Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 (Brandon Regional Medical Center)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 9, 2006

346 N.L.R.B. 199 (N.L.R.B. 2006)

SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 15 (BRANDON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER)
346 NLRB No. 22
199
Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local
15, AFL–CIO and Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Bran-
don Regional Medical Center and Energy Air,
Inc. Cases 12–CC–1258, 12–CC–1270, 12–CG–13,
and 12–CC–1268
January 9, 2006
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On December 7, 2004, Administrative Law Judge
George Carson II issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,1 the
General Counsel and Charging Party Brandon filed an-
swering briefs, and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
Charging Party Energy Air filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief, to which the Respondent filed a brief in
opposition. The General Counsel filed cross-exceptions
and a supporting brief, to which the Respondent filed a
brief in opposition.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions,
cross-exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions as modified
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified be-
low.2
1. Respondent’s September 26, 2003 letter to CVS
The Respondent had a labor dispute with Energy Air, a
nonunion sheet metal contractor. Pursuant to this labor
dispute, the Respondent sent a letter to CVS, a drug store
with many locations in Florida. Although Energy Air
was not presently working on any CVS construction pro-
jects, the Respondent’s letter to CVS indicated that it
understood that Energy Air “may be bidding” on future
CVS projects and that there would be leafleting and pro-
testing at the site if Energy Air worked on any CVS pro-
ject. Attached to the letter was a newspaper article that is
described below.
The judge found that, in its letter to CVS, the Respon-
dent did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The allega-
tion was that the Respondent threatened to picket CVS
and failed to provide assurances that such picketing at

1 The Respondent subsequently supplemented its brief by directing
to the Board’s attention the decisions in Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398
F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S.Ct. 399 (2005), and
Overstreet v. Carpenters Local 1506, 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005).
2 The judge included a broad cease-and-desist provision in his rec-
ommended Order, but failed to set forth any rationale justifying the
need for this remedy. We note that the General Counsel did not request
a broad order and we find no warrant for one under the circumstances
of this case. We therefore shall substitute a narrow cease-and-desist
provision for that in the recommended Order, and conform the notice
accordingly.
future CVS construction sites would comply with the
standards set forth in Sailors Union (Moore Dry Dock),
92 NLRB 547 (1950). The judge rejected this allegation
on the basis that the letter contained only a threat to leaf-
let and protest, not a threat to picket.
In their argument to the judge, and in their respective
exceptions and cross-exceptions to the Board, Energy Air
and the General Counsel contend that the letter should be
read in context with an attached newspaper article. The
appended article described the Respondent’s protest
demonstration at a CVS construction site 3 months ear-
lier, which protest allegedly involved picketing. Thus,
the General Counsel and Energy Air argue that the letter
should be construed as containing a threat to picket that
triggered the requirement of providing Moore Dry Dock
assurances. Specifically, the General Counsel and En-
ergy Air note that the newspaper article described the
Respondent’s display of a large inflatable rat during the
earlier CVS construction site protest, and they argue that
because the rat display is a method of picketing, the Re-
spondent’s letter containing the current threat to protest
was actually a threat to picket any future CVS construc-
tion site where Energy Air may be employed as a sub-
contractor. We disagree.
The purpose of the Board’s requirement that unions
provide secondary employers with Moore Dry Dock as-
surances in connection with an announcement to picket a
common situs is to assure the secondary that the picket-
ing will be confined to the primary employer. Electrical
Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740, 749–
750, 752 (2004). Here, even assuming that the letter is to
be read in context with the newspaper article, and assum-
ing further, but without deciding, that the previous dis-
play of the rat constituted picketing, we agree with the
judge that the newspaper article reported that the Re-
spondent’s activities at the previous CVS construction
site appear to have been confined to the primary em-
ployer and, thus, would not have violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B). We find, therefore, that the Respondent’s
letter and appended newspaper article indicated that
whatever protest activity that it intended to undertake at a
future CVS site would likewise be primary and in con-
formity with Moore Dry Dock standards.
2. Respondent’s conduct at Brandon Regional
Medical Center
We agree with the judge that the Respondent, in fur-
therance of its primary dispute with Massey Metals and
WTS, engaged in picketing at the neutral secondary site
of Brandon Regional Medical Center. For the reasons set
forth by the judge, we agree that the Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by holding a “mock funeral pro-
cession” at that site. That conduct constituted picketing.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD200
The procession, accompanied by leafleting, involved
members of the Respondent patrolling on the public
sidewalk in front of the Medical Center while carrying a
faux casket and accompanied by a member dressed as the
Grim Reaper.
We agree with our concurring colleague as to the rea-
sons why this conduct was picketing. However, to the
extent that she implies that picketing requires a physical
or symbolic barrier, we do not necessarily agree. Since
the funeral procession was such a barrier, we need not
pass on whether such a barrier is a sine qua non of pick-
eting. It may be that other conduct, short of a barrier, can
be “conduct” that is picketing or at least “restraint or
coercion” within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
As to the leafleting that the Respondent concurrently
undertook at the Medical Center, it is unclear whether the
judge found this activity to be independently unlawful.
The Respondent has filed exceptions to several state-
ments in the judge’s decision which arguably indicate
that the leafleting itself was unlawful. Assuming that
this is the judge’s holding, we find merit in the Respon-
dent’s exceptions and reverse the judge on the bases that
the complaint did not allege that the leafleting conducted
during the mock funeral was unlawful, and because the
General Counsel, in his answering brief, expressly dis-
avows that the leafleting was unlawful.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Sheet
Metal Workers International Association, Local 15,
AFL–CIO, Tampa, Florida, its officers, agents, and rep-
resentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order as
modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
“(a) Unqualifiedly threatening to picket with the object
of forcing Beall’s Inc., to cease doing business with En-
ergy Air, Inc.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b).

3 Because we have found that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) at the Medical Center and have issued an appropriate
Order, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s findings that the
Respondent additionally violated Sec.8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by displaying a
large inflatable rat on public property near the front vehicle and door-
way entrances to the Medical Center and by the conduct of Brandon
Holly who the judge found held a leaflet in front of his chest as a plac-
ard. A finding of such a violation as to these matters would be cumula-
tive and would not affect the Order.
In finding it unnecessary to decide whether the display of the inflat-
able rat was unlawful, Member Schaumber notes that the General
Counsel alleges only that the display of the rat violated Sec.
8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The General Counsel does not allege that the display
violated Sec. 8(b)(4)(i)(B).
“(b) Picketing Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon Regional
Medical Center, with the object of forcing it to cease
doing business with Massey Metals, Inc., and Workers
Temporary Staffing.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
MEMBER LIEBMAN, concurring in part.
I join with my colleagues in finding that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by engaging in a
mock funeral procession at the Brandon Medical Center
in support of a secondary objective. In finding the viola-
tion, I am guided by the principles set forth in Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), and Overstreet v. Carpen-
ters Local 1506, 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005).
DeBartolo stands for the proposition that picketing or
patrolling is different than handbilling and other forms of
“mere persuasion.” 485 U.S. at 580. The DeBartolo
court embraced much of Justice Stevens’ concurrence in
NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 101 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607
(1980). In Safeco, Justice Stevens stated that picketing
“is a mixture of conduct and communication. In the la-
bor context, it is the conduct element rather than the par-
ticular idea being expressed that often provides the most
persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a
business establishment.” 447 U.S. at 619. As the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Overstreet—a case
involving a stationary banner—ambulatory picketing or
patrolling classically involves more than the “mere per-
suasion” of a banner, it also involves the intimidation of
a physical or symbolic barrier to the entrance way.
In the present case, the Respondent engaged in ambu-
latory patrolling activity in front of the Medical Center.
It engaged in a procession in which four persons went
back and forth on the public sidewalk in front of the hos-
pital’s main entrance. This conduct effectively created a
symbolic barrier, a line in front of an entrance way not to
be crossed, that is akin to picketing under the principles
of DeBartolo and Overstreet. The gravamen of the vio-
lation is not that patrollers carried a faux casket and a
costumed “grim reaper” figure carrying a large sickle, for
these expressive displays offer “mere persuasion” and do
not serve to erect a physical or symbolic barrier to the
Medical Center’s entrance. Rather, it is the patrolling
itself that erected a barrier to entering the hospital.
Accordingly, I concur in finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 15 (BRANDON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER) 201
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
WE WILL NOT unqualifiedly threaten to picket with the
object of forcing Beall’s, Inc. to cease doing business
with Energy Air, Inc.
WE WILL NOT, by picketing, threaten, coerce, or restrain
Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon Regional Medical Center,
with the object of forcing Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon
Regional Medical Center, to cease doing business with
Massey Metals, Inc., and Workers Temporary Staffing.
WE WILL NOT fail to give notice to Galencare, Inc.,
d/b/a Brandon Regional Medical Center, of our intention
to engage in picketing at its facility located in Brandon,
Florida.
SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 15, AFL–CIO
Chris C. Zerby, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Arlus J. Stephens and Michael P. Anderson (on brief), Esqs.,
for the Respondent.
Tammie L. Rattray and James G. Brown (on brief), Esqs., for
the Charging Party, Galencare.
Patrick M. Muldowney, Esq., for the Charging Party, Energy
Air.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Tampa, Florida, on September 14, 2004, pursuant
to a consolidated complaint that issued on July 29, 2004.1 The
complaint alleges that the Respondent Union unlawfully en-
gaged in secondary activity against three separate employers in
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. One of the employers is a health care institution and
the complaint alleges that the Union’s activity at that institution
on March 15, 2004, constituted picketing and violated Section
8(g) of the Act. The Respondent’s answer denies all violations
of the Act (the Act). I find that the Respondent did violate the
Act substantially as alleged in the complaint.

1 All dates are in 2003, unless otherwise indicated. The charge in
Case 12–CC–1258 was filed on January 13, the charge in Case 12–CC–
1268 was filed on October 21, and the charges in Cases 12–CC–1270
and 12–CG–13 were filed on March 18, 2004.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by all parties, I make the following2
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, Sheet Metal Workers International Asso-
ciation, Local 15, AFL–CIO, the Union, admits, and I find and
conclude, that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The Charging Party Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon Regional
Medical Center (the Hospital), is a Florida corporation engaged
in the operation of a private acute care hospital in Brandon,
Florida. The Hospital annually derives gross revenues in excess
of $250,000 and purchases and receives goods valued in excess
of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of
Florida. The Union admits, and I find and conclude, that the
Hospital is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and is a health care
institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act.
The Charging Party Energy Air, Inc. (Energy Air), is a Flor-
ida corporation engaged in the business of sheet metal fabrica-
tion and installation. Energy Air annually purchases and re-
ceives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
outside the State of Florida. The Union admits, and I find and
conclude, that Energy Air is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Statute
This proceeding concerns four instances of alleged unlawful
secondary activity. Two of the instances involve alleged threats
in letters sent to Beall’s, Inc. and CVS Pharmacy, respectively.
The other two instances involve conduct at the Hospital. Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, in pertinent part as applied to this case,
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor or-
ganization or its agents: “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any per-
son engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where . . . an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring any person
. . . to cease doing business with any other person . . . .”
B. An Evidentiary Issue
At the hearing, over objections, I admitted a newspaper re-
port of comments attributed to the chief executive officer of the
Hospital, Mike Fencel, to the effect that the Union’s activities
in January “helped our business.” The General Counsel and
Hospital point out that the effect of unlawful secondary activity
is not relevant and do not address my admission of the docu-
ment. The Respondent argues that the statement is an admission
by a party-opponent and is not hearsay. Fed.R.Evid.
801(d)(2)(A). The newspaper article is admissible pursuant
Fed.R.Evid 902(6); however, the only evidence before me is

2 In its brief, the Respondent cites advice memoranda relating to rats
and a billboard in which it was determined that a complaint should not
be issued. As all parties are aware, decisions of administrative law
judges are based upon applicable Board precedent, not advice memo-
randa.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD202
that document, the report of the reporter. Although the state-
ment is attributed to the CEO, the fact remains that the state-
ment in the document is the statement of the reporter, attribut-
ing it to the CEO. The reporter is not a party, thus the reported
statement is not an admission of a party, and it is hearsay. See
Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 642 (9th Cir. 1991).
In this case, as in New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ander-
son, 888 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1989), the “purported admissions
in the article were recounted in statements of a third party re-
porter, who was unavailable for cross-examination, and the
statements were offered to prove the truth of the matters as-
serted. The fact that the statement was in the form of a newspa-
per account reinforces its hearsay character . . . and it was not
demonstrated that the statements as reported were accurate.” Id.
at 650. In view of the foregoing, I shall not rely upon the pur-
ported statement of the CEO. I shall leave the document, Re-
spondent’s Exhibit 10, in the record to assure that the record is
complete.
C. The Alleged Unlawful Threats to Beall’s, Inc.,
and CVS Pharmacy
1. Facts
The Union is involved in a labor dispute with Energy Air.
Beall’s, Inc. operates a chain of retail department stores in Flor-
ida. On September 26, 2003, Samuel A. McIntosh, organizer
with the Union, sent to Steven M. Knopik, president of Beall’s,
Inc. a letter stating the following:
Our organization has an ongoing labor dispute with Energy
Air, Inc. This contractor has been charged with serious Fed-
eral Law Violations and is currently being investigated by the
Federal Government.
We understand that Energy Air is performing HVAC me-
chanical work on the Beall’s Department Store construction
projects in Oldsmar and Ormond Beach, Florida.
The union will be compelled to publicize our dispute with
Energy Air by the way of leafleting, protesting, and the possi-
bility of picketing at the sites.
If you have any question I can be contacted at (813) 628-
0021.
CVS operates a chain of pharmacies throughout the United
States including locations in Florida. On September 26, 2003,
organizer McIntosh, sent to Mark Chiarletti, project manager of
CVS Pharmacy, Inc., a letter similar to that sent to Beall’s, Inc.
The first and last paragraphs were identical to those paragraphs
in the letter sent to Beall’s, Inc. The second and third para-
graphs state:
We understand that Energy Air may be bidding to perform
HVAC mechanical work on CVS Pharmacy construction pro-
jects throughout Florida.
In the event Energy Air commences operation on any CVS
Pharmacy construction project, the union will be compelled to
publicize our dispute with Energy Air by the way of leafleting
and protesting at the site.
Accompanying the letter to CVS was a newspaper article
downloaded from the Internet that described a demonstration at a
CVS construction site involving Organizer McIntosh, three union
members, and a large inflatable rat. The article reports that the
protest was against the nonunion sheet metal contractor on the
site and that the protesters made clear that the Union’s protest
was against the sheet metal contractor on the site “not . . . the
pharmacy.”
2. Analysis and concluding findings
The complaint alleges that the foregoing letters contained
unlawful threats in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
Act. The Respondent’s answer denies the allegations and as-
serts that the Union does have a labor dispute with Beall’s and
CVS over their use of nonunion contractors. The Union’s dis-
pute with Beall’s and CVS does not relate to the wages, hours,
and working conditions of employees represented by the Union.
It relates to the entrepreneurial decisions of Beall’s and CVS.
Board precedent establishes that an unqualified threat to en-
gage in secondary picketing, without qualifying the threat, vio-
lates the Act. “Thus where a union makes an unqualified threat
to a neutral general contractor to picket a jobsite where an of-
fending primary employer would be working, and has reason to
believe that persons other than the primary would be at work on
the site, it has an affirmative obligation to qualify its threat by
clearly indicating that the picketing would conform to Moore
Dry Dock [92 NLRB 547 (1950)] standards or otherwise be in
uniformity with Board law.” Teamsters Local 456 (Peckham
Materials), 307 NLRB 612, 619 (1992) [citations omitted]. I
note that this assurance that a union will not act contrary to the
law is similar in character to the assurance against reprisals that
an employer must give pursuant to Johnnie’s Poultry Co., 146
NLRB 770 (1964), prior to interviewing an employee in prepa-
ration for an unfair labor practice proceeding.
The Respondent cites the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Journeymen Local 32 v. NLRB, 912
F.2d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1990), in which the court of appeals
denied enforcement of a Board order and stated that the “Board
could not presume that a union’s unqualified threat to picket the
job was a threat to picket contrary to the law . . . .” The Board
accepted the foregoing decision only as law of the case. Plumb-
ers Local 32 (Ramada, Inc.), 302 NLRB 919 (1991). The Board
continues to require a union to indicate that its picketing will
conform to Moore Dry Dock standards and recently affirmed
the decision of an administrative law judge that restated the
foregoing principle. Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF Ser-
vices), 342 NLRB 483, 495 (2004).
The letter to Beall’s threatened picketing. The uncertainly
conveyed by referring to the “possibility of picketing” does
not diminish the threat. Insofar as the letter specified HVAC
mechanical work, the Respondent was aware that other sub-
contractors would be on the jobsite. The threat was unaccom-
panied by the qualification that the Union would conform to
Moore Dry Dock standards. I find that the Respondent’s un-
qualified threat to picket Beall’s construction projects in
Oldsmar and Ormond Beach, Florida, violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 15 (BRANDON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER) 203
The Respondent’s letters to Beall’s and CVS also referred to
leafleting and protesting but do not set out the nature of the
protests. The newspaper article attached to the letter to CVS,
which notes that the Union made it clear that the protest was
against the contractor and “not . . . the pharmacy,” does not
establish that the Union’s activities were secondary rather pri-
mary. Upon remand from the Ninth Circuit in Plumbers Local
32 (Ramada, Inc.), supra, the Board considered the union’s
additional threats to handbill and organize a boycott, issues that
it had not addressed in view of its finding that the threat to
picket violated the Act. The Board held that, under Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Coun-
cil, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), DeBartolo II, a union’s attempt to
persuade customers not to patronize neutral employers “in the
absence of violence, picketing, and patrolling” was not coercive
and did not violate the Act. Plumbers Local 32 (Ramada, Inc.),
supra at 920.
I shall recommend that the allegations relating to leafleting
and protests, the nature of which were not specified, at Beall’s
jobsites be dismissed. There was no threat to picket CVS. I
shall recommend that all allegations relating to CVS be dis-
missed.
D. The Allegations Involving the Hospital
1. Facts
a. The entities involved
The Union has an ongoing labor dispute with Massey Met-
als, Inc., a nonunion sheet metal contractor. In January and
February 2003 and March 2004 Massey Metals was engaged in
the construction of additional hospital facilities that were lo-
cated south of and behind the existing hospital building in
Brandon, Florida. Although the Respondent’s answer does not
admit that Massey was performing work on March 15, 2004,
the testimony of Esco O’Neal, supervisor for Massey Metals,
establishes that it was. O’Neal testified that Massey is perform-
ing work at the site for general contractor J. J. Kirlin. Workers
Temporary Staffing, WTS, is a temporary employment agency
providing employees to various employers including Massey
Metals, which augments its workforce with employees pro-
vided by WTS.
b. The location
In 2003, the main entrance to the Hospital faced north, to-
ward Oakfield Drive. The construction site was not visible from
the front of the Hospital because the existing hospital building
blocked the view. The Oakfield right-of-way includes a side-
walk and grassy area separated from the property of the Hospi-
tal by a low, 3-foot-high hedge. Immediately inside the hedge is
a parking lot. Access to the parking lot and hospital entrance is
obtained by driving onto the hospital property on a semicircular
driveway or walking to the entrance upon sidewalks that paral-
lel the driveway. The east driveway entrance, referred to as the
main entrance, intersects with Oakfield in a “T,” i.e., access is
only from Oakfield. The west driveway is at the intersection of
Oakfield and South Moon Avenue. It is referred to as the Moon
entrance, and it is effectively an extension or continuation of
South Moon Avenue. All of the Union’s activity occurred on
the Oakfield right-of way, and no citations were issued for tres-
passing.
In 2003, construction employees entered the construction site
from an entrance on Vonderberg Drive, a street that runs per-
pendicular to Oakfield Drive on the west side of the property of
the Hospital.
c. January 2003
On May 9, 2002, prior to the commencement of the expan-
sion project, the Union had written the Hospital and stated its
intention “to establish a massive picket line” if the Hospital
used various named nonunion contractors on the project. In-
cluded in the list was Massey Metals. On January 9, organizer
McIntosh and six members of the Union went to the Oakfield
Drive right-of-way directly in front of the Hospital. They in-
flated a rat balloon that is 12-feet wide at the base and 16-feet
high. The balloon has what appears to be a cigar in the mouth
of the rat. Six metal rings have been stitched onto the rat’s ab-
domen. The Union uses the rings to attach banners to the rat’s
abdomen. The Union placed the rat on a flatbed trailer between
the entrances to the semicircular driveway, approximately 145
feet west of the main entrance and 170 feet east of the Moon
entrance. This location was approximately 100 feet away from,
but directly in front of, the doors through which people entered
and exited the Hospital. Attached to the metal rings on the rat’s
abdomen was a banner that read “Workers Temporary Staff-
ing.”
After the rat was inflated, the union members began distrib-
uting leaflets. The leaflets were 8-1/2 by 11-inch sheets of pa-
per bearing the caption, “There’s a ‘Rat’ at Brandon Regional
Hospital.” Immediately beneath the caption is a cartoon depict-
ing a hospital room in which a patient lying in a bed is being
attended by a nurse who is looking in an alarmed manner at a
rat in the patient’s room. The rat caricature is sitting on the
floor picking its teeth and a custodian with a broom and dust-
pan is depicted as being on one knee behind the rat. The rat,
bearing the letters WTS on its abdomen, is larger than the cus-
todian. Union Business Manager Michael Jeske testified that to
him it appeared that the custodian was sweeping up cheese
crumbs. I suggest, given the fact that the custodian is behind
rather that in front of the rat, that cleaning up rat droppings
rather than cheese crumbs is the message conveyed. Beneath
the cartoon is the following text:
Workers Temporary Staffing (WTS) is a temporary employ-
ment agency that employs workers on the construction site of
the South Tower expansion project of Brandon Regional
Hospital.
We consider a “rat employer” to be one that undermines the
wages, benefits and other working condition established by
our local labor agreement or otherwise violates workers’
rights.
We consider Workers Temporary Staffing to be such an em-
ployer. In fact, Workers Temporary Staffing is currently being
investigated by the Federal Government for possible labor law
violations.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD204
It’s just a matter of common sense. If the action of companies
like Workers Temporary Staffing are tolerated, it will under-
mine the living standard of our entire community
The Union’s name does not appear anywhere on the leaflet.
Assuming that the Union intended to refer to itself when using
the word “we,” that reference fails because the entity to which
the word “we” refers is not stated. The reference to “our local
labor agreement” is totally meaningless in the foregoing con-
text.
One of the union members engaging in leafleting was Brendon
Holly. Holly was photographed at the hospital entrance at the
intersection of Oakfield and South Moon Avenue, the Moon
entrance, holding a leaflet with both hands in front of his chest at
the eye level of drivers in passing vehicles. Organizer McIntosh
acknowledged that Holly did this for 2 days, the first day, Janu-
ary 9, and on one other occasion. “He was only out there I be-
lieve for only two days and once . . . the charges were filed, we
instructed him not to hold up the handbills like that. . . . On the
second day, I advised him to stop doing it.” The initial charge
was filed by the Hospital on January 13. Despite instructions to
hold the handbills “by his side and pass them out,” McIntosh
admitted that Holly “decided to do it his own way.”
Dodd Day, the Hospital’s former safety and security man-
ager, testified that the Workers Temporary Staffing sign affixed
to the rat was printed in letters 12 inches high and was “promi-
nent enough” to be seen by passing vehicles. Dodd spoke with
McIntosh regarding what was occurring. McIntosh gave Dodd a
handbill and stated that “he was there picketing because one of
our subcontractors was not union or he had some kind of union
problem with the sheet metal subcontractor.”
McIntosh acknowledged that the Union was not seeking to
represent nurses and that the dispute with the Hospital related
to its use of nonunion contractors. He testified that the Union
was “targeting the community, patients in the area” rather than
WTS. He explained that the Union felt that the rat balloon
“would probably get the attention of the public more than just
regular handbills.” Business Manager Michael Jeske acknowl-
edged that “among construction workers, rat is known as being
a nonunion contractor.”
The Hospital filed an unfair labor practice charge against the
Union on January 13. Soon thereafter, the Union added a dis-
claimer in smaller typeface at the bottom of the leaflet stating:
This Flyer does not intend, nor does it ask any employee to
cease work or cease deliveries, nor does it ask anyone to take
any action against Workers Temporary Staffing or Brandon
Regional Hospital.
The Hospital established a reserved gate on January 16, sev-
eral hundred feet west of the Moon entrance, off of Vonderberg
Drive. The Union continued to inflate the rat and leaflet on the
Oakfield right-of-way intermittently until February 20.
The charge filed by the Hospital against the Union was set-
tled. The terms of the settlement agreement do not appear in the
record. Insofar as there was no inflation of the rat or leafleting
after February 20, it would appear that the Union agreed to
cease those activities. The settlement agreement was set aside
by the Regional Director on July 15, 2004, following the Un-
ion’s actions on March 15, 2004.
d. March 15, 2004
On March 15, 2004, organizer McIntosh, three union offi-
cials, two members, and McIntosh’s stepson, returned to the
right-of-way on Oakfield Drive between the two entrances of
the semicircular drive. On this occasion there was no rat. Or-
ganizer McIntosh referred to the Union’s activities as “street
theater.” The individuals present conducted a mock funeral
procession and handed out leaflets. Organizer Chris Stewart,
Business Agent George Bayer, and two union members served
as pallbearers. They carried a sheet metal coffin, fitted with
handles and covered with contact paper so that it appeared to be
wooden, in front of the Grim Reaper, the stepson of organizer
McIntosh who was dressed in a black costume that reached a
height of about 8 feet. He carried the Grim Reaper’s traditional
scythe, a realistic looking implement, but made from plastic.
McIntosh and Business Manager Michael Jeske handed out
leaflets. As the “funeral procession” proceeded, an audio sys-
tem played Siegfried’s Funeral March by Wagner, O Fortuna
from Carl Orff’s Carmina Burana, and Movement 3 from Cho-
pin’s Piano Sonata No. 2. The complaint alleges the music to be
somber. Taken as a whole I concur, but note that O Fortuna is a
loud choral piece, whereas the Chopin piece is quiet and medi-
tative.
At some point between February 2003 and March 2004, the
Oakfield Drive entrance to the Hospital had been designated as
the entrance to the Women’s Center. The main entrance was
moved to Parsons Avenue. Although the Hospital had moved
its main entrance, the current manager of safety services, Ford-
ham Hutton, testified that the community continued to consider
the Oakfield entrance to be the main entrance as it had been for
20 years and that “85 to 90 percent of our traffic would enter
through the Women’s Center.” In March, Massey Metals em-
ployees were entering the site from Parsons Avenue which runs
perpendicular to Oakfield Drive on the east side of the Hospital.
The pallbearers, followed by the Grim Reaper, carried the
coffin on the sidewalk parallel to Oakfield drive to a point
about 80 feet from the semicircular drive entrance on Oakfield,
the former main entrance, where they turned and carried the
coffin about 250 feet to the Moon entrance which they crossed
and then continued on the Oakfield right-of-way another 150
feet where they turned and retraced their steps, again crossing
the Moon entrance. Each time they crossed the Moon entrance
they complied with the traffic signal, waiting for a green light
to walk across if necessary. After each circuit, the pallbearers
and Grim Reaper would take a break. Organizer McIntosh ac-
knowledged that this “street theater” continued throughout a 2-
hour period from 12 noon until 2 p.m. The procession was oc-
curring approximately one half of the time.
Throughout the period, the Union distributed four separate
leaflets, each of which bore the caption “Going to Brandon
Regional Hospital should not be a Grave Decision.” Under this
caption is a black and white cartoon depicting six pallbearers
outlined against the sky carrying a casket in a cemetery, as
suggested by the outline of several headstones. The four sepa-
rate leaflets each summarized facts relating to a lawsuit brought
against the Hospital after a patient died at the Hospital or after
alleged improper treatment at the Hospital. The last line of each
SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 15 (BRANDON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER) 205
states: “A public service message from the Sheet Metal Work-
ers’ International Association.”
Business Manager Michael Jeske acknowledged that the mock
funeral procession was held because the union wanted the Hospi-
tal “to use Union sheet metal contractors on future construction
projects” and “because the Hospital you know, they were using
nonunion contractors . . . after we had sent information to the
Hospital indicating that we had had problems with these contrac-
tors and what we believed were labor law violations and it didn’t
seem to affect the Hospital at all. So we were not happy about
that.” He further testified that the Union had learned “about the
malpractice problems and we just saw that . . . corporate greed
has victims[,] displaced Union construction workers or . . . pa-
tients who are subject to poor patient care. It all stems in our view
from corporate greed.”
The Union gave no notice to the Hospital prior to engaging
in the mock funeral demonstration.
2. Analysis and concluding findings
a. The “Rat” and handbilling in January 2003
The complaint alleges that the Respondent’s inflation of the
rat and handbilling from January 9 through 15 threatened, re-
strained, and coerced the Hospital in violation of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. The Respondent’s answer denies the
allegations. There is no allegation regarding the Union’s con-
duct between January 16 and February 20. No party has ad-
dressed that period, and the remedy sought herein would be
unaffected.
The Respondent, in its brief, discusses “viewpoint discrimi-
nation” and argues the Union’s First Amendment right of free
speech citing various cases involving protests regarding contro-
versial issues. Those arguments overlook the fact that the ob-
jectives of those protests are not proscribed. The objective of
the Union in this case is proscribed.
The objective of the Respondent was to force the Hospital to
cease doing business with Massey Metals, a nonunion contrac-
tor that was using employees provided by WTS, also a nonun-
ion entity. The employees of those contractors were performing
construction work on a new building located behind the main
entrance to the Hospital. They entered the construction site
from Vonderberg Drive, which runs perpendicular to Oakfield
on the west side of the property of the Hospital. Despite this,
the Union erected a 16-foot-tall rat in front of the Hospital
wearing a Workers Temporary Staffing banner and distributed
leaflets depicting a WTS rat caricature sitting in a patient’s
room. The Respondent’s brief cites a defamation case that
states that individuals cannot “reasonably interpret a cartoon as
literally depicting an actual event or situation” and refers to the
“explanatory text” underneath the cartoon, presumably the
statement that “Workers Temporary Staffing (WTS) . . . em-
ploys workers on the construction site of the . . . expansion
project.” The cartoon, however, places the rat inside the Hospi-
tal. It is not installing sheet metal outside of the Hospital; it is
sitting in a hospital room next to a patient. Thus, the cartoon
and the text present contradictory information regarding the
location of the rat. A cursory perusal of the leaflet leaves the
impression that the dispute is with the Hospital and relates to
patient care. The leaflet does not name the Sheet Metal Work-
ers, and, therefore, it does not reflect that the entity responsible
for the leaflet is a labor union and that its labor dispute is with
Massey Metals and WTS.
Organizer McIntosh admitted that the Union’s dispute with
the Hospital related to its use of nonunion contractors. The
Union’s leaflet condemns tolerance for “companies like Work-
ers Temporary Staffing.” Insofar as such companies should not
be “tolerated,” the Hospital, in order to demonstrate its intoler-
ance, would have to sever its relationship with those nonunion
contractors. The object of cessation of doing business with
nonunion contractors is further established by the testimony of
Respondent Business Manager Jeske. When testifying regard-
ing the Union’s actions on March 15, 2004, Jeske acknowl-
edged that the Respondent took that action because “they were
using nonunion contractors . . . after we had sent information to
the Hospital indicating that we had had problems with these
contractors and what we believed were labor law violations and
it didn’t seem to affect the Hospital at all.” (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing testimony regarding the Respondent’s displeas-
ure with the Hospital’s continued use of nonunion contractors
constitutes direct evidence that its objective was to have the
Hospital cease that use. See Service Employees Local 254
(Women & Infants Hospital), 324 NLRB 743 (1997).
The Respondent expressed its displeasure with the Hospital
by inflating its rat directly in front of the main entrance to the
Hospital, midway between the entrances to the semicircular
drive. Union members then began distributing the leaflet de-
picting a rat in the room of a patient. Organizer McIntosh ad-
mitted that the Union was “targeting the community, patients in
the area” rather than WTS. He explained that the Union felt that
the rat balloon “would probably get the attention of the public
more than just regular handbills.” Although the Union has also
used the rat to promote its political agenda, any denial that the
rat symbolized anything other than a labor dispute is contra-
dicted by the Workers Temporary Staffing banner in 12-inch-
high lettering prominently displayed to passing drivers on the
rat’s abdomen and the Union’s leaflet which, consistent with
Jeske’s testimony, identified WTS as a “rat employer” that does
not comply with “our local labor agreement.” The Union, rather
than providing signs or placards to the handbillers, used the rat,
wearing the Workers Temporary Staffing banner, as a surrogate
picket.
The Respondent, General Counsel, and Charging Party Hos-
pital all cite DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), for various
propositions. The only conduct addressed by the Supreme
Court in DeBartolo II was the peaceful distribution of handbills
“without any accompanying picketing or patrolling.” Id.at 571.
Although the Respondent’s brief asserts that the Court held that
the leaflets therein were “truthful union publicity protected by
the First Amendment,” no such statement appears in that deci-
sion. The final paragraph of the decision makes clear that the
construction by the Court, “interpreting Sec. 8(b)(4) as not
reaching the handbilling involved” made it “unnecessary” to
pass upon the “constitutional questions.” Id. at 588. As the
Charging Party Hospital points out, the Court has “consistently
rejected the claim that secondary picketing by labor unions in
violation of § 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD206
Amendment.” Longshoremen v. Allied International, Inc., 456
U.S. 212, 226 (1982).
No party has cited, and I have found, no Board decision re-
lating to the display of an inflatable rat in the context of secon-
dary activity. I am mindful that, among cases decided by the
Board, unions have used inflatable rats in numerous situations
involving primary rather than secondary activity. See, e.g.,
Celtic General Contractors, 341 NLRB No. 116, JD slip op. at
4 (2004) (not reported in Board volumes). The critical differ-
ence is that primary activity is protected by the Act whereas
secondary activity in which the object is to have an entity cease
doing business with another is proscribed.
A picket is a person. Patrolling either with or without signs is
not essential to a finding of picketing. Service Employees Local
87 (Trinity Building Co.), 312 NLRB 715, 743 (1993); Mine
Workers (New Beckley Mining), 304 NLRB 71, 72 (1991).
“The important feature of picketing appears to be the posting
by a labor organization . . . .of individuals at the approach to a
place of business to accomplish a purpose which advances the
cause of the union, such as keeping employees away from work
or keeping customers away from the employer’s business.”
Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local 2797 (Stoltze Land & Lum-
ber Co.), 156 NLRB 388, 394 (1965). “Picketing has been de-
fined as conduct ‘which may induce action of one kind or an-
other irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated.” Service Employees Local 254 (Womens & In-
fants Hospital), supra at 749.
In DeBartolo II, the Court commented upon the absence of
“any coercive effect on customers” and noted the absence of
any violence, picketing, or patrolling, “only an attempt to per-
suade.” 385 U.S. at 578. The Court distinguished picketing
from publicity such as leafleting, referring to language in Bab-
bit v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 311 fn. 17 (1979), that
“picketing is qualitatively ‘different from other modes of com-
munication,’” and citing the concurring opinion of Justice Ste-
vens in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607
at 619 (1980), which pointed out that “picketing is ‘a mixture
of conduct and communication’ and the conduct element ‘often
provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to
enter a business establishment.’” Id. at 580.
The Respondent’s conduct in inflating a 16-foot-tall rat dis-
playing a banner as a surrogate for a picket defined the charac-
ter of the Respondent’s actions. The Respondent, in May 2002,
had threatened to picket if the Hospital used nonunion contrac-
tors. In January 2003, McIntosh told Dodd Day, the Hospital’s
former safety and security manager, that “he was there picket-
ing because one of our subcontractors was not union or he had
some kind of union problem with the sheet metal subcontrac-
tor.” McIntosh’s admission that the Union chose to use the rat
in its effort to “target” the public and patients reflects the con-
frontational rather than informational intent behind the Union’s
actions. I find that the Respondent engaged in picketing from
January 9 through 15.
Even if it were to be found that the inflation of the rat as a
surrogate picket and leafleting did not, standing alone, consti-
tute picketing, the Respondent was engaged in picketing when
union member Brandon Holly was present. On January 9, in
addition to the rat, there were six individuals engaged in leaflet-
ing on behalf of the Union and Holly who stood at the Hospital
entrance at the intersection of Oakfield and South Moon Ave-
nue, the Moon entrance, holding a leaflet in front of his chest as
a placard. The leaflet was at the eye level of drivers who had to
pass Holly in order to enter the parking lot of the Hospital.
Organizer McIntosh acknowledged that Holly did this for 2
days, on January 9, and on one other occasion. Despite being
told to hold the leaflets at his side and hand them out, Holly
“decided to do it his own way.” I find that the Respondent’s
actions on January 9 and the other occasion that Holly was
present constituted picketing.
“It is well settled that picketing (or other coercive conduct)
violates Section 8(b)(4) if the object of it is to exert improper
influence on a neutral party.” Mine Workers (New Beckley Min-
ing), supra at 73. I have found that the inflation of the rat and
accompanying leafleting, including specifically the activities of
member Holly on the days that he was present, constituted
picketing. Organizer McIntosh acknowledged that the Union
was picketing. If, contrary to McIntosh’s acknowledgement, it
be found that the foregoing activities did not constitute picket-
ing on the days that Holly was not present, I would find that the
inflation of a 16-foot-tall rat wearing a banner directly in front
of the entrance to the Hospital, coupled with the distribution of
a leaflet depicting a rat in a patient’s room and that does not
identify the Sheet Metal Workers as its source and that the Re-
spondent Union’s labor dispute was with nonunion contractors
Massey Metals and WTS, not the Hospital, was coercive con-
duct. The object of that conduct was to have the Hospital cease
doing business with Massey Metals and WTS. The foregoing
conduct violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
b. The “Street Theater” on March 15, 2004
The complaint alleges that the mock funeral procession con-
stituted picketing and threatened, restrained, and coerced the
Hospital in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Respon-
dent’s answer denies the allegations.
Business Manager Jeske admitted that the Union staged the
mock funeral procession because the Union wanted the Hospi-
tal “to use Union sheet metal contractors on future construction
projects” and because it continued to use nonunion contractors
“after we had sent information to the Hospital indicating that
we had had problems with these contractors.” The object of the
Respondent Union’s action, to have the Hospital cease doing
business with the companies that it had made an entrepreneurial
decision to do business with, was unlawful.
The Respondent notes that Section 8(b)(4) prohibits activi-
ties that threaten, coerce, or restrain, argues that patrolling “re-
fers to a gauntlet of protesters,” and contends that its street
theater, although “in questionable taste,” was not unlawful.
I have found no case, and counsel have cited no case, hold-
ing that picketing for a proscribed objective is not coercive.
Various coercive activities, strikes and picketing attendant
thereto being the most obvious, are protected under the Act, as
well they should be. Multiple injunctions have issued in various
cases that limit the number of pickets, i.e., people, which may
be present at a single location. As reflected in Florida Wire &
Cable, 333 NLRB 378, 381 (2001), and Clougherty Packing
Co., 292 NLRB 1139,1141 (1989), a limit of five pickets is not
SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 15 (BRANDON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER) 207
unusual. There need be no “gauntlet of protesters” in order to
establish coercion. Five individuals were involved in the mock
funeral procession. Crossing a union’s picket line to go to a
destination, whether to a job or to a hospital for medical care,
requires the individual doing so to either ignore or reject the
message of the union. Although coercive, such coercion is pro-
tected under the Act when engaged in for a lawful rather than a
proscribed purpose. It is prohibited when the purpose is pro-
scribed.
The Respondent’s brief acknowledges that its activities “may
have offended some onlookers.” An individual driving on Oak-
field would have observed the procession. Any individual seek-
ing to enter the Hospital at the Moon Drive entrance would
have heard the music and encountered either the procession or
leafleting. As aptly characterized by the Charging Party Hospi-
tal, individuals “were forced to view and cross a death march in
order to patronize the Hospital.” I find that the procession, four
individuals carrying a coffin followed by the Grim Reaper to
the accompaniment of solemn music, constituted picketing.
Even if it were to be held that the procession did not constitute
picketing, the funeral march in conjunction with leaflets refer-
ring to a person making a “grave decision” by going to the
Hospital were coercive.
The Union had no organizational objective regarding the
employees of the Hospital, and it had no dispute regarding the
wages, hours, or working conditions of the employees of the
Hospital. Its dispute with the Hospital was its continued use of
nonunion contractors. Rather than peacefully persuade, the
Union sought to injure the Hospital’s reputation by its “street
theater” accompanied by the distribution of leaflets referring to
“grave decisions” and deaths and subsequent lawsuits. Even
assuming that the Union intended to present such a message as
a “public service,” Jeske admitted that the Respondent’s action
was prompted by the Hospital’s continued use of, i.e., its failure
to have ceased doing business with, nonunion contractors. The
proscribed objective need not be “the sole objective” of the
proscribed conduct to constitute a violation of the Act. NLRB v.
Denver Building Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951). By
staging “street theater” on March 15, 2004, that consisted of
patrolling the entrance to the Hospital with a casket and Grim
Reaper, the Respondent engaged in picketing, a purpose of
which was to coerce the Hospital into ceasing to use nonunion
contractors. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
c. The 8(g) allegation
Section 8(g) of the Act requires that a labor organization
give 10 days notice to a health care institution prior to picket-
ing. I have found that the Respondent’s conduct on March 15,
2004, constituted picketing. The foregoing conduct was en-
gaged in with no prior notice to the Hospital. In Service Em-
ployees Local 535 (Kaiser Foundation), 313 NLRB 1201
(1994), the Board affirmed the finding of an administrative law
judge that, notwithstanding the designation of the union spon-
sored event as a press conference, the “milling around” of un-
ion agents carrying signs regarding staffing levels during the 30
to 45 minute event constituted picketing, and the failure to give
appropriate notice violated Section 8(g). The patrolling at 5-
minute intervals over a 2-hour period in this proceeding pre-
sents an even clearer case of picketing. By picketing a health
care institution without notice, the Respondent violated Section
8(g) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By unqualifiedly threatening to picket with the object of
forcing Beall’s, Inc. to cease doing business with Energy Air,
Inc., at its jobsites in Oldsmar and Ormond Beach, Florida, the
Respondent Sheet Metal Workers International Association,
Local 15, AFL–CIO, has engaged in unfair labor practices af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By picketing at Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon Regional
Medical Center, with the object of forcing the Hospital to cease
doing business with nonunion contractors Massey Metals and
WTS, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. By failing to give notice to Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon
Regional Medical Center, of its intention to picket on March
15, 2004, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(g) and
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Section 8(g) of the Act, I shall recommend
that it be ordered to cease and desist from such violations and
to post an appropriate notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended3
ORDER
The Respondent, Sheet Metal Workers International Asso-
ciation, Local 15, AFL–CIO, Tampa, Florida, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unqualifiedly threatening to picket with the object of
forcing Beall’s, Inc., or any other employer to cease doing
business with Energy Air, Inc.
(b) Picketing Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon Regional Medi-
cal Center, or any other employer with the object of forcing it
to cease doing business with Massey Metals, Inc., and Workers
Temporary Staffing or any other employer with whom the Re-
spondent Union may have a dispute.
(c) Failing to give notice to Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon
Regional Medical Center, of its intention to engage in picketing
at its facility located in Brandon, Florida.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
business offices and all meeting halls within its jurisdiction

3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD208
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 12, after being signed by Local 15’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to members are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, mail a copy
of the attached notice marked “Appendix” to all of its members.
The notice shall be mailed to the last known address of each
member after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.