Penn Pipe & Supply Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 28, 1973

208 N.L.R.B. 9 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

PENN PIPE & SUPPLY CO., INC.
Penn Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. and Building Material &
Dump Truck Drivers Local No. 36 , International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America. Case
21-CA-11659
December 28, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On August 23, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
James T. Rasbury issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief. General Counsel filed
an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent's grant of wage increases and other benefits
after receiving knowledge of the Union's majority
status violated Section 8(a)(5) as well as 8(a)(1) of the
Act and that a bargaining order remedy is appropri-
ate under the holding of the Supreme Court in the
Gissel case.I
During the early morning of March 12, 1973, seven
of the eight employees in the appropriate unit
attended a union meeting at which they signed not
only union authorization cards but also applications
for union membership, and paid initiation fees and
membership dues. On March 13, the Union's
attorney wrote Respondent a letter which advised
Respondent that the Union represented a majority of
its employees in an appropriate unit and requested
bargaining. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of March
12, Respondent's manager, Curtis Wright, learned
that the employees had contacted the Union. He
assembled the employees at a meeting on the
morning of March 14 and promised them increased
benefits if the employees discontinued their interest
in and support of the Union. Shortly after the
meeting, the employees met and decided to abandon
the Union. On March 19, a spokesman for the
employees called the Union and requested it to
forget the whole thing.
Apparently, Respondent does not dispute the
Administrative Law Judge's finding that after learn-
ing of its employees' union activity, its manager
9
assembled them and promised and granted them
wage increases and other benefits as a condition to
their abandoning interest in the Union. Nor does it
apparently dispute the Administrative Law Judge's
finding that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. The thrust of its argument is that the
promise and grant of benefits did not violate Section
8(a)(5) because the meeting with the employees was
held before Respondent received the Union's letter
advising of its majority status and requesting
bargaining. The evidence was in dispute as to
whether the meeting was held before or after
Respondent received the Union's letter. The Admin-
istrative Law Judge found the resolution of this
factual question unnecessary to a determination of
the issues in the case. We agree.
On March 12, the Union had unquestionably
received the adherence of a majority of employees in
the appropriate unit. It is also unquestionable that as
a result of Respondent's unfair labor practices,
intended to achieve that result, the employees
withdrew their support of the Union. Under these
circumstances, the only effective remedy for Respon-
dent's unfair labor practices is to require Respondent
to bargain with the Union, regardless of whether
Respondent received the Union's demand for bar-
gaining before or after its promise of additional
benefits to employees. To refuse to issue such an
order would reward Respondent and allow it to
profit by its unlawful conduct.2 Accordingly, we
find, as did the Administrative Law Judge, that by
promising and granting wage increases and other
improved employee benefits after having knowledge
of the employees' union activity, Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Penn Pipe & Supply
Co., Inc., Escondido, California, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
I N L R B v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U S 575 (1969)
2 Merritt Motor Company, 181 NLRB 1099, 1106, General Stencils, Inc,
195 NLRB 1109
3 N L.R B v. Gissel Packing Co, supra, Merritt Motor Company, supra
Chairman Miller agrees that a bargaining order is appropriate herein as a
part of the remedy in accordance with his separate views as expressed in
United Packing Company of Iowa, Inc, 187 NLRB 878, and General Stencils,
Inc, supra. He would note that the facts here point up the need to abandon
the legal fiction of finding an 8(a)(5) violation in these cases, and to
demonstrate that what is really at issue is whether a bargaining order is an
appropriate Remedy, not whether there has been a refusal to bargain under
our usual criteria.
208 NLRB No. 5
10 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES T. RASBURY, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard at San Diego, California, on June 11, 1973.1 The
charge was filed by the Union on March 22, and the
complaint was issued on May 1.2 The primary issues are
whether the Company (a) unlawfully solicited grievances,
promised wage increases, and other employee benefits to
the employees in order to induce said employees to refrain
from supporting the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative; and (b) whether Respondent has refused to
bargain in good faith with the Union as the representative
of the employees in an appropriate unit in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is engaged in Escondido, California, in
the wholesale distribution of plumbing supplies. During the
past calendar year, in the course and conduct of its
business operations, Respondent purchased and received
goods, materials, and supplies valued in excess of $50,000
directly from suppliers located outside the State of
California. The Respondent admits, and I herewith find,
that at all material times it has been an employer engaged
in commerce and in a business affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
At the hearing, the Respondent agreed to stipulate, and I
herewith find, that the Union is now, and has been at all
times material herein, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
With the exception of one issue, which will be noted and
discussed hereinafter, the essential facts are not in dispute.
By way of background only, the testimony revealed that in
the early part of June 1972 Hugh McDonald, Jr., business
agent for the Union, was contacted by James Beatty, an
employee of the Respondent, and told that the employees
of Respondent were interested in being represented by the
Union. McDonald met with the employees on June 15,
1972, at a restaurant in Escondido at an early morning
hour. On that occasion McDonald obtained union authori-
zation cards from all of the employees, but received a
telephone call either that afternoon or the following day,
advising him to forget the whole thing. No explanation was
given to McDonald as to why the employees had changed
their minds. Donald Ray Phillips, however, testified that
1 All dates hereinafter are 1973 unless otherwise indicated
2 The complaint was amended by telegram dated June 7 and motion
granted at the hearing
Curtis Wright, manager of Respondent, had offered the
employees a raise and additional holidays if the employees
would forget the Union.
B. Current Events
In the early part of March, McDonald received another
phone call from an employee of Respondent again
requesting the Union to aid them as their bargaining
representative. As a result of this conversation, McDonald
met with the employees on March 12 at 5 a.m. at Sandy's
Restaurant in Escondido. There were eight employees in
what was stipulated to be an appropriate bargaining unit
and on the occasion of this meeting, seven of the eight
employees attended.3 At this meeting, McDonald not only
obtained authorization cards but also applications for
membership, including the initiation fee and dues from
each of the employees. All of the employees paid
McDonald $38 except Chester Patton, who had formerly
been a member of a Teamsters local and he redeposited his
Teamsters card and paid a sum of $25 to McDonald. The
application cards reflecting payment of the monies are in
evidence as General Counsel's Exhibits 3(a) through (g).
The authenticity of each of the signatures appearing on
these exhibits was stipulated by Respondent. On March 19,
McDonald received a telephone call from Chris Maier, one
of the employees of Respondent in the appropriate
bargaining unit who had attended the early morning
meeting of March 12, informing McDonald that he had
been elected spokesman for the group and he was
requesting McDonald to forget about the whole thing.
Other than a phone call from an employee by the name of
Riggs, who wanted to know what to do with his dues,
McDonald has not spoken or had further contact with any
of the employees of Respondent.
By letter dated March 13, Ronald Domnitz, attorney for
the Union, advised Respondent that the Union represented
a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit; expressed a willingness to submit conclusive proof of
its majority status to a mutual'y acceptable, neutral third
party; and demanded a meeting for purposes of collective-
bargaining negotiations regarding the wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment (see G.C. Exh.
2).
Meanwhile, in the afternoon of March 12, Curtis Wright
received information from one of the clericals in the office
that the warehousemen were interested in the Union. Mr.
Wright testified that upon learning of this, he contacted
two of the employees, Chris Maier and James Beatty, and
asked each of them if there were some misunderstandings.
Upon learning that there were some misunderstandings
and that the employees had contacted the Union, Mr.
Wright notified all of the employees involved that there
would be a meeting on the early morning of Wednesday,
March 14. Before attending this meeting , Mr. Wright had
copied a number of wage scales and holidays from the
union contract that had been given him by James Beatty.
(This was a copy of the contract which the Union had
negotiated covering the period 1972 through 1975 and is
3 The eighth employee was Clella-Ann Goforth, a woman working as a
warehouseman-counterman who has since become an office clerical.
PENN PIPE & SUPPLY CO., INC. 11
titled "San Diego Plumbing & Hardware Dealers Inde-
pendents' Agreement." McDonald had given each of the
employees at the early morning meeting of March 12 a
copy of the contract and explained that this was what he
would seek to obtain for them. See G.C. Exh. 5.) At the
meeting of March 14 Mr. Wright solicited gripes or
grievances from the employees, circulated the paper which
contained the holidays and wages rates that he had copied
from the union contract, and indicated to the employees
that these increased holidays and hourly earnings, includ-
ing time-and-a-half for hours in excess of 40 per week,
would be granted all employees if they discontinued their
interest and support for the Union. Employee Louis Nagy
testified that his weekly pay was increased from $135 to
between $170 and $190 per week. Shortly after the meeting
with Mr. Wright, the employees met and decided to
abandon the Union.
The one point of factual difference between Respondent
and General Counsel is the time of the meeting between
Mr. Wright and the employees. Did this meeting occur at a
time after the receipt of the letter from the Union or before
the Union's letter was received? Employees Phillips, Nagy,
and Riggs could not be sure whether the meeting occurred
on Wednesday or Thursday. However, Phillips testified
that to his best recollection, Wright indicated to the
employees that he had received a letter from the Union
and thus knew of their interest in the Union. Mr. Wright
was very positive that the meeting had been held at 7 a.m.
on Wednesday, March 14, and that the letter had not been
received because the mail is normally delivered around I
o'clock and the letter dated March 13 could not possibly
have been received before 1 p.m. on March 14, which
would have been after his meeting with the employees.
Furthermore, he said that he contacted his attorney
immediately upon receipt of the letter from the Union and
was advised by his attorney not to have any further contact
with the employees, insofar as this matter was concerned,
until he received further advice from the attorney. He said
he followed his attorney's instructions. A resolution of this
factual difference is not, in my opinion, necessary for a
complete and total resolution of the current dispute.
C. Analysis
Curtis Wright, an acknowledged supervisor and agent of
the Respondent, testified to learning of the interest and
activity on the part of Respondent's employees on the
afternoon of March 12. Immediately thereafter, he inter-
viewed and solicited further information concerning the
employees' gripes and grievances from two of the employ-
ees directly involved. This conduct was, in turn, followed
by a meeting with the employees where a further
solicitation of grievances occurred and the employees were
promised wage increases and improved holiday benefits in
exchange for a discontinuation of their interest in the
Union. The promising and the granting of wage increases,
4 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO [Walls
Manufacturing Co.] v N L R.B, 321 F.2d 753 (C A.D C, 1963), cert denied
375 U.S. 923 (1963)
5 E.g., "It is the demand from the Union which creates the duty to
bargain . Mount Hope Finishing Company v N L.R B, 211 F.2d 365 (C A 4,
1954) The burden of proof is on the Union to show that the employer's
an increased number of holidays, and the soliciting of
grievances from the employees in exchange for the
employees' discontinuing their interest in the Union, I find
to have interfered with, restrained, and/or coerced employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights as guaranteed in Section 7
and thus violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I am of the
opinion that Mr. Wright was entirely innocent in his
conduct and had no idea that he was limited by the law in
what he could do and say to his employees. This personal
lack of knowledge of the law, however, does not detract
from the violation. There can be no doubt that his motive
for granting the improved benefits and soliciting the
grievances was to induce the employees to abandon their
interest and activities within the Union. The Board' s well-
settled test is whether the employer engaged in conduct
which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with
the free exercise of employee rights under the Act. In fact,
the protection afforded by Section 7 is not limited to the
right to join or assist labor organizations, or to refrain from
such activities but has been invoked to protected concerted
employee activity wholly unrelated to union organization. 4
In N. L R. B. v. Exchange Paris Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964), the
Supreme Court said: "The broad purpose of Section
8(a)(1) is to establish 'the right of employees to organize for
mutual aid without employer interference .' Republic
Aviation Corporation v. N.LR.B., 324 U.S. 793, 798. We
have no doubt that it prohibits not only intrusive threats
and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to
employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of
impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against
unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that
affect" The affect of Wright's course of conduct was
undoubtedly just as he had expected it to be; namely, it
caused the majority strength which the Union had clearly
established prior to the improper conduct by Respondent
to be completely dissipated.
Respondent's argument in its brief is directed entirely
toward the 8(a)(5) allegations contained in the complaint.
Respondent cites N.LR.B. v. J. H. Rutter Rex Manufactur-
ing Co., Inc., 415 F.2d 1133 (C.A. 6, 1969), wherein the
court said, "Whether Respondent's unilateral wage in-
crease violated Section 8(a)(5) depends on whether
Respondent was obligated to bargain with the Union at the
time it was granted." Respondent then argues that it is the
demand from the Union which creates the duty to bargain
and further asserts that there was no such demand
communicated to the Respondent until after its course of
conduct and thus there can be no refusal to bargain. While
this is an ingenious argument that can be given some
credence by circumscribed language taken from a number
of cases which Respondent's brief cited,5 nevertheless, it is
not the law. In the Rutter Rex case , supra, the court
remanded the case to the Board for further findings with
respect to the violations of Section 8(a)(5) only because the
Supreme Court had rendered its decision in N.LR.B. v.
Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), between the
failure to recognize it was not based on good faith doubt that the Union
represented a majority of its employees in the appropriate unit Montgomery
Ward & Co. Inc. v. N LR.B. 385 F 2d-760 (C A. 8, 1967 ) If bona fide proof
of representation is presented to the employer, the law obligates him to
bargain Oregon Teamsters Security Plan Office, 119 NLRB 207 "
12 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
time Rutter Rex was considered by the Board and the time
it was considered by the circuit court. The remand asked
the Board to make an express finding concerning the effect
of the unfair labor practices as the Supreme Court
indicated in Gissel, supra, is necessary.
The General Counsel has requested a Gissel-type remedy
in the instant case and it might be well to recite portions of
the Supreme Court's decision in Gissel in an effort to
ascertain its application to the facts herein.
The traditional approach utilized by the Board for
many years has been known as the Joy Silk doctrine.
Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263 (1949), enforced 87
U.S. App. D.C. 360, 185 F.2d 732 (1950). Under that
rule, an employer could lawfully refuse to bargain with
a union claiming representative status through posses-
sion of authorization cards if he had a "good faith
doubt" as to the union's majority status; instead of
bargaining, he could insist that the union seek an
election in order to test out his doubts. The Board,
then, could find a lack of good faith doubt and enter a
bargaining order in one of two ways. It could find (1)
that the employer's independent unfair labor practices
were evidence of bad faith, showing that the employer
was seeking time to dissipate the union's majority. Or
the Board could find (2) that the employer had come
forward with no reasons for entertaining any doubt and
therefore that he must have rejected the bargaining
demand in bad faith. An example of the second
category was Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB 709 (1961),
enforced 308 F.2d 687 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1962), where the
employer reneged on his agreement to bargain after a
third party checked the validity of the card signatures
and insisted on an election because he doubted that the
employees truly desired representation.
Continuing , the Court traced the Board's modifications to
the Joy Silk doctrine and then said:
Thus, an employer can insist that a union go to an
election, regardless of his subjective motivation , so long
as he is not guilty of misconduct; he need give no
affirmative reasons for rejecting a recognition request,
and he can demand an election with a simple "no
comment" to the union . [Underscoring added.]
After considering the cases and the legislative history and
concluding that Congress intended that there were accepta-
ble methods of ascertaining majority status other than by a
Board-conducted election, the Court said:
And we have held that the Board has the same
authority even where it is clear that the union, which
once had possession of cards from a majority of the
employees, represents only a minority when the
bargaining order is entered. Franks Bros. Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702 (1944). We see no reason now to
withdraw this authority from the Board. If the Board
could enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an
election or a rerun, it would in effect be rewarding the
employer and allowing him to "profit from [his] own
wrongful refusal to bargain," Franks Bros., supra, at
704, while at the same time severely curtailing the
employees' right freely to determine whether they
desire a representative. The employer could continue to
delay or disrupt the election processes and put off
indefinitely his obligation to bargain; and any election
held under these circumstances would not be likely to
demonstrate the employees' true, undistorted desires.
[Footnotes omitted.]
In giving approval to a bargaining order without an
election, the Court then concluded:
The only effect of our holding here is to approve the
Board's use of the bargaining order in less extraordi-
nary cases marked by less pervasive practices which
nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine
majority strength and impede the election processes.
The Board's authority to issue such an order on a lesser
showing of employer misconduct is appropriate, we
should emphasize, where there is also a showing that at
one point the union had a majority; in such a case, of
course, effectuating ascertainable employee free choice
becomes as important a goal as deterring employer
misbehavior. In fashioning a remedy in the exercise of
its discretion, then, the Board can properly take into
consideration the extensiveness of an employer's unfair
labor practices in terms of their past effect on election
conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the
future. If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing
the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair
election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional
remedies, though present, is slight and that employee
sentiment once expressed through cards would, on
balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then
such an order should issue . [Footnotes omitted.]
In the instant case, there can be no doubt but that the
Respondent's illegal course of conduct in soliciting
grievances and in granting wage and benefit improvements
to the employees caused the Union's majority strength to
be dissipated and I have so found. As a consequence, I
herewith find that the granting of the wage increase and
the other improvements in employee benefits without
consultation and negotiations with the Union was in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. To hold otherwise
would allow the Respondent to profit by its own illegal
conduct. While there may have been some "good faith
doubt" at the time Mr. Wright first met with the
employees, based on Wright's own testimony as well as the
acknowledged date on which the Union's demand was
received, the actual payment of the improved wages and
improved benefits occurred after Wright had received the
Union's letter. I find that the Respondent's course of
conduct was not only violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, but the installation of the wage increase and the other
improved employee benefits after having knowledge of the
Union's majority status was clearly a violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. Under the doctrine expressed by the
United States Supreme Court in Gissel, supra, a bargaining
order remedy is appropriate in situations where, in fact, a
union's majority can be clearly established by authoriza-
tion cards and the nature and extensiveness of the
PENN PIPE & SUPPLY CO., INC.
employer's unfair labor practices make a subsequent free
choice by the employees problematical. In the instant case,
the Union's majority was clearly established by the
authorization and membership cards, as well as the
Union's records. (See G.C. Exh. 3(a) through (g) and 4(a)
through (g).) The employees have been guilty of "using"
the Union to obtain desired results and having accom-
plished their purpose, they may not now desire the Union.
Their current attitude, however, was only achieved by the
unlawful conduct of Respondent and it is most unlikely
that a fair election could be held.
D. The Appropriate Bargaining Unit
The complaint alleged, and during the course of the
hearing the Respondent stipulated, the appropriate bar-
gaining unit to be: "All truck drivers, warehousemen,
helpers and countermen employed by Respondent at its
facility located at 2357 Vineyard, Escondido, California;
excluding all other employees, office clerical employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." On the basis
of the stipulation approved by the Respondent, I find the
description of the unit set forth immediately above to be an
appropriate bargaining unit.
III. THE EFFECT OF ' THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices of the Respondent, as set forth
in section II, above, occurring in connection with its
operations described in section 1, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent
be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully refused to
bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of
its employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, it will be
recommended that Respondent be ordered to bargain
collectively with the Union, upon request, and, in the event
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is, and at all times material herein was,
6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
13
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All truck drivers, warehousemen, helpers and count-
ermen employed by Respondent at 2357 Vineyard,
Escondido, California; excluding office clerical employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. The Union is, and at all times since March 12, 1973,
has been, the exclusive representative of the employees in
the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
5. By soliciting grievances and by granting wage
increases and other improved benefits with full knowledge
that the Union was active and interested in representing
the employees, Respondent has interfered with the employ-
ees' Section 7 rights as set forth in the Act and has thereby
violated Section 8(a)(1).
6. By refusing, upon request, to bargain in good faith
with the Union as the representative of its employees in the
above-described appropriate bargaining unit and by
dealing directly with the employees as set forth in the
paragraph immediately above, Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 6
ORDER
It is hereby ordered that Penn Pipe & Supply Co., Inc.,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Offering to bargain directly with employees in an
attempt to bypass the Union, or any other authorized
representative of its employees.
(b) Promising and granting employees wage increases
and other fringe benefits to induce them to forego
adherence to the Union, or any other labor organization.
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit described above.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with the
rights of employees guaranteed them in Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive representative of the employees in the above-
described appropriate unit and embody in a signed
agreement any understanding reached.
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
14 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Post at its Escondido, California, place of business
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies
of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 21 shall, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of Respondent be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for
a period of at least 60 consecutive days thereafter in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
7 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT promise or grant employees wage
increases or other improved fringe benefits to induce
them to forego their adherence to Building Material &
Dump Truck Drivers Local No. 36, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with said
Union as the exclusive representative of our employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit described as follows:
All truck drivers, warehousemen, helpers and
countermen employed at 2357 Vineyard, Escon-
dido, California; excluding all office clerical
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with the rights of our employees as guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with
said Union as the exclusive representative of our
employees in the above-described appropriate bargain-
ing unit, and embody in a signed agreement any
understanding reached.
Dated By
PENN PIPE & SUPPLY CO.,
INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Eastern Columbia Building,
849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014,
Telephone 213-688-5229.