Poly Ultra Plastics, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 30, 1977

231 N.L.R.B. 787 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

POLY ULTRA PLASTICS, INC.
Poly Ultra Plastics, Inc. and United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC. Cases 6-CA-8714 and
6-RC-7276
August 30, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND
WALTHER
On November 18, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and the General Counsel filed limited excep-
tions to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge, to
modify his remedy, 3 and to adopt his recommended
Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Poly Ultra
Plastics, Inc., Ridgway, Pennsylvania, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in said recommended Order except that the
attached notice is substituted for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 6-RC-7276 be
severed and remanded to the Regional Director for
Region 6 and that said Regional Director shall take
the action set forth by the Administrative Law Judge
in his recommended Order concerning the challenges
and objections in that case.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent did not violate
Sec. 8(a)(l) of the Act by comments allegedly made by its president. Allen,
to employee Frantz regarding changes in pay and vacations if the Union
came into the plant. In the absence of exceptions thereto. we adopt these
findings proforma.
z While we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent's
involvement in the November 8, 1975. petition did not violate Sec. 8(aX)I) of
the Act. we note that three, not two, employees were present when the
petition was prepared.
:1 In accordance with our decision in Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977). we shall apply the current 7-percent rate for periods prior
to August 25. 1977. in which the "adjusted prime interest rate" as used by
the Internal Revenue Service in calculating interest on tax payments was at
least 7 percent.
231 NLRB No. 124
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The Act gives all employees these rights
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help a union
To bargain collectively through a repre-
sentative of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOr do anything that restrains or
coerces you with respect to these rights. More
specifically:
WE WILL NOT issue warning letters or repri-
mands, reduce wage rates, place on probation, or
deny recall to laid-off employees, or in any other
manner discriminate against employees because
they join or support United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor
organization.
WE WILL NOT maintain rules prohibiting you
from discussing any grievances during nonwork-
ing time nor will we maintain a rule prohibiting
you from engaging in work stoppages under
circumstances protected by the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten to blacklist employees
who show an interest in representation by a
union.
WE WILL NOT question our employees concern-
ing their union activity.
WE WILL NOT segregate employees for the
purpose of limiting union activity.
WE WILL offer immediate reinstatement to June
Haines and Valerie Marzella, giving Marzella the
same hourly wage rates she enjoyed before the
discrimination against her, and giving them
backpay, plus interest.
WE WILL delete and expunge from our records
all reference to the warning letters issued against
Valerie Mazella, dated October 10 and 28, 1975.
WE WILL make whole June Haines and Cathy
Steger for the loss of earnings they sustained by
reason of the discriminatory layoff of October 14
through October 22, 1976, with interest.
POLY ULTRA PLASTICS,
INC.
787
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: Upon an
unfair labor practice charge filed on October 17, 1975, a
complaint was issued on May 25, 1976, alleging that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by coercive-
ly interrogating employees concerning union activity;
making various threats of reprisal for engaging in union
activity; participating in the preparation and circulation of
an antiunion petition; creating the impression of surveil-
lance; and maintaining a work rule threatening employees
with immediate dismissal for engaging in activities protect-
ed by the Act. The complaint, as amended, further alleges
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by issuing a warning letter on October 14, 1975, reducing
the pay, and placing on probation employee Valerie
Marzella; on October 14, 1975, laying off employees June
Haines and Cathy Steger for approximately 1 week; and on
November 14, 1975, terminating employees Valerie Mar-
zella and June Haines, all because of union activity. The
complaint, as amended, also alleges that said termination
of June Haines violated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. In its
duly filed answer, Respondent denied that any unfair labor
practices were committed.
Pursuant to a representation petition filed in Case 6-RC-
7276 on October 16, 1975, and a Decision and Direction of
Election issued by the Regional Director for Region 6 on
February 17, 1976, an election by secret ballot was
conducted on March 15, 1976, among the employees in the
unit found to be appropriate. The results of that election
show that, of approximately 9 eligible voters, 10 ballots
were cast, of which 2 were for, and 4 against, the Petitioner,
with 4 determinative challenges. Thereafter, the Petitioner
filed timely objections to conduct of the election. On May
25, 1976, the Acting Regional Director for Region 6 issued
his "Order Directing Hearing on Challenged Ballots and
Objections and Notice of Hearing" in which he concluded
that challenges to the ballots of Valerie Marzella, Mary
Lou Leslie, June Haines, and Steve Martin, as well as
Petitioner's objections, raised issues best resolved by a
hearing. Accordingly, since certain of these issues were
encompassed in a complaint to issue against the Employer
in Case 6-CA-8714, by order dated May 25, 1976, the
Acting Regional Director for Region 6 consolidated Case
6-CA-8714 with Case 6-RC-7276 for hearing, ruling, and
decision by an administrative lawjudge.
Pursuant thereto a consolidated hearing was conducted
before me in Ridgway, Pennsylvania, on August 10, 1976.
After close of the hearing a brief was filed by the General
Counsel.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, including my
observation of the witnesses while testifying and consider-
ation of the posthearing brief, I find as follows:
I All dates refer to 1975 unless otherwise indicated.
I Following a hearing in Case 6-RC 7276, Mark Marzella was found to
be a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Respondent-Employer is a Pennsylvania corporation
with its sole facility located in Ridgway, Pennsylvania,
from which it is engaged in the manufacture and nonretail
sale of expanded polystyrene products. During the 12-
month period preceding issuance of the complaint, a
representative period, Respondent shipped goods valued in
excess of $50,000 from its Ridgway, Pennsylvania, facility
directly to points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Respondent-Employer is now, and has been at all times
material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Petitioner-Charging Party, United Steelworkers of Ameri-
ca, AFL-CIO-CLC, is now, and has been at all times
material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The issues in this case are essentially factual and relate in
the main to the period contemporaneous with an initial
union campaign among Respondent's previously unrepre-
sented employees. A number of independent 8(a)(I)
violations are imputed to Respondent, as well as varied
acts of discrimination, including the issuance of formal
warnings, the cutting of wage rates, layoffs, and the failure
to recall employees. It is also alleged that Respondent
terminated and denied recall to an employee in violation of
Section 8(a)(4).
B. Background
Respondent is a small manufacturing operation engaged
in the production of styrofoam packing materials. As of
mid-October 1975,1 its work force consisted of only 14
production and maintenance employees. No union has
ever represented Respondent's employees.
Valerie Marzella, together with her brother, Mark,2 made
the initial contact with the Union. Thus, in late September
or early October, Mark Marzella circulated a petition
amongst Respondent's employees urging them to sign if
they wished representation by a labor organization. During
this same time period, Arthur Kistler, a staff representative
of the United Steelworkers Union, through the Marzellas,
arranged and conducted a meeting with Respondent's
employees at the Moose Hall in Ridgway. That meeting
was attended by some eight to nine employees. Thereafter,
employees met at the Marzella home; all of Respondent's
employees attended, except three or four who worked on
the night shift. At that time, a number of employees signed
DECISION
788
POLY ULTRA PLASTICS, INC.
authorization cards designating the Union as their repre-
sentative.
On October 13, 1975, Kistler, in the company of another
union representative, visited Edmond Allen, Respondent's
president. After introducing himself, Kistler handed Allen
a letter, evidencing the Union's claim of majority status
among Respondent's employees, offering a third party card
check, and demanding recognition and bargaining. Allen
admitted that he was "absolutely shocked" at this turn of
events, and according to the uncontradicted and credited
testimony of Kistler, Allen informed Kistler that the plant
was not making money and that he would "shutdown,"
"file for bankruptcy," or sell the plant.
On Tuesday, October 14, 1975, Valerie Marzella was
given a warning letter, dated October 10, 1975, citing her
with "insolence and verbal abuse ... directed toward . . .
supervisors," and withdrawing a 10-cent increase given her
on September 28, 1975, removing a 25-cent increment
related to her prior position as bookkeeper-leader, and
placing her on a 2-week probation.3 Also on October 14,
1975, employees June Haines and Cathy Steger were given
a I-week layoff. Despite this layoff, Respondent hired new
employees Barbara Carr, Debbie Warmbrodt, and Diane
Northrup on October 13, 15, and 24, respectively.
On October 16, 1975, the Union filed a petition in Case
6-RC-7276. In addition, the Union filed the unfair labor
practice charges giving rise to this proceeding on that same
date, alleging that Respondent demoted Valerie Marzella
and laid off Haines and Steger in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
On October 28, 1975, Valerie Marzella received her
second formal warning, reciting that she had demonstrated
an "insolent and disrespectful attitude towards the supervi-
sion . . . particularly on October 24, 1975," and further
charging that, since her prior reprimand, her work
performance had still not met expectations. The letter goes
on to state that this was a final warning and that: "Any
further displays of insolence, defiance, disrespectfulness or
inferior workmanship will result in . . . immediate dis-
charge." 4
On November 5, 1975, a preelection hearing was held in
Case 6-RC-7276.
On Saturday, November 8, 1975, Allen at the home of an
employee, on request of two employees, assisted in the
preparation of a petition, whereby signers indicated their
request for withdrawal of their authorization cards. On
November 14, 1975, Haines and Valerie Marzella together
with four other employees were laid off. Only Haines and
Marzella were not recalled.
The foregoing chronology furnishes the background for
the significant events placed in issue by the complaint, as
discussed fully below.
:' See G.C. Exh. 4.
See G.C. Exh. 5.
: I discredit the denial of Allen and Moyer that any reference to unions
and blacklisting was made on that occasion. As between them, I consider
Marzella the more credible witness. It is noted that Marzella received some
corroboration from Judy Frantz. an incumbent employee, who on cross-
examination by Respondent's counsel, related that Marzella, at the time of
this meeting, informed Frantz as to Allen's blacklisting threat. On the other
hand. the testimony of Allen and Moyer throughout this proceeding was
C. Miscellaneous Instances of Interference,
Restraint, and Coercion
1. Valerie Marzella testified that sometime in May
1975, well prior to any contacts with the Union, she went to
Allen's office in the company of Respondent's plant
manager, Jesse Moyer, to protest the absence of sufficient
breaks for the female employees. On that occasion,
according to the credited testimony of Marzella, Allen
resisted her demands, stating, among other things, that if
employees sought out a union, "he'd blackball us all over
town and we wouldn't be able to get a job anywhere."
Based upon her credited testimony I find that Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(aX I) of the Act.5
2. At all times material, Respondent posted and
maintained a set of "work rules." The published rules
included the following:
Employees will not become involved in on the floor
discussions concerning work rule violations committed
by himself or other employees.
This restriction, when violated, subjects employees to
prescribed forms of discipline. Section 7 of the Act gives
employees a right, without fear of discipline or intervention
by their employer, "to engage in . . . concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection .... " The General Counsel correctly
observes that this rule is unlawfully broad insofar as it
tends to restrict employees from concerted action relative
to terms and conditions of employment on nonworking
time. It is of no moment that Respondent intended the rule
to have a more narrow and legitimate operative scope, for
from all appearances this limitation was never communi-
cated to employees. Accordingly, I find that Respondent
by maintaining this rule violated Section 8(aX )(1) of the Act.
The work rules also include a second provision which
provides as follows:
Employees who take part in any work slowdown or
work stoppage are subject to immediate dismissal.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects the
right of employees to withdraw their services from an
employer and to engage in a strike, subject to express
statutory limitations. 6 Here again the rule's threat of
discipline restrains and coerces employees without differ-
entiating between protected and unprotected strike action,
and accordingly this provision of Respondent's rules also
violates Section 8(aX)(1) of the Act.
3. Kistler testified, and Allen acknowledged, that in the
course of their meeting on October 13, when the Union
demanded recognition, Allen received a telephone call
from employee Darla Zuchelli. Kistler testified, without
often improbable and the substance thereof and their demeanor convincing-
ly suggested that they had something to hide.
6 Sec. 13 of the Act, as amended, provides as follows:
Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications of
that nght.
789
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contradiction, that Allen asked her if she had signed a
union card. 7 By this inquiry to a rank-and-file employee,
during early stages of an organizational drive, I find that
Respondent engaged in coercive interrogation violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. An allegation that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(I) by threatening reduced wages and benefits if
employees engaged in union activity is based upon the
testimony of Judy Frantz. According to Frantz, in mid-
October, while discussing the pros and cons of the Union
with fellow employee, Scott Jacobs, Allen approached
them saying that if a union came into the plant, vacations
would be different "and pay would be back where . . .
[employees] ... started from." On cross-examination,
Frantz indicated that Allen stated that negotiations would
start all over again. Allen could not recall the conversation
in question, nor could he recall ever having said that wages
would be lower if the Union came in.8 In any event, the
testimony of Frantz is sketchy and vague, while confused
further by her concession that Allen referred to the
reductions in the context of negotiations.
At best, from the General Counsel's view, her testimony
as to this 8(a)(1) allegation is to be considered in the light
of precedent concerning the familiar "bargaining from
scratch" type of propaganda. Such statements, when made
in a context indicating that the employer might abrogate
existing benefits if the employees exercise their right to
select a bargaining representative, have been deemed
violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.9 Nonetheless, in the
circumstances presented here the General Counsel has
failed to make out a violation of Section 8(a)(1). The
incident was isolated, and apparently the statement
imputed to Allen was uttered spontaneously, and in an
argumentative vein, reaching only two employees.'o More
importantly, the cryptic nature of the Frantz' account
seriously prejudices any fair conclusion as to whether
Allen's remarks on that occasion, even when considered in
conjunction with other unfair labor practices found on this
record, exceeded permissible bounds of free speech
protected by Section 8(c) of the Act.
5. The General Counsel also contends that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) through Allen's involvement in the
preparation and circulation of a petition dated November
8, an instrument designed to facilitate those employees
intent on revoking their authorization cards. Employee
Roxanne Burkett testified that this document was prepared
with fellow employee Debbie Cicuzza at Burkett's home on
November 8. Allen admittedly was present during the
preparation of that document, but solely because his
assistance was requested, as Burkett relates: "to help us to
I Zuchelli did not testify. Any claim by Respondent that Zuchelli was a
supervisor is lacking in credible support from this record. The attempt by
Allen to portray her as possessed of responsibility to exercise independent
judgment in assigning work to production employees struck me as
exaggerated and unbelievable.
Scott Jacobs did not appear as a witness.
"See, e.g., Astronautics Corporation ofAmerica, 164 NLRB 623 (1967).
~" See, e.g.. Daiton Tire & Rubber CompanY, a Division of the Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company, 206 NLRB 614. 624-625 ( 1973).
" The testimony by June Haines that the petition was shown to her
during working hours does not establish or provide a basis for inferring that
write something up that would tell the Labor Relations
Board that we thought we were misrepresented and we just
wanted to know more about the Union, really, before we
got roped in." Allen simply helped them "figure something
out to write down."
The claim by the General Counsel that Allen's involve-
ment violated Section 8(a)(l) turns exclusively upon Allen's
providing assistance to the employees in the phrasing of the
petition. The evidence does not support the General
Counsel's claim that Allen permitted the petition to be
circulated during working hours" or that Allen's approval
was established by his receiving reports as to employee
support of the petition. 2
The Board has held that employers may not "lend more
than minimal support and approval" to employee efforts
directed toward removal of a union as an employee
representative.' 3 However, here, Respondent did not
initiate, sponsor, or assist in the circulation of the petition.
Its conduct was limited to aiding employees in the
expression of their predetermined objectives through a
document that could be utilized to accomplish said
purposes. Allen's limited assistance to Cicuzza and Burkett
was not witnessed by other employees, nor does it appear
that this fact was communicated to any other employees.
In the circumstances, I find that Allen's participation in the
preparation of the petition was "too minimal" to impair
employee rights protected by Section 7 of the Act.
Accordingly, I shall dismiss the 8(a)(1) allegation in this
regard.
6. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) through Moyer's creating the impression
that union activity was subject to surveillance. The General
Counsel's brief does not specify the evidence relied on in
support of this allegation. In canvassing the record, the
only testimony-apart from that of Haines which shall be
discredited, infra-tending to conform to this allegation is
that of employee Debbie Warmbrodt, who relates that
following a conversation with Valerie Marzella, Moyer
took her aside and told her not to become involved with
Marzella or the Union. This testimony is too vague to
support the allegation in question, which shall be dis-
missed.
In addition to the foregoing, the complaint alleges other
independent violations of Section 8(aX)(I), concerning
matters linked to the appraisal of events material to the
issues of discrimination. Findings with respect to these
allegations shall be made below.
Respondent was mindful that working hours were used for this purpose, or
that this practice was authorized or condoned by Respondent.
12 In this respect, General Counsel relies on testimony by Haines that she
overheard Roxanne Burkett tell Allen and Moyer that she (Burkett) was
mad because nobody on the second shift would sign the petition. In this
respect, Haines' testimony indicates nothing more than an officious,
personal expression on the part of Burkett. Haines does not indicate that
any response was made by Moyer or Allen and, in these circumstances, no
basis exists for inferring the latter did anything on that occasion to signify
their approval or interest in such reports.
13 See, e.g.. Placke Toyota, Inc., 215 NLRB 395 (1974).
790
POLY ULTRA PLASTICS, INC.
D. The Alleged Discrimination
1. Valerie Marzella's reprimand of October 14,
1975
Valerie Marzella had been employed since the inception
of Respondent's operations, having been hired on Septem-
ber 26, 1974, a month before production began at the
Ridgway plant. She was initially hired as a "packer" but
also worked in the office as Respondent's bookkeeper. The
testimony of Moyer attests to the skills acquired by
Marzella in the course of her employment. He relates that:
"she knew most everything there was to know about the
hot wiring. . . the preexpanding, and the identification of
parts . . . so she was kind of a trainer for the other girls
that came on."
On September 28, 1975, Marzella received a 10-cent
hourly increase. Previously, during the summer of that
year, Marzella informed Moyer that she no longer wished
to do office work, expressing a preference to work in the
plant exclusively. In late September 1975, Moyer called her
to his office, offering Marzella the choice of working either
in the plant or the office, or continuing to do both. At that
time, Marzella indicated that she preferred to work in the
plant. Moyer then solicited her recommendation for a
replacement in the office job. Marzella named Darla
Zuchelli. who ultimately was selected to fill that position.'4
Thereafter, following Zuchelli's selection as her replace-
ment, Marzella assisted Zuchelli in adapting to the new
position as bookkeeper. Marzella did not begin perfor-
mance of plant work on an exclusive basis until October
10.
Also beginning in late September, Marzella, together
with her brother, initiated union activity at the plant. She
signed the petition circulated early in the campaign thereby
designating her union support, attended the very first
meeting with Union Representative Kistler, and hosted a
meeting at her home, where a number of employees signed
authorization cards. Subsequently, on October 13, the
Union, through Kistler, formally demanded recognition,
claiming majority status.
As will be recalled, Allen handed Marzella a letter, on
October 14, the day after the Union's formal demand for
recognition, which stated as follows:
October 10, 1975
Valerie Marzella
It has been two weeks since our decision to remove
you from the bookkeeping position because of the great
discrepancies and errors uncovered within the record
keeping system. It was our intent to observe your
performance within the plant in an effort to give you
every opportunity to retain your employment in a
l One aspect of Marzella's testimony suggests that this conversation
took place on October 10. However, I do not believe that Marzella intended
to create that impression. for said date was suggested in a question put to
her by the General Counsel. Based on subsequent, more convincing.
evidence that Marzella's handwriting did not appear on the books dunng
the first 2 weeks of October, and her indication that Zuchelli had assumed
the office position during that period, I find that this conversation occurred
in late September.
different position. At this point it should be brought to
your attention that we have grave doubts as to your
ability to perform in the new capacity. These doubts
have been raised as a result of your actions in
attempting to perform the functions given to you and
the insolence and verbal abuse which you have directed
towards your supervisors. In all fairness I should point
out that attitude is a very important ingredient in being
a good employee and your overall transition from
bookkeeper/leader to plant worker during your proba-
tionary period has left much to be desired. As a
consequence I must take the following action:
i. Withdrawl [sic] of the $.10 per hour increase given
you on 9/28/75.
2. Remove the $.25 per hour which had previously
been given because of your position as bookkeep-
er/leader.
3. Place you on final 2 weeks probation during which
time we will give your overall performance final
review and determine your future as an employee.
/s/Edmund P. Allen
In addition to the above letter, Allen and Moyer concede
that during October and in advance of the layoff of
Marzella on November 14, while working in the plant as a
packer, Marzella was deliberately assigned one man tasks,
which isolated her from other employees. Allen testified
that he and Moyer decided to segregate her from other
employees because she was "inciting some of the other
employees to give our supervisory people problems," and
there were questionable things being done relating to
quality determinations,t5 while adding that Marzella had
been creating "friction" among the other girls. Allen
denied that Marzella's union activity played any part in the
decision to segregate. Moyer simply testified that Marzella
was given the one man jobs because she knew how to run
them.
In this connection, it is significant that Debbie Warm-
brodt credibly testified that in mid-October Moyer called
her to his office and accused her of discussing the Union
with Marzella. When Warmbodt denied this charge, Moyer
told her "to stay away from Val, that it would just mean
trouble." Moyer admits that a conversation to this effect
occurred. However, he in effect denies that the Union was
mentioned in that conversation, claiming that, as Warm-
brodt was a new employee, whose work was going fairly
well, he indicated to her that there had been "some
conflicts and various things happening" and she would
probably do better to stay out of such matters, and to
"keep neutral on everything that was happening and do
what her mind dictated." 16
On October 28, Marzella was given a second warning
letter, which stated as follows:
1s Apparently the packers arc responsible for determining the quality of
goods shipped. There is no reference in the record to the nature of
Marzella's mishandling of this responsibility. nor does it appear that
Respondent had a reasonable basis for believing that she was guilty of fault)
inspection.
If Moyer's claim that he did not know of Marzella's involvement with
the Union until just before the preelection hearing in Case 6-RC-7276.
which was conducted on November 5, seems incompatible with his admitted
(Continued)
791
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
October 28, 1975
Valerie Marzella
Two weeks have now past since we informed you of
our concern about your overall work performance.
Since that time we have determined that your work
performance has still not been up to our expectations.
Furthermore, your insolent and disrespectful attitude
towards the supervision within the plant, particularly
on Oct. 24, 1975, indicates that your position within the
company has become even more precarious.
The only thing that prevents me from discharging
you at this time is the fact that you have been an
employee as long as you have. I am of the opinion that
you are capable of performing your duties in a much
more efficient manner and I want to be as fair as
possible in giving you the chance to improve your work
performance and resolve the attitude problem which
you have been displaying. I feel that your performance
and attitude is beginning to effect your fellow employ-
ees and it is extremely important for us to maintain a
high level of performance and at the same time
maintain order within the manufacturing complex.
I am going to be very frank at this time and state that
this is your final warning. Any further displays of
insolence, defiance, disrespectfulness or inferior work-
manship will result in your immediate discharge.
/s/Edmund P. Allen
Allen testified that the October 24 incident referred to in
the above letter concerned conduct by Marzella at a
general plant meeting conducted on that date. Allen did
not attend that meeting, but he claims that Moyer reported
immediately after this meeting that he was constantly
interrupted and shown disrespect by Marzella. Allen
indicates that the purpose of the meeting was a "general
discussion about the way things were going in the plant"
involving an attempt to establish work rules within the
plant and procedures. Allen could not testify as to his
knowledge of exactly what Marzella reportedly said on that
occasion, or how frequently she interrupted.
Moyer testified that the general plant meeting was called
on October 24 to announce a layoff. He claims that after he
read the list of those to be furloughed, a list which included
Marzella, she kept interrupting asking about seniority.
Moyer also claims that she disrupted by raising such
irrelevancies as the Company's failure to maintain candy
machines for employee use.
The issues involving Marzella do not relate to an
employee historically derelict in work performance. In-
stead, from the credible evidence it appears that Marzella
participation in such a discussion. In any event, his allegedly belated
acquisition of such knowledge is even more difficult to believe when
considered in the light of service of the unfair labor practice charge in this
proceeding, which admittedly was effected on October 18, 1976, and
specifically named Marzella as a victim of discrimination. In any event, as
shall be seen, infra, I believe that the circumstances justify an inference that
both Moyer and Allen either knew or suspected that Valerie Marzella was a
key exponent of the Union as early as October 14.
17 Allen testified that during October 1975 Zuchelli "immediately" ran
into problems with Marzella after replacing the latter, going on to state that
the "feed-back" from the plant was that this was because Valerie was
was an employee whose performance soured in the eyes of
her employer at a time corresponding to her efforts to
obtain union representation.
The effort of Allen and Moyer to justify the warnings,
deprivations, and segregation of Marzella - based upon
accusations as to her inadequate job performance, bad
attitude, and incitation of other employees-was not
persuasive. In most respects this testimony was vague,
conclusionary, and unsubstantiated by detailed evidence.
Moreover objective factors in the record demonstrate the
incredulity of their testimony. No effort was made by
Respondent to explain why, if Marzella had been guilty of
serious discrepancies in her role as a bookkeeper, she
received a 10-cent increase on September 28, only slightly
more than 2 weeks prior to her receipt of the first warning
letter. Nor is it explained why, until that letter was
submitted to her, she continued to enjoy the 25-cent hourly
rate differential despite her replacement on the bookkeep-
ing job. Also incomprehensible is the fact that, despite her
alleged incompetence, Moyer, as late as September 28,
afforded Marzella the option to remain exclusively in
bookkeeping work. Contrary to the impressions Allen and
Moyer sought to convey, the foregoing, together with the
solicitation of her recommendation as to a successor, and
the fact that this recommendation was ultimately acted
upon stand objectively in support of a conclusion that as
late as September 28 Marzella was regarded as a trusted
and valuable employee.t7
Considering the objective circumstances against which
the action against Marzella occurred, the evidence does not
warrant a conclusion that, contemporaneous with her
union activity, Marzella changed her attitude towards her
employment; rather, the record convincingly demonstrates
that it was Marzella's union activity that altered Respon-
dent's attitude towards Marzella. As the first step in what I
find to have been an unlawful deliberate campaign of
harassment against Marzella, Allen on October 14, 1975,
delivered the formal reprimand dated October 10.18 That
letter attests to the guile with which Allen would proceed in
the effort to build a case against Marzella. Indisputably the
description of the transfer of Marzella from bookkeeping
to plant work while highly prejudicial to Marzella was
patently false. The reference to this transfer is drafted in
terms designed to convey that it was a unilateral act of
management prompted by Marzella's inadequate perfor-
mance in the office. The fact that Marzella was transferred
from the office job by exercise of a personal preference,
and not because of any work inadequacies, is conceded on
Respondent's own evidence, and further, as heretofore
mentioned, the option given Marzella to remain in office
work and the 10-cent increase of September 28 belie the
charge that, prior to advent of the Union, Respondent had
"enticing the people not to co-operate with her [Zuchelli ." I discredit Allen
in this respect. Not a single witness was called to corroborate Allen as to
either the real or rumored existence of such a problem. I credit the testimony
which is perfectly plausible, and stands uncontradicted, that, after Zuchelli's
designation, Marzella spent at least 10 days training Zuchelli. Aside from
my mistrust of Allen, I think it improbable that Marzella would have
attempted to undermine a successor, who had been named to replace her on
her recommendation, on a job Marzella no longer wished.
1I I credit Marzella and employee Judy Frantz, over Allen and find that
the letter though dated October 10, was delivered on October 14.
0
792
POLY ULTRA PLASTICS, INC.
significant misgivings concerning her performance. The
assertions in the letter of October 14, together with the date
appearing thereon, reflected a careless attempt to conceal
the real animus with which it was drafted.
It is true that there is no direct evidence that Respondent
as of October 14 knew specifically of Marzella's role in the
union campaign. However, the shop was small, there is
uncontradicted evidence of Allen's interrogation of an
employee concerning union activity, and other evidence
indicates that union activity was an object of discussion
between various employees and Allen and Moyer. On the
total record, including Respondent's transparent attempt at
pretext, a reasonable basis exists for imputing such
knowledge to the Respondent, or at a minimum, warrants
an inference that Respondent, at least, suspected that
Marzella was a prime protagonist of the Union as early as
October 14.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by issuing the October 14
warning notice to Marzella, and, through such action, by
rescinding a previously given 10-cent increase, withdrawing
the 25-cent hourly increment she allegedly received as
bookkeeper-leadman, 19 and placing her on 2 weeks'
probation.
I also find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by assigning Marzella work tasks which insulated
her from her fellow employees and by the conduct of
Moyer, in a not dissimilar vein, of instructing newly
employed Debbie Warmbrodt to refrain from involvement
with Marzella or the Union.
The complaint does not specifically challenge the formal
reprimand of October 28, 1975, and final warning con-
tained therein. However, the motivation issue placed into
question by that document was fully litigated. Considering
the illegal campaign of intimidation which furnished the
foreground against which the reprimand was issued, and
my disbelief of Moyer and Allen as to its justification, I
find that Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by this extension of an overall pattern of
conduct whereby Respondent sought to discredit Marzella
because of her role in the organizational campaign.
E. The i-Week Layoff of Employees June Haines
and Cathy Sieger
The complaint alleges that a layoff of 1 week between
October 14 and 22 involving June Haines and Cathy Steger
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Haines was hired on August 25, 1975. She executed an
authorization card and also endorsed the petition signed by
Union supporters during the very early stages of the
campaign.
Steger was hired on June 21, 1975. She too signed an
authorization card and her signature appears on the
petition circulated early in the organizational campaign.
1t The reprimand recites that this differential was linked with the
position of bookkeeper leader. However, Respondent's witnesses indicate
that Marzella was relieved of this position in late September. Yet, no action
was taken to rescind the increment until the discriminatory warning of
October 14. The circumstances warrant the inference that when Marzella
elected to work in the plant. Respondent either by reason of her length of
service or value as an employee, or both, had no intention of eliminating the
25-cent differential.
At the time of their layoff, Steger and Haines were
among approximately five packers actively employed in the
plant. On October 14, the same day that Marzella received
the first of her formal warning letters, Haines and Steger
were informed that they would be the object of a
temporary layoff, which was effective that day. It will be
recalled that the unfair labor practice charge served on
Respondent on October 18, among other things, alleged
that this layoff was discriminatory. The layoff ended on
October 22 when Haines and Steger were recalled. In the
interim, Respondent hired Barbara Carr on October 13
and Debbie Warmbrodt on October 15. In addition a third
new hire, Diane Northrup, began her employment on
October 24.
A great deal of suspicion emerges from Respondent's
testimony as to the reason behind, and circumstances
attendant in, this layoff. Thus, according to Moyer and
Allen, they decided that during this period when there was
a limited amount of work available in the plant, they would
train new employees, so as to avoid the need for such
training when an anticipated increase in orders material-
ized.20 This, according to Respondent, could be achieved
in October, but would require a layoff from among the
existing work force in order to accommodate the hiring of
new employees during this period of slack work. Although
there was testimony on behalf of Respondent that this
technique had been considered in the past, this was the first
occasion on which it was implemented, and its application
was limited to the packer classification. Moyer and Allen
testified that after completion of a I-week layoff and
training cycle, if work volume had not picked up, the newly
trained employees and five incumbents in the packer
classification would on a rotating basis share the work
hours available. Though professing a concern for the
morale of his workers, Allen acknowledged that he was
aware that the cost of training under this method was
thrust upon his employees, whereas, if training were
deferred to periods of high output no one would suffer.
The effort to explain that special training was important
to the type of routine work performed in the packer
classification struck me as shifting, argumentative, and in
part at least, inherently incredulous. In this latter category
was the testimony that packers had to be trained to identify
different parts for different customers. Despite Moyer's
testimony in this respect, Allen had previously testified that
during the period of the layoff in question, Respondent was
producing a single part for a single customer. It was my
definite impression that the training of new hires during
periods of high output would be far more effective with
respect to this unskilled classification. Note also that
although Respondent claims that Haines and Steger were
separated to make room for the trainees, only one in that
group was on the payroll for the entirety of the layoff.21
Also noteworthy is the fact that neither Allen nor Moyer
could testify as to the precise basis for selecting Steger and
0 Note that this planned increase in orders never did materialize, and.
on November 14, six employees were laid off. with most not recalled until
January 1976.
21 The newly hired employees were not called to testify as to the nature
of the so-called training they received in the period October 14-22. One of
those employees, Warmbrodt, appeared as a witness for the General
(Continued)
793
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Haines for layoff. Allen had no recollection whatsoever.
Moyer argumentatively testified that they were "probably"
the poorest workers among the existing packers.
Finally, an attempt to explain the timing of the layoff did
not reflect favorably in the credulity of Respondent's
evidence. Thus, Moyer testified that this layoff was
discussed and planned about a week before it occurred.
However, he also testified that under Respondent's normal
practices, layoffs are effected usually at the end of the
week, particularly when they are preplanned. October 14
was a Tuesday. Nonetheless, Moyer explained that the
Company wished to start the new hires together, and when
one of the girls could not make the original date, the layoff
was deferred until October 14. It will be recalled that Carr
started on Monday, October 13, Warmbrodt's employment
did not begin until Wednesday, October 15, and Northrup
did not start until after reinstatement of Haines and Steger.
Concededly the General Counsel's case as to this layoff
is not ironclad. For, there is no direct evidence that
Respondent had knowledge that Haines and Steger were
union supporters.2 2 And, indeed, their union activity was
no more substantial than that manifested by a number of
employees in the unit. Furthermore, there is little in the
way of proof tending to substantiate the General Counsel's
theory that this layoff was born of Respondent's design to
"pad" its payroll in order to defeat the Union.23
Nonetheless, the elements of timing and union animus
have been established by the record. These considerations,
together with the unbelievable nature of the defense, lend
convincing weight to the inference that, like the warning
letter to Marzella of the same date, this ill thought out and
precipitant layoff was another step in Respondent's union-
oriented campaign of retribution against its employees.
From the totality of the record, including Allen's hostility
toward union activity, the palpably false explanation for
the layoff, considered with the unlawful pattern of conduct
commencing immediately after the Union's demand for
recognition, I find that a preponderance of the evidence
warrants the inference that Respondent laid off Haines and
Steger in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Counsel and was available at the hearing. Although I draw no adverse
inference from Respondent's failure to examine Warmbrodt, the testimony
of Allen and Moyer was unbelievable and that conclusion was hardly
diminished by the absence of corroboration.
22 I discredit the testimony of Haines that, on October 22, she had the
conversation with Moyer in which he asked Haines if she had "signed the
petition." Haines averred that, on that occasion, Moyer also expressed his
thought of not recalling Haines or Steger because they were taking him to
court. With respect to the latter aspect of her testimony, after extensive
examination of Haines, I was not persuaded that Moyer made such a
statement, and indeed my disbelief, as to this matter, aroused doubt as to
her general reliability. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the allegations of
interrogation and creating the impression of surveillance insofar as based on
this phase of her testimony.
z:' The RC petition in Case 6-RC-7276 was not filed until after the layoff
was effected.
24 Respondent's principal customer during the period in question was
Fisher-Price Toys. Uncontradicted testimony establishes that during the
period of October. Respondent was engaged almost entirely in the
production of packaging materials for Fisher-Price. Unlike other aspects of
F. The Termination of Valerie Marzella and June
Haines
On November 14, Valerie Marzella and June Haines
were laid off. Neither was ever recalled.
Respondent's claim that this layoff was based on
legitimate economic considerations has not been refuted on
this record. Thus, Marzella and Haines were within a group
of six employees laid off on November 14. No evidence
was adduced tending to show that Marzella and Haines
were discriminatorily included in this group. Following the
layoff, no new employees were hired until January 1976. In
these circumstances the record provides no reasonable
basis for inferring that the layoff was predicated upon
anything other than Respondent's claim that its principal
customer failed to come through on an anticipated order.2 4
On the other hand, no evidence was offered by
Respondent as to why it failed to recall Marzella and
Haines. In this connection, it is noted that of the six
employees laid off on November 14, only Haines and
Marzella were denied recall. This, despite the fact that
commencing in January 1976 Respondent hired some 15
new employees.
With respect to Marzella, the conclusion is inescapable
that the denial of recall represented the final step in
Respondent's staged out campaign of harassment, which
commenced with the unlawful warning letter of October
14. Accordingly, I find that the failure to recall Marzella
was based on the same considerations underlying earlier
acts of discrimination against her and represented the final
step in Respondent's effort to rid itself of one of the key
employee protagnists of the Union, and that Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act.
In the case of Haines, I have heretofore found that
Respondent discriminatorily laid off Haines and Steger on
October 14.25 Against the background of other unfair labor
practices committed by Respondent and its recall of other
laid-off employees, the failure of Respondent to offer any
justification for this treatment of Haines warrants the
conclusion that here again, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.26
his testimony, there is no reason to doubt Allen's testimony that in advance
of the Christmas season, Respondent expected an increase in orders prior to
November, but that the first significant order was not received until January
1976.
2s Steger quit Respondent's employ on November 12 and was not
employed at the time of the layoff.
26 The record, in my opinion, does not support the alleged 8(aX4)
violation in this respect. I have heretofore discredited the testimony of
Haines that upon her recall on October 22, Moyer expressed hostility
towards her participation in a suit against Respondent. It is a fact that, on
October 18, Respondent was served a copy of the unfair labor practice
charge naming Haines as a victim of proscribed discrimination, and it is
entirely probable that, by virtue of this information, Respondent strongly
identified Haines with the union movement. Nonetheless, based on the
entire record, the more clearly supported inference is that, as part of the
aftermath of the November 14 layoff, Haines was again victimized by
discrimination upon the very considerations underlying the act of discrimi-
nation described in that charge. Accordingly, I find that Respondent's
refusal to recall Haines was not based on considerations proscribed by Sec.
8(a) 4) of the Act.
794
795
POLY ULTRA PLASTICS, INC.
IV. CASE 6-Rc-7276
A. The Challenges
With respect to the determinative challenges, I have
heretofore found that Valerie Marzella and June Haines
were discriminatorily denied recall in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act. The record amply demonstrates
Respondent's practice of recalling employees laid off for
economic reasons as work became available. Accordingly,
at the time of the election, Valerie Marzella and June
Haines were eligible voters, and the challenges to their
ballots are overruled.
At the election, the Board agent challenged the ballot of
Mary Lou Leslie because her name did not appear on the
list of eligible voters submitted by the Employer. At this
stage of the proceeding, no position with respect to the
status of Leslie was expressed by either the Petitioner or the
Employer. It does appear, however, that while the matter
was pending in the Region, the Employer claimed that
Leslie was permanently terminated prior to the election,
and therefore was ineligible, while Petitioner urged that she
had a reasonable expectancy of recall in the foreseeable
future, and hence was eligible to vote. The record is almost
entirely devoid of reference to Leslie. Although it does
appear that she was on Respondent's payroll as of October
13, her name is not again mentioned and no evidence was
adduced as to when, how, and for what reason she was
terminated. In my opinion, the circumstances, including
her exclusion from the eligibility list submitted by the
Employer, together with the absence of any apparent
dispute as to the fact that she was terminated, sufficed to
place the onus upon Petitioner, if it seriously held such a
position, to establish her expectancy of recall. Having
failed to produce proof with respect to this issue, Petitioner
has not met its burden, and, accordingly, I find that Mary
Lou Leslie was not an eligible voter, and the challenge to
her ballot is sustained.
The final challenge involves Steve Martin, who was
challenged by the Petitioner on grounds that he occupied a
supervisory position. As I indicated at the hearing, since
Petitioner adduced no proof as to the status of Martin, the
challenge to his eligibility was unsubstantiated. According-
ly, I find that Steve Martin was an eligible voter, and the
challenge to his ballot is overruled.
Based on the foregoing, it shall be recommended that the
determinative ballots of Valerie Marzella, June Haines,
and Steve Martin be opened and counted by the Regional
Director and that a revised tally be furnished the parties. I
shall further recommend that if the revised tally indicates
that the Union has been designated by a majority of the
valid ballots cast, that the Regional Director shall issue a
Certification of Representative.
B. The Objections
The objections to the election are based on the discrimi-
natory layoffs of November 14, and Respondent's partici-
pation in the preparation of a petition seeking revocation
of signed authorization cards. I have heretofore found that
Respondent did not violate Section 8(aXI) of the Act,
through Edmund Allen's participation in the preparation
of said petition. On the other hand, Respondent violated
Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by its discriminatory
failure to recall Valerie Marzella and June Haines. These
unfair labor practices occurred and continued unremedied
throughout the critical preelection period. Based thereon I
find that Respondent has unlawfully interfered with the
conduct of the election. Accordingly, I shall recommend
that, in the event that the revised tally of ballots does not
disclose that the Union was designated by a majority of the
ballots cast, that the election conducted on March 15, 1976,
be set aside and that a rerun election be directed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent-Employer is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Charging Party-Petitioner is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent independently violated Section 8(aX1)
of the Act by threatening employees with "blacklist"
because they engaged in union activity, coercively interro-
gating employees concerning their union membership,
segregating a union supporter from other employees, and
by maintaining work rules which threaten employees with
discipline for engaging in activities protected by Section 7
of the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by issuing warning letters to, reducing the pay of, and
placing on probation, employee Valerie Marzella, in
reprisal for her union activity.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the
Act by laying off employees June Haines and Cathy Steger
for I week on October 14, 1975, in reprisal for union
activity.
6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by failing to recall Valerie Marzella and June Haines,
after a layoff on November 14, 1975, in reprisal for union
activity.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discriminatorily issued
warning letters to Valerie Marzella, I shall recommend that
Respondent expunge and delete said warnings from its
records. In view of the discriminatory refusal to recall
Valerie Marzella and June Haines, it shall be recommend-
ed that Respondent offer them immediate recall, and, in
doing so, to restore the discriminatorily denied pay
increments to Valerie Marzella, and to provide both their
former positions, without loss of seniority or other benefits,
and make whole Valerie Marzella for any loss of pay
resulting from the discriminatory reduction of her wage
rate, and make whole Valerie Marzella and June Haines
for losses of earnings resulting from Respondent's discrimi-
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
natory refusal to recall them, by payment of a sum of
money equal to the amount they normally would have
earned as wages from the date they would have been
recalled but for the discrimination against them, to the date
of a bona fide offer of reinstatement. Backpay shall be
computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and shall
include interest at 6 percent as provided in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716(1962).
Finally, as the unfair labor practices committed by
Respondent, particularly the various forms of discrimina-
tion, strike at the heart of the Act, a broad cease-and-desist
order shall be recommended, precluding Respondent from
"in any other manner" interfering with, coercing, or
restraining employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER27
The Respondent, Poly Ultra Plastics, Inc., Ridgway,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union activities, threatening to blacklist employees because
they have engaged in union activities, maintaining work
rules which subject employees to discipline for engaging in
activity protected by the Act, and segregating employees to
limit union activity.
(b) Discouraging membership in a labor organization, by
issuing warning notices, placing employees on probation,
reducing wage rates, refusing to recall employees from
layoff, or any other manner discriminating against employ-
ees because they have or are suspected of having engaged
in union activity.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Valerie Marzella immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former position, if available, or, if that position
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
restoring her with the wage rate she enjoyed as of October
1, 1975, plus any general increases, and without prejudice
to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her
27 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
whole for the loss of earnings suffered by reason of the
discrimination against her in the manner set forth in the
section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Offer to June Haines immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former position, if available, or, if that position
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make her whole for loss of earnings
sustained by reason of the discrimination against her in the
manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
(c) Make whole June Haines and Cathy Steger for the
loss of earnings they sustained by reason of the discrimina-
tory layoff of October 14 through 22, 1976, with interest.
(d) Delete and expunge all reference from its records to
the warning letters issued against Valerie Marzella, dated
October 10 and 28, 1975.
(e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due.
(f) Post at its Ridgway, Pennsylvania, plant, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 28 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 6, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Decision, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Case 6-RC-7276 be
severed and remanded to the Regional Director for Region
6 for the opening of the ballots of Valerie Marzella, June
Haines, and Steve Martin. Thereafter, the Regional
Director shall issue a revised tally of ballots, and, if said
tally indicates that the Petitioner was designated by a
majority, issue a Certification of Representative. Should
the revised tally of ballots fail to disclose that the Petitioner
has been designated by a majority, the election conducted
on March 15, 1976, shall be set aside and said Regional
Director shall conduct a rerun election at such time as he
deems the circumstances permit a free choice on the issue
of representation.
28 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
796