Morgan Precision Parts

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 25, 1970

183 N.L.R.B. 1141 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

MORGAN PRECISION PARTS
Morgan Precision Parts and Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union, Local 506, AFL-CIO.
Cases 10-CA-7994 and 10-CA-8071
June 25, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MCCULLOCH, BROWN , AND JENKINS
On April 15, 1970, Trial Examiner George Turitz
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed-
ing, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
also found that the Respondent had not engaged in
other unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaint and recommended that those allegations be
dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with these cases to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief,
and the entire record in these cases, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby
orders that Respondent, Morgan Precision Parts,
Gadsden, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE TURITZ , Trial Examiner : Upon a charge
and amended charge filed by Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union , Local 506 , AFL-CIO
(the Union ) in Case 10-CA-7994 on October 15
and November 28, 1969, respectively , and served
183 NLRB No. 119
1141
upon Billy Morgan, an individual doing business as
Morgan Precision Parts (Respondent and, at times,
Morgan), on October 16 and December 1, 1969,
respectively, and upon a charge in Case
10-CA-8071 filed by the Union and served upon
the Respondent on December 4, 1969, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
(the Board), through the Regional Director for Re-
gion 10, on January 14, 1970, issued an order con-
solidating cases, complaint, and notice of hearing
against Respondent. Respondent filed an answer in
which he denied all allegations of unfair labor prac-
tices. A hearing was held at Gadsden, Alabama, on
March 3 and 4, 1970, before me. The General
Counsel and Respondent were represented by their
respective counsel at the hearing, and the Union
was represented by its International representative.
The General Counsel and Respondent have sub-
mitted briefs.
Upon the entire record and from his observation
of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, Billy Morgan, is an individual doing
business under the name Morgan Precision Parts
and having his principal office and place of business
in the city of Gadsden, State of Alabama, where he
is engaged in the assembly and sale of weaponery
fuse mechanisms. In the course of his operations at
the Gadsden plant, Respondent annually sells
finished products valued at in excess of $50,000 to
customers located within the State of Alabama,
each of whom in turn ships goods valued at in ex-
cess of $50,000 directly to its customers located
outside the State of Alabama. It is found that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the
Act).
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Retail , Wholesale and Department Store Union,
Local 506, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The principal issue litigated at the hearing was
the allegedly discriminatory discharge of Betty
Mansfield. Most of the facts that the complaint al-
leges constituted violations of Section 8(a)( I) were
stipulated for purposes of this case.
A. Sequence of Events; Interference, Restraint, and
Coercion
In October 1969, Respondent had approximately
30 employees. On October 10 and 11, a number of
1142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the employees signed authorization cards for the
Union. At the plant during their free time the em-
ployees freely discussed unionization, including the
question of who, specifically, had signed cards, with
no attempt at concealment or secrecy.
On October 14 about 11 o'clock in the morning,
Morgan's secretary handed him a letter received
from the Union an hour before demanding recogni-
tion. Morgan immediately called a meeting of the
employees. He had his secretary read the Union's
letter to the employees and then, his face flushed
and his voice trembling with anger,' he threatened
the employees that if the Union was successful in its
organizational campaign, he would take away the
employees' incentive pay, holiday pay, and other
benefits, and would close the plant, and he also
threatened that because of the Union's organiza-
tional campaign he would withhold new insurance
or hospitalization benefits. It is found that by each
of said threats Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. At the end of his speech Respondent in-
structed one group of employees, the stakers, to
punch out and go home.2 The laid-off employees
went to the union hall.
On October 14 and prior thereto Respondent had
kept a supply of candy and gum on a shelf in the
break room which employees could purchase, leav-
ing the money in a cup. Respondent had also main-
tained a coin-operated sanitary napkin dispenser in
the women's restroom, and he made a supply of
Bufferin and facial tissue available in the break area
to which the employees could help themselves. Im-
mediately after October 14, Respondent cut off the
supplying of facial tissue, and sanitary napkins and
Bufferin were no longer available where the em-
ployees could help themselves; they were required
to request them at the front office. The candy and
gum were not removed, but after the supplies on
the shelf on October 14 were exhausted, they were
not replaced by Respondent. Employees could
purchase candy and gum outside the plant but
would have had to spend their entire break periods
making such purchases. As these changes followed
so soon after Morgan's speech in which he
threatened to visit retaliation upon the employees,
and as Respondent has offered no explanation, it is
found that Respondent made the described changes
because employees had displayed interest in
unionization. While the deprivations thus imposed
by Respondent may have been relatively mild, the
notice they served was by no means mild. Even
standing alone they pointedly told the employees
that before they took the step of organizing, they
should bear in mind that "the employer gives and
the employer takes away." Following as they did so
' One witness ' description was "Well, you could tell he was real mad, his
face was kind of red and he dust couldn't hardly speak what he was trying to
say " Another 's was "Well, his face was real red and you could tell he
was kind of aggravated He was sort of trembling all over And it was sort of
like he was trying to get through with what he had to say right quick, you
know , before something developed, like maybe he'd get real upset and do
quickly upon Morgan's speech of October 14, how-
ever, they served as earnest of the threats made in
that speech. It is found that by making the above
changes Respondent restrained and coerced his em-
ployees in their exercise of rights guaranteed in the
Act, and that he thereby violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
On October 20 Morgan made another speech to
the employees. This time he threatened that if the
Union was successful in its organizational cam-
paign, he would move the plant. It is found that
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
On October 28 Morgan told Julua Hargrove, a
high producer, that she was earning more than
union wages . Morgan's statement to Hargrove
referred to wages in accordance with the Union's
alleged scale ; it did not imply any retaliatory action
on his part. It is found that the statement was not
violative of the Act.
On October 29 a Board agent was at the union
hall in Gadsden gathering evidence from employees
in the course of the investigation of the charge in
Case 10-CA-7994. Morgan kept under surveillance
the employees giving evidence to the Board agent.
Included in employees' Section 7 rights are the
right of free and unimpeded access to the Board's
processes and the right to secure the cooperation of
witnesses in a properly conducted and protected
proceeding. Cf. Grand-Central Chrysler, Inc., 155
NLRB 185, 188. It is well established that an em-
ployer's surveillance of employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 is coercive and viola-
tive of the Act, It is not material that there is no
evidence that Respondent's employees were aware
at the time that surveillance was taking place. See
N.L.R.B. v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transport,
177 F.2d 119 (C.A. 3), enfg. 77 NLRB 153,
vacated for other reasons 177 F.2d 124; compare
N.L.R.B. v. Collins and Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454
(C.A. 4), enfg. 55 NLRB 735, where the court said
at page 455, "Any real surveillance by the em-
ployer over the Union activities of employees,
whether frankly open or carefully concealed, falls
under the prohibitions of the Act." It is found that
by his surveillance, Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced his employees in the exer-
cise of their rights under the Act and thereby vio-
lated Section 8( a)(1).
B. The Discharge of Betty Mansfield
Mansfield was first employed by Respondent in
December 1968. In March 1969, Respondent laid
her off along with four other employees, telling
them that it was because work had slackened and
something "
' The General Counsel has made no allegation or contention that this
layoff or the manner of its announcement constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice As these matters were not litigated, they are not passed upon in this
decision
MORGAN PRECISION PARTS
that they had been selected because they were the
last ones hired . Mansfield , who was not a fast
worker , approached Morgan alone and specifically
asked him if she was being laid off because of her
work , saying that if that was the case , she wanted to
know . Morgan replied , "No, ma'am it wasn 't, I told
you what ." Thereafter Mansfield spoke to Morgan
and his wife from time to time to ask if work was
available . Eventually she was recalled and she again
started to work for Respondent on July 18, 1969.
At that time Morgan told her that she was coming
in as a new employee , subject to the usual 90-day
probationary period.
During her second employment with Respondent,
Mansfield worked as a staker, an incentive job on
which she occasionally attained the daily produc-
tion standard .3 From time to time Morgan criticized
Mansfield 's method of work and made suggestions
for improving her production , but she never at-
tained her production standard on a weekly basis.
About October 10, 1969 , Respondent put Man-
sfield and several other employees on rotary-drill
work , a nonincentive job. This was a temporary as-
signment made necessary because Respondent had
to fill an important rush order for a customer.
On October 14 the stakers whom Morgan had
laid off during his speech told Mansfield and other
employees that they were going to the union hall.
The employees who remained at work discussed
among themselves whether it was necessary for
them to go also. During the 2 o 'clock break that
day, Mansfield called Linda Hopper , one of the
laid-off stakers , using the telephone in the em-
ployees ' break area, and asked her what Taylor, the
union organizer , had said . Present at the time, ap-
proximately 8 feet from the telephone, were
Charles Morgan , Respondent 's son , and James
Mackey, the head setup man. After completing the
telephone call, Mansfield proceeded to a table in
the break area at which several of her friends, with
whom she had discussed the matter, were sitting.
As she approached the table, one of them asked,
"Betty , did you find out anything?" Mansfield,
standing at the far end of the table from where the
others were sitting, reported that the stakers had
gone to the union hall , that the union representative
had said that the employees should stick together,
and that those left at the plant were to continue
working and proceed to the union hall at the end of
the workday. While she was thus relaying Taylor's
instructions to the employees , Charles Morgan
walked over to the slot machine to purchase a
drink , passing immediately behind Mansfield while
she was in the midst of her report . Standing in front
of the slot machine, Charles Morgan was at approx-
imately the same distance from Mansfield as the
' Respondent 's production records were not produced This finding is
based on Mansfield 's testimony , which has been credited over that of Mor-
gan and Moon , his secretary
' The findings as to the exit interview are based on Mansfield's
testimony , which has been credited over that of Morgan and Moon, his
1143
employees to whom she was reporting. Charles
Morgan testified that he did not recall whether he
was in the plant on that occasion, but categorically
denied having overheard any conversation among
employees at that time concerning the Union. The
Trial Examiner has carefully considered the
testimony of Hargrove, Alexander, and Mansfield
herself about the incident, as well as Charles Mor-
gan's denials. The Trial Examiner is convinced that
the three employees did not contrive or imagine the
incident and credits their testimony and does not
credit Charles Morgan's denials. It is found that
Charles Morgan heard enough of what Mansfield
said after the telephone conversation to make him
aware that she was relaying to the other employees
matters concerning the employees' efforts at
unionization.
At the close of the workday, Mansfield was sum-
moned to the office. Morgan told her that she had
not done her job and had not "made production,"
and that pursuant to a company rule he had to let
her go. He said that he could show her records
which would bear out that she had not attained her
production standard. Mansfield protested that she
had, and that other employees would confirm this;
and she protested that Morgan had discontinued his
prior practice of showing the employees their
production records each day. She was handed a
form termination notice which contained the fol-
lowing explanation: "Lay-Off. Unsatisfactory work.
Never made production, in allotted time given."4
Respondent's payroll week was Monday to Satur=
day, and payday was Friday. Mansfield's discharge
took place on a Tuesday.
Concluding Findings as to Mansfield's Discharge
Mansfield's termination notice stated as the
reason for her discharge: "Lay-Off. Unsatisfactory
work. Never made production, in allotted time
given"; and Morgan informed her that a company
rule required him to discharge her since she had
not done her job, having failed to "make produc-
tion." The Trial Examiner has credited Morgan's
testimony that he found it necessary to criticize
Mansfield's work methods and habits; and the
General Counsel has conceded that she was a poor
producer. The record shows also that Morgan told
at least some employees that they would be
discharged if they did not "make production"
within 90 days. However, to the extent that there
was such a policy, it referred to 90 days on a par-
ticular machine or job. Mattox so testified and
Morgan, himself, testified, "Well, it's required that
they make production in 90 days ... on whatever
job they are assigned to and to prove themselves to
the company." At the time of her discharge Man-
secretary, who was also a friend of Morgan's wife According to them Man-
sfield was told that her work and attitude were unsatisfactory and that she
did not make sufficient effort, and Moon included a statement about exces-
sive absenteeism The form included a termination category, "Excessive
Absence," but it was not checked
1144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sfield had been on her assigned incentive job only
75 to 80 days, having spent a week and a half of her
89 days of employment at the screening table, and
about half a week on a rotary drill. More important,
Morgan also testified that in speeches to the em-
ployees he sought to relieve the anxiety of those
nearing the end of their probation and therefore as-
sured them that ". . . we like to give everybody the
benefit of a doubt"; and Moon testified that the 90-
day policy was applied, "With exceptions, which is
in almost every case." Morgan admitted that he had
never before discharged any employee for poor
production, claiming that he always managed "to
work around" until they quit. At least one em-
ployee, Jan Geyton, was retained beyond her
probationary period, even as extended because of
absence, without ever having attained her produc-
tion standard. Plainly, Respondent's policy as car-
ried out was that the 90-day period was a guide as
to what could be achieved, and no more. Signifi-
cantly, Mansfield was never warned that her job
was in jeopardy. At the hearing, Respondent con-
tended that poor production was not the sole
reason for Mansfield's discharge, and that it was
based on her attitude, lack of effort, and absentee-
ism. In support of this contention Morgan's and
Moon's discredited testimony as to the exit inter-
view, already described, omitted specific reference
to Mansfield's having failed to meet production
standards and sought to give the interview a dif-
ferent character from that indicated by the termina-
tion notice and by what was actually stated on that
significant occasion. It is found that Respondent did
not have a policy or rule allotting a specific time
within which employees were required to attain
their production standards. It is further found that
Mansfield's alleged attitude, lack of effort, and ab-
senteeism were not factors considered by Respon-
dent at the time of her discharge but were raised by
Respondent as an afterthought. Their mere ex-
istence would not preclude a finding that the
discharge was discriminatory. See Topeka Discount,
Inc., 181 NLRB 17.
A telling aspect of this case is the evidence ad-
duced by Respondent to explain the suspicious tim-
ing of Mansfield's discharge as mere coincidence.
According to Morgan and Moon, Morgan ordered
the termination papers prepared on October 14
between 8:15 and 9 o'clock, which was approxi-
mately 1 to 2 hours before the Union's letter ar-
rived. They also testified that on the prior
Thursday, they had met together and had gone over
Mansfield's employment record in order to ascer-
tain when her probation would expire. However,
Moon testified that on that occasion she made a
complete count and ascertained that October 14
would be Mansfield's 89th working day, whereas
Morgan testified that on that prior Thursday he
' It is noted that Morgan was limited at the hearing as to when he could
arguably claim he had made the decision to discharge Mansfield In her af-
fidavit given to a Board agent on December 30, 1969, Moon stated, " 1
counted only enough to know that Mansfield had
already been employed more than 80 calendar days
so that her probation would expire shortly. The
Trial Examiner was unfavorably impressed by
Moon and Morgan with respect to credibility and
does not credit their testimony that Mansfield's em-
ployment record was checked, or that her possible
discharge was under consideration, prior to Oc-
tober 14. The Trial Examiner also does not credit
their testimony as to when Morgan ordered the ter-
mination papers prepared.
It has been found that Respondent based Man-
sfield's discharge on a nonexistent rule as to achiev-
ing a production standard within an "allotted
time," that the allegedly allotted time had not, in
any event, expired, that in order to overcome the
effect of this inaccuracy Respondent and his secre-
tary misrepresented materially the character of
Mansfield's exit interview, and that she was never
warned that her job was in jeopardy. It has also
been found that Respondent and his secretary
testified to prior preparations for Mansfield's possi-
ble discharge which in fact never took place.
Moreover, Respondent offered no credible explana-
tion for its selection of the 89th day of a 90-day
probationary period and the middle of a payroll
week as the time to discharge Mansfield.5 Plainly
Respondent's explanation of the circumstances and
reasons for the discharge cannot be accepted.
There remains for consideration the General Coun-
sel's contention that Respondent's actual motiva-
tion was to discourage membership in the Union.
The record establishes that Respondent was
strongly opposed to having the Union and that the
receipt of the Union's demand for recognition an-
gered him and led him immediately to make a
speech in which he threatened to take drastic ac-
tions flagrantly discriminatory in character against
his employees. There is no evidence that in the 4
hours between his threats and his discharge of Man-
sfield, Morgan's ire had subsided or that his dis-
criminatory inclination had abated. On the contra-
ry, his further threat to the employees the following
week and his surveillance of their contacts with the
Board agent on October 29 are persuasive that his
mood and discriminatory purpose remained fixed
and determined. In the absence of any reasonable
explanation of why it was appropriate suddenly to
discharge Mansfield at that especially inappropriate
time, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
fact that the discharge followed so directly upon
Morgan's angry threats of discrimination was no
mere coincidence but rather was evidence that
Morgan's purpose was to discourage union mem-
bership. See N.L.R.B. v. Jamestown Sterling Corp.,
211 F.2d 725 (C.A. 2), enfg. 106 NLRB 466. This
would be true even in the absence of proof that
Mansfield was known to him as a union adherent.
do not remember when exactly I prepared the papers except that it was in
the morning of the day she was fired I did it as soon as I was given the in-
struction by Mr Morgan 11
MORGAN PRECISION PARTS 1145
The sudden stiffening of his policy as to poor
producers at that particular time would serve to
discourage union membership irrespective of the
identity of the victim. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Piezo Manu-
facturing Corporation, 290 F.2d 455 (C.A. 2), enfg.
125 NLRB 686; see also A-Z Manufacturing &
Sales Co., Inc., 177 NLRB 254. Morgan was in no
mood to pause to make distinctions, and the plant
closing and other retaliatory actions which he had
threatened in his speech would have affected all
employees, including even those who might have
been opposed to the Union. However, there is
ample evidence from which it can be inferred that
Morgan did know that Mansfield was a union ad-
herent. Certainly the atmosphere in the plant on
October 14 after Morgan's angry speech was tense,
and all were aware that the tenseness revolved
about the question of unionization. Morgan's son
plainly was especially interested, and he could not
have failed to notice the scene where Mansfield,
after her telephone call, walked over to her friends
and, from the far end of their table, relayed the in-
structions of their union organizer. In that situation
he did not have to hear much of what she said, as
he passed immediately behind her and then stood at
the drink machine nearby, in order for him to real-
ize that she was the conveyor of a message about
the employees' union activities, and that his father
would be most interested. It is found that, when
Respondent discharged Mansfield, he knew that she
was an adherent of the Union. It is further found
that Respondent discharged Mansfield because of
that fact and because she engaged in activities on
its behalf, and that by such discharge Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act 6
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
It is recommended that Respondent reinstate
Mansfield to her former or substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority and
other rights and privileges, and that she be made
whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of
the discrimination against her. The amount of
backpay shall be a sum of money equal to what
Mansfield would have earned from the date of her
discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of rein-
statement, less her net earnings during said period,
computed in accordance with the formula stated in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with in-
terest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum to
be computed in the manner described in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. It is
recommended also that Respondent preserve and,
upon request, make available to the Board and its
agents all payroll and other records to facilitate the
computation of backpay.
Morgan responded to the news that some of his
employees desired collective bargaining by a dis-
play of anger and by threats to use his economic
power to visit retaliation upon his employees in
various ways. He followed his threats by discrimina-
torily discharging Mansfield and by pointedly mak-
ing the employees' access to candy, Bufferin, and
other articles less convenient. Plainly Respondent
has manifested a disposition not to permit his em-
ployees to exercise their right to bargain collective-
ly and to engage in concerted activities. It is there-
fore recommended that Respondent be required to
cease and desist from infringing in any manner on
the rights of employees guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and of the entire record in this case the Trial Ex-
aminer makes the following:
The activities of Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with the opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, in-
timate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
As it has been found that Respondent has en-
gaged in certain unfair labor practices, it is recom-
mended that the Board issue the Recommended
Order set forth below requiring Respondent to
cease and desist from his unfair labor practices and
to take certain affirmative action which will effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Mansfield was normally a staker and Morgan had laid off the entire
staker line during his speech that morning The record contains no explana-
tion of that layoff, which was temporary Respondent has made no claim
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent , Billy Morgan , doing business as
Morgan Precision Parts , is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2( 6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. Respondent is, and at all times material has
been , an employer within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act.
3. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Local 506, AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
4. By discriminatorily discharging and refusing
to reinstate Betty Mansfield, Respondent has en-
gaged in , and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
that Mansfield's layoff was caused in any part by a lack of need for her ser-
vices
1146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. The unfair labor practices described above
are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the
Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and the entire record in the case,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, Respondent,
Billy Morgan, doing business as Morgan Precision
Parts, and his agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating
against employees in regard to their hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment because of their membership in, or activities
on behalf of, Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, Local 506, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization.
(b) Depriving employees of benefits or privileges
because they seek to bargain collectively or
because they engage in union or other concerted
activities.
(c) Keeping under surveillance employees giving
information or testimony to a Board agent in the in-
vestigation of charges or in other Board business.
(d) In any other manner interfering with the
processes of the Board.
(e) Threatening to withhold insurance or
hospitalization or other benefits, or to take away in-
centive pay, holiday pay, or other benefits or to
close or move Respondent's plant because the em-
ployees seek to bargain collectively or because they
engage in union or other concerted activities.
(f) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which, it
is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Betty Mansfield immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to her seniority and other rights
and privileges.
(b) Make Betty Mansfield whole for any loss of
earnings she may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against her in the manner described
above in section V of this Decision, entitled "The
Remedy."
(c) Notify Betty Mansfield, if presently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States of her
right to full reinstatement upon application in ac-
cordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents , for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Post at Respondent's office and place of
business in Gadsden, Alabama, copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."7 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respon-
dent or his representative, shall be posted by him
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by him for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by him to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of this
Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to
comply herewith."
IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices
not specifically found in this decision.
' In the event no exceptions are riled as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read " Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
s In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which both sides had the opportuni-
ty to present their evidence, a decision has been is-
sued finding that we violated the law and ordering
us to post this notice and actually do what we say in
this notice.
WE WILL reinstate Betty Mansfield to her
former position, without loss of seniority or
other rights and privileges, and will pay her for
any loss of wages she suffered as a result of the
discrimination which it has been found that we
MORGAN PRECISION PARTS 1147
practiced against her . If Betty Mansfield is now
in the Armed Services , we will notify her of her
right to her former job after discharge from the
Armed Services.
WE WILL NOT keep watch on any of you
while you give information or testimony to any
agent of the National Labor Relations Board
engaged in the investigation of charges or
other Board business.
WE WILL NOT deprive you of benefits or
privileges because you engage in concerted ac-
tivities or seek to bargain collectively.
WE WILL NOT threaten to take away incen-
tive pay , holiday pay , or other benefits, or to
withhold new insurance or hospital benefits, or
to move or close our plant , because you seek
to bargain collectively or engage in organiza-
tional activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise dis-
criminate against employees because they join
or assist Retail , Wholesale and Department
Store Union, Local 506, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization.
WE WILL respect your rights to self-organiza-
tion , to form , join, and assist any labor or-
ganization , and to bargain collectively about
terms and conditions of employment through
Retail , Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Local 506, AFL-CIO, or any other
representative of your own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any
or all such activities, and WE WILL NOT inter-
fere with , restrain , or coerce you in the exer-
cise of these rights.
MORGAN PRECISION
PARTS
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Peachtree Building, Room 701, 730
Peachtree Street NE., Atlanta , Georgia 30308,
Telephone 404-526-5760.