RDM Concrete Masonry, LLC, Collective Concrete & Masonry and REMCO Concrete, LLC, alter ego.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 13, 2018

366 NLRB No. 34 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 34
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
RDM Concrete & Masonry, LLC, Collective Con-
crete, Inc.,1 and Remco Concrete, LLC, Alter
Egos and a Single Employer and New Jersey
Building Laborers District Council. Case 22–
CA–181515
March 13, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN KAPLAN AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND MCFERRAN
On November 3, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Jef-
frey P. Gardner issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondents Collective Concrete, Inc. and Remco Con-
crete, LLC filed exceptions and a supporting brief and
the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed an-
swering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, conclusions, and
remedy,2 and to adopt the judge’s recommended Order as
modified and set forth in full below.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents RDM Concrete & Masonry, LLC, and Col-
lective Concrete, Inc., alter egos and a single employer,

1 We amend the caption to correct the name of the Respondent Col-
lective Concrete, Inc.
2 In affirming the judge’s remedy, we clarify that the Respondents
shall make whole unit employees by, inter alia, making all delinquent
contributions to the Union’s benefit funds set forth in the collective-
bargaining agreement, including any additional amounts due the funds
in accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216
fn. 7 (1979). The Respondents shall also reimburse unit employees for
any expenses ensuing from the failure to make the required benefit fund
contributions, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 252
NLRB 891, 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981).
Such amounts shall be computed in the manner set forth in Ogle Pro-
tection Service, Inc., 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th
Cir. 1971), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River
Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). To the extent that an employee
has made personal contributions to a fund that are accepted by the fund
in lieu of the employer’s delinquent contributions during the period of
delinquency, the Respondents will reimburse the employee, but the
amount of such reimbursement will constitute a setoff to the amount
that the Respondents otherwise owe the fund.
3 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order to conform to
his unfair labor practice findings and to the Board’s standard remedial
language, and we have substituted a new notice to conform to the Order
as modified.
and their alter ego Remco Concrete, LLC, Toms River
and Jackson, New Jersey, their officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain col-
lectively with the New Jersey Building Laborers District
Council (the Union) as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of their employees in an appropriate unit of
Laborers, by refusing to apply the terms and conditions
of their collective-bargaining agreement, including wage
rates and benefit fund contributions.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Honor and abide by the terms and conditions of
their collective-bargaining agreement with the Union and
make whole their employees in the bargaining unit for
any loss of pay and other benefits suffered as a result of
the Respondents’ refusal to apply the collective-
bargaining agreement to all unit employees, in the man-
ner set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s deci-
sion.
(b) Make whole their employees for any expenses en-
suing from the Respondents’ failure to make required
contributions to the Union’s benefit funds and make
whole the Union’s benefit funds for losses suffered, in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s
decision as clarified in this decision.
(c) Compensate affected employees for the adverse
tax consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum backpay
awards, and file with the Regional Director for Region
22, within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay awards to the appropriate calendar
year for each employee.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
their Toms River and Jackson, New Jersey facilities cop-
ies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 22, after being signed by the Respondents’
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondents and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physi-
cal posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or
an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Re-
spondents customarily communicate with their employ-
ees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Re-
spondents have gone out of business or closed the facili-
ties involved in these proceedings, the Respondents shall
duplicate and mail, at their own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondents at any time since Novem-
ber 30, 2015.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 22 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondents have
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 13, 2018
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.

ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to recognize and bargain
with the New Jersey Building Laborers District Council
(the Union) as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of our employees in the bargaining unit by re-
fusing to apply the terms and conditions of our collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, including wage rates and
benefit fund contributions.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL honor and abide by the terms of our collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the Union, and WE WILL
make whole our employees in the bargaining unit for any
loss of pay and other benefits suffered as a result of our
refusal to apply the collective-bargaining agreement to
all unit employees, plus interest.
WE WILL make all delinquent payments to the Union’s
benefit funds and WE WILL make you whole for any ex-
penses ensuing from our failure to make such payments,
including any additional amounts due to the funds on
your behalf, with interest.
WE WILL compensate affected employees for the ad-
verse tax consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum
backpay awards, and WE WILL file with the Regional Di-
rector for Region 22, within 21 days of the date the
amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or
Board order, a report allocating backpay awards to the
appropriate calendar years for each employee.
RDM CONCRETE & MASONRY, LLC,
COLLECTIVE CONCRETE, INC., AND REMCO
CONCRETE, LLC, ALTER EGOS
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/22-CA-181515 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
RDM CONCRETE & MASONRY, LLC, COLLECTIVE CONCRETE, INC., AND REMCO CONCRETE, LLC, ALTER EGOS 3
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Sharon Chau, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Ronald L. Tobia, Esq., for Collective Concrete and Remco
Concrete.
Christopher Errante, Esq., for RDM Concrete.
Raymond G. Heineman, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JEFFREY P. GARDNER, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Newark, New Jersey, on May 17, June 15 and 19,
2017. The consolidated complaint alleges that the three named
Respondents (hereinafter separately identified as RDM, Collec-
tive, and Remco) are alter egos of each other, and, together, a
single employer. It also alleges that those entities (sometimes
collectively referred to in the singular as Respondent) violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to
recognize the Charging Party Union (hereafter the Union), on
and after February 15, 2016, as the bargaining representative of
its employees engaged in laborer’s work; and repudiating and
refusing to apply the applicable collective-bargaining agree-
ment to the Remco bargaining unit employees. Respondent
denied the essential allegations in the complaint. After the trial,
the parties filed briefs, which I have read and considered.1
Based on those briefs and the entire record, including the tes-
timony of the witnesses and my observation of their demeanor,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent and each of its individual entities are engaged in
operating concrete and masonry businesses with locations in
the State of New Jersey. They admit and stipulate to the
Board’s jurisdiction, including that they are engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act. It is also admitted and stipulated that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
(See Tr. 20–21 and GC Exh. 1.)2

1 Tobia filed a brief on behalf of Collective and Remco. Errante did
not file a separate brief on behalf of RDM, but joined in the submission
of the brief on behalf of Collective and Remco and submitted what he
described as a position statement on the issues.
2 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for the
Transcript, “GC Exh.” for the General Counsel’s exhibits, “CP Exh.”
for the Charging Party’s exhibits, and “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s Ex-
hibits. Specific citations to the transcript and exhibits are included only
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
THE FACTS
The three entities in this case, Collective, RDM, and Remco,
are populated by members of the Ciullo family: Mark Ciullo,
his wife Deborah,3 his son Ryan, daughter Desiree, and Ryan’s
wife, Jennifer. To avoid confusion, their first names will be
used hereafter.
Collective is Formed
Collective was formed in 1998 as a concrete and masonry
business. Ryan Ciullo is its sole owner. He was 22 years old at
the time and still living with his parents. (Tr. 23, 32, 48.) He
described himself as Collective’s “project manager” (Tr. 22);
and he was “in charge of the jobsites.” (Tr. 33.) Prior to form-
ing Collective and since graduating from high school, Ryan had
been working for his father Mark’s masonry and concrete busi-
ness, known as D&M Construction. (Tr. 295–296.) At that
time, D&M was “folding” and Mark was “on [the] downswing
of his career,” according to Ryan. (Tr. 297.) From the incep-
tion of Collective, Mark worked for Collective, mostly in the
office. Mark also visited jobsites, in connection with making
job bids and meeting with project superintendents. (Tr. 33–36,
134–136.) According to Ryan, Mark “would coordinate every-
thing” and “confirm major decisions with me.” (Tr. 298.)
Ryan’s sister, Desiree, was the office manager for Collective
and his wife, Jennifer, helped out in the office or with paper-
work. (Tr. 27–32, GC Exh. 5.) Ryan, Mark, and Desiree were
all authorized to engage in bank transactions with Sovereign
Bank on behalf of Collective. (GC Exh. 8.)
In its certificate of incorporation, Collective listed its address
as 55 Bay Breeze Drive, Toms River, New Jersey, the residence
of Ryan’s parents and the home owned by Mark. (Tr. 25, 32,
47–48, GC Exh. 4.) That same year, 1998, in a corporate reso-
lution submitted to open a bank account, Collective listed its
address as 460 Faraday Avenue, Jackson, New Jersey. (GC
Exh. 8.)
Sometime in 2001, while Mark was at one of Collective’s
jobsites, he spoke with a representative of the Union and
agreed, on behalf of Collective, to sign a short form agreement
with the Union. Shortly thereafter, a short form agreement was
sent to Collective’s office and signed, on April 3, 2001, by
Ryan. (GC Exh. 6, CP Exh. 1, Tr. 321.) Subsequently, Collec-
tive agreed to three additional and successive short form
agreements with the Union. (CP Exh. 1, Tr. 38, 141–145, 217–
224, 321.) The short form agreement contains a provision stat-
ing that, by signing, Collective agreed to be bound by the terms
of the master agreement between the Union and various con-
struction employers in the area of the Union’s jurisdiction,
which are “incorporated herein as if set forth in full.” Subse-

where appropriate to aid review, and are not necessarily exclusive or
exhaustive.
3 Deborah’s name is erroneously spelled as Debra in the transcript;
documentary evidence showing her signature confirms the correct
spelling. I also correct the following at p. 66 of the transcript. At L. 3,
“Judge Gardner” should be substituted for “Witness;” and, at L. 5,
“Witness” should be substituted for “Judge Gardner.”
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
quent short form agreements signed by Collective contained the
same provision. (GC Exh. 6 and CP Exh. 1.)
The master agreement incorporated in the original short form
agreement states that “[t]he Employer recognizes that [the Un-
ion] represent[s] a majority of the employees of the Employer
doing laborer’s work and shall be the sole bargaining repre-
sentative with the Employer for all employees employed by the
Employer engaged in all work” set forth in the unit description
in another clause of the agreement. (Exh. A of GC Exh. 7.) The
master agreement also specifies wages and fringe benefits that
are to be paid to and for the covered employees. It further pro-
vides that the agreement applies to the work of related compa-
nies.
Another part of the master agreement provides that in order
for the agreement to be terminated after the stated termination
date, written notice must be given by the Employer “at least 30
days prior to April 30th of each succeeding year and, if said
thirty (30) days is given, the Agreement shall terminate on
April 30th of the year following the giving of such notice.”
Ibid. This so-called “evergreen provision” appears in subse-
quent master agreements, as do the other provisions mentioned
above. (GC Exhs. 37 and 38.)
Shortly after Collective signed its first short form agreement,
the Union filed grievances alleging that Collective had violated
the contract. On August 28, 2002, Mark and not Ryan ap-
peared on behalf of Collective at an arbitration hearing on those
grievances. On June 23, 2004, the arbitrator issued his decision
finding a violation and directing Collective to submit to an
audit. A second arbitration decision was issued on July 28,
2006, directing Collective to pay the Union $10,384.72 for its
violations. On September, 20, 2006, the Union filed a petition
to confirm the 2006 arbitration award. Collective filed an op-
position, which included an affidavit signed by Mark. On Jan-
uary 8, 2007, the United States District Court, District of New
Jersey, granted the Union’s petition. (GC Exhs. 7 and 24, Tr.
145–150.)
RDM is Formed
Just 3 months later, in April of 2007, Mark formed RDM as
a nonunion concrete and masonry business. (Tr. 150–151.) He
and his wife, Deborah, are the owners of RDM and they are
both authorized signers of RDM’s bank accounts with Santan-
der Bank (formerly Sovereign Bank). (Tr 152, 160–162, GC
Exh. 26.) Mark’s daughter, Desiree, also worked for RDM as
office manager and was authorized to sign for the RDM ac-
count at the Santander Bank. (Tr. 162, GC Exh. 27.) At that
point, Mark stopped working for Collective. (Tr. 37–38.)
Mark and Ryan both admitted that RDM does the same type
of work as Collective and uses the same type of equipment as
Collective uses. (Tr. 45–46, 150–151.) Indeed, Collective
transferred some of its equipment to RDM. (Tr. 235–236.)
Ryan does not have an ownership interest in RDM, but has
been employed by RDM to run jobs in the field, the same re-
sponsibilities he had at Collective. (Tr. 46, 79, 181–182.) Tell-
ingly, in explaining why RDM was formed, Ryan testified that
his father, Mark, “realized that a lot of our customers were
nonunion and that was important to our business, that’s what
the marketplace sustained so he formed RDM and he started to
do work so he could support himself and that’s the direction we
went.” (Tr. 37.)
It is undisputed that Mark, Deborah and Desiree were em-
ployed by RDM and Collective at the same time. (Tr. 164.)
Documentary evidence confirms that this association with Col-
lective continued well after the formation of RDM, as reflected
in relevant bank authorizations. It also confirms that Mark was
more than simply an office employee at Collective. In a series
of documents in connection with an application and authoriza-
tion for a Collective bank account with Sunshine Bank (later
Sovereign bank), Mark was authorized to be signatory to that
account by a Collective corporate resolution that identified him
as “vice-president.” The date of that corporate resolution was
October 10, 2008. (GC Exh. 8, Tr. 50–52, 121.) In another
document submitted to Sovereign Bank on behalf of RDM,
dated January 21, 2011, and titled “On Site Business New Ac-
count Opening Application,” Mark, Deborah and Desiree
signed the document that identified themselves as employees of
Collective. (GC Exh. 27, Tr. 162–164.)
RDM and Collective also shared an office and phone and fax
lines. Shortly after its formation and in the early years of Col-
lective’s existence, as indicated above, it rented an office at 460
Faraday Avenue, Suite 3, Jackson, New Jersey. When Mark
formed RDM, he listed the Faraday Avenue address on a num-
ber of tax and bank documents. (GC Exhs. 8 and 25.) RDM’s
bank documents with Sovereign/Santander Bank from 2011
through 2013 also list the Faraday Avenue address. Those
documents also list, as RDM’s telephone number, the telephone
number for Collective. (GC Exh. 27, 28, 30, 31, Tr. 34, 39, 48.)
RDM admittedly did not pay rent for the Faraday Avenue loca-
tion when both entities used it. Sometime in 2013, Collective
gave up the Faraday Avenue location and RDM took over Col-
lective’s lease. The rent paid by RDM was initially the same as
the amount Collective was paying at the time. (Tr. 47–48, 155–
160, 349–353, 362.)
Even after Collective gave up its Faraday Avenue offices, it
continued operations, listing that address for banking purposes
for 3 more years until finally closing its bank account in 2016.
(Tr. 69, GC Exhs. 9 and 13.) Nevertheless, despite the bank
account closure, Collective remains in existence. (Tr. 82, 86–
91, 272.) Ryan testified that Collective is basically dormant
today, but he continues its corporate shell out of his home to
pay debts. (Tr. 97.) The remaining balance in the Collective
bank account of $1,003, as of June 7, 2016, was transferred to
RDM. (Tr. 69–70.)
The record further shows that RDM has assisted Collective
in significant ways and that both Mark and Ryan treated these
companies as conduits. Ryan testified that “we helped each
other like a father and son would.” (Tr. 379.) Mark testified
that RDM lent money to Collective because Collective was his
son’s business, and “I got him into this mess.” (Tr. 242.) Ryan
further testified that, during the good years, with Collective, he
and Mark each received salaries of “upwards of a couple hun-
dred thousand.” (Tr. 381.) But, in the bad years, they might
forego a salary. They did the same with RDM. (Tr. 378–382.)
RDM also assisted Collective in about 2012 or 2013, when
Collective’s bank threatened to call in its line of credit, requir-
ing payment of an outstanding loan balance. At that time, ap-
RDM CONCRETE & MASONRY, LLC, COLLECTIVE CONCRETE, INC., AND REMCO CONCRETE, LLC, ALTER EGOS 5
parently, RDM, or Mark personally, jointly assumed the out-
standing debt with Collective. And payments are still being
made on this debt. But, according to Ryan, neither he nor Col-
lective ever repaid Mark or RDM for this assistance. (Tr. 70–
77, 380.) Significantly, Collective’s bank statements show that
RDM transferred money totaling $1,644,658.17 to Collective in
37 separate transactions from July 2013 through February 2015.
(GC Exh. 9.)4
RDM remained nonunion until May 2014, when the Union
organized its workers and obtained authorization cards signed
by a majority of the RDM employees. The Union filed a repre-
sentation petition with the Board on May 7, 2014. (Tr. 181,
250, 270–271, GC Exh. 40.) Shortly after the petition was
filed, Mark met with three representatives of the Union, includ-
ing Union Coordinator Gurvis Miner at a diner in Toms River,
New Jersey.
At that meeting, Miner asked Mark whether he was aware
that a majority of RDM employees were interested in represen-
tation by the Union and Mark answered in the affirmative.
Mark was also told that the Union believed that Collective and
RDM were alter egos and bound by the union agreements that
Collective had signed. Mark refused to recognize the Union,
complaining about his bad experience with the Union at Collec-
tive, including the result of the arbitrator’s decision that cost
Collective a lot of money. According to Miner, Mark admitted
that he was “highly upset” by the arbitrator’s decision. (Tr.
274.) He also admitted that he had opened RDM so he could
be more competitive and signing an agreement with the Union
would not help in that respect. The Union then raised the pos-
sibility of giving Mark some relief in order to help him be more
competitive by working with him on his pending projects.
Mark agreed to provide the Union with a list of RDM’s pending
projects. (Tr. 273–274.)
At a subsequent meeting on May 28, 2014, Mark agreed to
sign an agreement with the Union that would include some kind
of amnesty for certain pending projects, but he still had not
provided the Union a list of his pending projects. (Tr. 275–
276.) The parties agreed to still another meeting, but that did

4 Ryan gave a convoluted and unconvincing explanation for these
transfers, which I discredit. He testified that these transfers were loans,
but no loan or other documents were provided to support that testimo-
ny. The record contains a document (GC Exh. 23) that purports to be a
sale of equipment from Collective to RDM, but the amount of that
transaction is nowhere near the amount of the transfers listed above.
And it is not clear that even that transaction was an arm’s length trans-
action because Ryan himself apparently set the value of the equipment.
Moreover, the equipment sale agreement was executed in June of 2013,
a month before the beginning date of the transactions listed above in
GC Exh. 9. Nor is there any evidence, aside from Ryan’s conclusory
testimony, uncorroborated by documentary evidence, that these alleged
loans were ever repaid. Indeed, as already noted, it appears that RDM
had to come to the rescue of Collective with a loan that has not yet been
repaid in order to prevent Collective’s bank from calling in its line of
credit. That is the more likely explanation for any loans by RDM to
Collective, especially in view of testimony by Mark about these events.
See Tr. 202–203. Thus, the reason for the more than a million and a
half dollars of transfers from RDM to Collective during a roughly 2-
year period from 2013 to 2015 remains a mystery. What is clear, how-
ever, is that the transfers were made.
not occur. After a breakdown in communications, the Union
filed an unfair labor practice charge against RDM with the
Board (GC Exh. 41) and set up a picket line at two of RDM’s
jobsites. (Tr. 277–278.) Later, Mark agreed to sign an agree-
ment with the Union and the Union removed its picket line and
withdrew the charges. The parties thereafter worked out an
amnesty agreement, and, on June 20, 2014, Mark signed a short
form agreement with the Union on behalf of RDM. (GC Exh.
39, Tr. 278–280.)5
Shortly thereafter, the Union filed a grievance against RDM
over its failure to abide by the agreement. The matter went to
arbitration and, on January 29, 2015, an Award and Order is-
sued against RDM. On November 17, 2015, RDM and Collec-
tive, jointly, and the Union agreed to a consent arbitration
award setting forth a settlement amount and a payment sched-
ule for monies owed. The Union filed a petition to confirm the
arbitration award and, on April 13, 2016, a United States Dis-
trict Court entered a judgment confirming the award. (GC Exh.
33, Tr. 187.)
Collective’s work started slowing down as RDM’s was pick-
ing up. From its inception and throughout most of 2014, Ryan
was working for RDM. (Tr. 79–80.) His last work project as
Collective was in 2014, on the so-called Keiwet job. (Tr. 26–
27, 79–82, 86, 272, GC Exh. 15.) That year, Collective also did
some finishing work for RDM, for which Collective was not
always paid back. (Tr. 86–91, 372–377, GC Exh. 15.) In addi-
tion, Ryan did some consulting work for another company,
New Horizons, which was owned by Don Yonkers, his father,
Mark, and Ryan himself. (Tr. 91.) That consulting work was
performed in 2015; he was paid by New Horizons for that work
a total of about $73,000, in 4 separate checks made out to Col-
lective and deposited in Collective’s bank account. The last
check was dated December 21, 2015. (Tr. 83–85, 91–93, 313,
GC Exh. 14.) During that same period and until mid-2016,
Ryan also worked as a foreman for DY Concrete, a nonunion
company owned by Don Yonkers for which he was paid an
annual salary of $100,000. (Tr. 92.)
Like Collective, RDM’s work started slowing down, as
shown by the fact that Ryan was no longer working for RDM in
November of 2014. (Tr. 358.) He began working as a salaried
employee for DY Concrete at the end of 2014 or the beginning
of 2015. (Tr. 92–93, 358–359.) Although, like Collective,
RDM still exists as a corporate entity, Mark testified that, as of
the time of the hearing in this case, RDM was “pretty much
dormant right now.” (Tr. 160.) Several of RDM’s employees
joined Ryan at DY Concrete. (Tr. 358–360, CP Exh. 4.)
Remco is Formed
In late 2015, around the time RDM and Collective were
jointly agreeing with the Union to a consent arbitration award,
and while Ryan was still working for DY, he formed Remco.

5 The above is based on the essentially uncontradicted testimony of
Miner. Mark, who testified before Miner, actually confirmed most of
Miner’s account of their dealings, although he gave it a different slant.
(Tr. 183–186.) Mark testified that, as a result of his experience with
Collective and the Union, “I lost a lot.” (Tr. 185.) Ryan confirmed that
Mark agreed to the union contract with RDM after union representa-
tives told Mark that RDM was Collective’s alter ego. (Tr. 77–78.)
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(Tr. 92–96, 188–190.) He has a 99 percent interest, and his
wife, Jennifer, owns 1 percent of the Company. (Tr. 93.) Rem-
co does concrete and masonry work, mostly in New Jersey, just
like Collective and RDM, using the same type of equipment.
(Tr. 95.) Remco also uses many of the same suppliers used by
RDM. (Tr. 111–113, 196–198.) Ryan, of course, owned and
managed Collective and still owns it; and he also owns and
manages Remco.
Ryan testified that he formed Remco with the intention of
taking advantage of the market place after Collective and RDM
had signed union agreements and started having problems. He
testified that he was not “doing well in union work before then”
and he “needed . . . the non-union work to fulfill what I was
doing previous to all of this.” (Tr. 326.) He also readily admit-
ted that, with Collective and Remco, he now covers both the
union and the nonunion marketplaces. (Tr. 379.)
During the first quarter of 2016, Remco employed 7 people,
including Jennifer, Ryan’s wife, and six other employees, half
of whom had previously worked for RDM and DY with Ryan.
(GC Exh. 16, Tr. 94–95, 98–100, CP Exh. 4.) Later, in the
second quarter of 2016, Ryan hired other former RDM employ-
ees, including former RDM Foreman Mark Kowalski, who had
also worked with Ryan at DY. (Tr. 100–103, 191–196.) Ryan
also hired RDM’s former purchasing and pricing employee,
Jackie Brantiff, to do the same work for Remco. (Tr. 100–103,
GC. Exh. 17.) Contrary to Ryan’s testimony that Brantiff was
on unemployment when Ryan hired her (Tr. 103), documentary
evidence shows she was on RDM’s payroll until June 4, 2016.
(GC Exh. 36.)
Ryan has publicly represented that Remco is a continuation
of Collective and RDM. In a March 21, 2016 email seeking a
certificate of insurance for Remco for a job with the Iorio Con-
struction Company, Ryan told the Creative Coverage Insurance
Company that “RDM used to do work for the same company.”
(GC Exh. 18, Tr. 104–105.) Creative also provided insurance
for RDM. (Tr. 104.) Ryan also used his prior connections with
Collective and RDM when applying for new lines of credit for
Remco. (GC Exhs. 19 and 20, Tr. 105–106.)
In seeking work on behalf of Remco in a February 16, 2016
email, Ryan introduced Remco as follows: “We are a local
concrete subcontractor that has over 20 years of experience
with commercial projects like this.” (GC Exh. 21, Tr. 107.)
Moreover, it was apparent that at least some outside contractors
viewed Remco as a continuation of RDM, as evidenced by a
March 21, 2016 email in which PJR Construction contacted
Ryan, not Mark, about a final release for a job which had been
performed by RDM. (Tr. 108–110, GC Exh. 22.)
By letter, dated December 2, 2016, and addressed to Ryan,
the Union requested that Remco recognize the Union as the
bargaining representative of the laborers in its employ and that
Remco apply the applicable agreements signed by Collective
and RDM to the laborers. (GC Exh. 42.) In a response dated
December 12, 2016, Remco denied the request. (GC Exh. 43.)
It is undisputed that neither Collective nor RDM ever gave the
required notice to terminate their agreements with the Union.
And, under the evergreen clause in the applicable bargaining
agreements with the Union, unless terminated in writing at
appropriate times, those agreements automatically renew them-
selves. (Tr. 224–225, 265–266.)
Credibility
Many of the above factual findings are based on uncontra-
dicted testimony, authenticated documentary evidence and
testimony against interest by Mark and Ryan Ciullo, which
amounted to admissions. To the extent that Mark and Ryan
gave arguably exculpatory testimony for their actions, I reject
their testimony. I found both to be unreliable witnesses. They
were often defensive, evasive, contradictory, and unable to
recall important details in their testimony.
I have already mentioned Ryan’s unconvincing explanation
of a series of bank transfers between the Collective and RDM.
Here are several other examples of their unreliability: Ryan
and Mark contradicted each other on whether RDM had ever
purchased a laser screed from Collective. (Tr. 54–55, 238.)
Ryan at one point suggested that former RDM employee Jackie
Bratiff was hired by Remco because she was unemployed at the
time. This I viewed as an attempt to show a hiatus between her
employment with RDM and that with Remco. But documen-
tary evidence shows that she was employed by RDM up until
the time she was hired by Remco.
Mark’s testimony that he used Collective’s address to store
documents for RDM because his home was often flooded was
far-fetched at best. (Tr. 153–159.) Indeed, both Mark and Ryan
gave unconvincing testimony in an effort to diminish their re-
sponsibilities in the companies owned by the other.
For example, Mark initially testified that he simply coordi-
nated the office at Collective, “receiv[ing]” and “open[ing] the
mail,” and visited jobsites “to see what was going on.” (Tr.
135.) However, the record clearly shows that Mark’s authority
was much more extensive than that to which he testified. And
Ryan initially testified, “I have nothing to do with RDM” (Tr.
46), even though he worked for it for at least 7 years and en-
gaged in numerous financial transactions between Collective
and RDM. Mark testified that he did not even know about
Ryan’s formation of Remco until after it happened and claimed
to be “surprised” when he found out. (Tr. 189.)
These transparent efforts at evasion are implausible consider-
ing what they each described as a close father-son relationship
where one was always seeking to help the other, and in light of
the documented assistance they gave each other in their various
roles with these entities. Accordingly, I do not credit their tes-
timony where it differs from my otherwise supported factual
findings.
Analysis
The Supreme Court has long-recognized that the operation of
a prior enterprise under a different name could, in certain cir-
cumstances, constitute a disguised continuance” binding the
new company to the old company’s obligations under the Act.
Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
In determining whether an enterprise is a “disguised continu-
ance” or alter ego of another business, the Board examines
whether the entities share substantially identical management,
business purpose, operation, equipment, customers and supervi-
sion. Other factors include common ownership or control, lack
of arm’s length dealings between the two entities and whether
RDM CONCRETE & MASONRY, LLC, COLLECTIVE CONCRETE, INC., AND REMCO CONCRETE, LLC, ALTER EGOS 7
one entity was formed or used to avoid union obligations under
the Act.
No one factor is controlling and not all the indicia need be
present to find an alter ego relationship. Kenmore Contracting
Co., 289 NLRB 336, 337 (1988), enfd. 888 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.
1989), and cases there cited. See also U.S. Reinforcing, Inc.,
350 NLRB 404, 404–405 (2007). Moreover, strict common
ownership is not a necessary requirement if there is a family
relationship that shows common control. El Vocero de Puerto
Rico, Inc., 357 NLRB 1585, 1585, fn. 3 (2011).
Single-employer status is similar to but different from alter
ego status. Johnstown Corp., 322 NLRB 818 (1997). The fol-
lowing four factors are addressed in determining single-
employer status: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common
management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4)
common ownership or financial control. Significantly, in the
single employer analysis, there is no requirement that one entity
was formed in order to avoid responsibilities under the Act.
Here again, however, no one factor is controlling and not all
need be present, although the most important is centralized
control of labor relations because it tends to demonstrate “oper-
ational integration.” Single employer status is also character-
ized by a lack of an arm’s length relationship. RBE Electronics
of S.D., Inc., 320 NLRB 80 (1995) and cases there cited. See
also Mercy Hospital of Buffalo, 336 NLRB 1282, 1283–1284
(2001).
A. Collective and RDM were and are Alter Egos and
a Single Employer
As the factual findings above clearly show, RDM was and is
an alter ego of Collective. One is owned by Ryan Ciullo and
the other by Mark Ciullo and each worked in an important
management position for the other’s company. Ryan and Mark
provided the essential operational management of both compa-
nies, Mark in the office and Ryan on the jobsite. Mark’s
daughter, Desiree, was the office manager of both companies
and all three did the same work for both companies at the same
time. Both entities perform masonry and concrete work in New
Jersey and use the same type of equipment. Their operations
and business purposes are thus essentially the same.
Mark, Ryan and Desiree were authorized bank signers for
Collective; and Mark, Desiree and Mark’s wife, Deborah, were
authorized bank signers for RDM. Indeed, Mark was designat-
ed a “vice-president” of Collective in a corporate document
filed in connection with his bank signature authorization. And
when they submitted bank authorization statements for RDM,
Mark and Desiree, and even Deborah, identified themselves as
employed by Collective. Mark also agreed to a union short
form agreement on behalf of Collective and represented Collec-
tive in the subsequent arbitration proceeding. He likewise dealt
with the Union as the owner of RDM.
There is substantial evidence of a lack of an arm’s length re-
lationship in the many transactions between the two companies.
Both entities used the same Faraday Avenue address at the
same time and RDM paid no rent to Collective for its joint use.
They also used the same fax and telephone number. As late as
2014, Collective did finishing work for RDM, some of which
was not paid for by RDM. In addition, there were significant
financial dealings between the two companies. And no docu-
ments exist to support that these transactions were loans or
otherwise arm’s length business dealings.
Indeed, when Collective’s bank line of credit was threatened,
RDM stepped in to rescue it. There is no credible or docu-
mented explanation in the record for the $1.6 million dollars
transferred from RDM to Collective from 2013 to 2015. Tell-
ingly, although Collective is still technically in existence, it
closed its bank account in June of 2016 and transferred the
proceeds to RDM. Moreover, in testifying about the two com-
panies, Ryan used the word “we” to refer to both. (Tr. 37, 73.)
Mark made similar references in his testimony. (Tr. 141.)
Finally, there is substantial evidence that RDM was formed
as a way to avoid Collective’s agreements with the Union and
thus the Act’s bargaining requirements. RDM was formed
shortly after the conclusion of litigation with the Union that
resulted in a money judgment against Collective. And in con-
versations with representatives of the Union leading up to
RDM’s agreement with the Union, Mark complained that he
was wary of the Union because of his experience with the Un-
ion when he was with Collective, which had cost him a lot of
money—here again identifying himself with Collective. But
RDM’s relationship with the Union led to more litigation be-
cause of its noncompliance with its bargaining agreement, as
did Collective’s relationship with the Union for the same rea-
son. Thus, I find that RDM was formed at least in part to avoid
dealing with the Union and to avoid bargaining obligations
under the Act.
The above analysis also provides support for the finding,
which I make, that Collective and RDM constitute a single
employer. There is, of course, common management and, in
view of the financial transactions between the two companies,
an interrelation of operations. It is also clear that the lack of
arm’s length relationship in the financial dealings between the
two entities provides support for the single employer finding.
Thus, it is not as significant that there is a technical differ-
ence in ownership, although the two companies were owned by
father and son. Mark’s dealings with the Union, both while
employed by Collective and later as owner of RDM, also sup-
port the finding that there was common control of labor rela-
tions. It is also clear that Mark and Ryan considered them-
selves as part of one enterprise.
B. Remco is an Alter Ego of Collective and RDM
The factual findings above also strongly support the finding
that Remco is an alter ego of Collective and RDM. Ryan
formed Remco in late 2015, while he was still operating Collec-
tive. Although he apparently had interim employment in parts
of 2014 and 2015, Collective still had jobs under its own name
and it performed finishing work for RDM, all in 2014. And in
2015, Collective was paid by another company for Ryan’s con-
sulting work; the last check for this work was issued in Decem-
ber of 2015. Ryan owns 99 percent of Remco and he owned
100 percent of Collective. The business purpose of Remco is
the same as the business purpose of Collective/RDM and they
use the same type of equipment. They also use many of the
same suppliers.
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Through Ryan, both also have the same management. Ryan
hired many of the former RDM employees, including a former
foreman, for his new company. Remco also retained the same
insurance company used by Collective/RDM. Indeed, the evi-
dence shows that Ryan represented his new company, Remco,
as being a continuation of Collective/RDM when he told enti-
ties he dealt with that Remco had extensive experience in the
concrete and masonry business.
The evidence also shows that contractors recognized Rem-
co’s connection with the Ciullo family’s prior companies. In
March of 2016, a contractor contacted Ryan, when he was at
Remco and no longer with RDM, about a job release for work
performed by RDM. In introducing Remco to a possible cus-
tomer and asking for an opportunity to bid on a particular job,
Ryan made reference to 20 years of experience, which included
the word “we,” clearly encompassing the combined experience
of Collective and RDM. (GC Exh. 21. See Johnstown Corp.,
313 NLRB 170, 171 (1993), remanded, sub. nom., Stardyne,
Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 1994), and reaffirmed in
322 NLRB 818 (1997).
It is also clear that Remco was formed, at least in part, to
avoid the union problems experienced by Collective/RDM.
Ryan and Mark had been found to be in noncompliance with
previous union agreements in their operation of Collective and
RDM. Both were concerned about the burdens of operating
under a union contract. Indeed, Ryan formed Remco shortly
after RDM’s litigation with the Union required it and Collective
to comply with the union agreement.
Ryan essentially admitted that, in forming Remco, his pur-
pose was to avoid union work. He testified that he was “not
doing well in union work,” and needed to do nonunion work
“to fulfill what I was doing previous to all of this.” (Tr. 236.)
Although he may have framed some of his purpose in terms of
financial considerations, it is clear that, where, as here, those
financial considerations are related to avoiding the costs of
operating under a union contract, such evidence is a strong
factor supporting an alter ego finding. See Diverse Steel, Inc.,
349 NLRB 946 (2007).6
C. Remco Violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by Refus-
ing to Bargain with the Union and by Failing to Apply the Bar-
gaining Agreement in Existence Between the Union
and Collective/RDM
It is undisputed that Remco never recognized the Union as
the representative of its laborer employees and never applied
the applicable union agreements to the unit employees it em-
ployed. It is also clear that neither Collective nor RDM ever
timely terminated the agreements they had with the Union,
which by their terms renewed themselves unless written notice
of termination was given. Thus, those agreements continued.
And the Board has held that the collective-bargaining agree-
ment of an employer applies to its alter ego, as of the date of
the alter ego’s first use of bargaining unit employees. E. G.
Sprinkler Corp., 268 NLRB 1241, 1241 fn. 1 (1984).

6 Although the complaint alleges that RDM, Collective and Remco
are a single integrated enterprise, in its brief, the General Counsel does
not contend that Remco is a single employer with Collective/RDM. I
therefore consider any such allegation waived.
Because Remco was and is the alter ego of Collective and
RDM, it is subject not only to the bargaining obligations of
Collective and RDM, but also to the continued application of
the bargaining agreements binding Collective and RDM. See
E.G. Sprinkler, Corp., cited above, 268 NLRB at 1244; A.D.
Connor, Inc., 357 NLRB 1770, 1785–1787 (2011); and Mid-
west Precision Heating & Cooling, Inc., 341 NLRB 435, 440
(2004), enfd. 408 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 2005).
Respondent has not successfully countered the findings and
legal conclusions set forth above. The main point in its brief
(Br. 15–18) is that so-called double breasted operations (where
an employer has both a union and nonunion entity) are not “in-
herently illegal,” citing Carpenters’ Local Union No. 1478 v.
Stevens, 743 F.2d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984). The quoted
proposition is accurate as far as it goes. But there is an im-
portant caveat, which the Ninth Circuit emphasized, and it is
crucial in the distinction between that case and the instant case.
In Carpenters’, the Court was considering the enforcement of
an arbitrator’s award applying the bargaining agreement of a
union company to the employees of a nonunion company. The
Court refused to enforce the award because it noted that the
Board had ruled that the two entities involved were not alter
egos. Id. at 1275–1278, 1280.
In contrast, here, my findings show that Remco, Collective
and RDM were and are alter egos and that the prior bargaining
agreements are valid and continue to apply to Remco’s bargain-
ing unit employees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Collective and RDM were and are alter egos of each other
and together constitute a single employer.
2. Remco is an alter ego of Collective and RDM.
3. By failing and refusing to bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its laborer
employees in an appropriate unit, Remco, has violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. By failing and refusing to apply the collective-bargaining
agreements that its alter egos, Collective and RDM, have and
continue to have with the Union, Remco violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. The above violations constitute unfair labor practices that
affect commerce within the meaning of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall order it and its constituent entities to
cease and desist therefrom and to take appropriate affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since Respondent (Respondent here means all three named
respondents) has unlawfully failed to apply the terms and con-
ditions of employment under the applicable bargaining agree-
ments to its laborer employees, it must make those employees
whole for any loss of earnings or benefits, computed in accord-
ance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970),
enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest as prescribed
in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily
as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6
(2010).
RDM CONCRETE & MASONRY, LLC, COLLECTIVE CONCRETE, INC., AND REMCO CONCRETE, LLC, ALTER EGOS 9
In addition, Respondent shall be ordered to make employees
whole for any expenses resulting from the failure to make con-
tributions to the benefit funds provided for in the applicable
bargaining agreements, plus interest, and to reimburse those
benefit funds for those contributions it has failed to make on
behalf of bargaining employees employed by it. Such pay-
ments shall be computed in the manner described in Kraft
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 252 NLRB 891, fn. 2 (1980), enfd.
mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981), and Merryweather Optical
Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216, fn. 7(1979).7
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended8
ORDER
The Respondent,9 Collective Concrete and Masonry LLC,
RDM Concrete and Masonry, and each of them, their officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to apply the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreements that Respondent entered into with the
Union and failing and refusing to bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the laborer employees in the applicable bargaining unit.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole all bargaining unit employees for any loss
of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the unfair
labor practices found in this decision, in the manner set forth in
the remedy of this decision.
(b) Comply with all terms and conditions of the collective-
bargaining agreements that the Respondent entered into with
the Union.
(c) Bargain in good faith with the Union for all employees
of the bargaining unit.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of monies
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all of
its facilities, copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-

7 In the event that lumpsum payments are required to be made to
employees under this remedy, those payments must be made in accord-
ance with the requirements set forth in AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc.,
363 NLRB No. 143 (2016).
8 If no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Board’s Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
9 The term Respondent when used in the singular in this order refers
to all three respondents.
dix.”10 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
In addition to the physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced or covered by other materi-
al. If the Respondent has gone out of business, the Respondent
shall duplicate and mail, at its expense, a copy of the notice to
all employees and former employees employed by Respondent
at any time since February 16, 2016.
(f) In the event that lump-sum backpay awards are required
to be made to affected employees, the Respondent shall com-
pensate those employees for the adverse tax consequences, if
any, of receiving those lump-sum awards. Respondent shall
file with the Regional Director, within 21 days of the date such
awards are fixed, reports allocating the awards to the appropri-
ate calendar years for each employee.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., November 3, 2017
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to apply the terms of the appli-
cable collective-bargaining agreement with New Jersey Build-
ing Laborers District Council (the Union) or fail and refuse to
bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representatives of our laborer employees in the ap-
plicable bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-

10 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
strain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make whole all union bargaining unit employees
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result
of our failure and refusal to apply the terms of the applicable
collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of our laborer employees
in the applicable bargaining unit.
WE WILL comply with all terms and conditions of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement that we have entered into with the
Union.
RDM CONCRETE &MASONRY, LLC
COLLECTIVE CONCRETE & MASONRY, LLC
REMCO CONCRETE, LLC
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/22-CA-181515 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.