Schult Trailers, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 8, 1941

28 N.L.R.B. 975 (N.L.R.B. 1941)

In the Matter of SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. and INTERNATIONAL UNION,
UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFFILIATED WITH THE'
C. I. O.
Case No. C-1686.-Decided January 8, 1941
Jurisdiction : trailer manufacturing industry.
Unfair Labor Practices
In General
Employer field responsible for allegedly unauthorized acts of supervisory
employees regardless of its alleged instructions to them not to speak of
unions to non-supervisory employees, where such instructions are' not pub-
licized or communicated to the latter ; where employer is on notice of coercive
activities of supervisory employees but takes no steps to eliminate the
effect thereof; and where in their anli-union conduct, supervisory employees
are clearly emulating the anti-union conduct of their employer. -
Inter fcrence, Restraint, and. Coercion: anti-union statements ; interrogation con-
cerning union activities ; distribution of anti-union petitions ; misleading
explanation of employee rights; threats of discharge ; conducting straw votes
concerning employee affairs. I
Evidence concerning the effect or lack of effect of anti-unions conduct
of employer upon employees is not decisive of whether or not employer
interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees; that real question for
determination was whether such conduct constituted such interference,
restraint, or coercion.
Discrimination: discharge for union membership and activities ; allegations
dismissed as to one person.
Remedial Orders : reinstatement and back pay.
Mr. Lester Asher, for the Board.
Mr. Verne G. Cawley, of Elkhart, Ind., for the respondent.
Mr. Mose Kucela, of Mishawaka, Ind., for the Union.
Mr. Hawley 0. Burke, of Elkhart, Ind., for the I. T. W.
Miss Edna Loeb, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges and amended charges duly filed by International
Union, United Automobile Workers of America, herein called the
Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board,
28 N. L. R. B., No. 150.
975
i
976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
,by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region (Chicago, Illi-
nois ), issued its complaint, dated May 9, 1940, against Schult Trailers,,
Inc., Elkhart , Indiana, herein called the respondent , alleging that
the respondent had engaged in and was engaging , in unfair labor
,practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (2)
and (3 ) and Section 2 (6) and- ( 7) of the-National Labor Relations
Act, 49 Stat . 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint'and
accompanying notice of hearing were duly served on the respondent,
the Union , Independent Trailer Workers Association , herein called
the I . T. W., and the Factory Rules Committee, herein called the
Rules Committee. _
The complaint alleged in substance that ( 1) on or about Novem-
ber 14, 1939, the respondent instigated the formation of the Rules
Committee , a labor organization , among its employees , and thereafter
dominated and interfered with its administration and contributed
financial and other support to it; (2) on or about March 30, 1940, the
respondent instigated the formation of the I. T. W., a labor organi-
zation, among its employees , and' thereafter dominated and inter-
fered with its administration and contributed financial and other
support to it; (3) the respondent discharged Donald Squibb, an em-
ployee, on or about January 10 , 1940, and discharged William L.
Stuyverson ,'another employee , on or about April 15, 1940, and there-
after refused to reinstate them, because they joined and assisted the
Union, thereby discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of em-
ployment and discouraging membership in the Union ; and (4) by
these and other acts , including warnings and interrogations regarding
membership in the Union, the respondent interfered with, restrained,.
and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. The respondent filed an answer to the complaint,
dated May 18, 1940, denying that it transmitted its finished products.
in interstate commerce and denying that it had engaged in the
alleged unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held at Elkhart , Indiana, on
May 27, 28, 29 , and 31 and June 4, 5, and 6, 1940, before Mortimer
Riemer, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Board. At the
opening of the hearing the I . T. W. moved, to intervene and to,
file its answer. The motion was granted . During the hearing, the
I. T. W. filed its answer to the complaint, denying that the respond-
ent had dominated or interfered with its formation or administration
or had contributed financial or other support to it. The Board, the
respondent , and the I. T. W. were represented by counsel , the Union
by a representative , and all participated in the hearing. Full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses , and tor
introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties.
- SCHULT TRAILERS,-INC. 977
During the course of the hearing, counsel for the Board moved that a
paragraph of the complaint be stricken. This motion was granted
by the Trial Examiner. At the conclusion of the Board's case the
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint in so far as it alleged
that the respondent had dominated and interfered with the formation
and administration of the Rules Committee and the I. T. W. and
contributed financial and other support to them. The I. T. W.-also
moved to dismiss the allegations of the complaint concerning the
I. T. W. The Trial Examiner overruled these motions. At the close
of the hearing the respondent and the I. T. W. renewed their motions
to dismiss and the Trial Examiner reserved ruling thereon. Counsel
for the, Board moved to conform the pleadings to the proof, which
motion the Trial Examiner granted. At the conclusion of the hear-
ing the Trial Examiner granted the respondent and the I. T. W. the
privilege of arguing orally before him. The Board has reviewed the
rulings of the Trial Examiner on motions and on objections to the
admission of evidence and finds that no prejudicial errors were,
committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. -
On SeptemUer 23, 1940, the Trial Examiner filed his Intermediate,
Report, copies of which were duly served on the parties. He found
that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1),
(2), and (3) and Section 2 (6) and- (7) of the Act and recom-
mended that the respondent cease and desist therefrom and rein-
state William L. Stuyverson with back pay. He found that the
respondent did not dominate or interfere with the formation or ad-
ministration of the I. T. W. and that it did not discriminate in regard
to the hire and tenure,of employment of Donald Squibb and recom-
mended that this part of the complaint be dismissed. The respond-
ent thereafter filed exceptions to the 'Intermediate Report and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before the Board on Novem-
ber 18, 1940, at Washington, D. C., for the purpose of oral argu-
ment. The respondent appeared by counsel and participated in the
oral argument.
On November 22, 1940, the Union filed with the Regional Director
second amended charges alleging that the respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6)
and (7) of the Act. Since the Union intended thereby to petition:
for permission to withdraw the prior charges alleging that the re-
spondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (2) of the Act, the Board on
November 30, 1940, issued its -order dismissing the complaint ini
so far as it so alleged.
°978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board has considered the exceptions and brief of the respond-
ent and in so-far as the exceptions are inconsistent with the findings,
conclusions, and order below, finds no merit in them.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The respondent, Schult Trailers, Inc., is an Indiana corporation
-engaged in the manufacture of house and commercial trailers. It
maintains its principal place of business and two plants at Elkhart,
Indiana, and employs approximately 250 employees. Among the
materials used by the respondent in its manufacturing operations
.are lumber, paint, sheet and structural metal; leather, cookstoves,
hardware, and automobile parts and accessories. From July 31, 1938,
to July 31, 1939, the respondent purchased materials valued at
$905,694, 60 per cent of which were secured from sources outside
Indiana. During the same period, the respondent's total sales of
finished trailers amounted to $1,428,127. Approximately 85 per
-cent of these trailers, valued at about $1,200,000 were transported to
points outside Indiana, f. o. b. Elkhart. Approximately 8 per cent
'of the trailers shipped outside Indiana are delivered by employees
.of the respondent, the remainder by dealers, distributors, or other
persons. "
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union, United Automobile Workers of America,
is a labor organization affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, herein called the C. I. O. It admits to membership
employees' of the respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interference, restraint, and coercion ,
-There was no labor organization among the respondent's em-
ployees prior to the fall of 1939. At that time the Union started its
drive to organize the employees, and the respondent soon learned of
this activity. On or about October 12, 1939, Walter O. Wells, the
respondent's vice -president and general manager, hired George F.
W. Weber as personnel director for the respondent and told him that
some employees appeared to possess grievances against the respondent
and to be dissatisfied. He instructed Weber "to find out what was
wrong."
On or about October 16, 1939, ,while the Union's membership
,campaign was in progress, the respondent mailed to every employee
:a mimeographed letter signed by Wells. The respondent stated in
SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. . 979
this letter that it had learned that several employees had been urged
by other employees or "some outsiders" to join a union under threat
of a union shop, that these employees' had asked foremen what the
respondent wanted them "to do about joining or not joining the
Union," and that it was writing to clarify this matter .for all the
employees. The respondent then set forth its views as follows :
The National Labor Relations Act permits an employee to
belong to a labor union if he sees fit, and makes it unlawful for
an employer to discharge that employee, or otherwise discrimi-
nate against him, because he joins or remains a member of a labor
union br because he is active in behalf of the union, and this
company is fully in accord with the rights and privileges granted
to the employees by that act.
You must, of course, determine for yourself whether you will
gain anything by belonging to the union, and in making that
decision it is proper for you to bear in mind the membership
fee and dues you will be required to pay on becoming and re-
maining a member, and such other benefits or lack of benefits
which may result solely because you do belong to a union.
So far as this company is concerned, so long as you perform
your duties satisfactorily it does not care whether you belong to
a labor union or do not belong to one.
We do not- hesitate to advise you that you do not need to
join any_labor union, or organization, in order to hold your job
with this company, as its plant will never be operated as a
"closed shop". There will never be any difference in the wages
paid to union employees and to non-union employees, nor will
membership or lack of it, in a union be considered when it be-
comes necessary to lay off employees because of a7-slow-down in
business, but employees will then be laid off in accordance with
the practice which we have always followed, that is, when every-
thing else .is equal, the oldest employee will be the last one laid
off. -
The executives of this company do not believe that over a period
of years you will be benefited financially, or otherwise, because
you belong to a labor union. If at any time in the future it
appears that you are entitled to any additional rights or privi-
leges which you, do not then possess, they will be granted to
[you] as readily when requested by you, as if they are requested
by somelabor organization.
The opinion of the executives of this company as to the benefits
or lack of them, which you will gain, or lose, by belonging
to • a union, are of necessity their own individual opinions, and
are not -binding on you, and as you know, you are completely free
to make your own decision.
413597-42-vol 28-63
980 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
If this letter does not contain all of the information on the
subject of union membership that you may desire to have, or
-does not answer all of the questions which may have been trou-
bling you , or if you have any grievances or complaints which you
would like to submit to the management , we hope you will feel
free to call' upon the writer of this letter at any time, and he
will be glad to discuss all of your problems with you.
On November 14, 1939, the respondent posted in its plants. a bul-
letin, signed by Wells, notifying all employees of the respondent's
plan, as a , part of its 1940 program and allegedly at the request of
employees , to establish a seniority list and a set of factory rules and
regulations regarding lay-offs, rehiring , employee loans , and the like.
The bulletin stated that the regulations would be formulated by the
management ' in conjunction with a five-man "factory rules com-
mittee," herein called the Rules Committee , elected by the employees;
asked each employee to mark on the ballot handed him by his fore-
man the , name""of one employee whom he desired to.represent him
on the committee; without their foreknowledge or. consent, named
two union members, Paul Loyer and Kenyon Peiffer, to.act .as tellers
with Weber in counting the ballots; stated that the five men re-
,ceiving- the highest number of votes would constitute the Rules
Committee ; and urged all employees to vote immediately so that
the rules could be set up without any delay. On November 14 or
15 foremen issued ballots to the employees during working hours,
and the balloting took place during and outside working hours,
foremen not being excluded therefrom . Loyer was paid for the
time spent in counting ballots. On November 15 the respondent
posted a bulletin setting forth the election results and the names of
the five employees elected to the Rules Committee.
On or about November 15 , 1939, the - respondent sent to all its
employees another mimeographed letter in which it stated :
In order that all of you might be familiar with what has taken
place as far as Union activity in our shop is concerned, and to
again answer some questions that have been asked by some of
the employees , thinking perhaps that the same questions might
be bothering all of you, we felt it our duty to again write another
general letter.
The respondent then referred to conferences which it had recently
had with More Kucela, international representative of the Union.
It stated that Kucela had reproved the respondent regarding some
statements made to employees by foremen but had failed upon re-
quest to reveal the foremen's names or what they had said. By the
respondent 's own admission elsewhere "in the record , it appears that
Kucela complained specifically and requested the discontinuance of
• SCB ITLT TRAILERS, INC. 981
foremen's "improper-rem-arks" about the Union and their statement
of "company policies" in that regard. The respondent stated fur-
ther in the letter that Kucela claimed to represent varying numbers
of the employees, asked to bargain for them, but failed and refused
to present authorization cards as proof thereof, leaving the respond-
ent "stymied" in 'regard to negotiations with him; and that "for
some strange reason," Kucela considered the Rules Committee "a
Factory Union" and threatened the respondent with Board action.'
The letter continued :
We wish 'to state again most definitely that it will never be
necessary for any employee to join any organization to receive
the maximum wages, the minimum working hours, the best
working conditions, etc., that this company ever provides for
any employee. .
If the kind of activity and palaver that we have just outlined
to you, is typical of organizations of this type, it is the,manage-
ments opinion that any benefit that you might receive joining
such an, organization would be very negligible. The right -to
self-determination, the privilege that each of you now have in
coming to the office to Mr. Weber, Mr. Schult, or the writer
[Wells], at any time with any grievance or complaint, or sug-
gestion, is a privilege which you should give a lot of thought
to before signing it away. These opinions, of course, are not
binding on you, and you are_ free to form your own conclusions.
However, ours is a. sincere effort to keep you informed as to the
actual facts rather than distorted facts.
A few days later Weber and Wells summoned the Rules Commit-
tee to Wells' office during working hours, discussed and outlined
the task of drafting the contemplated regulations and what they
thought the rules should cover, and then left the committee members
to meet alone. The five employees were paid for the time spent at
the meeting. Louis J. Francisco, a committee member, prepared a
proposed draft of the rules, and several days later he and the other
four employees met again with Wells and Weber during working
hours, without loss of pay. Wells, acting as chairman of the meet-
ing, suggested numerous changes and additions to the Francisco
draft, and apparently all these suggestions were adopted with the
consent of the committee. The Rules Committee did not meet again.
t The respondent also stated . `
It has been called to our attention today that some of our employees have been
telling other of our employees in our shop ' that Mr. Weber is fraternizing and
working with Mr . Kucela to increase Union membership and is actually a Union
organizer himself . This is ridiculous and untrue. Mr weber took Mr Kucela through
the factory at the request of Mr. Kucela because he stated that he might like to
purchase . a trailer , . . and it seems mighty small to us that this act of courtesy
on out part could be misconstrued in such a 'manner.
982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR' RELATIONS BOARD
The respondent had the altered rules stenciled , had the stencil signed
by Weber, Wells, and the committee , on or about November 30 dis-
tributed mimeographed copies thereof to all the employees, and put
the rules into effect without previously submitting them to a vote of
the employees . Seniority Rule 16 stipulates that the rules shall be
administered by the management except in case of controversy, and
that controversies shall be arbitrated by a "Seniority Committee,"
herein called the Arbitration Committee , composed of Wells , Weber,
and the five members of the Rules Committee . The Arbitration
Committee .did not meet prior to the issuance of the complaint herein.
'Dn ' December 22, 1939, the last pay day before Christmas, the
respondent gave each worker a check -.-in addition to -his regular pay
check . On the same day the respondent addressed a letter to all
the employees referring to this additional check as "a small token
,of our appreciation . .' . in the form of a Christmas present," "a
continuation of'a policy . . . started last year." In this letter the
respondent told every employee that there had been no change in
its attitude toward labor organizations and clearly expressed its
.opinion that no employee would be benefited by membership in any
'labor organization . The letter stated :
It has been rumored about that there has been a change in
the attitude of the management in its opinion as regards any of
you employees joining a labor organization.
We feel the same as we did the last we wrote you. We do
not believe that you would be benefited either in working con-
ditions, or from the financial end. There will not be any dif-
ference in the amounts of money paid to any employee because
he is , or is not, a member of any labor organization . This, of
course, is our opinion, and is not binding on you as you must
make your decision considering all the facts, if and when you
are approached to join any organization.
It has further been rumored about that the present attempt
to organize some of our employees into some form of organiza-
tion is a result of a government order. This is absolutely un-
true, and if it has been stated to anybody it is a very definite
effort to mislead you and misconstrue the facts.
The letter also disputed the merits of charges alleging, inter alia,
-that the Rules Committee was illegally formed by the respondent,
within the meaning of Section 8 ( 2) of the Act which charges the
Union had filed with the Regional Director ; stated that a Board
examiner had requested the dissolution of the Rules Committee and
the withdrawal of the rules and rights given the employees by the
;Rules Committee and the management ; and stated further that the
respondent did .not agree as to the illegality of the committee or the
SCHTLT TRAILERS, INC. 983.
rules and saw no reason why the employees should be "penalized
and have benefits removed" because a few employees,and "some out-
siders" were "taking it upon themselves to try to do the thinking
and the directing" of employment conditions. The respondent
concluded the letter :
Our reasons for mixing this in with the Christmas letter is that
we want to keep you advised as to the things that 'are going on
that you don't know about, and give you the actual facts-rather
than distorted ones that you might get from rumors that are
being passed around.
With kindest wishes to you rind your fors a very MERRY
CHRIsmIAS, and a happy and PROSPERous NEW YEAR, we
are * * *.
On March 11, 1940, the respondent wrote another letter to its em--
ployees, in which it referred again to the charges pending against
the respondent and stated that the Board objected to Rule 16, setting
up the Arbitration Committee, that the respondent had tried but had
been unable to convince the Board of the legality of the said com-
mittee, and that the Board had threatened to issue a complaint of
unfair labor practices against the respondent if it did not disestab-
lish that committee. The letter continued :
. Apparently the Labor Board -and the Union from the
stand they have taken, want the company to determine all ques-
tions of seniority, without any assistance from the Committee
appointed by all employees,' as it now stands.
* * * * * * *
Therefore, the company must either comply with the demand, or
defend itself before the Labor Board and court, at a probable
expense of several thousand dollars.
The respondent then stated that, before deciding what to do, it
desired an expression of the employees' opinion of the demand. It
enclosed a mimeographed ballot in the letter and explained :
If you wish the Seniority Committee, as it now stands, to arbi-
trate any disagreement that you might have with the manage-
ment on seniority, mark an "X" in the square beside the words
on the ballot: "I approve Rule 16." If you wish the company
to comply with the demand made by the Board and Union to
disestablish the Committee and leave all questions of- seniority
to management alone, mark an "X" in the square beside the
words : "I wish the Arbitration Committee established by Rule
16 abolished."
984 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The respondent concluded the letter by reiterating its position with
respect to union membership :
As the result of a number of questions by our employees as,to
what the company's opinion is toward their joining or not join-
ing a labor union,,we are going to again state our position, which
is the same as it was at the first time we wrote you. ' 'We do not
believe that you will be benefited, either by working con-
ditions or from the financial end, by joining a labor union.
There will not be any difference in the amounts of money paid
to any employee because he is or is not a member of a labor
organization. This, of course, is our opinion, and is not binding
on you. You must make your decision, considering all the facts,
if and when you are approached to join any organization.
On March 12 and 13, in accordance with, the above letter, about
160 employees marked their ballots and deposited them in a box in
the plant. It does not appear that foremen were precluded from
voting. The respondent assigned the counting of the ballots to four
union members, including Harry E. Rowe and James N. Conley,
president' and secretary of the Union. The vote, reflecting the re-.
spondent's expressed disagreement with the above request of the
Board's regional representatives, was 130 ballots in favor of continu-
ing Rule 16 and 30 for abolishing it. Thereafter the respondent
refused to comply With the said request..
Although in its letter of November 15, 1939, the respondent in-
dicated that it would accept signed authorization cards as proof
of the Union's representation among the employees and its au-
thority,to bargain in their behalf, some time prior to March 27,
1940, the respondent refused to accept such proof when offered by
the Union, stating that a number of employees, unnamed, had in-
formed the respondent that they were no longer interested -in the
C. I. 0., and further stating that an election was the only proper
method of determining the question. Kucela threatened to call a
strike to demonstrate the Union's right to be exclusive bargaining.
agent, and on March '27 the respondent distributed another letter
to all its employees in an attempt to prevent such a strike.2 In this
'letter the respondent referred again to union membership :
You well know our position in this matter. You do not have to
join any labor organization. There will never be any difference
8 The second paragraph of this letter reads as follows
We have repeatedly told Mr . Kucela that we would be glad to accept any adequate
proof of their majority membership , and as a result of that right to bargain for
the entire shop, but it is our opinion that the cards signed over the period of the
last six months do not represent a true picture, inasmuch as a number of you
employees have changed your mind, and so stated to the management that you were
no longer interested in the C. I . O. being your representative.
SCHULT TRAILERS,' INC. - - : 985' -
in the wages paid to an employee who is or is not a member of.
any labor organization, and with the strike situation seeming
to be very prevalent in Mr. Kucela's mind, it would certainly-
go toward reaffirming our thought that you could'not and would
not be benefited by your association with this particular labor,
"organization.
A postscript to the letter also pointedly reminded each employee:
"'Strikes stopebusiness-when business stops-=pay check stops-every-
body loses. Can you afford to lose-THINK FOR YOURSELF."
On or about April 15, 1940, the respondent addressed a bulletin
to all the employees in an attempt to prevent the strike which it
was rumored would be called by the Union on the, following day.
Affirming that the respondent would bargain with the Union upon
demonstration of its majority representation in a Board election
and appealing to the employees to petition for such an election, the
bulletin stated, "THERE WILL NOT BE ANY, DIFFERENCE IN WAGES PAID
To [or] . . . ANY DISCRIMINATION TOWARDS ANY EMPLOYEE BECAUSE
HE HAS BEEN , IS OR IS NOT A MEMBER OF ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION."
It also repeated that in the respondent's opinion no employee would
"be benefited financially or in working conditions" by joining a labor
organization, and stated further :
Conditions across the water show what happens to people
who do not think for themselves. Don't be a torchbearer for
somebody else. If you have anything wrong, tell it to the fellow
who can help you-which, as far as your job is concerned in
this Factory, is the Management.
In addition to, writing letters and engaging in the other conduct
noted above, early in the Union's organizational campaign the
respondent expressed its hostility to the Union through its super-
visory officials, who inquired regarding the union affiliation of em-
ployees and made numerous anti-union statements to them.
Thus, on or about October 1, 1939, Wells told William L. Stuyvei-
son, an employee who had just been promoted to foremanship of
the stove department, that he wanted Stuyverson to understand that
the respondent "was unalterably opposed to unions." Thereafter,
Personnel. Director Weber approached Stuyverson in the stove de-
partment and asked him what he knew about the progress of the
Union. When he replied that he knew nothing new, Weber in-
-quired, "You didn't know that two of your men joined last night?"
He named the men and told Stuyverson that he did not keep "a
very close tab" on his department. Neither Wells nor Weber denied
.having made the above statements. - -
Raymond Newman, an employee of the respondent, testified that
early in October 1939 Walter Koontz, foreman of the paint shop,
986 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
made certain anti-union remarks to employees . Unlike the repond-
ent's ordinary production employees , who, are paid hourly wages,
Koontz and other foremen of the respondent are paid --. on,'a weekly
salary basis , are apparently allowed vacations with pay, and attend
management meetings. In their respective departments they direct
the work of production employees , some with the . aid of assistant
foremen, and they have the power to recommend hiring, disciplin-
ing, and discharging employees and to discharge, employees with
Weber's approval . According to Newman 's testimony , Koontz en-,
tered a trailer upon which Newman, Frank Kilgren, and several
other employees were working , stated that there was going to be a
union meeting that night , and warned that anybody observed going
to the meeting would be discharged ; Newman and Kilgren replied
that the Wagner Act gave them the right to attend any union meet-
ings and do anything they liked outside of working hours ; but
Koontz threatened that they would nevertheless be discharged if they
went to the meeting. Koontz denied this testimony, but the Trial-
Examiner, who had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of
the witnesses on the stand , did not credit his denial . In view of the
Trial Examiner's finding and the fact that the statements attributed
to Koontz are consistent with the respondent 's demonstrated hostility
to the Union, we find that Koontz made these statements.
Cecil Anderson, another employee, joined the Union on or about
October 4,1939. On October 9 Wells took Anderson by the arm in the
plant, said he wanted to have a talk with him, and conducted him
to the respondent 's conference room. Wells -stated that he under-
stood that Anderson had "got mixed up with" the Union, and when
the latter replied that he had joined that organization, Wells ob-
served that since he "knew all about-it beforehand ," he was not going
to "pump " Anderson about the Union. He warned Anderson that he
"had better take the $2- [ initiation fee] and bowl with it," assured
him that the respondent 's 1940 program would better the employees'
wages, hours, and working conditions, and would undoubtedly grant
vacations with pay, asked him what he would gain by joining a
union, and told him "to study it over." Anderson testified , "And he
told me . . . he didn't think there was a labor organization in the
world, large enough to crack Schult Trailers." Wells denied the
latter testimony but admitted that he might have made the other
statements attributed to him by Anderson. The Trial Examiner
did no credit the denial , and we find that Wells made substantially
the above statements.
Maurice Foreman, an employee, joined the Union on October 13,
1939. Two days later , according to Foreman 's testimony , Martin
Schultz, foreman of the respondent 's trim or cover shop, asked him
during working hours if he had joined the Union ; he refused to
SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. 987
answer the question;- and Schultz stated in substance that he "for
himself did not like the C. I. O. as much as the A. F. of L., and he
did not like either 'one so well, but he would rather have us get
a company union in," that strikes caused business to become slack
and employees to lose money to little avail, and that it would be
"the best thing to leave [the Union] go." Donald Squibb, another
-employ",- testified that he overheard Schultz say to Foreman that
he did not care what organization he belonged to "as long as it
wasn't the C. I. 0." Schultz controverted the above testimony, but
the Trial Examiner did not credit his denial, stating that Schultz
impressed him "as an evasive and unreliable witness." We find that
Schultz in fact interrogated Foreman and made substantially the
statements attributed to`him above.
Roady Rodibaugh, also an employee of the respondent, joined the
Union in October 1939 and on several occasions thereafter Herbert
Stephenson, foreman of the respondent's tin shop, questioned him
during working hours about the organization. He asked Rodibaugh
if he belonged to the Union and upon receiving an affirmative reply,
said that he and the respondent bad always treated Rodibaugh
well, asked how union affiliation was going to "better" him in any
way; and stated that he t1iought it would be to Rodibaugh's "dis-
advantage." Rodibaugh overheard Stephenson making similar re-
marks to Carl Fredericks, another employee. At about the same
time, Stephenson conducted a straw ballot in the tin shop during
working hours, passing out blank ballots to the employees and ask-
ing them to write "no" if they were in favor of "the company union"
or "yes" if they favored the Union. The balloting was won by the
Union. Stephenson did not appear as a witness.
In October or early November several non-supervisory employees
solicited signatures to anti-union petitions in the plant during work-
ing hours with the approval and consent of several foremen. The
petitions read :
We the undersigned employees of the Schult Trailer Co. Inc. do
hereby declare our opposition to any union labor organization-
to become organized in this factory.
Dale Gardner, an employee, asked I. L. Hunsberger, an employee who
worked in the maintenance department, to sign one of the petitions
and to circulate it in the chassis department where he had formerly
been employed. Hunsberger signed it and submitted it for signa-
ture to several employees of the latter department, with the express
permission of Cleo Rude, its foreman. Neither Rude nor Gardner
testified at the hearing.3
8 Gardner was promoted to an assistant foremanship in the final finish department
a month or two later.
988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The experiences of James L. Fish, Newman, Kilgren, and Donald
Squibb, four employees who refused to sign the petitions, should
be noted. Shortly after Fish refused to sign the petition upon pres-
entation to him by an unidentified person, the latter returned ac-
companied by, John Hutton, the factory superintendent or foreman
who had hired-Fish. Hutton questioned Fish, "What is the matter?
Are you a union man ?", and when Fish replied in the negative,
stated, "It kind of looks like it : . . You will either have to
sign it the petition] or I will have to lay you off." Accordingly,
Fish signed the petition. Hutton (lid not testify. Newman testi-
fied that Foreman Koontz asked him and Kilgren why they had not
signed. Koontz denied even talking with Newman but the Trial
Examiner did not credit the denial. The petitions, which were intro-
duced into. evidence, bear the signatures of Koontz and at least two
other foremen, Raymond Jeffries 4, and William L. Stuyverson.5
Under all the circumstances, we, find that Koontz interrogated New-
man and Kilgren as noted above. Squibb, in refusing to sign the
petition presented to him, explained that he was a member of the
Union. On the following day Weber and Wells summoned him to
the office, and, according to his testimony, fold him that they under-
stood that he was a union member, that he "had been talking union
throughout the shop and that they wished [he] would please refrain
from that." Squibb admitted to then that he was a union member
but denied the talking charge. Wells did not controvert this testi-
mony. Weber testified that the subject of Squibb's alleged talking
was not mentioned, but the Trial Examiner found to the contrary,
and the respondent took no exception thereto. Upon all-the evidence
we credit Squibb's testimony as above set forth.
The petitions were signed by a total of 177 employees, including
at least three foremen, and were submitted to Wells.. Although the
latter denied authorizing the circulation of the petitions and dis-
claimed prior knowledge thereof, his interest in them is shown by
his above-described treatment of Squibb as well as by the fact that
he counted the names and during the strike in the spring of 1940,
placed check marks beside the names of signers who were partici-
pating in the strike.
Paul Loyer, an employee, joined the Union on October 25, 1939,
and early in November requested a wage increase from Hutton, his
foreman. On the same day Wells' summoned Loyer to the office, in
-Weber's presence questioned him regarding his grievance, and said
' Weber testified that Ray Jeffries was a foreman, and it appears and we find that
Raymond Jeffries ie the same person
G Stuyverson was subsequently demoted to a non-supervisory position, joined the Union,
and was discharged. We discuss in subsection B, infra, whether or not -the discharge
was discriminatory.
SCHULT TRAILERS,, INC. 989
that it would be adjusted . According to Loyer's testimony , Wells
stated that he understood "from a reliable source" that Loyer had
joined the Union, and inquired whether Loyer knew anyone who
had joined , whether he could go into the factory and find out who
were members , and whether he was "bothered" by anyone asking
him to join the Union . Loyer testified that he refused to investigate
union membership and offered little information in reply to Wells'
questioning. Weber did not testify regarding this conference.
Wells testified that he asked Loyer if he knew any other employees
who had grievances , denied that lie requested Loyer, or that Loyer
refused, to make such an investigation , but did'not deny Loyer's
other testimony set forth above. In view of the latter omission,
Weber's failure to testify with respect to this matter , the respond-
ent's clear hostility to the Union, and its repeated interrogation of
union members , discussed above and below, we do not credit Wells'
denial but find that he made the statements attributed to him by
Loyer.
Roland Steffen, an employee , testified that in about the middle
of November 1939, Weber summoned him to the office during work-
ing hours , asked him if he belonged to the Union , and inquired what
the Union could give him that Weber could not. Weber testified
generally that he did not quiz employees as to whether or not they
had joined the Union . Wells, his superior , admitted having done
so, however, and Weber admitted asking employees why they had
joined the Union. Under all the circumstances , we believe that
Weber in fact interrogated employees as to their union affiliation,
if any, and find that he questioned Steffen as indicated above.
Leopold Scheidler, an employee , joined the Union in November
1939. He testified that on one Saturday afternoon subsequent, he
believed , to his union affiliation , Robert Frederick , foreman of the
repair department, approached him in the plant , said, ". .. you
shouldn't belong to this, the C. I. 0.," and showed him what was
apparently a union card . Frederick did not specifically deny this
testimony . He testified , however, that on several occasions he in-
formed various members of his crew that he did not care what organi-
zation they belonged to as long as they did their work. It does
not appear that Scheidler was so informed . Frederick explained
that he volunteered the above statement in order to induce em-
ployees to cease talking at work regardless of the subject of their
conversation and testified further that the foremen "have" been
instructed by the management to make such statements in the in-
terest of harmony. He did not recall when the alleged instructions
were issued , however, and that fact , together with the vagueness of
his testimony , the failure of Weber or Wells to testify that they
'990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL' LABOR 'RELATIONS BOARD
'issued such orders, the absence'of proof that other foremen carried
out any such directions, and the affirmative evidence' that foremen
were actively hostile to the Union, lead us to doubt that any such,
directions were in fact issued 'or obeyed. Moreover, in the absence
of any specific denial, we believe that Frederick made the anti-
I. 0. statement attributed to him by Scheidler, and it is clear that
such a remark, coupled with the anti-union activities described above
and below, rendered Frederick's purported assertions of neutrality
meaningless so far as the employees were concerned.
Another employee, Bert Harsch, joined the Union in January
1940 and was thereafter summoned to the office for a conference with
'Weber and Wells during working hours. Harsch testified that Wells
asked him if he had any grievances against the respondent and that
.when he replied in the negative, Wells stated, "Well, you must have
some reason for joining the Union," and "said something about it
was . . . just like a flock of sheep." Wells did not controvert this
testimony. Weber admitted questioning -Harsch regarding griev-
ances but testified that Wells did not say the other things attributed
to him, so far as Weber knew or recalled. The Trial Examiner
accepted Harsch's testimony and upon all the evidence we concur in
his finding. Wells also asked Harsch if he knew any other em-
ployees who had grievances.
Cortlin S. Casselman, an employee, joined the Union on March 6,
1940. He secured a union button in the latter part of March and at
about the same time Weber told him during working hours that he
understood that a number of employees had grievances and were
joining the Union, and that he had questioned many of them regard-
ing their grievances but had been unable to secure information from
them. He queried Casselman with respect to his grievances and those
of others. Around the first of April, Wells summoned Casselman to
the office and asked how he was getting along. When Casselman
replied, "Just, fine," Wells stated, "I wouldn't say that if I didn't
mean it . . . from the [C. I. 0.] badge that you wear, I don't think
your attitude towards the company is such as it should be." Wells
also asked Casselman if he had any grievances against the respondent
and upon learning that he had four grievances, suggested placing
them before all the employees by letter. Casselman requested that
a committee of 12 employees decide whether the matter should be
thus publicized. Wells selected a committee composed of six union
and six non-union employees, summoned the committeee and Cassel-
man to a meeting during working hours, and presented to them a
proposed letter from the respondent to the employees, dealing with
Casselman's grievances and ' alleged grievances of other employees.
Before leaving them alone to consider the letter, Wells read them an
SCHULT TRAILERS, INC., 991
article ° which purports to be the writing of an employee of an un-
named company and reads in part as follows:
A fellow's best friend is his boss . Anyway, that 's what I
think and I'm getting tired of seeing him pushed around ve{'=
bally and legislatively by pinks, professors and politicians who.
never in their lives had to dig up a payroll.
I am beginning to wise up to the fact that it 'is an economic
impossibility for my boss to get hurt without my feeling it, too.
Reformers , therefore , do me no service at all when they harass
him or get in the way of his normal business operations . - On the
contrary.
A thumping share of all the profits goes to help finance
the Government 's program to lift up.the "underdogs ," make the
weak strong and generally re-write economic law . . . this is
supposed to level things out and to be all in the interest of us.
of the "working classes."
Well, so far as I am concerned , this reform program misses by
a mile on one very important point: It is mighty hard for my
boss 'to sweeten up my pay envelope when so large a share of
what he takes in has to be passed along to the tax collectors.
... -When your boss and my boss stop ' "making it" we're
going to have a hard time "getting it." And may heaven help
us all if our bosses eventually get fed up with sweating and
struggling and worrying under restrictions imposed by crack-
pots who couldn 't successfully run a bush -league peanut stand.
At any rate , I feel that my self -interest and my well-
being are very closely tied up with the well -being of the man who
pays me my salary , very much dependent on the health of his.
business.
Naturally , I appreciate good wishes-but let it go at 'that
because I certainly don't appreciate any interference with that
set-up. I just" don't want anyone to represent me or intercede
for me.7
As a matter of fact, "comrades ," you've got to stop kicking
my boss around . Or else you 'll have me to fight, too.
After reading the above , Wells left and the employees discussed
their grievances but failed to pass upon the letter . Casselman met
with Wells on the following morning, told him the results of the
meeting, and when Wells asked if they wished to continue the
meeting, stated that the union men felt that they-had no right to
O Entitled "After Hours," by' David Henderson appearing in the March 29, 1940. issue
of "Printers' Ink." '
* Italics added.
992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
serve as a grievance committee in this fashion without union authori
zation. Apparently nothing more 'was done regarding the matter.
Late in March or early in April" 1940 several employees told
Wells that they had attended an employee meeting at which the
formation of a labor organization was discussed, either an unaffili-
ated organization or one affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor, and they asked Wells' opinion thereof. According to Wells'
own testimony, he replied that he had not changed his opinion since
he first heard of union organization, that he "didn't think they would
benefit through any organization, either financially or oiherwise."
Some time after the Union had started to organize, Charles E.
Sinton, an employee, had several 'conversations regarding unions
with Melvin Miller, foreman of the, body department. Miller told
Sinton that he was very much opposed to "unionism of any type."
'Sinton joined the Union on April 3, 1940, and began to wear a
union button at work. Miller approached him on the following
day and said that he was very much disappointed in Sinton, that
he thought the latter "had better sense." 8
On the same day on which Miller made the above remarks, Wells
summoned Sinton to his private office; looked at his union button;
said -that he did-not think Sinton "would ever do it" and that he
thought Sinton "was a more loyal employee than that, to have
joined." . When the latter replied that his union membership had
not altered his loyalty, Wells asked his reason for joining the Union
and expressed his preference for a company union, which Sinton
had formerly openly favored. Wells admitted some of the above
facts and did not controvert any of them.
As already noted, both Wells and Weber admitted, and we have
found in incidents set forth above, that they questioned employees
regarding their union affiliation. On this record, the fact of the
questioning, usually coupled with anti-union statements, shows and we
find that the respondent was endeavoring to frighten the employees
away from the Union.9 The respondent stated that it so interro-
gated its employees because it considered their joining the Union as
evidence of their having grievances against the respondent, and it
desired to discover these grievances, if any; and the employees' reasons
for joining the Union, in order that the respondent might correct
the' conditions which caused the workers to join. It appears that,
8 Miller did not testify at the hearing . Counsel for the respondent stated that it was
not calling Miller as a witness because he had just returned to work after a severe
heart attack the previous week and his doctor had informed the respondent that if he
took the witness stand and became excited he might have a recurrence of the attack. How-
ever, no deposition , affidavit , or other statement by Miller was introduced into evidence
by the respondent . Moreover , the Trial Examiner credited Sinton's testimony.
See New York Handkerchief Manufacturing Company v . N. L. R., B ., 114 F. ( 2d),,
144 (C. C. A. 7), cert. den., November 18, 1940.
SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. 993
at least one of the reasons for hiring Weber at the outset of the
Union's drive was to make this investigation. Employers who seek
knowledge regarding the union affiliation of their employees do
not ordinarily reject it.10 The respondent's own explanation of its
systematic inquiries, viewed in the light of its anti-union sentiments,
disclosed above and below, demonstrates clearly that by such inquiries
the respondent sought to secure information with which ;to combat
the growth of the Union and alienate its members, and we so find.
The respondent seeks to disclaim responsibility for the statements
and conduct of its foremen antagonistic to the Union, by urging that
it did not authorize such activity, and that during approximately
a year prior to the hearing, it repeatedly instructed the foremen not
to talk to employees about unions and "to take no sides in any union."
The respondent, however, did not inform the employees generally
of these instructions. Moreover, although put,on notice by the Union
in October 1939 and by the signatures of three foremen on the peti-
tions circulated thereafter, that foremen were engaging in anti-union
activity, the respondent did not take any steps to eliminate the coercive
effect thereof. Furthermore, because of their duties and powers, the
anti-union statements and other conduct of the foremen must be
attributed to the respondent.'1 Finally, the respondent is responsible
for its foremen's anti-union activity because it is apparent that in such
activity the foremen were emulating the example set by the manage-
ment, which expressed its hostility toward the Union by its letters
and the actions, systematic interrogation, and statements of Wells and
Weber, its high-ranking officials. Under all these circumstances,
we deem immaterial the fact, which the respondent stresses, that the
Union failed to supplement its complaint to the respondent against
foremen by supplying names and details regarding their activities.
We find that the foremen sought to discourage union membership
and activity, that the employees had just cause to believe that the
foremen were acting for and on behalf of the respondent, and that
the respondent is not freed of responsibility for the activities of its
foremen' by its unpublicized instructions to them."
The respondent urges also that the activities described above did
not, in fact, constitute unfair labor practices because several em-
ployees testified that they were not intimidated, that they joined or
did not resign from the Union, continued to wear union buttons in
10 See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. N L R. B., 107 F. (2d) 555. (C. C. A 7), enf'g in
part, Matter of Montgomery Ward & Company and Reuben Lvtzenberger, et at, 9 N. L. It. B.
538
11 Cf. Swift d Company v. N L. R. B, 106 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A 10).
12 See International Associateon of Machinists, et at v. N L. R. B, United States
Supreme Court, decided November 12, 1940; Consumers Power Company v N. L. R B, 113
F. (2d) 38, 44 -(C. C. A. 6) ; H. J. h einz Company v. N. L. R B., 110 F. (2d) 843, 847
'(C. C. A. 6), cert granted, 310 U. S. 621.
994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the plant while at work, or otherwise disclosed a continuing interest
in the Union. The Trial Examiner found this contention without
merit and we concur in his finding. In the first` place, not all the
employees who were directly or indirectly subjected to the respond-
ent's ,anti-union conduct testified that they were not. intimidated.
Furthermore, it is impossible to estimate what might have been the
size of the Union's membership or the scope and nature of its ac-
tivities had it not been for these anti-union activities of the respond-
ent. The reasonable inference is that anti-union conduct of an
employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and col-,
lective bargaining,13 else Congress would not have passed the Act. The
real question for determination is whether the acts of the respondent
constituted interference with, restraint, or coercion of its employees
in' the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Evi-
dence concerning the effect or lack of effect of the respondent's acts,
on particular individuals is clearly not decisive of this issue. Having
considered the evidence relied upon by the respondent in this, con-
nection, we find that it does not warrant a dismissal of the complaint..
The respondent's purported neutrality regarding unions and al-
leged desire 'to leave its employees free to organize without dis-,
crimination, coercion, or intimidation 14 was specious and not in good
faith. In the series of letters sent to all its employees during the
first months of the Union's organizational drive, the respondent, while
affirming the right of employees under the Act to join a union if
they chose, sought to render self-organization and collective bargain-
ing futile, as well as superfluous, in advance, by studiously refraining
from 'mentioning the possible benefits of collective bargaining; by
emphasizing repeatedly that it did not believe the employees would
be benefited "either in working conditions or from the financial end"
by any union; by encouraging individual, as opposed to collective,
bargaining; by urging each employee not to be "a torch-bearer 'for
somebody else" but to take up his troubles with "the fellow who can
help [him]-which, as far as [his] job is concerned in this Factory,
is the Management"; by stating that additional employment privi-
leges would be granted as readily upon the request of an individual
employee as upon that of a labor organization, that the "privilege"
which each employee possessed of presenting grievances or suggestions
individually to the management was a "right to self-determination"
which the employees should not "sign away" without "a lot of
thought," and that "conditions across the water" show the fate of
persons "who do not think for themselves"; and, by affirming that the
plant would never be operated as a closed shop and that non-union
13 See Montgomery Ward t Co , Inc., v N L R B , decided December 2, 1940 (C. C. A. 8).
.14 See Cononmers Polder Company v. N. L. R. B, ibid.
SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. 995
employees would receive as great benefits as union members. View-
ing the timing and language of the letters upon the background of
A he Union's current campaign and the other circumstances disclosd
by the record, we find that the respondent was in fact "unalterably
opposed" to unions, as Wells told Stuyverson, and that the respondent
sought by these letters to coerce the employees and thereby to
circumvent and undermine the Union.15
The respondent's attempt to defeat the Union by making it appear
to be superfluous is also illustrated by the respondent's activities in
connection with the formation, administration, work, and defense of
the Rules Committee, and by its ostensible efforts during the union
campaign to ascertain and satisfy grievances. The respondent's ani-
mus and its anti-union resolve are further demonstrated by its other
activity during working hours through Wells, Weber, and several
foremen, namely, its interrogation of employees regarding union mem-
bership for the avowed purpose of discovering and removing the
causes thereof, its statements favorable to company unions and clearly
inimical to and disparaging of the Union as a futile waste of money,
its expression of, displeasure at employees' joining the Union, the
circulation of the anti-C. I. 0. petition on company time and property
with the consent and active, assistance of foremen and without any
disavowal,l$ its threats to lay off employees for failure to sign the
petition.or for attendance at a union meeting, its conduct of a depart-
mental ballot for or against the Union, its expressed knowledge of
the Union's internal affairs, its appointment of- a half union and half
non-union grievance committee which is caused to meet and function
during working hours, and its reading to that committee of an article
which represented a working man as stating that he did not want
his employer interfered with or restricted in any way and that
he did not desire anyone to intercede for or represent him with his
employer-in an attempt to better his economic status.
In connection with the discriminatory discharge discussed below,
we are convinced that by the above letters, statements of company
officials and foremen, and other conduct, the respondent has inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
is The following language of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
peculiarly applicable thereto : "The position of the employer , where, as here, there is
present, genuine and sincere respect and regard , carries such weight and influence that
his words may be coercive when they would not be so if the relation of master and servant
did not exist." N. L. R. B . v. The Falk Corporation , 102 F. ( 2d) 383 (C. C. A 7), 60
Sup. Ct. 307 , enf'g, Matter of The Falk Corporation and Amalgamated Association of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of North America, etc, 6 N L 11 B. 654 See also New
York Handkerchief Manufacturing Co. v N. L. R. B., 114 F (2d) 144 (C C. A 7), cert
den, NoN ember 18, 1940 -
11 See H . J. Heinz & Company v. N. L R B, 110 F (2d) 843 (C C A 6), ceit granted,
310 U. S 621. . .
413597-42-vol. 28--64
996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of
collective bargaining, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
B. The discharges of Donald Squibb and William L. Stuyverso-a
The complaint alleges that the respondent discharged Donald
Squibb on or about January 10, 1940, and discharged William L.
Stuyverson on or about April 15, 1940, and thereafter refused to
reinstate them, because of their union membership and activity, thereby
discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of employment and dis-
couraging membership in the Union. 'In its answer the respondent
denies that it discharged or refused to-reinstate the employees for
the alleged reason, claiming affirmatively that it discharged them for
cause. The Trial Examiner upheld the allegations of the complaint
concerning Stuyverson and the respondent takes exception to this
finding. The Trial Examiner found Squibb's case without merit,
and the Union has not taken exception to that finding. We have
considered the evidence regarding Squibb and find that the respond-
ent did not discharge his discriminatorily. Since no exception has
been taken to the Trial Examiner's recommendation in his case, we
shall not discuss it in further detail. , We turn now to Stuyverson's
case.
Stuyverson was hired by the respondent on May 8, 1939, and on
October 1, 1939, was made foreman of the stove department. We
have found above that at the time of his promotion Wells told him
that the respondent was "unalterably opposed to unions," and that
Weber thereafter questioned him about the progress of the Union in
the stove department, deprecating Stuyverson's failure to keep "a
very close tab" thereon. In March 1940 the stove 'department was
consolidated with another department of the plant, eliminating Stuy-
verson's position. Upon Stuyverson's inquiry at this time as to
whether his work was satisfactory, Weber and Wells replied that
it was very satisfactory and allowed him his choice of anew job.
He selected that of attendant in charge of the paint storage room,
a division of the receiving and storage department under the super-
vision of Gomer Shank, foreman. The respondent created a vacancy
for him there by transferring Perry Kirk dorfer,i7 the incumbent
and a member of the Union, to another job. Stuyverson was al-
lowed hourly wages smaller than his foreman's salary ' but 5 -cents,
an hour higher than Kirkdorfer had received.-
Stuyverson started his new work on March 13,1940, joined the Union
on April 3, attended one meeting, and was summoned to the office and
Also designated Harry Kirkdorfer in the record.
SCIIULT TRAILERS, INC. 997
discharged by Weber on April 10, a week later. Stuyverson's ver-
sion of his discharge is as follows :
Well, we went into this conference room and sat down, and
Mr. Weber said, "Bill, we have got to let you go," and I wanted
to know the reason, and he says, "Well, you joined the C. I. O.
Union, didn't you ?"
And I says, "Yes."
And he says, "Why didn't you join the company union?"
And I told him that I had no confidence in it.
And he says, "You have also been soliciting memberships during
working-hours,',' and I told him that I had not.
He said that, well, two of the [company] union boys had com-
plained to him that I had solicited memberships during working
hours, and I asked him to call these boys in, that I might ask them
some questions, and he refused to do it. He also said that I might
think that he had something to do with the formulation of the rules
.of this company union, but he didn't.
Well, he gave me my check, and as I was leaving, he said, "I
want you to know, Mr. Stuyverson, that I will never lay a straw in
your path."
After his conference with Weber, Stuyverson returned to his depart-
ment and told Foreman Shank that he wished he had had a witness
to the conversation, that he thought he had been fired for his union
membership. * Shank replied that he had never had any occasion to
criticize Stuyveison.
Shank did not specifically deny having made the latter statement
and we find that he did. Weber denied that on the above occasion,
he mentioned Stuyverson's membership in the Union, "the company
union," or solicitation of union membership. He testified that he told
Stuyverson that he was being released for inefficiency and doing too
much talking, without mentioning the subject matter of the alleged
talking, and that Stuyverson contradicted both charges. Stuyverson
denied at the hearing'that Weber gave him any reason for his dis-
charge other than-the questions.regarding unions. In his Intermediate
Report the Trial Examiner expressly commented on Stuyverson's cred-
ibility, stating that on the witness stand Stuyverson was "a responsive
and forthright witness" and impressed him "as a deliberate and steady
individual with a high regard for truth." The Trial Examiner did not
credit Weber's denial of Stuyverson's testimony but found that Weber
avoided making a direct answer to Stuyverson's inquiry regarding the
reason for his discharge, countered with the above questions, and did
not further. explain the discharge. Upon all the evidence, we concur
in this finding:
.998 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In its answer the. respondent avers affirmatively that Stuyverson
was discharged for inefficiency and insubordination. At the outset
it should be recalled that the gaulity of Stuyverson's work was
such as to warrant his promotion to a foremanship only 5 months'
after he was hired, and that the respondent considered his per-
formance as foreman very satisfactory. -It appears that he received
no reprimands other than Wells' deprecating comment on his failure
to observe the Union's progress in his department. It is notable
also that upon the abolition of the foremanship, Stuyverson's reten-
tion was considered desirable enough by the respondent to cause it
to create a vacancy for him in his choice of jobs:,' Thus the fact
that it was only after his transfer and affiliation with the Union
that the respondent began to find fault with his work gives rise
at .the outset to considerable doubt as to the genuineness of the
respondent's alleged reasons for the discharge, particularly in view
of Weber's remarks on the occasion thereof.
The respondent's reasons are further discredited by the circum-
stances surrounding the execution on April 10 of Stuyverson's dis-
position slip, a form made out by foremen upon the transfer or
release of any employee. On April 9 Weber summoned Shank to
his office to instruct him to discharge Stuyverson. According to
Shank's testimony, upon Weber's asking his opinion of the discharge,
he replied that he thought Stuyverson was dissatisfied .since his
demotion and planned to quit; that Shank believed that it would
be beneficial to the respondent and Stuyverson if the-'latter left
the respondent's employ; and that it would be better to return
Kirkdorfer to the paint storage room. Apparently Shank and
Weber consulted Wells about the matter, and Shank testified that
"it was finally decided to discharge Stuyverson" for "inefficiency and
for an excessive talking throughout the department," and that Weber
asked him to fill out a disposition slip for him. Shank filled in
spaces provided for the name and job of the employee and in the
space provided for explaining the cause of the dismissal, wrote only
the words "Requested to. do so." Thereafter, Weber added the words,
"Discharged for disobeying company rules and inefficiency" and
checked the following items as descriptive of Stuyverson's qualifi-
cations and conduct: "Ability, Fair; Conduct, Unreliable; Produc-
tion, Medium; Rehire in your dept., No; Remarks, Discharge." The
Trial Examiner found and we agree that if Shank actually partici-
pated in discussion of the discharge, more or less recommended it,
and,knew and approved the reasons therefor, as claimed in his
testimony above, it seems incredible that he should have been un-
willing or unable to complete the slip by stating the reasons for
,the discharge and checking his opinion of Stuyverson's qualifications.
The foreman who discharged Squibb completed his-disposition .slip,
-' SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. ' 999
and Shank gave no, adequate explanation of his failure to do so in
Stuyverson's case. The omission is consistent with his statement
after the discharge that he had never had any occasion to critize
Stuyverson, and casts doubt on the credibility of much of Shank's
testimony and the respondent's other evidence prejudicial to
Stuyverson.
Stuyverson's job after his transfer was that of sole attendant in,
charge of the paint storage room, and-his duties included receiving
and storing paints delivered to the plant, delivering paint on requisi-
tion to other departments of the plant, and assisting in the work of
the general stockroom. Before and at the time of his transfer to this
job, waste and spoilage of paints were resulting from faulty methods
of paint distribution. Among other things, large quantities of paint
were being delivered to departments on requisition when smaller
quantities would have sufficed, and surplus paints were not being re-
turned to the storeroom. Weber noticed this condition and contem-
plated "working out" with Shank a system for 'the prevention of
waste, which was admittedly "quite a job." He did not do so, how-
ever, but merely told Shank to see that paint was not wasted, to "get
after" Stuyverson in this regard, and to "work out a system." Shank
testified, that,-he told Stuyverson that he did not have time to re-
organize distribution methods and instructed him to observe existing
conditions and make recommendations for improvements, but admit-
ted that he did not tell Stuyverson what type of improvements he had
in mind.
Upon this background of admittedly poor organization and con-
templated' reorganization, the respondent charges Stuyverson with
inefficiency because of his failure to eradicate in less than a month's
period wasteful practices of distribution existing prior to his trans-
fer, and it adduces testimony in an effort to show that he did not
perform his duties as instructed. Stuyverson testified without con-
tradiction, however, that Shank told him that the department was
in the course of reorganization, that he had no particular recom-
mendation to make at that time, and that Stuyverson should just do
the best he could. Stuyverson denied receiving certain alleged or-
ders, and'testified further that he complied with all instructions as
far as possible, that lie failed to perform certain functions regularly
because of lack of time, proper equipment, or cooperation with him
by the supervisory staff of other departments, and that he was an
obedient and faithful employee.' 'The Trial Examiner credited his
testimony, finding that he,was not to be blamed for the respondent's
wasteful and inefficient methods, that the responsibility for inaug-
urating new remedial policies was primarily that of Foreman Shank,
and that it was unreasonable to place the entire onus on Stuyverson.
We agree with the Trial Examiner in these regards, particularly
1000 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
since Stuyverson had so recently assumed his new duties., It is, sig-
nificant to note that Shank admittedly did not warn Stuyverson that
if his work did not improve he would be discharged. Shank testi-
fied that on two occasions after the transfer, he talked to Stuyverson
about his general discontentment since his,demotion, seeking to secure
his better performance of his duties. Stuyverson testified, and-upon
all the evidence in this .record we find, that no such talks took place
and that Shank never reprimanded him for inefficiency or
insubordination.
Possibly Stuyverson's performance of his new duties was not alto-
gether flawless. - Wd are nevertheless convinced, in view .of his ex-
cellent record of previous service, and the other circumstances set
forth above, that such imperfections would not, in the-nor"mal. course
of business, have resulted in his discharge after less than a month's
trial on the new job without prior serious reprimand or warning. ,
At the hearing Weber testified. that Stuyverson was also dis-
charged for violating the respondent's rule against excessive talking.
He testified further that the words on Stuyverson's disposition slip
'Discharged for disobeying company rules . . ." referred to Stuy-
verson's talking of the Union in the washroom of the plant. The re-
spondent's answer did not aver that Stuyverson's talking was a
reason for his discharge and the Trial Examiner rejected this de-
fense, deeming it an afterthought employed "for the purpose 'of
screening the true motive for the discharge." Our consideration of
the evidence leads us to the same conclusion.
Stuyverson categorically denied engaging in, or being reprimanded
for, excessive talking. Shank testified that about 2 weeks after Stuy-
veison's transfer he - received complaints from three - foremen that
Stuyverson, and apparently also other storage department employees,
had engaged in too frequent conversations on their rounds to other
departments, and that he reported this to Weber. Shank admitted,
however, that he never approached Stuyverson individually,regarding
excessive talking. When questioned as to the names of the three
foremen, Shank stated that there were only two, Miller and Rude,
and that neither foreman told him the subject of the conversations,
whether regarding paint or otherwise. Neither Miller, nor Rude
testified at the hearing. Stuyverson denied that he ever went to
Rude's department while working in paint storage, stated that his
duties did not require him to go to Miller's department, and explained
that he,only went to the entrance thereof, which he considered part
of the paint department and which needed supplies. The Trial Ex-
aminer credited this testimony, and we do so likewise. Shank also
testified that about 8 of the approximately 15 employees of the storage
department complained that he was discriminating in favor of Stuy-
verson by permitting him to talk and prohibiting them from so doing.
SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. 1001
He did not name the employees nor did the respondent produce them
as witnesses . After a complaint from Wells that an unnamed em-
ployee was talking too much in the plant, Shank held a general meet-
ing of storage-department employees about 3 weeks after Stuyver-
son's transfer , cautioned them against excessive talking or loitering
.throughout the plant, but did not mention the names of employees
allegedly guilty thereof. Stuyverson testified and we find that he
never attended any such meeting and was not asked to do so. Upon
all the evidence it appears that Shank received complaints that mem-
bers of his crew other than Stuyverson engaged in excessive talking.
.In view of that fact and the other evidence , including Stuyverson's
denial of excessive talking and °Shank's failure to reprimand him
individually or to name him as an offender at the above employee
meeting, we do not believe Shank's above testimony that some of his
subordinates complained of any discrimination in favor of Stuyverson
with respect to talking.
Weber testified that about a week before Stuyverson's discharge,
Wayne C. Stutsman , an employee , complained of Stuyverson 's talking
.in the washroom but did not mention what the latter said; and that
at about the same time , Darwin Godshalk, another employee, told
him that Stuyverson "was doing a lot of talking [ in the wash room],
bothering him about joining an organization ." Godshalk testified
that he reported to Weber and Wells a 5 -minute conversation with
Stuyverson during a rest period in the washroom, in which "something
was said about the Union"; Stuyverson asked him if he had "joined
up yet," and when Godshalk replied in the negative, said that he
thought that was all right but that the respondent ought to be or-
ganized so that the employees could get a share of its profits. SLuy-
verson's version of the conversation was that during a 3-minute inter-
val, Godshalk asked him what he knew of the Union, and he replied
that he understood that the initiation fee was going to be raised.
Stuyverson denied soliciting membership for the Union but admitted
,that in response to questions regarding the Union , he spoke of union
organization on two other occasions before he joined the Union, stat-
ing that he had no faith in the unaffiliated union then being formed,
and that if he were going to join a union , he would choose a nation-
ally known organization.
Weber admitted that he did not discuss with Stuyverson the above
reports of talking but claimed that he took them up with Shank.
Shank contradicted the latter testimony , stating that Weber did not
tell him of any washroom conversations.
The respondent ' permitted among its employees discussion which
did not cause groups to collect or hamper production, and there is
.110, proof that Stuyverson's talking did either of the latter or in any
way interfered with plant discipline or operation . Weber claimed
1002 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that there was a rule prohibiting talk of union organization on com-
pany time and property ; but it does not appear that the employees
were generally apprized of any such rule, at least ,before Stuyverson's
discharge . Stuvyerson was terminated without prior reprimand or
warning with respect to this alleged rule, and he was the only em-
ployee released for alleged violation thereof. Moreover, Weber
does not claim to have told Stuyverson at the time of his discharge
that lie was-being discharged for infraction of any regulation against
anion discussion during working hours. We have noted .above that
the respondent , through Weber, Wells, and various foremen, spon-
sored and participated in activity hostile to the Union during work-
'0
Zn
ing hours, for example, the circulation of the anti-C. I. 0. petition,
the making of anti-union statements and threats, and the systematic
interrogation of employees regarding the Union. The record does
not show that any of the persons responsible for such activitiy were
disciplined therefor, and one of the employees who assisted with the
petitions wa§ thereafter promoted to an assistant _ foremanship.
Under all these circumstances , we do not believe that the respond-
,ent discharged Stuyverson pursuant to a bona fide application of a
bona fide company rule.
The respondent urges that Stuyverson 's discharge cannot be
found discriminatory since he was not a union officer nor as active
a union member as other employees whom the respondent did not
discharge and two-of whom it promoted to supervisory positions.
The' Trial Examiner correctly stated,. however, that Stuyverson's
former position as foreman and the undoubted respect which the
employees had for him led the respondent to resent his union mem-
bership to an unusual degree for the influence it might have on
other employees. By discharging Stuyverson the respondent could
-cancel the Union's gain in having secured him as a member.
In view of the respondent's hostility toward, interrogation with
respect to , and other activity against the Union; Wells' statement
to Stuyverson that the respondent's policy was unalterably anti-
union; Weber's avowed interest in having Stuyverson observe the
Union's progress in the stove department; the fact that he was dis-
,charged shortly after his transfer to another position upon the abo-
lition of his foreman 's position and shortly after his joining the
Union, without any prior reprimand for poor work or talking or
any warning that continuance thereof would result in discharge;
Weber's failure to reply directly to Stuyverson's inquiry as to the
reasons for his discharge and Webe'r's remarks about the Union,
"the company union," and solicitation of union membership; the
-other circumstances surrounding Stuyverson's employment and
-discharge; and the respondent's unconvincing explanations of the dis-
,charge, we find that the respondent, discharged Stuyverson not for
SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. 1003
inefficiency, insubordination, or violation of company rules, but
because of his union membership and activity.
We find that the respondent discharged William L. Stuyverson on
April 10, 1940, and thereafter failed to, reinstate him, because of his
union membership and activities, thereby discriminating in regard
to hire and tenure of employment, discouraging membership in the
Union, and interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7'of the Act.,
Stuyverson had not secured other employment or earned any
money at the time of the hearing, and he testified that he desired
reinstatement.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section
III above, occurring in connection with the operations of the re-
spondent described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the sev-
eral States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and
to take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies
of the Act and to restore as nearly as possible the conditions which
existed prior to the commission of the unfair labor practices.
Since we have found that the respondent discriminated against
William,L. Stuyverson in regard to hire and tenure of employment,
we shall order the respondent to offer to him immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges,
and make him whole for any loss of pay he has suffered by reason
of the discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum
equal to the amount which he would normally have earned as wages
from April 10, 1940, the date of the respondent's discrimination
against him, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less his net
earnings 18 during said period.
18By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transpoitation, room,
and board , incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working
elsewhere than for the respondent , which would not have been incurred but for his unlaw-
ful discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking emplovnient elsewhere See
Matter of Crossett Lumber Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joineis
of America, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union , Local 2590 , 8 N L. R. B 440. Monies
received for work performed upon Federal, State, county , municipal , or other work-relief
projects shall be considered as earnings See Republic Steel Corporation v. N L R. B ,
decided by United States Supreme Court , November 12, 1940.
1004 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL , LABOR . RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the
entire record in the case , the Board makes,
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ^
1. International Union, United Automobile Workers of America,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations , is a labor
organization , within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
2., By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of William L. Stuyverson , thereby discouraging membership
in International Union, United Automobile Workers ' of America,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations , the respond-
ent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices , within
the meaning ' of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing its employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7)
of the Act.
5. The respondent has not discriminated in regard to the hire and
tenure of employment of Donald Squibb, within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8 (3) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the - basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)_ of the National Labor Relations'
Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the re-
spondent , Schult Trailers, Inc., Elkhart , Indiana, and its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in_ International Union, United
Automobile Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations , or any other labor organization of its
employees ; by discharging, laying off, or failing or refusing to rein-
state any of its employees , or in any other manner discriminating in
regard to , their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of their employment , because of their membership or activity
in International Union, United Automobile Workers of America,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations , or any other
labor organization of its employees;'
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coerc-
ing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to
SCHULT TRAILERS, INC. 1005
form, join' or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purposes of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the National Labor
Relations Board finds will effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act :
(a) Offer to-William'L. Stuyverson immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to his seniority and other rights and privileges; and make him
whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the
respondent's discrimination against him, by payment to him of a
sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned
as wages from April 10, 1940, the date of the respondent's discrimi-
nation against him, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less his
net earnings 19 during said period;
(b) Immediately post in conspicuous places throughout its plants
at Elkhart, Indiana, and keep posted for a period of at least sixty
(60) consecutive days from the date of posting, notices to its em-
ployees stating : (1) that the respondent will not engage in the con-
duct from which. it is ordered to cease and desist in paragraphs 1 (a)
and (b) of this Order;. (2) that the respondent will take the affirma-
tive action set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of this Order; and (3) that
the respondent's employees are free to become or remain members of
International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, af-
filiated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and that the
respondent will not discriminate against any employee because of
membership or activity in that'organization;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region within
ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, in so far as it alleges
that the respondent discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of
employment of Donald Squibb, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
CHAIRMAN HARRY A: Mu.LIs took ,no part in- the consideration of
the above Decision and' Order.
u See footnote 18. supra.