Rochester Regional Joint Board, Local 14A

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 29, 2016

363 NLRB No. 179 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

363 NLRB No. 179
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Rochester Regional Joint Board Local 14A and Xerox
Corporation and Jones Lang Lasalle Americas,
Inc. Cases 03–CC–137244 and 03–CE–137252
April 29, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS HIROZAWA
AND MCFERRAN
On April 28, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Lauren
Esposito issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering briefs,
and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.2
The issue before us is whether to adopt the judge’s
finding that the Respondent, Rochester Regional Joint
Board Local 14A, violated Section 8(e) of the Act by
entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with the
Charging Party, Xerox Corporation (Xerox), containing a
certain “Successorship” provision. That provision,
which defined “Transfer of Business” as “the transfer by
sale, lease or otherwise of ownership of or operational
control over a significant portion of the Company’s cur-
rent production functions or facilities,” prohibited Xerox
from making such transfers unless the transferee as-
sumed the obligations of the collective-bargaining
agreement. The judge found that this was an unlawful
union signatory clause. In so finding, the judge inter-
preted the provision to impermissibly require any “les-

1 There were no exceptions to the judge’s finding that the Respond-
ent violated Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) of the Act by attempting to
restrict and enjoin the Charging Party’s subcontracting to Jones Lang
LaSalle Americas, Inc. (JLL) by seeking to enforce Article XXII of the
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement through the grievance proce-
dure and through Federal litigation. We reject the Respondent’s con-
tention, made for the first time in its reply brief, that it did not waive its
right to challenge the judge’s 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) findings. See Sec.
102.46(g) of the Board's Rules and Regulations (matter not timely
raised in exceptions or cross-exceptions cannot thereafter be argued to
the Board).
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to our
findings and to the Board’s standard remedial language, and we shall
substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified.
see” of Xerox to assume the obligations of the parties’
collective-bargaining agreement.
As explained below, we do not agree with the judge's
interpretation of the “Successorship” provision. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the judge's finding of an 8(e) violation
and dismiss this complaint allegation.
Facts
Xerox is engaged in the manufacture and sale of office
equipment worldwide. The events in this case involve
Xerox’s office and place of business in Webster, Monroe
County, New York. For many years, the Respondent and
Xerox have been parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement (Agreement) covering Xerox’s Monroe Coun-
ty production and maintenance employees. The most
recent agreement is effective from June 2, 2014, through
June 1, 2018.
Article XXII of the Agreement is entitled
“Successorship” and has been in the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreements in its current form since 1989. In
relevant part, it states:
A. DEFINITIONS
1. Transfer of Business shall mean the transfer by
sale, lease or otherwise of ownership of or operation-
al control over a significant portion of the Company's
current production functions or facilities in Monroe
County, New York to any other individual, partner-
ship or corporation provided, however such term shall
not include any such transfer, sale or lease, in
whole or in part, which forms part of one or more
financing transactions by the Company where the
Company retains operational control of the assets
transferred, sold or leased.
[…]
B. NOTICE AND REGULATIONS
1. There shall be no Transfer of Business unless at
least sixty (60) days prior to the effective date of such
Transfer of Business the Company has delivered to the
Manager of the Rochester Joint Board a binding written
commitment by the Transferee to assume all of the
Company’s obligations under this Agreement. In addi-
tion, the Company agrees that during said sixty (60)
day period immediately preceding such a transfer, it
shall meet at reasonable times, for the purpose of nego-
tiating with the Union all issues concerning the effects
of the Company’s decision to transfer its operations.
A separate section of the Agreement, Article II, B, ad-
dresses subcontracting.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. (JLL), a national
commercial real estate services provider, entered into a
contract with Xerox effective November 1, 2012, pursu-
ant to which JLL manages and administers Xerox’s real
estate in the United States and Canada. In 2014,3 JLL
contracted with Xerox to provide additional services,
including HVAC maintenance, cleaning, moving, docks,
and ancillary services, at the Webster, New York facility.
When Xerox notified the Respondent that it intended to
subcontract these additional services to JLL, the Re-
spondent replied that the subcontracting would, inter alia,
violate Article XXII and, accordingly, requested that
Xerox provide it with a written assurance that JLL would
honor the Agreement. When Xerox did not acquiesce,
the Respondent filed several grievances, one of which
alleged that Xerox violated Article XXII by transferring
“operational control over the maintenance functions” at
Xerox’s Monroe County facilities without complying
with the requirements of Article XXII.4 The Respondent
also initiated a civil action and filed a petition for a pre-
liminary injunction in Case No. 6:14-CV-6607 in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
New York, seeking to enjoin Xerox’s additional subcon-
tracting to JLL until its grievance was arbitrated. The
General Counsel then issued the instant complaint alleg-
ing, inter alia, that the Respondent violated Section 8(e)
of the Act by entering into and maintaining Article XXII
of the Agreement because it requires lessees doing busi-
ness with Xerox to assume the obligations of the Agree-
ment.5
Judge’s Decision
The judge concluded that Article XXII was facially
unlawful. As noted above, Article XXII states that there
shall be no transfer of business unless the transferee
agrees to assume the obligations of the Agreement. The
judge’s finding was primarily based on her interpretation
of the language in Article XXII defining a transfer of
business as “the transfer by sale, lease or otherwise of
ownership of or operational control over a significant

3 All dates are in 2014 unless otherwise indicated.
4 The Respondent’s other grievances alleged that Xerox violated the
subcontracting provision of the parties’ Agreement by subcontracting
exempt work.
5 In addition, the General Counsel filed a petition for preliminary in-
junction to enjoin the Union from enforcing Article XXII by pursuing
its grievance and compelling arbitration, and filing a lawsuit. On No-
vember 17, the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York granted the petition and entered an order enjoining and
restraining the Union from attempting to enforce Article XXII against
Xerox and JLL’s subcontracting arrangement pending the final disposi-
tion of the instant case before the Board. Rochester Regional Joint
Board, Local 14A, 59 F.Supp.3d 565 (W.D.N.Y 2014).
portion of the Company's current production functions
or facilities.” The judge read this language to mean that
any lease is a transfer of business subject to the require-
ments of the provision, and, therefore concluded that
Article XXII unambiguously “has the effect of prohibit-
ing Xerox from doing business with any potential lessee
which refuses to be bound by the [Agreement].”6 Having
determined that Article XXII applied to “any potential
lessee,” the judge concluded that Article XXII was effec-
tively a “union signatory clause” in clear violation of
Section 8(e).7
Discussion
For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judge and
find that Article XXII does not restrict Xerox’s right to
enter into any lease with a secondary employer. Rather,
we find that Article XXII is a lawful successorship pro-
vision that by its express terms is limited to “transfers of
ownership . . . or operational control” and is therefore not
prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act.
Section 8(e), which was enacted to protect genuinely
neutral employers and their employees, essentially pro-
hibits unions from disrupting an employer’s daily busi-
ness with neutral employers.8 By its terms, Section 8(e)
establishes that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer and union to enter into an agreement under which
the employer will “cease doing business” with another
employer.9 Thus, Section 8(e) proscribes contract claus-

6 The judge relied on rules of construction described in Teamsters
Local 982 (J. K. Barker Trucking Co.), 181 NLRB 515, 517 (1970)
(finding that if the meaning of a clause is clear, the Board will deter-
mine its validity under Sec. 8(e); where the clause is not clearly unlaw-
ful on its face, the Board will interpret it to require no more than what
is allowed by law, and if the clause is ambiguous, the Board will not
presume unlawfulness, but will consider extrinsic evidence to deter-
mine the parties’ intent), affd. 450 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
7 The judge relied on numerous decisions finding that lease agree-
ments requiring lessees to assume the obligations of a collective-
bargaining agreement violated Sec. 8(e). E.g., Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Local 274 (Sheraton University Hotel), 326 NLRB 1058,
1059 (1998) (clause requiring any lessee or concessionaire of hotel to
be bound by collective-bargaining agreement violated Sec. 8(e)); Chi-
cago Dining Room Employees Local 42 (Gaslight Club), 248 NLRB
604 (1980); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531 (Verdugo Hills
Bowl), 237 NLRB 1204 (1978), enfd. 623 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1980). The
judge further found that, even if Article XXII were ambiguous, the
extrinsic evidence surrounding the parties’ negotiations shows that the
Union intended for Article XXII to operate as a union signatory clause.
8 Operating Engineers, Local 701 (Cascade Employers Assoc.), 221
NLRB 751, 752 (1975).
9 Sec. 8(e) reads in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any
of the products of any other employer, or cease doing business with
any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into hereto-
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 14A 3
es that require certain business transactions, such as sub-
contracting, or, as alleged here, leasing, be limited to
employers who are signatories to union contracts—so-
called union signatory clauses. Such clauses are not
viewed as protecting the wages and job opportunities of
unit employees, but rather as a means of furthering gen-
eral union objectives and attempting to regulate the labor
policies of other employers.10
The Board and courts have long held, however, that
“doing business” within the meaning of Section 8(e) does
not include the sale or transfer of a business.11 The
Board has reasoned that a transfer or sale of a business
does not disrupt the employer’s daily conduct of its busi-
ness with a neutral employer, but rather constitutes “a
substitution of one entity for the other while the conduct
of business continues without interruption.”12 Accord-
ingly, the Board has found that contract provisions re-
quiring a successor employer to assume the obligations
of a collective-bargaining agreement do not violate Sec-
tion 8(e).13
Here, the judge correctly recognized the legal distinc-
tion between contract clauses that impermissibly seek to
prevent a signatory employer from doing business with
other companies (e.g. by limiting its leasing or subcon-
tracting to companies signatory to the union’s agree-
ment), and clauses that lawfully limit a signatory em-
ployer’s permanent transfer of its business (e.g., by sale
or transfer) to companies that agree to be bound to the
employer’s obligations under its collective-bargaining
agreement. We disagree, however, with the judge’s ap-
plication of these principles to the language of Article
XXII. The judge isolated the term “lease” from the oper-
ative language in the provision, including the phrase
“transfer by sale, lease or otherwise of ownership of or
operational control,” and interpreted Article XXII to

fore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforceable and void.
10 See Verdugo Hills Bowl, 237 NLRB at 1206.
11 See Cascade Employers Assoc., 221 NLRB at 752; see also Mine
Workers of America (Lone Star Steel Co.), 231 NLRB 573 (1977),
enfd. in rel. part 639 F.2d 545, 550 fn. 12 (10th Cir. 1980); Teamsters
Local 814 (Bader Brothers Warehouses), 225 NLRB 609, 609 fn. 1,
614–615 (1976); Machinists Local No. 71 (Harris Truck & Trailer
Sales), 224 NLRB 100, 103 (1976) (sale of physical assets does not
constitute “doing business” under Sec. 8(e)).
12 Cascade Employers Assoc., 221 NLRB at 752.
13 See Bader Bros. Warehouses, above (finding lawful a
successorship clause that required a lessee to assume the obligations of
the parties’ bargaining agreement in the event of a transfer of an entire
business operation or part thereof); Cascade Employers Assoc., 221
NLRB at 752. See also Painters Local 970 v. NLRB, 309 F.3d 1, 7
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (lawful successorship clause would only take effect
when “Employer’s business is, in whole or in part transferred to another
entity”) (internal quotation marks omitted), denying enf. W.R. Mollo-
han, 333 NLRB 1339 (2001).
apply to leases and subcontracts in violation of 8(e).
(Supra, fn. 7.) A plain reading of Article XII does not
support this interpretation. Article XXII states that a
“Transfer of Business shall mean the transfer by sale,
lease or otherwise of ownership of or operational con-
trol” over production functions or facilities and that
such transfers “shall not include any such transfer . . .
where the Company retains operational control of the
assets transferred, sold or leased” (emphasis added).
Thus, the provision plainly defines “transfer of business”
to mean transfers of “ownership or operational control”
where Xerox retains no operational control of the trans-
ferred work or facilities.
Furthermore, the terms “sale, lease or otherwise” do
not themselves define transfers of business for purposes
of 8(e). Nor, as the judge implied, are they examples of
transactions that are categorically subject to Article
XXII’s requirements. Rather, these terms indicate only
that Article XXII’s definition of a transfer of business
applies regardless of the specific name attached to a
transaction (i.e., whether parties call it a “sale, lease or
otherwise”). See NLRB v. Hotel & Restaurant Employ-
ees Local 531 (Verdugo Hills Bowl), 623 F.2d at 66.
There, in construing a provision restricting leasing to
signatory employers, the court observed that “title of a
transaction should not determine the applicability of sec-
tion 8(e) and . . . a clear articulation of the doing busi-
ness requirement is needed.” Id. Thus, the Board in
Verdugo Hills Bowl had analyzed a lease agreement be-
tween a bowling alley and an on-premises coffee shop
and found that it constituted “doing business” under Sec-
tion 8(e) because no permanent transfer of business took
place and the employer retained an interest in the coffee
shop and placed several restrictions on its use. Id. at
1207. In the present case, the plain language of Article
XXII provides that it is only triggered by a transfer of the
business notwithstanding that “lease” is referenced in the
clause. Contrary to the judge’s reading of the provi-
sion, should Xerox lease part of its business, Article
XXII would place no restrictions on the lessee unless
there was a transfer of ownership or operations and
Xerox retained no operational control over the trans-
ferred functions or facilities.14

14 As noted, the Respondent did not except to the judge's finding that
its effort to apply Article XXII to enjoin the subcontracting to JLL
violated Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B), and therefore we express no view
on that finding. Nevertheless, we observe that such a finding would not
establish a Sec. 8(e) violation. “Solely unilateral conduct by a union
. . . to enforce an unlawful interpretation of a facially lawful contract
clause [such as Article XXII] does not violate Sec. 8(e) because such
conduct does not constitute an ‘agreement.’” Sheet Metal Workers
Local 27 (AeroSonics), 321 NLRB 540, 540 fn. 3 (1996) (emphasis in
original), and cases cited therein.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
The cases that the judge relied on to find that leases
implicate “doing business” within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(e) are distinguishable. Unlike Article XXII, the
provisions in those cases, like those discussed above,
were clearly aimed at leases that would constitute “doing
business” under Section 8(e). For example, in Sheraton
University Hotel, 326 NLRB at 1058, the Board affirmed
the judge’s finding that the challenged successor provi-
sion violated Section 8(e) because it impermissibly ex-
tended beyond the sale or transfer of the business to ex-
pressly apply to “any lessee or concessionaire,” thereby
prohibiting the hotel “from doing business with such
potential lessee or concessionaire who refused to be
bound by that agreement.” (Emphasis added.) As such,
this was “a typical ‘union signatory clause’ not limited in
its effect simply to preserving bargaining unit jobs.” Id.
In addition, in Gaslight Club, 248 NLRB at 607, the
Board found that a lease agreement violated Section 8(e)
where it required any employer who leased part of the
employer’s premises where unit employees performed
work to agree to the terms of the existing contract
“whether or not those unit employees lose their jobs.”
Because the provision explicitly applied to non-
successors, the Board found that the provision exceeded
“the legitimate primary purpose of protecting unit work”
and was “directed at the secondary purpose of furthering
general union objectives.” Id.15
Accordingly, we find that Article XXII is a lawful
successorship clause that does not implicate “doing busi-
ness” within the meaning of Section 8(e) of the Act. 16

15 We disagree with the judge’s statement that the Board has categor-
ically held (or could hold) that assumption-of-contract provisions im-
plicating lessees and subcontractors violate Sec. 8(e). Regardless of
title, the question remains whether the transfer serves a lawful work
preservation objective. See, e.g., Bader Brothers Warehouses, 225
NLRB 609, 609 fn. 2 (rejecting any inference that subcontracting re-
strictions are outside the scope of a lawful work preservation objec-
tive); Harter Tomato Products, 321 NLRB 127 (1996) (lessee of a
tomato paste plant is a successor because it used the same employees to
make the same product).
16 As noted above, the judge found that, even if Article XXII were
ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence surrounding the parties’ negotiations
shows that the Union intended for Article XXII to operate as a union
signatory clause. We note, however, that the extrinsic evidence con-
firms instead that the parties “entered into” a successorship clause that
was meant to ensure only that a purchaser of the business would as-
sume the obligations of the Agreement. This evidence included the
initial proposal requiring adherence to the Agreement “from any new
owner of Xerox or a significant portion of the company”; testimony
that Article XXII was meant to require that “whoever bought the com-
pany would have to honor the contract”; a Union newsletter stating that
the provision was “a guarantee that the new contract will be honored
even if Xerox were to be sold”; and bargaining notes of the Union’s
negotiator stating that Article XXII’s purpose was to protect the bar-
gaining-unit employees and their jobs. The parties also included an
effects-bargaining clause at Section B of Article XXII requiring bar-
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Roches-
ter Regional Joint Board Local 14A, Rochester, New
York, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take
the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Delete paragraph 1(a) and reletter the subsequent
paragraphs.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
Dated, Washington, D.C. April 29, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

gaining over “the effects of the Company’s decision to transfer its
operations,” which further indicates that the provision was intended to
address transfers where another employer substitutes for Xerox as a
new owner or operator of the business.
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 14A 5
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Xerox Corp.
by filing grievances, or initiating civil actions, where the
object is to force or require Xerox Corp. to enter into an
agreement which violates Section 8(e) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Xerox Corp.
by filing grievances, or initiating civil actions, where an
object thereof is to force Xerox Corp. to cease doing
business with Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., or any
other person.
WE WILL withdraw the September 21, 2014 grievance
alleging that Xerox Corp.’s subcontracting to Jones Lang
LaSalle Americas, Inc. violated Article XXII of the col-
lective bargaining, and notify Xerox that the grievance
has been withdrawn.
WE WILL seek dismissal of civil action 6L140CV-6607
in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of New York filed on October 27, 2014, and motion
for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Xerox Corp. from
subcontracting to Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc.
until the September 21, 2014 grievance is arbitrated.
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL
14A
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CC-137244 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273-1940.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with
your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT enter into, maintain, enforce, or give effect to
those portions of article XXII of our collective-bargaining
agreement with Xerox Corp. which require that any lessee or
concessionaire assume the collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce or restrain Xerox Corp. by fil-
ing grievances, or initiating civil actions, where the object is to
force or require Xerox Corp. to enter into an agreement which
violates Section 8(e) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce or restrain Xerox Corp. by fil-
ing grievances, or initiating civil actions, where an object
thereof is to force Xerox Corp. to cease doing business with
Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., or any other person.
WE WILL withdraw the September 21, 2014 grievance alleg-
ing that Xerox Corp.’s subcontracting to Jones Lang LaSalle
Americas, Inc. violated article XXII of the collective-
bargaining, and notify Xerox that the grievance has been with-
drawn.
WE WILL seek dismissal of civil action 6L140CV-6607 in the
United States District Court for the Western District of New
York filed on October 27, 2014, and motion for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin Xerox Corp. from subcontracting to Jones
Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. until the September 21, 2014
grievance is arbitrated.
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD, LOCAL 14A
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CC-137244 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.
Alicia Pender, Esq. and Jesse Feuerstein, Esq., for the General
Counsel.
Michael T. Harren, Esq. and Joseph A. Gawlowicz, Esq.
(Trevett Cristo Salzer & Andolino, P.C.), of Rochester,
New York, for the Respondent.
Michael A. Hausknecht, Esq. (Nixon Peabody, LLP), of Roch-
ester, New York, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LAUREN ESPOSITO, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon
the charges in Cases 03–CC–137244 and 03–CE–137252, filed
on September 23, 2014, and amended on October 8, 2014, by
Xerox Corporation (Xerox), an amended consolidated com-
plaint and notice of hearing (the complaint) issued on October
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
29, 2014. The complaint alleges that Rochester Regional Joint
Board Local 14A (the Joint Board or the Union) violated Sec-
tion 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by en-
tering into and maintaining an agreement in which Xerox has
agreed not to do business with any other employer or person.
The complaint further alleges that the Joint Board violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) of the Act by repeatedly taking the
position that subcontracting was prohibited by the agreement
violating Section 8(e) of the Act, and by filing a grievance and
a lawsuit seeking to enforce the unlawful agreement. This case
was tried before me on November 12 and 13, 2014, in Buffalo,
New York.1
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the arguments of
the parties made at trial and in their posthearing briefs, I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all times material to the complaint’s allegations, Xerox
has been a corporation, with an office and place of business in
Webster, New York, and has been engaged in the manufacture
and sale of office equipment and related supplies. The Joint
Board admits and I find that Xerox has been an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act, and admits that the Union has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The Joint Board admitted at the hearing and I find that at all
material times, Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc. (JLL) has
been a corporation, with a principal place of business in Chica-
go, Illinois, engaged in providing commercial real estate ser-
vices at various locations in the United States, and that Xerox
and JLL have been parties to an agreement whereby JLL man-
ages and administers Xerox’s real estate in the United States
and Canada (Tr. 7–8).
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Union’s Representatives and the Collective-Bargaining
Relationship
For many years, the Joint Board and Xerox have been parties
to a collective-bargaining agreement applicable to Xerox’s
employees in Monroe County, New York, in various produc-
tion and maintenance job classifications. At all material times,
Gary Bonadonna was the Joint Board’s chief principal officer,
and Roger LaDue was its business representative; the Joint
Board admits and I find that Bonadonna and LaDue were its
agents within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.

1 On October 16, 2014, Rhonda P. Ley, the Regional Director of Re-
gion 3, National Labor Relations Board, filed a petition pursuant to Sec.
10(l) of the Act for a preliminary injunction against the Joint Board.
On November 17, 2014, the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of New York, Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford, granted the
Petition and entered an order enjoining and restraining the Joint Board
from giving force and effect to art. XXII of its collective-bargaining
agreement with Xerox, or threatening to enforce art. XXII through
arbitration or a lawsuit with the object of forcing Xerox to cease doing
business with Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc., pending the final
disposition of the instant case before the Board.
Bonadonna and LaDue testified at the hearing.
The most recent collective-bargaining agreement is effective
by its terms from June 2, 2014, through June 1, 2018. Accord-
ing to Bonadonna, negotiations for this agreement took place in
May 2014, and did not involve any proposed subcontracting or
changes to existing contract language addressing that issue.
Article II(B) of the collective-bargaining agreement is entitled
“Subcontracting,” and provides in pertinent part:
1. The Union recognizes the Company’s right to determine
what work is done within the jurisdiction of the bargaining
unit and what work is to be subcontracted, outsourced, vended
or placed in other Xerox facilities.
2. The parties further recognize that such decisions will be
subject to changing business conditions and will be ongoing.
3. The Company further agrees that any and all decisions to
subcontract, outsource, vend or relocate work performed by
the bargaining unit will only be reached after full disclosure,
in advance, with the Union leadership. Such meetings will be
called as needed and will provide the Union with all relevant
facts, to include the impact of such action on the bargaining
unit.
. . . .
5. It is understood that all Project work, exceeding twelve
(12) to fifteen (15) hours for the total project, shall be out-
sourced; however, at the end of six (6) months, and periodi-
cally thereafter, the Parties will review all Project work that
has been outsourced and any adjustments that may be re-
quired, and will be made based on factual data and operating
needs. However, it is understood, between the Parties, that
the “Coverage” work, designed to maintain and support our
manufacturing and building operations, will take priority. It is
further understood that there will be no outsourcing of Cover-
age work, with the exception of work which requires a skill
and/or equipment capability that does not exist within
Maintenance. Further, the Parties agree that for Project work,
not exceeding twelve (12) to fifteen (15) hours, “time con-
straints”, as well as skill and/or equipment capability, may al-
so be a factor contributing to outsourcing decisions; however,
there will be a strong preference for keeping the work in
house. The Parties agree that any and all “First Right of Re-
fusal”, “Contractual Overtime Obligations” and “Staffing
Percentage” agreements, due to vending or transferring work,
either externally or internally, shall be eliminated.
(Jt. Exh. 2, p. 2–3.)
The collective-bargaining agreement also contains a provi-
sion at article XXII entitled “Successorship,” which states as
follows:
A. DEFINITIONS
1. Transfer of Business shall mean the transfer by sale,
lease or otherwise of ownership of or operational control
over a significant portion of the Company's current produc-
tion functions or facilities in Monroe County, New York
to any other individual, partnership or corporation provid-
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 14A 7
ed, however such term shall not include any such
transfer, sale or lease, in whole or in part, which forms
part of one or more financing transactions by the Compa-
ny where the Company retains operational control of the
assets transferred, sold or leased.
2. Transferee shall mean any individual, partnership or
corporation to which the Company shall make a Transfer
of Business.
B. NOTICE AND REGULATIONS
1. There shall be no Transfer of Business unless at
least sixty {60) days prior to the effective date of such
Transfer of Business the Company has delivered to the
Manager of the Rochester Joint Board a binding written
commitment by the Transferee to assume all of the Com-
pany's obligations under this Agreement. In addition, the
Company agrees that during said sixty (60) day period im-
mediately preceding such a transfer, it shall meet at reason-
able times, for the purpose of negotiating with the Union
all issues concerning the effects of the Company's decision
to transfer its operations.
C. TERM OF ASSUMED CONTRACT
1. If on the effective date of a Transfer of Business,
this Agreement shall be within less than two years of its
expiration date, then the expiration date of this Agreement
shall be automatically extended to such later date as shall
be two years after such effective date. All dates for notice
of termination or modification shall be adjusted according-
ly.
2. The Parties acknowledge that the Union's right to have
this Agreement assumed by the Transferee prior to the
Transfer of Business is essential to the Union's responsi-
bility to represent its members. The Parties further
acknowledge that the Union will suffer irreparable injury if
notice is not given or if the contract is not assumed as
provided in this Article.
(Jt. Exh. 2, p. 47.) Article XXII was initially negotiated into
the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement in 1989, and has
been included since then in unchanged form (Tr. 139; Jt. Exhs.
1, 2).
At all material times, Linda Kelly was Xerox’s manager of
corporate labor relations (Tr. 19). Dave Nappi was Xerox’s
vice president of property management for the 6 years prior to
August 20, 2014, when he became JLL’s director of regional
facilities for Xerox’s facility in Webster, New York (Tr. 46).
Kelly and Nappi both testified at the hearing.
B. The Subcontracting of Bargaining Unit Work at Xerox’s
Webster Facility
JLL provides real estate facility services for Xerox at loca-
tions in the United States and Canada, including real estate
brokerage transactions, private management, facilities man-
agement, and maintenance (Tr. 8, 47). The most recent con-
tract between Xerox and JLL is effective as of November 1,
2012 (Tr. 47; GC Exh. 3). As of November 18, 2014, JLL was
to begin providing services for Xerox at its Webster, New York
facility, including HVAC maintenance, cleaning, moving,
docks, and ancillary services (Tr. 48–49). Pursuant to the con-
tract between Xerox and JLL, the scope of the work to be per-
formed will remain under the control of Xerox (Tr. 49; GC
Exh. 3, arts. 3.7, 4.6). Some of the services provided by JLL
would have been previously performed by bargaining unit em-
ployees, and some would not (Tr. 49).
On July 24, 2014,2 Kelly and Nappi met with LaDue at Xer-
ox’s labor relations office, and informed LaDue that Xerox
intended to subcontract certain facilities work to JLL (Tr. 20,
50). Kelly and Nappi described the work to be subcontracted
as site and facilities work, custodial work, and some mainte-
nance and utility work (Tr. 21). LaDue took the position at this
meeting that subcontracting of the maintenance work would
violate article II(B) of the collective-bargaining agreement (Tr.
21, 50–51, 55–56). Kelly and Nappi testified that LaDue did
not mention article XXII of the contract (Tr. 21, 52).
On July 28, Kelly and Nappi met with Bonadonna and
LaDue at the Joint Board’s offices in Rochester to again discuss
the subcontracting issue (Tr. 21–22). During this meeting,
Kelly and Nappi identified the bargaining unit job classifica-
tions whose work would be subcontracted, such as the L-45
utility workers which were part of site and facilities, and the
corporate riggers, custodial group, and maintenance (Tr. 22,
51). Kelly and Nappi stated that the subcontracting would take
effect in the 4th quarter of the year, around November (Tr. 22).
At this meeting, Bonadonna stated that the proposed subcon-
tracting would violate article II(B) of the contract, particularly
with respect to the maintenance classifications, and LaDue
stated that after Xerox announced the subcontracting the Joint
Board would file a grievance alleging that it violated article
II(B)(5) (Tr. 22, 51–52, 55–56). However, Kelly testified that
neither Bonadonna nor LaDue took the position that the pro-
posed subcontracting would violate article XXII, or mentioned
that provision (Tr. 22–23).
On August 7, Kelly received two letters by email from
Bonadonna’s administrative assistant, discussing the possible
applicability of article XXII to the impending subcontracting of
bargaining unit work at the Webster facility (Tr. 24–25; GC
Exh. 2). These letters, from Union Attorney Michael T. Harren
to Bonadonna, posited that article XXII provided a potential
basis for contending that the subcontracting of Xerox’s mainte-
nance operations in Monroe County violated the collective-
bargaining agreement, and discussed article XXII’s history and
purpose (GC Exh. 2).3
On August 21, the Joint Board filed three grievances.4 The
first grievance alleged that Xerox violated article XXII by
transferring “operational control over the maintenance func-
tions at the Corporation’s Monroe County facilities” without
complying with Article XXII (GC Exh. 3(a)). The second and
third grievances alleged that Xerox violated Article II(B)(5) by

2 All subsequent dates are in 2014, unless otherwise indicated.
3 The evidence establishes that the Joint Board had never previously
asserted that art. XXII applied to subcontracting situations (Tr. 43-45).
4 On August 12, Xerox and the Joint Board reached an agreement
providing that the approximately 67 skilled trades employees would
remain employees of Xerox, leaving 59 bargaining unit employees to
be laid off (Tr. 23–24).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
subcontracting L-7 lubrication work and L-45 work involving
the changing of filters, in that both of these functions constitut-
ed “coverage work” exempt from outsourcing or subcontracting
pursuant to that provision (GC Exhs. 3(b), (c)). On August 26,
the Joint Board filed a fourth grievance, contending that the J-
27 air tool repair positions also constituted “coverage work”
exempt from subcontracting under article II(B)(5) (GC Exh.
3(d)). The complaint does not allege that the grievances in-
volving violations of article II(B)(5) were unlawful pursuant to
Section 8(e) or 8(b)(4) of the Act.
On September 3, Kelly and Joe Calabria, who was then Xer-
ox’s site and facilities operations manager, met with LaDue
regarding the four subcontracting grievances (Tr. 25–26). Ac-
cording to Kelly, during this meeting, LaDue stated that the
Joint Board took the position that the subcontracting of site
facilities work would trigger article XXII of the collective-
bargaining agreement (Tr. 27). As a result, Xerox needed to
provide 60 days’ notice to the Joint Board’s regional manager,
and the Joint Board wanted a written assurance from JLL that
JLL would honor the collective-bargaining agreement (Tr. 27).
When Kelly asked LaDue for a more specific statement regard-
ing article XXII’s applicability, LaDue stated that he himself
did not fully understand the provision, as it involved “a lot of
legal jargon.” (Tr. 27, 100).
On October 27, the Joint Board initiated a civil action and
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in Case No. 6:14-
CV-6607 in the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York, seeking to enjoin Xerox from subcon-
tracting the maintenance and other functions at its Monroe
County facilities until the Joint Board’s grievance alleging that
the subcontracting violates article XXII was arbitrated (Jt. Exh.
5).
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel and Xerox contend that article XXII of
Xerox’s collective-bargaining agreement with the Joint Board
violates Section 8(e) on its face, because it is an unambiguous
provision having the effect of an impermissible union signatory
clause. The General Counsel and Xerox further argue that arti-
cle XXII is not a valid work-preservation clause, and that even
if the provision were ambiguous the extrinsic evidence in the
record indicates that the Joint Board sought to interpret or apply
it in an unlawful manner. Finally, the General Counsel and
Xerox contend that the Joint Board violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(A) by attempting to enforce the unlawful provision
through the grievance procedure and Federal litigation, and
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by threatening, coercing, and
restraining Xerox with the object of forcing Xerox to cease
doing business with JLL.
The Joint Board contends that article XXII is a valid work-
preservation provision under National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v.
NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), and subsequent cases. Specifical-
ly, the Joint Board argues that the evidence establishes that its
objective in entering into article XXII was the preservation of
work performed by bargaining unit employees, and that Xerox,
the contracting employer, has the power to assign the work
subcontracted to JLL. NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s
Assn., 447 U.S. 490, 504 (1980). As a result, the Joint Board
contends that the cComplaint must be dismissed on that basis.
The Joint Board further argues that, to the extent that an analy-
sis of article XXII’s validity under Section 8(e) is appropriate,
the clause is ambiguous, and should therefore be interpreted as
to require only what is lawful under established Board princi-
ples of construction. Finally, the Joint Board argues that within
the context of the Section 8(e) analysis, article XXII is more
appropriately considered a successor clause addressing sales
and transfers of ownership, and is therefore not unlawful.
B. Article XXII of the Collective-Bargaining Agreement
Violates Section 8(e)
Section 8(e) of the Act states as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization
and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, ex-
press or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or
agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any oth-
er employer, or cease doing business with any other person,
and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or here-
after containing such an agreement shall be to such extent un-
enforceable and void.5
In order to determine whether particular contract language
violates Section 8(e), the Board evaluates whether the union’s
objective was the “preservation of work” for bargaining unit
employees, or whether the agreement is “tactically calculated to
satisfy union objectives elsewhere.” National Woodwork Mfrs.
Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644 (1967); see also Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Local 274 (Sheraton University Hotel),
326 NLRB 1058 (1998); Chicago Dining Room Employees
Local 42 (Gaslight Club), 248 NLRB 604, 606 (1980). As the
Supreme Court has stated, “The touchstone is whether the
agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations
of the contracting employer vis-à-vis his own employees.”
National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn., 386 U.S. at 645. In NLRB v.
International Longshoremen’s Assn., 473 U.S. 61, 76 (1985),
the Court reiterated its analysis for determining whether con-
tested language constituted a lawful work-preservation agree-
ment as follows:
First, it must have as its objective the preservation of work
traditionally performed by employees represented by the un-
ion. Second, the contracting employer must have the power
to give the employees the work in question – the so-called
“right of control” test…The rationale of the second test is that
if the contracting employer has no power to assign the work,
it is reasonable to infer that the agreement has a secondary ob-
jective, that is, to influence whoever does have such power
over the work.
NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s Assn., 447 U.S. at 504-
505; see also Painters District Council 51 (Manganaro Corp.,
Maryland), 321 NLRB 158, 164 (1996).
The Board has also developed the following analytical

5 There are provisos to Sec. 8(e) which apply in the construction and
garment industries, neither of which are pertinent here.
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 14A 9
framework for evaluating language which allegedly violates
Section 8(e):
[I]f the meaning of the clause is clear, the Board will deter-
mine forthwith its validity under 8(e); where the clause is not
clearly unlawful on its face, the Board will interpret it to re-
quire no more than what is allowed by law. On the other
hand, if the clause is ambiguous, the Board will not presume
unlawfulness, but will consider extrinsic evidence to deter-
mine whether the clause was intended to be administered in a
lawful or unlawful manner. In the absence of such evidence,
the Board will refuse to pass on the validity of the clause.
Teamsters Local 982 (J. K. Barker Trucking Co.), 181 NLRB
515, 517 (1970), enfd. 450 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also
Painters District Council 51 (Manganaro Corp., Maryland),
321 NLRB at 161, 164.
Applying these general principles, the Board has long held
that contract language “which purports to limit leasing or sub-
contracting to employers who are signatories to union con-
tracts,” termed a “union signatory clause,” violates Section
8(e). Chicago Dining Room Employees Local 42 (Gaslight
Club), 248 NLRB at 606; Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local
531 (Verdugo Hills Bowl), 237 NLRB 1204, 1206 (1978), enfd.
623 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Teamsters Local 251 (Ma-
terial Sand & Stone Corp.), 356 NLRB No. 135, slip op. at 2–3
(2011), enf. denied in part 691 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2012); Carpen-
ters Local 623 (Atlantic Exposition Services), 335 NLRB 586,
589 (2001), enfd. 320 F.3d 385 (3d Cir. 2003). The Board has
consistently held that union signatory provisions seek “to regu-
late the labor policies of other employers” and thus further
“general union objectives,” as opposed to protecting the job
opportunities of bargaining unit employees. Chicago Dining
Room Employees Local 42 (Gaslight Club), 248 NLRB at 606;
see also Teamsters Local 251 (Material Sand & Stone Corp.),
356 NLRB No. 135, slip op. at 2-3; Carpenters Local 623 (At-
lantic Exposition Services), 335 NLRB at 589. Such clauses
therefore have a secondary objective, and violate Section 8(e).
Id.
The Board’s analysis in this respect distinguishes union sig-
natory clauses directed to subcontracting, leases and conces-
sions from clauses addressing the sale or transfer of an enter-
prise. The Board has reasoned that subcontracting, leasing, and
concessions involve an ongoing business relationship, or one
entity’s “doing business” with another within the meaning of
Section 8(e). Purchases and transfers, by contrast, involve a
permanent transfer or substitution of one entity for another, and
are not considered business transactions. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Local 274 (Sheraton University Hotel), 326 NLRB
at 1058, 1059; Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531 (Ver-
dugo Hills Bowl), 237 NLRB at 1207. The Board has deter-
mined that union signatory clauses applicable to leasing or
subcontracting are not designed to protect bargaining unit em-
ployees, but seek to advance “general union objectives” and “to
regulate the labor policies of other employers.” Chicago Din-
ing Room Employees Local 42 (Gaslight Club), 248 NLRB at
606; Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531 (Verdugo Hills
Bowl), 237 NLRB at 1206. Thus, clauses which explicitly limit
leasing or subcontracting to signatory employers, or which have
that effect, are facially invalid under Section 8(e). Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Local 274 (Sheraton University Hotel),
326 NLRB at 1058–1059; Chicago Dining Room Employees
Local 42 (Gaslight Club), 248 NLRB at 607; Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees Local 531 (Verdugo Hills Bowl), 237 NLRB at
1207.
Article XXII of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement
violates Section 8(e) on its face under the foregoing case law.
Article XXII prohibits the leasing of Xerox’s production func-
tions or facilities in Monroe County unless the lessee makes a
“binding written commitment . . . to assume all of the Compa-
ny’s obligations under this Agreement.” This language is simi-
lar to language found by the Board in previous cases to create
an unlawful union signatory clause under Section 8(e). Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Local 274 (Sheraton University Hotel),
326 NLRB at 1058–1059 (provision stating that the collective-
bargaining agreement “shall be applicable to and binding upon
any successor, assignee, lessee or concessionaire of the Em-
ployer” had the effect of an unlawful union signatory clause);
Chicago Dining Room Employees Local 42 (Gaslight Club),
248 NLRB at 607 (unlawful clause required that any “purchas-
er-lessee” with employees performing bargaining unit work
“shall as a condition precedent to such transaction execute this
Agreement”); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531 (Ver-
dugo Hills Bowl), 237 NLRB at 1207 (clause which provided
that the collective-bargaining agreement “shall be applicable to
and binding upon” any “lessee or subcontractor” which “utiliz-
es the services of employees performing work covered by this
agreement” prohibited under Section 8(e)). Like the clauses at
issue in those cases, article XXII has the effect of prohibiting
Xerox from doing business with any potential lessee which
refuses to be bound by the collective-bargaining agreement, and
therefore has the effect of a union signatory clause.
As discussed above, Respondent contends that the case law
requires an initial determination as to whether article XXII is a
work-preservation provision by evaluating whether the clause
has “as its objective the preservation of work traditionally per-
formed by employees represented by the union” and whether
the contracting employer has “the power to give the employees
the work in question.”6 Respondent argues that an analysis as
to whether article XXII violates Section 8(e) is only appropriate
if evidence establishes that article XXII does not have a legiti-
mate work-preservation objective. However, the cases dis-
cussed above apply a body of law developed by the Board to
determine whether clauses specifically addressing
successorship and subcontracting violate Section 8(e) or consti-
tute legitimate work preservation provisions. Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees Local 274 (Sheraton University Hotel), 326
NLRB at 1058–1059; Chicago Dining Room Employees Local
42 (Gaslight Club), 248 NLRB at 606-607; Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Local 531 (Verdugo Hills Bowl), 237 NLRB at
1206-1207.7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court cases relied upon

6 Respondent argues that the evidence satisfies both of these criteria,
and as a result art. XXII is a legitimate work-preservation provision.
7 In particular, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 274 (Sheraton
University Hotel), decided long after the Supreme Court’s NLRB v.
International Longshoremen’s Assn. opinion, determined that the pro-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
by Respondent in this respect involved contract provisions
which addressed completely different subjects. See National
Woodwork Mfrs. Assn., 386 U.S. at 616 fn. 2 (work rule prohib-
iting union carpenters on jobsites from handling prefitted or
cut-out doors alleged to violate Section 8(e)); NLRB v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Assn., 447 U.S. at 497–499 (allegedly
unlawful work rule required that containers which would oth-
erwise be loaded or unloaded within the local port area be load-
ed or unloaded by longshoremen at the pier); NLRB v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Assn., 473 U.S. at 64–66 (same). By
contrast, Article XXII addresses successorship, leases and, as
Respondent seeks to apply it here, subcontracting.
In any event, I find that given the applicable case law article
XXII is not a valid work-preservation clause under National
Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. Valid work-preservation clauses ad-
dressing subcontracting are generally limited to requiring that
the employer to which the work is subcontracted provide its
employees with wages and benefits commensurable with those
required pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement. See
Blyer v. Staten Island Cable LLC, 261 F.Supp.2d 168, 172
(2003) (union standards clauses which “limit subcontracting to
those companies whose terms and conditions match[] the eco-
nomic terms and conditions” of the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement permissible under Section 8(e)); NLRB v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531, 623 F.2d 61, 67
(1980) (permissible work preservation or area standards clauses
“prohibit an employer from subcontracting work normally per-
formed by union employees to any employer who pays his
employees less than union wages,” thus causing primary pres-
sure only). By contrast, as discussed above, clauses which
require that the employer to which the work is subcontracted
assume the entire collective-bargaining agreement, including
the union security provision, constitute union signatory clauses
prohibited under Section 8(e). Here, article XXII makes no
mention of wage rates, job security, or other specific terms and
conditions of employment pertaining to the bargaining unit, nor
does it make any mention of the bargaining unit employees. It
simply requires that any purchaser, lessee, or entity assuming
“ownership of or operational control over a significant portion
of the Company's current production functions or facilities in
Monroe County, New York,” also assume the collective-
bargaining agreement. Chicago Dining Room Employees Local
42 (Gaslight Club), 248 NLRB at 607 (clause which did not “in
any way limit its effect to the preservation of the jobs of any
unit employees” and required the lessee to assume the contract
“regardless of whether or not those unit employees lose their
jobs” exceeded “the legitimate primary purpose of protecting
unit work”).
I note that where such language does discuss the bargaining
unit employees or conditions more characteristic of
successorship by purchase or transfer, the Board has in some
cases found it to be ambiguous. In Liquid Carbonic Corp., 277
NLRB 851 (1985), the Board, overruling the ALJ, held that a

vision in question had the effect of an unlawful union signatory clause
without any mention of the two-component work-preservation analysis
from that Supreme Court case, which the Joint Board contends is con-
trolling here. 326 NLRB at 1058-1059
clause having a possible union signatory effect in the subcon-
tracting context was ambiguous, and did not violate Section
8(e). The language at issue in that case required that if the
employer sought to “discontinue using his trucks the Employer
must arrange for his Employees to be employed by whoever
does the pick-up or delivery,” and that “the provision of this
entire contract must be agreed to by whoever takes over the
operation.” Liquid Carbonic Corp., 277 NLRB at 851. The
Board found that this language did not violate Section 8(e) on
its face, and thus interpreted it “to require no more than what is
allowed by law.” Liquid Carbonic Corp., 277 NLRB at 851,
citing Teamsters Local 982 (J.K. Barker Trucking), 181 NLRB
at 517. However, in that case, the clause also required that the
bargaining unit drivers’ employment continue with the entity
taking over the pick-up or delivery aspect of the contracting
employer’s operation. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 277 NLRB at
851; see Teamsters Local 277 (J & J Farms Creamery), 335
NLRB 1031, 1032-1033 (2001) (Member Liebman, dissenting).
In addition, the language at issue in Liquid Carbonic Corp. did
not explicitly apply to lessees or concessionaires, and required
a complete discontinuance of the use of the bargaining unit
employees’ equipment. Id; see also Teamsters Local 277 (J &
J Farms Creamery), 335 NLRB at 1032 fn. 3 (noting that the
contract provision in Liquid Carbonic Corp. “did not limit sub-
contracting to union signatories, in the first instance”). The
contract provision in that case could thus more arguably be
limited to a purchase or sale. Finally, despite the Board’s deci-
sion in Liquid Carbonic Corp., other clauses which specifically
refer to bargaining unit employees and their work were never-
theless found to be or have the effect of unlawful union signato-
ry provisions under Section 8(e). See Chicago Dining Room
Employees Local 42 (Gaslight Club), 248 NLRB at 605 (con-
tract provision required purchaser, lessee, or transferee to exe-
cute contract only in the event that they “employ[] employees
working in job classifications covered by this Agreement”);
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531 (Verdugo Hills
Bowl), 237 NLRB at 1204–1205 (clause provided that contract
was binding on a lessee or subcontractor that “utilizes the ser-
vices of employees performing work covered by this Agree-
ment”).
Given my conclusion that article XXII is unambiguous and
facially invalid, evidence of the parties’ intent in negotiating
and enforcing it is irrelevant. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Local 274 (Sheraton University Hotel), 326 NLRB at 1059.
However, the extrinsic evidence presented by the Joint Board
here indicates that the parties intended article XXII to operate
as a union signatory clause, as opposed to union standards or
work- preservation provision. Bonadonna was shop chair and
attended the 1989 negotiations where article XXII was first
negotiated (Tr. 125). He testified that Union Demand 1(h),
article XXII’s precursor during the negotiations, required “Ad-
herence to all provisions of the current labor agreement” from
any new owner of Xerox or a significant portion of the compa-
ny (Tr. 133). Bonadonna also testified that when describing
their agreement regarding article XXII during negotiations, the
parties stated that “whoever bought the company would have to
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 14A 11
honor the contract provision, provisions” (Tr. 141).8 Bargain-
ing notes refer to the proposal as a “successorship clause” (R.S.
Exh. 3(g), p. 344–345; see also GC Exh. 2). A Joint Board
newsletter describing the tentative agreement following the
1989 negotiations describes article XXII as “a guarantee that
the new contract will be honored even if Xerox were to be
sold” (CP. Exh. 1, p. 3). It is true that in the notes of the 1989
negotiations, the Union’s negotiator states that the purpose of
article XXII was to protect the bargaining unit employees and
their jobs (R.S. Exh. 3(b), p. 38, Exh. 3(g), p. 344-345). The
Joint Board was perfectly entitled to accomplish this objective
through a successorship provision applicable in the context of
sales or transfers of Xerox’s business. However, given the case
law distinguishing in the context of successorship and union
signatory clauses between purchases or transfers and leasing or
subcontracting, the inclusion of leasing in article XXII removed
the clause from the purview of a legitimate work-preservation
provision, causing it to run afoul of Section 8(e).9
Finally, the Joint Board’s Post-Hearing brief refers to Team-
sters Local 814 (Bader Brothers Warehouses), 225 NLRB 609
(1976), arguing that the General Counsel’s contentions here
contradict the Board’s decision in that case. I disagree. In that
case, which preceded the Board’s decisions in Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees Local 274 (Sheraton University Hotel), Chica-
go Dining Room Employees Local 42 (Gaslight Club), and
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531 (Verdugo Hills
Bowl), the Board affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that a clause
containing the following language did not violate Section 8(e)
in the context of a sale of the Employer’s assets and lease of its
premises:
In the event an entire operation or part thereof, is sold, leased,
transferred or taken over by sale, transfer, lease assignment,
receivership, or bankruptcy proceeding, such operation or part
of an operation shall continue to be subject to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement during the term hereof…In the
event the Employer fails to require the purchaser, transferee or
lessee to assume the obligations of this Agreement, the Em-

8 The Joint Board also argues that because the parties understood
that Union Demand 1(c) could not apply to a recently purchased sub-
sidiary of Xerox, they did not intend to apply contract language beyond
that which was legally permissible or feasible (R. S. Exh. 5). However,
Union Demand 1(c) extends the Joint Board’s jurisdiction to employees
in the vicinity of Monroe County, and is not a successorship clause or a
precursor to art. XXII. In addition, the fact remains that the Joint Board
did, through its statements and its grievance and lawsuit, seek to apply
art. XXII to leasing or subcontracting—beyond the permissible scope
of a union signatory provision under the relevant case law.
9 I also note that the evidence establishes that the Joint Board had
never before invoked art. XXII in the context of subcontracting. Fur-
thermore, it is undisputed that a purchaser, lessee, or transferee of Xer-
ox would have found it impossible to reproduce all of the terms and
conditions of employment enjoyed by bargaining unit employees under
the collective-bargaining agreement, because its employees would not
have been able to continue to participate in Xerox’s self-insured pen-
sion and health benefits plans. This state of affairs casts doubt on the
Joint Board’s contention that art. XXII was intended solely to ensure
that a purchaser, lessee, or transferee provided its employees perform-
ing bargaining unit work with terms and conditions of employment
commensurate with those provided for under the contract.
ployer shall be liable to the Union, and to the employees cov-
ered, for all damages sustained as a result of such failure to
require assumption of the terms of this Agreement; but shall
not be liable after the purchaser, transferee or lessee has
agreed in writing to assume the obligation of this Agreement.
Teamsters Local 814 (Bader Brothers Warehouses), 225 NLRB
at 610–612. The Board in its decision concurred with the gra-
vamen of the ALJ’s analysis of two previous cases involving
maritime shipping, which the ALJ distinguished to ultimately
conclude that the disputed provision did not violate Section
8(e). Teamsters Local 814 (Bader Brothers Warehouses), 225
NLRB at 609 fn. 2. However, the Board also referred to its
decision in Machinists District No. 71 (Harris Truck & Trailer
Sales, Inc.), 224 NLRB 100 (1976), holding that “the sale of
assets in liquidation” did not constitute “doing business” within
the meaning of Section 8(e), which issued between the ALJ’s
decision in Teamsters Local 814 (Bader Brothers Warehouses),
and its own. Teamsters Local 814 (Bader Brothers Ware-
houses), 225 NLRB at 609 fn. 1. The Board found that its
holding in Machinists District No. 71 (Harris Truck & Trailer
Sales, Inc.), provided “an alternative basis” for the ALJ’s ulti-
mate determination in Teamsters Local 814 (Bader Brothers
Warehouses). Id. Indeed, subsequently Teamsters Local 814
(Bader Brothers Warehouses), has been cited primarily for the
proposition that a sale or purchase does not constitute “doing
business” within the meaning of Section 8(e). See Liquid Car-
bonic Corp., 277 NLRB at 861; Heartland Industrial Partners,
LLC, 348 NLRB 1081, 1091 (2006), petition for review dis-
missed 265 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In any event, I find
the line of cases cited by the General Counsel and Xerox –
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 274 (Sheraton University
Hotel), Chicago Dining Room Employees Local 42 (Gaslight
Club), and Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531 (Verdugo
Hills Bowl)—more authoritative given their consistent analysis
and more recent provenance. As a result, I find that Teamsters
Local 814 (Bader Brothers Warehouses), does not contradict
the contention of the General Counsel and Xerox that union
signatory agreements, such as article XXII here, violate Section
8(e) in context of subcontracting, as opposed to a purchase or
transfer of assets.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I find that article XXII of
the collective-bargaining agreement between the Joint Board
and Xerox violates Section 8(e) of the Act.
C. The Joint Board’s Alleged Attempts to Enforce Article XXII
The complaint alleges that the Joint Board violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) when LaDue demanded written assur-
ances that JLL would assume Xerox’s obligations under the
collective-bargaining agreement during the parties’ meeting on
September 3. Because I find that under the relevant case law
LaDue’s comments during the September 3 meeting did not
threaten, coerce, or restrain Xerox, I conclude that the General
Counsel has not substantiated this allegation, and recommend
that it be dismissed.10

10 The complaint also alleges that the Joint Board violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) on July 24 and 28 when LaDue and Bonadonna,
respectively, told Xerox that subcontracting was prohibited by Article
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) prohibits labor organizations from
threatening, coercing, or restraining any person engaged in
commerce with the object of “forcing or requiring any employ-
er…to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by Section
8(e).” Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibits labor organizations from
threatening, coercing, or restraining persons engaged in com-
merce with the object of “forcing or requiring any person . . . to
cease doing business with any other person.”
I find that LaDue’s remarks at the September 3 meeting did
not threaten, coerce, or restrain Xerox within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B). During this meeting, LaDue
told Kelly and Calabria that the Joint Board took the position
that subcontracting of site facilities work would trigger Article
XXII. LaDue stated that Xerox was therefore required to pro-
vide 60 days’ written notice of the subcontracting to the Joint
Board, and that the Joint Board wanted written assurances from
JLL that JLL would honor the collective-bargaining agreement.
LaDue’s statement would thus constitute a reaffirmation of
Article XXII, in violation of Section 8(e). See, e.g., Teamsters
Local 251 (Material Sand & Stone Corp.), 356 NLRB No. 135,
slip op. at 2–3; Time Warner Cable of New York City, 344
NLRB 361, 364 (2005); Laborers Local 29 (RWKS Comstock),
344 NLRB 751, 754–755 (2005).
By contrast, there is no precedent for finding that a union’s
statement seeking compliance with a contract provision which
violates Section 8(e), unaccompanied by threats of legal or
economic action, constitutes a threat, restraint, or coercion
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B). The cas-
es finding Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) violations in connec-
tion with a contract provision violating Section 8(e) involve
definite statements that the union will take some sort of action,
such as picketing or other direct action involving the employ-
er’s business, if the employer does not comply with the unlaw-
ful contract language. In cases such as Sheet Metal Workers
Local 27 (AeroSonics, Inc.) and Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Local 531 (Verdugo Hills Bowl), cited by the General Counsel,
the union threatened to take economic action such as picketing
or refusing to handle products or work, if the employer failed to
comply with a contract provision violating Section 8(e). Sheet
Metal Workers Local 27 (AeroSonics, Inc.), 321 NLRB 540,
547–548 (1996) (union threatened to have its members refuse
to handle products manufactured by entities with whom the
union had a labor dispute unless the employer complied with an
award unlawfully interpreting a facially valid subcontracting
clause); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 531 (Verdugo
Hills Bowl), 237 NLRB at 1207 (union threatened to strike
employer if employer’s lessee did not assume collective-
bargaining agreement pursuant to unlawful union signatory
clause).
LaDue’s statements at the September 3 meeting, however,
merely sought to enforce the contract provision, without por-
tending economic or legal action if Xerox refused to comply.

XXII. There is no evidence that LaDue and Bonadonna made such
statements; as a matter of fact, Kelly testified that LaDue and
Bonadonna did not even mention art. XXII at the July 24 and 28 meet-
ings. As a result, I recommend that pars. VIII(b) and (c) of the com-
plaint be dismissed.
All of the evidence here indicates that Xerox and the Joint
Board entered into article XXII voluntarily in 1989. Thus,
there is no evidence of restraint and coercion above and beyond
from the contract provision, voluntarily agreed upon, which
violated Section 8(e). See Longshoremen Local 1410 (E. Har-
ris Mercer), 235 NLRB 172, 180 (1978) (Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A)
“requires independent proof that the employer party was re-
strained and coerced” in addition to the parties’ having entered
into a clause violating Section 8(e) “of their own free will”).
Nor does the evidence regarding LaDue’s statements at the
September 3 meeting rise to the level of restraint and coercion
under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Longshoremen Local 1410 (E.
Harris Mercer), 235 NLRB at 180–181. Instead of threatening
economic or legal action, LaDue was arguing that Xerox should
comply with contract language to which it had voluntarily
agreed. While his remarks may have constituted a reaffirma-
tion of the contractual provision which violated Section 8(e),
they did not entail restraint and coercion over and above what
the parties had already voluntarily agreed upon. The General
Counsel does not cite any authority to support a specific con-
tention that LaDue’s statement that Xerox’s subcontracting
violated article XXII of the collective-bargaining agreement,
and his demand for written assurances that JLL would apply the
contract, violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B).11 As a result,
I decline to find that LaDue’s statements at the September 3
meeting violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B), and will rec-
ommend that these allegations be dismissed.
Finally, the complaint alleges that the Joint Board violated
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) by filing and processing a griev-
ance alleging that Xerox violated article XXII, and by filing a
lawsuit in Federal district court seeking to enjoin Xerox from
subcontracting with JLL and to compel arbitration. I find that
by filing the August 21 grievance alleging that Xerox’s failure
to comply with Article XXII prior to subcontracting violated
the collective-bargaining agreement, the Joint Board violated
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) of the Act. Newspapers & Mail
Deliverers (New York Post), 337 NLRB 608 (2002); see also
Elevator Constructors (Long Elevator), 289 NLRB 1095,
1095–1096 (1988) (union violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) by
filing a grievance based on an interpretation of the contract
“that would convert it into a de facto hot cargo provision,” in
violation of Section 8(e)); Sheet Metal Workers Local 27
(AeroSonics, Inc.), 321 NLRB at 540 fn. 2, 548 (grievance with
a “cease doing business” objective violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B)). The Joint Board’s initiation of civil action
6:14-CV-6607 and motion for a preliminary injunction on Oc-
tober 27 in order to enjoin Xerox’s subcontracting prior to the
arbitration of the grievance likewise violates Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B). Sheet Metal Workers Local 27
(AeroSonics, Inc.), 321 NLRB at 548.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the evidence establishes that
the Joint Board violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) by filing
its August 21 grievance alleging that Xerox failed to comply

11 Xerox does not argue that LaDue’s statements at the September 3
meeting violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B), but only contends that
the Joint Board’s grievance and lawsuit were unlawful. Posthearing
brief for Charging Party at 17–18.
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD LOCAL 14A 13
with Article XXII, and by initiating a civil action on October 27
to enjoin Xerox’s subcontracting prior to the grievance’s arbi-
tration. I recommend that the complaint’s allegations that
LaDue’s statements at the September 3 meeting violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Xerox Corporation and Jones Lang LaSalle Americas,
Inc. are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Rochester Regional Joint Board Local 14A is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By entering into article XXII of its collective-bargaining
agreement with Xerox Corp., Rochester Regional Joint Board
Local 14A, violated Section 8(e) of the Act.
4. By filing a grievance to enforce article XXII on August
21, 2014, and by filing a civil action and a motion for a prelim-
inary injunction in the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York on October 27, 2014, seeking to
enjoin Xerox Corp. from subcontracting until the August 21,
2014 grievance was arbitrated, the Joint Board violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(A) of the Act.
5. By filing a grievance to enforce article XXII on August
21, 2014, and by filing a civil action and a motion for a prelim-
inary injunction in the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York on October 27, 2014, seeking to
enjoin Xerox Corp. from subcontracting until the August 21,
2014 grievance was arbitrated, with the objective of precluding
Xerox Corp. from doing business with Jones Lang LaSalle
Americas, Inc., the Joint Board violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the Act.
6. The Joint Board has not violated the Act in any other
manner.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Joint Board has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that article XXII of the collective-bargaining
agreement violates Section 8(e) of the Act as applied to “leas-
es” as specified in paragraph A(1), I shall recommend that the
Joint Board be ordered to cease enforcing only that portion of
article XXII which requires that a lessee or concessionaire be
bound by the agreement, as suggested by the General Counsel.
Teamsters Local 291 (Lone Star Industries), 291 NLRB 581
(1988).
Having found that the Joint Board violated the Act by filing
a grievance alleging that Xerox violated article XXII by its
subcontracting to JLL, and by filing a civil action in Federal
district court to enjoin Xerox’s subcontracting until the griev-
ance can be arbitrated, I shall recommend that the Joint Board
be ordered to withdraw its September 21, 2014 grievance alleg-
ing that article XXII was violated. As the object of the Joint
Board’s grievance was unlawful, I shall further recommend that
the Joint Board be required to seek dismissal of its action 6:14-
CV-6607 in the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York attempting to enjoin Xerox from subcon-
tracting until the grievance is arbitrated.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended
ORDER
The Respondent, Rochester Regional Joint Board Local 14A,
Rochester, New York, its officers, agents, and representatives,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Entering into, maintaining, enforcing, or giving effect to
those portions of article XXII of its collective-bargaining
agreement with Xerox Corp. which require that any lessee or
concessionaire assume the collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Pursuing its September 21, 2014 grievance alleging that
Xerox Corp. violated article XXII of the collective-bargaining
agreement in connection with its subcontracting to Jones Lang
LaSalle Americas, Inc.
(c )Pursuing civil action 6:14-CV-6607 filed on October 27,
2014, in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of New York seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining
Xerox Corp. from subcontracting to Jones Lang LaSalle Amer-
icas, Inc. until the September 21, 2014 grievance is heard.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Withdraw the September 21, 2014 grievance alleging that
Xerox Corp.’s subcontracting to Jones Lang LaSalle Americas,
Inc. violated article XXII of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and notify Xerox that the grievance has been withdrawn.
(b) Seek dismissal of civil action 6:14-CV-6607 in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the Western District of New York
filed on October 27, 2014, and motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin Xerox Corp. from subcontracting to Jones Lang
LaSalle Americas, Inc. until the September 21, 2014 grievance
is arbitrated.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Rochester, New York office copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Joint Board to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Xerox Corp. has gone out
of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Joint Board shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by Xerox Corp. at any time since July 1, 2014.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply.

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
Dated: Washington, DC April 28, 2015
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with
your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT enter into, maintain, enforce, or give effect to
those portions of article XXII of our collective-bargaining
agreement with Xerox Corp. which require that any lessee or
concessionaire assume the collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce or restrain Xerox Corp. by fil-
ing grievances, or initiating civil actions, where the object is to
force or require Xerox Corp. to enter into an agreement which
violates Section 8(e) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce or restrain Xerox Corp. by fil-
ing grievances, or initiating civil actions, where an object
thereof is to force Xerox Corp. to cease doing business with
Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., or any other person.
WE WILL withdraw the September 21, 2014 grievance alleg-
ing that Xerox Corp.’s subcontracting to Jones Lang LaSalle
Americas, Inc. violated article XXII of the collective-
bargaining, and notify Xerox that the grievance has been with-
drawn.
WE WILL seek dismissal of civil action 6L140CV-6607 in the
United States District Court for the Western District of New
York filed on October 27, 2014, and motion for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin Xerox Corp. from subcontracting to Jones
Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. until the September 21, 2014
grievance is arbitrated.
ROCHESTER REGIONAL JOINT BOARD, LOCAL 14A
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CC-137244 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.