Musicians Local 148-462 (Atlanta Symphony Orchestra)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 24, 2001

333 N.L.R.B. 1108 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1108
American Federation of Musicians & Atlanta Federa-
tion of Musicians, Local Union 148-462 (Atlanta
Symphony Orchestra) and Daniel O. Laufer. Case
10–CB–7335
April 24, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND HURTGEN
On May 16, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Jane
Vandeventer issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
Charging Party filed cross-exceptions and a supporting
brief, the Respondent filed an answering brief, and the
General Counsel filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to af-
firm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and to
adopt the recommended Order.2
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted, and the complaint is dismissed.

Lauren Rich, for the General Counsel.
Lesley A. Troope and James D. Fagan Jr., Esqs. (Stanford, Fa-
gan & Giolito), for the Respondent.
Robert Thompson Jr. and Gordon J. Rose, Esqs. (Thompson &
Associates), for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JANE VANDEVENTER, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried on January 5, 6, 7, 24, 25, and 31, 2000, in At-
lanta, Georgia. The complaint alleges Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing and refusing fairly to repre-
sent Daniel O. Laufer (Laufer or the Charging Party) by refusing
to process his several grievances. The Respondent filed an an-
swer denying the essential allegations in the complaint. At trial,
I granted counsel for the General Counsel’s motion to amend the
complaint to plead a special remedy. After the trial, the parties
filed briefs which I have considered.1

1 We disavow the judge’s statement that the Board applies a different
standard for determining whether a union breaches its duty of fair repre-
sentation depending on what stage the grievance is in.
2 The Charging Party has requested oral argument. The request is
denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues
and the positions of the parties.
1 Counsel for the Charging Party, on April 12, 2000, filed a late mo-
tion to supplement the record with a corrected and modified brief. Rule
102.42 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations makes no provision for
additional briefs. I deny counsel for the Charging Party’s motion and
reject its late-filed brief.
Based on the testimony of the witnesses, including particu-
larly my observation of their demeanor while testifying, the
documentary evidence, and the entire record, I make the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, a division of the Robert W.
Woodruff Arts Center, Inc. (the ASO), is a Georgia corporation
with an office and place of business in Atlanta, Georgia, where it
operates as a professional symphony orchestra. During a repre-
sentative 1-year period, the ASO derived gross annual revenues
in excess of $1 million in operating revenues. During the same
period, the ASO sold and shipped from its Atlanta, Georgia fa-
cility goods valued in excess of $5000 directly to points outside
the State of Georgia. Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits,
the ASO is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Respondent (Respondent or the Union) is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1. Background
a. The orchestra and “seating” in the orchestra
The ASO is a major symphony orchestra which not only per-
forms a full season of concerts in its Atlanta venue, the Wood-
ruff Arts Center, but also performs concerts in other parts of
Georgia, the United States, and outside the country. In addition,
the ASO records music for sale and distribution by a large re-
cording company. At the present time, there are approximately
95 players in the orchestra.
The symphony players are seated in sections, according to
their instruments. The placement of the sections, as well as the
placement of individual players within the sections, is usually
decided upon in accordance with long tradition. Under the tradi-
tional pattern, the string instruments are seated nearest the audi-
ence, with the first violins to the conductor’s (and the audi-
ence’s) left, and the cello section to the conductor’s right.
The seating of players within each section is largely governed
by tradition as well. In most of the sections, there are leading
players called “principal” players. In the cello section of the
ASO during the entire period herein, the principal cello player
was Christopher Rex. The principal cellist, for example, sits at
the right hand of the conductor, and the principal first violin,
normally called the concertmaster, sits at the left hand of the
conductor. The cellists sit in ranks of two, each two cellists
sharing a music stand. If there are, for example, 10 cellists in an
orchestra, there will be five rows or “stands” of 2 cellists each,
sitting behind one another, all facing the conductor.
The duties of the principal player are to mark the bowings on
the music for the entire cello section, to play solos, and to lead
the section who, sitting behind him, can follow his movements
and playing. In some sections, there are additional “titled” play-
ers, namely “associate principal” and/or “assistant principal,”
ranked in that order. For many years, until 1991, the ASO had
an assistant principal cellist, but did not have an associate prin-
333 NLRB No. 139
MUSICIANS LOCAL 148-462 (ATLANTA SYMPHONY) 1109
cipal cellist. From 1982 to the present time, the assistant princi-
pal cellist of the ASO has been Dona Klein. The duties of an
associate principal (or if there is no associate principal, then of
the assistant principal) player in the cello section are to play any
secondary solos, to lead the cellists seated behind him or her,
and to substitute for the principal player during any absence.
The remaining players in the section, those without specific
titles, are referred to as “section players” or “tutti” players.
In addition to the duties outlined above, there is a certain
amount of prestige attached to being a principal or other titled
player. Continued advancement within the profession of sym-
phony musician could be enhanced for a musician who is a titled
player rather than simply a tutti player.

_________________________________________________
AUDIENCE

In the diagram above, the box represents the conductor’s po-
dium, and the shapes represent the cello section. The player on
the lower left of the group is the principal player, and his seat is
designated as the first chair. The seat beside him (upper left) is
designated as the second chair. Together, the first and second
chairs are called the first stand. The shape immediately to the
right of the first chair is designated as the third chair, also re-
ferred to as “second stand, outside.” The remaining seats are
numbered consecutively to the rear of the section.
Music Director Yoel Levi came to the ASO in 1988 and con-
tinued as music director throughout the events of this case. As
Music Director, he is also the principal conductor of the ASO.
Levi testified that while the seating arrangement described above
is the traditional and most common practice among orchestras
with which he is familiar, it is not an invariable practice, and
there are orchestras which change the traditional seating pattern
for their own reasons.
After a few years at the ASO, pursuant to his goal of improv-
ing the ASO, Levi decided to create the position of associate
principal cellist beginning in the 1991–1992 concert season.
The position was advertised in the fall of 1990, and auditions
were held in February 1991.
b. The collective-bargaining agreement and
individual contracts
Respondent has represented the musicians of the ASO for
many years, since at least 1962. The ASO negotiates not only a
collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent, but also indi-
vidual employment contracts with the musicians on an annual
basis. The collective-bargaining agreements for many years
have included a provision stating that all individual contracts are
incorporated into the collective-bargaining agreement. Despite
the fact they are “a part of” the collective-bargaining agreement,
the individual contracts are given only to the individual musi-
cians, and it is entirely up to the individual musician whether to
file a copy of his or her individual contract with Respondent. If
an individual contract is filed with Respondent, the collective-
bargaining agreement requires Respondent to hold its contents
“in the strictest confidence.”
Typically, an individual employment contract specifies a
player’s salary, a player’s title, if any, and the player’s seat
within his or her section. The contract may also specify addi-
tional vacation weeks or some other arrangement whereby a
player may be permitted time to perform with other orchestras or
ensembles.
While Respondent is the collective-bargaining representative
of the musicians in the ASO, a committee of musicians partici-
pates in the negotiations and administration of the contract. This
committee is called the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra Players
Association, or ASOPA Committee.
One other aspect of the collective-bargaining agreement de-
serves mention at this juncture. Through August 1996, the col-
lective-bargaining agreement contained a specific procedure for
reseating of principal players and the non-renewal of any
player’s contract. This procedure was to be invoked “for reasons
of insufficient musical competency,” and required notice, written
reasons, a discussion, a chance to demonstrate improvement, and
an appeal process, culminating in arbitration. Beginning with
the current collective-bargaining agreement, covering the period
December 1996 through August 2000, a less complex procedure
for the reseating of all other musicians (non-principal players)
was negotiated. That provision is germane to this case and is set
forth here:

Seating in the Orchestra will be at the discretion of the Music
Director. Each musician shall, however, be notified in his/her
individual contract as to which seat he/she will occupy for the
following contract year. Prior to recommending a reseating of
a Tenured non-Principal Musician, the Music Director will
consult with the Review Committee, consisting of the Principal
and two members of the section involved. The two members
of the section involved will be chosen by the ASOPA Commit-
tee. Following this consultation, the Music Director will meet
with the Musician involved. The said meeting will take place
on or before October 1st of the season preceding the season in
which the reseating would take effect. The Music Director will
explain the reasons for the proposed reseating. The Musician
will be given a period of approximately four months in which
to demonstrate corrective performance. A second meeting will
be held approximately four months following the first to com-
municate the final results of the Music Director’s decision.
The Music Director may make changes on an emergency basis
due to illness or absence.

There was a strike among the ASO players during the fall of
1996, which ended when the current collective-bargaining
agreement was agreed upon. During that period, in 1996–1997,
Laufer was secretary of the ASOPA Committee. Laufer has
been a member of Respondent for his entire tenure at the ASO.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1110
c. Laufer’s career
Laufer, the son of cellist Wolfgang Laufer, began the study of
the cello as a child, and at the age of 18, began his own profes-
sional career as a cellist with the Dallas Symphony Orchestra,
where he played for two seasons. At the time of his audition
with the ASO in February 1991, he was 21 years old. In the
highly competitive world of symphony musicians, auditions are
conducted anonymously; that is, the player is seated behind a
screen or curtain. According to principal cellist, Rex, the audi-
tion committee (which included Music Director Levi) was
unanimous in selecting Laufer as associate principal cellist in
February 1991.
Laufer and Levi were the only two witnesses who specifically
recalled being present when Laufer was offered the position.2
Levi offered him the position, but at the same time stated that he
would be seated at the second stand, outside chair. Levi re-
marked that he hoped Laufer didn’t mind, but that he couldn’t be
seated at the first stand because there was a “problem with the
Assistant Principal cellist,” but that it “will be resolved.” Laufer
recalls that Levi did not say when the seating situation would be
resolved. The written individual contract (for the 1991–1992
season) proffered to Laufer and ultimately signed by him pro-
vided that his “position and/or title” was “Associate Principal
(Outside 2nd Stand).” Laufer told the ASO’s personnel manager
that he was agreeing to the seating arrangement as proposed only
until the problem was resolved. His annual individual contracts
continued to include essentially the same language concerning
his position and seat through the 1998–1999 season. At the time
of this trial, during the 1999–2000 season, Laufer was playing
without a contract.
As time went by, Laufer began to regard Levi’s comments—
to the effect the seating issue would “be resolved”—in the nature
of a promise by Levi to reseat him in the second chair. He also
began to wonder just when this undertaking would be fulfilled.
It is undisputed in this record that Laufer was and is the better
cello player as between himself and Assistant Principal Klein.
Both Music Director Levi and Principal cellist Rex testified
without equivocation this is so, and described Laufer as “tal-
ented . . . the better player” and “the stronger player,” respec-
tively.
d. The ASO’s handling of the seating issue
Unbeknownst to Laufer, in the summer of 1990, the assistant
principal cellist, Dona Klein, had filed a grievance regarding the
announcement of the creation of the associate principal cellist
position. It is undisputed that the position of associate principal
outranks that of assistant principal. Klein was apparently un-
happy that her longtime status of being second only to the prin-
cipal cellist was about to change, and was apparently not satis-
fied with Levi’s suggestion that she audition for the associate

2 Laufer was a conscientious and careful witness who is credited
throughout. Where his testimony conflicts with that of other witnesses,
Laufer is credited. Levi, although an honest witness, and worthy of
credit on general factual matters and particularly the “industry practice”
of orchestra, did not possess a detailed recollection of many of the events
about which Laufer and he both testified. Again, Laufer is credited
based on his clearer recollection. While Laufer recalled that Rex was
also present, Rex had no recollection of the meeting at all.
position. It appears from the evidence available concerning this
1990 grievance that then-president of Respondent, Nick Pen-
nington, supported Klein in her grievance as well as in her right
to file a grievance as an individual under the collective-
bargaining agreement. This latter point may be unimportant as
to Klein’s grievance, since Pennington apparently authorized
Klein to state that Respondent joined in Klein’s grievance. Pen-
nington also wrote to the ASO in November 1990 stating Re-
spondent’s intention to pursue Klein’s grievance through arbitra-
tion, if necessary. Pennington apparently also essentially dele-
gated settlement of the grievance to Klein and her husband, Dan,
who is an attorney.
Nearly 6 months after Klein’s grievance was filed, and shortly
before Laufer’s audition in February 1991, the Kleins negotiated
a settlement of the grievance with the ASO. The settlement
provided that Klein would retain her second chair (“inside stand,
first row, next to principal cellist” in the settlement). Respon-
dent did not sign the settlement document, and there is no evi-
dence in this record as to whether Respondent concurred in the
settlement or even received a copy of it. Since the settlement
was conditional upon Respondent withdrawing the grievance,
however, it may be inferred that Respondent did indeed with-
draw the grievance. Klein did not audition for the associate
principal position when the audition was held some days later.
From time to time during the first few years of his career with
the ASO, Laufer had inquired of Music Director Levi and other
management officials as to the status of his accession to the sec-
ond chair. Laufer recalled that on one of these occasions, Levi
counseled him to “be patient.” During this period, assistant
principal cellist, Klein, often played divisi solos by virtue of her
seat next to the principal cellist, which Laufer regarded as one of
the perquisites of his position as associate principal. However,
on at least one occasion, Levi assigned Laufer to play one of the
solos despite the fact that he was not sharing a music stand with
the principal cellist.
In connection with the negotiation of his 1995–1996 individ-
ual contract, Laufer wrote to the ASO’s president raising the
issue of his seating. In his letter of March 20, 1995, Laufer ap-
pears to be offering to “settle” the issue of his sitting in the third
chair in exchange for consideration in the form of salary and
vacation time. While he did meet with President Allison Vul-
gamore about this offer, and did ultimately sign an individual
contract for the succeeding season, it is unclear whether this
agreement “settled” the issue of Laufer’s seating, and if so,
whether for that one season or for any longer period. The con-
tract contains no express language which applies to anything
other than the 1995–1996 season. Accordingly, I find any “set-
tlement” of the issue of Laufer’s sitting in the third chair was
limited to the 1995–1996 season, the duration of the contract in
question.
At about the same time, Music Director Levi met with Dona
Klein in an effort to move her seat to the third chair. Dan Klein
promptly wrote a letter protesting this effort, contending under
the collective-bargaining agreement and her individual contract,
Dona should retain her seat unless the ASO showed she lacked
“sufficient musical competency” to continue in her titled posi-
tion. Dan Klein also brought the matter to the attention of Re-
spondent, and on April 29, 1995, the ASOPA Committee issued
MUSICIANS LOCAL 148-462 (ATLANTA SYMPHONY) 1111
a memorandum to musicians who were “Non-principal Titled
Players” alerting them to the controversy. Before the matter
went any further, Dona Klein began a medical leave because of a
hand problem, and was out of the orchestra for the entire 1995–
1996 season and some months of the following season. During
the period of Klein’s absence, Laufer sat in the second chair.
Laufer received a copy of the April 29, 1995, memorandum,
and testified that, while he had previously heard rumors concern-
ing Dona Klein’s agreement about her seating, the April 29
memorandum was the first confirmation he had that such a deal
existed and was apparently in writing.
As stated earlier, at the beginning of the 1996–1997 season,
the musicians went on strike against the ASO. The strike was
finally resolved and the season was begun in December 1996.
Beginning in December 1996, the new reseating procedure
quoted above went into effect. Dona Klein returned to the or-
chestra in early 1997 and resumed her second chair in the cello
section. At some point following her return, Principal cellist
Rex was absent from the orchestra on medical leave for a num-
ber of months, and Laufer assumed his duties and his chair dur-
ing his absence. Except for this period, he continued to occupy
the third chair for the remainder of the 1996–1997 season, the
1997–1998 season, and the 1998–1999 season. Throughout
these seasons, as noted above, Laufer’s individual contract
specified his seating in this chair. On at least one occasion dur-
ing the 1997–1998 season, Laufer spoke to Music Director Levi
once again about his seating, but Levi told Laufer he could not
do anything about it because the ASO management was afraid of
a lawsuit on behalf of Dona Klein.
2. Facts concerning the instant charge
a. The January 1999 grievance
It was in this last season, in November 1998, during “Mahler
week,” that Laufer became impatient once again with the seating
arrangement. During both the concerts and the recording session
of Mahler week, he would not be playing two solos in Mahler’s
Seventh Symphony which he felt “belonged” to the associate
principal player. He approached the general manager, George
Alexsovich, as well as Music Director Levi, about the matter,
but was not assigned to play the solos.
During that week, Laufer for the first time contacted Respon-
dent in order to seek help with his problem. He called John
Head, Respondent’s president, and explained his dilemma. Head
had previously played in the ASO, and was aware of the normal
duties of an associate principal. According to Laufer’s testi-
mony, Head was sympathetic with Laufer’s plight, and said he
blamed Levi for it. Laufer asked Head if he could protest by
refusing to go to work. Head told him the ASO could fire him if
he stayed out of work for 3 days. Head advised him to call Re-
spondent’s attorney, Robert Giolito, for his opinion. During one
of their two telephone conversations in November, Laufer testi-
fied, Head told Laufer he believed Laufer could file a grievance
as an individual under the collective-bargaining agreement.
Laufer also asked Head if he could secure independent counsel
and if Respondent would pay the cost. Head told Laufer he
could contact Giolito and Respondent would pay Giolito for time
he spent talking with Laufer or researching the issue. Head testi-
fied his initial reaction was that Laufer’s problem was a “musi-
cal matter,” not a contractual one, since seating in the orchestra
is “at the discretion of the Music Director” according to the col-
lective-bargaining agreement.
When Laufer spoke to Giolito during the same week, he ex-
plained the usual duties of an associate principal to the lawyer,
described what was stated in his individual contract, and men-
tioned the fact other players titled associate sat next to the prin-
cipal players and played divisi solos, but he did not. According
to Laufer,3 Giolito told him that unless his responsibilities were
spelled out in his contract, he had “no hope” of showing he
should be performing these duties, despite what other titled
players and other orchestras might do.
Not content with the opinions he got from Respondent, Laufer
secured attorneys, Robert Thompson and Gordon Rose, to assist
him with his problem. Together they drafted a letter setting
forth Laufer’s grievance, and forwarded it to Respondent’s Head
on about January 13, 1997. Head, in turn, forwarded the draft
grievance to Giolito and asked him for his opinion.
The draft grievance (later submitted to the ASO by Laufer)
has two main “theories,” one that “industry practice” requires
the Associate to be seated second chair, and the second essen-
tially requiring the music director to exercise his discretion de-
scribed in the collective-bargaining agreement to reseat Laufer
in the second chair regardless of what Laufer’s and/or Klein’s
individual contracts might say.
A meeting took place in Giolito’s office on January 14, 1999.4
According to Head, his purpose in meeting with Laufer was to
find out the basis for the grievance and to see if Respondent
could concur in it. Present were Laufer, his attorney Gordon
Rose, Head and Giolito.5 The draft grievance was discussed,
and Laufer related his history with the ASO. Laufer also pro-
vided copies of his individual contracts. Laufer related what had
happened when he was offered the job, that he had been told
there was a problem with the second chair, and asked if he
would sit in the third chair “until it was resolved.” Giolito in-
quired who had told him that, but Laufer did not name Levi.
Either Giolito or Head asked Laufer if he had this statement in
writing, preferably a writing from 1991. Laufer said he did not.
Giolito said without a writing as evidence of management’s
intention, Laufer’s claim was not compelling.
During the course of the meeting, Giolito asked Laufer why
he had originally signed his individual contracts with the third
chair specified. Laufer answered he had had no choice. At

3 Where Laufer’s testimony differs from that of Giolito, Laufer is
credited for the reasons stated above. In addition, Giolito was not an
impressive witness. He often answered in a hasty manner, and did not
appear to be careful or to be trying to recall events with accuracy. His
memory of some of the events was negligible, and he appeared overall to
be more interested in expressing legal opinions and theories than in an
unvarnished recital of the facts.
4 All dates hereafter are in 1999, unless otherwise specified.
5 Laufer and Head are credited with respect to what took place at this
meeting. Giolito is not credited for the reasons stated above. Rose is
likewise not credited. In addition to displaying a poor memory, he, like
Giolito, was eager to offer legal opinions and theories in lieu of facts.
His advocacy and strong belief in his client’s interests appear to have
colored his recollection of the facts. While Rose is not credited as to
Giolito’s manner at the meeting being “hostile,” it was conceded by all
parties that Giolito is talkative and has a quick and eager demeanor.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1112
some point in the discussion, Giolito asked Laufer if he would
settle his claim against the ASO for money, and Laufer declined,
saying it was not about money. At another point, Laufer men-
tioned that Dona Klein appears to have some kind of agreement
entitling her to the second chair. Giolito responded Respondent
could not discuss individual contracts, since they are confiden-
tial. There was also some discussion of the fact that Laufer’s
potential grievance would “pit one member against another.”
The two lawyers discussed whether Laufer could file an indi-
vidual grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement,
regardless of whether Respondent joined in the grievance. Dur-
ing this meeting, Giolito was equivocal in his opinion on the
question. According to Head, he and Giolito asked several times
what precise provision of the collective-bargaining agreement
was violated, especially since the duties of the associate princi-
pal are not set forth there. Giolito also stated the music director
should initiate the reseating process, as he is the one with the
power to do so. After about an hour of questions and discussion,
Giolito gave his opinion to the effect that he did not think Laufer
could make out a violation of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, or could prove he should be seated in the second chair
when his contract specified the third chair.
Head sent Laufer a letter dated January 15 stating he would
recommend to Respondent’s executive board (which has the
power to approve the pursuit of grievances) that it not file or
pursue Laufer’s grievance. Head gave as reasons, “Based on the
information you supplied, I do not see that a violation of the
Agreement has taken place,” and “I do not feel that it is in the
best interest of the union to enter into a process that would ulti-
mately be unsuccessful.”
Laufer and his attorneys submitted the grievance to the ASO
on January 15, and by letter of January 30, General Manager
Alexsovich denied the grievance on the grounds: (1) Laufer
could not file an individual grievance and (2) he had not “set
forth a matter that is grievable under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.”
Following the meeting on January 14, Laufer sought to obtain
evidence of Levi’s previously expressed sentiments in favor of
seating him in the second chair. He had been impressed by the
importance attached to documentary evidence by Giolito.
Laufer apparently reasoned that if he did not have any contem-
poraneous (i.e., 1991) expression of the music director’s desire
that he should be seated second chair, evidence of the music
director’s desire at the present time would be the next best thing.
On January 16, he met with General Manager Alexsovich, Music
Director Levi, and Personnel Manager Russell Williamson, in
which meeting Levi stated it was his desire, and always had been
his desire, to have Laufer sit in the second chair. Levi gave
artistic and musical reasons for this desire. Alexsovich stated he
felt the same, but was bound by the agreement the ASO had
made with Klein in 1991.
Laufer took notes of what was said at this meeting, as did Per-
sonnel Manager Williamson, and copies of these notes were sent
to Respondent’s Head on February 9. After consulting with
Giolito, Head responded by letter on February 17 to the effect
that he had reviewed the notes submitted by Laufer, but they did
not change his viewpoint on the grievance. Head also talked
with Laufer on the telephone on February 22 and told him,
among other things, that in his opinion, Laufer’s situation was
the result of errors and weakness on the part of management. He
said Levi should have exercised his responsibility long ago and
taken care of the matter. Head was sympathetic to Laufer’s
dilemma, but again stated Respondent was in a difficult position
when the controversy would pit two members against one an-
other. According to Laufer, Head suggested it would be benefi-
cial to have a letter from Music Director Levi to the effect that
he desired Laufer to be seated second chair, but his hands were
tied by other components of management. Further, according to
Laufer, Head said Laufer had a good case and “management will
have to deal with it.”
The following month, Laufer obtained a letter from Music Di-
rector Levi. The text of the March 26 letter is as follows:

In response to your letter of March 21, 1999, I would
like once again, as the Music Director of the Atlanta Sym-
phony Orchestra, to express my desire regarding the title
Associate Principal Cello: as I stated very clearly in our
meeting of January 16, 1999, with you, George Alexsovich,
and Russell Williamson, my wishes are that this position
should occupy the inside chair, first stand. It was my intent
when I hired you, as Associate Principal Cello, for you to
have the same chair, as it is in the case of Associate Con-
certmaster position.
The record shows that, a few years ago, I started a proc-
ess of implementing my above wish, and unfortunatelly
[sic], the process was put on hold. I hope that we are able
to restart the process, and bring it to a successful conclu-
sion.
Laufer wrote to Respondent’s Head on April 5, enclosing a copy
of Levi’s letter quoted above, and again stating that in view of
Levi’s wishes, he believed management was violating the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. By letter dated April 7, Giolito reit-
erated Respondent’s position it would not proceed with Laufer’s
grievance, stating, “[A]fter a full investigation of the matter,
which included a meeting with Mr. Laufer and his counsel, a
thorough review of all of the correspondence and documents
which Mr. Laufer submitted to the Union, and consultation with
its counsel, the Union determined that Mr. Laufer’s grievance is
without merit.” Giolito went on to deny Head had promised to
proceed with the grievance should Levi memorialize his desire
to reseat Laufer in the second chair.
b. Conduct of the ASO
At the same time as he was attempting to enlist Respondent to
aid him, Laufer was also negotiating his individual contract for
the 1999–2000 season with the ASO. In the course of these
negotiations, he presented Levi’s March 26 letter, to the conster-
nation of President Vulgamore and other members of the ASO
management team. After several meetings and exchanges of
letters, it was agreed Laufer would perform during the 1999–
2000 season, but no individual contract was signed by him, as
Laufer would not sign a contract which did not specify he would
occupy the second chair. In June, General Manager Alexsovich
informed him the second chair was “not available.”
Laufer continued to have conversations with Levi during the
summer about the reseating procedure, and Levi continued to
assure Laufer he intended to give notice to Klein by October 1,
MUSICIANS LOCAL 148-462 (ATLANTA SYMPHONY) 1113
as required by the contract, of his intention to reseat her in the
third chair. According to Rex, General Manager Alexsovich had
informed him in August of Levi’s desire to change Klein’s seat.
Alexsovich told Rex that since the master collective-bargaining
agreement had changed, Klein’s “rider” concerning her seat was
no longer in force. Rex told Alexsovich that Klein is playing no
differently, and is “adequate.” Rex said he saw the reseating of
Klein as a demotion. He stated Levi would be gone by the time
the reseating took effect in the fall of 2000, and since it is an
artistic decision, the new music director who would replace Levi
in the 2000–2001 season should make the decision. He pointed
out if Levi made this decision so late in his tenure, it would be
perceived as favoritism, or “pay-back,” and not as an artistic
decision. During September, Levi consulted with Principal cel-
list Rex about the matter, in conformance to the collective-
bargaining agreement. Rex made the same points to Levi as he
had to Alexsovich, and added the likelihood of a lawsuit by the
Kleins might necessitate Levi’s return to Atlanta to testify after
he had left the city.
Apparently Rex was persuasive, and after 6 months of fully
intending to do so, Levi decided not to initiate the reseating
process with respect to Klein. In testimony, Levi described it as
a painful, unhappy decision. He testified his reasons for making
this decision were:

1. it was his last year, and he felt that drastic changes
should not be made so late, that it might seem vindictive or
personal on his part;
2. the Principal cellist advised against reseating Klein in
Levi’s last year as Music Director;
3. the orchestra members would not support the deci-
sion to reseat Klein;
4. he knew it would be challenged, would be a big
mess, a public relations nightmare, and a no-win situation;
and
5. he didn’t want to have to return to Atlanta to testify
in any litigation concerning it.

Levi informed Laufer of his change of heart about a week before
the October 1 deadline for initiating the reseating procedure.
c. Laufer’s October 1 grievance
Laufer filed a second grievance protesting the October 1 fail-
ure of the ASO to initiate the reseating process, seeking to be
seated in the second chair, and reiterating the theories contained
in his first grievance, but adding an additional theory, that of
“fraudulent inducement,” based on the theory the purported
promise to him in 1991 to move his seat to the second chair at
some point in time was the inducement to enter into a contract
with the ASO in the first place.
On September 27, the complaint and notice of hearing in the
instant case issued.
Sometime in August, Respondent secured from Dan Klein a
copy of the 1991 settlement agreement regarding Dona Klein’s
grievance. Respondent’s Head testified that when he took over
as President in 1993, succeeding Nick Pennington, Respondent’s
files were in an embarrassing state of chaos. Head did not know
whether Respondent had possessed a copy of the settlement in
1991 or at any time prior to August. In September, Laufer and
his attorneys were provided with a copy of the Klein settlement
agreement by the regional office investigating Laufer’s charge.
Giolito testified Respondent determined to investigate
Laufer’s October 1 grievance anew, since it concerned a new
incident, and contained a new claim, that of fraudulent induce-
ment to enter into a contract. Giolito met with Laufer and his
attorneys during October, and exchanged documents and letters
for about 2 months. Respondent also interviewed Principal cel-
list Rex about the history of the seating issue as well as his Sep-
tember discussions with various members of management about
it. Respondent requested of the ASO to examine the personnel
files of Laufer and Klein. Finally, on December 29, Respondent
decided not to pursue Laufer’s October 1 grievance, and in-
formed him of its decision by letter of that date. Respondent
informed Laufer that it considered his grievance to be time
barred, but did address the merits, stating:

The Union does not interpret Klein’s settlement agree-
ment as usurping the discretion afforded the Music Director
under Art. X.1.e of the master agreement to make seating
assignments as provided therein. Moreover, ASO man-
agement recently informed the Union that the Music Direc-
tor had decided not to make any change in the seating at is-
sue. Accordingly, we do not believe there exists any con-
tractual basis on which to challenge management’s deci-
sion.
We understand that you feel deeply wronged. Regret-
fully, the Union simply cannot seek to arbitrate what we
sincerely believe to be a non-meritorious grievance.
C. Positions of the Parties
1. The General Counsel
The General Counsel relies upon the “pattern of conduct”
cases, which hold that a union may violate its duty of fair repre-
sentation by conduct which is so unreasonable, perfunctory,
and/or irrational, as to amount to arbitrary conduct. In support
of this theory, the General Counsel argues Respondent violated
the duty of fair representation because it intentionally misled the
Charging Party about its intentions with respect to handling his
grievance, it intentionally withheld information from the Charg-
ing Party, its investigation was inadequate and perfunctory, it
decided too hastily that his grievance lacked merit, and thereaf-
ter refused to evaluate additional evidence with an open mind.6
2. The Charging Party
The Charging Party’s argument tracks that of the General
Counsel, but adds a contention that Respondent did in fact dis-
criminate for invidious reasons by essentially deciding to sup-
port one member’s right to the second chair (Klein’s) over an-
other member’s right to the same chair (Laufer’s). The Charging
Party also differs from the General Counsel with respect to the
remedy sought. In addition to the remedy sought by the General
Counsel, that of ordering Respondent to process Laufer’s griev-

6 The General Counsel’s theory of the case does not allege that Re-
spondent violated its duty of fair representation by refusing to process
and arbitrate Laufer’s grievance because of discriminatory reasons, such
as nonmembership in Respondent, internal political opposition, race or
sex discrimination, or other such invidious forms of discrimination.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1114
ance through arbitration, the Charging Party seeks reimburse-
ment of legal fees incurred in retaining his own counsel for the
purpose of pursuing his grievance.
3. Respondent
Respondent argues it has not violated the duty of fair repre-
sentation implied in Section 8(b)(1)(A), because it made a good
faith decision, based on reasons grounded in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, not to arbitrate Laufer’s grievance, and while
its actions and investigation may not have been perfect, they
were well within the “wide range of reasonableness” granted to
unions in the discharge of their representative duties. Respon-
dent contends a union is not required to arbitrate every griev-
ance, even if meritorious. Respondent further contends the ac-
tions pointed to by the General Counsel to show arbitrary con-
duct are susceptible of rational explanation. Respondent asserts
there was no showing of bad faith or discrimination on its part,
and further argues Laufer’s grievance was clearly non-
meritorious, based on various claims that it was time barred.
B. Discussion and Analysis
1. The duty of fair representation
The duty of fair representation is a judicially created doctrine
which assumes that a union which has the status of exclusive
representative of a group of employees owes those employees a
duty to represent them fairly.7 While this sounds a simple and
an eminently reasonable proposition, it has been the subject of
countless refinements in cases decided by the Board and the
Federal courts.
The duty applies to a union’s conduct in the area of collective
bargaining negotiations, grievance handling, including settle-
ment and arbitration, and fiscal management, among others.
See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Assn. v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67
(1991); Teamsters Local 814 (Beth Israel Medical), 281 NLRB
1130, 1146–1147 (1986); Teamsters Local 101 (Allied Signal),
308 NLRB 140, 143 (1992); Furniture Workers Local 76B (Of-
fice Furniture), 290 NLRB 51, 62–63 (1988); Communications
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
The degree of rigor assigned to the duty must take into ac-
count the union’s duty to represent the entire bargaining unit, as
well as individuals. It has been recognized that in order to per-
form its representative functions effectively, a union must be
allowed a “wide range of reasonableness” in its conduct and
decision-making. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330,
338 (1953).
With specific reference to grievance handling, in cases where
a union has never undertaken to arbitrate a grievance because of
its determination that the grievance lacks merit, the standard of
conduct is that of a good-faith evaluation of the grievance and a
rational reason for the decision. Pacific Maritime Assn., 321
NLRB 822, 823 (1996); Teamsters Local 337 (Swift-Eckrich),
307 NLRB 437, 438, 440 (1992).
The cases cited by the General Counsel in which a union first
undertook to process a grievance, and later dropped it or decided
not to arbitrate involve a somewhat different standard. In those

7 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB
181 (1962).
cases, the merits of the grievance are not the issue, assuming the
grievance is more than “frivolous;” instead “the finding of a
violation turns . . . on whether the union’s disposition of the
grievance was perfunctory or motivated by ill will or other in-
vidious considerations.” Bottle Blowers Local 106 (Owens-
Illinois), 240 NLRB 324 (1979).
2. Respondent’s “pattern of conduct”
The General Counsel has alleged that Respondent engaged in
a “pattern of conduct” which was dishonest, arbitrary, and un-
fair, and, taken together, amounted to a breach of the duty of fair
representation. The General Counsel points to instances of al-
leged intentional misleading of Laufer, willful misinformation,
purposeful withholding of information, favoritism, dishonesty,
and cursory investigation. While the General Counsel asserts it
is unnecessary under this theory to show that Laufer’s grievance
had merit, nevertheless, the General Counsel contends that it is
meritorious. The General Counsel relies upon Teamsters Local
814 (Beth Israel Medical), supra.
a. Intentional misleading
The allegation Respondent intentionally misled Laufer is
based on the contention that Head’s and Giolito’s comments
concerning the importance of a writing as evidence was correctly
construed as a “promise” to take Laufer’s grievance to arbitra-
tion should such a writing be found.
At the January 14 meeting, while there was certainly mis-
communication, I do not find there was any intention by Re-
spondent to mislead Laufer. After studying Laufer’s individual
contracts, his draft grievance, and the other documents he
brought to Respondent on January 13, Head and Giolito met
with Laufer and his attorney to discuss the evidence, to find out
if there was any other evidence, and to ask questions relative to
the issues raised in the grievance. In such a clearly investigatory
meeting, it would be entirely logical for Head and Giolito to
express regret that a contemporaneous writing promising to re-
seat Laufer at some time in the future did not exist, and even to
express the opinion the grievance would be a stronger one if
there were such evidence. That Laufer construed these com-
ments to indicate he should secure such a writing, and if he did
so, Respondent would then take his grievance to arbitration was
not the result of any intentional misleading by Head and Giolito,
but was, I am persuaded, the result of Laufer’s intense desire to
have Respondent’s support.
Head expressed sympathy with Laufer’s predicament both in
November 1998 during telephone calls and during February in
telephone calls. Head’s comment to Laufer in February that
“management would have to deal with” his grievance does not,
in my opinion, constitute a clear promise to support Laufer’s
grievance. Consistent with Head’s repeatedly placing the blame
for Laufer’s situation on management, I find this remark in-
tended to place the responsibility for solving Laufer’s dilemma
exclusively on management’s shoulders, and did not constitute a
“promise” Respondent would proceed with Laufer’s grievance.
In sum, I find Respondent did not, as contended by the Gen-
eral Counsel, act dishonestly or intentionally mislead Laufer by
promising it would proceed with his grievance if he were to
obtain a writing from Music Director Levi. Likewise, I find
Respondent did not intentionally mislead Laufer with respect to
MUSICIANS LOCAL 148-462 (ATLANTA SYMPHONY) 1115
its position on filing an individual grievance. Respondent did
not take a definite position concerning this issue at the January
14 meeting or in its January 15 letter to Laufer. This was not
particularly relevant, since Laufer filed his grievance with the
ASO in any case, and subsequently, the ASO took the position
an individual grievance was not cognizable.
b. Willful misinformation and withholding of information
The General Counsel argues that at the January 14 meeting,
the discussion of Dona Klein’s contract constituted willful mis-
information and/or withholding of information by Respondent.
In this regard, when an assumed Klein agreement was men-
tioned, Giolito said he could not discuss other musicians’ indi-
vidual contracts, because they were confidential. Contrary to the
suspicious characterization assigned to this remark by the Gen-
eral Counsel, I find it is entirely consistent with the collective-
bargaining agreement, which states in article X, section 1,g, that
Respondent is obligated to keep each individual contract confi-
dential, if a musician opts to supply Respondent with a copy.
With respect to Klein’s 1991 grievance settlement agreement,
Head testified without contradiction he was unaware on January
14 whether Respondent had a copy at all, because Respondent’s
files had been left in such a chaotic state by the former President.
Giolito credibly testified the first time he saw the 1991 Klein
settlement was in August, when Dan Klein provided him with a
copy. Any implication Respondent “willfully” withheld a
document which it did not possess is rejected.
c. Favoritism
The Charging Party argues Respondent’s choice not to pursue
Laufer’s grievance amounted to an arbitrary favoring of Klein
over Laufer. It appears Respondent had to choose one course or
the other, and if it had chosen to pursue Laufer’s grievance,
Klein would have an equally valid argument Respondent had
arbitrarily favored Laufer. As counsel for the General Counsel
cogently stated in her brief, “Two musicians in an orchestra
cannot possibly sit in the same seat at the same time.” Unions
are frequently presented with situations, either in negotiations or
in grievance handling, in which the interests of two unit mem-
bers or two groups of unit members are opposed. It would beg-
gar logic to hold that whenever a union was forced to such a
choice between two competing interests, it “discriminated”
against one employee or group of employees in violation of the
duty of fair representation.
The Charging Party has also argued Respondent showed hos-
tility towards Laufer. I find no basis in the record for such an
assertion. Head was, by Laufer’s admission, sympathetic in
manner towards him and his problem. I have not credited
Rose’s testimony with respect to Giolito’s “loud” or “hostile”
manner towards Laufer and Rose during the January 14 meeting.
In any case, speaking to a grievant in a loud tone and even using
rude language is not in and of itself a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A). Teamsters Local 997 (Keebler Co.), 298 NLRB 604,
606 (1990).
d. Cursory investigation and hasty decision
The reading of Laufer’s January 13 submission, the investiga-
tory meeting of January 14 and subsequent perusal by Head and
Giolito of documents supplied to them by Laufer is admittedly
the extent of the investigation of the grievance undertaken by
Respondent. In view of the collective-bargaining agreement
provision concerning reseating, and the written contract provid-
ing for Laufer’s seating for the current season, I find it was not a
cursory or perfunctory investigation. While Respondent cer-
tainly could have attempted to track down a copy of Klein’s
1991 settlement in January, and did not do so, it is clear from
Giolito’s remarks at the January 14 meeting that he assumed
Klein’s individual contract for the current season included her
second chair seating, just as Laufer’s contract included his third
chair seating. Both Head and Giolito were well aware musi-
cians’ individual contracts customarily included their seating. I
find neither Respondent’s failure to seek the 1991 agreement in
January nor any other omission renders its investigation “cur-
sory.” I find the investigation Respondent did pursue enabled it
to form a nondiscriminatory opinion concerning the grievance
issues and potential for success. Slevira v. Western Sugar Co.,
200 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2000).
e. Postcomplaint investigation of October 1 grievance
Respondent’s investigation of Laufer’s October 1 grievance
was admittedly more thorough than its investigation of his Janu-
ary 15 grievance. The second investigation included interviews
with Chris Rex, with Laufer and his attorney, as well as a review
of his ASO personnel file and a search for other relevant docu-
ments.
The General Counsel contends this later, more thorough, in-
vestigation demonstrates the inadequacy of Respondent’s inves-
tigation of the earlier grievance, and at the same time argues that
it does not show any good faith on the part of Respondent be-
cause it was undertaken after the complaint had issued concern-
ing the January 15 grievance. Respondent’s conduct with re-
spect to the October 1 grievance is not alleged in the complaint
as an independent violation of the duty of fair representation.
Respondent contends a more thorough investigation was un-
dertaken because the grievance was clearly timely, being based
on the October 1 failure of the ASO to initiate the reseating
process and the events leading up to that decision, as well as not
being affected by Laufer’s contradictory individual contract,8
and raising the “fraudulent inducement” claim, couched for the
first time in that particular language.
I find the more thorough investigation of the October 1 griev-
ance is not probative of the “perfunctory” nature of the earlier
investigation, because the action grieved—the October 1 failure
to begin the reseating process—was different. Likewise, various
other aspects of the factual situation were different, including the
fact Laufer had signed no individual contract agreeing to sit third
chair. However, on the other side of the coin, the more thor-
ough investigation of the October 1 grievance is likewise not
probative of Respondent’s good faith in the earlier investigation,
since it was undertaken after complaint had issued.
f. Merit of grievance
The General Counsel contends that the potential merit of
Laufer’s grievance is not relevant to the analysis, but neverthe-
less contends that the grievance is meritorious. One of the rea-

8 Laufer had signed no individual contract for the 1999–2000 season.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1116
sons cited by the General Counsel for the claim that the griev-
ance had merit is another “promise” by Music Director Levi in
1999 to Laufer that if Respondent would pursue the grievance
that he would start the reseating process. In fact, if the mere
pressure from Respondent on the ASO would be enough to mo-
tivate the ASO to “settle” the grievance, this time in Laufer’s
favor, then the merits of the grievance at arbitration would be
unimportant. In any case, reliance upon any assurances by Levi
is unconvincing, especially in the face of the ASO’s denial of the
January 15 grievance, and in the face of Levi’s repeated unful-
filled assurances over the previous 8 years. Why this particular
assurance is to be given any more credence than the assurances
of Levi in 1991 that he would reseat Laufer in the second chair
or the repeated assurances throughout 1999 that he would start
the reseating process in September, is a question not answered
by the argument of the General Counsel. In each instance, Levi
was persuaded, either by other members of management or by
the Principal cellist, to exercise his discretion NOT to reseat
Klein.
Contrary to the General Counsel, and assuming arguendo the
issue of merit has importance to the analysis of Respondent’s
conduct, I find Laufer’s grievance was of doubtful merit. It
relied upon two pieces of evidence—industry practice, which I
have found supportive of Laufer’s position, and Levi’s oral as-
surance of 1991 and later written expression of his desire that
Laufer sit in the second chair—to persuade an arbitrator to find
contrary to two written individual contracts, and to the total dis-
cretion in reseating of the music director. It is unlikely in the
extreme that an arbitrator would rely upon such evidence, even
assuming Respondent could surmount the hurdle of the parol
evidence rule, to force management to exercise its discretion to
contravene the specific terms of two written contracts.9
3. Respondent’s “rational basis”
Respondent’s decision not to proceed with Laufer’s January
15 grievance was based on its inability to find that the ASO’s
conduct violated the collective-bargaining agreement, and there-
fore believing the grievance lacked merit, according to its letters
to Laufer of January 15, February 17, and April 7. Both Head
and Giolito testified Laufer’s written submissions, the discus-
sions at the January 14 meeting, the collective-bargaining
agreement, and Laufer’s individual contracts were carefully
considered in reaching this decision. I find this evaluation was

9 In addition, this evidence would be viewed by an arbitrator against
the background of management’s repeated determinations, for at least
seven seasons, not to exercise the discretion to reseat Laufer and conse-
quently, Klein. It must be remembered that Music Director Levi had
chosen, for 8 years—whether from timidity, persuasion, or other rea-
sons—NOT to exercise his power to reseat Klein, or to stop the process
on the few occasions when he took any initial steps. Management was
vested by the collective-bargaining agreement with the power to reseat
musicians, and prior to December 1996, this power was absolute, lacking
even a procedural rein. That management did not do so for this entire
period, even while certain members of management were assuring
Laufer that it would be done, shows a pathetic failure of will, as well as
exceedingly shabby treatment of Laufer. The fact that Laufer was
treated shabbily, however, does not in and of itself establish that said
shabby treatment would give rise to a meritorious grievance under the
collective-bargaining agreement.
conducted in good faith and Respondent’s interpretation of the
collective-bargaining agreement was not unreasonable.10 I find,
as discussed in more detail above, there is no convincing evi-
dence which would convert this facially neutral conduct into
irrational, dishonest, arbitrary, or invidious conduct by Respon-
dent.
In the January 14 meeting, Respondent’s Giolito could cer-
tainly have conducted himself in a more sensitive manner, could
probably have demonstrated better listening skills, could have
explained his reasoning and opinions more clearly, and could
have been more forthcoming generally. However, such impoli-
tic behaviors are not in themselves a violation of the duty of fair
representation. “Lack of sensitivity,” inept manner, poor judg-
ment, or negligence do not demonstrate unlawful hostility, nor
do they supply the “something more” than mere negligence
which is necessary to prove a violation of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. Furniture Workers Local 76B (Office Furniture),
supra. In addition, because I have found Respondent did not
undertake to process the grievance, nor willfully mislead Laufer
to the effect it would do so, I find the cases cited by the General
Counsel are inapposite. The correct standard is that of good
faith evaluation of the merits of the grievance based on a reason-
able interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. The
fact Respondent’s interpretation of the reseating provision of the
contract was similar to that of the ASO does not render its inter-
pretation “arbitrary or invidious.” Teamsters Local 337 (Swift-
Eckrich), supra, 307 NLRB at 440; Carpenters Local 415 (Cin-
cinnati Fixtures), 226 NLRB 1032, 1033 (1976).
While it may be argued Respondent could have done a better
job of investigating the grievance and communicating with the
grievant, I find that Respondent did not venture beyond the
“wide range of reasonableness” accorded to labor organizations
in exercising discretion with respect to grievance processing.
Teamsters Local 337 (Swift-Eckrich), supra.
Based on all the foregoing, I recommend the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, American Federation of Musicians & Atlanta
Federation of Musicians, Local Union 148-462, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Atlanta Symphony Orchestra is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
3. Respondent has not violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
as alleged.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended11
10 I reject Respondent’s argument that one of the reasons it rejected
Laufer’s grievance was untimeliness. First, I find insufficient evidence
this asserted reason was raised during the discussions and letters involv-
ing the January 15 grievance, and second, since the seating issue was
automatically reopened each season, the time bar would last no longer
than until the next annual contract renewal or reseating date.
11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
MUSICIANS LOCAL 148-462 (ATLANTA SYMPHONY) 1117
ORDER

Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.