SJK, INC. D/B/A FREMONT FORD

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 16, 2016

364 NLRB No. 29 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 29
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
SJK, Inc. d/b/a Fremont Ford and International As-
sociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL–CIO, East Bay Automotive Machinists
Lodge No. 1546, District Lodge 190. Case 32–
CA–151443
June 16, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND MCFERRAN
The General Counsel seeks summary judgment in this
case on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of
material fact as to the allegations of the complaint, and
that the Board should find, as a matter of law, that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining an
agreement that prohibits its employees from participating
in collective or class litigation in all forums.
Pursuant to a charge filed on May 4, 2015, by the In-
ternational Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL–CIO, East Bay Automotive Machinists
Lodge No. 1546, District Lodge 190 (Charging Party),
the General Counsel issued a complaint on November
24, 2015, and an amended complaint on December 4,
2015. The amended complaint alleges that at all material
times since at least November 4, 2014, the Respondent
has maintained an Employee Acknowledgement and
Agreement (Arbitration Agreement) that employees are
required to sign at the time of their hire. In addition, the
amended complaint alleges that the Arbitration Agree-
ment specifically informs employees that they are bound
to the agreement as a condition of their employment.
The relevant portions of the Arbitration Agreement read
as follows:
I . . . acknowledge that the Company utilizes a system
of alternative dispute resolution which involves binding
arbitration to resolve all disputes which may arise out
of the employment context. . . . I and the Company
both agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy
that either party may have against one another (includ-
ing, but not limited to, any claims of discrimination and
harassment, whether they be based on . . . Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, as well as all
other applicable state or federal laws or regulations)
which would otherwise require or allow resort to any
court or other governmental dispute resolution forum
between myself and the Company . . . arising from, re-
lated to, or having any relationship or connection what-
soever with my seeking employment with, employment
by, or other association with the Company, whether
based on tort, contract, statutory, or equitable law, or
otherwise, (with the sole exception of claims arising
under the National Labor Relations Act which are
brought before the National Labor Relations Board. . .)
shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by
binding arbitration. . . . [T]he arbitrator is prohibited
from consolidating the claims of others into one pro-
ceeding. This means that an arbitrator will hear only
my individual claims and does not have the authority to
fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to
award relief to a group of employees in one proceed-
ing. Thus, the Company has the right to defeat any at-
tempt by me to file or join other employees in a class,
collective, representative, or joint action lawsuit or arbi-
tration (collectively “class claims”). I further under-
stand that I will not be disciplined, discharged, or oth-
erwise retaliated against for exercising my rights under
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, includ-
ing but not limited to challenging the limitation on
class, collective, representative, or joint action. I un-
derstand and agree that nothing in this agreement shall
be construed so as to preclude me from filing any ad-
ministrative charge with, or from participating in any
investigation of a charge conducted by, any govern-
ment agency such as the Department of Fair Employ-
ment and Housing and/or the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission; however, after I exhaust such
administrative process/investigation, I understand and
agree that [I] must pursue any such claims through this
binding arbitration procedure.
The amended complaint alleges that the Arbitration
Agreement interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights to
engage in collective legal action by binding employees to
a waiver of their rights to participate in collective and
class litigation and that, by this conduct, the Respondent
has been interfering with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
On December 9, 2015, the Respondent filed an answer
to the complaint. On December 18, 2015, the Respond-
ent filed an answer to the amended complaint admitting
all of the factual allegations in the amended complaint,
but denying the legal conclusions in the amended com-
plaint and asserting two affirmative defenses.
On January 11, 2016, the General Counsel filed a Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment. On February 1, 2016, the
Charging Party filed a Joinder in Motion for Summary
Judgment. On February 10, 2016, the Board issued an
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
order transferring the proceeding to the Board and a No-
tice to Show Cause why the motion should not be grant-
ed. On February 23, 2016, the Respondent filed an Op-
position to the Motion for Summary Judgment, and on
February 24, 2016, the Charging Party refiled its Joinder
in Motion for Summary Judgment.1 On March 8, 2016,
the General Counsel filed a response to the Respondent’s
Opposition, and the Charging Party filed a Partial Joinder
in the General Counsel’s response.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
In Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014),
enf. denied in relevant part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir.
2015), the Board reaffirmed the relevant holdings in D.
R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in
relevant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and found
unlawful the maintenance and enforcement of a mandato-
ry arbitration agreement requiring employees, as a condi-
tion of employment, to waive their rights to pursue class
or collective actions involving employment-related
claims in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial. As
stated, the Respondent admits in its amended answer that
it has maintained the Arbitration Agreement and required
employees to sign it as a condition of employment since
at least November 4, 2014. By its terms, the Arbitration
Agreement requires that all employment-based claims be
resolved through individual, binding arbitration. In its
response to the Board’s Notice to Show Cause, the Re-
spondent raises no material issues of fact or any other
issues warranting a hearing. The Respondent’s argu-
ments largely focus on the assertion that Murphy Oil and
D. R. Horton were wrongly decided.2 We disagree for

1 The Charging Party’s Joinder in Motion for Summary Judgment
raises substantive arguments that are wholly outside the scope of the
General Counsel’s amended complaint. It is well settled that a charging
party cannot enlarge upon or change the General Counsel’s theory of a
case. Kimtruss Corp., 305 NLRB 710 (1991). We also decline to
award the additional remedies requested by the Charging Party. We
find that the standard remedies requested by the General Counsel are
sufficient to remedy the unfair labor practice found. See, e.g., AT&T,
362 NLRB No. 105, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2015).
2 The Respondent also asserts that the Arbitration Agreement is law-
ful because it does not prevent employees from filing charges with the
Board or with other administrative agencies and assures employees that
they will not be disciplined, discharged, or otherwise retaliated against
for exercising their Sec. 7 rights. We reject these arguments for the
reasons stated in SolarCity Corp., 363 NLRB No. 83 (2015).
The Respondent further asserts that the filing of a class action on be-
half of potential class members, without action by each employee to
affirmatively associate with the filing of the lawsuit, is not concerted
activity under Sec. 7. Contrary to the Respondent’s assertion, as the
Board made clear in Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152 (2015), “the filing of
an employment-related class or collective action by an individual em-
ployee is an attempt to initiate, to induce, or to prepare for group action
the reasons given in those decisions. See also Lewis v.
Epic Systems Corp., __ F.3d __, No. 15-2997 (7th Cir.,
May 26, 2016) (holding mandatory individual arbitration
agreement that did not permit collective action in any
forum violates the Act and is also unenforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1, et seq.). Ac-
cordingly, we apply those cases here and find that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining an
agreement requiring employees to waive their right to
pursue class or collective claims in any forum.3
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, the Respondent, a California
corporation with an office and place of business in New-
ark, California, has been engaged in the sale and servic-
ing of automobiles.
During the 12-month period ending October 31, 2015,
the Respondent, in conducting its operations described
above, derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and
purchased and received goods or services valued in ex-

and is therefore conduct protected by Sec. 7.” Id., slip op. at 2. See
also D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB at 2279.
In addition, the Respondent asserts that employees would not rea-
sonably construe the Arbitration Agreement to restrict employees from
filing charges with the Board or from accessing the Board’s processes.
The amended complaint does not allege the agreement to be unlawful
on this basis. In addition, in his Motion for Summary Judgment, the
General Counsel focuses exclusively on whether the agreement infring-
es on employees’ rights to engage in collective action and does not
argue that the agreement is also unlawful because employees would
construe it to restrict their right to file charges with the Board or other-
wise interfere with their access to the Board’s processes. In these cir-
cumstances, we find that the issue raised by the Respondent is not
before us for our consideration.
3 Our dissenting colleague, relying on his dissenting position in
Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014), would find
that the Respondent’s Arbitration Agreement does not violate Sec.
8(a)(1). He observes that the Act does not “dictate” any particular
procedures for the litigation of non-NLRA claims, and “creates no
substantive right for employees to insist on class-type treatment” of
such claims. This is all surely correct, as the Board has previously
explained in Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 2, and Bristol Farms, 363
NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 2 & fn. 2 (2015). But what our colleague
ignores is that the Act “does create a right to pursue joint, class, or
collective claims if and as available, without the interference of an
employer-imposed restraint.” Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 2 (empha-
sis in original). The Respondent’s Arbitration Agreement is just such
an unlawful restraint.
Likewise, for the reasons explained in Murphy Oil and Bristol
Farms, there is no merit to our colleague’s view that finding the Arbi-
tration Agreement unlawful runs afoul of employees’ Sec. 7 right to
“refrain from” engaging in protected concerted activity. See Murphy
Oil, above, slip op. at 18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2. Nor is he
correct in insisting that Sec. 9(a) of the Act requires the Board to permit
individual employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 right to en-
gage in concerted legal activity. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 17–
18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2.
SJK, INC. D/B/A FREMONT FORD 3
cess of $5000 which originated outside the State of Cali-
fornia.
We find that the Respondent is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Since at least November 4, 2014, the Respondent has
maintained the Arbitration Agreement that employees are
required to sign as a condition of employment. As de-
scribed above, the Arbitration Agreement requires em-
ployees to bring all employment-related disputes to indi-
vidual binding arbitration, thereby interfering with em-
ployees’ Section 7 right to engage in collective legal ac-
tivity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, SJK, Inc. d/b/a Fremont Ford, is
an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. By maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
under which employees are required, as a condition of
employment, to waive the right to maintain class or col-
lective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial,
the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act, and has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, we shall order it to cease and desist
and to take certain affirmative actions designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, we shall order
the Respondent to rescind or revise the Arbitration
Agreement; notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
Arbitration Agreement about the rescission or revision
and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised
agreement; and post a notice at its Newark, California
location where the agreement was in effect. See D. R.
Horton, above at 2289.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, SJK, Inc. d/b/a Fremont Ford, Newark, Cal-
ifornia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that require employees, as a condition of employment, to
waive the right to maintain employment-related class or
collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judi-
cial.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the Arbitration Agreement in all of its
forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear to em-
ployees that the agreement does not constitute a waiver
of their right to maintain employment-related joint, class,
or collective actions in all forums.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign or otherwise become bound to the man-
datory Arbitration Agreement in any form that it has
been rescinded or revised, and, if revised, provide them a
copy of the revised agreement.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Newark, California facility copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 32, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceed-
ings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice marked “Appendix” to all
current employees and former employees employed by
the Respondent at any time since November 4, 2014.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 32 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 16, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, dissenting.
In this case, my colleagues grant the General Coun-
sel’s motion for summary judgment and find that the
Respondent’s Employee Acknowledgment and Agree-
ment (Agreement) violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act (the Act or NLRA) because the
Agreement waives the right to participate in class or col-
lective actions regarding non-NLRA employment claims.
I respectfully dissent from this ruling and finding for the
reasons explained in my partial dissenting opinion in
Murphy Oil USA, Inc.1 Although I agree that there are
no genuine issues of material fact warranting a hearing, I
believe the General Counsel is not entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on this complaint allegation. To the
contrary, the Respondent is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law. Accordingly, I would enter summary judg-
ment for the Respondent and against the General Counsel
and dismiss the complaint.2
I agree that an employee may engage in “concerted”
activities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to a
claim asserted under a statute other than NLRA.3 How-
ever, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest authority in
the Board to dictate any particular procedures pertaining
to the litigation of non-NLRA claims, nor does the Act
render unlawful agreements in which employees waive

1 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014) (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in Murphy Oil inval-
idating class-action waiver agreements was denied enforcement by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,
808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
2 It is well settled that summary judgment may be entered in favor
of the party against whom the motion is filed even though that party has
not filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. See 10A Charles A.
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 2720, at 347 (3d ed. 1998) (“The weight of authority . . . is
that summary judgment may be rendered in favor of the opposing party
even though the opponent has made no formal cross-motion under
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56.”) (citing cases).
3 I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activi-
ties engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual
aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA
Sec. 7. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 23–25 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part). However, the existence or absence of
Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are
pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory
requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an
individual employee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective
action. Id.; see also Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152, slip op. at 4–5
(2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the con-
trary, as discussed in my partial dissenting opinion in
Murphy Oil, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of
every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “ad-
just” grievances “at any time.”4 This aspect of Section
9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects
each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the
collective rights enumerated in Section 7. Thus, I be-
lieve it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive
right for employees to insist on class-type treatment of
non-NLRA claims;5 (ii) a class-waiver agreement per-
taining to non-NLRA claims does not infringe on any
NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the
overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board’s
position regarding class-waiver agreements;6 and (iii)

4 Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 30–34 (Member Miscimarra, dis-
senting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or select-
ed for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any indi-
vidual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legisla-
tive history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual
employee’s right to “adjust” any employment-related dispute with his
or her employer. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 31–32 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
5 When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are po-
tentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class-type proce-
dures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See D. R. Horton,
Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class
action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted),
petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12–60031 (5th Cir. 2014);
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)
(“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
6 The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly denied enforcement of Board or-
ders invalidating a mandatory arbitration agreement that waived class-
type treatment of non-NLRA claims. See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
v. NLRB, above; D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above. The overwhelm-
ing majority of courts considering the Board’s position have likewise
rejected it. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 34 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 36 fn. 5 (Member John-
son, dissenting) (collecting cases); Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC v.
NLRB, __ F.3d __ (8th Cir. 2016); see also Patterson v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 96 F.Supp.3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Nanavati v. Adecco
USA, Inc., 99 F.Supp.3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015), motion to certify for
interlocutory appeal denied 2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal. June 30,
2015); Brown v. Citicorp Credit Services, No. 1:12-CV-00062-BLW,
2015 WL 1401604 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2015) (granting reconsideration
of prior determination that class waiver in arbitration agreement violat-
ed NLRA); Bell v. Ryan Transportation Service, No. 15-9857-JWL,
2016 WL 1298083 (D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2016); but see Lewis v. Epic
Systems Corp., __ F.3d __, No. 15-2997 (7th Cir. May 26, 2016); Tot-
SJK, INC. D/B/A FREMONT FORD 5
enforcement of a class-action waiver as part of an arbitra-
tion agreement is also warranted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA).7 Although questions may arise regard-
ing the enforceability of particular agreements that waive
class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I be-
lieve these questions are exclusively within the province
of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has
jurisdiction over such claims.8
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 16, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for you bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires our employees, as a condition of em-
ployment, to waive the right to maintain employment-

ten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, No. ED CV 14–1766 DMG
(DTBx), 2016 WL 316019 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016).
7 For the reasons expressed in my Murphy Oil partial dissent and
those thoroughly explained in former Member Johnson’s dissent in
Murphy Oil, the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be en-
forced according to its terms. Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 49–58 (Member
Johnson, dissenting).
8 Because I disagree with the Board’s decisions in Murphy Oil,
above, and D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in
pert. part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and I believe the NLRA does
not render unlawful arbitration agreements that provide for the waiver
of class-type litigation of non-NLRA claims, I find it unnecessary to
reach whether such agreements should independently be deemed lawful
to the extent they “leave[] open a judicial forum for class and collective
claims,” D. R. Horton, supra at 2288, by permitting the filing of com-
plaints with administrative agencies that, in turn, may file class or col-
lective action lawsuits. See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050
(8th Cir. 2013).
related class or collective actions in all forums, whether
arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the Employee Acknowledgment and
Agreement Arbitration Agreement (the Arbitration
Agreement) in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its
forms to make clear that the agreement does not consti-
tute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-
related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
mandatory Arbitration Agreement in all of its forms that
the agreement has been rescinded or revised and, if re-
vised, WE WILL provide them a copy of the revised
agreement.
SJK, INC. D/B/A FREMONT FORD
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/32–CA–51443 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273-1940.