Rocket Messenger ServiceDownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsAug 31, 1967167 N.L.R.B. 252 (N.L.R.B. 1967) Copy Citation 252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Olympic Delivery Service, Inc., d /b/a Rocket Mes- TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION senger Service and Irwin Kadens. Case 21-CA-7403 August 31, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND ZAGORIA On May 10, 1967, Trial Examiner William E. Spencer issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir- mative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex- aminer's Decision. He further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recom- mended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. .ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM E. SPENCER, Trial Examiner: Pursuant to a charge filed on December 7, 1966, by Irwin Kadens, an individual, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, the latter hereinafter called the Board, on December 14, 1966, issued his complaint alleging in substance that the Respondent herein discharged Kadens because of the latter's union activities and because he filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Respond- ent, and threatened Kadens with reprisals if he sought the aid of the Union, his bargaining representative, in the matter of grievances, thereby engaging in conduct viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, hereinafter called the Act. Respondent in a duly filed answer denied all allegations of the unfair labor practices. A hearing on the General Counsel's complaint, with all parties represented, was conducted by me in Los An- geles, California, on February 20, 1967, and within a stipulated period thereafter the Respondent and the General Counsel filed briefs. Upon consideration of the said briefs, my observation of the witnesses, and the en- tire record, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Olympic Delivery Service, Inc., d/b/a Rocket Mes- senger Service, the Respondent herein, is a corporation engaged in parcel delivery to business enterprises in the area of Greater Los Angeles, California. During a materi- al 12-month period it performed services of a value in ex- cess of $500,000, including services valued in excess of $50,000 performed for various wholesale enterprises in the area of Greater Los Angeles, each of said enterprises in turn performing services or making sales valued in ex- cess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside California. During a material 12-month period it per- formed services valued in excess of $30,000 for Lockheed Aircraft Corp., which services were related to the national defense. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or- ders that the Respondent, Olympic Delivery Ser- vice, Inc., d/b/a Rocket Messenger Service, Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as modified herein: Delete from paragraph 2(a) of the Trial Ex- aminer's Recommended Order that part thereof which reads "to be furnished" and substitute therefor "on forms provided ...." IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, in- sofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Teamsters Automotive Workers Union, Local No. 495, called the Union hereinafter, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Essential Facts The Respondent was organized by the Union in about 1962, and for several years has had, and currently has, a collective agreement with the Union. The agreement in- corporates the standard grievance procedure. Irwin Kadens, alleged to have been unlawfully discharged on October 12, 1966, has been employed by the Respondent as a messenger since 1956. His first discharge occurred on April 20, 1966. It was preceded by a warning notice dated February 23, 1966, which stated: You have been repeatedly warned by your 167 NLRB No. 33 ROCKET MESSENGER SERVICE dispatchers and myself regarding the untidy condi- tion of your vehicle and your failure to maintain your vehicle within safe operating requirements. You have seen fit to disregard these warnings This is your final warning. Further violations of these rules will be deemed sufficient grounds for instant dismis- sal. The notice was signed by Nelson Thurston, Respond- ent's president and manager. On April 22, Kadens filed a grievance with the Union protesting his discharge and making various accusations of discriminatory treatment. On April 26, at a meeting at- tended by Kadens, John Krasnick, the Union's business representative, Thurston, and Donald D. Rea, Respond- ent's labor consultant (who is not an attorney), Respond- ent agreed to reinstate Kadens with backpay and without prejudice to his seniority. As part of the settlement agreement Kadens signed the following statement: I, Irwin Kadens, hereby agree to reinstatement to my job at Rocket Messenger Service, will [sic] full back pay and full seniority rights, as complete settlement of my grievance regarding my recent discharge. Further, I hereby agree to abide by all company rules, and understand that any further infraction of Company rules will result in appropriate disciplinary action, including discharge. According to Kadens, whose grievance encompassed numerous items of alleged discriminatory treatment aside from the discharge, it was agreed that these various other grievances "would be investigated and corrective mea- sure would be taken." Both Krasnick and Thurston testified that they understood that the agreement arrived at on April 26 was in settlement of all of Kadens' out- standing complaints. Without going into detail as to the nature of Kadens' grievances, their burden was that Kadens charged that he was being discriminated against by not being assigned a fair share of the work, resulting in substantially reduced pay, and by being given the less desirable assignments. Kadens, following his reinstatement on April 26, was convinced that Respondent was continuing to deny him his fair share of the work and consequently, according to him, became nervous and upset to a degree that caused him to seek the services of a physician upon whose order he took a leave of absence from Respondent's employ from May 7 to June 12. On May 8 he filed another grievance, protesting that since his reinstatement "there are more and continuous violations and abuses by the dispatchers and the General Manager [Thurston] of this company" and further stating: I have returned to work in good faith on 4/26/66. I have good reason to believe there was bad faith and deception by the company so as to avoid an in- vestigation of my case. This continued harassment and punishment has caused me mental anguish and my doctor ordered me to rest from this work for a while... . Kadens "dropped" this grievance upon the assurances, according to him, of his union representative, Krasnick, that Krasnick had talked with Thurston and had been told by the latter that "everything would be all right." Kadens returned to work on June 12, and on July 19 filed another grievance, the second since his reinstate- ment . In this grievance he stated: I request a hearing by the National Labor Rela- tions Board due to unfair labor practices by the 253 above named employer because of violations of sec- tion 8(a), etc., of the National Labor Relations Act. The basis of charges are as follows: 1. Previous grievances, abuses, and protests of un- fair labor practices have been ignored and not remedied to this present date. 2. The continuance of unfair distribution of long distance and well-paid work to employees. 3. Requesting a full investigation of the company records to prove by employee witnesses that the union contract and the labor laws are violated. Once again, Kadens dropped his grievances, according to him on Krasnick's representations that Thurston had assured Krasnick "everything would be all right." Believing that Respondent was continuing to treat him unfairly, Kadens on October 3, filed still another grievance. According to him, before this fiiling he at- tempted to get in touch with Rea, Respondent's labor relations advisor, in the hope that through Rea he would be able to resolve matters satisfactorily so as to avoid the filing of further grievances. He could not reach Rea by phone, but Rea, apparently aware of the calls, informed Thurston, and on the morning of September 28 Kadens was summoned to Thurston's office. According to Kadens, on meeting Thurston, this occurred: THURSTON: Why are you filing grievances against me? KADENS: Why don't you leave me alone , and let me do my work properly and give me a fair deal in this, instead of keeping me on low calls and low bookings and low wages? THURSTON: I am going to get you for this. You are not going to get away with this. You are not going to file any grievances against me and get away with it. At this point Kadens left Thurston's office and went to his automobile which was parked some 15-20 feet from Thuurton's office. Thurston followed Kadens to his car and when he approached the latter took off his glasses and told Kadens: "Take your glasses off. I am going to punch you right in the nose." When Kadens stood mute, Thurston said, "You are yellow. I always knew you were a yellow belly." Kadens then took the grievance papers out of his car, saying that he was going to file them with the Union "right now." Thurston warned him not to file them on company time, took the papers out of Kadens' hands, and then said, "you are not going to file these papers You are going to make up new papers if you want to file." Thurston did not return the grievance papers, went to his office, and in a few minutes returned to tell Kadens to be in Rea's office next morning for a con- ference, with Krasnick in attendance. Kadens went to Rea's office as instructed where Rea informed him that since Krasnick was unable to attend there would be another meeting . Rea then handed Kadens two Xeroxed copies of the grievance papers Thurston had taken from him on the previous day. After adding an additional grievance on his encounter with Thurston on September 28, Kadens on October 3 filed his grievance with the Union. Krasnick informed him that he would in- vestigate the grievance and would talk to Rea. A few days later Krasnick told Kadens that he had checked out the grievances and that in his opinion there was no merit to them and advised him that if he was still dissatisfied that he should file charges with the Board. 254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On October 10 Kadens did not report for work. He phoned the company office , told dispatcher Jeschke that he was engaged on personal business and would not re- port for work . That same morning he filed charges of un- fair labor practices against the Respondent and, accord- ing to him , was so "upset" and "nervous " that he went to his physician , who advised him to take off from work for a few days . Accordingly , on October 11, Kadens called the office , advised Jeschke that he would be off from work for a period and that if the Company wanted to get in touch with him they should write or call. He also told Jeschke that he had filed charges against the Company on the previous day. Kadens did not report for work on Oc- tober 12 and did not call because he had informed the Company the day before that he would be off the job. On October 11, the Respondent received a copy of the charge filed by Kadens the previous day alleging that the Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices. On October 12, Respondent ' s Thurston was interviewed by a Board agent on the basis of Kadens ' October 11 charge. Also on October 12, Respondent decided to discharge Kadens and a notice of his dismissal was mailed to him on that date . Kadens then filed the charge which initiated the present proceedings. There is some dispute over the circumstances of Thurston ' s seizing Kadens' grievance papers on Sep- tember 28, and whether in reporting his absence from work on October 11, Kadens made reference to acting on doctor 's orders. According to Thurston , when Kadens came to his of- fice on September 28, he informed Thurston that he was going to file another grievance . Thurston said, "I thought we had this all settled .... What charges have you got to throw against me now ?" Kadens then showed him the grievance papers and on reading them Thurston admit- tedly became very angry . Thurston testified , "I read the paper , and the paper in itself is enough to make an honest businessman angry ." Apparently he had reference to this language appearing in Kadens ' grievance papers: Due to continued deliberate and malicious unfair labor practices , breach of the union contract, and violations of trust by the above-mentioned company manager [ Thurston].... Admittedly while still angry , Thurston followed Kadens to the latter ' s car, told him that he wanted to make copies of the grievance papers, snatched the papers out of Kadens' hands, and returned with them to his office. He admitted something was said about a "poke in the nose" but was uncertain whether he or Kadens initiated the challenge to fisticuffs. Kadens was certain his testimony and I find that Thurston was the challenger and that when Kadens stood mute he called him a "yellow belly." Thurston denied that he threatened Kadens with reprisals if he filed any more grievances, but admitted that he said "something" to the effect that he would sue Kadens for "slander and false misrepresentation." Kadens' absence from work on October 10 raises no question of substance . As was customary he called in and informed Jeschke that he would be absent and Jeschke raised no objection . His call on the following day raises a more substantial question. Jeschke denied that Kadens made any reference to being absent on doctor's instruc- tions, but testified that Kadens said he "had been advised not to come in until this thing was settled" and that "any official communications should come to his house, and, please , mail his check ." Jeschke reported on the telephone conversation to his immediate superior , Daniel Segura. Segura denied that in reporting the conversation, Jeschke made mention of Kadens' having said he would be absent on doctor 's orders. In a prehearing affidavit, however, Segura stated: I believe the next day , October 11, Jeschke told me that Kadens had called in and said that his doctor had told him , Kadens, not to come in to work for a couple of weeks because of Kadens' nervous condi- tion. Segura testified that in his affidavit he had reference to Kadens' earlier absence from work on doctor ' s orders, and that either he or the Field Examiner taking his af- fidavit confused the two dates . Thurston denied that either Segura or Jeschke in reporting to him on Kadens' absence made any reference to doctor 's instructions, but testified that he was informed that Kadens had called say- ing that he would not report back to work until "this thing" was settled . It was Thurston 's undenied testimony that he called the Union 's agent , Krasnick , to find out if the latter was the one who had instructed Kadens not to report for work. During his conference with the Board 's Field Examiner on October 12, and according to an affidavit given the Field Examiner on that date , Thurston announced his decision to discharge Kadens and gave "unauthorized absences" as his reason for effectuating the discharge. It was Thurston ' s undenied testimony that after reviewing the circumstances of Kadens ' employment, the Board ' s Field Examiner stated as his opinion that Kadens' discharge was justified. Kadens' October 10 charge was deemed by the General Counsel to be of in- sufficient merit to require the issuance of a complaint. It was not until December 7 that Kadens filed the charge which initiated this proceeding. Respondent admitted that up until the past year or so preceding the discharge , it regarded Kadens as a satisfac- tory employee , and there is no evidence that any problems affecting his employment arose between Kadens and the Respondent during this period . Further according to the Respondent , during the past 1-1/2 to 2 years, Kadens' work deteriorated and he became increas- ingly untidy in his personal appearance , failed to maintain his vehicle in a clean and safe condition , was frequently tardy, and took more time with his assignments than was normally required . Substance is given this position by the warning notice preceding Kadens' April discharge and the discharge notice itself , notices not alleged to have been predicated in any degree on Kadens' union or con- certed activities. Respondent attributed the decline in the quality of Kadens' job performance to various illnesses and injuries requiring increasingly intensive treatment for "nervous disorders ." Kadens' testimony on cross-examination: A. Well, I had a head and neck whiplash , back in- jury, during this time. Q. When? A. A few years ago. Q. And what since? A. I had a hand injury. I had a nevous condition, past year or year and a half or so, and I had headaches. Kadens attributed the decline in his earnings over the past year and a half to discriminatory treatment. His testimony: In previous years, before this past year and a half, I ROCKET MESSENGER SERVICE was averaging among the top five men, and the records will show that in pay period. In the past year and a half due to my Union activities, my salary dropped from $150.00 to $200.00 a week down to . . . $90.00 to the highest, I believe, which was $120.00 a week. There was deliberate and malicious attempts to give me poor pickups and deliveries and sent on1pickupsriand deliveries which were low paid. The orders were given, I understand from other drivers who talked to the dispatcher, by Mr. Thurston to keep me down, and that I would have to quit. Krasnick, Kadens' union representative, testified that he investigated each of the grievances filed with the Union by Kadens, interviewing Kadens' fellow em- ployees, studying company records, etc., but could find no factual support for Kadens' allegations of discrimina- tory treatment. B. Concluding Findings Kadens was active, along with others, in bringing the Union into Respondent's plant, but this occurred in 1962 and for years Respondent has operated under a collective agreement with the Union. There is no reason to infer that Kadens, aside from filing grievances, has been any more active in union affairs than any other employee, and no foundation has been established in the evidence for in- ferring that the Respondent would single him out for dis- criminatory treatment because of his union or concerted activities, unless in the matter of grievances. The fact is that he filed no written grievances prior to his April 1966 discharge, and there is no evidence that his discharge in April was predicated in any degree on this, or activities of a like nature. Nevertheless, he was discharged in April and his reinstatement on union intervention raises no proper inference that this discharge was in any way viola- tive of the Act. It does raise a proper inference that at that time Respondent had, or thought it had, reasons having nothing to do with union or concerted activities, to discharge him. The situation remains much the same with respect to his October 12 discharge except that in the interim Kadens had filed a succession of grievances, and it is possible to infer that the filing of these several grievances prompted, in part at least, his discharge. In fact, Thurston admitted in substance, that the harassment suffered from repeated filing of grievances which he, and Kadens' union representative as well, considered to be without merit, may have played some part in the discharge decision. If this were the usual discharge case such an admission, without more, might ground a finding of discriminatory action, but I do not regard this as a usual or "pattern" discharge case. There must be some point where the legitimacy of grievances ends and the unwarranted harassment of an employer begins, and here I think it had reached that point. There is no doubt that this employee suffers a deep and wounding sense of persecution at the ends of his em- ployer. Suffering such a sense of persecution he naturally would cast about for some explanation of its source and motivation. His union activity no doubt would furnish him with what would appear to him to be the root cause of all his trouble, for a man in his state of mind would not likely be able to admit to himself that the substantial falling off in his earnings in recent years was attributable 255 to any failure on his part. The fact is that outside the wit- ness' own unverified version of the abuse that he suffered in Respondent's employ, the record fails to disclose that he was actually discriminated against in any way in the course of his employment prior to his discharge. His grievances, submitted directly to the Union, were investigated by Krasnick, who testified convincingly- al- beit with obvious embarassment that in so testifying he was placed in the posture of supporting the employer rather than a member of his Union - that he could find no support for the accusations contained in the Kadens' grievances. On the occasion of the last grievance Kadens filed with the Union, Krasnick informed him that there was no basis for his charges, that if carried to arbitration he would almost certainly lose, and that if not satisfied with his Union's advice in the matter he should file charges with the Board. This Kadens did and the charge was dismissed by the Board without the issuance of a complaint, only to be followed by a second charge which initiated this proceeding. I have given considerable weight to Krasnick's testimony both because of its obvious sincerity and straightforwardness and my conviction that had he found it possible to support Kadens' position in this matter, he would have done so. It must be remembered that it was on the basis of the Union's intervention in April that Kadens was restored to his job with backpay. There is no reason to infer that the Union's support would have been any less marked on later occasions had there been any factual basis for Kadens' complaints. Among Kadens' grievances was the assertion that in violation of its union contract, Respondent was assigning nonunion men to union jobs, something, were it a fact, that assuredly would have given Krasnick as much concern as any employee. Assuming, however, contrary to the testimony of Krasnick, Thurston, and others, that there was some sup- port in fact for some of the grievances, it would not follow that Kadens was being discriminated against because of union or concerted activities. I think there is no evidence to support such a conclusion. Thurston exceeded the bounds of permissible conduct when, after being shown Kadens' latest grievance on Sep- tember 28, he followed the latter to his car, snatched the grievance papers out of Kadens' hands, and threatened him. We must not, however, if we are going to be objec- tive in the matter, ignore the fact that there were ex- tenuating circumstances. While the settlement agreement reinstating Kadens to his job in April on its face related solely to the matter of reinstatement, I have no doubt that Thurston believed, as did Krasnick, that all of Kadens' grievances up to that date were being settled. Soon after his reinstatement , however, Kadens recommenced the fil- ing of grievances relating to much of the same subject matter, took weeks off from his job because of what is commonly described as a "nervous breakdown," thereafter filed more grievances- all without a founda- tion in fact, according to his own union representative - culminating in the grievance of September 28 in which, as usual, Thurston was portrayed as his chief persecutor, one guilty of "deliberate and malicious unfair labor prac- tices, breach of the union contract, and violations of trust." Assuming Thurston's innocence of all these accusa- tions- and we may assume it because there is no proba- tive evidence to the contrary- some allowance must be made for Thurston's words spoken in anger and his sub- 256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Sequent action in seizing the grievance papers. It is borne in mind that Thurston is not a lawyer, his labor relations advisor is a layman, and he has not presented here the astutely formulated and phrased defense that might have been made out on the facts of this case. He might have pleaded, with conviction I think, that it was not the filing of grievances per se that brought him to the breaking point, but the filing of a succession of grievances which incorporated unfair and baseless accusations against the Company and himself: not the grievances qua grievances but the baseless and abusive language appearing in them. As to the discharge itself, it appears to me, as ap- parently it appeared to the Board's Field Examiner in- vestigating Kadens' October 10 charge, that justification existed for Respondent's action. Kadens duly reported his October 10 absence and there is no reason to believe that it alone constituted cause for discharge. He also re- ported his October 11 absence, and the absences that he indicated were to follow, and while this may have con- stituted a technical compliance with Respondent's rules, it can hardly be said that the said rules were designed to allow employees to absent themselves from work when- ever they chose and for indefinite periods, without some form of authorization. It hardly takes a rule to spell out limitations of such conduct. Kadens duly reported his absences, and in an absence of a single day that probably sufficed, but in a protracted absence mere reporting did not signify authorization. That some S months earlier, on advice of his doctor, he had absented himself from work for about a month and was penalized therefor, can hardly be said to have established a precedent justifying further like absences without company authorization.' That Respondent was considerate enough to retain him as an employee on this earlier occasion does not license us to exact equal consideration when for a second time, only a few months later, he gave notice of a second period of ab- senteeism . I do not think whether Kadens reported that he was absenting himself on "doctor's orders" is material. I doubt that the notice of his future absenteeism was re- ported to Thurston that way for had it been he would hardly have called Krasnick to ascertain if Kadens was staying away on the latter's advice. But in any event, I do not see that the Respondent was obliged to condone his absence for some indefinite period, the second such absence in a period of less than a year, even though it was indeed in compliance with doctor's orders. This agency has not been created an arbiter of conscience nor a prod to charitable forebearance. Obviously, when a discharge follows so closely on the heels of the filing of a grievance which Respondent admit- tedly resented, and the filing of a charge of unfair labor practices which Respondent could hardly have wel- comed, it is easy to find what might otherwise constitute compelling reasons for discharge action mere pretext, and here Respondent's madly scrambled defense makes such a finding all the easier. However, neither the filing of grievances, charges of unfair labor practices, or other manifestations of union and concerted activities freeze an employer in a state of inaction where a discharge for cause would otherwise lie, and while it may well be that the Respondent would not have acted so hastily in I Does the fact that Respondent returned Kadens to his job after his first period of absences raise an inference that it therefore considered him a desirable employee? I think it is just as reasonable to infer that having al- ready encountered the intervention of the Union by its earlier discharge of discharging Kadens the second time except for his record of harassment by way of meretricious grievances contain- ing defamatory language, I cannot say on a preponder- ance of the evidence that the discharge would not have occurred when it did on the basis of job performance which had been worsening for a period of more than a year and a half, and now an unauthorized absence for some indefinite period dependent to a degree on when "this thing" was settled. For all these reasons I am not disposed to make an 8(a)(3) finding based on this discharge, and were I to do so, I would be unable to recommend the usual remedy of r°instatement with backpay, for I am convinced that Kadens' deep-seated and perhaps ineradicable sense of persecution at Thurston's hands would result, were he ordered rein- stated, in a renewal of practices which would make his continued employment intolerable both to himself and to his employer. I do, however, make an 8(a)(1) finding based on Thurston's threats against the filing of further grievances and his action in taking Kadens' grievance papers by force and not thereafter returning them to him in their original form, for despite the provocation, such statements and such action have a far-reaching potential impact upon employees' rights under the Act and should not stand without an appropriate remedy. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the fol- lowing: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interfering in an unlawful manner with the filing of a grievance by its employee, Irwin Kadens, with his duly constituted bargaining representative, and by threatening him with reprisals in the event of his con- tinued exercise of his right, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. The Respondent has not engaged in conduct viola- tive of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, conclu- sions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pur- suant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that the Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from interfering in an unlawful manner with the filing of grievances by employees with their duly constituted bargaining representative, threaten- ing them with the reprisals for the exercise of this right, or in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, Kadens, it did not care so soon thereafter , by a second attempt to remove Kadens from its payroll, to risk further union intervention with its possible impact on a bargaining relationship which on the whole appears to have been amicable ROCKET MESSENGER SERVICE or coercing its employees in the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations , to join or assist the Union, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to en- gage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiting membership in a labor organization as authorized in Sec- tion 8 (a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its Los Angeles, California, place of busi- ness, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."2 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.3 2 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words " a Decision and Order " 3 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond- ent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 257 Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that. WE WILL NOT interfeie in an unlawful manner with the filing of grievances by our employees with their duly constituted bargaining representative, threaten them with reprisals for the exercise of this right, or in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Teamsters Automotive Workers Union, Local No. 495, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. OLYMPIC DELIVERY SER- VICE, INC., D/B/A ROCKET MESSENGER SERVICE (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Eastern Columbia Building , 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014, Telephone 688-5229. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation