New England Lathing, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 12, 1973

206 N.L.R.B. 411 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

NEW ENGLAND LATHING, INC. 411
New England Lathing, Inc. andAlfred A. Cavuoti. Case
1-CA-8976
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses I make the following:
October 12, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On July 17, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Thom-
as A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a brief
in support of the said Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thorixty in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the complaint in its entirety be, and it
hereby is, dismissed.
i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544,
enfd. 188 F .2d 362 (C A 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing his findings
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
was held in this proceeding at New Haven, Connecticut, on
June 12, 1973, on complaint of the General Counsel against
New England Lathing, Inc., herein called the Respondent
or the Company. The charge was -filed on March 29, 1973,
by Alfred Cavuoti, an individual herein called the Charging
Party, and the complaint issued on May 10, 1973. The sole
issue presented is whether the record evidence warrants an
affirmative finding that Cavuoti was discharged in violation
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. A brief was filed by the Gener-
al Counsel.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
New England Lathing, Inc., a Connecticut corporation,
has its principal office and place of business in Woodbridge,
Connecticut, and is engaged in the construction and instal-
lation of lathing and related products. In the course of its
business the Respondent causes large quantities of wood,
wire; and plaster lathing material to be purchased and
transported in interstate commerce from other states into
the State of Connecticut, and also causes substantial quanti-
ties of such materials to be sold and transported away from
its place of business to points outside the State. During the
past fiscal year it purchased materials originating outside
the State of Connecticut having a value in excess of $50,000.
I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers International
Union, Local No. 215, herein called the Union, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Alfred Cavuoti, a lather, worked 10 years for the Respon-
dent, and throughout that period was so well liked by
Charles Daniels, who owns the business and runs it from
day to day, that he was considered a "shop man." As such
the Respondent paid him $2 extra for every day he worked
and in full for holidays. These benefits had nothing to do
with the union contract always in effect; they were pure
gratuities of no concern to Local 215, of which Cavuoti was
a member as well as a member of the executive board.
Cavuoti also sometimes served as union steward on this job
or that and sometimes as the Respondent's foreman in
charge of the work on other construction projects. On
March 11, 1973, there occurred an incident which Respon-
dent said was the immediate and provocative cause for
Cavuoti's summary discharge, but which, according to the
General Counsel, was the straw that broke the camel's back,
the last of the series of events going back several years and
which cumulatively build up resentment in Daniels' breast
against the lather's prounion proclivities.
It is a question of motivation. Did Daniels release Cavuo-
ti for reasons prohibited by the statute, or did he fire the
man for speaking offensively and in a threatening manner
to him personally? The Respondent, a construction contrac-
tor, has always run a completely union shop; the record
shows clearly it has never had any serious run-in with the
Union, no strikes or even formal grievances ever marring
their relationship. The complaint is phrased in conventional
language. It says Cavuoti was discharged because "he
joined or assisted the Union or engaged in other concerted
activities for purposes of collective bargaining." These are
statutory words and were not intended to be taken literally,
206 NLRB No. 110
412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as indeed the record as a whole makes clear enough. At the
hearing the General Counsel stated his theory of complaint
more pointedly. He said the discharge came because Cavuo-
ti was "an adherent of the strict letter language of the con-
tract," and "engaged in colloquy from time to time with
Respondent 's representatives" in -this matter of "strict and
literal enforcement of the contract."
Apart from what happened on March 11, there is no
factual question as to what colloquy Cavuoti had-always
with Daniels himself-on any subject. A pure issue of credi-
bility arises from a telephone conversation between the two
on the evening of Sunday, March 11. Considering the total
testimony of both men, their respective attitudes reflected
as witnesses at the hearing, and a member of related factors
shown by the record as a whole, I resolve the credibility
question in favor of Daniels' version of the critical conversa-
tion. I also find, on the basis of the entire record, that the
General Counsel had not proved illegal motivation in the
discharge by the preponderance of the substantial evidence.
See, N.L.R.B. v. Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc., 235 F. 2d
413 (C.A. 4, 1956).
As in most of the construction industry, employment by
lathers with this Company is an on-and-off proposition.
Jobs start and jobs end, the need for men on a single project
fluctuates, depending upon the progress of other contrac-
tors, and the men go to other lathing contractors when they
are laid off by the Respondent. Cavuoti said he lost no more
than 3 months of work altogether during the 10 years he was
with the Respondent. The truth must be closer to Daniels'
impression, that the man worked perhaps 75 percent of the
time, for it was shown that during 1972 alone Cavuoti was
off completely from July 4 to August 8, between August 15
and September 5, and from December 12 through the end
of the year. His last assignment ended at the end of January
1973, at a job where he had worked for about 2 weeks.
During the week before Sunday, March 11, there arose
the need for adding a few men to a superior court construc-
tion job in New Haven, where there then worked only two
men. During the same week there also developed the need
to send two additional men to another job then in pro-
gress-what was called the Connecticut University job.
Daniels learned of these requirements about Thursday,
March 8. That same day he telephoned Charles Setaro,
business agent of Local 215, who was then working on the
Connecticut University job, and asked who did Setaro have
available ; Setaro answered he had Alfred Cavuoti, the jour-
neyman, and Sal Castagno, an apprentice. Daniels then
telephoned Joe Cavuoti, Alfred's uncle, who was working as
the foreman on the superior court project. Daniels told him
they must use local men before any out-of-towners, and that
the foreman should put his nephew, Alfred, and Castagno
to work. Daniels also told the uncle that he would call him
again on Sunday to give him precise instructions.
Daniels testified, and no one contradicted him although
all the actors were in the room throughout the hearing, that
direct calls to employees to report to work are normally
made late Sundays, when the men can surely be reached at
home. Consistent with this practice, he tried to reach both
Joe Cavuoti and Setaro at home Sunday afternoon but
found no one home. Cavuoti's son promised to have his
father call back but forgot to forward the message. Daniels
then called Michael Buonasora, the Local 215 president, to
ask for the home number of Castagno, the apprentice, and
himself then called the man and instructed him where to go
the next day. Daniels also personally called a journeyman
named Murname, another journeyman member of the
Union, and directed him also to work. Apparently Alfred
Cavuoti learned of all of these telephone and attempted
telephone calls, for the next thing that happened, still that
same Sunday evening, is that he called Daniels. It is what
was said to the boss at this point that becomes the turning
point of this case.
Cavuoti testified at the start of the hearing, the only wit-
ness called by the General Counsel in support of the com-
plaint. He started by saying he criticized Daniels for having
"called an apprentice boy when we had journeymen lathers
out of work," and that Daniels explained he had called the
local president, "for Sal Castagno," because he had been
unable to reach Setaro. Daniels, told him to call his uncle,
Joe, "and talk to him." At this point Cavuoti retorted "your
foremen have no right hiring or firing anyone, that ev-
erything has to come through the Union . . . and I .. .
stated to him that his is not running the Union and that it
should go through the business agent. And he hung up on
me and that was it."
It is thus also apparent that while Cavuoti had heard
Murname, a journeyman, and Castagno, the apprentice,
had been told to report for work, he had not yet learned that
Daniels had also given orders that he too was to be put to
work. Later, on cross-examination, Cavuoti changed his tes-
timony somewhat; now he explained that the fault he found
with Daniels on the telephone was not that he had hired an
apprentice while journeymen were idle, but only that Dan-
iels had communicated directly with the apprentice instead
of doing so through the business agent, as union rules re-
quired.
Daniels' version is otherwise. He testified Cavuoti was
upset when he called and started by saying Daniels "was
taking the food out of his family's mouth. . . . When you
hire apprentices before me." Daniels answered, still accord-
ing to him, "Look, you are going to go to work tomorrow
.... If you want to check that out, call your uncle," but
that Cavuoti's response then was: "I ain't going to check it
out with anybody.... I am going to come over there and
break your head and straighten you right out." At this point
Daniels told him to "come right ahead," and hung up. Ca-
vuoti called again in a few minutes, but Daniels refused to
talk to him upon recognizing his voice.
After this Daniels tried again to reach Setaro, whose
phone still did not answer; he called Buonasora, the presi-
dent, told him what had happened, and that he would not
"take that type of abuse," that he would never again hire
Cavuoti, and that Buonasora should relay that message to
the business agent Setaro. On March 15, Thursday, Daniels
wrote to both Setaro and Buonasora reaffirming his fixed
decision not to employ Cavuoti again.
During the following week there was a meeting of the
union officials. On March 19, the following Monday, Joe
Cavuoti, under the mistaken impression that the matter had
been somehow resolved favorably to his nephew, put him to
work on the superior court job. When Daniels came on the
scene and saw Cavuoti at work, he paid him off then and
NEW ENGLAND LATHING, INC. 413
there. The Respondent concedes its intent not to hire him
in the future.
In crediting Daniels' testimony, that Cavuoti threatened
him with physical violence on the telephone. I rely upon
more than the demeanor of the two men on the witness
stand. Cavuoti was an angry man, clearly still resentful of
the loss of his job. He also tried more than once, when
speaking of past events, obliquely to impute evil action to
Daniels although the facts do not warrant any such infer-
ence . Daniels, on the other hand, evinced a certain honesty
in not denying the lather's testimony, which preceded his,
that 3 months before the discharge, he, the owner, had said
the man was "too much union." There is also at least some
significance in the fact Cavuoti literally did not deny the
damaging words Daniels put in his mouth. In a sense it
could be said that by giving his version of the telephone
conversation, with no reference at all to any threat, Cavuoti
by implication intended to contradict in advance anything
a later witness might say to the contrary. It is still a fact,
however, that Daniels testified after him and in his testimo-
ny appeared for the first time the heart of the Respondent's
affirmative defense. The General Counsel called two wit-
nesses in rebuttal, but did not recall Cavuoti to give the lie
directly to Daniels on the critical point. More important is
the fact Cavuoti did not contradict Daniels' further testimo-
ny that Cavuotj attempted to talk to him on the telephone
again shortly after their now disputed conversation.
Cavuoti's story is simply that Daniels told him to call his
uncle. He did not, else he would have said so at the hearing.
One wonders: Why did he call Daniels again? The high
probability is that he realized that he had spoken disre-
spectfully for the least, and wanted to undo the bad impres-
sion he had left.
Daniels also testified that after Alfred Cavuoti's call that
evening, and after he had called his uncle to see that Alfred
was not put to work, he also spoke to Buonasora, the union
president, and expressly told him he "wasn't going to take
that type of abuse on the telephone," that he was going to
reduce to writing his intention to discharge the man, and
that Buonasora should pass the message to the business
agent. Both Setaro and Buonasora were present throughout
the hearing, both testified after Daniels-the first for the
Respondent and the second for the General Counsel, but
neither mentioned these conversations. These are the offi-
cers of the Union whose interest, according to the com-
plaint, Cavuoti,pressed so hard it cost him his job. The fact
the Union did not file any charge with the Board to protect
this member of its executive board, coupled with its officers'
silence about Daniels' Sunday night complaint to them,
only suggests they both knew of Cavuoti's misbehavior to-
wards the boss, that night.
Daniels may have overreacted to the way an old and
favored employee talked to him, but that is a matter of
personal opinion. In calm retrospect it may well be that even
the boss realized Cavuoti would never really have come to
"break" anybody's head. The question, however, is not
whether Daniels acted reasonable in the matter, whether he
was fair in so rejecting the man with finality because of a
single telephone conversation. If in fact he discharged the
man for that reason, the discrimination imposed had noth-
ing to do with the union activity, the sole concern of this
statute, regardless of how another mind might view his judg-
ment.
I find that Cavuoti spoke to Daniels on March 11 as
Daniels testified. But this fact alone is not sufficient to
dispose of the ultimate allegation of the complaint. The
General Counsel contends that even assuming Cavuoti did
threaten Daniels that evening, such behavior was not the
real reason for his discharge. He starts by stressing the fact
Cavuoti was talking of union rules, faulting Daniels for
ignoring them, charging him with bypassing contractual re-
straints upon management. Discharge for such demands
upon the Company would certainly violate Section 8(a)(3).
The suggested approach would separate the subject of
Cavuoti's talk from the manner in which he spoke. And to
strengthen the assertion that it was the fact of unionism that
motivated Daniels and not the offensive language, the Gen-
eral Counsel points to certain incidents of the past in sup-
port.
Before talking about his discharge, Cavuoti told of a
number of incidents selected from among the uncounted
things that must have happened in his long career with this
contractor.
(1) In January 1972 he was working and acting as union
steward on a job in Wallingford, where there were also two
permit men. Cavuoti told his Uncle Joe, foreman then on
the job, that the permit men were not putting the lathes up
properly. It seems the uncle told this to Mr. Daniels, for
Daniels then told Cavuoti that as he was a "shop man" he
"should overlook these things." The uncle, Joe, testifying
for the Respondent, said that when his nephew complained
of the permit men's work, he answered it was "all right"; he
added he had no recollection of mentioning the thing to
Daniels at all.
(2) In February, still 1972, it became necessary to reduce
the complement on that samejob; Daniels wanted to release
certain apprentices licensed in Connecticut, before permit
men from out-of-state. Cavuoti reported this to the Local
215 business agent, Setaro, who told Daniels the permit men
had to leave first. Daniels then agreed the permit men would
go first.'
(3) In March 1972 Cavuoti was working at Groton, Con-
necticut, as a permit man out of the Union's Hartford Lo-
cal; he was also foreman on that job. His first pay showed
$8 per day traveling expenses ; he learned an apprentice boy,
his cousin Fred, had received only $6.50 and he called what
appeared to be a discrepancy to Daniels' attention. To learn
exactly what the travel allowance should be, he also called
the business agent of the Hartford Local, and learned it
should be $10. At the business agent's suggestion , he asked
Daniels to speak to the business agent; with this, Daniels,
first thinking the apprentice deserved less because he did
half the work, agreeed $10 was right and paid that amount
i Cavuoti's running commentary on this series of incidents, about which
Daniels made no comment when he testified, is highly colored and sprinkled
with irrelevancies intended deliberately to mislead. The first such extraneous
addition was that when it was decided to retain the apprentices, they stayed,
and that later what was then expected to be only 2 or 3 days more of
sheetrock work for the permit men to do, turned out to be several weeks of
work, which the out-of-towners did do. How this gratuitous coloring helps
prove illegal intent in Daniels' dismissal of Cavuoti over a year later is
unexplained.
414 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to both Cavuoti and his cousin. Cavuoti added at the hear-
ing he did this to avoid being charged within the Hartford
Local for accepting less than its contract called for.
(4) In November 1972 Cavuoti found himself on another
job, at New London, Connecticut, again in the jurisdiction
of the Hartford Local and again with himself as foreman.
And again he was paid $8 per day for travel expense; the
distance from Hartford apparently was different this time.
On this job there was also a job steward, Hassett, from the
Hartford Local, and he told Cavuoti the $8 was not enough.
Cavuoti repeated to Daniels what Hassett had brought up,
Daniels advised him to check once more with the Hartford
business agent, the business agent said it was supposed to
be $10, and Daniels gave it to him.2
(5) The last "colloquy" said to prove the complaint arose
from the fact the Respondent paid Cavuoti the usual gratui-
ty holiday pay for Thanksgiving 1972. After the holiday,
Aurora, financial secretary of Local 215, asked Cavuoti had
he been paid for that holiday; when Cavuoti answered yes,
Aurora asked was it alright if he told Joe DiFillippo, anoth-
er shop man about it, and again Cavuoti said yes. With this,
DiFillippo complained to Daniels that Cavuoti had been
paid and not he. Daniels then spoke to Cavuoti, saying this
was "none of my business," and he "was not supposed to
answer these questions." When Cavuoti protested he could
not lie, and that all Daniels had to do was not pay the other
man because the money was a gift and had nothing to do
with the contract or Union anyway, Daniels said he "wasn't
loyal" and that "I was too much union, involved with the
union business."
Analysis and Conclusion
As already stated, I do not think the 8(a)(3) violation
alleged in the complaint has been proved. Whenever an
employee is discharged and there appear both an obstensi-
ble, just explanation-here the threat to the owner-and a
suggested improper object-even if indicated by no more
than the expression of a single antiunion sentiment-search
for the true motivation is always elusive. To rest a finding
of unlawful intent here solely on the fact Cavuoti spoke of
contract or union rules that night, in total disregard of his
simultaneous offensive language, would be pure speculation
and unrealistic. More so as the purpose of his quarrel with
Daniels, as he finally stated after equivocating, involved
something very picayune. First he said he was incensed over
a job discrimination against him, but then reduced it to
charge that Daniels, withal he had the right to hire the
apprentice Castagno, had called the wrong union officer-
he had called the president when he should have called the
business agent. There must be something more tangible and
probative than this to prove an unfair labor practice.
As to the incidents of the past, they serve very little to
2In telling about his conversation with the Hartford business agent con-
cerning this November incident, Cavuoti added that on the telephone that
day he also learned his correct travel allowance for going to Groton back in
March should have been $12 per day, and that Daniels never paid him the
additional $2. There is no indication anyone ever told Daniels tlus further
detail. The added fillip illustrates once again how Cavuoti went out of his way
to put his employer in a bad light without regard to whether what he was
talking about had anything to do with the issue of his discharge.
buttress a finding of later animus so strong as to induce
outright discharge of a 10-year employee. Two of them had
nothing to do with union's interests as such, or with enforce-
ment of the collective-bargaining agreement. There is no
evidence the quality of work performed by out-of-town per-
mit men in Wallingford related in any way to the Union or
union activity. In December 1972 Daniels told Cavuoti to
keep his mouth shut about being paid for Thanksgiving
Day. If an employer is free to give or withhold a gift-as
Cavuoti himself conceded at the hearing-how does it be-
come evidence of union animus for him to tell the employee
not to talk about it? I suppose one can speculate the Re-
spondent used the holiday pay as inducement to wean cer-
tain employees from the Union, but no such thing has been
hinted at in this case . It could as well be presumed the last
thing Local 215 desires is discontinuance of the added mon-
ey given "shopmen."
The other three incidents did involve contract matters. It
does seem that permit men must be ]laid off before local
apprentices are released from any project. Cavuoti did re-
mind Daniels of this once. And travel expenses are presum-
ably fixed by agreement between contractors and
construction unions. A close look at Cavuoti's testimony
about the first incident involving travel indicates "strict and
literal enforcement of the contract"-as the General Coun-
sel called Cavuoti's protected activity-really came from
the Hartford local business agent and not from Cavuoti at
all. Cavuoti noticed a difference in his and in the
apprentice's allowance, and mentioned it to Daniels; he
then telephoned Hartford. After learning that under the
rules of the Hartford Local it happened to be $10 instead
of $8, he did not demand $10 of Daniels but asked him to
telephone Hartford. In a substantial sense this was his way
of telling Daniels it was not he, the employee, who was
asking for "strict enforcement" but the business agent.
There is nothing to indicate that Daniels minded paying the
added $2 to anyone. If an inference is to be drawn that
Daniels resented anything, it could as well be that he held
the Hartford business agent responsible for having to pay
the extra money. And the second time this matter of travel
came up, it was the Hartford local steward on the job,
Hassett, who told Cavuoti his $8 was not enough. Cavuoti
told Daniels about it, and the boss suggested he check once
again with Hartford; it was only when Cavuoti reported
what Harford wanted that Daniels again paid $2 more.
Must it necessarily be said, absent any direct comment ex-
pressed by Daniels at the time, that he deemed Cavuoti
responsible for "literal contract enforcement"? May it not
as reasonably be inferred he thought Hartford the culprit?
As he related these colloquies Cavuoti virtually charged
Daniels with discrimination in employment immediately
following one of the conversations. After saying that Dan-
iels, in December 1972, told him he was "disloyal" and "too
much union," he added: "He [Daniels] stated that he
wouldn't send me out on the Court House and he carried
the decision out." By "court house" Cavuoti meant the su-
perior court project in New Haven, a job of the Respondent
which had begun in September 1972 and, with the number
of its employees rising and falling in the usual way, was still
in progress in March 1973. Cavuoti admitted he was laid off
in December "for lack of work." There is no evidence at all
NEW ENGLAND LATHING, INC.
indicating any need for transferring men to the superior
court job at that time. And when there was, in mid-January,
Daniels did assign Cavuoti there, where he stayed until the
end of the month when again he left because there was not
enough work.
Daniels' comment about Cavuoti's excessive union zeal
would appear in one light if he had then and there done
anything to the employees' disadvantage. He did not. By a
distortion of the record evidence, and by completely depart-
ing from both the theory and the language of the complaint,
the General Counsel's brief recasts the entire case into an
unrecognizable picture, and by that technique attaches a
totally different significance to Daniels' remarks to Cavuoti
early in December. Daniels did not call Cavuoti an "ene-
my;" the brief's assertion to the contrary does violence to
the record testimony. The complaint says that the discrimi-
nation in employment-said to have been a violation of
Section 8(a)(3)-occurred precisely on March 15, or maybe
on March 19. When the Respondent objected to evidence
of earlier events, the General Counsel unequivocally disa-
vowed any contention there might have been any discharge,
or other unfair labor practice committed with respect to
Cavuoti's employment, before March 15. With the com-
plaint reading as it does, the General Counsel could hardly
do otherwise. At one point he did say he was considering
changing the complaint, but he did not. With things so
clearly stated, the Respondent had no reason to produce
evidence of what workmen were needed, or were not need-
ed, at its various projects from time to time throughout the
events. In the face of all this the General Counsel, for the
first time, in his brief charges the Respondent with a 8(a)(3)
violation as far back as December 1972: " . . . it is submit-
ted that the decision not to employ Cavuoti again was made
back in December when he was laid off at the Coast Guard
Academy job...."
Inconsistency and confusion only beget more inconsis-
tency and more confusion. Cavuoti worked at the superior
415
court job for a few weeks in January. If the Respondent
voluntarily put him to work in January, it follows of necessi-
ty it did not "decide not to employ him again" the month
before. In order to avoid this awesome block to his end-run
around the complaint, the General Counsel then says the
Respondent only hired Cavuoti "for a brief period" in Janu-
ary "for Setaro's insistence." Now we have it not only that
the Company had not decided "not to employ Cavuoti
again," but also that in his mind Daniels felt neither antiun-
ion [Setaro is the Local 215 business agent], nor anti-Cavuo-
ti. And "that fateful Sunday night," as the General Counsel
calls it, was still 2 months away.
And finally, that Daniels held no resentment against this
man for anything that had happened before the Sunday
night telephone talk is shown without question by the fact,
also unquestioned on the record, that he had already that
very week informed his foreman that Cavuoti was,to start
work the following Monday.
In view of the prima facie persuasiveness of the affirma-
tive defense advanced, and considering, the evidence in its
totality, I find the proof insufficient to establish an illegal
motive in the Respondent's discharge of Cavuoti. I shall
therefore dismiss the 8(a)(3) allegation of the complaint.
Daniels' remarked to Cavuoti in December, that the man
was too much involved with the Union, borders closely
upon coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1). As
there is no other evidence of improper conduct by any of
the Respondent's management representatives, no other ex-
pressions of union animus, I deem this sole remark insuffi-
cient to warrant an unfair labor practice finding or any
cease-and-desist order. I shall therefore dismiss the com-
plaint in its entirety.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
I hereby recommend that the complaint against the Re-
spondent be, and hereby is, dismissed.