing technical issues related to the machines. (Tr. 175, 242–243,
303–304.)
On August 26 at 9:38 p.m., Armstrong received a text mes-
sage from Stewart detailing staffing assignments for the C-shift
that evening. The text message read:
Chris,

22 I do not credit Spalding’s statement on this point. If he in fact was
willing to be a reference, and by inference influence the process to
guarantee Raul a job, he would have done it when told by the tempo-
rary agency that the application had been rejected.
23 As previously noted, Hunsburger agreed that Spalding made the
statement to him or a closely similar statement.
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 9
Run all three okumas on Detroit. Put someone on both Volvos
and don’t worry about getrag. I don’t know if you have been
made aware but Kevin is no longer with stahl. If you have any
problems when you get in shoot me a text. [GC Exhs. 4, 12.]25
Armstrong arrived at the plant on August 26, at approximate-
ly 10:30 p.m. and determined the steps he needed to take to
carry out Stewart’s instructions. Mary Meade (Meade), Randy
Tucker (Tucker), Michael Ridge (Ridge), and Jessica Timmons
(Timmons) worked with Armstrong that evening. In addition,
Steve Cochran (Cochran) was reassigned from the foundry to
assist them for part of the C-shift. (Tr. 757.) Armstrong ob-
served that the machining area was in disarray from the work
done on the B-shift. (Tr. 250–251.) The B-shift workers’ totes
(containers used to hold parts) and heat treat baskets had not
been returned to their proper places. The “chip hoppers”26 were
full and needed to be emptied. Aluminum casting parts were
stacked in front of the machine platforms and left to be trans-
ported to the inspector for inspection and shipping departments.
(Tr. 250–251.)
After evaluating the workload for the night and readiness of
the machines, Armstrong made the decision to assign Tucker to
the Okuma 1 and A77, Meade was placed on the Okuma 3,
Timmons ran the Okuma 5, and Ridge operated the air check
(getrag) machine.27 (Tr. 260, 357.) Armstrong readily admits
that he did not completely follow Stewart’s instructions be-
cause there were no parts to “run” on the A81 Volvo machine.
During the hearing, it was explained that parts are first cast in
the foundry, tested in heat treat and finally delivered to the
machining department to be “machined.” There were not
enough Volvo parts delivered from heat treat for the C-shift to
run on the A81 that evening.28 Further, Armstrong did not

25 I do not credit Stewart’s testimony on this point. The Charging
Party issued a subpoena for the text messages Stewart sent to Arm-
strong on the night at issue. Stewart testified that he sent Armstrong a
text message specifically directing him to operate a machine but could
not locate the message. (Tr. 14–15, 600–602, 618.) Consequently,
there is no corroborating evidence. Furthermore, I find it unlikely that if
the text message had existed, Stewart would have destroyed a key piece
of evidence that is the linchpin of the basis for Armstrong’s discharge.
26 Chip hoppers are containers that are located behind the machines
and collect the chips that break off from parts being machined.
27 There was undisputed testimony that during the period at issue
Ridge was only trained to operate the air check (getrag) machine. (Tr.
260, 357.)
28 Venkatesan disputed Armstrong’s testimony that there were not
enough parts for him to operate the A81 that night. I credit Arm-
strong’s testimony on this point. Since he did not work the C-shift that
night, Venkatesan failed to persuasively explain how he would have
had firsthand knowledge about the availability of parts for the A81. I
also find that Venkatesan’s overall testimony on the stand was dismal.
Often he responded to questions on cross-examination with evasive and
confusing answers. Frequently, Venkatesan provided what I perceived
as deliberate nonresponsive answers to questions posed by the counsel
for the Respondent. Several times I had to admonish him on this point.
He also tailored many of his answers to conform to the responses he
felt would best help Respondent’s attorney, rather than to illuminate the
truth. Based on the evasive, confusing, and vague responses
Venkatesan gave on both direct and cross-examination, his overall
demeanor, and the totality of the evidence, I find he was not a credible
witness.
interpret Stewart’s text as directing him to operate a machine
that evening. (GC Exh. 4, 12.)
At approximately 11:10 p.m. on August 26, Stowell ap-
proached Armstrong in the machining department to relay
Venkatesan’s instructions for the department’s operation that
evening. He also told Armstrong that he was required to oper-
ate a machine. (Tr. 269–270, 520.) Armstrong told Stowell that
he would not have time to operate a machine. Stowell did not
reply and did not speak to Armstrong again that evening. (Tr.
270.) Subsequent to his conversation with Stowell, Armstrong
called Stewart for clarification about his instructions for work
assignments that evening because the A81 machine was not
ready for operation. However, Stewart did not answer the tele-
phone so he left Stewart a voicemail message explaining the
reason he could not operate the A81 machine (Tr. 276–277,
591, 596.) There is no evidence that Stewart returned Arm-
strong’s call or otherwise tried to contact him that evening to
answer his questions. (Tr. 277, 591–592.)
As a result of what Armstrong perceived to be conflicting in-
structions from Stewart and Venkatesan, he prioritized his du-
ties for the night. After assigning each C-shift worker to run
one or more machines according to Stewart’s instructions,
Armstrong spent the remainder of the evening warming up the
machines, cleaning the disarray in the work area left by the
prior shift, ensuring that the machine operators had enough
parts to run for the shift, operating the forklift to clean the area
and transport parts to the inspection department and warehouse,
repairing air tools, checking machine operations, answering
employee questions, and adjusting the scribe on Timmon’s
machine.29 He also inspected the Hubble handles and manually
rebuffed those he discovered had imperfections in the casting.30
(Tr. 265–267.) At the end of his shift the next morning, Arm-
strong updated Moore on the status of the machines and the
work he performed that night. (Tr. 278.)
K. August 27 Investigation into Patrick Armstrong’s
Work Performance the Prior Night
On August 27, Stowell sent Venkatesan an email at 12:23
a.m. noting Armstrong had not operated a machine as instructed
and he would prepare a “writeup” (warning notice) of the in-
fraction. (Tr. 528–529.) Venkatesan arrived at the plant at
about 7 a.m., read Stowell’s email, and reviewed the produc-
tivity report for the C-shift from the previous night. (Tr. 754–
755.) Sometime prior to 8:45 a.m. he went to the machining
department and spent approximately 5 minutes assessing which
duties had been performed on the C-shift the previous evening.
(Tr. 659–660, 666–668.) Venkatensan instructed Stewart to
investigate and verify the charges noted in Stowell’s email that

29 Venkatesan and Stewart contend that Armstrong lied about the
tasks he performed during the shift. I credit Armstrong’s testimony on
this point for the reasons set forth in the analysis portion of this deci-
sion.
30 Prior to going to the wheelabrator, the machine operator looks at
the Hubble handle for imperfections. If the machine operator makes a
judgment that a flaw cannot be removed by the wheelabrator, the Hub-
ble handle is then placed in a basket to be sent to the inspection de-
partment. (Tr. 612.) The imperfections can be as small as a dime or
larger. (Tr. 613.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
Armstrong had failed to perform as instructed. (Tr. 650, 665.)
Subsequently, Venkatesan briefly spoke with Stowell to get
more information on the work performed the prior night by the
C-shift employees, specifically Armstrong. (Tr. 649–651.) In
response to his query about whether Armstrong operated a ma-
chine as instructed, Stowell told Venkatesan that the other op-
erators on C-shift were not assigned to the tasks as he had in-
structed and Armstrong did not operate a machine. (Tr. 529.)
On the morning of August 27, soon after he arrived at work,
Stewart listened to Armstrong’s voice mail message from the
previous night concerning one of the machines. (Tr. 591.) Up-
on review of the production report for the C-shift, he discov-
ered that the A81 and an Okuma machine had not been operat-
ed. Subsequently, Stewart had a meeting with Armstrong in his
office the morning of August 27 to determine why he had not
fully complied with his and Venkatesan’s instructions to “run”
the A81 and Okuma machines.31 He also asked Armstrong to
account for his actions that evening. Armstrong reminded
Stewart that he had attempted to call him for clarification of his
instructions since it was not possible to operate the A81 be-
cause it was out of Volvo parts. He also recited a list of the
work he performed on the night at issue. (Tr. 591–592.) Stew-
art told Armstrong he would investigate to verify Armstrong’s
account of his actions.
Stewart went to the machining department to inspect the ma-
chines and the overall condition of the area. (Tr. 593–594.) He
checked the chip hoppers to determine if they had been emptied
and inspected the Hubble handles. (Tr. 610–612.) It took Stew-
art approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete his inspection
of the work area. (Tr. 615.) He again spoke with Armstrong
and told him that his inspection of the area did not confirm
Armstrong’s description of the work he performed on August
26. Stewart admits that he did not interview any of the work-
er’s on the C-shift about their observations of Armstrong’s
work performance on the shift that prior night. (Tr. 615, 626–
627.) After his discussions with Armstrong, Stewart prepared
notes memorializing the meetings and informed Venkatesan
about the results of his investigation. (Tr. 595, 665–666.)
On August 27 at 9:02 a.m.,Venkatesan emailed Spalding that
Armstrong had not complied with his instructions to operate a
machine and he recommended his termination based on his
failure to follow instructions and a prior 3 day suspension. (Tr.
770.) Although he admitted that he incorrectly noted Arm-
strong had a prior 3-day suspension on his record, Venkatesan
felt that Armstrong’s action on the night of August 26 was suf-
ficient to justify termination. Spalding agreed but noted he
would discuss taking action against Armstrong with Wilkins
and copied her on the email response. (Tr. 501–502, 786.)
Spalding met with Wilkins and told her to investigate
Venkatesan’s complaint that Armstrong was insubordinate. He
also told her that Stewart had notes of his meetings with Arm-
strong. On August 27, Wilkins requested that Stewart send her
notes of his meeting with Armstrong. He complied with her

31 The parties do not agree on the time and number of meetings
Stewart held with Armstrong to discuss the work he performed on
August 26. (Tr. 282–283, 636–637.) I find that resolving the conflict-
ing testimony on this issue is not material to my analysis.
request the same day. (Tr. 597, 786–787; R. Exh. 8.) Wilkins
also received from Venkatesan a forwarded email from Stowell
about Armstrong’s failure to operate a machine and the verbal
warning notice that Stowell had begun to prepare for issuance
to Armstrong. (Tr. 787.) She emailed Venkatesan and Stewart
to get clarification on why Stowell did not follow up with Arm-
strong that night and tell him he was being insubordinate for
not running a machine and to clock out and go home. (Tr. 787–
788.) Wilkins also posed the question directly to Stowell. He
responded that “he had other activities that he was working on”
that night. (Tr. 788.) Subsequently, Wilkins instructed Stewart
to notify Armstrong that he was suspended pending an investi-
gation into the charges against him. Stewart met with Arm-
strong to inform that he was suspended and the human re-
sources department would contact him about his employment
status at the completion of the investigation. (Tr. 598, 788–
789.)
The Respondent has a four-stage disciplinary policy set out
in its employee handbook. The four steps are: Step 1—Verbal
Warning: Clarifying Expectations; Step 2—Written Warning;
Developing Commitment; Step 3—Written Warning: Decision
Making; and Step 4—Termination of Employment. (GC Exh. 3
pp. 47–48.) Discipline is normally meted out in this order.
However, the Respondent “reserves the right to determine ap-
propriate level of action to be taken on a case by case basis in
consideration of the circumstances involved.” (GC Exh. 3 p.
47.)
Wilkins, with assistance from Adams, reviewed both the re-
sults of her investigation of Armstrong and his past disciplinary
record. Her review of his personnel file revealed two discipli-
nary actions: abuse of attendance policy because he only had 16
hours attendance balance left, issued March 19, 2012;32 and
failure to meet production or quality standards, issued June 29,
2012.33 (R. Exhs. 6, 8.) The evidence reveals that Armstrong
was issued two additional verbal warnings which were not ini-
tially reviewed by Wilkins. The additional disciplines were for:
unsatisfactory and careless work habits because he failed to
conduct an audit prior to changing the tool on a machine, issued
on July 18, 2011; and low production, issued March 25, 2012.34
In July 2011, the verbal warning issued to Armstrong noted that

32 Each year the Respondent places 80 hours in the attendance bank
of full-time employees. The hours are dispersed on January 1 for 40
hours and the remaining 40 hours are deposited into the employees’
attendance bank on July 1. Hours that are not used by the end of the
calendar year cannot be carried over to the next period. (GC Exh. 3, pp.
29–30.) Although there is no evidence that Armstrong’s use of the
hours placed in his attendance bank was contrary to the policy in the
employee handbook, he was issued a verbal warning on March 19,
because he had 16 hours left in his attendance bank as of February 29.
(R. Exh. 6.)
33 Armstrong was again issued a verbal warning dated June 29, for
his shift’s failure to meet production or quality standards. (R. Exh. 6.)
34 On March 25, Armstrong was given a verbal warning for running
a machine with lower than required production numbers. He ran 20-
plus parts as opposed to 30-plus parts. Armstrong gave undisputed
testimony that he was unable to meet the production quota because he
stopped to fix the chip reclaimer machine but forgot to clock off of the
machine he was working on. This caused his production numbers to
appear lower than required. (Tr. 294–295.)
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 11
further infractions would result in progressive corrective action.
(GC Exh. 8.) Likewise, the verbal warnings issued to him on
March 19 and 25, noted that the consequences of further infrac-
tions would result in progressive corrective action. (GC Exh. 9,
10.) The verbal warning Armstrong received on June 29, noted
that “Failure to meet the requirements of your job description
will result in further disciplinary action, per the Employee
Handbook.” (GC Exh. 11.)
Based on her review of his disciplinary history and the in-
subordination charge, Wilkins recommended that Armstrong
receive a 3-day suspension with a final warning placed in his
personnel file. (Tr. 790.) As part of the basis for her recom-
mendation, Wilkins noted that contrary to Venkatesan’s belief,
Armstrong did not have a prior 3-day suspension in his disci-
plinary record. However, she later changed her recommenda-
tion from a suspension to termination because she learned from
Venkatesan, in a conversation with Spalding, that Armstrong
had two additional disciplines that were not in his personnel
file. (Tr. 790–791; R. Exh. 6.)
On or about August 29, Wilkins contacted Armstrong to ar-
range a meeting with him to discuss the outcome of the investi-
gation. A meeting was held in Venkatesan’s office on August
31, with Armstrong, Wilkins and Venkatesan. (Tr. 288, 797–
793.) She prepared the termination letter and a script of talking
points for Venkatesan to use in the meeting. (Tr. 793; R. Exh.
5, 7; GC Exh. 6.) In the meeting, Armstrong attempted to ex-
plain the reasons for his actions but Venkatesan dismissed his
explanations and handed him the termination letter. The letter
explained that Armstrong was terminated for “gross negligence
of assigned duties and making false reports of your activities
during the shift.” (GC Exh. 6.) Armstrong went to his work
area, gathered his personal items, and left the plant. (Tr. 290.)
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA/the Act) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
The rights guaranteed in Section 7 include the right “to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection.” See Brighton Retail,
Inc., 354 NLRB 441, 441 (2009).
In Meyers Industries (Meyers 1), 268 NLRB 493 (1984), and
in Meyers Industries (Meyers II), 281 NLRB 882 (1986), the
Board held that “concerted activities” protected by Section 7
are those “engaged in with or on the authority of other employ-
ees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.”
However, the activities of a single employee in enlisting the
support of fellow employees in mutual aid and protection is as
much concerted activity as is ordinary group activity. Individ-
ual action is concerted if it is engaged in with the object of
initiating or inducing group action. Whitaker Corp., 289 NLRB
933 (1988). A conversation can constitute concerted activity
when “engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or
preparing for group action or [when] it [has] some relation to
group action in the interest of the employees.” Meyers II, supra,
281 NLRB at 887 (quoting Mushroom Transportation Co. v,
NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964)). The object of induc-
ing group action, however, need not be expressed depending on
the nature of the conversation. See Hoodview Vending Co.., 359
NLRB No. 36, slip op. at 4–5 (2012).
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if it disci-
plines or discharges an employee for engaging in activity that is
“concerted” within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. If it is
determined that the activity is concerted, a violation of Section
8(a)(1) will be found if the employer knew of the concerted
nature of the employee’s activity, the concerted activity was
protected by the Act, and the adverse employment action was
motivated by the employee’s protected, concerted activity.
Relco Locomotives Corp., 358 NLRB 298 (2012) (citing Mey-
ers Industries, 268 NLRB 493, 497 (1984), remanded sub nom.
Prill v. NLRB 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474
U.S. 948 (1985), supplemented 281 NLRB 882 (1986), affd.
sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988)). Once the General Counsel es-
tablishes such an initial showing of discrimination, the employ-
er may present evidence, as an affirmative defense, showing it
would have taken the same action even in the absence of the
protected activity. The General Counsel may offer evidence
that the employer’s articulated reasons are pretext or false.
Relco, supra.
The Board applies the Wright Line35 analysis to evaluate
whether an adverse employment action violates 8(a)(3) of the
Act. The burden is on the General Counsel to initially establish
that a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s deci-
sion to take adverse employment action against an employee
was the employee’s union or other protected activity. In order
to establish this initial showing of discrimination, the evidence
must prove: (1) the employee engaged in union or concerted
activities; (2) the union or concerted activities were protected
by the Act; (3) the employer knew of the concerted nature of
the activities; and (4) the adverse action taken against the em-
ployee was motivated by the activity. Circumstantial evidence
may be used to show animus. Camaco Lorain Mfg. Plant, 356
NLRB 1182, 1185 (2011); Praxair Distribution, Inc., 357
NLRB 1048, 1048 fn. 2 (2011).
Once the General Counsel has met its initial showing that the
protected conduct was a motivating or substantial reason in
employer’s decision to take the adverse action, the employer
has the burden of production by presenting evidence the action
would have occurred even absent the protected concerted activ-
ity. The General Counsel may offer proof that the employer’s
articulated reason is false or pretextual. Hoodview Vending Co.,
supra, 359 NLRB No. 36, slip op. at 5. The General Counsel
retains the ultimate burden of proving discrimination. Wright
Line, id. However, where “the evidence establishes that the
reasons given for the Respondent’s action are pretextual—that
is, either false or not in fact relied upon—the Respondent fails
by definition to show that it would have taken the same action
for those reasons, absent the protected conduct, and thus there
is no need to perform the second part of the Wright Line analy-

35 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
sis.” Golden State Foods Corp., 340 NLRB 382, 385 (2003)
(citing Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981), enfd.
705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1982)). The Wright Line analysis is not
applicable when there is no dispute that the employer took ac-
tion against the employee because the employee engaged in
protected concerted activity. Phoenix Transit System, 337
NLRB 510, 510 (2002), enfd. 63 Fed. Appx. 524 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Armstrong’s Protected Union and/or
Concerted Activity
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent violated
Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Armstrong,
effective August 31, 2012. The Respondent counters that Arm-
strong was terminated solely for gross negligence of his duties
and making false reports of his work activities. (R. Br. 14.) A
Wright Line analysis is appropriate in this case because the
Respondent’s motive is at issue.
I find that the General Counsel has established that the dis-
charge of Armstrong effective August 31, 2012, violated Sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act for the reasons discussed below.
The evidence clearly establishes and I find that Armstrong
engaged in protected union and concerted activity. Armstrong
was an early supporter of the union organizing campaign. The
evidence is undisputed that he regularly attended weekly union
organizing meetings, joined the employee union organizing
committee, solicited union authorization cards, discussed the
benefits of unionization with employees, and engaged in
handbilling. (Tr. 132–133, 194–195, 212, 245–246.) Arm-
strong’s acts are the epitome of protected union and concerted
activity.
B. Respondent’s Knowledge of Armstrong’s Protected
Union and/or Concerted Activity
I find that the evidence establishes the Respondent had
knowledge of Armstrong’s protected union and concerted activ-
ity.
Venkatesan and Spalding both deny knowledge of Arm-
strong’s union activity prior to his termination. McBride, how-
ever, admitted that sometime after the union campaign began
he learned the names of “[p]retty much everybody that came to
the union meeting.” (Tr. 549.) Armstrong was also one of the
employees McBride learned had attended the union meetings.
(Tr. 550, 554.) He admitted that he learned of this information
and reported it to Venkatesan “sometime before the summer.”
(Tr. 550, 555.)36 Consequently, McBride and Venkatesan had

36 After unnecessarily redundant questioning by counsel for the
Charging Party on this point, McBride later changed his testimony to
state that he did not give Venkatesan the names of Armstrong and other
employees who had attended union meetings. (Tr. 555–556.) Nonethe-
less, I find his later denial lacks credibility. McBride testified that in
early May 2012, he was informed in a supervisor’s meeting that a union
campaign had begun. (Tr. 547.) The meeting occurred the week of
May 2. (Tr. 427–428.) He admitted that prior to this meeting, he knew
that “five to ten” employees were involved in a union organizing cam-
paign but in the meeting he learned that employee participation had
become more “widespread.” He testified that prior to the summer, he
knowledge of Armstrong’s protected union activity prior to his
discharge. Since I find that McBride, a supervisor and agent of
Respondent, had knowledge of Armstrong’s protected activity
prior to his termination, it is not necessary for me to rule on the
credibility of Spalding’s and Venkatesan’s denials on this
point.37 Thus, I find that the Respondent had knowledge of
Armstrong’s protected union activity at the time a decision was
made to discharge him.
C. Adverse Employment Action Based on
Discriminatory Animus
The remaining question the General Counsel must prove to
establish its initial burden is whether the Respondent dis-
charged Armstrong because of discriminatory animus. I find
that the General Counsel has proven the final prong of its initial
burden.
The General Counsel contends that the evidence shows the
Respondent was motivated to discharge Armstrong because of
his union activities. The General Counsel sets forth several
bases supporting its argument: (1) the intentional failure of the
Respondent to adequately investigate the charges against Arm-
strong that led to his termination (GC Br. 26–34); and (2) the
Respondent’s refusal to follow its progressive disciplinary poli-
cy against Armstrong. (GC Br. 35–39.)
1. Failure to conduct a fair and meaningful investigation
As noted earlier in the decision, the facts establish that
Venkatesan’s investigation into the charge that Armstrong dis-
obeyed his order to operate a machine consisted of reading
Stowell’s email notifying him of the occurrence, reviewing the
productivity report for Armstrong’s shift the night at issue,
spending 5 minutes on the plant floor assessing the work that
had been completed, briefly discussing with Stowell the situa-
tion, and instructing Stewart to further investigate. (Tr. 650,
659–668.) In response to Venkatesan’s directive, Stewart like-
wise reviewed the production report for the night, conducted a
10–15-minute inspection of the work area at issue, and met
with Armstrong to discuss the events.

learned Armstrong was one of several employees that was involved in
the union effort. (Tr. 548–549.) In response to counsel’s unambiguous
question whether he reported to “anyone in the company” the names of
employees he was aware of participating in the union organizing cam-
paign, McBride stated, without wavering, that he told Venkatesan. (Tr.
550.) Further, he noted that he told Venkatesan this information early
in the summer. A reading of the transcript of this exchange reveals that
the questions were clearly stated without room for multiple interpreta-
tions and McBrides’ responses were also clearly articulated. There is
nothing in the initial exchange which indicates that McBride did not
understand the questions asked or that counsel misinterpreted the re-
sponse. (Tr. 547–550.)
37 While not ruling on the credibility of Spalding and Venkatedan on
this point, I will again emphasize that I do not find credible the majority
of their overall testimony. I found Spalding’s testimony was evasive
and calculated to be misleading. In my many years as a judge, I have
never had a witness whose testimony I have found more worthy of
discredit than Venkatesan’s. There was virtually nothing about
Venkatesan’s testimony that I believed beyond the statement of his
name, prior work experience, and a few undisputed facts.
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 13
The weight of the evidence supports a finding that the Re-
spondent deliberately conducted an inadequate investigation
into the charges against Armstrong to justify terminating him.
Venkatesan admitted that as soon as he read Stowell’s email
and prior to conducting any investigation he “absolutely” felt
that Armstrong should be terminated. (Tr. 661.) After receiv-
ing feedback from Stewart on the results of his investigation
into Armstrong’s activities the previous evening, Venkatesan
went to the machining department and spent only 5 minutes
inspecting the area. (Tr. 666–667.) He testified that at about
8:45 a.m., he conducted a 5-minute review of the machining
department and observed that the A77 and A81 chip baskets
were full. According to Venkatesan, there were cradle and
getrag parts available to run on the A77, A81, and Okumas 1
and 2. He insisted the all of the machines were operational.
(Tr. 668–669, 672, 674.) Based on Stewart’s report and his 5-
minute review of the machining department, Venkatesan testi-
fied that he concluded Armstrong had willfully disobeyed his
instructions and falsely reported his activities.
I discredit Venkatesan’s testimony in its entirety. The evi-
dence is undisputed that prior to August 26, Venkatesan had
never given Stowell instructions to convey to Armstrong or any
other lead. (Tr. 518, 521, 753.) It is suspicious that soon after
he learned of Armstrong’s unionizing activity, Venkatesan
would tell Stowell to instruct Armstrong to perform a specific
task, especially a task that leads rarely perform. (Tr. 518, 753.)
Although Venkatesan claimed he needed Armstrong to operate
a machine that evening because the shift was missing one em-
ployee, I do not find his explanation plausible. (Tr. 648.) The
Respondent’s spreadsheet summarizing activity in the machin-
ing department for August 26 through 27 shows one employee
(Judy Holsey) was absent on the A-shift. (CP Exh. 5.) Howev-
er, there is no evidence that Venkatesan instructed the lead on
the A-shift to operate a machine to compensate for the absence
of an employee. Based on the evidence and combined with my
skepticism of Venkatesan’s overall veracity as a witness, I do
not credit his testimony.
Venkatesan also admitted that he had determined Armstrong
should be fired based on nothing more than an email from
Stowell sent within about an 1-1/2 hours into Armstrong’s shift
noting he had failed to operate a machine. Even Spalding had
to acknowledge it was odd for Stowell to target Armstrong for
discipline for failing to operate a machine a mere 1 hour and 23
minutes into the shift. (Tr. 494.)
Further, Venkatesan conceded that during his 5-minute cur-
sory review of the machining department, he did not inspect all
of the machines. He acknowledged that he saw a few chip
baskets behind two of the seven machines and assumed Arm-
strong had not emptied them. He admitted that the baskets
could have been filled by an employee on another shift after
they had been emptied by Armstrong. (Tr. 667–669.)
Venkatesan also provided unpersuasive testimony that there
were parts Armstrong could have run on the A77 or A81 ma-
chines. (Tr. 669–673.) He failed to detail the basis for his
statement, provide production reports to support his statement
or provide corroborating testimony on this point. The evidence
shows that the employees on the C-shift on August 26, had
efficiency rates well above 100 percent, even without the ab-
sent employee. (Tr. 623–624; CP Exh. 6.) The efficiency rate
of the C-shift, in combination with Armstrong’s credible testi-
mony, supports my finding that Venkatesan’s testimony is un-
convincing. Therefore, I do not credit his testimony on this
point based on the aforementioned and his overall evasive and
deceptive testimony.
Second, Venkatesan and Stewart did not interview Arm-
strong or any of the employees on the C-shift to confirm or
discredit the charges against Armstrong. Timmons provided
corroborating testimony that Armstrong spent more than an
hour that night adjusting the scriber on her machine and ob-
served him empty three or four of her full chip baskets. She
also gave undisputed testimony that she never saw Armstrong
idle during the shift. (Tr. 341–343.) Likewise, Tucker testified,
without contradiction, that he never saw Armstrong not work-
ing that evening. On the occasions he observed him, Arm-
strong was buffing Hubble handles or retrieving and removing
machined parts. (Tr. 348.) Based on Ridge’s sightline that
evening, he was able to observe half of the machining depart-
ment. From his vantage point, he was only occasionally able to
see Armstrong operating the forklift. (Tr. 357, 361.) Meade
could only recall that she observed Armstrong operating the
forklift and sweeping the floor. (Tr. 371, 373–374.) Each of
them provided undisputed testimony that no one from man-
agement interviewed them about the night at issue, either be-
fore or after Armstrong’s termination. An attempt at a reasona-
ble investigation would have at minimum included interviews
of those people who were most in a position to observe Arm-
strong’s actions that evening. The record established that
Venkatesan and Stewart had access to the employees who wit-
nessed Armstrong’s work performance that night but intention-
ally refused to interview them. (Tr. 626–627.) American Crane
Corp., 326 NLRB 1401, 1417 (1998) (the Board held that an
employer’s investigation is evidence of discriminatory motive
when it fails to interview key witnesses). Respondent’s failure
to take such action supports an inference of discriminatory
animus and motivation. See Relco Locomotives, Inc., 358
NLRB 298, 311 (2012) (evidence that the respondent failed to
adequately investigate alleged misconduct supports an infer-
ence of animus and discriminatory motivation).
As part of their investigation into Armstrong’s actions, man-
agement also failed to interview Moore. It is undisputed that at
least weekly Armstrong consulted Moore for technical advice.
(Tr. 304.) Further, prior to leaving work each day, it was a
standing practice for Armstrong to provide Moore with a de-
tailed account of the work he performed and the status of work
to be completed by the next shift. (Tr. 278–279.) On August
27, Armstrong gave the usual summary of the work he and the
other employees on the C-shift completed and “anything that I
thought day shift needed to be aware of.” (Tr. 278.) As the
only manager to speak with Armstrong immediately after his
shift, he was in a position to see and assess what work had been
completed on Armstrong’s shift before it was tainted by the
employees working the next shift. Despite the possible signifi-
cance of his testimony to the investigation, neither Venkatesan
nor Stewart interviewed him. Equally significant is Moore’s
failure to appear for the hearing despite being subpoenaed to
testify. (GC Exh. 1.) American Crane Corp., supra at 1417.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
Further, I do not find plausible Venkatesan’s and Stewart’s
testimony that within 5 minutes of walking around the machin-
ing department, they were able to determine that Armstrong
falsely reported on his activities the prior evening.
After following Venkatesan’s directive to investigate Arm-
strong’s activities on the C-shift August 26, Stewart reported to
him that his review of the machining department revealed that
“nothing had been done.” (Tr. 665.) Sometime before 8:45
a.m. on August 27, Venkatesan went to the machining depart-
ment to confirm Stewart’s findings. Since Venkatesan could
not remember what time he conducted his review, it is feasible
that he did not visit the area until almost 2 hours into the A-
shift’s work. (Tr. 665–666.) He gave no credible explanation
as to how 2 hours or more into the A-shift, he could distinguish
between tasks that were not completed on the C-shift versus
work generated by the A-shift. Venkatesan claimed the baskets
for A77 and A81 were full when he checked them. Therefore,
he discounted Armstrong’s claim that one of the functions he
performed that evening was emptying the chip baskets and
hauling them away. However, he admits that it is possible the
baskets could have been refilled by the A-shift before he looked
at them. Also, Venkatesan admitted that he only checked 2 of
the 11 machines in the department. (Tr. 667–668.) Therefore, it
is plausible that the other machines’ baskets were emptied by
Armstrong as he alleged and Venkatesan would not have
known it. Based on the foregoing and Armstrong’s more truth-
ful demeanor, I credit his testimony.
Venkatesan also attested that there were 400 Hubble handles
from the previous Friday waiting to be processed by the C-shift
on August 26. (Tr. 594–595.) However, Venkatesan uncon-
vincingly testified he was able to conclude, after less than 10
minutes of review, that there were not enough Hubble handles
in need of buffing to justify the amount of time Armstrong said
he had spent buffing them. I do not credit Venkatesan’s testi-
mony on this point. Timmons, Tucker, and Meade corroborat-
ed Armstrong’s testimony on this point. (Tr. 341–343, 348,
371, 373–374.)
I also find that Stewart conducted a cursory examination of
the machining department, which could not have afforded him
with enough information to determine whether Armstrong lied
about his actions on the C-shift.
Stewart claimed that his review of the area revealed none of
the machines’ hoppers had been emptied and only 20 out of 400
Hubble handles had been buffed. (Tr. 593–594.) He attempted
to explain that by looking at just 2 to 3 of the 20 buffed Hubble
handles, he could tell that they were ready for wheelbrating.
Stewart also insisted that from each stack he picked up 2 or 3 of
the remaining 380 Hubble handles and determined none of the
380 handles had been buffed. (Tr. 612–615.) However, Stewart
conceded that flaws occur in some of the handles after they are
buffed. (Tr. 612–613.) He admitted that it is left to the judg-
ment of the individual machine operator whether to send the
blemished handle to the wheelbrator or manually buff out the
imperfection. (Tr. 613–614.) There is no evidence to contradict
Armstrong’s credible testimony that in his judgment the han-
dles required buffing. Therefore, I do not credit Stewart’s tes-
timony on these points. Stewart failed to provide a persuasive
explanation of how a quick glance of a fraction of the 400 han-
dles would enable him to determine that out of 400 handles,
Armstrong only buffed 15 to 20 of them.
I previously found Stewart failed to interview Moore or key
witnesses on the C-shift. (Tr. 626–627.) In addition, Stewart
concedes that the lead does not usually operate a machine. (Tr.
583.) He testified that a lead is expected to operate a machine
for an absent employee or when training a new employee.38 (Tr.
583.) However, I again do not credit the argument that Arm-
strong needed to operate a machine the night at issue because
an employee was absent from the shift for the same reasons
noted earlier in the decision. Stewart and Venkatesan also ar-
gue that the A81 was operational and if there were not enough
Volvo parts to run on the A81, Armstrong should have
switched the machine over to run cradle parts because the ma-
chine could operate both parts. (Tr. 596–597, 670, 674.) I
likewise reject this argument because there is no evidence Arm-
strong was trained to perform this function, nor that he was
authorized or instructed to perform this function on the night at
issue. Regardless, I do not credit Stewart’s or Venkatesan’s
testimony that there were sufficient parts to operate the A81.39
Since neither witness has proven to be reliably credible, I will
not credit their testimony on this point without corroborating
objective evidence.
Last, Armstrong gave credible testimony that the prior shift
left the machining department in disarray which required him to
clean and organize the area in order to carry out several of the
duties on the C-shift. Neither Venkatesan nor Stewart provided
evidence that they had firsthand knowledge that the machining
department was not in disarray at the beginning of the C-shift.
The above facts, combined with the Respondent’s additional
acts of union animus (threat of plant closure and job loss, and
unlawful surveillance and interrogation of employees), supports
an inference that discriminatory animus was the actual motive
for Armstrong’s discharge by the Respondent.
2. Respondent failed to follow progressive
discipline policy
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent’s failure to
follow its progressive discipline policy prior to terminating
Armstrong is another factor pointing to discriminatory animus
being the true motive for his discharge. The Respondent argues
that it was justified in not following the usual progressive dis-
cipline steps because Armstrong’s action was so egregious that
it warranted immediate termination. Further, the Respondent

38 Stewart also argues that Armstrong had a history of attempting to
circumvent instructions to operate the machines. I do not credit his
testimony because there was no corroborating evidence. Also, I am
skeptical of the truthfulness of his overall testimony.
39 Another example of Stewart’s contradictory testimony is an email
he sent to Wilkins explaining Stowell told him he had checked on Arm-
strong “a couple different occasions” throughout the night and noted
each time he was not running a machine. (CP Exh. 8.) Stowell, howev-
er, contradicts Stewart’s testimony on this point. Stowell insisted that
after his initial conversation with Armstrong, he never spoke with him
again and only saw him once more that evening as Armstrong was
buffing handles. (Tr. 520–524.) This type of contradictory testimony
weighs negatively on the overall credibility of Stewart’s testimony.
Further, I find the overall evidence supports my finding that Stowell
was a more credible witness than Stewart.
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 15
contends that Armstrong’s prior disciplinary record, combined
with the current infraction, supports his immediate discharge.
I find the Respondent’s failure to follow its progressive dis-
ciplinary policy is evidence of discriminatory animus against
Armstrong.
It is undisputed that Armstrong had four prior infractions,
one in 2011 and three in 2012. Even considered in combina-
tion, the infractions would not have led a reasonable person to
conclude that termination was justified. None of the infractions
were considered serious enough to warrant more than a verbal
warning by his supervisor. The evidence reveals that Arm-
strong only received one disciplinary action in 2011. On July
18, 2011, he was issued a verbal warning for improperly chang-
ing out a tool. However, the verbal warning should not have
been a part of his record by the time Wilkins reviewed his per-
sonnel file in August 2012.40
After reviewing his personnel file, Wilkins initially recom-
mended that the Respondent issue Armstrong a 3-day suspen-
sion with a final warning placed in his personnel file in lieu of
termination. (Tr. 790.) She testified, unconvincingly, that she
revised her initial recommendation to a termination after
Venkatesan told her about two prior disciplines that Armstrong
had received which were not in his personnel file. (Tr. 790–
791.) She provided nothing in the way of testimony or other
objective evidence to support why the additional verbal warn-
ings issued for minor infractions would justify changing her
recom-mendation. In fact she appeared confused by the entire
rush to terminate Armstrong. As an example, she sent an email
to Venkatesan and Stewart asking why Stowell did not ap-
proach Armstrong when he observed him not operating a ma-
chine and tell him to clock out and go home because his action
was insubordinate. No one, including Stowell, could provide a
convincing response other than Stowell’s excuse that he had
other duties to take care of that evening. I do not credit
Stowell, Stewart, Spalding, or Venkatesan’s testimony on this
point. If Stowell had time to purposely observe Armstrong
allegedly on several occasions that evening, then it is reasona-
ble to assume that he could have taken a few extra seconds to
ask Armstrong why he was not working the machine and if not
satisfied with the response, instruct him he was suspended for
insubordination. Further, Armstrong and the other employees

40 Armstrong testified that McBride and Foundry Supervisor Bob
Brown told him it was the Respondent’s policy to remove discipline
from an employee’s record after a year. (Tr. 299.) McBride did not
dispute that he told Armstrong it was the Respondent’s policy to limit
the length of time discipline remained on employees’ record to a year.
However, Venkatesan, Spalding, and Wilkins testified that it was not
the Respondent’s policy to remove discipline from employees’ files
after a year. I do not credit their testimony on this point. I have made
clear my distrust of Venkatesan’s and Spalding’s testimony. While
Wilkins was a relatively credible witness when testifying about undis-
puted facts and personnel procedures, I find her testimony on this point
is incomplete. Venkatesan, Wilkins, and Spalding were evasive in
responding to questions on why the additional disciplines were not part
of Armstrong’s personnel folder; which missing disciplines were
brought to Wilkins attention; and how Spalding and, or Venkatesan
acquired the missing information. (Tr. 466–467, 676–678, 790–792,
830–834.) Their testimony on this point lacked credibility and was not
helpful.
working the C-shift the date at issue credibly testified that after
his initial con-versation with Armstrong, they did not see
Stowell again for the remainder of the night.
Based on the evidence, I find that the General Counsel has
established an initial showing of discrimination. Therefore, the
burden shifts to the Respondent to show, as an affirmative de-
fense, that it would have terminated Armstrong even in the
absence of his union and concerted protected activities.
The Respondent argues Armstrong was discharged because:
(1) Armstrong disobeyed instructions to operate a machine (R.
Br. 5–6, 13.); (2) Armstrong gave a false reporting of his activi-
ties during the C-shift on August 26 (R. Br. 5–6.); and (3) Arm-
strong had a history of prior discipline (R. Br. 7–8, 13–14).
I find that the Respondent’s reasons are pretext for discrimi-
nation. I set out earlier in the decision my reasons for finding
that Armstrong did not give a false report of his activities on
the C-shift on August 26. An adequate investigation by man-
agement that was not tainted by unlawful motivations would
have supported most or all of Armstrong’s claims. I also de-
tailed my rationale for finding that Armstrong’s prior history of
discipline, in combination with the most recent charge, would
likely not lead to termination but for discriminatory animus
(Armstrong’s prior disciplines were verbal warnings for minor
infractions). Last, the evidence established that Stewart did not
instruct Armstrong to operate a machine and Armstrong could
not carry out Venkatesan’s directive to operate a machine be-
cause the circumstances in the machining department that even-
ing made it impossible (machining department in disarray from
prior shift’s work, insufficient parts to operate the A8, etc.).
Based on the evidence, I find that the Respondent discharged
Armstrong for discriminatory reasons in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, as alleged in paragraph 7 of the
complaint.
D. Surveillance of Employees Union and/or
Other Protected Activities
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent, through its
managers and administrative staff, took extraordinary and un-
lawful steps to observe the union activity conducted on or near
its property. (GC Br. 50–51.) The Respondent refutes this
charge and contends that its managers observed union activity
that was “open and notorious and was subject to observation by
any person (employee or nonemployee) with nonimpaired vi-
sion.” (R. Br. 15.)
I find that the General Counsel has established that the Re-
spondent conducted unlawful surveillance of its employees in
violation of Sections 8(a)(1) of the Act for the reasons dis-
cussed below.
The Board and Federal case law have long held that surveil-
lance of employees by an employer, even if the employees are
unaware of it, violates the Act. NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Vege-
table Assn., 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941); Ivy Steel & Wire,
Inc., 346 NLRB 404 (2006). Nonetheless, an employer may
observe employees engaging in Section 7 activities in an open
and public manner on or near its property. This observation is
legal if done in a manner that is not out of the ordinary and
absent coercive behavior. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 347 NLRB
1225 (2006) (employer did not engage in illegal surveillance
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
when, because of a reasonable concern about employee tres-
passing on employer property, it moved a security camera to an
area where employee handbilling and trespassing had taken
place); Sprain Brook Manor Nursing Home, 351 NLRB 1190
(2007) (the Board found unlawful surveillance where supervi-
sor admitted to working outside her normal schedule because
she believed union activity may be occurring); Eddylean Choc-
olate Co., 301 NLRB 887, 888 (1991) (noting “[t]he Board has
long held that management officials may observe public union
activity without violating the Act so long as those officials do
not do something out of the ordinary”). Evidence of coercive-
ness includes, the “duration of the observation, the employer’s
distance from its employees while observing them, and whether
the employer engaged in other coercive behavior during its
observation.” Aladdin Gaming, LLC, 345 NLRB 585, 585–586
(2005), petition for review denied 515 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Board has held, however, that random or isolated observa-
tions of Section 7 activities, such as handbilling, do not violate
the Act. Id.
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent, through
Adams, unlawfully conducted surveillance of employees’ union
or other protected concerted activities. The General Counsel
argues that the frequency of the observations and her proximity
to the employees engaged in the activities are indicative of its
coercive and unlawful nature.
Although the charge alleges the Respondent unlawfully con-
ducted surveillance of “employees’ union or other protected,
concerted activities,” the primary complaint involves managers’
observation of employees and union officials engaged in
handbilling on or near company property. It has been estab-
lished that since May 2012, union organizers have conducted
weekly handbilling on the public road (Pride Avenue) leading
to the Respondent’s hourly employee parking lot. It is also
proven that beginning in late May 2012 until approximately
August 7, Adams observed the handbilling from her parked car
on at least 8 to 12 occasions. (Tr. 198–199.) After charges
were filed against the Respondent with the National Labor Re-
lations Board (the NLRB), Adams stopped her surveillance of
the handbilling activity. (Tr. 199.) In addition, Venkatesan
admitted to observing the handbilling on two occasions from a
window in the foundry and was aware of the handbilling occur-
ring each Tuesday. He reported this to Spalding. Spalding,
Adams, and Wilkins exchanged a series of emails from May 2
to September 1, commenting on the handbilling activity. In
response to an employee complaint and Venkatesan’s concern
about the handbilling, Spalding instructed Adams and
Venkatesan to ensure that handbilling did not occur on compa-
ny property. (Tr. 740. 820.)
Applying the standards set out in the above-cited cases, I
find that the General Counsel has met his burden of proof. The
evidence established on at least 8 to 12 occasions Adams
parked her car in the driveway leading to the hourly employees’
parking lot and observed the handbilling for “a few minutes”
each time. There was no evidence to show that prior to the
handbilling campaign Adams parked her car in that location.
Further, her observations took place from a close vantage point
and would likely have the effect of dissuading some employees
from interacting with the Union for fear of reprisal. Signifi-
cantly, Adams stopped her surveillance after charges were filed
with the NLRB. (Tr. 199.)
The Respondent counters that Adams observed the
handbilling on just two occasions in order to monitor the no-
distribution/no-solicitation rule and ensure nonemployees were
not trespassing on company property. However, the evidence
established Adams engaged in surveillance of union activity on
at least (possibly more) 8 to 12 occasions. On numerous occa-
sions, Adams reported her observations to Spalding, Wilkins,
and, or Venkatesan. (CP Exh. 9; Tr. 141–144, 198–199.) Last,
there is no persuasive evidence to show that the Respondent
had a reasonable basis for believing that the no solicitation or
no trespassing policies were being violated.
Based on the evidence, I find that the Respondent’s surveil-
lance of employees was coercive and a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
E. Soliciting Grievances, Promising Improved
Working Conditions, and Granting Increased
Benefits and Pay
The complaint alleges that on July 26, Stewart solicited em-
ployee complaints and grievances, and promised its employees
increased benefits and improved terms and conditions of em-
ployment if they refrained from union organizational activity.
In its brief, however, the General Counsel admits “no evidence
was presented in support of the allegation that Respondent so-
licited grievances and promised increased benefits if employees
refrained from union activity.” (GC Br. fn. 5.) The General
Counsel has the burden of presenting credible evidence to sup-
port the allegations in the complaint, but admits he failed.
Therefore, I recommend that paragraph 5(d) of the complaint
be dismissed.
F. Threats of Adverse Consequences for Supporting
the Union
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent, through
Spalding, threatened not to hire employees’ relatives because
the employees engaged in union or other protected, concerted
activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (GC Exh. 1)
Curiously, the Respondent rebuts this allegation using the
Wright Line burden—shifting framework and the legal princi-
ples covering refusal to hire cases in violation of 8(a)(3) set
forth in NLRB v. Interstate Builders, Inc., 351 F.3d 1020,
1035–1036 (10th Cir. 2003), and Copes-Vulcan, Inc., 237
NLRB 1253, 1257 (1978). The complaint at issue does not
involve a refusal to hire allegation. Rather the gravamen of the
allegation at issue is that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act when its agent, Spalding, threatened an ad-
verse consequence (refusal to hire Hunburgers’ stepson) against
its employee (Hunsburger) because of that employee’s union or
other protected, concerted activity. Further, the General Coun-
sel argues that, taken in context, Spalding’s statements to
Hunsburger would “reasonably tend to restrain, coerce or inter-
fere with rights guaranteed by the Act.” Bloomfield Health
Care Center, 352 NLRB 252 (2008), quoting Rossmore House,
269 NLRB 1176, 1178 fn. 20 (1984), enfd. sub nom. HERE
Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 17
The Board has established an objective test for determining
if “the employer engaged in conduct which would reasonably
have a tendency to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights under the Act.” Santa Barbara New-Press, 357 NLRB
452, 476 (2011). This objective standard does not depend on
whether the “employee in question was actually intimidated.”
Multi-Ad Services, 331 NLRB 1226, 1228 (2000), enfd. 255
F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2001). The mere threat of an unspecified
reprisal is sufficient to support a finding that the employer has
violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. Metro One Loss Prevention
Services Group, 356 NLRB 89, 89 (2010). Although I agree
that the correct standard for analyzing this allegation is the one
articulated by the General Counsel, I find that the General
Counsel has failed to present persuasive evidence to establish
that the above conversation contained an unlawful threat of an
adverse consequence for Hunsburger’s support of the union
organizing campaign.
The record established that in July, Spalding told Hunsburger
that he had checked on the status of his stepson’s application
for employment with the Respondent. He then told Hunsburger
that Harrison described to him a conversation he had with him
at Nathan’s restaurant. Spalding continued the conversation by
noting Harrison told him that Hunsburger was “bashing the
company”. Spalding stated to Hunsburger that it did not “line
up” for him to ask “someone who you—who is your kin to
come to work at a place that you don’t think is a good place to
work.” (Tr. 465.)
Although Spalding’s statement could reasonably lead an em-
ployee to believe that they or someone they recommended
would not get the job because they had spoken negatively about
company, it does not establish a threat in violation of 8(a)(1) of
the Act. While the parties disagree on the exact phrase that
Spalding used, the evidence establishes that Spalding was suffi-
ciently concerned about what he perceived to be Hunsburger’s
dissatisfaction with the job to question him about his comments
to Harrison at Nathan’s restaurant. In context, Spalding’s con-
versation with Hunsburger is not clearly linked to Hunsburger’s
union support. Rather, it reveals an employer’s unwillingness
to hire the relative of a disgruntled employee, irrespective of
that employee’s union sympathies. Additional evidence to
support the nondiscriminatory nature of Spalding’s action is the
undisputed fact that the Respondent uses a temporary agency to
accept employment applications, screen the applicants, and hire
employees. (Tr. 235, 460.) There is no evidence that the Re-
spondent’s managers or human resources department are aware
of the applicants prior to their hire. Further, the General Coun-
sel did not present evidence to dispute testimony that the tem-
porary agency had “screened out” Raul’s (Hunsburger’s step-
son) application prior to Spalding intervening to check on its
status.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel failed to meet
its burden of proof regarding this allegation and recommend
that paragraph 5(e) of the complaint be dismissed.
G. Interrogation
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent, through
Stewart, interrogated its employees about their union member-
ship and activities and the union sentiments and activities of
other employees. (GC Br. 54–55.) The General Counsel con-
tends that Stewart’s statements to Armstrong on July 26, were
coercive, intimidating and amounted to an unlawful interroga-
tion. The Respondent counters that Armstrong’s claim that
Stewart questioned him about his union sympathies was fabri-
cated. (R. Br. 18.)
I find that the General Counsel has established that the Re-
spondent, through Stewart, unlawfully conducted an interroga-
tion of its employees in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) of the Act
for the reasons discussed below.
The Board has adopted the test established in Bourne v.
NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964), to determine if man-
agement directly interrogating employees during union organiz-
ing campaigns violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Holiday Inn-
JFK Airport, 348 NLRB 16 (2006); Smithfield Foods, supra.
Under the Bourne test, the factors to consider are: the back-
ground; the nature of the information sought; the identity of the
questioner; the place and method of interrogation; and the truth-
fulness of the reply. Westwood Health Care Center, 330 NLRB
935, 939 (2000). In applying these factors, the Board assesses
whether, based on the facts of the specific case, the questioning
at issue would reasonably tend to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their statutory rights.
Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984); Temecula
Mechanical, Inc., 358 NLRB 1225 (2012).
The record establishes that on or about July 26, Stewart had
a discussion with Armstrong after a mandatory employee meet-
ing led by Spalding. Immediately following the meeting, Stew-
art called Armstrong into his office. There is no evidence that
Armstrong was told of any legitimate reason for a meeting in
which he was asked why he felt he needed a union. There is
also no evidence that Stewart gave Armstrong any assurances
that he could speak freely about his union sympathies or activi-
ties without reprisal. The evidence shows that the primary
purpose of Stewart’s talk with Armstrong was to specifically
ask him why he felt that he needed a union, if had ever been a
member of a union, and why none of the employees in the
meeting spoke in response to Spalding’s speech. Since Stewart
denied knowing that Armstrong was a union supporter, it must
be concluded that he questioned Armstrong in an attempt to
learn about the strength and depth of his and other employees’
union support.
Based on the facts, I find that Stewart’s questioning of Arm-
strong would reasonably tend to interfere with, restrain, or co-
erce employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. Ac-
cordingly, I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act when on July 26, Stewart interrogated Armstrong.
H. Threatened Employees with Facility Closure
Because of Union Sympathies
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent, through
Spalding, threatened employees with facility closure if they
selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
(GC Exh. 1-M.) The General Counsel contends that Spalding’s
statements to employees in the July 26 meeting, given the total-
ity of the circumstances, are an implied threat of plant closure
or job loss in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (GC Br.
53.) The Respondent counters that the Respondent, through
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
Spalding, merely communicated its general views about the
Union to employees and the possible economic consequences
of unionization. Further, Spalding denies that he told employ-
ees the Respondent’s plant would close if it was unionized. (R.
Br. 17.)
I find that the General Counsel has established that the Re-
spondent, through Spalding, unlawfully threatened its employ-
ees with plant closure if they unionized in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act for the reasons discussed below.
It is well understood that an employer, and by extension its
agents and supervisors may “communicate to his employees
any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific
views about a particular union, so as long as the communica-
tions do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.’” Albertson’s, LLC, 359 NLRB No. 147, slip op. at 33
(2013), quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618
(1968). Whether the statements are a threat is viewed from the
objective standpoint of the employee, over whom the employer
has a measure of economic power. See Mesker Door, Inc., 357
NLRB 591, 595 (2011); Inn at Fox Hollow, 352 NLRB 1072,
1074 (2008). See also Section 8(c) of the Act (stating that the
‘expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemi-
nation thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor prac-
tice under any of the provisions of this Act . . . ., if such expres-
sion contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of bene-
fit”). An employer’s communication to employees that they
will jeopardize their job security, wages, or other working con-
ditions if they support the union is a violation of Section
8(a)(1). Metro One Loss Prevention Services Group, supra, at
89; Noah’s Bay Area Bagels, LLC, 331 NLRB 188 (2000).
Based on the facts and the controlling legal standard, I find
that Spalding’s July 26, remarks are implicit threats of plant
closure or job loss in violation Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The evidence established that in response to rumors of a un-
ion organizing campaign, Spalding held mandatory employee
meetings for each of the three shifts to express management’s
and the parent company’s (Ligon Industries) views on unioni-
zation.41
In the meeting, Spalding extolled the virtues of a nonunion
plant and set out the consequences of unionization. This speech
came after almost 3 months of management’s intense efforts to
disrupt the union organizing campaign (surveillance of
handbilling, consults with attorneys, discussions and meetings
with management staff to discover the extent of the union cam-
paign and its supporters, interrogating employees on their union
support, and giving the same speech at a prior mandatory em-
ployee meeting).
The Respondent accurately points out that Spalding never
explicitly threatened the employees with facility closure if a
union was established at the plant. However, Spalding clearly
implied that the employees jobs were in jeopardy if they union-
ized by stating because all other similar casting companies were
non-union and Ligon preferred not to operate a union plant,
investment in the plant would be jeopardize by a union. He

41 Venkatesan, Stewart, Wilkins, and other supervisors also attended
at least one of the meetings.
also stated as a fact that unionized plants have a more difficult
time making profits and many shut down solely because of
union work rules and other union negotiated processes, without
allowing for other factors apart from the union as the reason for
lost company profits and inefficiencies. Further, this was the
second time Spalding had given the same speech to the hourly
employees, both times ending it with a warning that he would
continue to hold similar mandatory meetings if the workers’ did
not end the union organizing effort by refusing to support it.
(GC Exh. 5.) His comments go beyond communicating the
Respondent’s general views about the Union because they in-
volved thinly veiled threats of plant closure and job loss for
supporting the Union. I find that Spalding’s speech reasonably
would tend to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in paragraph 5(b) of the complaint.
I. Respondent Posted Literature Threatening
Permanent Job Loss
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent, in late July
or early August, posted literature at its facility that threatened
employees with permanent job loss if they were replaced by
new hires during a strike. (GC Exh. 1-M.) The General Coun-
sel contends that the posting at issue “went beyond merely
informing employees that they could be permanently replaced,
and instead threatened, contrary to Laidlaw,42 that as a result of
the strike, employees are not automatically entitled to their jobs
when the strike ends, or to be put on a preferential hire list.”
(GC Br. 56.) The Respondent counters that the “statement as to
the employment consequences of a strike was merely incom-
plete, rather than misleading.” (R. Br. 20.) The Respondent
also argues that the charge should be dismissed because neither
the General Counsel nor the Charging Party questioned any
witness to establish that they interpreted the posting as a threat
to their Section 7 rights. (R. Br. 21.)
An employer may tell its employees that they are subject to
permanent replacement in the event of a strike. Eagle
Comtronics, Inc., 263 NLRB 515, 516 (1982). An employer
does not have to fully explain the nature and scope of the Act’s
protections for replaced strikers. Superior Emerald Park Land-
fill, LLC, 340 NLRB 449, 462 (2003); Laidlaw, supra. None-
theless, the Board has held that “where an employer’s state-
ments about permanent replacements make specific references
to job loss, such statements are generally deemed to be unlaw-
ful since they convey to employees the message that their em-
ployment will be terminated.” Connecticut Humane Society,
358 NLRB 187, 220 (2012).
The Respondent’s posting clearly states that strikers will lose
their jobs during a strike if the company exercises its right to
hire replacement workers. (CP Exh. 4.) The Respondent fails
to make clear the distinction between employees who engage in
economic strikes and are not entitled to immediate reinstate-
ment if replaced, as opposed to employees who engage in un-
fair labor practice strikes and are protected against permanent
replace-ment. See Spurlino Materials, LLC, 357 NLRB 1510,

42 171 NLRB 1366 (1968).
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 19
1524 (2011) (explains the difference between unfair labor prac-
tice strikes and economic strikes); Connecticut Humane Socie-
ty, supra. Despite the Respondent’s argument to the contrary,
the posting does not, even when taken in context, “clearly”
show that the Respondent was referring only to economic strik-
ers. I find that there is absolutely nothing in the language of the
posting to support the Respondent’s argument. I also find
without merit the Respondent’s argument that the charge
should be dismissed because neither the General Counsel nor
the Charging Party questioned any witnesses to establish that
they interpreted the posting as a threat to their Section 7 rights.
The Respondent failed to provide any case law to support this
argument.
I find that the General Counsel has established that the Re-
spondent, through a posting of literature in late July or early
August, threatened its employees with permanent job loss if
they were replaced by new hires during a strike in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Stahl Speciality Company, is an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Lo-
cal 1464, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Patrick Armstrong on August 31, because
he engaged in union and protected concerted activities, the
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By, on or about May 31, June 13, 18, and 26, July 17, 24
and 26, and August 2 and 14, engaging in surveillance of em-
ployees’ union or other protected concerted activities in a man-
ner that was out of the ordinary and coercive, the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By, on or about July 26, threatening employees with facili-
ty closure if they selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative, the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By, on or about July 26, interrogating its employees about
their union membership and activities and the union sentiments
and activities of other employees, the Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By, on or about late July or early August 2012, threatening
not to hire employees’ relatives because the employees engaged
in union or other protected, concerted activities, the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. By, on or about late July or early August 2012, posting lit-
erature at its facility that threatened employees with permanent
job loss if they were replaced by new hires during a strike, the
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9. The above violations are unfair labor practices that affects
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
10. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set
forth above.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged Patrick
Armstrong must offer him reinstatement and make him whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits he suffered as a re-
sult of the discrimination against him from the date of the dis-
crimination to the date of his reinstatement. Backpay shall be
computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), with interest as provided in New Horizons, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Ken-
tucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010), enf. denied
on other grounds sub. nom. Jackson Hospital Corp. v. NLRB,
647 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Respondent shall file a report with the Social Security Ad-
ministration allocating backpay to the appropriate calendar
quarters. Respondent shall also compensate Patrick Armstrong
for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or
more lump-sum backpay awards covering periods longer than 1
year, Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 44 (2012).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended43
ORDER
The Respondent, Stahl Specialty Company, Warrensburg,
Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any em-
ployee for supporting the International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers Local 1464 affiliated with the International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO, or any other union.
(b) Interrogating employees about their union membership,
activities, and sympathies.
(c) Engaging in surveillance of employees’ union or other
protected concerted activities.
(d) Threatening employees with facility closure if they select
the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
(e) Threatening adverse employment consequences against
employees because they engage in union or other protected
concerted activities.
(f) Posting literature at its facility threatening employees
permanent job loss if they were replaced by new hires during a
strike.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer
Patrick Armstrong full reinstatement to his former position or,
if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.

43 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
(b) Make Patrick Armstrong whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the
decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of
Patrick Armstrong, and within 3 days thereafter notify Patrick
Armstrong in writing that this has been completed and that the
discharge will not be used against him in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities in Kingsville and Warrensburg, Missouri, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”44 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14 Sub-
region 17, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees and members are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notic-
es, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since August 7, 2012.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 30, 2013
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.

44 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against
any employee for supporting the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers Local 1464, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of electrical Workers, AFL–CIO, or any other
union.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against
any employee for engaging in union or other concerted activi-
ties protected by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the rights guaranteed to them
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
offer Patrick Armstrong full reinstatement to his former posi-
tion or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Patrick Armstrong whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimi-
nation against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy sec-
tion of the decision.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge
of Patrick Armstrong, and within 3 days thereafter notify Pat-
rick Armstrong in writing that this has been completed and that
the discharge will not be used against him in any way.
WE WILL, file a report with the Social Security Administra-
tion allocating backpay to the appropriate quarters.
WE WILL, compensate Patrick Armstrong for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum
backpay awards covering periods longer than 1 year.
STAHL SPECIALTY CO.
Anne C. Peressin, Esq., for the Acting General Counsel.
Chris Mitchell, Esq. and Catherine Crowe, Esq., for the Re-
spondent.
Thomas H. Marshall, Esq., for the Charging Party.
ORDER RATIFYING AND ADOPTING DECISION
On September 30, 2013, I issued a decision in this case.
Subsequently, Stahl Specialty Company (Respondent) filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel and
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1464
(Charging Union) filed answering briefs with the National La-
bor Relations Board (the Board). Respondent argued, inter
alia, that I was appointed at a time when the Board lacked a
quorum; my appointment was therefore invalid; and I lacked
the lawful authority to preside over the hearing, issue a decision
or otherwise act in this proceeding.
STAHL SPECIALTY CO. 21
On April 15, 2016, the Board issued an order remanding this
case back to me with full authority over this matter to “decide
whether or not to ratify [my] prior actions herein, to adopt or
modify [my] prior decision, or to issue an entirely new deci-
sion.”1 The Board’s order also stated that “[a]bsent a specific
order by [me], this remand does not give the parties the oppor-
tunity to relitigate any matter previously presented for decision,
nor does it give any party the right to expand the scope of the
issues previously presented.”
The Board agreed with the Respondent’s contention that un-
der the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning,
134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014), the Board lacked a valid quorum at the
time that it originally approved my appointment in April 2013.
However, the Board pointed out that on July 18, 2014, it rati-
fied all administrative and personnel decisions made from Jan-
uary 4, 2012, to August 5, 2013, and expressly authorized my
appointment. It also concluded that its ratification expressly
authorized my appointment.2 However, since my decision in
this case was issued and transferred to the Board prior to the
Board’s July 18, 2014 ratification of my appointment, I was
divested of jurisdiction as well as the opportunity to consider
whether or not to ratify my prior actions. In considering all of

1 Pursuant to the Board’s remand order, I am only addressing the is-
sues raised by Respondent regarding the validity of my prior actions
and decision in this case. The Board has already made determinations
regarding Respondent’s allegations and arguments about the validity of
appointments and authority of the Regional Director and Acting Gen-
eral Counsel in this case. (Board Order Remanding).
2 The Board explained in its order remanding this case that it took
this ratification action on July 18, 2014, “in an effort to resolve any
continuing uncertainty regarding various actions taken during the time
the Board lacked a quorum.” See Board Order Remanding (April 15,
2016).
the circumstances of this case, including its complexity, number
of alleged violations, the hearing and lengthy decision, excep-
tions filed and Respondent’s intention to continue to litigate my
authority, the Board, “in an effort to remove any lingering ques-
tions,” decided to remand the case to give me the opportunity to
consider the issues presented now that my appointment has
been fully confirmed by a legally valid five- member Board.
This complex case involves many alleged violations of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act), Sections 8(a)(1) and
(3), including allegations that, during a union organizing cam-
paign, the Respondent engaged in unlawful surveillance of
union handbilling, threatened employees with plant closure if
they selected the Union, interrogated an employee about his
union activities and sympathies and those of other employees,
threatened employees with permanent job loss if they were
replaced by new hires while on strike, and unlawfully dis-
charged a union supporter. Respondent denied violating the
Act in any way, and raised several affirmative defenses. Pursu-
ant to the Board’s remand order and my now valid ratification,
authority and jurisdiction over this case, I have fully reviewed
my decision in light of the alleged allegations and Respondent’s
defenses. In doing so, I have determined that my decision (in-
cluding the findings of fact, analysis, credibility determinations,
conclusions and recommended order), is based on the entire
record, and that it remains correct and should stand on its en-
tirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED that all prior actions performed by me in
this case are hereby ratified and that my decision issued in this
case on September 30, 2013, is hereby adopted in its entirety
for the reasons stated above and in the Board’s remand order
issued on April 15, 2016.
Dated, Washington, DC April 22, 2016