MIKE-SELL'S POTATO CHIP COMPANY

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 7, 2018

366 NLRB No. 29 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 29
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Mike-Sell’s Potato Chip Co. and General Truck Driv-
ers, Warehousemen, Helpers, Sales and Service,
and Casino Employees, Teamsters Local Union
No. 957. Case 09–CA–094143
March 7, 2018
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN KAPLAN AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND MCFERRAN
On October 6, 2017, Administrative Law Judge David
I. Goldman issued the attached supplemental decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the
Respondent filed reply briefs.1 In addition, the Charging
Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Mike-Sell’s Potato Chip Co.,

1 The Respondent filed reply briefs to the General Counsel’s an-
swering brief and to the Charging Party’s answering brief. However,
the Charging Party did not file its answering brief with the Board.
Dayton, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall make whole the following employees and
former employees named below by paying them the fol-
lowing amounts (which total $239,888.61), plus interest
accrued to the date of payment as prescribed in New Ho-
rizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), and Kentucky River
Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010), minus tax with-
holdings required by Federal and State law, plus such
additional backpay and interest as has accrued until such
time as the Respondent restores, honors, and continues
the terms of the collective-bargaining agreements with
the warehouse and drivers units that expired on October
26 and November 17, 2012, and maintains such terms
until the parties agree to a new contract or bargaining
leads to a good-faith impasse.2

2 In addition:
This backpay order only sets forth figures for backpay accruing
through March 31, 2017. The backpay continues to accrue.
By agreement of the parties in the stipulation (Jt. Exh. 1 at ¶3), in the
event all appeals to adverse rulings of the judge are unsuccessful, the
“Commission” payments alleged in General Counsel Exh. 2 (Amended
Appendix 1) will be paid at 50 percent; all other forms of pay (pension,
stop-pay, and excess tax payments) will be paid as alleged in GC Exh.
2. In that case, the order should provide for 50 percent of the payments
listed under “Commission.” For affected employees this will affect the
calculation of “Total Backpay” and “Total.”
The stipulation provided for specified payment of a portion of the al-
leged pension-based backpay to employees by August 31, 2017, owed
for the period 11/17/2012, through 6/15/2013, including specified inter-
est through August 31, 2017, and an amount specified for excess taxes
through August 31, 2017. See, Jt. Exh. 1 at ¶1. This amount to be paid
on or before August 31, 2017, totaled $18,993.70, with amounts speci-
fied by employee. To the extent these payments were made to speci-
fied employees, they are, to be deducted from the comparable payments
owed to the same employees under this Order.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
Route Sales Drivers 11/17/2012 through 03/31/2017
Last Name
First
Name
Commis-
sion
Pension Sick Days
Total Back
Pay
Excess
Taxes
Total
Anderson Stephen $641.00 $1,266.40 $271.56 $2,178.96 $32.00 $2,210.96
Bartels Michael $0.00 $7,166.30 1,152.95 $8,319.25 $76.00 $8,395.25
Binder Eric $0.00 $7678.80 $377.37 $8,056.17 $72.00 $8,128.17
Brown Brian $150.00 $4,561.60 $1,121.37 $5,832.97 $71.00 $5,903.97
Bryant William $0.00 $4,182.70 $539.32 $4,722.02 $51.00 $4,773.02
Coleman David $574.00 $1,024.90 $452.03 $2,050.93 $37.00 $2,087.93
Debevec Frank $0.00 $7,670.60 $1,228.32 $8,898.92 $77.00 $8,975.92
Deeter Dean $0.00 $7,706.60 $1,385.87 $9,092.47 $79.00 $9,171.47
Evans Tom $0.00 $8,130.70 $1,223.26 $9,353.96 $84.00 $9,437.96
Faulstich Bryan $69.00 $7,328.60 $707.28 $8,104.88 $71.00 $8,175.88
Fortener Ronald $181.00 $553.50 $198.01 $932.51 $19.00 $951.51
Glaser Gary $838.00 $3,057.90 $676.90 $4,572.80 $67.00 $4,639.80
Haeufle Robert $0.00 $7,532.20 $1,218.69 $8,750.89 $79.00 $8,829.89
Kazda Richard $0.00 $6,045.40 $1,347.13 $7,392.53 $77.00 $7,469.53
Koogler Thomas $232.00 $658.90 $104.02 $994.92 $20.00 $1,014.92
Krupp Lisa $0.00 $4,782.30 $0.00 $4,782.30 $46.00 $4,828.30
Lacy Paul $0.00 $7,670.60 $1,233.63 $8,904.23 $77.00 $8,981.23
Lake Jerry $0.00 $7,082.50 $1,061.13 $8,143.63 $70.00 $8,213.63
Mattern James $0.00 $8,036.50 $1,448.52 $9,485.02 $125.00 $9,610.02
Middleton David $0.00 $4,749.90 $225.10 $4,975.00 $25.00 $5,000.00
Miller Kris $987.00 $1,963.70 $291.47 $3,242.17 $54.00 $3,296.17
Montgomery James $124.00 $526.50 $134.21 $784.71 $16.00 $800.71
Nelson Gregory $0.00 $7,754.90 $1185.67 $8,940.57 $78.00 $9,018.57
MIKE-SELL’S POTATO CHIP CO. 3
Osborne James $0.00 $6,129.70 $993.75 $7,123.45 $74.00 $7,197.45
Pollard James $0.00 $7,613.60 $1,007.70 $8,621.30 $77.00 $8,698.30
Schimer Gerald $0.00 $7,874.90 $1,371.55 $9,246.45 $81.00 $9,327.45
Shockley Gregory $3.00 $0.00 $0.00 $3.00 $0.00 $3.00
Snook Randy $0.00 $7,430.20 $920.73 $8,350.93 $73.00 $8,423.93
Vance Richard $0.00 $7,646.70 $1,136.53 $8,783.23 $101.00 $8,884.23
Woyat Albert $267.00 $707.70 $81.49 $1,056.19 $21.00 $1,077.19
Gardner Richard $0.00 $229.50 $0.00 $229.50 $5.00 $234.50
Garvin Keith $37.00 $256.50 $107.27 $400.77 $9.00 $409.77
Hines Michael $4.00 $378.00 $136.80 $518.80 $11.00 $529.80
Jollay Steven $2.00 $391.50 $83.88 $477.38 $10.00 $487.38
Mason Larry $45.00 $81.00 $165.98 $291.98 $6.00 $297.98
Miller Jerry $5.00 $378.00 $161.23 $544.23 $11.00 $555.23
Ohler Gary $5.00 $391.50 $143.29 $539.79 $11.00 $550.79
Reigelsperger Todd $5.00 $378.00 $128.36 $511.36 $11.00 $522.36
Totals $4,169.00 $157,018.80 $24,022.37 $185,210.1
7
$1,904.00 $187,114.17
Over the Road Drivers: 11/17/2012 to 03/31/2017
Last Name First
Name
Pension Stop Pay Total Back
Pay
Excess Taxes Total Owed
Boyer John $7,640.30 $3,600.00 $11,240.30 $114.00 $11,354.30
Graeter Robert $7,573.00 $5,120.00 $12,693.00 $344.00 $13,037.00
Marcum Charles $0.00 $140.00 $140.00 0.00 $140.00
Titus Steve $270.00 $260.00 $53.00 11.00 $541.00
Totals $15,483.30 $9,120.00 $24,603.30 $25,072.30
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
Warehouse Employees: 11/17/2012 to 03/31/2017
Last Name First Name Pension Excess Tax Total
Adam Richard $1,389.74 $4.00 $1,393.74
Bledsoe Ronald $904.10 $16.00 $920.10
Cropper Rick $2,073.90 $31.00 $2,104.90
Dressel Edward $2,500.00 $35.00 $2,535.00
Gates Gary $3,646.00 $42.00 $3,688.00
Henry Ronald $4,837.00 $40.00 $4,877.00
Jackson Jelani $4,298.60 $29.00 $4,327.60
Myers Kody $2,181.70 $8.00 $2,189.70
Wolfe Gregory $751.40 $14.00 $765.40
Womack Terry $110.40 $2.00 $112.40
Zaborowski Alan $4,742.30 $46.00 $4,788.30
Totals $27,702.14
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 7, 2018
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Daniel A. Goode, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jennifer R. Asbrock, Esq. and Catherine F. Burgett, Esq. (Frost
Brown Todd LLC), of Louisville, Kentucky, for the Re-
spondent.
John R. Doll, Esq. and Matthew T. Crawford, Esq. (Doll, Jan-
sen & Ford), of Dayton, Ohio, for the Charging Party.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
DAVID I. GOLDMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. This
compliance case arises out of a labor dispute that began in
2012, during negotiations for new labor agreements covering a
bargaining unit of warehouse employees and a unit of (route-
sales and over-the-road) drivers employed by Mike Sell’s Pota-
to Chips Co. (Mike-Sell’s or Employer). The union represent-
ing the two bargaining units is the Teamsters Local No. 957
(Teamsters or Union).1
The collective-bargaining agreement covering the warehouse

1 The full name of the Union is the General Truck Drivers, Ware-
housemen, Helpers, Sales and Service, and Casino Employees, Team-
sters Local Union No. 957.
MIKE-SELL’S POTATO CHIP CO. 5
employees expired October 26, 2012. The collective-
bargaining agreement covering the drivers expired November
17, 2012. On November 18, 2012, Mike-Sell’s announced that
the parties were at a bargaining impasse over both units and
that effective November 19, 2012, it would unilaterally imple-
ment its bargaining proposals.
A. The Board’s Order
The Union disputed there was a bargaining impasse and filed
an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (Board) over this unilateral implementation. On
January 15, 2014, the Board issued a decision and order, re-
ported at 360 NLRB 131 (2014), finding, inter alia, that Mike
Sell’s unilateral implementation of its bargaining offers in the
absence of impasse violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (Act). The Board ordered its tradi-
tional remedies which included ordering Mike Sell’s to:
“Cease and desist from . . . . Failing to comply with the terms
and conditions of employment that are set forth in the ware-
house unit collective-bargaining agreement that expired on
October 26, 2012, and failing to comply with the terms and
conditions of employment that are set forth in the drivers unit
collective-bargaining agreement that expired on November
17, 2012, until the parties agree to a new contract or bargain-
ing leads to a good-faith impasse.
Affirmatively, the Board ordered, among other remedies, that
Mike Sell’s:
(a) On request of the Union, restore, honor and continue the
terms of the collective-bargaining agreements with the ware-
house and drivers units that expired on October 26 and No-
vember 17, 2012, respectively, until the parties agree to a new
contract or bargaining leads to a good-faith impasse.
(b) Make employees in the warehouse and drivers bargaining
units whole for any and all loss of wages and other benefits
incurred as a result of Respondent’s unlawful unilateral im-
plementation of its full and final offers on November 19,
2012, with interest, as provided for in the remedy section of
this decision.
(c) Make contributions, including any amounts due, to any
funds identified in the warehouse and drivers unit collective-
bargaining agreements that expired on October 26 and No-
vember 17, 2012, and which Respondent would have paid but
for the unlawful unilateral changes, as provided for in the
remedy section of this decision.
The remedy section of the Board’s decision, which is refer-
enced by the Order states, in part, that:
Respondent shall immediately put into effect all terms and
conditions of employment [of the expired contracts] and shall
maintain those terms in effect until the parties have bargained
to agreement or a valid impasse, or the Union has agreed to
those changes. In addition, the Respondent must make its
employees whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
that resulted from its unilateral and unlawful decision to, on or
about November 19, implement its full and final offers.
B. Court enforcement of the Board’s Order
On January 30, 2014, the Union requested, in writing, that
Respondent restore, honor and continue the terms of the ex-
pired collective-bargaining agreements. Mike-Sell’s declined
to do so. Instead, on February 10, 2014, Mike Sell’s petitioned
for review of the Board’s order by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Board cross-applied
for enforcement of its order on March 7, 2014. On December
11, 2015, after briefing and oral argument, the Court, in ac-
cordance with an opinion filed by Judge Silberman (with Judg-
es Millett and Williams joining), reported at 807 F.3d 318
(2015), denied Mike-Sell’s petition for review and granted the
Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order.
C. Compliance Proceedings
On September 30, 2016, the Regional Director of Board Re-
gion 9 issued a compliance specification alleging the backpay
amounts owed to employees under the Board’s Order, through
June 25, 2016. The total amount of backpay alleged through
June 25, 2016, amounted to $327,554, excluding interest.
Mike-Sell’s filed an answer to the compliance specification on
November 3, 2016.
On December 12, 2016, the Regional Director provided un-
ion counsel with a compliance determination in which he ex-
plained to the Union that he had concluded that the backpay
previously alleged had been overstated. The letter stated:
On September 30, 2016, the Region issued a Compliance
Specification alleging a total amount of backpay of $327,554.
This amount was based, in part, on projected sales figures.
After careful consideration of additional records of actual
sales obtained subsequent to the issuance of the compliance
specification, the Region has now determined that backpay
for the employees in this matter is $209,609. . . . The Region
intends to issue an amended compliance specification follow-
ing the disposition of any compliance appeal filed in this mat-
ter.
The compliance determination letter then detailed the basis
and methodology for the new backpay calculations. The com-
pliance determination acknowledged but rejected an alternate
backpay calculation advanced by the Union.
At the conclusion of the letter, the Regional Director ex-
plained the Union’s right to appeal his decision to the General
Counsel of the Board and the method and due date for doing so.
The Union filed an appeal of the Regional Director’s com-
pliance determination. The appeal was denied by the General
Counsel by letter dated April 7, 2016, which explained the
basis for denial and the General Counsel’s conclusion that the
Region’s calculation of backpay was not unreasonable. This
letter closed by explaining the Union’s right to file a request of
this decision directly with the Board:
You may file a request for review of our decision with
the National Labor Relations Board. You may file your
request electronically, by mail, or by delivery service. Fil-
ing a request for review electronically is preferred but not
required. Your request for review should clearly identify
the facts and reasons that form the basis of your objection.
You must file your request for review no later than April
21, 2017 and it must be served on the General Counsel and
on the Regional Director. [Emphasis in original.]
The Union did not file a request for review with the Board.
On July 10, 2017, the Regional Director for Region 9 issued
an amended compliance specification alleging the backpay
amounts owed to employees under the Board’s Order, through
March 31, 2017, “based on the methodology approved by the
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Counsel in his letter dated April 7, 2017, denying the
Union’s compliance appeal.” The total backpay alleged to be
owed through March 31, 2017, amounted to $242,944, exclud-
ing interest. Mike-Sell’s filed an answer to the compliance
specification on July 31, 2017, and an amended answer August
2, 2017.
A hearing on the compliance specification was conducted
August 7–8, 2017, in Cincinnati, Ohio. At the hearing, counsel
for the General Counsel moved to amend the compliance speci-
fication and submitted new appendices (GC Exh. 2) setting
forth the amounts allegedly owed through March 31, 2017, and
moved to amend paragraph 11 (total backpay and excess tax
due employees through March 31, 2017) to conform to the
calculations in the amended appendices. This exhibit was re-
ceived and the motion granted.
Counsel for the General Counsel, the Charging Party Union,
and the Respondent Employer, filed posttrial briefs in support
of their positions by September 12, 2017.2 On the entire record,
I make the following findings, conclusions of law, and recom-
mendations.
1. The rulings at the hearing
At the compliance hearing in this matter, before receipt of
evidence, and after argument of the parties, I issued three rul-
ings—one adverse to the Union, two adverse to the Respond-
ent—essentially precluding, as a matter of law and procedure,
the introduction of evidence on two of the Respondent’s de-
fenses, and separately, precluding a theory advanced by the
Union seeking enhancement of backpay liability beyond that
alleged in the amended compliance specification.
I invited the parties to brief these rulings posthearing, and
they have done so. I have considered their briefs on the sub-
jects, as well as all previous submissions and the record as a
whole. As discussed below, I reaffirm my rulings at trial, as
supplemented herein.
a. The Union’s effort to introduce evidence in support of a
theory of backpay liability in conflict with the General Coun-
sel’s amended specification
In a pretrial conference call, the Union indicated that it in-
tended to introduce evidence at the hearing in support of its
theory—rejected by the Regional Director in his December 12,
2016 compliance determination and by the General Counsel in
his April 7, 2017 ruling on the Union’s appeal of the compli-
ance determination—that Respondent’s backpay obligations
relating to commission-based pay should account for drivers
working additional hours as a result of the unlawful unilateral
change. On August 4, 2017, Respondent filed a motion in
limine (GC Exh. 1(bb)) contending that the Charging Party
should be precluded from introducing such evidence at the
hearing. On August 7, 2017, the Charging Party filed a re-
sponse in opposition to the motion in limine (GC Exh. 1(cc).)
After taking the parties positions at the hearing (Tr. 18-25), I
ruled on the record, granting the motion in limine. I have con-
sidered the parties’ posthearing briefs on this issue. I now reaf-
firm that ruling for the same reasons stated at the hearing. (See,
Tr. at pp. 25–33.)

2 Respondent’s motion to correct the transcript has been addressed
in a separate order.
b. The Respondent’s effort to offset vacation and holiday bene-
fits from sick benefits, and each of these benefits from wages
owed under the compliance specification
On August 2, 2017, counsel for the General Counsel filed a
motion in limine (GC Exh. 1(z)) seeking to preclude the Re-
spondent from adducing evidence in support of defenses assert-
ed in its answer contending that alleged overpayments to em-
ployees of vacation and holiday pay should be offset from sick
pay, and/or that sick-pay, holiday, and vacation pay should be
offset from wages owed to employees under the compliance
specification. The Respondent filed a response August 4, 2017.
(GC Exh. 1(aa).) The parties argued the motion at the hearing.
(Tr. at 35–45.) I ruled on the record, granting the motion in
limine. I now reaffirm that ruling for the same reasons stated at
the hearing. (See, Tr. at pp. 45–49.)
In response to the Respondent’s argument, as renewed in its
posttrial brief, I note that neither the General Counsel’s motion
nor my ruling precluded the Respondent from introducing evi-
dence of overpaid commission-based wages to offset commis-
sion-based wages. Rather, the ruling precluded overpayment of
one element of backpay (e.g., sick pay, vacation pay, or holiday
pay) from being offset from another element of backpay owed.
Mining Specialists, 330 NLRB 99 (1999) (setoff allowed only
if additional compensation paid the employee is equivalent to
the element of backpay claimed in the specification).
The Respondent asserts that its use of commissions (i.e., a
percentage of sales) as a basis for calculating the value of wag-
es and benefits (sick, holiday, vacation) suggests that these
disparate elements of backpay are uniquely linked so as to
make them the equivalent of one another. The Respondent
reasons that commissions incentivize higher sales, both in terms
of wages and benefits. However, I find that the use of commis-
sions to calculate the value of benefits is irrelevant to under-
standing the nature and purpose of these various benefits and/or
wages. Sales incentives aside, the wages, sick leave, holidays,
and vacations benefits, as their name suggests, continue to rep-
resent different forms of backpay, different in nature and pur-
pose.
Notably, the more typical use of hourly wage rates or salaries
to calculate the value of benefits also links the value of wages
to the value of benefits—in just as sure a way as does the use of
commissions. In an hourly-wage-rate-based system, an em-
ployee with a higher hourly-wage rate receives a sick, vacation,
and holiday benefit at a higher rate than an employee who earns
a lower hourly wage rate. The higher the wage rate, the higher
the benefit value. The same is true for salary systems. Thus, in
an hourly-wage rate or salary system, the value of sick, vaca-
tion, and holiday benefits is linked to the wage structure just as
it is with commission-based wage and benefits calculations.
When benefits are calculated based on an employee’s hourly
rate or salary, it creates its own type of incentive to increase
hourly or salary pay. Yet, no one—not even the Respondent—
contends that this renders the benefits “equivalent” and allows
one to be offset against the other for purposes of backpay speci-
fications. Commission-calculated benefits are no different in
this regard. An employer’s use of commission-based remu-
neration does not render equivalent any and all benefits calcu-
lated with reference to commission. Wages, sick pay, vacation
pay, and holiday pay are not equivalent benefits, regardless of
the base-rate method used to calculate the value to employees
of each benefit (e.g., hourly, salary, or commission).
In regard to the nature and purpose of the Respondent’s ben-
MIKE-SELL’S POTATO CHIP CO. 7
efits, I note the Respondent’s contention, made at the hearing
and in its posttrial brief (R. Br. at 20–21), that “drivers have
routinely used their sick and vacation days interchangeably for
whatever they please.” In other words, “if someone is sick,
they may take a vacation day,” and “vice versa.” However this
claim, which describes a not-unusual application of sick and
vacation pay benefits, does not change the fact that these bene-
fits are separately set out in the labor agreements, separately
maintained, calculated, and paid. The Respondent makes no
claim that the benefits have been merged so that they are one
indivisible benefit. At most, employees wanting a day off can
“take” the day from their sick leave benefits or their vacation
leave benefits, without employer inquiry into their medical
status. This does not render the benefits equivalent for purpos-
es of backpay offsets.
c. The Respondent’s June 2013 impasse defense
The Board issued its order in this case on January 15, 2014.3
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s order
in full on December 11, 2015.4
In front of the Board and the Court of Appeals, Respondent
argued that the parties had reached a bargaining impasse in
November 2012, justifying implementation of its final offer. In
addition, the Respondent argued to the Board and to the Court
that the parties had reached a subsequent impasse in February
2013, and that this second alleged impasse justified implemen-
tation, tolling any backpay obligation and nullifying the need
for an order restoring the November 2012 terms and conditions
of employment. These arguments were put to and rejected by
the Board, and then put to and rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Now, three and half years later, in a compliance hearing to
determine how—not if—the Respondent is to comply with the
Board’s court-enforced order, the Respondent contends that it
had reached a third bargaining impasse with the Union in nego-
tiations, one not previously mentioned to the Board or to the
Court of Appeals, although it allegedly occurred June 13, 2013,
seven months before the Board issued its order in this case and
some 30 months before the Court of Appeals enforced that
order.
In the compliance hearing, the Respondent sought to put on
evidence of the 2013 bargaining, contending in compliance that
the June 2013 alleged impasse terminated its duty to restore the
old terms and conditions and tolled the back pay period as of
June 2013. Thus, the Respondent came to the compliance hear-
ing contending for the first time that the Board’s order was
“dead on arrival” when it issued in January of 2014—that the
Board’s order was null and void from its inception—based on
events occurring seven months before issuance of the Board’s
order.
At the hearing I ruled (Tr. 76–83) that the Respondent’s ar-
gument amounted to an effort to modify the Board’s order—not
an argument for compliance with it—and that it could not
mount this argument in compliance. The Respondent has re-
newed its argument in its posthearing brief. However, I adhere
to my ruling, as supplemented herein.
Essentially, the Respondent’s position is that because the
June 2013 alleged impasse occurred (two months) after the
administrative law judge closed the unfair labor practice hear-
ing, the Respondent is free to raise this third alleged impasse as

3 360 NLRB 131 (2014).
4 807 F.3d 318 (D. C. Cir.).
an objection to the Board’s 2014 order, which was enforced in
2015.
The Respondent is in error. The Respondent is transparently
seeking to modify the Board’s order to eliminate the order’s
requirement that it restore the old terms and conditions and
maintain them until it reaches agreement or impasse with the
Union. The Respondent is seeking to modify the Board’s order
based on arguments that could have been made to the Board
even before the issuance of the Board’s order in this case.
It is too late under the Board’s rules.5 Indeed, once the
Board’s order was enforced by the Court of Appeals—nearly
three years ago and a full 30 months after the alleged June 2013
impasse—it became too late as a matter of jurisdiction under
Section 10(e) of the Act. The Board has no jurisdiction to mod-
ify a court-enforced order.6

5 Cogburn Healthcare Center, 342 NLRB 98, 99 (2004) (evidence
of changed circumstances warranting change in Board bargaining order
rejected as untimely: “The Respondent has failed to show that some or
all of this evidence it now relies on was not available during the period
that the case was pending before the Board on exceptions”); Electro-
Voice, Inc., 321 NLRB 444 (1996) (motion to reopen record 10 months
after judge’s decision issued untimely: “Clearly, the Respondent was in
possession of this evidence at least during the period when the case was
pending before the Board on exceptions”).
6 Willis Roof Consulting, Inc., 355 NLRB 280, 280 fn. 1 (2010) (“a
finding in the present [compliance] case that there was no collective-
bargaining agreement would modify the court’s order to comply with
that agreement. The Board has no jurisdiction to modify a court-
enforced order”); D.L. Baker, Inc., 351 NLRB 515, 525 fn. 31 (2007)
(Board order providing for backpay only back to beginning of 10(b)
period could not be expanded in compliance specification, even though
Board case law supported such expansion, because court’s enforcement
of order deprived Board of “liberty to modify an order that has been
enforced by a court of appeals”); Scepter Ingot Castings, Inc., 341
NLRB 997, 997 (2004), enfd. 448 F.3d 388, 390–391 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(holding that “Because [employer] did not in its petition for review of
the [Board’s] Order challenge the remedy clearly imposed in that order,
it could not do so at the compliance stage of the proceeding. The Board
therefore correctly held in the [compliance] Order that it lacked juris-
diction to grant [the employer’s] post-enforcement request for relief
from the [Board’s] Order. Indeed, § 10 of the NLRA requires a party to
timely file exception to an order of the Board precisely in order to
insure against repetitive appeals to the courts, such as this one”) (inter-
nal quotation omitted); Convergence Communications Inc., 342 NLRB
918, 919 (2004) (“even assuming no relitigation bar, we are powerless
in any event to revisit the merits and alter our Order accordingly. That
Order has been enforced by the court of appeals. Under Section 10(e)
of the Act, we are without jurisdiction to modify a court-enforced
Board Order”); In re Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co., 337 NLRB
141, 142 (2001) (“The Charging Parties' motion, though styled as one
for clarification, may more accurately be described as one seeking
additional substantive relief. Thus, the Charging Parties are essentially
asking the Board to change the Order that has already been enforced by
the Fourth Circuit. The Board, however, is without authority to change
such an order, as Section 10(e) of the Act”); Regional Import & Export
Trucking, 323 NLRB 1206, 1207 (1997) (“Because the Respondent
Union’s offset methods [in compliance hearing] . . . would effectively
require a modification of the Board’s 1988 Order, we do not have juris-
diction to adopt them”); Royal Typewriter Co., 239 NLRB 1, 2 (1978)
(“With respect to the ‘clarifications’ the Union seeks in our Order . . .
we perceive the extensive relief sought as, in actuality a request to
modify our Order. . . . Since, as noted above, the Board’s order has
already been enforced and is now the subject of contempt . . .); Dupuy
v. NLRB, 806 F.3d 556 (D.C. Cir. 2015); NLRB v. Mastro Plastics
Corp., 261 F.2d 147, 148 (2d Cir.1958) (“If respondents believed that
they had sufficient grounds to justify [deviating from a court-enforced
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Had the Respondent wanted to challenge the propriety of the
Board’s January 2014 order based on events occurring in June
2013, its path was clear under the Board’s rules, and under the
terms of the Act itself. Thus, Sec. 102(48(c) of the Board Rules
and Regulations provides for a motion for reopening to have
the Board consider newly available evidence. But such a mo-
tion “must be filed promptly on the discovery of the evidence to
be adduced.”7 In addition, Section 10(e) of the Act specifically
prescribes the method for raising new matters directly to the
Court of Appeals and seek an order from the court requiring the
Board to consider the matter.8
However, the Respondent chose not to pursue the matter
with the Board or the Court. At this point, the door has shut:
Because [the employer] did not in its petition for review of the
[Board’s] Order challenge the remedy clearly imposed in that
order, it could not do so at the compliance stage of the pro-
ceeding. The Board therefore correctly held in the [compli-
ance] Order that it lacked jurisdiction to grant [the employ-
er’s] post-enforcement request for relief from the [Board’s]
Order. Indeed, § 10 of the NLRA requires a party to timely
file exception to an order of the Board precisely in order to in-
sure against repetitive appeals to the courts, such as this one.”
Scepter, Inc. v. NLRB, 448 F.3d 388, 390–391 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation omitted).9
The Respondent contends that it is “implicit” in the Board’s
Order that it can argue in compliance for ignoring the order’s

order], their only proper recourse was in timely fashion to petition this
court for modification of its clear mandate.”) (emphasis added).
7 Sec. 102.48(c) of the Board Rules and Regulations states:
Motions for reconsideration, rehearing, or reopening the record. A
party to a proceeding before the Board may, because of extraordinary
circumstances, move for reconsideration, rehearing, or reopening of
the record after the Board decision or order. (1) . . . A motion to reo-
pen the record must state briefly the additional evidence sought to be
adduced, why it was not presented previously, and that, if adduced and
credited, it would require a different result. Only newly discovered
evidence, evidence which has become available only since the close of
the hearing, or evidence which the Board believes may have been tak-
en at the hearing will be taken at any further hearing. (2) . . . . [A]
motion to reopen the record must be filed promptly on discovery of
the evidence to be adduced.
8 Sect. 10(e) of the Act states, in relevant part:
If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional
evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such addi-
tional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for
the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its
member, agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evi-
dence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and
to be made a part of the record. The Board may modify its findings as
to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of additional evidence so
taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which
findings with respect to question of fact if supported by substantial ev-
idence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and
shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting
aside of its original order.
9 Although I do not assume that the Respondent engaged in a calcu-
lated withholding of its third impasse argument to the Board or the D.C.
Circuit—to be utilized later if it’s first two impasse arguments did not
stick—it seems to me that the Respondent’s argument, if accepted,
would condone exactly that in future cases.
direction to restore and maintain the status quo ante. To the
contrary, the Board order must be understood as it plainly
reads—i.e., that restoration is effectively a condition precedent
to reaching an impasse that can toll liability. Indeed, this read-
ing is mandated by Board precedent, enforced by the D.C. Cir-
cuit, holding that an order to restore terms and conditions of
employment requires actual restoration before claims related to
subsequent bargaining can toll the backpay. Mimbres Memori-
al Hospital, 356 NLRB 744 (2011), enfd. sub nom. Deming
Hospital Corp. v. NLRB, 665 F.3d 196 (2011). Mimbres is
dispositive of the issue. Contrary to the suggestion of the Re-
spondent, the Board’s holding in Mimbres Memorial Hospital
is firmly rooted in the rejection of the same species of argument
advanced by the Respondent here.
Mimbres Memorial Hospital involved an underlying order
identical in all material respects to the order in this case. See,
342 NLRB 398, 404 (2004), enfd. 483 F.3d 683 (10th Cir.
2007).
In Mimbres the employer arrived at the compliance hearing
some ten years after its unlawful reduction in hours, contending
as an affirmative defense that backpay tolled on its unlawful
reduction of hours because the union failed to engage in post-
violation bargaining that would have enabled the employer to
reach impasse and re-implement the prior unlawful changes.
In reasoning adopted by the Board, the administrative law
judge located the Respondent’s argument in the more general
“implementation-upon-impasse doctrine” and squarely rejected
its applicability where, as here, the Respondent simply flouted
the Board’s order to restore old terms and conditions:
“At the core of Respondent's Affirmative Defense 37
are Board cases that hold in one way or another that an
employer may “(re)implement the prior unlawful changes”
with the union's agreement or by bargaining to impasse
over that subject at issue. Five Star Mfg. Inc., 348 NLRB
1301, 1339 (2006); Mammoth Coal Co., 354 NLRB No.
83, slip op. at 45 (2009), citing U.S. Marine Corp. v
NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1322-1323 (7th Cir. 1991); New
Concept Solutions LLC, 349 NLRB 1136, 1161 (2007);
Waterbury Hotel Management LLC, 333 NLRB 482, 555
(2001); and Eldorado Inc., 335 NLRB 952, 959 (2001).
By failing to respond to the various requests made by Re-
spondent in 2007 for bargaining following the court's en-
forcement of the Board's order, the Union, according to
Respondent, effectively deprived it of the opportunity to
negotiate about the change made in 2001 that the Board
and the court found unlawful. However, I concluded that
principle from the Five Star Mfg. case and the other simi-
lar cases cited had no application here in the absence of a
showing, or an offer to show, that Respondent had restored
the status quo ante by rescinding the original unlawful re-
duction in hours as ordered by the Board. Five Star Mfg.,
348 NLRB 1339 (“If Respondent wants to change this sit-
uation, it can—after returning to the status quo ante, give
the Union notice of a proposed change and bargain with
the Union.”) Because Respondent failed to take such ac-
tion in advance of the 2007 bargaining requests, the Union
had no duty to bargain under those circumstances.
356 NLRB at 746.
Thus the Board’s answer to the unfair labor practice violator
who claims its subsequent bargaining released it from the
Board’s order is that under the terms of the order before bar-
MIKE-SELL’S POTATO CHIP CO. 9
gaining tolls its obligations it must have restored the old terms
and conditions.
In enforcing the Board’s decision, the D.C. Circuit, Deming
Hospital Corp. v. NLRB, 665 F.3d 196 (2011), made the point
just as forcefully:
Employers must rescind their unlawful actions before
attempting bargaining so they cannot “tak[e] advantage of
[their] wrongdoing to the detriment of the employees.”
U.S. Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1322 (7th
Cir.1991). Employers cannot force unions to come to the
bargaining table in a position of weakness. That is why,
“in cases involving unlawful unilateral changes, the
Board's normal remedy is to order restoration of the status
quo ante as a means to ensure meaningful bargaining,” a
policy that “has been approved by the Supreme Court.”
Porta–King Bldg. Sys., 310 N.L.R.B. 539, 539 (1993) (cit-
ing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203, 216, 85 S.Ct. 398, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964)), enforced,
14 F.3d 1258 (8th Cir.1994). Accordingly, an employer's
attempt to negotiate without first rescinding the unlawful
action “does not toll . . . backpay liability.” Porta–King
Bldg. System, 310 N.L.R.B. at 540.
The Hospital asserts its situation is different because
the Union “has decided to eschew the entire collective-
bargaining process,” and “backpay [should] not continue
to run into eternity.” Hospital's Reply Br. 9–10. The Hos-
pital has not provided any evidence the Union has aban-
doned collective bargaining. And even if the Union has
done so, the Hospital can simply rescind the hours reduc-
tion, and when its subsequent attempts to negotiate with
the Union fail, it can toll its backpay obligation by show-
ing the bargaining process has reached a “lawful impasse.”
NLRB v. Cauthorne, 691 F.2d 1023, 1026 (D.C.Cir.1982).
665 F.3d at 203; see also, Adams and Associates, Inc. v. NLRB,
__ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 4079063 (5th Cir. September 15, 2017)
(“subsequent participation in the bargaining process does not
dissipate [the employer’s] initial violation of unilaterally im-
posing its own terms and conditions of employment. Nor does
it make bargaining unit employees whole but for Adams's un-
fair labor practice. Accordingly, we hold that restoring the sta-
tus quo ante is an appropriate remedy for [the employer’s] un-
lawful conduct”).
Notably, there is nothing onerous about the approach of the
Board and court in Mimbres Memorial Hospital, supra. To the
contrary, where an employer has made unlawful unilateral
changes, compliance with a restoration remedy is the standard
prerequisite to termination of the remedial obligations. As the
Board explained Pressroom Cleaners, 361 NLRB No. 57, slip
op. at 3 (2014), overruling Planned Building Services, 347
NLRB 670 (2006), and returning to the standard rule that places
restoration as a prerequisite to mitigation in a unilateral change
case:
This approach is consistent with the Board's standard remedial
scheme in 8(a)(5) unilateral change cases: rescission of the
change, restoration of the status quo terms and conditions, and
bargaining to agreement or impasse. See, e.g., Mi Pueblo
Foods, 360 NLRB No. 116, slip op. at 4 (2014). In such cas-
es, the employer must maintain the status quo until it reaches
agreement or a good-faith impasse in bargaining; the employ-
er is not permitted to show in compliance that it would have
agreed to different terms, or reached impasse earlier, if it had
bargained lawfully in the first place.”
The Respondent, citing (R. Br. at 13–16) NLRB v. Cauthorne
Trucking, 691 F.2d 1023 (D. C. Cir. 1982), Dependable
Maintenance Co., 276 NLRB 27 (1985), and Storer Communi-
cations, 297 NLRB 296 (1989), contends that the Board and
courts can and should limit orders in unilateral changes cases to
continue only to such time when the parties reach a subsequent
lawful impasse, even if the old terms and conditions have not
been restored. However, in each of these cases, the employer
timely argued the point as a basis on which the Board should
forego an order requiring restoration of the status quo ante and
make-whole relief. In each case the Board, or in the case of
Cauthorne, the Court, addressed the argument and modified the
order as appropriate. Here, by contrast, neither the Board nor
the Court took that step and the Respondent never asked them
to. At this point, the Board’s order has been enforced, as is.
In the instant case, timely seeking to have the Board or court
consider the alleged June 2013 impasse—just as it asked the
Board and Court to consider the alleged February 2013 im-
passe—is the critical step that the Respondent skipped, and it
makes all the difference in the world, especially when we are
left with an enforced Board order on all fours with Mimbres
Memorial Hospital, and not one word from the Board or the
Court suggesting that the issue of the June 13 impasse may be
interposed to dissolve the Board’s order in a compliance hear-
ing. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., 364 NLRB No. 6 (2016)
(distinguishing case where court modified Board order from
case where court enforced Board order—in the latter instance
“[u]nder Section 10(e) of the Act, the Board has no jurisdiction
to modify an Order that has been enforced by a court of ap-
peals”).
The same point can be made as to each of the cases Re-
spondent cites (R. Br. at 16 fn. 10) where the Board, either in a
specific case, or as precedent for a recurring type of case, has
held in the unfair labor practice decision that it will be appro-
priate in compliance for the Board to consider anew a specific
defense to the scope of the remedy ordered.10 These examples
avoid the Section 10(e) problem posed here because the matter
was raised to the Board and addressed by the Board. Here, the
matter was not raised to the Board, not addressed by the Board,
and not raised to or addressed by the court enforcing the
Board’s order. It is done. See, Alden Leeds, Inc., 357 NLRB
84, 84 fn. 3 (2011) (distinguishing Greensburg CocaCola Bot-
tling Co., 311 NLRB 1022, 1029 (1993), enf. denied on other
grounds 40 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 1994)—where issue of curing of
illegal lockout was deferred to compliance—from Alden Leeds
where there was no deferral of the issue). In agreement with
the Board, the D.C. Circuit enforced the Board’s decision in
Alden Leeds, expressly rejecting the employer’s argument that

10 Thus, in Coronet Foods, Inc., 305 NLRB 79, 79 fn. 6 (1991), the
Board, relying on Lear Siegler, 295 NLRB 857, 862 (1991), expressly
stated that with regard to the order to restore an unlawfully disbanded
or transferred department of the employer, “evidence concerning the
appropriateness of the remedy could also be submitted at the compli-
ance stage.” Similarly, with regard to the remedy for illegally withheld
requested information, the Board has “set out a clear procedural
framework” that expressly authorizes the circumstances in which the
respondent may raise in compliance a defense to providing the infor-
mation. Boeing Co., 364 NLRB No. 24, slip op. at 5 (2016).
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the scope of the Company's backpay liability should be re-
served for the compliance stage of the Board's proceedings,”
because . . . [unlike [i]n Greensburg Coca–Cola, the ALJ ex-
plicitly deferred the backpay issue of whether the lockout was
cured or retained its initial taint of illegality to a future com-
pliance proceeding, 311 NLRB at 1028–29, and neither party
filed an exception to that portion of the ALJ's decision. Thus,
the jurisdictional bar of Section 10(e) was not at issue.
812 F.3d 159, 167 (2016).
I note that other arguments advanced in the Respondent’s
posthearing brief are not compelling. Thus, the Respondent
goes to great lengths in its posthearing brief (R. Br. at 10–12) to
argue that it was the Union’s responsibility to file a charge or
otherwise legally challenge the June 13, 2013 implementation,
and failing to do so has “waived” its right to restoration of the
November 2012 terms and conditions under the order. This is a
red herring. There is no allegation much less a finding that the
Respondent violated the Act when it implemented new terms
and conditions on June 13, 2013. The only issue is the Re-
spondent’s claim that this implementation extinguished the
force of the Board’s January 2014 order directing it to restore
the November 2012 terms and conditions.
Finally, the Respondent contends (R. Br. at 19) that through
my ruling barring evidence of the June 2013 alleged impasse, I
“took on the role of a litigant and improperly injected an entire-
ly new dispute into the compliance proceeding.” I do not agree.
The Respondent pleaded its impasse argument as an affirma-
tive defense. I have both the duty and power to “regulate the
course of the hearing” and “to request the parties at any time
during the hearing to state their respective positions concerning
any issue in the case or theory in support thereof.” Sec.
102.35(6), (12) of the Board Rules and Regulations. I did just
that. I am not required to hear evidence on a pleaded affirma-
tive defense that my questioning of counsel and research of the
issues lead me to conclude is invalid. In any event, when que-
ried, union counsel endorsed the theory that the impasse de-
fense was inappropriate in the absence of compliance with the
Board’s restoration order (Tr. at 63–64) and in his posttrial
brief counsel for the General Counsel also advances the argu-
ment.
2. Backpay owed
At the hearing, and in light of the rulings discussed above,
and subject to a stipulation agreed to by all parties (Jt. Exh. 1),
the Respondent (Tr. 128) admitted the allegations of the
amended compliance specification (as amended at the hearing,
see GC Exh. 2).
Thus, I will issue a supplemental order, below, requiring the
Respondent to satisfy its obligation to make employees whole,
in accordance with the extant amended compliance specifica-
tion and appendices (GC Exh. 2).
However, the supplemental order covers only the amounts
owing through March 31, 2017. In accordance with the
amended compliance specification (paragraph 2), the backpay
period will continue until the Respondent restores and honors
the terms of the labor agreements that expired on October 26
and November 17, 2012, respectively, or until an employee’s
last day of employment, whichever comes first.”
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended11
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent Mike-Sell’s Pota-
to Chip Co, Dayton, Ohio, its officers agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
Satisfy the obligation to make whole the following employees
and former employees by paying them the following amounts
(which totals $ $239,888.61), plus interest accrued to the date
of payment as prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), and Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6
(2010), minus tax and withholdings required by Federal and
State laws, plus such additional backpay and interest as has
accrued until such time as the Respondent restores, honors and
continues the terms of the collective-bargaining agreements
with the warehouse and drivers units that expired on October
26 and November 17, 2012, and maintains such terms until the
parties agree to a new contract or bargaining leads to a good-
faith impasse:12

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
12 Three important additional points:
1. As referenced, this backpay order only sets forth figures for back-
pay accruing through March 31, 2017. The backpay continues to ac-
crue.
2. By agreement of the parties in the stipulation (Joint Exhibit 1 at
¶3), in the event all appeals to my evidentiary rulings are unsuccessful,
the “Commission” payments alleged in General Counsel Exh. 2
(Amended Appendix 1) will be paid at 50 percent; all other forms of
pay (pension, stop-pay, and excess tax payments) will be paid as al-
leged in GC Exh. 2. In that case, the order should provide for 50 per-
cent of the payments listed under “Commission.” For affected em-
ployees this will affect the calculation of “Total Backpay” and “To-
tal.”
3. The stipulation provided for specified payment of a portion of the
alleged pension-based backpay to employees by August 31, 2017,
owed for the period 11/17/2012 through 6/15/2013, including speci-
fied interest through August 31, 2017, and an amount specified for ex-
cess taxes through August 31, 2017. See, Jt. Exh. 1 at ¶1. This
amount to be paid on or before August 31, 2017, totaled $18,993.70,
with amounts specified by employee. To the extent these payments
were made to specified employees, they are, of course, to be deducted
from the comparable payments owed to the same employees under
this order.
MIKE-SELL’S POTATO CHIP CO. 11
Route Sales Drivers 11/17/2012 through 03/31/2017
Last Name First Name Commission Pension Sick Days
Total Back
Pay
Excess
Taxes
Total
Anderson Stephen $641.00 $1,266.40 $271.56 $2,178.96 $32.00 $2,210.96
Bartels Michael $0.00 $7,166.30 1,152.95 $8,319.25 $76.00 $8,395.25
Binder Eric $0.00 $7678.80 $377.37 $8,056.17 $72.00 $8,128.17
Brown Brian $150.00 $4,561.60 $1,121.37 $5,832.97 $71.00 $5,903.97
Bryant William $0.00 $4,182.70 $539.32 $4,722.02 $51.00 $4,773.02
Coleman David $574.00 $1,024.90 $452.03 $2,050.93 $37.00 $2,087.93
Debevec Frank $0.00 $7,670.60 $1,228.32 $8,898.92 $77.00 $8,975.92
Deeter Dean $0.00 $7,706.60 $1,385.87 $9,092.47 $79.00 $9,171.47
Evans Tom $0.00 $8,130.70 $1,223.26 $9,353.96 $84.00 $9,437.96
Faulstich Bryan $69.00 $7,328.60 $707.28 $8,104.88 $71.00 $8,175.88
Fortener Ronald $181.00 $553.50 $198.01 $932.51 $19.00 $951.51
Glaser Gary $838.00 $3,057.90 $676.90 $4,572.80 $67.00 $4,639.80
Haeufle Robert $0.00 $7,532.20 $1,218.69 $8,750.89 $79.00 $8,829.89
Kazda Richard $0.00 $6,045.40 $1,347.13 $7,392.53 $77.00 $7,469.53
Koogler Thomas $232.00 $658.90 $104.02 $994.92 $20.00 $1,014.92
Krupp Lisa $0.00 $4,782.30 $0.00 $4,782.30 $46.00 $4,828.30
Lacy Paul $0.00 $7,670.60 $1,233.63 $8,904.23 $77.00 $8,981.23
Lake Jerry $0.00 $7,082.50 $1,061.13 $8,143.63 $70.00 $8,213.63
Mattern James $0.00 $8,036.50 $1,448.52 $9,485.02 $125.00 $9,610.02
Middleton David $0.00 $4,749.90 $225.10 $4,975.00 $25.00 $5,000.00
Miller Kris $987.00 $1,963.70 $291.47 $3,242.17 $54.00 $3,296.17
Montgomery James $124.00 $526.50 $134.21 $784.71 $16.00 $800.71
Nelson Gregory $0.00 $7,754.90 $1185.67 $8,940.57 $78.00 $9,018.57
Osborne James $0.00 $6,129.70 $993.75 $7,123.45 $74.00 $7,197.45
Pollard James $0.00 $7,613.60 $1,007.70 $8,621.30 $77.00 $8,698.30
Schimer Gerald $0.00 $7,874.90 $1,371.55 $9,246.45 $81.00 $9,327.45
Shockley Gregory $3.00 $0.00 $0.00 $3.00 $0.00 $3.00
Snook Randy $0.00 $7,430.20 $920.73 $8,350.93 $73.00 $8,423.93
Vance Richard $0.00 $7,646.70 $1,136.53 $8,783.23 $101.00 $8,884.23
Woyat Albert $267.00 $707.70 $81.49 $1,056.19 $21.00 $1,077.19
Gardner Richard $0.00 $229.50 $0.00 $229.50 $5.00 $234.50
Garvin Keith $37.00 $256.50 $107.27 $400.77 $9.00 $409.77
Hines Michael $4.00 $378.00 $136.80 $518.80 $11.00 $529.80
Jollay Steven $2.00 $391.50 $83.88 $477.38 $10.00 $487.38
Mason Larry $45.00 $81.00 $165.98 $291.98 $6.00 $297.98
Miller Jerry $5.00 $378.00 $161.23 $544.23 $11.00 $555.23
Ohler Gary $5.00 $391.50 $143.29 $539.79 $11.00 $550.79
Reigelsperger Todd $5.00 $378.00 $128.36 $511.36 $11.00 $522.36
Totals $4,169.00 $157,018.80 $24,022.37 $185,210.17 $1$1,904.00 $187,114.17
Over the Road Drivers: 11/17/2012 to 03/31/2017
Last Name First Name Pension Stop Pay Total Back Pay Excess Taxes Total Owed
Boyer John $7,640.30 $3,600.00 $11,240.30 $114.00 $11,354.30
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Graeter Robert $7,573.00 $5,120.00 $12,693.00 $344.00 $13,037.00
Marcum Charles $0.00 $140.00 $140.00 0.00 $140.00
Titus Steve $270.00 $260.00 $53.00 11.00 $541.00
Totals $15,483.30 $9,120.00 $24,603.30 $25,072.30
Warehouse Employees: 11/17/2012 to 03/31/2017
Last Name First Name Pension Excess Tax Total
Adam Richard $1,389.74 $4.00 $1,393.74
Bledsoe Ronald $904.10 $16.00 $920.10
Cropper Rick $2,073.90 $31.00 $2,104.90
Dressel Edward $2,500.00 $35.00 $2,535.00
Gates Gary $3,646.00 $42.00 $3,688.00
Henry Ronald $4,837.00 $40.00 $4,877.00
Jackson Jelani $4,298.60 $29.00 $4,327.60
Myers Kody $2,181.70 $8.00 $2,189.70
Wolfe Gregory $751.40 $14.00 $765.40
Womack Terry $110.40 $2.00 $112.40
Zaborowski Alan $4,742.30 $46.00 $4,788.30
Totals $27,702.14
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 6, 2017