Pioneer Electric of Monroe

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 2001

333 N.L.R.B. 1192 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1192
Pioneer Electric of Monroe, Inc. and Pioneer Electri-
cal and Mechanical Contractor, Inc., a single
employer and/or alter ego and International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
No. 446, AFL–CIO. Cases 15–CA–15190, 15–
CA–15384, 15–CA–15685, and 15–CA–15736
April 30, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND HURTGEN
On February 23, 2001, Administrative Law Judge
Richard J. Linton issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.1
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Pioneer Electric of Monroe,
Inc., and its alter ego, Pioneer Electric and Mechanical
Contractor, Inc., a single employer, Monroe, Louisiana,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order.

Sandra L. Hightower, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Essex Lacy, Pres. (Pioneer), of Monroe, Louisiana, for the Re-
spondent, Pioneer.
John Hopkins, Bus. Mgr. (IBEW), of Monroe, Louisiana, for
the Charging Party.

1 The Respondent does not except to any of the violations found by
the judge or to his finding that Pioneer Electric of Monroe, Inc. (Pio-
neer 1) and Pioneer Electrical and Mechanical Contractor, Inc. (Pioneer
2) constitute both a single employer and alter egos. Rather, the Re-
spondent excepts only to the judge’s recommended remedy of rein-
statement and backpay for six employees who were unlawfully laid off
when Pioneer 1 closed on January 14, 2000. Specifically, the Respon-
dent argues that these employees rejected offers of employment with
Pioneer 2 on that date, so it should not be required again to extend
offers of employment to them or to give them backpay. We disagree.
Absent exceptions, it is now undisputed that the Respondent did not
offer the discriminatees employment under the same contractual terms
and conditions and with the continued collective-bargaining representa-
tion by the Union that they had while employed by Pioneer 1. The
offers of employment were therefore part and parcel of the Respon-
dent’s unfair labor practices and cannot serve to toll the Respondent’s
remedial obligations. We therefore find that the traditional backpay
and reinstatement remedy ordered by the judge was proper.

DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD J. LINTON, Administrative Law Judge. This is
an alter ego case in which it is alleged that Pioneer Electrical
and Mechanical Contractor, Inc.1 (Pioneer 2) was created to
escape the perceived burdens of the collective-bargaining
agreement between Pioneer Electric of Monroe, Inc. (Pioneer
1) and IBEW Local 446 (the Union or Local 446). In January
2000, Essex Lacy and his wife DeBorah Lacy, the owners of
both Pioneer 1 and Pioneer 2, ceased operating Pioneer 1 and
terminated its employees. Pioneer 1’s employees were repre-
sented by the Union. (For consistency in this decision I shall
refer to Essex Lacy as Lacy and to DeBorah Lacy by her full
name.) I find that Pioneer 1 and Pioneer 2 (the Respondent),
violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bar-
gain with the Union and by discharging the employees of Pio-
neer 1. I also dismiss certain allegations of bad-faith bargain-
ing.
I presided at this 2-day trial in Monroe, Louisiana, on July 17
and 18, 2000, pursuant to a third order consolidating cases,
consolidated complaint and notice of hearing issued by the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
through the Regional Director for Region 15 on April 25,
2000.2 The complaint is based on charges filed by the Union in
1999 and 2000.3
In the complaint, the General Counsel alleges that Respon-
dent Pioneer 1 and Respondent Pioneer 2 are a single employer
or, in the alternative, that they are a single employer and that
Pioneer 2 is a disguised continuance and alter ego of Pioneer 1.
Respondent Pioneer 1 is alleged to have violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by failing and refusing to furnish relevant
information and to have violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
laying off employee Carlos Gasca. Respondent Pioneer 1 and
Respondent Pioneer 2, the Respondent, are alleged to have
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (5) of the Act by ceasing to operate
Pioneer 1, discharging all employees in the unit, and repudiat-
ing the collective-bargaining agreement between Pioneer 1 and
the Union, and to have violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
directly dealing with employees, and failing to bargain in good
faith. The answer of the Respondent admits certain factual mat-
ters but denies violating the Act.
The pleadings and record establish that the Board has both
statutory and discretionary jurisdiction over the Respondent,
that Respondent Pioneer 1 and Respondent Pioneer 1 jointly are
a statutory employer, and that the Union is a statutory labor
organization.
1 The name has been corrected to conform to the articles of incorpo-
ration. (GCX 4.) References to the two-volume transcript of testimony
are by volume and page. Exhibits are designated GCX for the General
Counsel’s and RX for those of the Respondent.
2 All dates are in the year 1999 unless otherwise indicated.
3 The charge in Case 15–CA–15190 was filed on February 1; the
charge in Case 15–CA–15384 was filed on June 14; the charge in Case
15–CA–15685 was filed on January 18, and was amended on February
11, March 27, and April 3, 2000; the charge in Case 15–CA–15736 was
filed on March 1, 2000.
333 NLRB No. 143
PIONEER ELECTRIC OF MONROE 1193
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs
filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make these
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Background and Overview
Essex and DeBorah Lacy created Pioneer 1 on August 19,
1992. (GCX 3) The business purpose of Pioneer 1 was to per-
form residential and commercial electrical, heating, and air
conditioning work. (GCX 21, par. 17.) On February 3, 1993,
Pioneer 1 signed a Letter of Assent that authorized the Ouachita
Valley Chapter, Inc., N.E.C.A. (National Electrical Contractors
Association) to act on its behalf in collective bargaining with
the Union. (GCX 9, p 3) In 1997, the Union obtained arbitra-
tion awards directing Pioneer 1 to sign and abide by the terms
of the Inside Agreement, Commercial Market Recovery
Agreement, and Local Industrial Agreement that were effective
from September 1, 1995, through August 31, 1997. (GCX 5, 7,
and 8.) When Pioneer 1 did not comply, the Union sought and
obtained enforcement of the arbitration awards from the United
States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana in a
Judgment entered October 30, 1998, that directed Pioneer 1 to
abide by the terms of the foregoing agreements. (GCX 9.). On
July 9, the District Court issued its “Ruling” (GCX 15) enforc-
ing an arbitration award finding Pioneer 1 liable for $32,359.60
for violations of the foregoing agreements. The Court’s judg-
ment was formally entered (pursuant to FRCP 58) on July 14.
As it turns out, the exhibit (GCX 15) presenting the July 9 Rul-
ing of the court contained the court’s July 14 single-page judg-
ment, a separate document, inserted as an unnumbered page
just before the July 9 signature page of the Ruling. Rather than
assigning the July 14 judgment a separate exhibit number, I
have removed the inserted copy of the court’s July 14 judgment
and placed it on top of the Ruling, so that the judgment will
remain part of General Counsel Exhbit 15.
In 1996, Union Business Agent John Hopkins sought to es-
tablish the Union as under Section 9(a) representative of the
employees of Pioneer 1 on the basis of a card check. Pioneer 1
refused to agree to recognition, the Union filed a petition, and a
representation election was held. (1:67.) On August 19, 1996,
as alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer, the
Union was certified as the 9(a) representative of the employees
of Pioneer 1 in the following appropriate unit:

All full time and regular part time journeymen and appren-
tices employed by the Respondent in Union, Morehouse,
West Carroll, East Carroll, Lincoln, Jackson, Ouachita, Cald-
well, Richland, Franklin, Madison and Tensas Parishes; ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, guards, professional
employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.

Thereafter, the Union and Pioneer 1 became parties to the In-
side Agreement that was, by its terms, effective from Septem-
ber 1, 1997, through August 31, 1999. (GCX 6.). Article I,
section 1, of that agreement provided that the agreement would
continue in effect from year to year unless, as provided in sec-
tion 2(a), 90 days written notice was given by either party ex-
pressing a desire to change or terminate the agreement. On
June 2, exactly 90 days before August 31, the Union sent to
Pioneer 1 letters stating its desire to terminate the current Inside
Agreement, Commercial Market Recovery Agreement, and
Local Industrial Agreement. (GCX 12, 13, 14.) Thereafter, the
parties met for negotiations prior to the contract expiration, but
no agreement was reached. (1:77, 81) Article I, section 2(c), of
the Inside Agreement provides that its provisions remain in
effect “until a conclusion is reached in the matter of proposed
changes.” (GCX 6.)
During the summer of 1999, on July 6, Essex and DeBorah
Lacy chartered Pioneer 2. The parties stipulated that Pioneer 2
was created because Pioneer 1 “was not able to meet the finan-
cial obligations caused by the Union and the $32,000 judg-
ment.” (GCX 21, par. 8). Pioneer 1 ceased to bid on contracts
in July. (GCX 21, par. 23.) On January 14, Lacy informed the
employees of Pioneer 1 that Pioneer 1 was closed and he of-
fered them employment with Pioneer 2. (1:155; 2:249; GCX
2.) The terms of the collective-bargaining agreement between
Pioneer 1 and the Union were “not applied to the employees of”
Pioneer 2. (GCX 21, par. 38.)
B. The Information Request
On November 2, 1998, following the enforcement by the
United States District Court of the arbitration award relating to
the contract that had expired on August 31, 1997, the Union
sent a letter to Pioneer 1 requesting information. In pertinent
part, it states:

Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, Local 446
hereby demands a list of all electrical jobs and projects
worked by your firm in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. Also,
please itemize all electrical employees and their hours worked
on these projects, including “helpers.”

This information is crucial to our separately filed grievances
under the Agreements. [(GCX 10, emphasis in the original.)]

The Respondent’s answer admits that the information sought
was relevant and necessary and that it refused to provide the
information. Lacy initially testified that, following receipt of
the information request, he informed Hopkins that he “could
not provide the information as he [Hopkins] requested because
my accounting system and my paperwork did not reflect every-
thing he was asking for.” (2:261.) Notwithstanding this admis-
sion, Lacy later testified that he informed Hopkins that he could
provide a portion of the information shortly after the request
was made. (2:262.) I do not credit this later version. When
first questioned regarding the ability of Pioneer 1 to partially
comply with the request, Lacy responded that a “portion of
these documents have been offered to Local Union 446 through
the NLRB.” (2:261, 262.) In explaining this response, Lacy
testified that he informed a Board agent that he could provide
the contracts that would reflect the jobs worked but that the
Board agent did not want them. (2:262) Lacy’s assertion of a
prior offer of the documents to Hopkins is inconsistent with his
testimony that he offered them “through the NLRB.”
Regarding the records identifying the electrical employees
that worked on specific jobs and the hours that they worked,
Lacy testified that Pioneer 1 was unable to produce those re-
cords because “there are no company records indicating payroll
and manhours.” (2:226.) In further testimony, he explained
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1194
that Pioneer 1 had attempted to have employees record their
hours on specific jobs, but, “with a lot of employees not coming
directly to the office, it . . . has been hard to get that in place.”
(2:264.) Insofar as an attempt was made in this regard, it would
appear that Pioneer 1 could have some records, even if incom-
plete records, that would be responsive to this aspect of the
Union’s request.
Employers are obligated to furnish available information
needed by a union to administer an existing contract. Praxair,
Inc., 317 NLRB 435, 436 (1995). Although there is no obliga-
tion to furnish information that does not exist, Lacy admitted
that information regarding the jobs worked by Pioneer 1 did
exist. His offer to provide this information to a Board agent, an
offer made after the charge was filed, did not fulfill the obliga-
tion of Pioneer 1 to provide this information to the Union.
Praxair, Inc., supra, 436 at fn. 3. Respondent Pioneer 1, by
failing and refusing to provide the Union with requested rele-
vant information identifying the jobs worked and whatever
records it had that would identify the employees that worked on
those jobs and the hours worked, violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
C. The Layoff of Carlos Gasca
Carlos Gasca was hired by Pioneer 1 on June 14. Lacy in-
terviewed Gasca on June 13. Lacy told Gasca that he could not
hire him as electrician “because of the contract.” He was hired
as an air-conditioner installer helper. (2:234–237.) Gasca be-
lieved, erroneously, that because he was not a union member he
could not be hired as an electrician. He did not seek a referral
as a nonmember, but contacted Lacy directly. (1:165.) Gasca
did not recall that Lacy informed him of his classification, but
he does remember that his pay rate was $9 per hour. (1:167.)
The first job to which he was assigned was performing electri-
cal work at a church in Epps, Louisiana, but Gasca does not
deny that he did perform air-conditioning work as well as elec-
trical work. (1:167, 177.) About September 1, Pioneer 1 trans-
ferred Gasca to work at its Marriott motel jobsite. (2:238.)
When working on that job, Gasca was performing electrical
work. He learned that he could become a union member by
taking a test that would establish his proficiency. (1:170.) He
took the test on October 13 and became a member of the Union
in November. (1:101, 172.)
October 13, the date Gasca took the proficiency test, coin-
cided with a scheduled negotiating session between Pioneer 1
and the Union. The parties met at the local union hall. Essex
and DeBorah Lacy saw Gasca at the hall. (1:172; 2:39.) In the
negotiations, Business Agent John Hopkins complained that
Pioneer 1 was working employees who had not been referred
by the Union and who were not being paid the contractual wage
rate. (1:100; 2:240.) Lacy responded that Pioneer 1 had re-
quested personnel in August but, when the Union failed to refer
anyone, he put Gasca on the job. Hopkins testified that he told
Lacy that Gasca was at the hall to be tested to become a jour-
neyman wireman, that he was tired of working for $9 an hour.
(1:100.) Lacy testified that, after complaining about employees
who had not been referred by the Union, Hopkins requested
that he lay off Gasca and that he told Hopkins he would do so.
(2:242, 243.) Hopkins denied making any such request, and I
credit his denial. (1:141.) Lacy admitted that he could not
“recall exactly what Mr. Hopkins said.” (2:241–242.) Hopkins
also denied that Lacy told him that Gasca would be laid off.
(1:100, 101.) DeBorah Lacy corroborated Hopkins. She testi-
fied that the decision to lay off Gasca was made after the meet-
ing. (1:37.)
I find it immaterial whether Hopkins noted that Gasca was
seeking to become a journeyman wireman. The mutually cor-
roborative testimony of Hopkins and the Lacys confirm that
Gasca was observed at the union hall and was mentioned by
name. Hopkins protested that Pioneer 1 was working employ-
ees who had not been referred by the Union and who were not
being paid the contractual wage rate. I do not credit Lacy’s
testimony that he told Hopkins he would lay off Gasca. Hop-
kins denied that any such statement was made, and DeBorah
Lacy testified that the decision to lay off Gasca was made after
the meeting. Gasca was laid off the following day, October 14.
The document laying him off states “lack of work.” (RX 2;
1:41.) Lacy testified that Gasca was laid off “because the un-
ion complained that he was on the project . . . [and Pioneer 1]
did not have any other work in its air conditioning division to
transfer Mr. Gasca back to.” (2:242.)
In assessing the evidence under the analytical framework of
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), I find that the presence of
Gasca at the union hall, observed by the Lacys, establishes both
union activity on his part and knowledge by the Respondent
Pioneer 1. It is immaterial whether Lacy was informed that
Gasca was seeking to become a union member. Hopkins’
statements to the Lacys revealed that Gasca had told the Union
that he was performing electrical work at the Marriott jobsite
but was not being paid in accordance with the contract. Pioneer
1 was liable for a judgment in excess of $32,000 that had re-
sulted from prior violations of the contract. In a negotiating
session, Lacy complained that “the issues that were causing the
grievances needed to be addressed” and stated that the “survival
of the company” depended upon the “day-to-day operating
procedures” he was proposing. (2:226.) Lacy’s statement re-
ferring to grievances, and equating the survival of the Company
with acceptance of his proposed changes in contractual operat-
ing procedures, reveals animus towards the union activity of
filing grievances to enforce the contract. Gasca had provided
the Union with information of a contract violation. Respondent
Pioneer 1 laid off Gasca after learning that he had provided the
Union with information establishing a contract violation. The
General Counsel has carried the burden of proving that union
activity was a substantial and motivating factor for the layoff of
Gasca. Manno Electric, 321 NLRB 278 (1996).
Respondent Pioneer 1 has not rebutted the prima facie case
presented by the General Counsel. Gasca was assigned to work
as an electrical employee about September 1. No other em-
ployee was laid off from the Marriott jobsite in mid-October.
Job Steward Michael Newton testified that, at the time Gasca
was laid off, the employees were finishing up the job and “it
was a little hectic . . . trying to catch all our loose ends.”
(1:159.) I find that Respondent Pioneer 1 violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act by laying off Carlos Gasca in retaliation for
his union activity.
PIONEER ELECTRIC OF MONROE 1195
Although I have found that Gasca was discriminatorily laid
off on October 14, the collective-bargaining agreement required
that employees not referred by the Union be considered tempo-
rary employees and that those employees should be separated
prior to employees referred by the Union. (GCX 6, art. V, Sec.
6 and 7.) Job Steward Newton testified that the first person to
be laid off would be the “person without a [referral] ticket.”
(1:162.) As the Marriott job was being concluded, Pioneer 1
laid off Anthony Wilson and Justin Bailey on November 2,
both of whom had been referred by the Union and neither of
whom is alleged to have been discriminatorily laid off. (GCX
17, RX 4, 5.) Gasca had been working as an electrical em-
ployee since September 1. Under the contract, Gasca had no
priority since he was not referred by the Union and did not have
a “ticket.” Thus, notwithstanding my finding that Pioneer 1
unlawfully laid off Gasca on October 14, when it was hectic on
the Marriott job, the layoffs of Wilson and Bailey establish that,
as the Marriott job neared completion, there were nondiscrimi-
natory economic layoffs and that, pursuant to the contract,
Gasca had less priority that the first two employees who were
laid off. There is no evidence disputing Lacy’s testimony that
there was no air-conditioning work to which Gasca could be
transferred. In view of the foregoing, I find that, but for his
discriminatory layoff on October 14, Gasca would have prop-
erly been laid off under the contract at the same time as Wilson
and Bailey, on November 2.
D. The Status of Pioneer 2 as a Single-Employer and/or
Alter Ego
The threshold issue regarding the remaining allegations of
the complaint is whether Pioneer 1 and Pioneer 2 are a single
employer or, alternatively, whether Pioneer 2 is a disguised
continuance and alter ego of Pioneer 1. Virtually all of the
relevant facts bearing upon this determination were stipulated.
Pioneer 1, chartered on August 19, 1992, is owned by Lacy
and his wife DeBorah Lacy. Lacy is, and at all times has been,
president and chief executive and DeBorah Lacy is, and at all
times has been, Secretary-Treasurer of Pioneer 1. Pioneer 1
operates from a building at 5061 Highway 165 bypass, South,
Monroe, Louisiana, and was created to perform residential and
commercial electrical, heating, and air conditioning work.
(GCX 21, par. 2, 3, 9, 10, 17, 29.)
Pioneer 2, chartered on July 6, 1999, is owned by Lacy and
his wife. Lacy is, and at all times has been, president and chief
executive and DeBorah Lacy is, and at all times has been, sec-
retary-treasurer of Pioneer 2. Pioneer 2 operates from the same
building as Pioneer 1 and was created to perform residential
and commercial electrical, heating, and air-conditioning work.
(GCX 21, par. 4, 5, 11, 12, 18, 29.)
The Lacys were employed by Pioneer 1 until January 14,
2000, the date that Lacy informed employees of Pioneer 1 that
it had closed. Since January 14, 2000, the Lacys have been
employed by Pioneer 2. DeBorah Lacy performs all adminis-
trative tasks for Pioneer 1 and 2. Lacy performs bidding, signs
contracts, and is responsible for the overall supervision of all
projects performed by Pioneer 1 and 2. (GCX 21, pars. 6, 13,
14, 15, 16.) Pioneer 1 and 2 perform the same kind of work,
and Pioneer 2 uses the same vendors and provides services to
the same customers and same type of customers as Pioneer 1.
Pioneer 1 ceased bidding on contracts in July 1999, and Pioneer
2 bids on the same contracts that previously would have been
bid on by Pioneer 1. (GCX 21, pars. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.) Lacy
owns the building from which Pioneer 1 and 2 operate. Until
January 14, 2000, the building was leased to Pioneer 1. After
January 14, 2000, it was leased to Pioneer 2. Pioneer 1 and 2
have the same telephone and facsimile number and use the
same office equipment. Pioneer 1 and 2 perform projects in
Monroe, Louisiana, under a single permit issued to “Pioneer
Electric.” The assets of Pioneer 1 and 2 are insured by the
same company under the same account number. Lacy and his
wife are responsible for the policies, work rules, and benefits of
Pioneer 1 and 2. (GCX 21, pars. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37.)
About 95 percent of the physical assets used by Pioneer 1
and 2 are personally owned by Lacy who has leased or loaned
those assets as needed to Pioneer 1 and 2. (1:64.) Included in
those assets are 13 vehicles that Lacy previously leased to Pio-
neer 1 and thereafter leased to Pioneer 2. There was no written
lease with Pioneer 1 and no written lease prior to January 24,
2000, with Pioneer 2. (GCX 21, pars. 33.)
Until the Lacys ceased operating Pioneer 1, Pioneer 2 sub-
contracted all work that it obtained to Pioneer 1. The parties
stipulated: “Once . . . [Pioneer 2] was formed, it subcontracted
for labor and materials any contracts it was awarded to the first
company, which is . . . [Pioneer 1]. This subcontracting agree-
ment between the two companies was not in writing.” (1:60).
This arrangement obviously ceased on January 14, 2000, when
the employees of Pioneer 1 were informed that it had closed.
There is no evidence that Pioneer 2 employed anyone prior to
January 14, 2000. After ceasing to operate Pioneer 1 in Janu-
ary, Lacy “reactivated” it in February or March for a short time
in order to complete a job. (2:270.)
The four basic indicia for finding a single employer are (1)
common ownership, (2) common management, (3) interrelation
of operations, and (4) common control of labor relations.
IMCO/International Measurement Co., 304 NLRB 738, 739
(1991). The record herein amply establishes that that Pioneer 1
and 2 are a single employer with common ownership and man-
agement of all aspects of both entities, including labor relations,
by the Lacys. There was an undisputed interrelation of opera-
tions since any contracts bid for Pioneer 2 by Lacy were “sub-
contracted for labor and materials . . . to the first company . . .
[Pioneer 1].”
The foregoing finding is relevant since Pioneer 1 continues
to exist. The more significant issue is the status of Pioneer 2 on
and after January 14. The record establishes that Pioneer 2 was
and is a (thinly) disguised continuance and alter ego of Pioneer
1 and, therefore, is bound to the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between Pioneer 1 and the Union.
In Johnstown Corp., 313 NLRB 170 (1993), the Board
quoted from its decision in Crawford Door Sales Co., 226
NLRB 1144 (1976), stating:

Clearly each case must turn on its own facts, but generally we
have found alter ego status where the two enterprises have
“substantially identical” management, business purpose, op-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1196
eration, equipment, customers, and supervision, as well as
ownership.

In the instant case, Pioneer 1 and 2 have identical ownership,
management, and business purpose. Pioneer 2 operates in the
same manner, although not pursuant to the collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union, as did Pioneer 1. The
equipment used by employees of Pioneer 2, 95 percent of
which is owned by Lacy, is the same equipment previously
used by employees of Pioneer 1. Ultimate supervision is by
Lacy. The parties stipulated that Pioneer 2 provides services to
the same customers and same type of customer as Pioneer 1 and
that Pioneer 2 bids on the same contracts that previously would
have been bid upon by Pioneer 1. Pioneer 2 is the alter ego of
Pioneer 1.
E. The Cessation of Operations of Pioneer 1, Discharge of
Employees, Repudiation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, and Direct Dealing
On January 14, Pioneer 2 began operating as a nonunion
contractor. (GCX 21, par. 6, 38.) Job Steward Newton recalled
that all employees were called into the office conference room
where Lacy stated that he had, in June or July, incorporated a
new company, Pioneer 2, that it was “time to let Pioneer [1]
go,” and that, in order for the employees to change companies,
“he had to lay us off.” Lacy informed the employees that he
would hire them at the same wages and benefits, but that they
needed to sign W-2 forms reflecting their employment by Pio-
neer 2. The union affiliated employees went to the union hall
because they had not been properly referred to Pioneer 2.
Those employees were Newton, Charles Monroe, Tommy
Tumlison, Eric Shopher, James Carter, and Anthony McDon-
ald. (1:4, 155).
Immediately following their arrival at the union hall, the un-
ion members informed Business Agent Hopkins of what had
occurred. After the employees arrived, Hopkins received, at
9:43 a.m. by facsimile, a letter from Lacy dated January 14,
2000, advising that Pioneer 1 had ceased doing business and
that the employees had been laid off. (GCX 2: 1:106.) The
letter states that the employees had been offered jobs with Pio-
neer 2. Prior to this Hopkins had not known of the existence of
Pioneer 2. (1:106.) Hopkins called Lacy who confirmed the
facts stated in the letter. Hopkins explained that the employees
could not work for Pioneer 2 unless it had an agreement with
the Union and that Pioneer 2 could not submit payments to any
benefit funds without an agreement. (1:107.) The terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement between Pioneer 1 and the
Union were “not applied to the employees of” Pioneer 2.
(GCX 21, par. 38.) The six laid-off employees were never
employed by Pioneer 2.
The parties stipulated that Pioneer 2 was created in July be-
cause Pioneer 1 “was not able to meet the financial obligations
caused by the Union and the $32,000 judgment.” (GCX 21,
par. 8.) The creation of Pioneer 2 had no effect upon the em-
ployees of Pioneer 1 which continued to perform work pursuant
to the collective-bargaining agreement. Indeed, the Union did
not even know that Pioneer 2 existed until January 14, 2000,
when Pioneer 1 ceased operating and Pioneer 2 began employ-
ing employees and performing work.
The record establishes that the Lacys ceased operating Pio-
neer 1 in order to avoid the obligations of the collective-
bargaining agreement between Pioneer 1 and the Union. Lacy
testified that, following a conference with a bankruptcy attor-
ney on January 13 in which the subcontracting of bids made by
Pioneer 2 to Pioneer 1 for performance of the bid work was
discussed, the Lacys decided to close Pioneer 1 because it “had
no contracts or assets.” (2:248.) Pioneer 1 had no contracts
because Lacy stopped bidding contracts for Pioneer 1 in July.
(2:274; GCX 21, par. 23.) Pioneer 1 had few assets because 95
per cent of its assets were the personal assets of Lacy that he
leased or loaned to Pioneer 1. The motivation for closing Pio-
neer 1 is revealed in the testimony of Lacy regarding bargain-
ing. In explaining that “wages were not a main issue,” when
bargaining in the summer of 1999, Lacy testified (2:226–227):

[Q]uite a number of grievances have been filed against . . .
[Pioneer 1]. Therefore, the issues that were causing the griev-
ances needed to be addressed. The survival of the company
will depend on the day-to-day operating procedures we are
trying to negotiate, as well as being able to compete with all
electrical contractors in the jurisdiction.”

Lacy’s concerns regarding “day-to-day operating proce-
dures” continued in subsequent negotiations. On January 12,
2000, Essex stated to Hopkins that “the Union could not tell
him how to operate [his] business.” (2:286) In explaining that
comment, Lacy testified (2:294.):

The comment made at the January 12 negotiating of 2000
meeting that the Union could not tell me how I could operate
my business was dealing with issues that we were trying to
negotiate on the day-to-day operational aspects of the com-
pany. There are procedures in the contract documents . . .
which give the Union an overwhelming authority on day-to-
day operational procedures. And at that time, we were at-
tempting to try and get those procedures out of the contract, so
we would have more flexibility with our operational proce-
dures, and these comments were made more or less in re-
sponse to that statement.

Pioneer 1 had failed to abide by the collective-bargaining
agreement in the past, resulting in grievances and an adverse
$32,000 judgment. The Union had not agreed to get the “day-
to-day operational procedures,” about which Lacy was con-
cerned “out of the contract.” Lacy was not going to let the
Union tell him how to operate his business. On January 14, he
and his wife ceased operating Pioneer 1. I find that they did so
in order to avoid the obligations of the collective-bargaining
agreement. When they did so, they terminated the employees
of Pioneer 1.
Pioneer 2 is the alter ego of Pioneer 1 and, as such, they con-
stitute a single Respondent. The Respondent has “not applied
to the employees of” Pioneer 2 the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement between Pioneer 1 and the Union. Be-
cause Pioneer 2 is the alter ego of Pioneer 1, it is, and has been
since January 14, 2000, bound by the collective-bargaining
agreement between Pioneer 1 and the Union. The Respon-
dent’s failure to honor the agreement constitutes a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Mar-Kay Cartage, 277
PIONEER ELECTRIC OF MONROE 1197
NLRB 1335, 1342 (1985), enfd. 822 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1987);
Advance Electric, 268 NLRB 1001, (1984). The cessation of
the operations of Pioneer 1 and activation of Pioneer 2 did not
constitute a change in the nature of the Respondent’s business.
Rather, it was an attempt to avoid the obligations of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement which restricted the “flexibility . . .
[of the] operational procedures” of Pioneer 1. In ceasing to
operate Pioneer 1 without notice to or bargaining with the Un-
ion and, when doing so, laying off the employees in the appro-
priate unit, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. See
Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB 891, 984 (1984). This action,
taken without notice to or bargaining with the Union also “ef-
fectively repudiated the collective-bargaining agreement . . .
and “constituted a separate, albeit a derivative and subsidiary,
violation of [Section 8(a)(5) of] the Act. Mar-Kay Cartage,
supra at 1342.
At the same meeting in which Lacy advised the unit employ-
ees that Pioneer 1 was closed and he had to lay them off, he
offered them jobs with Pioneer 2 but changed their working
conditions by failing to apply the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement to employees of Pioneer 2. Pioneer 2,
the alter ego of Pioneer 1, was obligated to continue to apply
the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement in effect be-
tween the Union and Pioneer 1. By directly offering the unit
employees jobs with different terms and conditions of employ-
ment, that is, no collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent
bypassed the Union and dealt directly with employees in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Insofar as I have found that the Respondent’s actions were
motivated by its desire to avoid the obligations of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, the cessation of operations of Pio-
neer 1 and failure to abide by the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement constituted a change in the terms and
conditions of employment of unit employees and discouraged
them from engaging in union activity in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. The termination of unit employees contem-
poraneously with the cessation of operations of Pioneer 1 also
constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. “Such a
termination of union-represented employees in an alter ego
situation is unlawful because it forces the employees to work
without a union contract or not to work at all.” Mar-Kay Cart-
age, supra at 1342. See also Advance Electric, supra.
F. The Bargaining in Bad-Faith Allegations
The complaint alleges (pars. 23(b) in conjunction with pars.
27 and 30) that the Respondent bargained in bad faith with the
Union in June, July, August, and September by failing to give
notice prior to the first bargaining session of changes it desired
in the collective-bargaining agreement, proposing deletion of
the recognition, subcontracting, and hiring hall clauses in the
collective-bargaining agreement, refusing to discuss wages and
benefits unless the Union accepted certain of its proposals, and
proposing to put any wage increase into effect at some indefi-
nite point in the future.
The answer admits that the Respondent failed to give notice
prior to the first bargaining session of the changes it desired and
that it proposed deletion of the recognition, subcontracting, and
hiring hall clauses. The answer denies refusing to discuss
wages and benefits or proposing implementation of a wage
increase at some indefinite point. The Respondent denies that
its admitted conduct violated the Act.
At trial the General Counsel referred to the admissions made
in the answer and stated that the allegation of bad faith bargain-
ing was predicated upon the indicia of bad-faith specified in the
complaint. (1:181–182.) Notwithstanding this statement, on
brief the General Counsel refers to exhibits that reflect the Re-
spondent paid journeymen electricians $15.70 per hour in Janu-
ary, 2000, and then reverted to the contractual $14.70 rate in
April, 2000. (GCX 19, 20.) Counsel argues that the fluctua-
tions in pay rates are “indicative of animus and bad faith.”
Business Agent Hopkins acknowledged that paying an em-
ployee more than the contract would not violate the contract,
“[y]ou can pay him anything you want to, just don’t . . . pay
less [than $14.70].” There is no charge or complaint allegation
relating to the issue of pay fluctuations. This issue was not
fully litigated, and I shall not consider it.
Although the complaint alleges that the Respondent bar-
gained in bad faith in June, July, August, and September, the
General Counsel submitted minutes of meetings held on March
22, April 13, and July 7, 2000. (GCX 23, 24 29.) The minutes
reflect the exchange of proposals in March and July, 2000, but
no discussion of the provisions contained in the proposals. The
minutes of the April 2000 meeting reflect that the Union asked
Lacy to sign a letter of assent and that he refused. There was
no testimony regarding these meetings. Hopkins, when asked
whether anyone from Pioneer 2 negotiated with the Union
“concerning the terms and conditions under which employees
would perform electrical work,” answered, “No.” (1:109.)
Lacy testified, that “[t]here has not been any negotiation with
the Union and [Pioneer 2] at any time.” (2:260.) There is no
complaint allegation relating to bargaining after September, and
I shall, therefore, make no findings in that regard.
The General Counsel argues that Respondent refused to dis-
cuss mandatory subjects of bargaining until the Union agreed to
Respondent’s management proposals, referring to the complaint
allegation that Respondent refused to discuss wages and bene-
fits. Hopkins testified that, at the first negotiating meeting on
June 8, Lacy stated that he was working under the Commercial
Market Recovery Agreement. Hopkins informed him that the
Union had terminated that agreement and was negotiating the
Inside Agreement. He presented to Lacy the Union’s proposal.
Lacy, who thought that he was working under the Commercial
Market Recovery Agreement, had no proposal at that meeting.
(1:77-78.) The next meeting that Hopkins addressed was on
August 12. Unable to recall “all of the items’’ that were in the
Union’s proposal, Hopkins did recall that Lacy proposed that
employees furnish their own battery pack drills, that the Union
agree to delete payments to the trust fund, and that Pioneer 1 be
permitted to hire “off the street.” (1:81, 82) Although the Re-
spondent’s answer admits proposing deletion of the hiring hall
clause, its proposal actually relates only to the Union being the
exclusive source of all employees. (RX 7, GCX 6, Art. V, Sec.
2.)
Hopkins testified that Lacy stated that wages could not be
discussed until “some of these other issues had been worked
out.” Even so, there is no evidence that the Union sought to
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1198
discuss wages on August 12. Hopkins noted that the Union had
initially proposed a wage increase but that “some items that
were not settled . . . with the other contractors” had been sub-
mitted to the NECA. When the NECA “came back with what
their wage increase would be . . . we offered [Pioneer 1] the
same wages and conditions . . . we had received back.” (1:84)
Hopkins acknowledged that Lacy stated that he would agree to
a wage increase “in the future, after other problems had been
worked out.” (1:86.) The NECA wage package provided for
wage increases at 6 month intervals, in September and March
of each year. (1:84.) On cross-examination, Lacy asked Hop-
kins whether he had “refused to negotiate any wage increases
or talk about pay increases with Local Union 446.” Hopkins
testified (1:131):

Again, each time that was brought up, as far as a complete
wage agreement, wage discussion on wages for the agree-
ment, it was always put in place of saying, “Well, when we
get some of this other; we may want a one-year contract; we
may want a two-year contract. Then we’ll work—whatever
we decide we’re going to get, we’ll work out wages. ”

Lacy testified that “wage scales was always a one permanent
thing that definitely could not be changed. There’s a clause in
the contract that states that Local Union 446 cannot give one
agent anything better than it gives another, and the monetary
value of a contract was one of the items. ” (2:228.) When
asked if he told this to the Union, Lacy answered, “It wouldn’t
have been stated [that way] . . . we went down the contract
items line item by line item . . . . My response was, ‘this is the
same wage package that the other contractors have; we will
accept this.” (2:232.) Hopkins specifically denied that Lacy
ever stated that he would accept the NECA wage rate, yet he
was not asked whether the wage scale was “one permanent
thing that definitely could not be changed” or whether the par-
ties understood that the Respondent would be bound by the
NECA rate. (2:301.)
Consistent with the testimony of Lacy, I find that the parties
understood that the NECA wage rate would be a part of any
contract to which they agreed. Lacy’s response to Hopkins that
“we’ll work out wages” after determining the length of the
contract is completely consistent with the evidence that the
NECA wage package provided for increases at 6 month inter-
vals. On September 9, Pioneer 1 proposed a 1 year contract,
from September 1 through August 31, 2000. The minutes do
not reflect any discussion of this, and Lacy noted on his copy of
the proposal that this item was left open. That proposal reflects
that Pioneer 1 proposed an hourly rate for journeymen as of
September 1 at $15.20, increasing to $15.70 on March 1, 2000.
(RX 7.) Lacy testified (2:233) that those were the NECA rates,
and Hopkins’ testimony confirms that those were the NECA
rates. (1:81.)
Article I, section 2(b), of the collective-bargaining agreement
and past practice between the parties contemplated the submis-
sion of proposed changes no later than the first negotiating
meeting between the parties. (GCX 6; 1:128.) Although Pio-
neer 1 did not submit a written proposal at the first negotiating
meeting on June 6, Hopkins’ testimony establishes that Lacy
mistakenly believed that Pioneer 1 was continuing to operate
under the Commercial Market Recovery Agreement. At the
next meeting, Pioneer 1 presented proposals.
The General Counsel cites Bozzuto’s Inc., 277 NLRB 977
(1985), for the proposition that one party may not insist to im-
passe that the parties bargain about permissive subjects of bar-
gaining to the exclusion of mandatory subjects of bargaining. I
concur with the General Counsel’s statement of the law. The
facts do not establish that this occurred. Although Hopkins
asserted that Lacy, on various occasions, made statements post-
poning discussion of a final wage package, the General Counsel
presented no evidence that Pioneer 1 insisted to impasse upon
discussing permissive rather than mandatory bargaining sub-
jects. Cf. Storer Communications, 294 NLRB 1056, 1079
(1989).
The minutes of the negotiating meeting of September 9 sub-
mitted by the General Counsel note discussion of various con-
tractual issues, identified by the Article numbers. (GCX 22.)
Those minutes, consistent with the testimony of Lacy, reflect
that the parties “went down the contract items line item by line
item.” Even though the parties had not agreed upon all the
terms of a prospective agreement, Lacy agreed that Pioneer 1
would implement a wage increase “in the future, after other
problems had been worked out.” I fail to see how this com-
mitment to implement a wage increase, at “some indefinite
point in the future” as alleged in the complaint, constitutes evi-
dence of bad faith. The wage increase was dependent upon the
parties reaching agreement. The proposal submitted by Pioneer
1 on September 9 reflects the NECA rates for one year and
proposed a one year contract. Since the NECA wage package
provided for increases at 6 month intervals, the final wage
agreement between the parties would be dependent upon the
length of the contract. There is no probative evidence that Pio-
neer 1 bargained in bad faith. I therefore shall dismiss com-
plaint paragraph 23(b).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By failing and refusing to provide to the Union informa-
tion reflecting electrical jobs and projects performed by Pioneer
1 in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, the employees who worked
on those jobs, and the hours those employees worked, the Re-
spondent Pioneer 1 has engaged in unfair labor practices affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By laying off employee Carlos Gasca because of his union
activities, the Respondent Pioneer 1 has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. By ceasing to operate Pioneer 1, terminating the unit em-
ployees of Pioneer 1, and failing to apply the terms of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement to the unit employees of Pio-
neer 2 without notice to or bargaining with the Union and in
order to avoid the obligations of the collective-bargaining
agreement, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3),
(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. By dealing directly with unit employees regarding the
terms and conditions of their employment, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
PIONEER ELECTRIC OF MONROE 1199
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Having unlawfully failed to provide the Union with the rele-
vant information it requested reflecting electrical jobs and pro-
jects performed by Pioneer 1 in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998,
the employees who worked on those jobs, and the hours those
employees worked, the Respondent must provide that informa-
tion. I am mindful that Lacy testified that “there are no com-
pany records indicating payroll and manhours.” (2:226..) In
view of his further testimony that he had attempted to have
employees record their hours on specific jobs, it appears that
Respondent may have some records, even if incomplete, that
are responsive to the Union’s request. Consistent with the fore-
going, Respondent must provide all records in its possession,
even if not complete, that are responsive to the Union’s request.
Having discriminatorily laid off Carlos Gasca, the Respon-
dent must make him whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from October 14, until
November 2, 1999, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed
in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as
computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).
Having unlawfully and discriminatorily terminated its union-
represented employees on January 14, 2000, the Respondent
must restore the status quo ante by offering Michael Newton,
Charles Monroe, Tommy Tumlison, Eric Shopher, James
Carter, and Anthony McDonald their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, substantially equivalent jobs, without
prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, dis-
missing if necessary, any employees hired on or since January
14, 2000, to fill any of those positions, and make them whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quar-
terly basis from date of discharge to date of proper offer of
reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F.
W. Woolworth Co., supra, plus interest as computed in New
Horizons for the Retarded, supra.
Having found that Pioneer 2 is a single employer with Pio-
neer 1, and that Pioneer 2, as the alter ego of Pioneer 1, has
continued to operate the same business, they constitute a single
Respondent. Inasmuch as Pioneer 2 has failed and refused to
recognize the Union or to apply the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement between the Union and Pioneer 1, I shall
order Pioneer 2 to recognize the Union as the representative of
its employees and to honor and apply the terms of that agree-
ment, and any subsequent agreement, to its unit employees.
The Respondent shall also make whole its employees by mak-
ing the contractually established payments to the welfare and
pension funds established by the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, with interest, in accordance with the formula set forth in
Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216 fn. 7 (1979),
and by reimbursing unit employees for any expenses they in-
curred as the result of the unlawful failure to make such re-
quired payments, as provided in Kraft Plumbing & Heating,
252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), affd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir.
1981).4
The Respondent will also be ordered to post an appropriate
notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, Pioneer Electric of Monroe, Inc., and its al-
ter ego Pioneer Electrical and Mechanical Contractor, Inc., a
single employer, Monroe, Louisiana, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to provide to the Union information
reflecting electrical jobs and projects performed by Pioneer 1 in
1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, identifying the employees who
worked on those jobs, and the hours those employees worked.
(b) Laying off employees because of their union activities.
(c) Discouraging membership in the Union, or any other la-
bor organization, by terminating its employees because they
belong to the Union, or any other labor organization, or because
they are covered under a collective-bargaining agreement, or by
otherwise discriminating against its employees in regard to hire,
tenure of employment, or other terms and conditions of em-
ployment.
(d) Refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the
exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit
with respect to wages, hours, working conditions, or other
terms and conditions of employment, and refusing to honor the
collective-bargaining agreement applicable to those employees.
(e) Dealing directly with employees represented by the Un-
ion concerning the terms and condition of their employment.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Provide to the Union information reflecting electrical
jobs and projects performed in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, and
provide such records that exist showing the employees who
worked on those jobs, and the hours those employees worked.
(b) Make Carlos Gasca whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of his discriminatory layoff in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Michael
Newton, Charles Monroe, Tommy Tumlison, Eric Shopher,
James Carter, and Anthony McDonald full reinstatement to

4 Respondent, in its brief, notes that it is a “mom and pop operation,”
and that compassion should be granted because of its “financial state.”
Board precedent prescribes the appropriate remedies I have ordered as a
result of the violations that I have found. The economic condition of a
respondent is not a basis for altering those remedies.
5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, 29 CFR 102.46, the findings, conclusions, and
recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, 29
CFR 102.48, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1200
their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substan-
tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(d) Make Michael Newton, Charles Monroe, Tommy Tumli-
son, Eric Shopher, James Carter, and Anthony McDonald
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful layoff or terminations and
notify the employees in writing that this has been done and that
the layoffs and terminations will not be used against them in
any way.
(f) Comply with the terms and conditions of the collective-
bargaining agreement between the Union and Pioneer 1, retro-
actively to January 14, 2000, including making the appropriate
trust funds, employees, and the Union whole in the manner
described in the remedy section of this decision.
(g) On request, bargain with the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 446, AFL–CIO as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the following ap-
propriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment:

All full time and regular part time journeymen and appren-
tices employed by the Respondent in Union, Morehouse,
West Carroll, East Carroll, Lincoln, Jackson, Ouachita, Cald-
well, Richland, Franklin, Madison and Tensas Parishes; ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, guards, professional
employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(h) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of the records if stored in electronic form, that
the Board or its agents deems necessary to analyze the amount
of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its of-
fice at Monroe, Louisiana, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”6 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 15, after being signed by Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or ceased its operation at the facility
involved in this proceeding, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at

6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

any time since November 2, 1998, the date of the first unfair
labor practice found in this proceeding.
(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official,
on a form provided by the Region, attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with, restrains,
or coerces you with respect to these rights, and more specifi-
cally:
WE WILL NOT lay you off or otherwise discriminate
against any of you for supporting IBEW Local 446 (the Union)
or any other union.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with IBEW
Local 446 as the exclusive representative of our employees in
the appropriate unit with respect to wages, hours, working con-
ditions, or other terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain collectively with
the Union by bypassing the Union and dealing directly with
employees, who are represented by the Union, concerning the
terms and conditions of their employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make whole Carlos Gasca for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits resulting from his layoff from October
14, 1999 until November 2, 1999, less any net interim earnings,
plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s Order, offer Mi-
chael Newton, Charles Monroe, Tommy Tumlison, Eric
Shopher, James Carter, and Anthony McDonald full reinstate-
ment to their former jobs, and if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and
WE WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits resulting from their terminations, less any net interim
earnings, plus interest.
PIONEER ELECTRIC OF MONROE 1201
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Or-
der, remove from our files any reference to the layoff of Carlos
Gasca and the terminations of Michael Newton, Charles Mon-
roe, Tommy Tumlison, Eric Shopher, James Carter, and An-
thony McDonald and, and WE WILL within 3 days thereafter
notify each of them in writing that this has been done and that
the discharges will not be used against them in any way.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 446, AFL–CIO,
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the follow-
ing appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of em-
ployment:

All full time and regular part time journeymen and appren-
tices employed by the Respondent in Union, Morehouse,
West Carroll, East Carroll, Lincoln, Jackson, Ouachita, Cald-
well, Richaland, Franklin, Madison, and Tensas Parishes; ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, guards, professional
employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.

WE WILL comply with the terms and conditions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement between the Union and Pioneer
Electric of Monroe, Inc., retroactively to January 14, 2000,
including making the appropriate trust funds, employees, and
the Union whole in the manner described in the Remedy sec-
tion of the decision.
WE WILL provide the Union with a list of all electrical jobs,
by year, worked by Respondent Pioneer Electric of Monroe,
Inc. in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, and a list, by year and by
job, of all employees and their hours worked on these jobs.

PIONEER ELECTRIC OF MONROE, INC.