Poudre Valley Rural Electric Association, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 20, 2018

366 NLRB No. 21 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 21
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Poudre Valley Rural Electric Association, Inc. and
International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, Local 111, AFL–CIO. Case 27–CA–167119
February 20, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN KAPLAN AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND EMANUEL
On February 27, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Ger-
ald M. Etchingham issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to furnish the Union with re-
quested relevant information, we do not rely on Lithographers Local
One-L (Metropolitan Lithographers Assn.), 352 NLRB 906 (2008),
cited by the judge, a decision that issued at a time when the Board
lacked a quorum. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674
(2010).
Among other findings, the judge found that deferring the dispute at
issue here to arbitration was inappropriate. Chairman Kaplan and
Member Emanuel recognize that under extant precedent, information-
request disputes are not deferrable to arbitration, see, e.g., General
Dynamics Corp., 268 NLRB 1432 (1984). Although they may be will-
ing to consider exceptions to this doctrine in a future appropriate case,
the Respondent has made no valid argument for doing so in this case.
On March 24, 2017, the Respondent moved to reopen the record to
introduce evidence regarding events that occurred after the close of the
hearing. The Respondent asserts that (1) in February 2017, the Union
posted the administrative law judge’s decision in this case on a bulletin
board located on the Respondent’s premises, and (2) on February 23,
2017, the Union posted an article online asking employees to update
their beneficiary contact information. The Respondent moves to reopen
the record to introduce evidence in support of these assertions. We
deny the Respondent’s motion. First, the evidence the Respondent
seeks to introduce would not require a different result. See Board’s
Rules & Regulations Sec. 102.48(d)(1). That the Union, in February
2017, posted a copy of the judge’s decision on a bulletin board on the
Respondent’s premises and an online article asking employees to up-
date their beneficiary contact information has no bearing whatsoever on
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Poudre
Valley Rural Electric Association, Inc., Fort Collins,
Colorado, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
“(a) Furnish to the Union in a timely manner, pursuant
to its November 6, 2015 request, a current list of the
names, home addresses, and home telephone numbers of
all bargaining-unit employees.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 20, 2018
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
William J. Emanuel, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.

whether the Respondent, in 2015, violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by refusing to furnish the Union requested relevant information.
Second, evidence sought to be introduced on a motion to reopen the
record must have been “capable of being presented at the original hear-
ing.” Rush University Medical Center, 362 NLRB No. 23, slip op. at 1
fn. 2 (2015), enfd. 833 F.3d 202 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 286 NLRB 219, 219 fn. 1 (1987). Here, the evidence
the Respondent seeks to introduce dates from February 2017 and could
not have been introduced at the original hearing, held in June 2016.
2 We clarify that the Respondent is to supply the Union with a cur-
rent list of unit employees’ names, home addresses, and home tele-
phone numbers rather than, as the judge recommended, information in
effect at the time of the November 6, 2015 information request. We
shall also substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local 111, AFL–CIO (Un-
ion) with requested information that is relevant and nec-
essary to its role as bargaining representative of our em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit:
All regular full-time employees of the Association in-
cluded within the following classifications: working
foreman, lead lineman, lineman, tree trimmer foreman,
lead tree trimmer, tree trimmer, vehicle maintenance
technician, ground man, apprentice lineman, apprentice
tree trimmer, fleet mechanic, equipment operator,
warehouse and plant maintenance foreman, fleet me-
chanic foreman, lead mechanic, warehouse and vehicle
helper, plant and maintenance helper, opera-
tions/dispatch clerk, operations administrative assistant,
cable locater, customer service representative, and cus-
tomer service representative lead; excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL promptly furnish to the Union a current list
of the names, home addresses, and home telephone num-
bers of all our employees in the bargaining unit set forth
above.
POUDRE VALLEY RURAL ELECTRIC
ASSOCIATION, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/27-CA-167119 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.
Isabel Saveland, Esq. and Daniel J. Michalski, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
Raymond M. Deeny, Esq. and Jonathon Watson, Esq. (Sherman
& Howard), for the Respondent.
Naomi Perera, Esq. (Buescher Kelman Perera & Turner, PC),
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GERALD M. ETCHINGHAM, Administrative Law Judge. The
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 111,
AFL–CIO (Union or Charging Party) filed the underlying un-
fair labor practice charge against Respondent Poudre Valley
Rural Electric Association, Inc. (the “Respondent” or “Employ-
er” or “Association”) on January 5, 2016, with amendments to
the charge on March 31 and April 5, 2016. After investigation
of the charge, the Region 27 Regional Director issued a Com-
plaint and Notice of Hearing on April 5, 2016. The Complaint
alleges that the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act), by failing
and refusing to furnish the Union with requested unit employ-
ees’ home addresses and telephone numbers. The Respondent
answered the complaint on April 19, 2016, generally denying
the critical allegations of the complaint and affirmatively de-
fends on grounds that the current labor agreement imposes no
such obligation on it; or, alternatively, if it does, that this matter
should be deferred to arbitration. In addition, Respondent main-
tains that the charge herein is barred by the 6-month limitations
rules in Section 10(b) of the Act; and that furnishing the re-
quested information would violate employees’ rights and priva-
cy. This case was tried in Denver, Colorado, on June 2, 2016.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon the entire record herein,1 including the briefs from
counsel for the General Counsel, Respondent, and the Charging
Party, I make the following findings of fact.
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admitted and I find that it is a State of Colorado
corporation with an office and place of business located in Fort
Collins, Colorado (Respondent’s facility). Respondent is a not-
for-profit public utility and electric cooperative that has been

1 The transcript in this case is mostly accurate, but I correct the tran-
script (Tr.) as follows: Tr. 69, lines (ll). 9, 12, and 14: “MICHALSKI”
should be: “MEISINGER;” Tr. 97, l. 9: “are yes” should be “are not
yes;” Tr. 177, l. 23: “it is not, I agree” should be “it is, I agree.; “and Tr.
184, l. 15: “I’m not finding nothing” should be “I’m finding that noth-
ing.”
POUDRE VALLEY RURAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC. 3
engaged in the retail and/or wholesale supply and transmission
of electrical energy to its members who are located in counties
in Northern Colorado. During the 12-month period ending
March 29, 2016, Respondent, in conducting its operations,
derived gross revenues in excess of $250,000 and purchased
and received at its Fort Collins, Colorado facility, goods valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of
Colorado. Respondent further admitted and I find that it is an
employer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning
of Sections 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. (General Counsel Ex-
hibits 1(j) and 1(l).)2
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admitted and I find that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. (GC
Exhs. 1(j) and 1(l).)
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background Facts
Facts and Issues
Since at least the 1970’s, the Union has been the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of
Respondent’s employees at its facility in Fort Collins, Colora-
do. (Tr. 142.) The last agreement between the parties was the
October 1, 2013–September 30, 2016 collective-bargaining
agreement (CBA). (Tr. 174; GC Exh. 2.) The bargaining unit
(the unit) covered by the agreement is appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:
All regular full-time employees of the Association included
within the following classifications: working foreman, lead
lineman, lineman, tree trimmer foreman, lead tree trimmer,
tree trimmer, vehicle maintenance technician, ground man,
apprentice lineman, apprentice tree trimmer, fleet mechanic,
equipment operator, warehouse and plant maintenance fore-
man, fleet mechanic foreman, lead mechanic, warehouse and
vehicle helper, plant and maintenance helper, opera-
tions/dispatch clerk, operations administrative assistant, cable
locater, customer service representative, and customer service
representative lead; excluding all other employees and super-
visors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.
In October 2015,3 there were approximately 40–42 bargain-
ing unit employees at Respondent with approximately half or
about 22-23 of them being dues-paying members. (Tr. 18–19,
76–77, 172.) The Union has the name, address, and telephone
number of the members of the bargaining unit who pay union
dues. (Tr. 77.) Similarly, for the other half of the bargaining
unit employees who are not dues-paying members, the Union

2 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran-
script; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s exhibit; “GC Exh.” for General
Counsel’s exhibit; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief and
“R. Br.” for the Respondent’s brief. Although I have included several
citations to the record to highlight particular testimony or exhibits, my
findings and conclusions are based not solely on the evidence specifi-
cally cited, but rather on my review and consideration of the entire
record.
3 All dates in 2015 unless otherwise indicated.
does not have the names, addresses and telephone numbers of
these non-member unit employees at all times.4 (Id.) The Union
also does not receive information containing the names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers of new employees immediately
after they are hired during the calendar year. The Union repre-
sents non-paying unit employees and dues paying member unit
employees at all times. (Tr. 76–78.)
The CBA at article 8 is a contractual provision entitled
SENIORITY that governs terms for application of seniority.5
Among other things related to Seniority and how it is calculated
for advancement, demotion, transfers, assignments, etc., this
article includes the following language:
Within thirty (30) days after the beginning of each calendar
year the Association will post a seniority list for the Associa-
tion including all employees in the bargaining unit, their clas-
sifications, and their date of hiring. Any dispute regarding the
seniority posting shall be taken up by the bargaining commit-
tee and representatives of the Association within thirty (30)
days after this posting.
(GC Exh. 2 at 3.) While each annual Seniority List contains
unit employees’ names, classifications, and dates of hiring,
neither this CBA provision nor the Seniority List it mentions
contains or references bargaining unit employees’ addresses or
telephone numbers. (Tr. 55; GC Exh. 2 at 3.)
Once a year, every January, under section 8 of the CBA, the
Respondent provides the Union with a seniority list of unit
employees that contains their seniority ranking, name, work
classification, and hire date (the “Seniority List”) (GC Exh. 2 at
3.)
Article 6 of the CBA provides that “no strikes shall be
caused or sanctioned by the Union or its members.” (GC Exh. 2
at 2.)
By letter dated March 31, the Union’s Business Agent Sean
McCarville (McCarville) requested information from Respond-
ent’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jeff Wadsworth6
(Wadsworth) regarding “Employee List as of 3/31/15” that
sought “a complete employee list covered under the CBA to be
employee’s name, classification, date of hire and last 4 social
security number digits.” McCarville gave the Respondent a
4/3/15 deadline to provide this info and explained his reasons
as: “In an effort to update our records and maintain accurate
information” as the “info is essential as we update our records.”
This information request did not ask for unit employees’ home
addresses or telephone numbers. (Tr. 93–94; GC Exh. 6(c).)
After receiving the March 31 information request, CEO
Wadsworth told Human Resources Director Vinnie Johnson
(Johnson) to deny the information request based on privacy
confidential concerns that Wadsworth had as well as the request

4 Meisinger’s uncontradicted testimony indicates that bargaining unit
employees at Respondent are not required to become members of the
Union to keep their jobs. Tr. 77.
5 Seniority is defined as “the state of being older or higher in rank.”
Webster’s II, New Riverside University Dictionary, The Riverside
Publishing Co., p. 1062 (2nd Edition, 1988).
6 Wadsworth had worked at Respondent for 6 years at the time of
hearing also holding positions there of chief financial officer and chief
operating officer before becoming CEO in January 2014. Tr. 134.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
being outside the time period for supplying this information
under the CBA. (Tr. 136.) Wadsworth explained that his per-
sonal privacy concerns for Respondent’s employees were that
in this day and age, cybersecurity is a huge issue in the utility
industry which is subject to attack such as in the Ukraine. Id.
Wadsworth further opined that he believes that employees’
privacy is near and dear to his heart as it is a trust thing be-
tween Respondent’s management and its employees making
sure that the information that employees provide to Respondent
is kept under lock and key.7 (Tr. 137.)
On April 2, Respondent’s Johnson provided McCarville with
a Seniority List dated March 31, as an accommodation to
McCarville’s March 31 Employee List information request.
Respondent points out that it provides the Union this same
information every January and also that “we cannot provide
you with the last 4 digits of employee social security numbers.”
(Tr. 96; GC Exh. 6(d) and 6(e).)
In June, Richard Meisinger (Meisinger) joined the Union as
assistant business agent at Respondent in place of its prior as-
sistant business agent, Timio Archuleta. (Tr. 17, 46.) Meisinger
reported to McCarville as business manager for the Union at
this time. (Tr. 67.)
Later on October 29, Meisinger arranged to meet with a Re-
spondent’s management group comprised of Wadsworth, HR
Director Sarah Witherell (Witherell), Chief Operating Officer
John Bouderline, and Lisa Wright (Wright). On October 29, the
group meets for coffee with Meisinger so he can introduce
himself as the new assistant business agent to discuss some
issues that Meisinger wanted to bring to the attention of Re-
spondent’s management, and to “build a bridge” for open
communication between Respondent and the Union. (Tr. 19–
20, 88, 96, 116, 137–138.)
At this meeting, Meisinger commented that he is aware that
new employees have been hired by Respondent and the Union
will be requesting new employee information from the Re-
spondent because Respondent, unlike all other employers
Meisinger had worked with previously, was not letting the Un-
ion know when new employees were hired so that the Union
could follow up with a proper designation for the employee in
the Union’s records. (Tr. 83–84.) Meisinger typically gives new
employee hires a union packet that, among other things, asks
them for their address and telephone number. (Tr. 51.) Because
Respondent did not immediately communicate when a new hire
arrived at Respondent, Meisinger relied ineffectively either on
the January seniority list or word of mouth from union stewards
at Respondent to find out about newly hired employees. (Tr.
81.)
One example Meisinger raised in the October 29 meeting
was he told Respondent’s management that he knew that a new
lineman, Dan Hanson, had been hired on at Respondent and
Hanson transferred his union ticket or card but that the Union

7 I note that as of March 2015, CEO Wadsworth’s only objection on
privacy grounds relates to the March 31 request that Respondent pro-
vide the last 4 social security digits of each bargaining unit employee as
the additional information requested on March 31 is limited to each
unit employee’s name, classification, and date of hire—the same non-
private information that Respondent freely provides each January as
part of the CBA Section 8 Seniority List referenced above.
did not have that information as Respondent did not alert the
Union to this new hiring as other employers typically did based
on Meisinger’s prior experience. (Tr. 21, 63, 83.) Meisinger
further explained that he needed information from Respondent
concerning the new employees because the Union did not know
immediately to move Hanson from a construction unit to the
bargaining unit at Respondent and this caused confusion of a
bargaining unit employee’s proper classification in the Union’s
records. (Tr. 21, 63, 83, 97, 139, 165–166.)
As a result, Meisinger next told Wadsworth and the man-
agement group that he believed either under the existing CBA
or possibly somewhere else, he had been told that the Union
was legally entitled to receive this information concerning new
hires, addresses, telephone numbers of bargaining unit employ-
ees so Meisinger asked the management group at this October
29 meeting if Respondent would send him the new employee
information whenever new employees were hired so the Union
could contact the new employee(s) and update their records.8
(Tr. 21–22, 63, 83, 101, 139–140.) In response, the manage-
ment group told Meisinger that they would look into this, check
the CBA, and get back to Meisinger with Employer’s response.
(Tr. 21, 52, 56, 63, 93, 97–99, 101.)
Also, Wadsworth denied Meisinger’s request to go out to a
crew in the field as a union representative to talk with the crew
while they are working (a crew visit) which would be another
alternative means of getting to know both member and non-
Union member unit employees. (Tr. 22, 141.) Finally,
Meisinger admits that at this meeting, what he really wanted
was a list of new hires that included their addresses and tele-
phone numbers but that through November 2015, Respondent
only provided him different versions of the Seniority Lists ref-
erenced in the CBA at article 8. (Tr. 57.) Also, Meisinger did
not specifically refer to the McCarville/Johnson correspond-
ence from March/April 2015 referenced above at any time to
the management group on October 29. (Tr. 98, 100.)
Later that same day, Respondent HR Director Witherell
sends an October 29 email to Meisinger in response to his oral
request at the earlier meeting and says in regard to “New Em-
ployee Notification” and the Union’s request that Respondent
provide the Union with notification of new hires, “we have
reviewed the CBA and there is not language present requiring
us to do so. As such, we will continue with our current process
of advising new employees to contact the Union directly if they
have an interest in doing so.” Respondent made no offer of
accommodation to the Union. (Tr. 23, 98–99; GC Exh. 3.)
Witherell also points out that the Union can get the names of
newly hired employees, their position, and their start date from
union stewards at Respondent and Respondent supplies this
information to all of its employees. (Tr. 131.) Larry Binder
(Binder), a former union steward at Respondent prior to July
2014, testified that as a steward, he would meet with newly
hired employees and explain the benefits of a union and let
them make a decision whether or not they want to pay dues.
(Tr. 175.)

8 Meisinger later discovered that he is entitled to the requested in-
formation under the Act even though it is not provided for in the senior-
ity list of the CBA. Tr. 36–37, 109; GC Exh. 11.
POUDRE VALLEY RURAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC. 5
On November 2, Meisinger responds regarding “New Em-
ployee Notification” and in an email to Witherell his infor-
mation request evolves to become a request for a complete
employee list of all Respondent employees covered by the
CBA. “The information is to include the employee’s name,
classification, date of hire, current address, phone number, and
last four digits of their social security number.” (Emphasis
added). The reasons given for this request are that it is in an
effort to update the Union’s records and maintain accurate in-
formation. The Union concludes that the requested information
is essential for IBEW Local 111 “so we can properly represent
our members” and a December 1 deadline is given to Respond-
ent. (Tr. 24, 99–100; GC Exh. 4.)
Meisinger also sends an 11/2/15 letter request for infor-
mation to CEO Wadsworth regarding “Employee List as of
January 31, 2015.” The letter request for information is the
same evolved request as the 11/2 email except as to the subject
matter and the letter contains the same December 1 deadline as
the email but only requests the employee’s name, classification,
date of hire and current address. A request for telephone num-
bers and the request for last four digits of employee’s social
security numbers are omitted from the November 2 letter.9 (Tr.
24–25, 62; GC Exh. 5; GC Exh. 11(b).)
On November 3, Witherell responds to Meisinger’s Novem-
ber 2 email with an email to Meisinger regarding “New Em-
ployee Notification.” (Tr. 101; GC Exh. 6.) The November 3
email says essentially the same things as Witherell’s October
29 email referenced above, GC Exh. 3, that the CBA does not
require that Respondent send the Union the requested infor-
mation. Respondent made no offer of accommodation to the
Union. Attached to the November 3 email is also a copy of
Respondent’s March 31 letter from McCarville to Wadsworth
referenced above as GC Exh. 6(c) as well as a copy of Re-
spondent’s April 2 response from Johnson and a copy of the
March 31 Seniority List also provided with Respondent’s April
2 response to McCarville. (Tr. 26–28, 102–103; GC Exh. 6(d)
and (e).)
Meisinger was aware of the Respondent’s position that the
Union was not entitled to the Seniority List10 that McCarville

9 Meisinger’s business manager at the Union informed Meisinger af-
ter the Nov. 2 email had been sent to Witherell but before the Nov. 2
letter to Wadsworth that the Union did not need the last four digits of
employees’ social security numbers. Tr. 25.
10 Witherell testified that she and Meisinger used the Seniority List
and the New Employee Notification and Employee List interchangea-
bly at this time. Tr. 90, 100–103, 121, 128; R.Br. at 18, 22, 26. I reject
this testimony and argument as only Respondent used the seniority list
interchangeably with the employee list and Witherell’s testimony is
inconsistent with Meisinger’s understanding of these labels as evi-
denced by his testimony and in his correspondence that Meisinger knew
the difference between an employee list he sought in Novem-
ber/December 2015 and a seniority list which is covered by the CBA.
(Tr. 61-62.) Specifically, the Seniority List was tied to the CBA and
only available to the Union at the beginning of each calendar year
under the clear and unambiguous terms of article 8 of the CBA and that
Meisinger, instead, sought the names addresses and telephone numbers
of all bargaining unit employees as a statutory right under the Act par-
ticularly so he could learn the identity, address, and telephone numbers
of new hires and non-member unit employees at Respondent as of
requested in March 2015 under the terms of the CBA. (Tr. 52–
55.) Meisinger never used the Seniority List interchangeably
with the new Employee List he sought and he also acknowl-
edges that McCarville was not entitled to receive the last four
digits of bargaining unit employees’ social security numbers.
(Tr. 55.) Meisinger believed that he was entitled to receive the
requested information, possibly under the CBA, if not some-
where else. (Tr. 21–22, 139.)
On November 6, Meisinger sends Witherell an email regard-
ing “PVREA’s [siq. Union’s] request for Employee Infor-
mation” that contains a copy of his November 2 letter and once
again clarifies the total information requested by deleting the
Union’s request for each employee’s last 4 digits of their social
security number. (Tr. 30; GC Exh. 7.) Thus, Meisinger told
Witherell that he was no longer seeking the bargaining unit
employees’ social security numbers not because they were
private information but because Meisinger had been told by
McCarville that the Union no longer needed this information.
(Tr. 67.) Meisinger’s information request was now limited to
the bargaining unit employees’ names, classifications, address-
es, and telephone numbers. (Tr. 32–33.)
On November 9, via email from Witherell to Meisinger re-
garding “PVREA’s [siq. Union’s] request for Employee Infor-
mation,” Witherell repeats her earlier position that Article 8 of
the CBA calls for posting of the seniority list within a discreet
period early in the year and also defines what info is to be in-
cluded on the list (name, classification, date of hire). Witherell
further writes that as a courtesy in response to the Union’s No-
vember 2 letter request for information, Respondent will pro-
vide the Union with a Seniority List as of November 1. The
email concludes by saying that Respondent “will not share
private employee information such as current addresses” and
that Respondent has not shared this information previously.
Respondent made no offer of accommodation to the Union. (Tr.
31–33, 102–104; GC Exh. 8.)
On November 16, Meisinger sends Wadsworth a letter re-
garding “Employee List.” The letter begins saying: “In further-
ance of the Union’s obligation as collective-bargaining repre-
sentative and in order to properly represent the bargaining unit,
the Union is requesting the following information:
Please send a list of all bargaining employees that are current-
ly identified in the [CBA] by classification between [Re-
spondent and the Union.] Please include the employees[’][sic]
name, address, and phone number.”
“This is my third request for this information and under the
National Labor Relations Act[,][sic] I am entitled to this infor-
mation. Any attempt to not comply with this request is a viola-
tion of the Act.” (Tr. 34–35, 80, 105; GC Exh. 9.)
On December 3, Respondent, by Witherell, once again re-
peats its November 9 email, GC Exh. 8 above, and mentions
that Respondent’s obligation to provide the Seniority List in the
CBA in January has been satisfied and that Respondent has also

November 2, 2015, so he could contact them about union membership
and update his records as soon as possible. Tr. 21, 57, 61–63, 83, 101,
139–140.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
provided the Union this Seniority List at more frequent inter-
vals than required under the CBA (March 31, 2015). Respond-
ent made no offer of accommodation to the Union. (Tr. 35–36,
107–108, 119–120; GC Exh. 10.) Witherell admits that she did
not consider the Act in her responses to the Union’s infor-
mation requests. (Tr. 121.)
On December 18, Meisinger sends an email to Witherell
which reads: “In regards to our November 2nd information re-
quest for employee information (attached), the Local is not
requesting this information under a provision of the CBA – it is
doing so in furtherance of its representation duties, and in order
to police the CBA, IBEW Local 111 is legally entitled to this
information under the NLRA. Please be advised that if we do
not get this information from you by January 2nd, 2016, we will
be filing an unfair labor practice charge against PVREA for its
repeated failure to disgorge this information.” The Union also
attached a copy of the November 2 letter to Wadsworth, GC
Exh. 5. The email also copies outside legal counsel for the Re-
spondent and the Union and McCarville. (Tr. 36–37, 109; GC
Exh. 11.)
Meisinger admits that at the time of his December 18 letter,
GC Exh. 11, the Union was not preparing for or having ongoing
collective-bargaining negotiations with Respondent, there were
no ongoing grievances pending or to be filed involving any
wages, hours, or working conditions, and there was no notice to
commence bargaining at this time. (Tr. 85, 110, 152–153.) The
CBA, however, was slated to expire in September 2016. (GC
Exh. 2.) The CBA was expiring as of September 2016. (GC
Exh. 2.)
On December 19, Respondent’s outside legal counsel sends
an email to Meisinger and the Union’s outside legal counsel
with a copy to his client, Witherell, responding to Meisinger’s
December 18 email, GC Exh. 11, and basically says to the Un-
ion that they can contact the bargaining unit employees directly
to get the same information and if the Union has legal authority
in support of the Union’s position that this private information
must be turned over to the Union, please send it to Respond-
ent’s lawyer and keep all future correspondence in this matter
between the outside counsel from here on out. (Tr. 37–38; GC
Exh. 12.)11 Witherell, however, did not offer any accommoda-
tion from Respondent to the Union for the Union to obtain the
same names, addresses, and telephone numbers sought by its
November 6 information request. (Tr. 110.)
Meisinger admits that as assistant business agent for the Un-
ion, he attended monthly meetings with unit employees but
they were sparsely attended as only 6–10 dues-paying members

11 At hearing, Respondent’s counsel similarly argued that at all rele-
vant times, the Union had the ability to obtain the same requested in-
formation at issue here, the bargaining unit employees’ addresses and
telephone numbers, through open use of a bulletin board message sys-
tem at Respondent, its monthly meetings with bargaining unit employ-
ees on Respondent’s premises, and through employee email addresses
available to all employees at Respondent. Tr. 14, 61. Respondent
counsel also argued at hearing that the Union’s information request is
improperly trying to modify the CBA through the request for infor-
mation process. Tr. 60. The General Counsel argued that there is noth-
ing improper with the Union using information requests here to update
its records regarding unit employees. Tr. 60.
would attend these meetings on average of the 42 unit employ-
ees at Respondent. (Tr. 65, 77–78.) Wadsworth and Witherell
admit that there have been no recent strikes at Respondent
where any striker replacement workers could have been hired.
(Tr. 127, 162.) As stated above, the CBA specifically provides
that neither the Union nor its members can ever go on strike.
(GC Exh. 2 at 2.) Witherell also admits that the Union could
not use the Respondent’s email system to notify an employee if
the Union did not already know the name of an employee. (Tr.
128.)
On December 21, the Union’s counsel emailed Respondent’s
counsel with copies to Meisinger and McCarville and informed
Respondent’s counsel that bargaining unit employee’s address-
es and telephone numbers had not been provided to the Unit by
Respondent in response to the Union’s earlier information re-
quests. (Tr. 39–40, 43–44; GC Exh. 13.)
On December 22, Respondent’s counsel emails a letter to the
Union’s counsel. (Tr. 40; GC Exh. 14.) Among other things, the
December 22 letter from Respondent’s counsel provides:
The Union has acknowledged in the past and the instant case
these qualifications to production obligations when they in-
volve confidential information. You should be aware of meet-
ings previously held between the union leadership and
PVREA management during Mike Byrd’s administration [in
or before 2013] in which the union sought access to confiden-
tial information about members’ dues delinquencies and de-
mands for payments. In those instances, the employees com-
plained to PVREA management about the harassing tech-
niques used by the local to collect these monies. Management
met with the Union representatives to discuss alternative
means to allow the Union to pursue these delinquencies with-
out intruding on the privacy or confidentiality issues of the
bargaining unit employees.12 We offer now those similar ac-
commodations13 – post a letter to your unit and solicit their
addresses from them; access the premises to hold a meeting to
gain signed authorizations to have the employer release their
addresses; hold a Union meeting offsite to gain the employ-
ees’ approval to release this private confidential information;
use an independent third-party mailer; or, as the Union has

12 While Meisinger worked under McCarville for the Union and
Meisinger knew that Mike Byrd preceded McCarville as the union
business manager at Respondent, Meisinger had no knowledge of any
prior history at Respondent of employees purportedly being disrupted
by the Union’s use of private information to collect delinquent dues
payments. Tr. 67. Wadsworth recalled that a prior issue in 2013 re-
garding employee privacy came to light at Respondent involving accu-
sations that the Union was trying to use alleged private information to
collect delinquent dues payments. Tr. 145–146. Witherell opines that
the Respondent and Union have had a positive working relationship
since at least October 2014. Tr. 130. More importantly, the Union here
seeks presumptively relevant bargaining unit employees’ 2015 names,
addresses, and telephone numbers and not information from, in, or
before 2013 about members’ dues delinquencies.
13 While Respondent’s counsel makes disingenuous reference to “ac-
commodation” throughout his December 22, 2015 letter, what he is
really doing is pointing out to the Union various alternatives which as
referenced herein have proven ineffective for various reasons. Re-
spondent made no offer of accommodation to the Union.
POUDRE VALLEY RURAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC. 7
done before, bring such a proposal to modify the current CBA
to the bargaining table. These accommodations are appropri-
ate under the circumstances. Feel free to propose alternative
accommodations for PVREA’s consideration.
(Tr. 111–112, 156–159; GC Exh. 14(b).) Respondent made no
offer of accommodation to the Union. Witherell opines that the
Respondent and Union have had a positive working relation-
ship since at least October 2014. (Tr. 130.)
The Union filed its charge on January 5, 2016 which states
that “[s]ince on or about November 3, 2015, the employer has
refused to provide a current employee list of all employees
covered under the CBA between IBEW Local 111 and the em-
ployer.” (Tr. 58–59; GC Exh. 1(a).) The charge was amended
by the Union on March 31, 2016 and again on April 5, 2016, as
the basis of the amended charge became that “[s]ince on or
about November 3, 2015, the employer has refused to provide a
current employee list of all employees, including their name,
classification, date of hire, telephone number, and current ad-
dress, who are covered under the CBA between IBEW Local
111 and the employer” and the employer was clarified as incor-
porated Respondent. (GC Exh. 1(d); 1(g).)
In addition to the need expressed in its information requests
for the unit employees’ names, addresses, and telephone num-
bers (i.e., its statutory duty to properly represent all bargaining
unit members whether or not they were members of the Union,
to update union records, and in order to police the CBA), the
Union also cited at the hearing more specific concerns, mainly
relating to the Union’s need to directly contact bargaining unit
employees because Respondent did not immediately communi-
cate when a new hire arrived at Respondent and, therefore,
Meisinger relied hit and miss either on other information or
word of mouth from union stewards at Respondent to find out
about newly hired employees so Meisinger could give a new
employee hire a union packet. (Tr. 21, 51, 63, 81–84.) Finally,
in this time of computerized data maintenance, I further find
that the requested bargaining unit employee names, addresses,
and telephone numbers for approximately under 50 employees
would place no material burden on Respondent to produce.
Analysis
A. Credibility
A credibility determination may rely on a variety of factors,
including the context of the witness’ testimony, the witness’
demeanor, and the weight of the respective evidence, estab-
lished or admitted facts, inherent probabilities and reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole. Dou-
ble D Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003);
Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Auto-
motive Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996)), enfd.
56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Credibility findings need
not be all-or-nothing propositions—indeed, nothing is more
common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some,
but not all, of a witness’ testimony. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB
at 622. My credibility findings are generally incorporated into
the findings of fact set forth above.
B. Summary
The CBA in effect at the time of hearing was scheduled to
expire in September 2016. The CBA is silent on the subject of
furnishing unit employees’ addresses and telephone numbers to
the Union. From June to October, Meisinger was not receiving
information on newly hired employees at Respondent that he
expected and normally received from other employers so he
asked for bargaining unit employees’ names, addresses, and
telephone numbers. The information requests on October 29
and November 2 started out more broadly than Meisinger actu-
ally needed and was later refined to what was most needed –
bargaining unit employees’ names, addresses and telephone
numbers. The requested names, addresses, and telephone num-
ber of unit employees are not private confidential information.
Instead, it is presumptively relevant and necessary information
as Meisinger, the assistant union business manager, was not
receiving this information from Respondent, his union stew-
ards, crew visits, or from the union bulletin boards at Respond-
ent’s premises, or from monthly union meetings sparsely at-
tended by a few dues-paying members. This information was
necessary for collective bargaining and for the Union’s repre-
sentational role as the CBA was expiring in September 2016.
Here, unlike situations where: (1) non-bargaining unit infor-
mation is being sought; (2) employer’s trade secrets are in-
volved; or (3) medical test results of employees are the subject
of an information request, Meisinger seeks only the bargaining
unit employees’ names, addresses, and telephone numbers.
More importantly, any alleged hint of harassment by the Union
against the Respondent occurred almost 3 year before the cur-
rent information request, it involved a tense relationship be-
tween the Respondent and the Union which there was no evi-
dence of being present here, such that any alleged harassment
here is too tenuous and irrelevant to the current information
request. The Respondent offered no accommodation on its own
such as limiting the use of the information by time or who from
the Union could view the information, or making it subject to a
protective order or confidentiality agreement. The only offered
alternatives from the Respondent had to do with actions sug-
gested be taken by the Union to obtain the same information
which had proven ineffective as discussed more fully below.
1. This information request case should not be deferred
to arbitration
I am mindful that “the Board is not required by the [Act] or
by ‘national labor policy’ to defer information request cases to
arbitration.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. NLRB, 288 F.3d 434,
444 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Also, the “Board has long adhered to a
policy of refusing to defer disputes concerning information
requests” to arbitration. Id.; Postal Service, 302 NLRB 918,
918. Any exceptions to this policy must be made by the Board
in the first instance. Cf. SBC California, 344 NLRB 243, 243
fn. 3 (2005) (judge correctly applied the Board’s policy of non-
deferral in information cases, where a three-member Board
majority has not overruled existing Board precedent). As such,
because the Board has not made such an exception to its
longstanding policy for the type of situation set forth herein,
deferral of this matter is inappropriate.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
2. The Union’s January 5, 2016 ULP charge is not barred by
the section 10(b) 6-month limitations rule
The Respondent throws out its argument that the Union
waited too long to file its charge in this matter. Section 10(b)
provides that “no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair
labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing
of the charge.” Here, Respondent contends that Section 10(b)
bars the complaint because a March 31, 2015 request for infor-
mation from the Charging Party Union denied by Respondent
on April 2 is virtually identical to an October/November 2015
request for information from the Union’s new business agent.
As a result, Respondent argues that the April 2, 2015 denial
date is controlling to start the statute of limitations.
The General Counsel argues any earlier union requests for
similar information [the March 31, 2015 request] would have
had its own separate Section 10(b) timely filing dates, but that
earlier request is not at issue in this proceeding. The March 31,
2015 request’s 10(b) timely filing date, therefore, is irrelevant.
As the Complaint makes clear, the only alleged Act violations
in this matter relate to the Respondent’s violations ‘since about
October 29, 2015’ relating to the Union’s evolving October
29/November 6 information requests since that date for bar-
gaining unit employees’ contact information. The Union timely
filed charges over the only alleged violations in this case.
I find that there is no merit to the claim that the charge is
barred by the Section 10(b) 6-month limitations rule. The Un-
ion’s initial information request containing the request for bar-
gaining unit employees’ names, addresses, and telephone num-
bers, began verbally on October 29, 2015 and evolved on No-
vember 6 to become the information request at issue here. Re-
spondent’s initial refusal to provide the requested information
began on October 29, and evolved to November 2, 9, and De-
cember 3, followed by the Union’s filing of a charge on Janu-
ary 5, 2016, less than 6 months from Respondent’s initial re-
fusal.
In their brief, the Respondent cites to Local Lodge No. 1424
v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960), in its argument that the Novem-
ber 6 information request is barred by the statute of limitations
because of the March 31 information request. However, the
General Counsel is not relying on the facts relating to the
March 31 information request. It was not proven that McCar-
ville’s March 31, 2015 information request was identical to
Meisinger’s November 6 information request for all bargaining
unit employees’ names, classifications, dates of hire, addresses,
and telephone numbers as of November 6. Therefore, the stat-
ute of limitations did not begin until October 29 at the earliest.
Moreover, I further find that the March 31 information re-
quest and the November 6 information request are different.
The March 31 information request dealt with names, classifica-
tions, dates of hire, and last 4 of the employee’s social security
number digits, while the November 6 information request
evolved to request the same names, classifications, and dates of
hire information and added these employees’ current addresses
and phone numbers. Moreover, failure to provide information
in the past does not constitute a continuing waiver. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass, 282 NLRB 609 (1987).
Assuming both acts by the Respondent in refusing to give
the information to the Union constitute an unfair labor practice
under Section 7 of the Act, each act is a separate incident from
the other. The Union did not mention the March 31 request but
instead made an independent information request beginning on
October 29 to later become the November 6 information re-
quest at issue here. Since both are independent acts with differ-
ent facts, Section 10(b) does not bar the January 5, 2016 charge
which is based on the November 6 information request for bar-
gaining unit employee names, addresses, and telephone num-
bers.
3. The requested information-bargaining unit employee names,
addresses, and telephone numbers-are relevant and nonconfi-
dential
a. Presumptive Relevance of Bargaining Unit Employees’
Names, Addresses, and Telephone Numbers
Under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, an employer must, upon
request, provide a union with information, which is necessary
and relevant to collective bargaining and its representational
role. See e.g., NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436
(1967), citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
See also Daimler Chrysler Corp., 288 F.3d 434, 439 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (“[I]nformation is essential to the union if it is to function
effectively as the bargaining agent for unit employees”). Rele-
vancy is defined by a broad discovery standard, and it is only
necessary to show that requested information has potential
utility. A-1 Door & Building Solutions, 356 NLRB 499, 500
(2011). Under that standard, even potential or probable rele-
vance is sufficient to give rise to an employer’s obligation to
provide information. United States Testing, supra, at 859;
Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994). An
employer must, for example, provide information connected to
collective bargaining or contract administration. NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–153 (1956); Southern California
Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235 (2005).
The failure to provide requested relevant information is a vi-
olation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.14 Like a flat refusal to
bargain, “[t]he refusal of an employer to provide a bargaining
agent with information relevant to the Union’s task of repre-
senting its constituency is a per se violation of the Act” without
regard to the employer’s subjective good or bad faith. Brooklyn
Union Gas Co., 220 NLRB 189, 191 (1975); Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 237 NLRB 747, 751 (1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 1310 (8th
Cir. 1979).
Information related to bargaining unit members is presump-
tively relevant, including, names, addresses, and phone num-
bers, and the result here is controlled by the Board’s decisions
in Childrens Center for Behavioral Development, 347 NLRB
35, 49 (2006) (All bargaining unit employees’ home addresses
and telephone numbers are presumptively relevant and not
confidential); River Oak Center for Children, 345 NLRB 1335
(2005) (same); and Helca Mining Co., 248 NLRB 1341, 1341,
1343 (1980) (unit employees’ names and addresses must be
forthwith provided to the union as relevant & not private re-

14 In addition, an employer’s violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act is a
derivative violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. Tennessee Coach Co.,
115 NLRB 677, 679, enfd. 237 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1956). See ABF
Freight System, 325 NLRB 546, 546 fn. 3 (1998).
POUDRE VALLEY RURAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC. 9
quested information), and cases cited respectively therein. As a
result, no particularized showing of need is necessary given the
Union’s role as bargaining agent here. See Georgetown Holiday
Inn, 235 NLRB 485, 486 (1978), and cases cited.
In addition, a union can obtain supplemental updates about
unit employees’ addresses and telephone numbers from the
employer even when this same information has previously been
provided pursuant to a provision in the collective-bargaining
agreement. See River Oak Center for Children, 345 NLRB at
1335; Watkins Contracting, Inc., 335 NLRB 222 fn. 1, 224–225
(2001). The Board’s reason for this is that “[i]t is reasonable to
assume that there was employee turnover, changes in address,
phone numbers, and job classifications.” Watkins Contracting,
Inc., 335 NLRB at 225 (citing Long Island Day Care Services,
303 NLRB 112, 130 (1991).
b. The Requested Information Is Not Confidential
Respondent asserts a confidentiality interest in protecting
from disclosure the bargaining unit employees’ names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers. Respondent, however, cannot
find refuge in a claim of privilege. As found above, the request-
ed information here is presumptively relevant and is not confi-
dential or private as referenced above and for the additional
reasons that follow.
I find that Meisinger convincingly opined that the requested
information is necessary because there is an unusual difficulty
for the Union effectively to communicate with all of the unit
employees, members and nonunion members, whom Meisinger
is duty bound by statute to represent, including because of the
relative ineffectiveness of the steward system, the fact that
regular union meetings are sparsely attended, Respondent’s
denial of crew visits, and that unlike other employers he has
experienced, Meisinger was not being informed by Respondent
immediately whenever a new employee was hired into the bar-
gaining unit (collectively known as the ineffective alternatives).
Also I find that the requested information is necessary for col-
lective bargaining and for the Union’s representational role as
the CBA was expiring in September 2016.15 I further find that
when weighing the Union’s inability to successfully obtain the
same requested information here through the use of the ineffec-
tive alternates referenced above versus the potential burden to
the Respondent of compiling and furnishing such information
for only 42 bargaining unit employees, I find that Respondent
can furnish the bargaining unit employees’ names, addresses,
and telephone numbers with ease and efficiency and that this
factor renders the availability of such ineffective alternative
channels relatively insignificant to the statutory merits of the
Union information request.
Alternatively, even if the requested information may be con-
fidential, in Postal Service, 356 NLRB 483, 486 (2011), the

15 See, i.e., NLRB v. CJC Holdings, Inc., 97 F.3d 114, 117 (5th Cir.
1996), where the Circuit Court rejected the employer’s argument that it
did not have to disclose employee’s addresses as requested by the union
to allow it to update its records because the union had various alterna-
tive means of communication with the employees because the 5th Cir-
cuit found that the requested addresses were so fundamental to the
union’s capacity to communicate with the employees it represented that
the union did not have to make a special showing of specific relevance.
Board explained:
A party asserting a confidentiality defense must prove a legit-
imate and substantial confidentiality interest in the infor-
mation withheld. Pennsylvania Power Co., 301 NLRB 1104,
1105 (1991). Confidential information is limited to a few
general categories that would reveal, contrary to promises or
reasonable expectations, highly personal information. Detroit
Newspaper Agency, 317 NLRB 1071, 1073 (1995). Such
confidential information may include “individual medical
records or psychological test results; that which would reveal
substantial proprietary information, such as trade secrets; that
which could reasonably be expected to lead to harassment or
retaliation, such as the identity of witnesses; and that which is
traditionally privileged, such as memoranda prepared for
pending lawsuits.”
Id.
In A–1 Door & Building Solutions, 356 NLRB at 500–501,
the Board stated:
In considering union requests for relevant but assertedly con-
fidential information, the Board balances the union’s need for
the information against any “legitimate and substantial” con-
fidentiality interests established by the employer. See Detroit
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) [parallel citations
omitted]. The party asserting confidentiality has the burden of
proving that such interests exist and that they outweigh its
bargaining partner’s need for the information. See Jackson-
ville Area Assn. for Retarded Citizens, 316 NLRB 338, 340
(1995).
More to the instant case, the Board also held in Transport of
New Jersey, 233 NLRB 694 (1977), that an employer’s refusal
to comply with a union’s request for the names and addresses
of passenger-witnesses to a bus accident, in the context of the
employer’s determination that the driver was at fault, violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1).
In this case, the information sought to be protected is not
highly personal, proprietary, or traditionally privileged.
In addition, there is no credible record evidence of fear by
bargaining unit employees of harassment or violence from the
Union if their addresses and telephone numbers are provided.
See Metropolitan Edison, 330 NLRB at 108 (While it “would
be naïve to deny any latent possibility of retaliation against
informants whose information leads to an investigation and
discharge of an employee, . . . this case presents no more than
just that—a possibility. There is nothing in this record to indi-
cate a likelihood or real risk of retaliation or violence.”).
Moreover, Witherall made clear that the Respondent and the
Union have had a positive working relationship since on or
before October 2014 and made no reference in her emails to
Meisinger that anyone at Respondent harbored a clear and pre-
sent fear of harassment from the Union’s information request.16

16 Any alleged past Union harassment for members’ delinquent dues
payments in or before early 2013 is unrelated and irrelevant to the
November 2015 information sought here and is too tenuous for any
reasonable fear of harassment to convert the non-confidential requested
information to privileged information. See Page Litho, Inc., 311 NLRB
881, 883 (1993) (Strike ending January 19, 1990, with no incidents of
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
This is not a case where strike replacement workers fear for
their safety as in the cases cited by Respondent in support of
limiting access of the Union to bargaining unit employees’
names, addresses, and telephone numbers. In addition, the CBA
here specifically prohibits bargaining unit employees and the
Union from striking at this public utility and electric coopera-
tive Employer.
Assuming arguendo that the Respondent is not estopped
from asserting the confidentiality claim, the Respondent’s
claim must still fail. A party claiming confidentiality must tell
the union of its claim and bargain to seek accommodation of its
interests. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 261 NLRB 27
(1982). In that event, however, the employer must offer and
bargain in good faith over a reasonable accommodation, such
as redacting the information and/or restricting its use. The bur-
den is on the employer not the union to propose a precise op-
tion to providing the information unedited. See A-1 Door &
Building Solutions, 356 NLRB 499, 500–501 (2011); and Bor-
gess Medical Center, 342 NLRB 1105, 1106 (2004). See also
U.S. Testing Co. v. NLRB, 160 F.3d 14, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
and cases cited there.
The fact that the union may be able to obtain the requested
information from a source other than the employer or by means
other than requesting it from the employer “does not alter or
diminish the obligation of the [e]mployer to furnish relevant
information [citations omitted].” Watkins Contracting, Inc., 335
NLRB at 225.
Here, the Respondent failed to offer a reasonable accommo-
dation to the Union. The Respondent did not make any effort to
seek accommodation or approach the Union to bargain about
limiting the information provided in order to protect the alleged
confidentiality. Respondent never offered to provide the re-
quested information to the Union subject to a protective agree-
ment for limited access or viewing or any other manner that

misconduct thereafter did not justify a refusal to supply the names of
bargaining unit employees nearly 4 months later). Here, Respondent’s
throw-in argument in its December 22, 2015 letter to the Union, its
sixth expanded refusal to provide the requested information for the first
time raises the Union’s alleged past harassment techniques to collect
dues delinquencies in or before January 2013 - almost 3 years from the
instant information request. I find that to hold in these circumstances
that the Respondent need not provide the requested information would
establish an unreasonable precedent, i.e., that on the basis of alleged
past unrelated union misconduct almost 3 years prior, an employer
could foreclose for an indefinite length of time the opportunity for the
bargaining representative to obtain the names, addresses, and telephone
numbers of all bargaining unit employees. I conclude that Respondent’s
purported fear of harassment was no longer reasonable in November
2015 and that the Union is entitled to the information requested. As
stated above, Witherall made clear that the Respondent and the Union
have had a positive working relationship since on or before October
2014 and made no reference in her emails to Meisinger that anyone at
Respondent harbored a clear and present fear of harassment from the
Union’s information request. “It is well established that there must be
more than a speculative concern on the part of the employer . . . there
must be a clear and present danger of harassment and violence . . . to
justify a refusal to furnish a union with relevant information . . . [cita-
tions omitted].” Safelite Glass, 283 NLRB 929, 948 fn. 26 (1987).
would accommodate its concerns as required under the NLRA.
Rather, without providing any assistance, Respondent merely
asked the Union to take its own steps to try and obtain the same
information through the Union’s use of its own ineffective al-
ternatives referenced above including the poor steward system
and sparsely attended Union meetings. As indicated above, this
was insufficient. Moreover, no evidence was presented showing
that the Union is unreliable concerning confidentiality agree-
ments. See Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB 622, 622 fn. 1 (1993) (em-
ployer’s failure to show that the union is unreliable re: confi-
dentiality agreements is an important factor in assessing the
employer’s confidentiality defense).
In sum, the specific facts and circumstances here are distin-
guishable from the facts in the cases cited by Respondent
against producing the requested information such as the Chica-
go Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 1996), and
Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co. v. NLRB, 272 F.3d 1028
(8th Cir. 2001), cases with facts involving ongoing strikes and
labor unrest with threats of violent conduct against striker per-
manent replacement workers and the potential for misuse of the
information not present in this case where the Union’s new
assistant business manager simply wanted to update the Un-
ion’s records in response to ineffective alternatives with Re-
spondent and member and non-Union member bargaining unit
employees. “Moreover, controlling Board precedent is to the
contrary.” River Oak Center for Children, Inc., 345 NLRB at
1335–1336 fn. 6.
Once again, this case does not present credible evidence of
any relevant fear of safety or concern of retribution. Respond-
ent has not proven any relevant reasonable “clear and present
danger” of harassment. See Diamond Walnut Growers, 312
NLRB 61 (1993), enfd., 53 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 1995). See also
Page Litho, Inc., 311 NLRB 881 (1993) (Ordering disclosure of
striker replacement information reaffirming “clear and present
danger” test, and finding that employer’s alleged fear of har-
assment was no longer reasonable nearly 4 months after strike
ended and last reported incidents of harassment had occurred).
Finally, there is no credible evidence here that the bargaining
unit employees requested anonymity or that Respondent ever
promised confidentiality as to the identities, addresses, and
telephone numbers of the bargaining unit employees.
Given the specific facts in this case, and the Board prece-
dent, I find that the Respondent has not proven a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving the confidentiality of the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the bargaining unit
employees. Because I find there is no legitimacy of the Re-
spondent’s claimed confidentiality interest in the bargaining
unit employees’ names, addresses, and telephone numbers, I
further find that the requested names, addresses, and telephone
numbers must be produced and that no accommodation in its
place is necessary. I therefore conclude that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to provide to the
Union the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the
bargaining unit employees.
POUDRE VALLEY RURAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC. 11
4. The CBA does not mention or bar the Union’s information
access to bargaining unit employees’ names, home
addresses, and telephone numbers
Another affirmative defense thrown in by Respondent is that
the CBA does not require them to provide bargaining unit em-
ployees’ names, addresses and phone numbers under Section 8.
Also, the Respondent argues that the Union is trying to unilat-
erally modify the contract by adding that the request must in-
clude addresses and phone numbers to the Seniority List pro-
vided once per year in January. Respondent further argues that
the Union, through this article 8 language, gave up or waived
its right under the Act to obtain unit employees’ home address-
es and telephone numbers.
The relevant part of the CBA involving the unrelated Senior-
ity List is Section 8 which states:
Within thirty (30) days after the beginning of each calendar
year, the Association will post a seniority list for the Associa-
tion including all employees in the bargaining unit, their clas-
sifications and their date of hiring. Any dispute regarding the
seniority posting shall be taken up by the bargaining commit-
tee and representatives of the Association within thirty (30)
days after this posting.
(GC Exh. 2 at 3.)
This is not a dispute regarding the Seniority List posting. I
find that it is a separate dispute concerning Respondent’s fail-
ure to produce the bargaining unit employees’ addresses and
telephone numbers which are not mentioned in the CBA and
has nothing to do with employee seniority and is more a func-
tion of the Union’s ineffective alternatives. Thus, the CBA is
silent on the subject of furnishing unit employees’ addresses
and telephone numbers to the Union. (GC Exh. 2.)
It is the obligation of both parties to bargain in good faith
and to not unilaterally modify or terminate a collective-
bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2016). “In accord-
ance with that policy, the Board has recognized that a union’s
right to information is a statutory right that is independent of
rights accorded under a collective-bargaining agreement. See
Chapin Hill at Red Bank, 360 NLRB 116, 122–123; Lithogra-
phers Local One-L (Metropolitan Lithographers Assn.), 352
NLRB 906, 915 (2008) (rejecting respondent’s contention that
‘the Agreement defines and limits the scope of its obligation to
provide information under the Act’); Helca Mining Co., 248
NLRB supra at 1344 (‘the right to such information [a list of
names and addresses of bargaining unit employees] being a
matter of statutory entitlement there is ordinarily no need to
obtain an employer’s agreement to do that which he is already
compelled by statute to do’); American Standard, 203 NLRB
1132, 1132 (1973) (‘[i]t is now well settled that a collective-
bargaining representative is entitled to information which may
be relevant to its task as bargaining agent, and this is not a mat-
ter for deferral to arbitration where, as here, the material is
sought as a statutory, rather than a contract right’).” (GC Br. at
21).
In agreement with General Counsel’s contention, I further
find that here the Union is entitled to the requested names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers information to keep their rec-
ords current about membership as a separate statutory right
distinguishable from its rights under the CBA which makes no
reference to providing the Union with bargaining unit employ-
ees’ addresses and telephone numbers.
In addition to names, addresses, and telephone numbers, the
Union also sought bargaining unit employees’ classifications
and dates of hire, items included as part of the Seniority List
provided in January each year. (GC Exhs. 1 and 2.) Respondent
also contends that by agreeing to what essentially amounts to a
Seniority List, the contract [CBA] covers the Union’s request
for employee addresses and phone numbers. I further find that
while Article 8 of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement
provides that Respondent shall annually post a list of employee
names, classifications and hire dates, article 8 is completely
silent with respect to the home addresses and telephone num-
bers of unit employees. Thus, there is no basis to claim that the
providing of unit employees’ phone numbers and home ad-
dresses is covered by article 8 of the contract.
The Respondent’s final argument is that the Union, through
this article 8 language, gave up or waived its right under the
Act to obtain unit employees’ home addresses and telephone
numbers. The General Counsel counters arguing “. . . there is
no clear waiver in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement
of the Union’s right to unit employees’ home addresses and
phone numbers. (GC Br. at 22.)
The waiver of the right to information relevant to the fulfill-
ment of a union’s statutory duty of representation of unit em-
ployees by a collective-bargaining agreement is not lightly
inferred and must be “clear and unmistakable” in express terms
and not by implication and not merely by omission from the
contract. See Metropolitan Edison v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708
(1983); Skyway Luggage Co., 117 NLRB 681 (1957); Califor-
nia Portland Cement Co., 103 NLRB 1375 (1953). The party
asserting waiver must establish that the parties “unequivocally
and specifically express[ed] their mutual intention to permit
unilateral employer action with respect to a particular employ-
ment term, notwithstanding the statutory duty to bargain that
would otherwise apply.” Provena St. Joseph Medical Center,
350 NLRB 808, 811 (2007); see also Lithographers Local One-
L (Metropolitan Lithographers Assn.), 352 NLRB 906, 915
(2008) (the Board has held that a contract provision entitling a
party to certain specific information will not be found to consti-
tute a waiver of that party’s right to receive other relevant in-
formation, unless such a waiver is expressly stated in the
agreement). “Failure to provide information in the past does not
constitute a continuing waiver.” Owens-Corning Fiberglass,
282 NLRB 609 (1987).
I further find that the Respondent has not established that the
Union has waived its right under the Act to obtain the requested
information of bargaining unit employee names, addresses, and
telephone numbers. In addition, there is no language in the
CBA expressly and unmistakably mentioning or specifically
waiving, the Union’s right to unit employees’ names, addresses,
and telephone numbers. (See GC Exh. 2.)
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing, on and after Novem-
ber 6, 2015, to furnish the Union with the current names, home
addresses, and home telephone numbers of bargaining unit
employees and I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
to cease and desist therefrom and to remedy that violation by
forthwith furnishing such current information to the Union and
by posting an appropriate notice.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act, and is, and has been at all times materi-
al herein, the exclusive collective-bargaining representative in
the appropriate unit set forth below:
All regular full-time employees of the Association included
within the following classifications: working foreman, lead
lineman, lineman, tree trimmer foreman, lead tree trimmer,
tree trimmer, vehicle maintenance technician, ground man,
apprentice lineman, apprentice tree trimmer, fleet mechanic,
equipment operator, warehouse and plant maintenance fore-
man, fleet mechanic foreman, lead mechanic, warehouse and
vehicle helper, plant and maintenance helper, opera-
tions/dispatch clerk, operations administrative assistant, cable
locater, customer service representative, and customer service
representative lead; excluding all other employees and super-
visors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.
3. By failing and refusing on and after November 6, 2015, to
furnish the Union with the current bargaining unit employees’
names, home addresses, and home telephone numbers, Re-
spondent engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. Respondent’s above-described unfair labor practices af-
fect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
5. Unless specifically found above, Respondent engaged in
no other unfair labor practices.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent Poudre Valley Rural Elec-
tric Association, Inc. has engaged in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, I find that they must be ordered to cease and desist and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
ORDER17
The Respondent Poudre Valley Rural Electric Association,
Inc., Fort Collins, Colorado, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to provide the Union, the International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, Local 111, AFL–CIO with re-
quested information that is relevant and necessary to the Un-
ion’s performance of its duties as collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the Respondent Poudre Valley Rural Electric Asso-
ciation, Inc.’s bargaining unit employees.

17 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Promptly provide the Union with the names, home ad-
dresses, and home telephone numbers of all bargaining unit
employees as of November 6, 2015, requested by the Union.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Fort Collins, Colorado facility copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”18 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 27, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since November 6, 2015.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 27, a sworn certification of a
responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting
to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington D.C. February 27, 2017
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

18 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
POUDRE VALLEY RURAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC. 13
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the
above rights.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local 111 (Union) with ·information
that is relevant and necessary to its role as your bargaining
representative in the appropriate unit set forth below:
All regular full-time employees of the Association included
within the following classifications: working foreman, lead
lineman, lineman, tree trimmer foreman, lead tree trimmer,
tree trimmer, vehicle maintenance technician, ground man,
apprentice lineman, apprentice tree trimmer, fleet mechanic,
equipment operator, warehouse and plant maintenance fore-
man, fleet mechanic foreman, lead mechanic, warehouse and
vehicle helper, plant and maintenance helper, opera-
tions/dispatch clerk, operations administrative assistant, cable
locater, customer service representative, and customer service
representative lead; excluding all other employees and super-
visors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL provide the Union with the information that it re-
quested from us on or after November 6, 2015, and thereaf-
ter, consisting of ba rga in ing un i t employees ’ home
addresses and home te l ephone numbers.
WE WILL in any like or related manner interfere with your
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
POUDRE VALLEY RURAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/27-CA-167119 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.