Reading & Bates, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 22, 1967

164 N.L.R.B. 812 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

812 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Reading & Bates, Inc. and Patrick La Riviere
and Alaska Petroleum Crafts Council and
International Union of Petroleum Workers,
affiliated with Seafarers International
Union of North America , AFL-CIO. Cases
19-CA-3343,19-CA-3345, and 19-CA-3355
May 22,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On January 12, 1967, Trial Examiner Maurice
Alexandre issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
also found that Respondent had not engaged in other
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and
recommended dismissal of these allegations.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and Respondent
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision,
supporting briefs, and answering briefs.' The
Charging Parties filed a statement joining in General
Counsel's exceptions and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, as modified herein.
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
Robert W. Moore and three other employees were
discriminatorily discharged in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act because of their union sympathies
and activities. However, in finding that Moore's
sleeping on the job on one occasion provided a
pretext for termination, the Trial Examiner
nevertheless stated that Moore (1) was not ill at the
time of that incident and (2) appeared to have a
penchant for loafing on the job. The General Counsel
excepts to (1) and (2) and contends that these
findings are not supported by the evidence. We find
merit in this position.
The record shows that many employees were
suffering from influenza and Moore testified on both
direct-and-cross examination and without con-
tradiction that he was ill at the time of the fore-
going incident. Moreover, there is no evidence
beyond this episode to indicate that Moore had a
penchant for loafing. We therefore find, contrary to
the Trial Examiner, that there is no adequate basis
for finding that Moore was not ill or that he had a
propensity for loafing on the job. Accordingly, we
hereby disavow said findings of the Trial Examiner.
2. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
Respondent, in instituting a 10-percent wage
increase on January 26, 1966, retroactive to
January 23, 1966, was motivated by a desire to
forestall union organization of platform B employees
and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As
the Trial Examiner by inadvertence did not
incorporate this finding in his Conclusions of Law
and made no reference thereto in the cease-and-
desist portion of his Recommended Order, we shall
make the appropriate modification in the Order.
3. The General Counsel contends, and we agree,
that the Trial Examiner's proposed notice to the
employees is incomplete on the ground that it does
not meaningfully address itself to all of
Respondent's unfair labor practices, particularly its
unlawful acts of interrogation and the unlawful wage
increase. We shall therefore expand the notice to
cover these violations.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
modified below, and hereby orders that Respondent,
Reading & Bates, Inc., its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order,
as herein modified:
1. Reletter paragraphs 1(b) and (c) as paragraphs
1(c) and (d) and insert the following new paragraph
1(b):
"(b) Granting increases to encourage employees
to abandon and defeat the Union."
2. Reletter paragraphs 2(b) and (c) as paragraphs
2(c) and (d), and insert the following new paragraph
2(b):
"(b) Notify the above-named employees if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of their right to full reinstatement, upon
application, in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces."
3. Substitute the following Appendix in lieu of the
Appendix presently attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision.
' Respondent's request for oral argument is denied because the
record, exceptions, and briefs adequately set forth the issues and
the positions of the parties
164 NLRB No. 96
READING & BATES 813
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein
be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges
unfair labor practices not specifically found in the
Trial Examiner's Decision.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board , and in order to effectuate
the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
International Brotherhood of , Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization of our employees, by unlawfully
discharging them or otherwise discriminating in
regard to their hire , tenure of employment, or
any other terms or conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees
concerning their membership or activities on
behalf of the above Union, or any other labor
organization , or make threats of reprisal or
promises of benefit because of such activity.
WE WILL NOT grant wage increases to
encourage employees to abandon or defeat the
Union or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, to
join or assist the above Union, or any other
labor organization , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or any other
mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL offer Robert E . Evans, Floyd
Langston , Claude Hebert , and Robert W.
Moore immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights or privileges , and pay them for all back
wages lost as a result of their unlawful
discharges.
All our employees are free to join or refrain from
joining any labor organization, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreeement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
READING& BATES, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
Note: We will notify the above-named employees,
if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of their right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 327 Logan Building, 500 Union Street,
Seattle, Washington 98101, Telephone 583-4532.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MAURICE ALEXANDRE, Trial Examiner: This matter was
heard before me at Anchorage, Alaska, from August 15
through 19, 1966, upon the consolidated complaint of the
General Counsel, issued on June 20, 1966,1 and amended
at the hearing,2 alleging that Respondent had violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended. In its answer as amended at the hearing,
Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor
practices. The issues presented are:
1. Whether or not the Respondent, through certain
named supervisors,3 violated Section 8(a)(1) by unlawfully
I Based upon charges filed on March 15, 1966, by Patrick La
Riviere, on March 18, 1966, by Alaska Petroleum Crafts Council,
and on March 28, 1966, by International Union of Petroleum
Workers, affiliated with Seafarers International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO During the hearing , Respondent twice
moved to strike the charges of March 18 and 25, 1966, and to
dismiss the complaint insofar as it was based on such charges, on
the ground that such charges were not filed in good faith,
inasmuch as the dischargees named therein had not been
consulted by the Charging Parties and did not know that the
charges were filed, and because the charges contained statements
which would allegedly be established as false in a collateral
proceeding . In the course of oral argument presented by
Respondent in support of its motion, which I denied, statements
were made which prompted me to admonish counsel to refrain
from any attack upon each other's integrity Thereafter,
Respondent sought and obtained leave to withdraw not only its
motion to strike the charges , but also all argument and
observations made in connection therewith , conceding , inter alta,
that the admonition to counsel had been appropriate
In its brief, Respondent again refers to irregularities and
misconduct in connection with the charges , and requests that the
proceeding be remanded for further investigation thereof The
request is denied It is hornbook law that a charge does not
constitute either a pleading or evidence , that it is merely a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the issuance of a complaint , and that
it may be filed by anyone with or without the permission and
knowledge of those named therein Moreover, the motion to strike
the charges having been voluntarily withdrawn, it cannot now be
revived
, The formal appearance of Peter B Walton, Esq , for the
council was entered at the commencement of the afternoon
session on the third day of the hearing.
3 Donald R Stewart, Charles Coleman, William J.
L'Hirondelle, Omega Walker, David Brown, and Dwain C Foster.
Respondent 's answer admits , the record establishes , and I find,
that these individuals were supervisors
814 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
interrogating and threatening to discharge employees, and
by instituting a wage increase on or about January 26,
1966, in order to frustrate organization by its employees 4
2. Whether or not Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) by discharging five-named employees. s
Upon the entire record,", my observation of the
witnesses, and consideration of the briefs filed by the
General Counsel and the Respondent following an
extension of time, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS7
1. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
In September 1965, preparatory to fulfilling its contract
to drill offshore oil for Pan American Oil Company in Cook
Inlet, situated near Anchorage, Alaska, the Respondent
began assembling a permanent all-weather floating
platform which it called platform B. Drilling for oil began
about December 15, 1965.
In the latter part of that month or the beginning of
January 1966,8 Pan American hired six roustabouts to
assist Respondent's employees on platform B. Such
roustabouts, who were unionized, received higher wages
than their counterparts on platform B; and upon learning
of such higher wages, Respondent's roustabouts
complained to their supervisor, Jessie Curl. Sometime
during the first week or 10 days of January, Curl expressed
the opinion to his supervisor, William J. L'Hirondelle,"
that Respondent's pay scale was out of line, and
L'Hirondelle thereupon brought the matter to the attention
of Donald R. Stewart, who was then superintendent in
charge of Respondent's Alaska operations.
On January 10, employees Claude Hebert and Patrick
La Riviere decided to ascertain how many of the
employees on platform B wished to unionize. Accordingly,
Claude Hebert and La Riviere, along with employees
Chester Quick and Jess Taylor, signed a blank sheet of
paper (hereafter called the petition or the list) which was
then circulated for the signatures of other employees on
the platform. Stewart testified that he first learned about
the petition when he overheard a conversation between
employees Stuckey and Benson in January 1966, that he
did not know what petition they were talking about, and
that he then "started listening" to conversations of
employees on the platform. Stewart admitted that as a
result of the information which he received concerning
Curl's complaint, he thought that the petition related to an
attempt to obtain a wage increase; that he wanted the
employees to be satisfied with their working conditions;
and that he wished to know what complaints they had
regarding wages. However, he gave contradictory
testimony as to whether he discussed the petition with
Supervisors Coleman, L'Hirondelle, Brown, and Walker,
and as to whether he asked Coleman and L'Hirondelle
what the petition was for. Coleman testified that Stewart
informed him that it was his duty to find out what, if
' Respondent's answer admits the wage increase.
5 Robert E. Evans, Floyd Langston, Claude Hebert, Dan B
Hebert, and Robert W Moore Respondent 's answer alleges that
the discharges were for cause.
6 The General Counsel's unopposed motion to correct the
transcript is granted
No issue of commerce is presented The complaint alleges
and the answer admits facts which establish that Respondent is
anything, the employees wished so that they could be
satisfied, and that Coleman replied that he "would find out
if there was any trouble amongst us."
B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. Interrogation and threats
(a) The General Counsel relies on the following
testimony to establish unlawful interrogation and threats
by Respondent' s supervisors . Employee Claude Hebert
testified that on January 11, the day after he and Patrick
La Riviere began circulation of the petition , Supervisor
Coleman called him into his room on platform B, stated
that he wished "to find out about this petition," asked who
had started it, and specifically inquired whether "Pat" had
started it. Initially, Hebert professed ignorance as to what
petition Coleman referred to. He then admitted that he
had signed it, but denied knowledge as to whether it was
started by La Riviere.
Employee Robert W. Moore testified as follows. A few
days after the petition began circulating, Coleman stated
that he had information that Moore had the petition in his
possession and that if so, Coleman wanted it. Although
Moore had the petition, he denied that fact because he
wished to obtain additional signatures and to deliver it to
the union office, and feared that Coleman would take it
from him. On the following day, Coleman called him into
his office and asked what he "thought about that union
deal" and why he wanted a union, and Moore told him his
"gripes." After telling Moore that he was a good worker,
Coleman stated that he "would hate to see a man like you
go"; and after informing him that the employees working
on a platform operated in Alaska by Sante Fe Drilling
Company were then voting for the union and that seven
men had already been discharged, Coleman stated that
"You can always find some excuse to run a man off."
Employee Hilton Bell testified that in early January,
Coleman asked him whether he had signed the petition;
that upon receiving an affirmative answer, Coleman asked
why and was told "Because everybody else did"; that
about a week later, Coleman asked Bell to disclose who
was circulating the petition and the latter replied that he
did not know; that about the time of that conversation,
Coleman again asked Bell whether he knew who was
circulating the petition; and that upon receiving a negative
reply, Coleman stated that "if he did, he would run him
off. ""'
Employee Milton Fikes testified that early in January,
Coleman asked in a jocular manner whether he had heard
about the "union deal," and that he replied: "Yes, I signed
the list." Employee Darral Palmature testified that
sometime in January, Coleman asked whether he "had
heard about La Riviere's union list," received a negative
reply, and stated: "I don't see what these boys want a
union for ... I wouldn't want one. . . . It seems mighty
communistic to me, telling me what I could do and what I
couldn't do." Palmature further testified that about a week
later, Coleman asked him whether he had signed "that
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act
I find such facts to be as pleaded.
" All dates hereinafter mentioned relate to 1966 unless
otherwise indicated
Also known as "Running Bear "
Employee Bell testified that the term "run off" meant
discharge
READING & BATES 815
union list"; and that he replied affirmatively, stating that
the men needed more money.
Employee Raymond Six testified that about February,
during a jocular conversation, Coleman asked what he
knew about the petition. Employee Ronald Wild testified
that in early March, Supervisor Foster told him that
Coleman had asked Foster "to find out who these union
people were" and had stated that "he was going to fire
them"; that Foster asked Wild whether he knew who they
were; and that at about that time, Supervisor L'Hirondelle
asked him "who was working on organizing the union out
there."
Employee Palmature testified that on March 10,
Supervisor Foster stated that he had to fire employee
Floyd Langston, and asked whether Langston "wasn't
fouled up in that union."
I credit the foregoing uncontradicted testimony,'' and
find that it establishes unlawful interrogation and threats
by Respondent's supervisors. The widespread character of
the attempts to ascertain who began, circulated, and signed
the petition, and which employees were attempting to
organize a union, necessarily had a coercive effect upon at
least some of Respondent's employees. Moreover, the
employees questioned were neither advised of the purpose
of the interrogation nor reassured that there would be no
reprisals against those who had circulated or signed the
petition. On the contrary, Coleman's threats to fire those
circulating the petition showed that the interrogation did
not involve idle curiosity, had no valid purpose, and was
deadly serious despite its jocular context on two occasions.
Since the circulation and signing of the petition in order to
ascertain how many employees were interested in
unionizing constituted protected activity, the interrogation
and threats regarding such activity interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
(b) The General Counsel also relies on the following
testimony by La Riviere. About January 23, while
Supervisor Brown was present, Coleman stated to La
Riviere that "he would like to see the union list" and might
want to sign it himself, but La Riviere professed ignorance
of any list. About 5 or 10 minutes after Coleman and
Brown left, the latter returned and, in the presence of
employees Milton Fikes and Anthony Norris and using
obscene language, angrily accused La Riviere of trying to
get everyone fired and stated, "You are in trouble now."
On the following day, when La Riviere told Coleman of his
conversation with Brown, Coleman asked him how he was
doing with his list. About 1 or 2 hours later, Brown
apologized to La Riviere, stating that he was sorry about
"last night," that he no longer knew what was right or
wrong "about this union matter," that he "had seen this
union thing happen one time before," and that "It makes
everybody mad."
In its brief, Respondent attacks La Riviere's credibility.
Although La Riviere testified that he signed the petition
about January 20, the record shows that it had
disappeared about January 13, and since he was one of its
originators and was active in circulating it for signatures, it
is reasonable to believe that he must have known about
when it disappeared. The record further shows that he
deliberately injured himself to obtain workmen's
compensation because he anticipated discharge'12 an act
which bespeaks his unreliability. Accordingly, absent
corroboration, I would not credit La Riviere's testimony.
The record, however, contains corroboration. Neither
Coleman nor Brown contradicted La Riviere's testimony
regarding his conversations with them. Employee Norris
corroborated Brown's obscene language, and employee
Fikes corroborated the obscene language, threat, and
subsequent apology. Employee Palmature testified that
during one of his conversations with Coleman, referred to
above, the latter stated that he had asked La Riviere, in
the presence of Brown, to show him the petition, that La
Riviere denied knowledge of the petition, and that Brown
later became angry. Palmature further testified that
Coleman informed him that Brown had called La Riviere
an obscene name. Although a portion of Palmature's
testimony consisted of hearsay, it was not objected to. And
since Coleman did not contradict such testimony, I find
that it has corroborative value. Accordingly, I credit La
Riviere's testimony and find that he was unlawfully
interrogated by Coleman and threatened by Brown.
(c) The General Counsel also relies on the testimony of
employee Dan Hebert that on January 26, Coleman asked
him whether he had seen the petition that was being
circulated by some employees who want things a little
better, and that Coleman stated: "As long as we can get
those boys up from Louisiana they will never organize. "13
According to Dan Hebert, he had just returned to platform
B after 5 days' leave, and had not heard of the petition
prior to Coleman's reference thereto. He further testified
that he was told on January 26 or 27 by employee Claude
Hebert that he and La Riviere had prepared a petition to
see whether they could obtain sufficient support for a
union on the platform, and that the petition was then out
on the crane.
In its brief, Respondent attacks Hebert's credibility.
The record shows that the two Heberts were friends and
perhaps relatives, and that they discussed union matters
on several occasions. It thus seems improbable that Dan
Hebert would have heard of the petition for the first time
as late as January 26 or 27, and from Coleman rather than
from Claude Hebert or another employee. Moreover, since
Claude Hebert testified that the petition disappeared
about January 13, it is implausible to believe that he told
Dan Hebert on January 26 or 27 that the petition was then
out at the crane. Accordingly, I do not credit Dan Hebert's
testimony regarding his conversation with Coleman on
January 26 or 27, and find that it fails to establish a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The wage increase
It is undisputed that Respondent instituted a 10-percent
wage increase for platform B employees on January 26,
retroactive to January 23. The General Counsel contends
that Respondent adopted the increase in an attempt to
frustrate organization of a union on platform B.
Respondent insists that its supervisors were unaware that
the employees on platform B were seriously considering
unionization , that the wage increase merely followed an
annual pattern, that the increase was necessary in order
for Respondent to remain competitive in a tight labor
" Respondent's brief does not discuss any of such testimony
except to rely upon Moore's denial to Coleman that he had any
knowledge of the petition.
12 According to the uncontradicted testimony of employee
Anthony Norris
13 Superintendent Stewart testified that Louisiana was about
the only place where experienced personnel could be recruited for
platform B, and that many of the employees on the platform had
been obtained from that State
816 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
market , and that it had no relationship to union
organization . I agree with the General Counsel.
The record shows that Superintendent Stewart learned
about the existence of the petition , began listening to
employee conversations, and asked Coleman and
L'Hirondelle to find out what the petition was for. Stewart
admittedly believed that the petition had something to do
with a wage increase, but he undoubtedly also suspected
that it related to unionism as well . That was Supervisor
Walker's admitted belief. Moreover, Coleman,
L'Hirondelle, and Foster interrogated a number of
employees regarding the "union petition" and union
activity. After the disappearance of the petition, it was
replaced by blank cards which were circulated for
signature by the employees who desired to unionize.
Although the employees sought to conceal the cards,
Stewart admittedly learned of them from supervisors.
Indeed as Stewart testified, in view of the close proximity
in which all the personnel lived on the platform, there were
not many secrets among them . 14 I find that
Superintendent Stewart and other supervisors were
aware, prior to the wage increase of January 26, that
platform B employees were seriously considering
unionization.
Although Respondent had engaged in collective
bargaining in the past and had hired known union
adherents , 15 it does not necessarily follow that its
supervisors would take no action to prevent the formation
of a union on platform B. Superintendent Stewart
admitted that he had been antagonistic toward unions in
the past, felt that a union was not needed on platform B,
and would have been very concerned if the platform were
unionized because he feared union interference in his
conduct of Respondent's affairs. Coleman admitted to
somewhat similar views. Based on these admissions and
the interrogation and threats already referred to, I find
that Stewart was interested in preventing unionization of
the employees on platform B.
I further find that Stewart gave contradictory evidence
regarding the circumstances relating to and the reasons
14 The platform measured approximately 110 by 125 feet,
consisted of two stories, and contained two drilling rigs and other
equipment , living quarters for the employees , a dining room, a
galley, recreation room , radio room , a heliport, and other
necessary facilities . By January 1966, the platform was fully
manned with approximately 50 employees divided into six crews,
i e., three crews for each of the two rigs . Under the practice
followed, two crews operated the two rigs for a 12-hour shift for 10
days, two crews remained off duty but on board for a 12-hour shift
for 10 days, and two crews were off duty on shore for 5 days As a
result, there was a crew change every 5 days
11 I note in this connection that experienced employees were
difficult to obtain and retain on platform B
is Stewart's testimony was that soon after a general wage
increase was instituted in the industry in California on January 1,
he began to give consideration to recommending an increase for
platform B employees , that he advised his superior in
Respondent 's Houston office, Thornton , regarding the California
wage increase and recommended an increase for platform B
employees, that when Coastal Drilling Co , a California company
which competes with Respondent for labor, increased wages on
January 17 , he notified Houston regarding the amount of the
increase , and that on January 26 , he was authorized to grant a 10-
percent increase
17 Contrary to the claim in Respondent's brief, I find that the
record does not establish a pattern of wage increases in the month
for the wage increase . On direct examination , he testified
that he recommended the increase in order to keep pace
with an industrywide wage raise in California on
January 1.16 On cross-examination , he testified that he
made no reference to competitors when he recommended
the wage increase ; that because Respondent had granted a
pay increase every year since its offshore operations had
begun , he assumed that there would be an increase in
January;" and that he suggested an increase of 15 cents
an hour in order to keep pace with the spiraling cost of
living.18 In view of such contradictions , both reasons
advanced for the wage increase are suspect. 19
In addition, I do not credit Stewart's testimony that in
his telephone conversation with Thornton, he did not refer
to unions or to the dissatisfaction of platform B
roustabouts over the fact that the union roustabouts
temporarily assisting them received higher wages. As
already found, Stewart had learned about such
dissatisfaction and the petition , suspected that the petition
related to unionization , and instructed Coleman to
ascertain the employees' complaints so that they could be
satisfied. It would have been most unusual for him to have
failed to report this problem to Thornton. In this
connection, I note that Stewart did not call Thornton
until after Curl complained about the higher wages re-
ceived by the union roustabouts.
Finally, the relationship between the wage increase and
the union petition is shown by the testimony of employee
Norris. According to Norris, at the time Coleman
announced the increase to the men, Coleman asked what
they thought of the union now. Although Coleman denied
that he stated anything other than the amount and
retroactive date of the wage increase, I credit Norris'
testimony . Coleman was a partisan and somewhat evasive
witness. Norris, who was still employed by Respondent at
the time of the hearing, gave testimony which was both
favorable and unfavorable to the Respondent.
In sum, I find that the wage increase was motivated by a
desire to forestall organization of platform B and thus
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
of January During negotiations in 1963 between Respondent and
Alaska Petroleum Crafts Council, one of the Charging Parties
herein, the parties failed to agree to a contract proposing, inter
alia, wage increases effective July 1, 1964 , and January 1, 1965
Superintendent Stewart testified that Respondent adhered to the
pay scale provided in the proposal , but instituted the 1965
increase in the spring rather than in January , because it had no
offshore operations in the latter month.
1" Stewart's testimony was that in view of his assumption that a
wage increase would be made as in the past , the only questions to
be decided were the effective date and amount , that during the
first or second week in January , prior to the increase adopted by
Coastal Drilling Co., he telephoned his Houston office and
recommended a 15-cent - per-hour wage increase because it would
take that amount to keep the employees on a par with their
earnings the preceding year , that he made no reference to his
competitors , and that on January 26, Thornton informed him that
a 10-percent increase , which equaled 30 cents an hour, had been
decided upon in order to remain competitive with other drilling
contractors in the area who had raised wages. Stewart testified
that Thornton did not refer to any specific competitor, but on
further cross-examination stated that Thornton approved the
wage increase because of the increase adopted by Coastal Drilling
Co on January 17.
1" Responden .'s brief makes no claim that the spiraling cost of
living played any part in the wage mci ase
READING & BATES 817
C. The Five Discharges
1. Robert E. Evans
a. The evidence
Evans had worked for the Respondent in 1960 and 1964.
During his employment in the latter year, he was a
member of a Teamsters local, and Superintendent Stewart
knew that he was a union member. About November 1,
1965, Supervisor L'Hirondelle offered Evans a job as a
mudman20 because he needed someone who knew what he
was doing. Evans accepted the job, and Supervisors
Coleman and Walker both felt that he did good work. He
was discharged by Walker on February 15.
Evans signed the petition in January in the hallway just
outside the washroom, which was a meeting place for the
employees on platform B. After the petition disappeared,
he was active in seeking signatures on blank cards to
determine how many employees on the platform were
interested in unionizing; but as far as he was aware, no
supervisors knew of the cards. In addition, he openly wore
union buttons on his cap while on the platform; and in
February, in response to an inquiry by Supervisor
Coleman, he explained that the buttons were Teamsters
dues buttons. Supervisor Walker testified, although
somewhat equivocally, that he did not know that Evans
was a union member.
In January or February, Coleman found a blank
Teamsters bargaining card on his desk, asked
L'Hirondelle whether he had ever seen it before, and
received a negative reply. Coleman testified that he did
not believe that he talked to Superintendent Stewart or to
any of the other supervisors about the card. Stewart
testified that Coleman told him about the card; that later
the same day, L'Hirondelle also told him about it; but that
he never talked to Walker about bargaining cards. Walker
gave evasive and contradictory testimony as to whether or
not the petition and a bargaining card or cards were
mentioned or discussed in any of his conversations with
Stewart and Coleman; but admitted that he believed that
the petition and/or cards related to a union, and that he
preferred not to have a union on platform B.
In the early morning on February 15, Evans was
awakened by Supervisor Walker, who handed him a
termination slip without comment. Evans testified that his
work had never been criticized and that he had not been
warned of possible discharge; that following his discharge,
he could not locate Walker on the platform and asked
Supervisor Brown why he had been discharged, but the
latter was not aware of the discharge; that 3 days later, he
asked Office Manager Bryson why he had been fired and
blackballed in the oil field, and Bryson stated that he did
not know; and that he later asked Coleman why he had
been fired but Coleman did not answer the question.
Walker testified on direct examination that he was told
that Evans spent considerable time standing around
drinking coffee; that in February, he told Evans that he
would have to show more interest in his job; that about 10
p.m. on February 14, he found Evans sitting on the mud
pump drinking coffee instead of mixing mud; that he then
and there decided to fire Evans; and that he gave him a
termination slip the following morning. On cross-
examination, Walker testified he awoke Evans at 5 a.m.
that morning to give him the termination slip so that he
would have time to catch the 8 a.m. helicopter. Walker
further testified on cross-examination that it is dangerous
to operate the platform when it is shorthanded; that
employees are asked to "double up," i.e., work beyond
their normal shift, only in an emergency and for a short
time; that he could not recall whether the platform was
shorthanded at the time he fired Evans; that employees
were hard to get; that it was not customary to fire an
employee at a time when the platform was shorthanded if
it was not known whether or not replacements were
immediately available; that it was not practical to fire an
employee without assurance that a replacement was
immediately available, because it was more practical to
retain an employee who might be a little slow in
performing his duties than to be without anyone to do the
work; that he could not recall whether there was an extra
man on the platform at the time he fired Evans or whether
he had a replacement for him that day or the following
week; that when he fired Evans he had another man in
mind who could take his job; that he put that man in Evans'
job but could not recall his name; that the man was not "a
mud man"; that it is possible that he did some doubling up
when he replaced Evans the day after his discharge; and
that he later obtained a replacement for the man who was
put in Evans' job.
On redirect examination, Walker testified that
Respondent tries not to tolerate keeping an employee on
the platform if he is not performing his work or is away
from his work station; that it tries to correct that situation
as soon as possible by relieving the employee or firing him
and getting someone to replace him; that some off-duty
employees were ordinarily available for emergency
overtime work and could usually be reached; and that he
did not believe that Respondent had ever been unable to
obtain an off-duty replacement for an employee who had
been relieved or fired.
Superintendent Stewart testified that there is normally a
scarcity of good personnel; that in the wintertime, he had
even greater difficulty in maintaining full crews because
some men do not enjoy the shipboard-like conditions on
platform B; that the platform was shorthanded and six
roustabouts were sent by Pan American to assist
Respondent's employees in January; that some of the
roustabouts were still on the platform at the time of the
hearing in August; that Stewart had been told of Evans'
union membership by L'Hirondelle; and that he was sure
that Evans was replaced because each crew has a required
number of men.
b. Analysis and conclusions
I agree with the General Counsel's contention that the
discharge of Evans was motivated by antiunion
considerations. I do not credit Walker's testimony that he
did not know that Evans was a union member.
Superintendent Stewart knew it. Supervisor Coleman
knew that he was a member of the Teamsters. Stewart
discussed the petition and cards with at least some of the
supervisors, and the latter interrogated and threatened a
number of employees regarding union activities. In
addition, Stewart and Walker both gave evasive and
20 The job involved caring for he mud pits and mixing
chemicals and muds for the drilling op-ration.
818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
conflicting testimony as to whether they had discussed the
petition and cards. In my opinion, it would be naive to
believe that Walker was not apprised of Evans' Teamsters
affiliation and of the Teamsters card which Coleman found
on his desk. Indeed, Respondent's brief states that "Evans
was very active on behalf of the Teamsters, [and] known
to be so." I find that Walker knew of such affiliation.
Respondent argues that Evans' known union
membership had never prejudiced his employment with
Respondent, and hence that there is no basis for
concluding that his discharge was motivated by his union
activity. I disagree. Although Superintendent Stewart
employed union members on platform B,21 it does not
follow that he would not and did not oppose organization of
the platform employees. It is one thing to tolerate union
memberships by some employees; it is quite another to
permit union organization by a majority of the employees.
Stewart was admittedly antagonistic to unions and had
openly displayed his hostility, and there is no reason to
suppose that he concealed his views from the supervisors
on platform B. Nor is there any reason to believe that
Walker's similar antiunion attitude was not influenced by
the views of his superior. In these circumstances, and
considering the interrogation and threats already found, it
is not unreasonable to believe that Walker concluded that
the Teamsters were seeking to organize the employees on
platform B and that it was desirable to eliminate an active
Teamsters member by discharging Evans.
The circumstances surrounding Evans' discharge tend
to support that interpretation of Walker's conduct. From
Walker's testimony regarding his admonition to Evans
regarding his coffee drinking, it does not seem that he was
especially exercised about the situation. Certainly, he did
not warn Evans that he would or even might be discharged
therefor. Moreover, despite Respondent's explanation, it
seems odd that Walker should find it necessary to awaken
Evans at 5 a.m. to discharge him. Respondent has
suggested no urgent reason for getting Evans off the
platform on the 8 a.m. helicopter. Walker's precipitate
action is particularly strange in view of the fact that an
experienced mudman was not immediately available on
the platform to replace Evans, that the need to replace
Evans may have compounded an existing shortage of
employees on the platform, and that it was admittedly
preferable to retain an unsatisfactory employee until a
replacement was obtained because of the danger inherent
in being shorthanded. In contrast, although there had been
even greater provocation for firing Employee Claude
Hebert the preceding January, Supervisor Brown testified
that Hebert was not discharged because there was no
immediate replacement (see discussion below).
In sum, I find that Walker's concern regarding Evans'
coffee drinking constituted a pretext , that Evans was
discharged because of his activities in connection with the
attempt to organize the employees on platform B, and that
his discharge violated Section 8 (a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
2. Floyd Langston
a. The evidence
Langston had worked for Respondent in 1963 and 1964.
He was recruited again in the early part of 1965 in
Louisiana, and Respondent paid his fare to Alaska. Shortly
before Christmas of that year, he reported for duty on
platform B where he worked as a mudman. Supervisors
Coleman and Foster were both of the opinion that
Langston was a good worker. He was discharged by Foster
on March 10.
Langston testified that he could not recall whether he
signed the petition; but that he signed a blank card in
January, later went to the Teamsters hall to obtain
bargaining cards, received signed Teamsters cards from
other employees on platform B, obtained the signature of
two employees on the day before his discharge, signed a
Teamsters card on the day of his discharge, and took the
cards to the Teamsters hall on an unspecified date. He
further testified that no supervisor saw the signed cards in
his possession or knew that he had received signed cards
from other employees.
Prior to March 6, Langston had never been told that his
work was unsatisfactory. He testified that beginning about
that date, he had the flu and the quality of his work
decreased; that on March 10, Supervisor Foster, his
immediate superior, informed him that he was discharged
pursuant to orders from Coleman, who had stated that he
was not keeping up his work; that Foster indicated that he
had talked to Coleman for about an hour about the matter;
and that Foster then asked whether Langston had had
"anything to do with this union."
Foster testified as follows. About March 8, his
immediate superior, Coleman, instructed him to talk to
Langston because he was not paying attention to and
keeping up with his work.22 So far as Foster knew,
Langston had always kept up; but when asked by Foster,
Langston admitted that he had been a little slack in his
work. Foster admonished Langston to improve and the
latter agreed to try. It was evident that most of the
employees on the platform did not feel well at the time;23
"everybody got lax on their job"; and although Langston
did not state that he was sick, it is very possible that he
was. Langston's performance thereafter improved. On
March 10, Coleman instructed Foster to discharge
21 I have already noted his difficulties in obtaining and keeping
employees on the platform.
22 Foster, who was called as a witness by the General Counsel,
furnished the foregoing testimony on direct examination On
cross-examination, he gave the following conflicting testimony as
to what Coleman had instructed him to tell Langston
Q When Mr Coleman discussed with you this situation of
Mr. Langston didn't he lust say to you, "I think you better be
taking a closer look at Floyd, he isn't picking them up and
laying them down fast enough and keeping his attention to his
work"
A That is more or less what he said, yes, sir
Q And did he say to you that you ought to fire him or
anything like that, what did he say to you to do?
A tletoldmetotalktohim
Q So, then, two or three days later Mr Coleman reported
to you that he had observed Floyd not performing his work
properly , being away from his work, and asked you to
indicate to him that if he didn 't want to stay and keep up with
the work that he would have to let him go, didn't he?
A Yes.
21 On March 11, during an influenza epidemic , Respondent
arranged for a physician to examine and treat a number of
employees on platform B When asked on cross-examination
whether there was much sickness on platform B at that time,
Coleman replied , "There could have been "
READING & BATES 819
Langston. Coleman agreed at the time that it appeared
that Langston had improved. Foster, who did not expect
that Langston would be fired, tried to persuade Coleman
not to discharge him24 and asked Coleman: "Well, if he is
keeping up why don't we try to keep him?" Coleman
replied that it seemed that Langston no longer took an
interest in his work, and that if he was going to "pull slack
on his work," there was no room for him on the platform.
Foster thereupon carried out Coleman's instruction to
discharge Langston.
Coleman testified as follows: The quality of Langston's
work began to fall off about 3 or 4 days before he was
discharged. On March 7, he found Langston away from his
duty station and pointed out work which needed to be
done. About that time, he told Foster that the mudroom
was not being properly attended to and that things had to
change. Foster agreed. Later, in response to an inquiry
from Foster as to whether Langston had improved,
Coleman replied that Langston "did perform exact duties
. . . and nothing more." When asked at the hearing
whether there was anything wrong with that, Coleman
testified that Langston "still wasn't watching the mud,"
that he knew that because he continued to find Langston
away from his duty station, and this occurred at least six
times on March 10. Accordingly, he instructed Foster to
discharge Langston on that date.
The next morning, while waiting for the helicopter,
Langston admitted to Coleman that he had not kept up his
work. Coleman testified that he would rehire Langston if
he applied for work, but he never asked for reemployment.
b. Analysis and conclusions
There is no doubt that the quality of Langston's work
deteriorated prior to his discharge. Nevertheless, he had
been a valued employee of the Respondent prior to that
time, and the deterioration began only several days before
the discharge. In such circumstances, the discharge
seems rather sudden. Moreover, there is considerable
doubt as to the extent to which he fell down in his work.
Foster, his immediate superior, was not disturbed by
Langston's performance and failed to confirm Coleman's
testimony that he agreed that the mudroom was not being
properly cared for. Also, Foster was aware that lax
performance was common on the platform owing to the
influenza epidemic at that time.25 In any event, after
Foster talked to Langston pursuant to Coleman's
instructions, 26 his work improved and Foster did not
expect that Langston would be discharged. And although
Coleman apparently agreed that this was so when Foster
tried to persuade him to retain Langston, he nevertheless
refused to change his mind. Such refusal is especially
strange, since the record shows that experienced
personnel was difficult to obtain and that a shortage of
employees on the platform created a dangerous situation.
In addition to the foregoing considerations, the record
contains evidence which links the discharge to Langston's
organizational activities. Thus, although Langston
believed that his possession of signed Teamsters cards
was unknown to any supervisor, the fact remains that after
receiving instructions from Coleman to discharge
Langston, Foster asked employee Palmature whether
Langston was involved with the Union, and I credit
Langston's uncontradicted testimony that he was asked
the same question by Foster at the time of his discharge.
For these reasons, and considering the independent
violations of Section 8(a)(1) already found, I find that
Coleman either knew or suspected that Langston was
involved in union activity, and instructed Foster to
discharge him because of such activity. Accordingly, the
discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. Claude Hebert
a. The evidence
Claude Hebert had worked for the Respondent in 1959
and 1961. He was hired again in Louisiana by the
Respondent, which paid his transportation expenses to
Alaska, and he reported for duty in September 1965 on
platform B, where he operated a crane. He was discharged
by Supervisor Coleman on March 11.
As already noted, Hebert along with employee La
Riviere began the petition on January 10, was interrogated
about it the next day by Coleman, admitted that he had
signed it, thereafter obtained signatures on the petition
during January, but testified that the petition never passed
through his hands in the presence of a supervisor. During
February, he arranged for Teamsters bargaining cards to
be sent to him on platform B, distributed cards to several
employees on the platform, signed a card on February 20,
and returned signed cards to the Teamsters Union.
According to employee Wild, Hebert and employee Moore
were often mentioned as the main union sympathizers on
platform B.
During the first week of January, while operating a
crane, Hebert negligently permitted a 3,000 pound
armature to fall 6 feet. As a result, the armature shaft was
bent, it took 3 weeks to have it repaired, and Supervisor
Brown reprimanded Hebert. Brown testified that he
reported the incident to Superintendent Stewart, told
Supervisor Coleman that he thought Hebert should be
replaced, but that he did not discharge Hebert at that time
because he "didn't have anybody to replace him at the
moment." Walker testified that in January or February,
Hebert refused to unload a boat with his crane because of
rough weather, but finally agreed, and proceeded to
unload it without difficulty. Walker further testified that in
January or February, he requested Hebert to be less
reckless in handling equipment because he was
endangering other employees, and to shout less when
giving instructions to those under him.
Hebert admitted that he had been cautioned once about
going to the locker room to meet employee Mouser,
instead of following the usual practice of waiting for a
relieving employee to arrive. Coleman testified that about
a month prior to Hebert's discharge, he informed Hebert
that Supervisors Knott, Walker, and Brown, as well as
other employees, had complained about him; that Knott,
24 During the conversation of March 10 in which, as found
above, Foster told employee Palmature of his instructions to fire
Langston and in which he asked Palmature whether Langston
was "fouled up in that union," Foster also stated that he thought
that Langston had been doing a pretty good job and that he was
going back to try to persuade Coleman to reconsider the
discharge.
25 Coleman's testimony was less than candid when he was
questioned regarding illness on platform B.
26 1 accord little probative weight to Foster's response to the
leading question propounded on cross-examination, and find that
Coleman did not instruct Foster to warn Langston of possible
discharge.
298 -668 0-69- 53
820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
who was Hebert's immediate supervisor, wanted to fire
him because nobody could work around him; that
Coleman, who knew that Hebert's wife was sick and that
he had financial difficulties, offered to give him one more
chance before discharging him; and that Hebert agreed to
improve. Thereafter, his work improved but then fell off
again. Hebert testified that that was the last time he
received any complaint prior to his discharge.
About 8:30 a.m. on March 11, Hebert was in the
electrician's shack on platform B, discussing union
matters with Dan Hebert, when Coleman entered the
shack momentarily and left. An hour later, Coleman
discharged him. Employee Moore testified that on that
date, Coleman walked past him, pointed to the shack, and
said, "Your buddies are in there"; that he went to
Coleman's office and asked what he meant by that
remark; and that Coleman replied, "nothing, it was just a
beef." Coleman testified that he did not know whether
Dan Hebert was in the shack with Claude Hebert at the
time, and that he did not remember seeing or talking to
Moore after leaving the shack. He further testified that
Claude Hebert did less than 5 minutes' work between 7
and about 9:30 a.m. on March 11; that although Hebert
could not have had any work to do in the shack, he was
there for about an hour on that date; that finding Claude
Hebert in the shack was the "immediate thing" that
caused his decision to discharge him; and that shortly
thereafter, he informed Hebert that he no longer needed
his services on the platform.
Coleman further testified that he "was short a crane
operator because [he] terminated Claude Hebert." There
is conflicting testimony as to whether employee Moore was
assigned to operate the crane on the night of March 11 and
was replaced by employee Hill the next day, or whether he
was assigned to help Hill with the crane that night. It is
undisputed, however, that Coleman instructed Moore, who
had worked from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. on that day, to resume
work at midnight, and that the latter worked until noon the
following day.
Claude Hebert testified that while on the plane to
Anchorage following his discharge, he told Supervisor
Brown that he knew he had been discharged because he
had union cards; and that Brown replied that "he didn't
know why Charlie27 was fighting the union so hard."
Employee Palmature testified that on March 10 or 11,
while sitting in front of Claude Hebert and Brown on the
plane to Anchorage, he heard the two men "talking about
Claude and a couple more of the boys getting run off," and
that Brown stated "that he wasn't going to fight the union
like Charlie was, he was going to try to get along with the
men." Claude Hebert testified that about 5 days after his
discharge, Supervisor Knott told him that he had asked
"Charlie" whether the latter "did the right thing," and
that Charlie replied, "Yes, I got the right man. I am fixing
to get another one." Hebert further testified that about 3
weeks after his discharge, he went to see Superintendent
Stewart, whom he had known for a long time ; that he
talked to Stewart about obtaining transportation back to
Louisiana and they did not discuss his own discharge; but
that Stewart stated that the employees were causing him
considerable trouble; and that Hebert's reply was that
Stewart had caused considerable trouble by having the
employees fired.
b. Analysis and conclusions
It is obvious that Respondent had ample provocation to
discharge Hebert for cause. The question is whether he
was in fact discharged for cause or because of protected
activity. I find that such activity was the reason for his
discharge.
It is understandable that Respondent would not carry
out its alleged desire to discharge Hebert in early January,
when he operated the crane negligently, because there
was no immediate replacement for him. However,
Respondent had ample time to find a replacement
between that time and March 11, during which period it
continued to be dissatisfied with Hebert's performance.
Nevertheless, Respondent merely continued to warn him.
This indicates that the dissatisfaction was only mild.
When he was finally discharged, a replacement had not
yet been obtained, the discharge admittedly left the
platform shorthanded, and Respondent found it necessary
to direct employee Moore to return to work at midnight on
March 11, even though he had already worked from 6 a.m.
to 6 p.m. that day. The admitted danger inherent in being
shorthanded was thus compounded by Moore's two 12-
hour shifts separated by little time to sleep, as well as by
the illness prevalent on the platform at that time. These
considerations suggest that it was not until Claude Hebert
was found discussing union matters in the electrician's
shack that his performance became intolerable to the
Respondent; and this view receives support from
Coleman's remark to Moore that his "buddies" were in the
shack.28
In addition, employee Palmature corroborated Claude
Hebert's testimony that during a discussion of the
discharge on the flight to Anchorage the following day,
Supervisor Brown admitted to Hebert that Coleman was
actively fighting unionism on the platform. In addition,
according to Hebert, several days after his discharge,
Supervisor Knott told him that Coleman had stated that he
had the "right man." Brown did not contradict the
testimony of Hebert and Palmature, which I credit. I also
credit Hebert's testimony regarding Knott's conversation
with Coleman. Although that testimony was hearsay, no
objection thereto was raised at the hearing, Coleman did
not contradict the testimony, and Respondent did not call
Knott as a witness
I find that Coleman overheard Claude Hebert's
conversation in the electrician's shack regarding the
Union and concluded, correctly, that Hebert was active in
promoting unionism on the platform; that Coleman
discharged Hebert because of his activity on behalf of
unionism ; and that Hebert's shortcomings as an employee
are merely an afterthought advanced by Respondent to
conceal its real motive. Respondent argues that Hebert's
failure to discuss the discharge with Superintendent
Stewart, whom he had known for many years, shows that
his participation in union activities had nothing to do with
his discharge and that even Hebert did not believe it did. I
disagree. It is apparent from his discussion with Brown
following his discharge that Hebert believed he was fired
for union activities. Moreover, it is clear that Hebert held
Stewart responsible for the discharge. Since Stewart had
not countermanded the discharge by the time of their
conversation 3 weeks later, and in view of Stewart's
27 Presumably Coleman convincing and I do not credit it I credit Moore's testimony that
t" Coleman's testimony that he did not know whether Dan Coleman saw Moore and made the reference to his "buddies"
Hebert was in the shack , and that he did not remember seeing or which Moore did not understand , since such testimony dovetails
talking to employee Moore after leaving the shack, is not with admitted facts.
READING & BATES 821
statement that the employees were causing him
considerable trouble, there was no reason for Hebert to
believe that a discussion of his discharge with Stewart
would be fruitful. Accordingly, I find that the discharge of
Claude Hebert violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. Robert W. "Buddy" Moore
a. The evidence
Moore was hired to work on platform B as a helper in
September 1965, worked briefly as a crane operator,
returned to his job, and was then transferred to welding.
He was discharged by Coleman on March 13.
On January 10, Moore failed to report for work because
he was drunk. On the following day, when he returned to
the platform, Coleman put him back to work with a
warning not to repeat the offense.29 Thereafter, Moore
signed and helped circulate the petition; and as already
found, when questioned by Coleman shortly after the
petition began to circulate, although denying that he had
the petition, he in effect admitted his desire for a union,
was told that he was a good worker, and was impliedly
threatened with discharge for union activity by Coleman,
who stated that an excuse therefor can always be found.
Moore later signed a Teamsters bargaining card, but did so
in the privacy of his room, gave the card to employee
Claude Hebert, and never saw it again. Employee Wild
testified that along with Claude Hebert, Moore was often
mentioned as one of the main union sympathizers on
platform B.
It is undisputed that sometime on March 13, Moore
went to sleep during work time; that while making his
rounds on the platform, Supervisor L'Hirondelle
discovered that fact; and that he thereupon reported his
observations to Coleman. The time of day is in dispute.
Moore testified that he went to bed about 3 o'clock in the
evening. L'Hirondelle testified that he found Moore asleep
in the "morning." Coleman testified that L'Hirondelle
made his report about 9 a.m., and that Moore later
admitted that he had stopped working at 2 a.m., about 2
hours after he went on duty.
Shortly after his report to Coleman, L'Hirondelle
returned to Moore's room and informed Moore that
Coleman had stated that this would be a good time for him
to go home. Moore had earlier requested leave to visit his
home and was under the impression that L'Hirondelle's
statement signified approval of his request. He
accordingly sought out Coleman and asked when he
should return. On direct examination, Moore was asked
four times regarding the ensuing conversation. The
substance of his testimony was that Coleman told him that
he was discharged because he failed to work at a time
when the platform was shorthanded; that he informed
Coleman that no one had told him to do so at the time; and
that Coleman did not reply. On cross-examination, he
testified that he also informed Coleman that he had the flu.
Coleman testified that Moore told him that he could not
find anything to do and went to bed, and that he
discharged Moore for that reason.
Moore left the platform shortly thereafter. He testified
that on the following day, March 14, while travelling with
Coleman on the plane to Anchorage, he asked the latter to
tell him the real reason for his discharge; that Coleman
stated that he could not tell him; but that Coleman replied
affirmatively when Moore asked whether he would hire
him on some other job. Employee Norris testified that
while sitting behind the two men at the airport on that day,
he overheard Moore's inquiry for the reason he was fired,
and that he understood Coleman's answer to be, "if we
were down south, I could tell you more." Coleman's
testimony regarding that conversation was that Moore
asked whether he could go back to work, that Coleman
replied that some day he probably would put him back to
work, that Moore asked Coleman to help him obtain a job
on the Gulf Coast, and that Coleman agreed to help him.
b. Analysis and conclusions
It is unnecessary to resolve the conflict as to whether
Moore went to sleep at 2 a.m. or at 3 p.m. on March 13
since it is clear, and I find, that the incident took place
during Moore's working time.30 Contrary to the
contentions of the General Counsel, I further find that
Moore was not ill at the time of the incident," and that
Moore was given a reason at the time Coleman discharged
him, namely, sleeping on the fob 32 Such conduct was
considered to be a serious matter by Respondent, and the
record shows that L'Hirondelle's brother had been
discharged for similar conduct. Moreover, Moore had been
warned on January 11 about his failure to report for duty
on the preceding day. It thus appears that Respondent had
ample cause to discharge Moore.
On the other hand, contrary to Respondent's contention,
I find that Respondent's knowledge of Moore's union
sympathy and activities is supported by Coleman's
interrogation of Moore, the latter's admission that he
favored a union, and his reputation as a leading union
proponent on the platform. In addition, Coleman impliedly
threatened to discharge him for union activity, stating that
an excuse can always be found, and later made an oblique
reference to the presence of his "buddies" in the
electrician's shack.
If the record contained nothing more, I would conclude
that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of
proof. and that Coleman discharged Moore for sleeping on
29 Moore had been on his regular 5-day leave Coleman testified
that 90 percent of the employees who quit fail to report for duty
after their leave, that sometimes an employee who had failed to
report for duty for the first time would be permitted to go back to
work if he returned prior to the arrival of his replacement, that
Coleman assumed that Moore had quit; and that he had called for
a replacement
30 According to Moore, his shift on March 13 was from 6 a in to
6 p in According to Coleman, Moore was scheduled to work from
midnight to noon on March 13 Under either version, Moore went
to sleep during worktime, and no contrary contention has been
made
31 Moore did not testify on direct examination that he told
Coleman that he went to sleep because of illness, and referred to
illness for the first time on cross- examination In addition, Moore
appears to have had a penchant for loafing on the job, and
admitted that at midnight on March 12, after being told by
employee Hill that he was taking over Moore's temporary
operation of the crane pursuant to Coleman's instruction, he went
to bed because he did not know of anything else he could do
except to return to welding the following morning Moore also
admitted that the platform was shorthanded, that each employee
was required to do all he could to help keep the operations going,
that he was capable of performing a number of different tasks,
that it was not necessary for him to be given orders from hour to
hour as to what to do, and that he normally went on to other work
whenever he completed a task
32 There is, however, nothing to show that any supervisor knew
that Moore had gone to sleep during working hours on March 12
as well as on March 13
822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the job. I am, however, unable to reach that conclusion in
view of the testimony, which I credit, that Coleman
refused to reveal his true reason for the discharge during
his conversation with Moore at the airport on March 14.'3
Such refusal was a most peculiar response from one who
claimed to have discharged an employee for sleeping on
the job and who specified that reason at the time of the
discharge. Had Coleman in fact discharged Moore for that
reason, it is strange that he should have refused to repeat
the reason. Absent some reasonable explanation for his
refusal, I conclude that he implemented his threat to
Moore and had found "some excuse to run a man off."
Accordingly, I find that Moore's misconduct was merely a
pretext, and that Coleman discharged him because of his
union sympathy and activity, thereby violating Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. Dan B. Hebert
a. The evidence
Dan Hebert was employed by the Respondent as an
electrician in Louisiana from July 1962 to May 1965, when
he was transferred to Alaska. He then worked for several
months under the supervision of L'Hirondelle on the
Venmac, a tender utilized by the Respondent in
connection with an offshore drilling barge. About
September 1965, he was transferred to platform B where
he worked under Coleman's supervision, then returned to
the Venmac for a time, and finally worked again on
platform B until March 13, when he was discharged by
Coleman.
Hebert testified that during the period from January 27
until he was discharged, he discussed the union with, and
expressed a prounion attitude to, a number of employees,
largely in the living quarters on the platform. In early
March, he told Supervisor Foster that the employees
wished to be unionized and asked for Foster's views.
Hebert further testified that he signed a Teamsters
bargaining card on March 10,34 and confirmed Claude
Hebert's testimony regarding the occasion on March 11
when Coleman entered the electrician's shack while the
two Heberts were discussing union matters.
L'Hirondelle testified that he and Hebert frequently
disagreed about the number of hours worked which the
latter recorded on the drilling reports reviewed by
L'Hirondelle;3' that he told Hebert he was "padding his
time"; that Hebert sometimes corrected the figures but at
other times L'Hirondelle made the correction with
Hebert's consent; that when he transferred Hebert to
platform B in September 1965, he advised the platform
supervisors to watch Hebert for possible padding of time;
and that he did not think there was any need to discharge
Hebert since the latter had corrected the time reports in
his presence. Coleman testified that he was advised of
Hebert's padding of overtime; that in September or
October 1965, in reply to an inquiry by Coleman, Hebert
admitted that he had not worked the 8 hours which he had
recorded for a particular day; and that Hebert stated that
John Bush, Respondent's overall electrical supervisor, had
told him that whenever he worked along with contract
electricians furnished to Respondent by an electrical
company, he "could just as well be drawing as much
money as they are."36 According to Coleman, he told
Hebert that Bush was not running the payroll, that
Coleman would make the decisions, and that he wanted
only the number of hours actually worked to be
recorded.37 Hebert testified that he and Coleman never
discussed the arrangement he had with Bush.
Supervisor Brown testified that on an unspecified day in
February, Hebert worked from noon to 6 p.m. but recorded
12 hours of work in the drilling report; that Brown so
informed Supervisor Walker; and that he later saw that
the 12 hours had been changed to 6 hours in the report.
Hebert testified that Walker asked him whether he was
reporting time not spent on the platform ; that he could not
approve a report of time worked while Hebert was not
officially on duty; but that Walker did not warn him of
possible discharge. Hebert further testified that on the
occasions when his overtime reports were corrected, he
did not object.
Superintendent Stewart testified that on one occasion,
he noted a greater amount of overtime on Hebert 's report
for the first pay period in February than that which
appeared on the report of an electrician who had worked
on the same job with Hebert, and that he asked Coleman
to investigate . Coleman testified that he discussed
overtime with Hebert in February. Hebert testified that
when Coleman complained about excessive overtime, he
replied that he was not working any time not required of
him, and that Coleman made no reply.
Coleman testified without contradiction that on
March 10, Hebert arrived on the platform about 1:30 p.m.
and could not have worked more than 5 hours, since he
stopped at 6 p.m.; that the next morning, he noticed that
Hebert had recorded 12 hours in the drilling report; that
when he called the matter to his attention , Hebert agreed
to change the figure but did not keep his promise ; and that
he was paid for 12 hours. Coleman further testified that
during the same conversation , he instructed Hebert to
hook up certain indicator lights without stopping until the
work was completed; that Hebert could have worked 14
hours on that job but recorded 18 hours; and that on the
following day, March 12, he talked to Hebert about the
matter, referred to the fact that Hebert had argued with
him regarding the overtime on March 10, and stated that
he was not going to argue about the subject any more.
II Moore's testimony regarding such refusal was corroborated
by employee Norris Coleman did not expressly contradict either
Moore or Norris Assuming that his testimony may be regarded as
tacitly contradicting them, as between Coleman and Norris, I give
greater credence to the latter's testimony for reasons already
stated above
14 Superintendent Stewart testified that during a conversation
with Hebert about March 25, the latter stated that he signed the
card after his discharge, i e., after March 13
as On both the Venmac and platform B, it was the practice for
each electrician to record his own working hours
w Hebert's version of the arrangement was different from the
one described by Coleman Hebert testified that it was necessary
for him, on his days off, to spend considerable time at an electrical
warehouse in Anchorage obtaining electrical parts which were
missing from the materials sent to platform B by Respondent from
Houston , that because Bush was aware of no company provision
for reimbursing employees who worked on their own time, he told
Hebert to add the time he worked while on leave to the number of
hours worked on platform B, and to report the sum of the figures
as the number of hours worked on the platform, and that Hebert
followed that practice in recording his time
3' Superintendent Stewart testified that Bush had no authority
to alter the company pay scale, and that Bush had never talked to
him about the method of compensation of electricians on platform
B or about the compensation of any platform employee while he
was off duty
READING & BATES 823
Later that day, Coleman communicated with employee
Renfrow, an electrician who was then off duty, and told
him to return to the platform. On the next day, March 13,
Coleman instructed Renfrow to go to work. According to
Hebert, Renfrow informed him that Coleman was going to
fire him, Hebert then sought out Coleman to ask for an
explanation, and Coleman told him that his "traces hadn't
been tight enough"38 and questioned him about his
overtime reports. Hebert testified that he replied that all
time which he reported had been worked and that it was
usual to warn a man and give him a chance to tighten his
traces; but that Coleman stated that he did not wish to
argue about the matter, and discharged him. Coleman's
version of the conversation was that when Hebert asked
why Renfrow had returned, he replied that he was tired of
reports claiming time not worked on the platform, that
Hebert's traces had not been tight, that he was either
daring Coleman to fire him or merely seeing how much
money he could make by padding the payroll, and that
Renfrow would take his place.
Hebert further testified that on March 24 or 25,
Superintendent Stewart asked him whether he would drop
the charges filed with the Board if he was restored to his
job. Stewart testified that he merely asked Hebert what he
knew about the charges.
b. Analysis and conclusions
I agree with the Respondent's contention that Dan
Hebert was discharged for padding his overtime. His
implausible testimony concerning his conversations about
the petition on January 26 or 27, discussed above, shows
that he knew nothing about the petition until after it had
disappeared. His subsequent organizational activities on
the platform consisted largely of expressing prounion
views. And there is nothing in the record which even
suggests an unlawful motive for his discharge other than
the incident involving the electrician's shack. Standing
alone, that incident is insufficient to establish that his
discharge was discriminatory.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that Hebert's
overtime reports had been corrected with his approval on a
number of occasions so as to reduce the number of
working hours for which he received payment. It is true
that Respondent had tolerated overstatements of overtime
by Hebert for many months despite the fact that Bush had
no authority to approve payment for work while an
employee was off duty, and despite instructions that
Hebert report only authorized overtime. It is also true that
Coleman's tolerance did not become exhausted until
shortly after the incident at the electrician's shack.
However, the circumstances immediately preceding
Hebert's discharge are wholly consistent with the view
that Coleman eventually concluded that he could no longer
overlook Hebert's continued disregard of his instructions
regarding overtime. Thus, on March 10, Hebert again
inflated his overtime, Coleman ordered him to correct the
figure, he agreed, but he failed to do so and was overpaid.
Two days later, Hebert again overstated his overtime and
Coleman finally, and understandably, lost his patience and
decided to discharge Hebert.
It may well be that Coleman suspected that Dan Hebert
was assisting Claude Hebert in organizing the employees
and was delighted to rid the platform of another union
adherent. But I am persuaded that he would have
discharged Dan Hebert on March 13 because of his
inflated overtime reports irrespective of any suspicions he
may have harbored regarding union activities by Hebert.
Accordingly, I find that the discharge was for cause and
did not violate the Act.
II. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action which
I find necessary to remedy and remove the effects of the
unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Affirmatively, I shall recommend that Respondent offer
to Robert E. Evans, Floyd Langston, Claude Hebert, and
Robert W. Moore immediate and full reinstatement to the
respective positions which they held at the time of their
discharges, or to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and
privileges, dismissing if necessary employees hired
subsequent to such discharges. I shall further recommend
that Respondent make each of them whole for any loss of
pay suffered because of his discriminatory discharge by
paying to each a sum of money equal to that which he
would have been paid by Respondent from the date of his
discharge to the date on which Respondent offers, or has
already offered, reinstatement as aforesaid, less his net
earnings, if any, during the said period.39 The loss of pay
under the order recommended shall be computed in the
manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Finally, I shall recommend that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices which
have not been established.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By unlawfully interrogating its employees concerning
protected activities, and by threatening them with
discharge therefor, Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By discharging Robert E. Evans, Floyd Langston,
Claude Hebert, and Robert W. Moore because of their
protected activities, Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The allegations of the complaint that Respondent
engaged in unfair labor practices by Coleman's
interrogation of and remarks to Dan B. Hebert on
January 26, and by discharging Dan B. Hebert, have not
been sustained.
an Hebert understood the term to mean that he was not diligent
in his work He testified that he had received no prior complaints
about the quality of his work
"'" In its brief, Respondent makes no reference to its offer,
made in open hearing on August 16, 1966 , to reinstate Evans, and
no opinion is expressed herein respecting any of the problems
involved in that offer Among other things, the record does not
disclose whether Evans accepted and Respondent fulfilled its
offer
824 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Reading & Bates, Inc., its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unlawfully interrogating employees concerning
protected activities, and threatening them with discharge
therefor.
(b) Discouraging membership in any labor organization
by discriminating against any of its employees in regard to
their hire, tenure, or any term or condition of employment.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of any of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Offer to Robert E. Evans, Floyd Langston, Claude
Hebert, and Robert W. Moore immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions, and make them whole for any loss of pay they
may have suffered by reason of Respondent's
40 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the
section herein entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents on request, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of
reinstatement under the terms of this Recommended
Order.
(c) Post at its office in Anchorage, Alaska, at platform
B, and at all other places where it customarily posts
notices to employees of the said platform, copies of the
notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix. "40
[Board's Appendix substituted for Trial Examiner's
Appendix.]
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.41
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of Section 8(a)(1)
which have not been established, and insofar as it relates
to the discharge of Dan B. Hebert.
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
41 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the
Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to
comply herewith "