Soft Water Laundry, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 8, 1963

143 N.L.R.B. 1283 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

SOFT WATER LAUNDRY, INC. 1283
1. Upon the foregoing, we find that the Joint Employers are en-
gaged in operations affecting commerce and that it will effectuate the
policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.'
2. The labor organization named below claims to represent certain
employees of the Employers.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of certain employees of the Employers.
4. The following employees of the Employers constitute a unit ap-
propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within Section
9(b) of the Act:'
All employees of the Employers at Riverhouse, Riverhouse Wrest,
and Riverhouse South, all located in Arlington, Virginia, engaged in
the operation, maintenance and repair of all boilers, air-conditioning
machinery and their appurtenances and all other mechanical equip-
ment coming under the supervision of the chief engineer, excluding all
other employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
MEMBER RODGERS took no part in the consideration of the above De-
cision and Direction of Election.
° See Mistletoe Operating Company, 122 NLRB 1534 In view of the fact that, under
the cited case , the operations of one of the Joint Employers meet our office building stand-
ard, we need not, and do not, reach the question of what standard would be applied if the
operations of the three apartment corporations alone were involved . See also, Carol
Management Corporation, et al, 133 NLRB 1126, 1127.
7 The parties are in agreement on the composition and scope of the unit.
Soft Water Laundry, Inc. and AFL-CIO Laundry and Dry
Cleaning International Union. Case No. 12-CA-P2417. August
8, 1963
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 18, 1963, Trial Examiner Harold X. Summers issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Interrnedi-
ate Report. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had
not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and the General Counsel filed
a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provision of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
143 NLRB No. 118.
717-672-64-vol. 14 3-8 2
1284 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members
Rodgers and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi-
ate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case,
and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
The Board adopts the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
The original charge in this matter, alleging that Soft Water Laundry, Inc., had
been and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, was filed on August 3,
1962, by AFL-CIO Laundry and Dry Cleaning International Union; the charge
was amended on August 28, October 30, and November 9, 1962. On the basis of
the investigation of this charge and its amendments, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint on September 21, 1962; i on
October 25, 1962, he issued an amended complaint alleging that Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act.
Respondent's answer to the amended complaint admitted some of its allegations,
denied others, and, in substance, denied the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tices? Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on the allegations of the amended
complaint, as further amended at the hearing, and on the answer, as amended at
the hearing, before Trial Examiner Harold X. Summers at Tampa, Florida, on
November 14 and 15, 1962. All parties were afforded full opportunity to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to submit briefs. Briefs, which
have been filed by the General Counsel and by Respondent, have been fully
considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, including my evaluation of the, witnesses based
upon the evidence and my observation of their demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. COMMERCE
Soft Water Laundry, Inc., herein called Respondent, is a Florida corporation with
an office, principal place of business, and two plants at St. Petersburg, Florida, where
it is engaged in the laundry and drycleaning business. During the calendar year
1961, Respondent purchased and received goods, supplies, and materials from points
outside the State of Florida valued at in excess of $50,000; and, during the same
period, it did a gross volume of business in excess of $500,000.
I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE UNION
AFL-CIO Laundry and Dry Cleaning International Union, herein called the
Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
i Motions to strike, to dismiss, and for a more definite statement and a bill of particulars,
addressed to this complaint, were denied by the Trial Examiner to whom it was referred
2 Respondent also filed motions to strike, to dismiss, and for a more definite statement
and a bill of particulars, addressed to the amended complaint Referred to Trial Examiner
Harold X. Summers but not having been ruled upon by the opening of the hearing in this
matter, these motions were discussed early in the hearing Respondent waived the neces-
sity for rulings at that time, and agreed that the hearing might proceed and that the
rulings, if the motions were still then pending, might be ruled upon in this Intermediate
Report The motions to strike and for a more definite statement and a bill of particulars
are hereby denied ; the motion to dismiss is disposed of in accordance with the findings,
conclusions, and Recommended 'Order appearing in this Intermediate Report.
SOFT WATER LAUNDRY, INC. 1285
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
During the late spring and early summer of 1962,3 the Union sought to organize
and to become the bargaining agent of certain of Respondent's employees. Repre-
sentation petitions involving the route drivers (Case No. 12-RC-1454) and the
production and maintenance, or inside, employees (Case No. 12-RC-1497) were
filed on May 3 and July 3, respectively; and elections were held thereon on June 22
and August 29, respectively. Receiving less than a majority of the votes cast in
the drivers' election, the Union filed timely objections; on August 22, the election
was set aside? In the inside workers' election, the Union received a majority of
the valid votes cast; Respondent's objections to the election were overruled by the
Regional Director, an appeal from which ruling was pending before the National
Labor Relations Board in Washington as this hearing opened.
B. Chronology of events 5
1. Late in 1961 or early 1962, on the day of or the day following the discharge
of one Robert Brostic, Respondent's route drivers met with Russell M. Knightly,6
Respondent's president. At this meeting, the drivers outlined various "gripes" about
their working conditions.
2. During the month preceding March 21, a majority of Respondent's route
drivers had signed cards authorizing the Union to act as their bargaining agent.
Among those who signed and who participated in the procurement of signatures
was Marvin "Sonny" Henson, a route driver.
3. On March 21, at 10 a.m., Knightly approached Henson at the loading platform
of Respondent's 22d Street plant and asked, "Sonny, why are you doing this to
me?" Henson reminded Knightly that he had promised to remedy the working
conditions about which the drivers had complained but that the promise had been
ignored. Knightly then said that if Henson would "break up" the Union, Respond-
ent would restore to the drivers the 11 percent drycleaning commission (which had
been cut to 5 percent). When Henson said he would have to talk to the other
drivers, Knightly said that he would give Henson 24 hours in which to make up
his mind.
4 Next morning, at 10 a.m., Knightly told Henson that his 24 hours were up.
Henson said that he had had insufficient time in which to speak to more than a
few of the drivers and that, as far as he knew then, the union activities would
continue. At this, Knightly shouted-and he said that he would say the same
thing to Jimmie Hoffa-"I will padlock these doors and under no circumstances will
I ever work with the Union at Soft Water Laundry." 7
5. During the evening of March 29, eight of Respondent's drivers met with
T. O. Porter, union representative. They met at Henson's home, located in an
outlying, uncongested neighborhood on an unpaved street; and the actual meeting
took place in a "Florida room" whose windows, covering the. entire wall, looked
out on the street. Early in the course of the meeting-between 7:30 and 7.40-
Henson received a telephone call from Dale Beck, route supervisor for Respondent 8
Somewhat cryptically-and this record contains no further illumination-Beck
warned Henson to stay away from Beck's wife. Twenty minutes later, someone at
the meeting called the others' attention to the fact that Beck was slowly driving past
the house. Beck drove by the house several times more. On one of these occasions,
several of the drivers at the meeting ran out to their own cars and chased Beck
from 7 to 12 blocks, finally losing him in traffic when he entered a main artery 9
3 Unless otherwise indicated all incidents described in this report occurred In 1962.
4 No rerun election was held. The Union withdrew its petition on or about November 9.
G My findings of what occurred-or did not occur-as recited in this section will not be
repeated elsewhere in this report Reference to items in this section will take the form
of the abbreviation "Chron " followed by the item number or numbers being discussed
Spelled throughout this record as N-i-g-h-t-l-y. (The transcript is hereby corrected
accordingly) It was stipulated, and I find, that Knightly is a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act.
4 The findings recited in Chron. 1 to 4 are based upon the credited testimony of Henson
Knightly did not testify.
9 The pleadings and a stipulation establish, and it is here found, that Beck was a super-
visor within the meaning of the Act
6 This finding is based on the credited testimony of Benson and Eugene Risher, another
driver Beck did not testify. At the hearing, there was no positive identification of Beck
.is an occupant of the car. There was testimony to the effect that, although it was dark,
1286 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6. About April 6, Respondent caused to be posted at its plants, a number of iden-
tical notices.10 Approximately 14 by 20 inches and bordered by a %-inch red strip,
they bore the following legend:
TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Since the Union has been putting on a campaign to get in here , some of you
have been asking questions in regard to the following matters. We have decided
to state the Company's position on these subjects as clearly as we can for every-
body alike:
(1) This matter is, of course, one of concern to the Company. It, is how-
ever, also a matter of serious concern to you and our sincere belief is that if
this Union were to come into this Plant, it would not work to your benefit but
to your serious harm.
(2) It is our positive intention to oppose this Union and by every proper
means to prevent it from getting in here.
(3) We would like to make it clear that it is not necessary, and it is not ever
going to be necessary, for anybody to belong to any Union in order to work in
this Plant.
(4) Those who might join or belong to this Union are not going to get
any advantages or any preferred treatment of any sort over those who do not
join or belong to any Union.
(5) If anybody causes you any trouble at your work or puts you under any
sort of pressure to join the Union, you should let the Company know, and we
will undertake to see that this is stopped.
(6) No person will be allowed to carry on Union organizing activities on the
job. Anybody who does so and who thereby neglects his own work or inter-
feres with the work of others will be subject to discharge.
Anybody who tells you anything contrary to any of the foregoing is not tell-
ing you the truth.
(S) R. M. KNIGHTLY , Pres.,
Soft Water Laundry, 4-6-62.
The notices remained posted until August 29 (the date of the inside workers' election),
at which time they were taken down.I"
7. Driver Henson testified that on Saturday, May 26 (the day after the hearing
in Case No. 12-RC-1454 was held), at 10 a.m., Knightly called a meeting of five
drivers and spoke to them. Holding a sheet of paper, he told them that he was
going to read it. He then spoke about the Union . He said , among other things,
that he would never sign a union contract-that he would take the matter to court
and keep it there from 3 to 5 years. He added that, in negotiating, "we take all
benefits from you and start from scratch, you wouldn't have nothing."
Driver Risher testified about a meeting occurring on or about June 8 (2 weeks
before the election). According to him, Knightly spoke to more than five drivers;
he "generally talked about the union, what things we would lose, and explained a
little about the election , negotiations , and so forth, generally about the union."
With respect to bargaining, according to Risher, Knightly said that, under the law,
he would have to bargain in good faith.
Driver Shepard testified that, on or about June 15, Knightly spoke to all the
drivers and, then, on or about June 20 to three separate groups of drivers. (Shepard
attended the first talk and one of the group talks.) Knightly had with him a written
statement which (quoting from Shepard's testimony), "I believe . .. from all I
a porch light made the car visible ; and that the automobile was a green 1949 or 1950
Chevrolet, the same as the one owned by Beck. Further, there was testimony to the
effect that, next morning, In answer to Henson's comment upon the running ability of
Beck's car, Beck said, "Yep, it outran a Hornet, a Chevrolet, and a Simca last night "
Finally, Risher testified that, also on the morning following the alleged chase, he spoke
to Clarence Thorsen-stipulated and here found to be a supervsor within the meaning of
the Act-about Beck's "escape," to which Thorsen replied, "Yes, you would never catch
him In this area because he's worked here for some time, in this particular territory "
(Thorsen did not testify.) On the basis of this testimony, which I credit-but without
reliance on the incident involving Thorsen, which incident, I find, has no probative
value-I find that the automobile was Beck's and that Beck was its driver.
10 There was some testimony with respect to the posting of other materials as well, but
they are not at issue in this matter.
li This finding Is based upon a stipulation, as supplemented by credited testimonial and
documentary evidence.
SOFT WATER LAUNDRY, INC. 1287
could see, or understand, Knightly read from." Knightly (according to Shepard)
did not say he would not bargain; on the contrary, he would bargain, but it would be
a matter of time; the bargaining could extend into the future; during negotiations
wages and fringe benefits would be frozen (During cross-examination, Shepard
quoted Knightly as having said, "Wages, benefits, vacations, and so forth could be
[frozen].")
My evaluation of these three witnesses and my analysis of their three versions in
the entire context of this case convinces me that a meeting, or series of meetings,
was held between Knightly and all or groups of drivers during the period between
May 26 and June 20; that, in one or more of these meetings, Knightly, acknowledg-
ing that he would be obligated to bargain with the Union if it should win an election,
said that he could delay bargaining-among other things, by resort to court pro-
ceedings-from 3 to 5 years. I find further that at least in the talk at which Henson
was in attendance, Knightly not only said that working conditions would be frozen
during negotiations-he said that "we take all benefits from you and start from
scratch, you wouldn't have nothing." 12
8 The drivers' election was held on Friday, June 22. On the preceding Monday
or Tuesday, at 6:30 a.m., in the sales meeting room of the 22d Street plant, Knightly
spoke to approximately 20 drivers. Once again, the substance of what he had to
say was written out.13 He said:
Before we go any further, I want to straighten out one thing that may have
been of concern to you. It has come to our attention that there may be some
businessmen in this area that have taken an interest in our election. We want
you to fully understand that this company has authorized no other company
or outsider to speak for it. This company has no connection with any individuals
who may or may not have an interest in this election. What any of the outsiders
do will be on their own time without any aid, assistance, or cooperation from
the company. The company did not ask for aid from these outsiders, and we
will not be responsible for anything said or done by any outsider group.
We do appreciate any and all past and present favors.
I find that Knightly was referring to the interest displayed in the Union's attempt
to organize Respondent's employees by a number of citizens referred to in this com-
plaint as the Citizens' Committee.
These citizens met with approximately 16 of Respondent's drivers on Wednesday,
June 20, at 7:30 p.m, at the premises of a supplier of commercial laundry equip-
ment. (Notice of the meeting-and testimony herein does not reveal the source-
was passed by word of mouth.) Present, in addition to the drivers, were the owner
of the building in which the meeting was held; a Mr. Rogers of Rogers Cleaning,
presumably a competitor of Respondent; the "owner" of Blue Ribbon Cleaners,
another competitor; a "man from the laundry and cleaners association"; and an
unnamed attorney from out of town Beer and refreshments were served.
Rogers did most of the talking for the "Committee." There was a point-by-point
discussion of a leaflet-origin unknown-which had earlier been distributed (by per-
sons unknown) into parked automobiles of Respondent's employees.14 The drivers
were told-by Rogers-that Respondent did not need a union, that the drivers had
now made their demands known and would probably get satisfaction if the Union
was dropped. To this, the owner of Blue Ribbon Cleaners added, "If you push
Knightly into a corner, you'll have a big fight on your hands."
i Knightly did not testify, and although-over the General Counsel's objection-a copy
of what appears to be the speech in question was made available to Respondent, it was not
introduced into evidence (I do not regard, as probative of the contents of the speech in
this matter, the Regional Director's account of a speech-based upon informal investiga-
tion-which appeared in his Supplemental Decision, Order, and Direction of Second Elec-
tion in Case No 12-RC-1454 ) At any rate, to the extent that the speech as above
found may vary from the speech as it was written, I find that Knightly, in delivering it,
deviated from the written material ; in this respect, I credit Henson, who testified that
Knightly spoke for long intervals without looking at the paper.
But the writing was not offered into this record.
The leaflet spoke of the possibility of strikes and the attendant ",costs" ; of union
dues, fines, and assessments and where they "often" go ; of the loss of the personal
employer-employee relationship with the advent of a "powerful" steward ; of the small
voice in local union affairs which the drivers would have if-as expected-the Union
should also organize inside workers ; and, finally, of the "good possibility" that some exist-
ing tfringe benefits "would be lost" during a period of contract negotiations. (" . . nego-
tiations would start from scratch !")
1288 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
9. A union meeting was held on Monday, May 28, at which Magnolia Odom,
silk finisher in Respondent's drycleaning department, signed a union bargaining-
authorization card.
Two or three days later, according to Odom, James Harold Davis, manager of the
drycleaning department,15 approached her. He held out three pencils and asked
her to look at them. Pointing out that each pencil was of a different color, he said,
"I can take three pencils and sign anything I want to sign with them, but I would
have to be careful what I signed because I may sign the wrong papers, and after
signing the wrong papers, I might, you know, go down the wrong road." Odom's
answer: "Well, I don't sign anything unless I read it, even though I can't read too
well, but I make sure I read whatever I sign . . . . If I go down the wrong road,
as long as the majority are going down the wrong road, when I get to the end of the
wrong road, I would just say we had a hell of a good time, and come back home."
Davis, testifying, denied that, at or about this time, he pulled out three pencils
and made any statements to Odom about them.
From my observation Magnolia Odom was a forthright individual. She answered
questions straightforwardly and without hesitation.16 Davis' testimony, on the
other hand, was punctuated by longer-than-normal pauses between questions and
answers. Granted that a reasonably prudent individual would exercise caution in
testifying at a legal proceeding, I believe that Davis was unduly wary. Also, I
had the impression that he was fencing with his questioner, on direct as well as
cross-examination. Finally, I take note of the prehearing statement which, brought
to his attention, caused him to change certain testimony being given at this hearing.
I credit Magnolia Odom in her version of the "pencil" incident. And I find, in
context, that (in the minds of both Davis and Odom) the "papers" referred to were
union authorization cards and that the "wrong road" was the direction taken in
signing such cards.
10. On or about June 13 or 14, Davis approached Odom while she was smoking
a cigarette. He said he knew she had signed a union card. She admitted that she
had and said that others had signed cards, too. His rejoinder was that she was
hurting herself and the Company, and others who were working with her.''
11. On June 26, Davis again approached Odom as she spoke to another employee
and said, "Let's go back to work." She was on her way to her work station when
he asked her if she was aware of what the union was doing at Eastern Air Lines
He pointed out that the union there was on strike and that Eastern employees were
losing their families, homes, and cars; and he asked her how she would like to
lose her home and car.18
12. As noted earlier, the drivers' election was held on June 22 and a petition
for the inside workers was filed on July 3. Carrie Drayton, a checker at Respond-
ent's 22d Street plant, was on vacation during the first 2 weeks in July Upon her
return on July 16, she had a conversation with Charles Hayes, supervisor at the
plant.ls
According to Drayton, Hayes told her that if anyone approached her about the
Union she should let him know; that, if the Union "got in," Respondent would no
longer lend money to employees; 20 and that, if she had already signed a union
card, this did not mean she had to vote for the Union 21
Hayes, called as a witness, denied making these statements as such. He con-
ceded that he had a conversation with Drayton at or about this time, but his version
15 Respondent's answer admits , and I find, that Davis is a supervisor within the meaning
of the Act
30 The one exception: Asked whether she wanted her job back, she paused Then--al-
though she might have expected her answer to prejudice her case- she said that, under
the circumstances of her discharge, she did not
17 This finding is based on the credited testimony of Odom, over the denial of Davis
is This finding is based on Odom's credited testimony. Davis did not remember talking
to Odom about Eastern, but conceded that he spoke to a number of employees about the
strike there: while denying that he said the same thing would happen to Respondent's
employees, he did say to them that "In case there should be a strike called, you would
probably have to go out on a strike." As Indicated, I credit Odom's testimony.
30 The answer, as amended , admits, and I find, that Hayes is a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act.
20 The testimony establishes, and I find , that Respondent had a policy of lending money
to employees The last time Drayton had borrowed from Respondent was 73/2 months
earlier
21 The bearing on the inside workers ' petition was now set for July 23.
SOFT WATER LAUNDRY, INC. 1289
differs from hers. He had become aware of union activities on the part of the
inside workers shortly after the drivers' election was held (June 22), first, because
of a remark made to him by a driver and, thereafter, "the activity just kind of built
up and [sic] in kind of a pattern." On the return of Drayton from her vacation
(according to Hayes' testimony), he told her "that there was union activity or that
we felt that there was going on; that I didn't know since she had been on vacation
whether she knew about it; ... that we knew there were certain ones attending meet-
ings (which we didn't care), that cards had been signed (which didn't matter),
but if she had been attending the meetings ... or if she heard of any of the girls
speaking of them or talking to her about it, if her or any other employees had
any questions in regard to it, to feel free to come and ask me, or John Graham,
or . . . any other supervisor." [Punctuation supplied.] He also has told "all of
them" that, whether or not they had signed cards "when you go to vote, you can
vote as you wish, vote as you please." With respect to loans, Hayes testified that
he told Drayton that if the Union won an election, there would have to be negotia-
tions for a contract, and the (policy of) loaning could or might be discontinued.
Both Drayton and Hayes appeared to be credible witnesses, and I can only ascribe
their differences in testimony to some failure of communication between them. On
the basis of my observation of the witnesses and of the entire pattern of events
herein, I find that, on or about July 16, Hayes told Drayton that Respondent was
aware of union activities on the part of the inside workers; that her signing of a
union card, if she had signed one, did not obligate her to vote for the Union in
an election ; and that she should come to him, or other supervisors, for answers to
any questions she might have about the Union. (I find specifically that he did
not ask Drayton to report to him anyone's union approach to her. While she
may have so understood his words. I do not regard as plausible, under the circum-
stances, his making the request; and I do not find Drayton's to be a reasonable inter-
pretation of what I have found was said.) I find further that he told Drayton that,
in the event the Union "came in ," the Respondent "might" cut out its policy of
lending money to employees. I find specifically that he did not relate this "predic-
tion" to a period of bargaining or to a possible negotiated outcome, even though
this is what he may have had in mind (I find it implausible for him to have raised
this fine legal point in such conversation).
13. On Monday, July 23, between 9 and 10 a.m., Davis again had a conversation
with Odom. He said that the Union would keep employees out on strike and that
"Welfare" would have to take care of them; that the Union was no good and that
Odom's job with Respondent was a good one; and that she could borrow $50 or $60
from Respondent 22 but that she should see what Union Representative Porter would
do about it if she needed $50 or $60.23
14. On July 26, Magnolia Odom was discharged, under circumstances discussed
in detail under "The discharge," infra
15. Rosalie Jones, a flatworker for Respondent, testified that early in August
or (alternatively) after a majority of the inside workers voted for the Union (i.e.,
after August 29), Charles Hayes had a conversation with her. He asked if she had
been at a union meeting, to which she replied in the affirmative. He then pointed
to the copy of the notice-identified as that described in Chron. 6, above-which
was posted nearby and said that no union was coming in "over Knightly's head."
She and Hayes-her testimony continues-then had an argument. in the course of
which he told her that she was going to the "damned Welfare" 24 if the Union came
in and that the girls who joined the Union would have no jobs
Hayes' testimony of the incident differs. He denied ever asking Jones if she
had attended a union meeting, calling her attention to the notice on the wall, or
making any statement to her about "Welfare." He did, according to his testimony,
have a conversation with Jones on or about August 1. just outside the office of the
plant superintendent, near which was posted one of the notices In this conversa-
tion , he tried to explain to her the workings of the Florida right-to-work law; under
it, he told her, workers on strike could draw neither company pay nor unemploy-
ment compensation.
22 Odom had borrowed $50 in June.
za In so finding , I credit Odom 's testimony . Davis denied talking to any employee about
welfare, although he conceded talking of "rocking chair" money At one point he denied
speaking about loans-Jbut see Cbron . 12 Finally , with respect to whether he had ever
mentioned Porter in connection with a discussion of loans, he changed his testimony after
being confronted with a pretrial statement.
24 Meaning , presumably , relief.
1290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I found Jones to be a confused and confusing witness. I have previously com-
mented on Hayes' credibility. I credit his testimony with respect to this
conversation.25
16. During the first 2 weeks in August, John Graham, Respondent's plant
superintendent,26 spoke to a number of employees.
Mary Chance, formerly a fiatironer for Respondent, testified that, following a
speech to all employees made by someone whom she could not identify,27 Graham
spoke to groups of employees; Chance, with four others, was in one of the groups.
To her group-she testified-Graham said that the Union would not do the em-
ployees any good-they would lose more than they would gain; that Union Repre-
sentative Porter would be making $9,000 a year off them; that he and Respondent
would fight the Union's coming in; that, if the laundry employees did not want to
hurt Knightly, they could sign "a piece of paper" and file a "petition against the
Union"; and, finally, that anyone who did not like this job could collect her money
and get a job at Gulf Coast Overall Service.
Graham, called as a witness, conceded that he, at or about this time, spoke to
employees about "this union matter." He denied, however, that he made any men-
tion of an employee petition to get rid of the Union. He added that, among other
things, he gave employees the address of Knightly, who was ill at the time and whose
illness, in Graham's opinion, was brought about by the Union's organizational
campaign.
In the two respects in which Chance's and Graham's version differ-the allusions
to an antiunion petition and to Knightly's away-from-plant address-I credit Graham.
(Chance was vague on details; moreover, I regard it to be significant that Chance
was the only witness called to testify about Graham's telling a number of employees
about an antiunion petition.) In other words, I find that Graham did say that the
Union would not do the employees any good-they would lose more than they
would gain; that Union Representative Porter would be making $9,000 a year off
them; that he and Respondent would fight the Union's coming in; that if any em-
ployee wanted to write to Knightly, who was sick over this whole union matter, he
would furnish the address; and, finally, that anyone who did not like this job could
collect her money and get a job at Gulf Coast Overall Service.
17. On or about August 15, at 4:30 p.m., Davis called Henry Vangodwin, a
presser and wool finisher, into his office. Bidding him to be seated, Davis asked if
he knew about the Union. Vangodwin said, "No." Davis asked if Vangodwin had
read the notice above the timeclock.28 Then he said, "Henry, all the Union will do
is make you a lot of promises, and all he [I find the reference to be to Knightly]
need do is make you a lot of offers .... If you join the Union, your pay will be
cut down to 91¢ an hour.29 You are messing around, and you will lose your home,
your wife, and your kid. You might be the shop steward." When Vangodwin asked
why Davis was singling him out, Davis said, "It could be Mrs. Beets, or Magnolia
[Odom], but I believe it is going to be you." 30
25 It could be significant that Hayes never specifically denied that part of the conversa-
tion attributed to him by Jones relating to the loss of jobs by girls who joined the Union.
In the context of the conversation which I have found, I regard his making of this threat
as implausible ; and I regard his failure to deny it as due to an oversight by his questioners.
=a Admitted and here found to be a supervisor within the meaning of the Act
ar The sole substantive pairt of this speech to which 'Chance testified was a statement by
the unidentified speaker to the effect that, while he didn't know who had joined the Union,
the employees would hurt Knightly badly by joining. The General Counsel does not in-
elude this speech among his allegations of violations.
Identified and here found to be the notice referred to In Chron. 6, above.
se Vangodwin currently averaged $1 60 per hour
30 This finding is based upon the testimony of Vangodwin, who impressed me as being
the most believable of all the witnesses Davis conceded that the conversation took place,
but his testimony contains variations and explanations: his allusion to 91 cents was merely
in connection with his showing Vangodwin a south Florida union contract in which this
was top pay for Vangodwin's job classification-he did not say Vangodwin would end up
with 91 cents if the Union came in; his reference to a loss of home, wife, and child took
the form of an opinion that, if Vangodwin would have to go on strike, he would be un-
able to keep up his house and automobile payments ; and he added a name-Mrs. Single-
ton-to those whom he had listed as possible stewards To the extent that there is varia-
tion between Vangodwin's and Davis' versions, I credit the former
SOFT WATER LAUNDRY, INC. 1291
18. On or about August 25, Davis approached Vangodwin's working area. In
a loud voice, he said "Henry, you're a big man in the Union. Bring me a turkey
and a ham." 31
19. At 9:30 a.m., on or about August 27-2 days before the inside workers'
election was scheduled to be held-Ralph E. Dillon 32 approached driver Henson
as the latter was loading his truck. He asked, "Sonny, can I talk to you for a few
minutes? You don't have to if you didn't want to, but I would like to talk to you."
Receiving an affirmative answer, Dillon took Henson to the office of Superintendent
Graham. There, he asked what was wrong at Respondent that required a union.
Henson explained the drivers' "gripes," as previously explained to Knightly. To
this, Dillon said that he controlled Soft Water Laundry and that he was satisfied with
Knightly. He then said that if the inside people voted for the Union, he would fire
them and replace them. "I see there's no talking to you," he finished, "What you
need is for somebody to knock your teeth down your throat to wake you up."
20. On the same day, Davis told Vangodwin to go to his (Davis') office. There,
Vangodwin found Ralph Dillon. "Henry, do you know me?" asked Dillon. "No-
I [have] seen you, but I do not know you," was the answer. "Well," said Dillon,
"I am one of the owners of this Company. Why are you trying to hurt me?"
Vangodwin protested that he was not trying to hurt Dillon, that he was merely trying
to help himself; he complained, for example, that for purposes of medical insurance
and retirement, he was listed as "unskilled labor." To this, Dillon, after giving an
explanation geared to hospital rates, said, "I'll tell you what you do. You go in
there and vote `No ' Come back in after it's all over with you and I will straighten you
out. What's wrong with you [is], your blood pressure is too high. I will straighten
you Out." 33
C. Interference, restraint, coercion
As alleged in the amended complaint, I find that Respondent, through its super-
visor, James Harold Davis, on or about June 26, 1962,34 told an employee he knew
she had signed a union card and was just making trouble for herself and everyone
else at the plant; 35 through its supervisor, Russell M. Knightly, on or about March 21,
1962, asked an employee why he was doing this (i e., participating in unionization)
and promised benefits if the employee would work against the movement; 36 through
its supervisor, Knightly, on or about March 22, 1962, threatened to close the plant
rather than work with the Union,37 and through its supervisor, Davis, on or about
August 15, 1962, threatened an employee with the loss of economic benefits in the
event he joined the Union.38
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Ralph M. Dillon, a director of Re-
spondent, on or about August 27, 1962, interrogated employees concerning union
membership and activities, offered benefits for not joining the Union or engaging in
union activities, and threatened employees who should sign union cards or engage
in union activities . Respondent , in effect , disclaims responsibility for any of Dillon's
actions. The circumstances surrounding the involvement of Dillon are found in
Chron. 19 and 20 It is clear that Dillon entered the plant, summoned an employee
to the office of the plant superintendent, and there engaged in a conversation with
him; and that a supervisor told another employee to go to his (the supervisor's)
office, where he found, and was engaged in conversation by, Dillon. Without reli-
ance on Dillon's statements as to his own authority, I find these facts, otherwise
unexplained, to be sufficient to establish Respondent's responsibility for Dillon's
actions. I find, therefore, that Respondent, through its agent Ralph M. Dillon,
on or about August 27, 1962, did threaten reprisals and promise benefits to employees
in order to discourage union membership and activities 39
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Respondent, through Foreman Charles F.
Hayes, on or about July 16, 1962, told an employee that Respondent would not
loan money to employees if the Union won an election. I find this allegation to be
m Based on Vangodwin's credited, uncontradicted testimony.
3' Whose status is discussed elsewhere in this report
33 The findings in Chron. 17 and 18 are based on the credited testimony of Henson and
Vangodwin, respectively. Dillon did not testify
34 The date named in the complaint was May 29, 1962
Chron 10
3a Chron. 3
S7 Chron. 4
38 Chron 17
3a See Chions 19 and 20
1292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
supported by the evidence outlined in Chron. 12. Also-although this was not
alleged, it was thoroughly litigated-I find that a similar threat was voiced by
Respondent, through its Supervisor James Harold Davis, on July 23, 1962.40
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Respondent, through Russell M. Knightly,
on or about May 26, 1962, told a group of employees that if the Union won he
did not have to agree to a contract and that he could keep the matter in court
from 3 to 5 years during which time the employees' working conditions would be
frozen. I find-see Chron 7-that, between May 26 and June 20, Knightly told
employees that, while he would be obligated to bargain if the Union won an elec-
tion, he could delay bargaining-among other things, by resort to court proceed-
ings-for from 3 to 5 years; that, during negotiations, not only would working
conditions be frozen-benefits would be taken from the employees and bargain-
ing would "start from scratch" I find that, in making these statements,'Knightly
stepped beyond the bounds of lawful prediction; his words, in the light of the other
conduct here found to have occurred, constituted a thinly veiled threat designed to
discoui age interest in the Union.
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Respondent, on or about April 7, 1962,
and continuously thereafter, posted a notice informing employees that if the Union
came into the plant, it would work to their serious harm. I have found that, from
on or about April 6 to August 29, 1962, Respondent did post a notice 41 in which-
and this is the only part of the notice under attack by the General Counsel-Re-
spondent says •
It is . . . our sincere belief that if this Union were to come into this Plant,
it would not work to your benefit but to your serious harm
Respondent, in effect demurs to the allegation; it urges that the posting of this ma-
terial is not unlawful.42 I have carefully considered the statement in the light of
all acts here found and not found to have been committed; words take on real
meaning when viewed in the context in which they are uttered. In view of the
many threats of reprisals and promises of benefit to discourage union membership
and activities enumerated herein, I find that the words in question contained an im-
plied threat of harm to employees if the Union's organizing campaign should be
SUCCeSSful 43
The complaint, as amended, alleges that Respondent, through Foreman Dale
Beck, on or about March 29, 1962, maintained surveillance of a meeting place,
meetings, or other concerted or union activities of Respondent's employees I have
found 44 that Beck did, during the evening of March 29, drive slowly past a meeting
of union adherents several times. Since the neighborhood was outlying and un-
congested, I find that the reason for Beck's presence there at that time was to
gather information about the Union's organizational campaign. I find, therefore,
that the allegation is supported by the evidence
In the context in which they were performed, I find that each of the acts above
found to have occurred were intended to interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees
in the exercise of their self-organizational rights.
The complaint also alleges that Respondent, through Foreman Charles F. Hayes,
on or about July 16, 1962, told an employee she should tell him if any employees
were talking on behalf of the Union; through Hayes, on or about August 9, 1962,
asked an employee if she had attended a union meeting on the previous day; and,
through Foreman John Graham, on or about August 2, 1962. told employees that
they should pass around an antiunion petition. I have found 45 that these allega
tions are not supported by the offered testimony. Furthermore, no testimony was
40 See Chron. 13.
41 See Chron. 6
42 Respondent concedes that the omission of the prefatory words, "It is . . . our sincere
belief that" would render the communication unlawful
41 Morris & Associates, Inc, 138 NLRB 1160 ; White Oak Acres, Inc , 134 NLRP, 1145.
I am aware that in N L R R v Threads, Inc., 308 F 2d 1 (C A 4), a speech containing
similar language was found not to be violative of Section 8(a) (1) ; however, (1) the
underlining supplied by the court demonstrated that the words being tested were those
which conveyed that union membership would never bring advantages rather than that
union membership would work hardship-the count could hardly find fault with an em-
ployer who said he would not "grant any favors to union members which are not available
to nonmembers also" ; and (2) the decision appears to be bottomed, in part, on the fact
that the General Counsel, in seeking enforcement, was doing so upon a ground not con-
sidered by the Board
44 See Chron. 5.
45 See Chrons 12, 15, and 16, respectively
SOFT WATER LAUNDRY, INC. 1293
offered in support of the allegation in the complaint that Respondent, through Fore-
man Graham during August 1962, told employees Respondent could cut certain
benefits regardless of employees' adherence to the Union.
Finally, the amended complaint alleges that Respondent, through a group of
persons known as the Citizens' Committee, at meetings held during the month of
June 1962, informed employees that they would receive certain benefits if they re-
jected the Union. Aside from an expression of appreciation for "past and present
favors" and from some striking parallels in the representations of the Citizens'
Committee and Respondent, the evidence bearing upon the allegation-see Chron.
8-does not reflect any authority on behalf of the Committee, either real or ap-
parent, to speak for Respondent; hence, I find a failure of proof.
D. The discharge
The complaint alleges that Respondent terminated the employment of Magnolia
Odom on or about July 26, 1962, and has since failed and refused to reinstate her,
because she joined and assisted the Union and engaged in other protected concerted
activity. The answer denies this; further explicating at the hearing, Respondent,
admitting the fact of discharge, attributes it to Odom's use of a profane threat di-
rected at a supervisor.
Odom was originally employed by Respondent in 1944, and, except for a 12-
month break in the mid-1950's, she worked there until she was discharged on
July 26, 1962. On the latter date, she was a silk finisher in the drycleaning depart-
ment under the supervision of Harold Davis.
Odom attended her first union meeting on May 28. Between that date and the
date of her discharge, she spoke to approximately 7 of the 16 to 18 employees
in the drycleaning department about signing union authorization cards.
On May 30 or 31, as earlier noted,46 Davis spoke to Odom about going up the
"wrong road" by signing a union authorization card On June 13 or 14-after she
attended a union meeting on June 11-Davis specifically charged Odom with hav-
ing signed an authorization card, a charge which she admitted; and he added that,
in so doing, she was hurting herself, Respondent, and fellow workers 47 On June 26,
the day after she attended her third union meeting, Odom was again approached by
Davis, this time,48 he dwelt upon the losses being sustained by Eastern Air Lines
strikers, and he asked her how she would feel about incurring similar losses.
Finally. on July 23,49 he again reminded her of the dire results which would follow
upon the advent of the Union.
During the week beginning July 16, Respondent's laundry employees, in protest
against what they conceived to be the intention of Respondent (to discontinue lend-
ing money to employees if the Union should be successful in its current organizing
campaign), engaged in a concerted refusal to purchase carbonated beverages from
Respondent's vending machine; instead, they purchased refreshments from a
neighboring general store. On the morning of July 24, this "boycott" spread to
the drycleaning employees, of whom Magnolia Odom was one. That morning, she
purchased a bottled soda from the general store; and she placed her empty bottle
among some cans outside the plant.
Meanwhile-because of the danger from broken glass which was attendant upon
the profusion of "foreign" soda bottles throughout the plant-Harold Davis had
instructed Sol Warner, a washboy and handyman, to gather empty bottles from
throughout the plant. Among the bottles picked up by Warner was the bottle
Odom had stored away during the morning of the 24th. She discovered her loss
as she prepared to go to the general store on the morning of July 25, and, when
she returned with a new bottle at or about the morning break time, she asked Warner
what had become of her empty bottle.
T shall not burden this report with details of the immediately ensuing argument.
Suffice it to say that Warner, conceding that he may have picked up her bottle, de-
fended the action on the ground of Davis' instructions; and she, in effect, said that
no one had the right to take her property from where she had placed it, outside
the plant The discussion became heated, profane,50 and progressively louder, and
a group of employees gathered around51
48 See Chron 9
47 See Chron 10.
4s See Chron. 11.
49 See,Chron 13.
60 Odom ]testified that Warner, as well as she, used profanity I find that she, as the
aggrieved one. was the only one using profanity during the argument
51 It was breaktime, and the argument took place outside the rear of the plant
1294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At or about this time, Harold Davis came out of the plant. Referring to the
commotion, he asked Odom to quiet down. Being apprised of her problem, he
affirmed that he had given Warner the cleanup orders. This started a new ex-
change-between her and Davis-she defending the right of private property and he
defending Respondent's right to make and enforce safety rules. The discussion
reached such heights-or depths-as her threatening to replace any of her "stolen"
pop bottles with a bottle from Respondent's vending machine bottle case and his
saying that, if she did this, the cost of the bottle would be deducted from her pay
At this point, Davis turned and walked away, and Odom is supposed to have made
the remark which was the assigned reason for her discharge next morning: "You
white m- f-, I'll put my knife in your side."
Davis continued to walk away. According to his testimony, he considered the
matter for the remainder of the day, and that evening he called Knightly and reported
the incident to him. Next morning-July 26-he told Odom to report to Knightly's
office. She did. Knightly asked her what had happened concerning a soda bottle
on the previous day. She gave her version-i e., all that I have related above
except for the profane threat. He then took her to Davis, who repeated his version-
including the profane threat. Knightly then asked Davis if he hated Odom (Davis'
answer: `No"), if he had any malice in his heart toward her (again "No"), and
if he distrusted her (this time, "Yes, because of the threat"). Then, Knightly left,
telling Davis, in effect that he'd have to straighten out the matter. A few minutes
later, Davis discharged Odom.
Respondent contends that it was not the profanity alone which brought about the
discharge; 52 it was the profanity coupled with the threat.
The issue, as developed by the testimony, is whether Odom was discharged for
uttering the above threat or because of her union interest and activities.
Odom denied making the threat; Davis and Warner testified it was made; and
two bystanders testified that they heard no threat whatsoever.
On this record, I conclude that Odom, while she may have used profanity, said
nothing about a knife. The basis for this finding goes beyond my evaluation of
the relative credibility of Odom and Davis, as above discussed: (1) By his own
admission, Davis was walking away from Odom as she allegedly made the state-
ment-how is it that he heard a remark which other bystanders did not hear? 53
(2) My credulity is strained by Davis' actions-if he thought the threat was made,
why did he not discharge Odom on the spot? 54 (3) I cannot credit Warner, a witness
who testifies (a) that he never heard profanity at this plant, and (b) that he never
told Davis of Odom's threat and neither Davis nor Knightly ever asked him
about it'
My analysis of the testimony persuades me that Odom was not discharged because
of the utterance of a threat; that the incident of the soda bottle was seized upon as
a pretext for discharge; that the real reason for the discharge was Odom's interest
in and activities on behalf of the Union; and that the discharge was designed to
discourage membership in the Union.
These findings are based upon the total pattern as depicted above; the interference,
restraint, and coercion; Odom's length of service; Davis' singling her out, on four
recent occasions, for conversations about the Union; and the fact (as I have found)
that she did not make the threat to which her discharge is attributed These findings
are fortified by the fact that, on August 15, 3 weeks after her employment had been
terminated, Davis mentioned her name among those who might become union
steward.55
Upon the entire record, and on the basis of what I am convinced is a fair pre-
ponderance of credible evidence, I conclude that Respondent's underlying reason
for discharging Magnolia Odom on July 26, 1962, was her interest in and activities
on behalf of the Union; that, by discharging her and thereafter failing and refusing
to reinstate her, Respondent discriminated in regard to hire and tenure of employ-
ment; and that, thereby, Respondent not only interfered with, restrained, and coerced
52 The credible testimony establishes, and I find, that the use of profanity was the rule
rather than the exception at Respondent's plants It was used by supervisors as well as
by the rank and file, and it was used by members of both sexes.
53 I do not rely, in arriving at this finding, on the testimony of two bystanders that,
although Odom spoke loudly, they (lid not hear the threat.
si According to Odom's testimony, which I credit, Knightly later called Davis a fool for
not calling the police if such a threat were made
se Chron. 17. Davis also named Henry Vangodwin, with whom he was then talking, and
Mrs Beets, an ex-employee who had, in a prior conversation with Davis, defended the
Union.
SOFT WATER LAUNDRY , INC. 1295
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, but
discouraged membership in the Union, or any other labor organization, in violation
of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discriminated with respect to the hire and tenure
of employment of Magnolia Odom, I shall recommend that Respondent offer her
full and immediate reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole
for any loss of earnings suffered by her because of the discrimination, by payment
to her of a sum of money equal to the amount she would have earned from the
date of her discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less her
net earnings during said period. Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis
in the manner prescribed by the Board in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum computed quarterly. I make
this recommendation despite the fact that, at the hearing, Odom said she did not
want her job back in view of the rough treatment she felt she had been accorded;
in the first place, it was clear that she was not being offered reinstatement, and,
secondly, her attitude was based upon a situation yet unremedied.
As the unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent are of a character
striking at the roots of employee rights safeguarded by the Act, it will also be
recommended that Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing factual findings and conclusions and upon the
entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of Magnolia Odom be-
cause of her activity on behalf of the Union, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act.
4. By the foregoing conduct; by interrogating employees as to their interest in or
activities on behalf of the Union; by engaging in the surveillance of employees' union
activities; by threatening that the signing of a union authorization card or that the
advent of the Union will result in a plant shutdown, loss of employment, loss of
economic benefits, "trouble," or "serious harm"; and by promising benefits to em-
ployees for working against the Union-Respondent has interfered with, restrained,
and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) thereof.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6 Except for the above, Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices
as alleged in the complaint herein.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, I recommend that Soft Water Laundry, Inc., of St.
Petersburg, Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in AFL-CIO Laundry and Dry Cleaning Interna-
tional Union, or any other labor organization, by discriminating in regard to hire,
tenure, or other conditions of employment.
1296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Interrogating employees as to their interest in or activities On behalf of a
labor organization.
(c) Engaging in the surveillance of employees' union activities.
(d) Threatening that the signmg of a union authorization card or that the advent
of a union might result in a plant shutdown, loss of employment, loss of economic
benefits, "trouble," or "serious harm."
(e) Promising benefits to employees for working against a union.
(f) In any other manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to
join or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any and all such
activities
2. Take the following affirmative action, which I find will effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Offer Magnolia Odom immediate and full reinstatement to her former posi-
tion even though this may necessitate displacement of a present incumbent (or, if
her former position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position), with-
out prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole
for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against her, in the
manner set forth in the section above entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents, upon request, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, and personnel records and reports necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due and the right to reinstatement.
(c) Post at its plants at St Petersburg, Florida, copies of the notice attached
hereto as Appendix.56 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Di-
rector for the Twelfth Region, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized repre-
sentative of Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Twelfth Region, in writing, within 20
days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.57
It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges
that Respondent, through Foreman Charles F. Hayes on or about July 16, 1962,
told an employee she should report to him if any employees were talking for a
union; through Hayes, on or about August 9, 1962, asked an employee if she had
attended a union meeting the previous day; through Foreman John Graham, on
or about August 2, 1962, told employees to pass around an antiunion petition;
through Graham, during the month of August 1962, told employees that certain
employee benefits could be cut despite their adherence to a union; and, through a
Citizens' Committee, during the month of June 1962, promised benefits in return
for employees' dropping adherence to a union.
5° If this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "A Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
in the notice If the Board's Order Is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of
Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "A Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for the words "A Decision
and Order."
51 If this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be mod.fied
to read* "Notify the Regional Director for the Twelfth Region, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent hastaken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in AFL-CIO'Laundry and Dry Cleaners
International Union, or any other labor organization, by discriminating as to
the hire, tenure or any other term or condition of employment of any of our
employees.
LOCAL 369, INT'L BROTHERHOOD ELECTRICAL WORKERS 1297
WE WILL NOT ask employees about their interest in or activities on behalf
of any labor organization.
WE WILL NOT spy on employees ' union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that their signing union cards or that the
coming in of a union might result in a plant shutdown , loss of employment,
lowered working conditions , trouble, or serious harm.
WE WILL NOT promise employees benefits to work against a union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner, interfere with , restrain , or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their right to organize ; to form, join , or assist a
labor organization ; to bargain collectively through a bargaining agent chosen
by themselves ; to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ; or to refrain from any such
activities.
WE WILL offer Magnolia Odom her former or substantially equivalent job
(without prejudice to seniority or other employment rights and privileges)
and pay her for any loss suffered because of our discrimination against her.
All of our employees are free to become or remain members of any labor
organization.
SOFT WATER LAUNDRY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Ross
Building, 112 East Cass Street , Tampa, Florida , 33602, Telephone No. 223-4623,
if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
Local Union No. 369 of the International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, AFL-CIO and George F. Wode, its agent and
Robert N . Moore and Charles A. Bentley , d/b/a Bentley Elec-
tric Company , Intervenor. Case No. 9-CB-1038. August 9,1963
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 1, 1963, Trial Examiner Sydney S. Asher, Jr., issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had not engaged in certain unfair labor practices
alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Intermediate
Report. Thereafter, the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and
the Intervenor filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and sup-
porting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and Leedom].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.'
' We find without merit the contention of the Charging Party and the Intervenor that
the Trial Examiner showed bias against them at the hearing and in his Intermediate
Report . A consideration of the entire record shows no basis whatever for a finding of
bias. Wico Corporation , 140 NLRB 924.
143 NLRB No. 116.