Ray Hopman Plumbing & Heating

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 11, 1969

174 N.L.R.B. 403 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

RAY HOPMAN PLUMBING & HEATING
Ray Hopman d/b/a Ray Hopman Plumbing &
Heating and Southern California Pipe Trades
District Council No. 16 . Case 31-CA-869
February 11, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
On September 13, 1968, Trial Examiner Eugene
K. Kennedy issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision,
and the General Counsel filed a supporting brief and
an answering brief to the Respondent's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at , the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, except as modified herein.
We find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's inadvertent failure to fully
describe the appropriate collective-bargaining unit,
and to make certain conclusions of law based upon
his findings of fact. We substitute the following
description of the bargaining unit for that in the
Trial Examiner's Decision:
All employees of the employer-members of the
Council, including Respondent's employees,
employed as plumbing journeymen, heating and
air-conditioning journeymen, industrial pipe fitters
journeymen, lead burning journeymen, service and
repair journeymen, and certified service and repair
journeymen or who perform and are performing
all plumbing, heating and piping work in the area
known as Southern 'California, more particularly
described as the Counties of Los Angeles, Orange,
Riverside, San Bernardino, Imperial, San Diego,
Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo,
but excluding office clerical employees,
professional employees, guards, watchmen, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
We substitute the following Conclusions of Law
for those of the Trial Examiner:
1. The Respondent is, and has been at all times
material herein, an employer engaged in commerce
403
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is, and has been at all times
material herein, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
3. At all times material herein the Union has been
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit described
herein, including employees of the Respondent.
4. At all times material herein the Respondent
has been a member of the Plumbing-Heating and
Piping Employers Council of Southern California,
Inc. and said Council exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of bargaining with the Union with
respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
5. By failing and refusing to recognize the Union
as the bargaining representative of his employees,
and by failing since April 24, 19671 to honor and
apply the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement executed by the Council with the Union
on his behalf on July 1, 1966, the Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
THE REMEDY
We agree with the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order insofar as it orders the
Respondent to recognize the Union as the
bargaining representative of his employees and to
honor the collective-bargaining agreement by
fulfilling his monetary obligations arising
thereunder. Moreover, we find merit in the General
Counsel's argument that the Respondent should be
ordered to give retroactive effect from April 24,
1967 to all the terms and conditions of the
bargaining agreement. Accordingly, we shall so
modify the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
Backpay, if any, shall be computed in accordance
with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and shall bear interest as
prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
modified herein, and orders that the Respondent,
Ray Hopman, d/b/a Ray Hopman Plumbing &
Heating, Solvang, California, his agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
This is the date specified in the complaint , and conceded in the
Respondent's answer to the complaint , from which Respondent failed and
refused to give effect to, maintain and enforce the subject
collective-bargaining agreement
174 NLRB No. 64
404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so
modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph I of the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to recognize the Union and to make
the payments due to date as required by its Labor
Agreement with the Union.
(b) In any like or related manner , interfering with,
restraining, or coercing his employees in the exercise
of the right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join, or assist Southern California
Pipe Trades District Council No. 16, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities, except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
2. Substitute the following as paragraph 2(a) of
the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order:
"(a) Honor and give retroactive effect from April
24, 1967, to the terms and conditions of said
agreement, including but not limited to the
provisions relating to wages and other employment
benefits, and in the manner set forth in the section
of this Decision and Order entitled "The Remedy,"
make whole his employees for losses, if any, they
may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's
failure to honor and apply the terms of the labor
agreement."
3. Substitute the following for the first indented
paragraph of the Appendix.
I WILL NOT refuse to recognize the Southern
California Pipe Trades District Council No. 16 as
the bargaining agent for my employees and I
WILL NOT refuse to honor and apply the terms
of the labor agreement entered into on my behalf
with the Union by the Plumbing-Heating and
Piping Employers Council of Southern California,
Inc.
4. Add the following indented paragraphs to the
notice:
I WILL give effect, retroactive to April 24, 1967,
to terms and conditions of said labor agreement,
including but not limited to wages and other
employment benefits, and I shall make my
employees whole for any losses they may have
suffered by reason of my refusal since that date to
honor and apply the terms of said agreement.
I WILL NOT in any like or related manner,
interfere with, restrain, or coerce my employees in
the exercise of the right to self-organization, to
form labor organizations, to join, or assist
Southern California Pipe Trades District Council
No. 16, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any or all such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EUGENE K KENNEDY, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
was heard in Santa Barbara, California on March 26,
1968 and in Los Angeles, California on April I, 1968.'
The issue presented is whether Ray Hopman d/b/a Ray
Hopman Plumbing & Heating, herein Respondent,
violated its obligation to bargain by his failure to comply
with the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement.
Upon the entire record, a consideration of the briefs
filed by Respondent and the General Counsel, and my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD
The litigation in this case was concerned in some
measure with the question of membership by Respondent
in the Plumbing-Heating and Employer Council of
Southern California, herein called the Council A finding
on this question will be made in the course of considering
the evidence that Respondent was a member at all times
material herein.
During the calendar year 1966 and during the 12
months preceding October 24, 1967, the
employer-members of the Council, in the course and
conduct of their business, collectively purchased and
received goods, materials and supplies valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from sources located outside the State of
California.
During the calendar year 1966 and during the 12
months preceding October 24, 1967, the
employer-members of the Council collectively performed
services valued in excess of $50,000 for agencies of the
United States Government and/or private business firms
which in turn engaged in National Defense work.
The Council is a trade association which admits to
membership firms engaged in the plumbing-heating or
piping industry in Southern California and which exists in
part for the purpose of negotiating, executing and
administering multiemployer collective-bargaining
agreements on behalf of its members with the
collective-bargaining representatives of their employees.
The Council is engaged in commerce and in a business
affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Southern California Pipe Trade District Council
No 16, herein the Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of the Act
'The charge was filed on October 10, 1967 and the complaint issued on
December 22, 1967.
RAY HOPMAN PLUMBING & HEATING 405
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Events
Respondent has been engaged in the plumbing business
since 1957 . He has at times been a member of the Union
and since 1957 has personally executed two
collective-bargaining agreements with the Union.
On October 27, 1965, Respondent was approached by
Brian Bilat who was engaged in securing new members for
the Council Bilat ' s approach was to stress the advantages
of having the Council represent small employers in their
dealings with a powerful union in the event of disputes
and also in negotiations.
On October 27, 1965, Respondent signed the
application for membership in the Council (see attachment
A).
The application recites that Respondent Hopman
acknowledged receipt of the By-laws of the Council and
the Labor Agreement in effect between the Council and
the Union and by the execution of such agreement agreed
to be bound by the By-laws and the Labor Agreement.'
By letter dated December 9, 1965, Respondent was
informed by the Council that he had been accepted into
the multiemployer association and from that time
Respondent paid dues through June 1966 when the
1963-1966 Labor Agreement between the Union and the
Council terminated.
A new agreement was negotiated between the Council
and the Union effective July 1, 1966 . Respondent was not
informed of the terms of the new agreement prior to its
execution and when he received a copy after July 1, 1966,
according to his testimony he "blew his top" over a new
provision in the agreement and thereafter refused to
comply with its terms , or to make any payments required
by the Labor Agreement.
The provision in the new agreement which was not in
the previous one is as follows:
Section I
2.. No employer employing less than three (3)
journeymen shall be permitted to work with the tools
on any job in any shop unless he complies with all the
provisions of this agreement, including payment of all
fringe benefits at journeymen rate of pay for fifty (50)
full weeks a year. Such payment shall be a condition of
being permitted to work with the tools.
Respondent submitted calculations that if he worked
for the 3 year period covered by the Labor Agreement he
'Hopman testified that Bdat did not leave with him a copy of the
By-laws and Labor Agreement. Although the question of when the
Hopmans probably received the By-laws is not a substantial issue, in the
entire context of events the testimony concerning their receipt has a
bearing on assessing the accuracy of the evidence to the effect that Bilat
said Respondent could withdraw from the Council at any time by sending
a letter. Hopman testified that prior to November 1, 1966 he had never
received a copy of the By-laws from anyone. At a later stage of his
testimony he related that he received a copy of the Labor Agreement and
By-laws, 3 or 4 weeks after he signed his application for membership in the
Council , on October 27, 1965 He was recalled as a witness and changed
his testimony to the effect that he first received a copy of the By-laws in
November 1966. Bilat's testimony to the effect that when he signed up
members he always gave them a paperbound copy of the By-laws and
Labor Agreement was convincing and is credited as indicating he gave
these documents to Respondent Furthermore, his testimony is credited
that it was an unvarying practice to send new members a leatherette bound
copy of the By-laws, and it is found that Respondent received one of these
as well as the copy given on the occasion of signing the application.
would have to make contributions amounting to $11,690.
About 30 percent of this would be of no benefit at all.
This percentage represents the amount paid into the
pension fund for which he was not eligible. About 25
percent represented compulsory payments for health and
welfare which may or may not be useful to Respondent.
Presumably substantial amounts would be due for
Respondent's two employees since the record indicates he
did not make any payments on their behalf after July 1,
1966. The amounts due may be different for Respondent
than for his employees. According to the testimony of
Council Respresentative Bilat, if an employer only
personally performs service work, his obligation for
contributions in connection with his own work is limited
to 1 percent contribution for the apprentice fund.
However, if at any time during the year he performs work
characterized as new construction, he must make the full
contributions for the entire year. The record reflects that
Respondent performed some new construction work but
has curtailed, if not eliminated it except for one project
since July 1, 1966.
Although this matter could be resolved without
reference to Respondent's obligation to the Council
arising from the By-laws of the Council, a considerable
part of the record hinged on Bilat's alleged representations
concerning the timing and right of Respondent to
withdraw from the Council.
Section E of the By-laws provides:
A regular member may resign effective upon the date
of ratification of negotiations of any collective
bargaining agreement between the Council and its
members and the United Association of Journeymen
and apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
Industry of the United States and Canada, provided
such members shall have given notice of such intention
during the period between ninety (90) and one hundred
twenty (120) calendar days prior to such expiration date
of such contract. In the absence of written notice as
hereinabove provided, each member shall continue
membership for the duration of days succeeding
collective bargaining contract entered into between the
Council and the United Association subject to
resignation upon the date of ratification of each such
succeeding contract upon ninety (90) to one hundred
twenty (120) days notice prior to expiration date thereof
as aforesaid.
Respondent's principal defense rests on a contention of
fraud based on this claim of reasoning. Respondent
contends that Bilat told the Hopmans, Respondent could
withdraw from the Council at any time by sending a
letter. This allegedly was a fraudulent representation and
contrary to the provision for resignation in the By-laws as
set forth above. Further when Respondent discovered that
the Council had not carried out its allegedly declared
purpose as contained in Bilat's representation to assist its
members in dealing with the Union, but, on the contrary,
negotiated a harmful agreement from Respondent's
standpoint, it had a right to rescind its membership.
Respondent contends that flowing from this right to
rescind, the result would be that it was no longer bound
by the Union's labor agreement. The two bases for fraud
rest on an alleged misrepresentation of method of
resignation and- a misrepresentation that the Council
would help its small employers.
A study of the record leads to the result that
Respondent is bound by the 1966-69 Labor Agreement
because it did not make a timely withdrawal from the
Council and that he did not comply with the By-laws of
406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Council which bind him to the 1963-1966 Labor
Agreement by specific contractual provisions.
Even assuming, arguendo, there might be merit in
Respondent's theory that a right to rescind his agreement
with the Council would carry with it the right to relief
from the Labor Agreement, the record facts do not
support a basis for recission.
Respondent claims that Bilat misled him by telling him
he could withdraw from the Council at any time by
sending a letter. Although Bilat conceded he could not
recall the verbatim conversation with the Hopmans, he
was definite in his testimony that he verbally told the
Hopmans as he did other new members the requirements
of the By-laws for resignation. As noted above,-it is found
that Respondent was furnished a copy of the By-laws on
October 27, 1965 and another copy shortly thereafter.
Respondent's application for membership in the Council,
executed by him, also acknowledged receipt of a copy of
the By-laws.
In addition on October 25, 1966, Respondent's
handwritten note indicating a refusal to pay dues was on
the basis that Respondent had not signed a new
agreement, and was not based on the claim that
Respondent could withdraw at any time.
On February 23, 1967, Respondent wrote a letter
indicating a desire to sever any connection with the
Council and to be relieved of any obligations under the
labor agreement. While expressing dissatisfaction with the
.contract and lack of knowledge of its terms prior to its
execution, Respondent made no mention of any
misrepresentation about the method of resigning from the
Council.
Respondent's attorney, in a letter of September 18,
1967, to a Joint Arbitration Board, stated that
Respondent was induced by fraud to join the Council. The
type of fraud is not specified and from the context of the
letter it appears that the claimed fraud was based on the
premise that Hopman was told the Council would help
him, whereas the Council negotiated an agreement adverse
to the interest of Respondent.
In addition, Respondent's affidavit given to a Board
agent does not recite that Bilat told him he could
withdraw from the Council at any time but merely recited
that Bilat failed to tell him he could withdraw only at
specified times. This affidavit was reviewed by Respondent
and his attorney before he signed it.
Respondent's answer alleges collusion between the
Union and the Council and that the Labor Agreement was
unlawful but does not claim fraud based on Respondent
being told he could withdraw at any time.
On November 1, 1966 Frances Hopman, wife of
Respondent, added the following handwritten note on a
letter sent to Respondent by the Council and returned it
to the Council: "The man who sold us on this said we
could drop it whenever we wanted to and since we did not
sign the new Labor Agreement in July, we do not owe
this."
This note was added on a letter from the Council which
dealt with the resignation provision of the By-laws, and
Mrs. Hopman's reply was directed to this after
Respondent's previous reason given to the Council for
attempting to withdraw was that he had not signed the
agreement. It seems likely that Mrs. Hopman's note
represented an additional attempt to avoid what was
regarded as an extremely unjust agreement and it is not
accepted as correctly reflecting Bilat's statement to the
Hopmans about the conditions of resignation.
In summary, the record does not support a finding that
misleading or false statements about the time and method
of resignation induced Respondent to become a member
of the Council and in turn become bound by the 1966-69
agreement with the Union.
In the other more nebulous area of claimed fraud
suggested by some of the evidence, Respondent's defense
is even less persuasive. In general terms the fraud seems
to lie on the claim that Bilat represented to Respondent
the Council would be helpful in dealing with the Union,
whereas in fact the 1966-1969 agreement was
economically harmful to Respondent. The realities of
labor negotiations would militate against finding that
Respondent was guaranteed that a good or better
agreement would be negotiated. Perhaps the agreement
was the best that could be obtained under the
circumstances. The fact that the Council has
approximately 400 members and slightly more than half
are in the same position as Hopman, with three or less
employees, prevents a finding on this record that
Respondent has a right to rescind its agreement with the
Council because it negotiated a poor labor agreement for
Respondent even though Bilat undoubtedly told
Respondent the purpose of Respondent was to aid him in
dealing with the Union. Terms of any labor agreement
would hardly be calculated to satisfy all 400 members of
the Council. Respondent did not choose to follow the
resignation procedure specified by the Council By-laws
and the result, harsh though it may be, is a binding
agreement with the Union.
Aside from the question of Respondent's right to resign
from the Council, there is a basic principle established by
case law which under the circumstances would bind
Respondent to the 1966-1969 agreement executed by the
Council and the Union.
From October 1965 until July 1, 1966, Respondent was
a member in good standing with the Council, paid dues
and other payments representing fringe benefits and thus
was a member of a multiemployer bargaining unit.
Respondent did not attempt to withdraw from the
bargaining unit or the Council until a new contract had
been executed. This by any test is not a timely withdrawal
and Respondent is bound by the labor agreement
negotiated by his representative.
The applicable law on this question is cited by the
General Counsel in his brief as contained in Tulsa Sheet
Metal Works, Inc., 149 NLRB 1487 at 1500-01:
Once bargaining has commenced and negotiations are
reaching their fruition, it would appear that stability of
the collective-bargaining, process would demand that
withdrawal from group bargaining be permitted only
under the most unusual circumstances. Such
circumstances would not arise, it seems apparent,
merely because the evolution of negotiations has
indicated to one of the individual participants that its
bargaining agent appears to be moving inexorably
toward agreement or contract terms which would be to
it economically burdensome. . . .some responsibility
must rest upon the Employer who invokes the
advantages of group bargaining to assess and assume
the responsibilities and limitations inherent therein.
In the present case it was not a question of attempted
withdrawal during negotiations, but after the execution of
the agreement. Thus here Respondent would be bound by
its terms irrespective of the Council By-laws as
Respondent made no effort to terminate the authority of
the Council as his bargaining agent until the new
RAY HOPMAN PLUMBING & HEATING 407
agreement, which Respondent disliked, was executed.
Respondent makes a claim that the labor agreement
was illegal and thus he was relieved from honoring its
obligation. This contention does not meet the question of
Respondent's obligation to recognize the Union as the
lawful bargaining agent of his employees. As a practical
matter this would probably be a matter of indifference to
Respondent as he obviously is only concerned about the
financial obligations arising from the Labor Agreement.
On the question of illegality of the agreement,
Respondent's contention amounts to little more than a
bare claim. The Labor Agreement on its face pertains to
and affects working opportunities of employees, which is a
subject embraced by the National Labor Relations Act.
Respondent cites Section 16600 of the California
Business and Professional Code.
Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, business of any kind is to that extent
void.
This section is part of a statute now codified sometimes
still referred to as the Cartwright Act.
Section 16722 of the Business and Professional Code
also provides. "Any contract or agreement in violation of
this chapter is absolutely void and is not enforceable at
law or in equity."
Without resolving the question of federal preemption on
this issue as suggested by United States v. Carrozzo 37
F.Supp. 191, affd. 313 U.S. 539, and United States v.
William L Hutcheson 32 F.Supp. 600, the California
authorities that have been reviewed establish that
Respondent's defense on this point is without merit.
The test of whether an agreement is in violation of the
Cartwright Act is whether by its nature it generally tends
to lessen competition and creates a monopoly. People v.
Santa Clara Valley Bowling Proprietors Assn., 238 (C A.
2) 225. The labor agreement here does not appear to meet
this test.
A more definitive answer to this question, contrary to
the position of Respondent, is contained in O'Shea v. Tile
Layers Union, 155 Cal. App. 2d 373, 376:
Full freedom of employees to associate to negotiate the
terms and conditions of their employment is the
declared policies of this state. (Lab. Code 923) These
provisions have been held to except from the operation
of the Cartwright Act combinations of laborers for the
purpose of furthering their interests (L. Schweizer v.
Local Joint Executive Board, 121 Cal. App. 2d 45 (262
P (2) 568) and this exception is recognized where the
object of the labor combination is reasonably related to
wages, hours or conditions of employment. (L. S. Smith
Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389 (106 P.2
414); Los Angeles Pie Bakers Assn. v. Bakery Drivers,
122 Cal. App. 2d. 237 (264 P.2 615).
The provisions of the labor agreement here challenged
by Respondent require a price on the part of employers to
work under certain conditions but have a clear
relationship to providing additional work for employees.
In conclusion, it is found the General Counsel has
clearly established Respondent has unlawfully failed to
recognize the Union and to comply with his obligations
under the Labor Agreement with the Union.
By virtue of his membership in the Council at all times
material and his obligation to the Union embodied in an
agreement containing a recognition and a union security
clause,' the Union at all times material has been, and is
now, the exclusive majority representative of the
employees in this described unit:
All employees of the employer-members of the
Council, including Respondent's employees, employed
as plumbing journeymen heating and air-conditioning
journeymen, industrial pipe fitters journeymen, lead
burning journeymen, service and repair journeymen or
who perform or are performing all plumbing, heating
and piping work in this area known as Southern
California, more particularly described as the Counties
of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernadino,
Imperial, San Diego, Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San
Luis Obispo, but excluding office clerical employees
professional employees, guards watchmen, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the
following-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is and has been at all material times an
employer within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Union is and has been at all material times a
labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
3. The bargaining unit of employees described in
Section III at all times material has been represented by
the Union as the exclusive majority bargaining
representative of the employees in the unit including the
employees of Respondent.
4. By failing and refusing to recognize the Union as the
lawful bargaining representative of his employees and to
honor the Labor Agreement with the Union covering such
employees, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor,practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of
the Act, it will be recommended that he cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative actions designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
In order to remove the effects of the unfair labor
practices, an order will be recommended requiring
Respondent to fulfill all its monetary obligations arising
from the Labor Agreement with the Union as well as to
recognize the Union as the bargaining representative of
his employees.4
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this
proceeding, it is recommended that Respondent, his
agents, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from refusing to recognize the
Union and to make the payments due to date as required
by its Labor Agreement with the Union.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act
'Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc, supra, 1479
W.L.R.B. v Hyde Supermarket , 339 F 2d 568 (C A 9), Ogle Protection
Service, 149 NLRB 545
408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(a) Make the payments as described in paragraph 1
above.
(b) Preserve until compliance with any order made by
the National Labor Relations Board for payments due
under the Labor Agreement is effectuated and make
available to the said Board and its agents upon request for
examination and copying all payroll records, social
security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports and all other records relevant to a
determination of the amount of payments due as provided
under the terms of any such order.
(c) Post in conspicuous places at Respondent's place of
business including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached
hereto and marked "Appendix."5 Copies of said notice on
forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region
31, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent, be
posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be
maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days
thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) In writing, notify the Regional Director for Region
31 within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.,'
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice . In the further
event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order "
,in the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director, for
Region 31, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
I WILL NOT refuse to recognize the Southern
California Pipe Trades Council No. 16 as the
bargaining agent for my employees and will pay all
monetary obligations due under an agreement with said
labor organization from July 1, 1966 to date.
RAY HOPMAN, D/B/A
RAY HOPMAN PLUMBING
& HEATING
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 215 West
Seventh St., Los Angeles, California, 90014, Telephone
688-5850.
ATTACHMENT A
APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
To:
PLUMBING-HEATING
AND PIPING EMPLOYEES
COUNCIL OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC.
608 South Hill Street, Suite 1010
Los Angeles, California 90014
Date October 27, 1968
The undersigned hereby applies for membership in
the PLUMBING-HEATING AND PIPING EMPLOYERS
COUNCIL OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC., and
in connection therewith hereby states and agrees.
1. That the undersigned is a licensed contractor
engaged in the plumbing, heating and/or piping
industry within the following Southern California
counties: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San
Bernadino, Imperial, Ventura, Santa Barbara,
San Luis Obispo and San Diego.
2. That if admitted to membership the undersigned
will abide and be bound by all the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of the Council
as they now exist and as they may be amended, and
will thereby, and also by virtue of this application,
become a party to and be bound by the Southern
California Pipe Trades Agreement between the Council
and Southern California Pipe Trades District Council
No. 16 of the United Association and affiliated local
unions. Receipt of copies of the Articles, By-laws,
and labor agreement now in force is hereby
acknowledged.
3. The PLUMBING-HEATING AND PIPING
EMPLOYERS COUNCIL OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA, INC., is hereby designated as the
sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative
for and on behalf of the undersigned , and the Council
and its Officers and other designated representatives
are authorized to execute any and all labor agreements
and documents which are to be binding upon the members
RAY HOPMAN PLUMBING & HEATING
of the Council in accordance with the By-laws.
4. During the past year the average number of
.United Association members employed by the undersigned
was 2.
Ray Homan Plumbing & Heating 688-6691 (805)
Name of Firm or Contractor Busines Phone Number
1661 Fir Avenue Solvang California
Business Street Address City State Lip o e
Contractor's License No. 173575 Type L34396 Business
License No. 93463
Is your firm a corporation no, Partnership no, or
single ownership yes
OFFICERS, PARTNERS OR OWNERS OF
BUSINESS
Name Ray Hopman Title Owner
Name Title
Name Title
5. Name of Officer, Partner or Owner to be excluded
from coverage by the labor agreement: (List only one. See
Section I Paragraph 2 of Labor Agreement).
Ray Hopman Title Owner
409
6. Name of Workmen's Compensation Insurance
Carrier State of California.
7. Name of Disability Insurance Carrier Northern
Insurance Co.
8. Name, HOME ADDRESS, and telephone number
of one principal of your firm:
Ray Ho man 1661 Fir Ave., Solvang, Calif., 688-6691
t er firms in the p l um b ing , heating an d piping
industry in which I/We have management or ownership
interest:
Name and Address X Phone
Name and Address X Phone
Name and Address X Phone
I certify that I am authorized to execute this application
for the above named firm with knowledge that the
information contained herein may be relied upon by the
Council and its members.
By /s/ Ray Hopman Owner
Authorized Signature Title