Minza M. Shiraki-Higa, Complainant, v. Ray Mabus, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

9 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 241,208 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 220,608 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,194 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,388 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,198 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan
417 U.S. 188 (1974) Cited 1,425 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that an employer has the burden of proof to show that it falls within the stated exemption
Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.
846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1988) Cited 413 times
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer
Potter v. Goodwill Industries of Cleveland
518 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1975) Cited 46 times
In Potter v. Goodwill Industries of Cleveland, 518 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1975), a case involving a claim of racially discriminatory dismissal and conditions of employment, this Court reiterated the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard.
Section 206 - Minimum wage
29 U.S.C. § 206 Cited 9,055 times 101 Legal Analyses
Asking only whether the alleged inequality resulted from “any other factor other than sex”

Minza M. Shiraki-Higa, Complainant, v. Ray Mabus, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

9 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that an employer has the burden of proof to show that it falls within the stated exemption

Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer

In Potter v. Goodwill Industries of Cleveland, 518 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1975), a case involving a claim of racially discriminatory dismissal and conditions of employment, this Court reiterated the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard.

Asking only whether the alleged inequality resulted from “any other factor other than sex”