Mickey's Linen & Towel Supply, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Oct 2, 2006

13-CA-043153 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 2, 2006)

JD–75–06
Hammond, IN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES

MICKEY’S LINEN & TOWELL SUPPLY, INC.

and Case 13-CA-43153

CHICAGO AND MIDWEST REGIONAL
JOINT BOARD, UNITE-HERE

Hyeyoung Bang-Thompson, Esq., of Chicago, IL,
for the General Counsel.
Rebecca Munoz, of Chicago, IL,
for the Charging Party.
Scott V. Kamins, Esq., of Washington, DC,
for the Respondent-Employer.

DECISION

Statement of the Case

Bruce D. Rosenstein, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me on July
12 and 13, 20061, in Chicago, Illinois, pursuant to a Complaint and Notice of Hearing in the
subject case (complaint) issued on April 27, by the Regional Director for Region 13 of the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board). The underlying charge and amended charges
were filed on various dates in 2006, by Chicago and Midwest Regional Joint Board, Unite-Here
(the Charging Party or Union) alleging that Mickey’s Linen & Towel Supply, Inc. (the
Respondent or Employer), has engaged in certain violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondent filed a timely answer to the complaint
denying that it had committed any violations of the Act.

Issues

The complaint alleges that the Respondent engaged in independent violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act including unlawfully assisting employees in their attempts to decertify the
Union and unlawfully interrogating employees by asking them if they had already signed the
decertification petition. Additionally, the complaint alleges that the Respondent engaged in a

1 All dates are in 2006 unless otherwise indicated.

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violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by unilaterally changing the union access provision
in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
Findings of Fact

I. Jurisdiction

The Respondent is a corporation engaged in the business of linen cleaning and rental in
Hammond, Indiana, where in the past twelve months it purchased and received at its Hammond
facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 from points directly outside the State of Indiana. The
Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.

II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices

A. Background

The Union has represented the Respondent’s employees for approximately twenty
years. That recognition has been embodied in successive collective-bargaining agreements,
the most recent of which was effective from April 3, 2003 to February 1.

An employee of the Respondent filed a RD (decertification petition) in March 2006 with
the Board asserting that a majority of the employees no longer wanted the Union to represent
them for collective bargaining purposes. Because of the outstanding Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
allegations in the subject complaint, Region 13 dismissed the RD petition.

B. The Section 8(a)(1) Allegations

The Board has held that interrogation is not a per se violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, (1984), affd. sub nom. Hotel Employees Union Local
11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). In determining whether an interrogation is unlawful,
the Board examines whether, under all the circumstances the questioning reasonably tends to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Rossmore
House, 269 NLRB at 1177-1178. Emery Worldwide, 309 NLRB 185, 186 (1992). Under the
totality of circumstances approach, the Board examines factors such as whether the
interrogated employee is an open and active union supporter, the background of the
interrogation, the nature of the information sought, the identity of the questioner, and the place
and method of interrogation. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB at 1178 fn. 20; Bourne v. NLRB, 332
F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964); Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217, 1218 (1985).

1. Allegations Concerning David Cerda

The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 5 (a) of the complaint that Respondent, by
David Cerda,2 unlawfully assisted employees in their attempts to decertify the Union by asking

2 Cerda is an admitted supervisor, at another of Respondent’s facilities, who came to the
plant on February 3 to serve as an interpreter for an all-employee meeting to explain the
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employee sentiment about the Union and telling employees they could do better than being
represented by the Union.
a. Facts

Judy Wickhorst, an employee at Respondent and a member of the collective bargaining
unit, testified that she independently commenced soliciting signatures from co-workers to
decertify the Union in early February 2006. Wickhorst and a number of co-workers were
dissatisfied with the Union and often complained about paying union dues when they were
receiving little or no support. Wickhorst titled the petition “No Union-No Unite”. When Wickhorst
obtained a majority of signatures, she told Respondent’s General Manager Richard Ashby about
the employee petition. Wickhorst informed the employees that if they dropped the Union they
would no longer have to pay dues and that the employees could always bring another union into
the facility. Since two co-workers seemed to have trouble understanding Wickhorst’s
explanation of the petitions purpose, she approached Cerda after the February 3 all-employee
meeting, and enlisted his help to translate her questions in Spanish to the two employees.
Wickhorst specifically requested Cerda to ask the employees whether they wanted to pay dues
to a Union and to tell them that Wickhorst believed that they could do better then the Union.
After Cerda made the explanation in Spanish, both employees signed the petition in the
presence of Wickhorst and Cerda.

Wickhorst further testified that no manager of Respondent requested or directed her to
solicit signatures for the decertification petition. Likewise, Wickhorst stated that Cerda informed
her that he could not get involved in the decertification petition process.

b. Analysis

I am not convinced that the Respondent violated the Act for the following reasons. First,
the General Counsel did not establish that Cerda unlawfully assisted employees in there
attempts to decertify the Union. Rather, I find that Wickhorst solely initiated the petition effort by
herself and only requested Cerda to translate her questions in Spanish to the two employees. I
note that the questions translated by Cerda did not specifically state that the petition was to
remove the Union as the employee’s collective bargaining representative. Second, Wickhorst
credibly testified that Cerda informed her that he could not get involved in the decertification
petition process and the General Counsel presented no evidence to the contrary.3 Lastly, I find
that Cerda’s conduct did not go beyond the mere ministerial act of assistance and did not
constitute an attempt to have or induce Wickhorst to file the decertification petition. Amer-Cal
_________________________
Respondent’s position on the status of contract negotiations to the Spanish speaking
employees.
3 The General Counsel argues in its post-hearing brief in support of a violation that the ALJ
in St. George Warehouse, Inc. (JD (NY) 02-05) determined that the Employer violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act when one of its supervisors translated for the decertification petitioner in an
effort to obtain employees’ signatures on the decertification petition. In that case, the supervisor
translated while the employee explained that he had a petition against the Union and that he
was asking the three employees to sign the petition. It is also noted that the supervisor took the
employees away from their work station and brought them to his office to translate. Unlike the
facts in that case, the present situation is distinguishable. Here, there was no discussion about
the decertification petition that took place during the course of the translation and Cerda
specifically informed Wickhorst that he could not get involved in the decertification process.
Additionally, the questions asked by Wickhorst and translated by Cerda were significantly
different then what took place in the cited case.

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Industries, Inc., 274 NLRB 1046 (1985).
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel did not sustain the allegations in paragraph
5 (a) of the complaint and recommend that they be dismissed.4

2. Allegations Concerning David Cerda

The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 5 (b) of the complaint that Cerda (i)
made unlawful promises of benefits to employees by asking them why they needed a union and
informing them that the Respondent could give them good benefits, (ii) encouraged employees
to sign the decertification petition and (iii) unlawfully interrogated employees if they had signed
the petition.
a. Facts

The General Counsel presented the testimony of employee Zoila Loredo to sustain the
allegation in paragraph 5 (b)(i) of the complaint. Loredo testified that sometime during early
February 2006, Wickhorst approached her on three occasions in the same day and asked
whether she wanted to sign a petition to remove the Union as the employee’s collective
bargaining representative. Around that same time, Loredo testified that she attended a
company wide meeting in which Cerda served as an interpreter to explain the Respondent’s
position to the Spanish speaking employees about the status of on-going collective bargaining
negotiations.

Loredo further testified that several days after the all-employee meeting, Cerda returned
to the facility and just before her break requested to speak with her. According to Loredo,
Cerda asked her if “she agreed to keep the Union at the facility and was she happy with the
Union.” Additionally, Loredo testified that Cerda told her that “Respondent could give the
employees good benefits.” Loredo told Cerda that I need the Union because I want a good
contract.

Cerda testified that he returned to the facility on February 10 at Ashby’s request to
further explain to the Spanish speaking employees the Respondent’s position on the status of
there final proposal in contract negotiations. He admits that he spoke with the majority of the
Spanish speaking employees on February 10, but asserts that the conversations were limited to
the Respondent’s offer for health insurance and wages within the context of collective
bargaining negotiations. He assured the employees that contrary to rumors in the plant and
information that the Union was spreading, the Respondent had no intention of taking away their
health insurance or reducing wages. Cerda admits talking with Loredo but testified that he only
asked her “Were you happy with the information that you were getting from the Union.” Cerda
denied that he asked Loredo about her need for the Union or informed her that the Respondent
could give the employees good benefits.

With respect to paragraph 5(b)(ii) and (iii) of the complaint, the General Counsel
presented the testimony of employee Martha Robles to sustain these allegations.

Robles testified that Cerda came to her work station around 1:30 p.m. and asked her “If
she was aware of what was going on.” In her pre-trial affidavit (R Exh. 2), Robles testified that
Cerda asked her, “Did you already sign to get rid of the Union.” However, both on direct and

4 I note that paragraph 5 (a) of the complaint alleges Cerda engaged in the unlawful conduct
in January 2006. The evidence confirms that Cerda was only at the Respondent’s facility on
February 3 and 10 (R Exh. 6).

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cross examination, Robles testified that Cerda “never asked her whether she signed the
decertification petition that Wickhorst distributed to the employees.”

b. Analysis

Cerda testified that while he spoke to a number of Spanish speaking employees on
February 10, he did not urge employees to sign the decertification petition nor did he ask
employees whether they had already signed the petition.

I found Loredo to be an impressive witness who stuck to her story on direct and cross
examination in addition to responding to questions that I asked her about the conversation that
she had with Cerda on February 10. Loredo’s testimony had a ring of truth to it and seems
plausible under the circumstances. Cerda had unfettered access to the Spanish speaking
employees and was the only manager that was bilingual. He was fully aware that a
decertification petition was being circulated in the facility and I find that his discussions with the
Spanish speaking employees was a method to glean information on the strength of the
sentiment in the bargaining unit to remove the Union as the collective bargaining representative.
While I did not credit Robles testimony that Cerda interrogated her about signing the
decertification petition for reasons discussed below, nevertheless, I believe a pattern developed
with Cerda asking a number of the Spanish speaking employee’s similar questions to those that
he asked Loredo and Robles.

For all of the above reasons, I find that Cerda made unlawful promises of benefits to
employees by asking them why they needed a union and informed employees that the
Respondent could give them good benefits. Therefore, I find that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act based on the allegations set forth in paragraph 5(b)(i) of the
complaint.

With respect to paragraphs 5(b)(ii) and (iii) of the complaint, I cannot find that the
General Counsel has established a violation of the Act for the following reasons. First, while the
General Counsel represented that Loredo would support these allegations, my review of her
testimony does not establish that she testified about these allegations. As it concerns Robles, I
find it impossible to credit her testimony that Cerda encouraged her to sign the decertification
petition or interrogated her about signing it. In this regard, Robles’s testimony was inconsistent
and conflicted with her own prior testimony on this point. Indeed, she was not certain of what
Cerda said to her about the decertification petition during there February 10 conversation. Such
conflicts in her pre-trial affidavit and her testimony on direct and cross examination undermines
her credibility.

Under these circumstances, I find that the General Counsel’s witnesses did not support
the allegations in paragraphs 5(b)(ii) and (iii) of the complaint and recommend that they be
dismissed.

3. Allegations Concerning Al Polewski

The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 5(c)(i) and (ii) of the complaint that
Respondent, by Al Polewski, unlawfully assisted employees to decertify the Union by
acknowledging the solicitation was occurring but refused to cease the activity and
discriminatorily applied its no solicitation and distribution rule by allowing employees to solicit
signatures for the decertification petition on work time in work areas.

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a. Facts

Employee Erika Vela, who was employed at the Respondent during the operative period
and served as the Union steward, testified that she observed Wickhorst talking to co-workers in
work areas on work time with a yellow pad in her hand that contained a number of signatures
thereon. Vela was under the impression that employees were prohibited from visiting and
talking to co-workers in there work areas during work time.

Vela informed Polewski that Wickhorst was talking to employees outside of her regular
work area during work time. Polewski responded that it was not his position to act on it.

Vela acknowledged on cross examination, however, that the Respondent routinely
permitted employees to sell cookies, solicit for parties and Avon products in work areas other
then there own during work time as long as it did not unduly impact productivity. When Vela
was confronted with a section of the Employee 2005 Handbook (GC Exh. 3, p. 29), that covered
solicitation, she admitted that not only was she not aware of its provisions but the policy was not
enforced by the Respondent.

Both Polewski and Ashby testified that the Respondent does not enforce its solicitation
policy on the shop floor and would only curtail the solicitation if it dramatically impacted
productivity. Indeed, Polewski noted that he was not aware of the Handbook provision
prohibiting solicitation in work areas on work time.

Polewski further testified that he heard a rumor about a decertification petition being
distributed in the facility but he never observed Wickhorst soliciting signatures from employees
on work or non-work time. He also noted that it was not unusual for Wickhorst to have a yellow
pad in her possession, as part of her job was to take orders which she often placed on a yellow
pad.
b Analysis

The General Counsel’s witness proffered to support these allegations did not
conclusively establish that Polewski knew that the signatures on the yellow pad represented a
decertification petition. Indeed, the General Counsel did not rebut Polewski’s testimony that he
never observed Wickhorst soliciting signatures from employees nor that he observed the
decertification petition. Likewise, Vela was unable to contradict Polewski and Ashby’s testimony
that the Respondent’s no solicitation and distribution rules were not routinely enforced. To the
contrary, Vela acknowledged that employees were permitted to solicit and sell products to other
co-workers in work areas other than there own on work time as long as it did not impact on
productivity.

Under these circumstances, and particularly noting that Vela did not know what was on
the yellow pad with the exception of signatures, it cannot be established that the Respondent
violated the Act as alleged and I recommend that paragraph 5 (c)(i)and (ii) of the complaint be
dismissed.

4. Allegations Concerning David Cerda

The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 5 (d) of the complaint that Cerda unlawfully
assisted employees in their attempts to decertify the Union by asking employees if they wanted
to pay union dues.

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a. Facts

The General Counsel presented the testimony of Wickhorst to sustain this allegation.
Wickhorst testified that she asked Cerda on February 35 to translate several questions for two
co-workers who did not speak English. One of the questions that Cerda translated was whether
the two employees wanted to continue paying union dues. Additionally, the General Counsel
argues that because the Respondent did not respond to this specific allegation in its answer to
the complaint, the allegation must be found to have been admitted and a violation of the Act
found.

b. Analysis

As I previously found above, the question proffered to the two Spanish speaking
employees was initiated by Wickhorst, a bargaining unit employee. Cerda merely asked the
question in Spanish so Wickhorst could obtain a response.

Under these circumstances, I do not find that Cerda independently asked the two
employees whether they wanted to continue paying union dues.

With respect to the Respondent’s failure to specifically respond to this complaint
allegation, I find that its answer states that the Respondent denies each and every factual
allegation contained in the complaint that is not expressly admitted herein.

Therefore, based on the foregoing and particularly noting that the General Counsel did
not sustain this allegation, I recommend that it be dismissed.

C. The 8(a)(1) and (5) Allegation

The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 6 (h) of the complaint that since February 3,
Respondent unilaterally changed the union access provision contained in Article 12 of the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement.6

1. Facts

Munoz is the business agent for the Union and has serviced the employees
in the unit for approximately four months. During this period, Munoz developed a practice of
contacting Ashby at least twenty-four hours in advance of her desire to access the facility and
meet with employees.7 Once such notice is given, Munoz is not required to apprise Ashby of
the nature or reason for her visit to the facility. Likewise, there is no requirement that Ashby
must confirm the visit with Munoz.

5 I note that the General Counsel’s complaint allegation alleges the violative conduct took
place on February 26.
6 Article 12.3 states: It is further understood and agreed that a representative of the Union
shall have access to the premises, at mutually agreed times with the Employer, to confer and to
adjust grievances or hear complaints. The meetings shall not take place in work areas or during
work time of the employee involved, unless mutually agreed upon in advance by the Employer
and the Union. Union representatives shall, whenever possible, provide at least four (4) hours
of advance notice of their intent to visit the premises (GC Exh. 2).
7 Ashby’s testimony and record evidence confirms this practice (R Exh. 3).

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On February 2, Munoz instructed her secretary to contact Ashby and let him know that
Munoz wanted to visit the facility on February 3 around noon. Since the secretary was unable
to personally talk with Ashby, she left a message for him and also notified another manager that
Munoz intended to visit the facility the next day.

Ashby noted that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement expired on February 1,
and since that time there has been no agreement that alters the union access provisions.
Ashby admits that on February 2 he received a telephone message from his secretary in which
Munoz requested to come to the facility the next day around noon (GC Exh. 4).

Ashby testified that he returned Munoz’s telephone call around 2:30 p.m. on February 2,
and left a message that February 3 was not a good date for her to visit and that she should call
back to reschedule. Ashby did not receive a return telephone call from Munoz, and when she
arrived at the facility on February 3 around 11:50 a.m., Ashby informed Munoz that he had left a
telephone message for her that he could not meet with her that day since it was not a mutually
agreeable time. Ashby credibly testified that the Respondent had scheduled two meetings that
day with separate groups of employees to give a status update on the course of collective
bargaining negotiations from the Employers standpoint.

Ashby asserts that when he informed Munoz on February 3 that she could not have
access to the premises, she called him an “asshole” and gave him the “middle finger.” Ashby
responded that since the contract had expired, he did not want to see her on the premises
again. Ashby testified, however, that he made the statement in the heat of passion and on
February 6, he permitted Munoz access to the premises to conduct Union related business.
Indeed, after the misunderstanding on February 3, the parties agree that the provisions of
Article 12.3 have been followed without incident.

2. Analysis

It is hornbook law that once a collective bargaining agreement expires, the terms and
conditions of employment remain in full force and effect until a new agreement is reached or the
parties reach a good faith bargaining impasse. Indeed, the Respondent apprised the
employees during the all-employee meeting on February 3 that they have been operating with
the expired agreement and will continue to do so (R Exh. 7).

The evidence establishes that Munoz fully complied with the provisions for advance
notice under Article 12.3 of the parties’ agreement. Ashby credibly testified that once Munoz
complies with the advance notice provisions contained in the agreement he would routinely call
her back to confirm that the visit was mutually agreeable. Typically, if Munoz wanted to meet
with Ashby, and it was not an agreeable time, Ashby would request that the visit be
rescheduled. Ashby could not recall an instance when the Union left a message requesting a
definite time to visit the facility that he did not return the telephone call and confirm whether the
visit would be mutually agreeable.

It is noted that Article 12. 3 states that a representative of the Union shall have access to
the premises only at a mutually agreed time with the Employer. While Munoz provided advance
notice under Article 12.3 of the parties’ agreement to access the premises, Ashby had legitimate
business reasons for denying her access and so informed her by a return telephone call on
February 2. Munoz did not testify to the contrary.

Under these circumstances, I find that the Respondent adhered to the provisions of

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Article 12. 3 of the parties’ agreement and did not unilaterally change its provisions without
notice or bargaining with the Union. Therefore, I recommend that paragraph 6 (h) of the
complaint be dismissed as the General Counsel did not establish an 8(a)(1) and (5) violation of
the Act.
Conclusions of Law

1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it asked an employee why she
needed a union and informed the employee that they could give the employees good
benefits.
4. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it asked employees about
there sentiment for the Union and told them they could do better than being
represented by the Union, by encouraging employees to decertify the Union and
asking them if they had already signed the decertification petition, by permitting
employees to solicit signatures for the decertification petition on work time and in
work areas and by asking employees whether they wanted to pay union dues.
5. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act since it did not
unilaterally change the union access provision in the parties’ collective bargaining
agreement.

Remedy

Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended8

ORDER

The Respondent, Mickey’s Linen & Towel Supply, Inc., its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from
(a) Asking employees why they need a union and telling employees that they
could give them good benefits
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Hammond,
Indiana, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”9 Copies of the

8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
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notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 13, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since February, 10, 2006.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.

Dated, Washington, D.C. October 2, 2006

____________________
Bruce D. Rosenstein
Administrative Law Judge

_________________________
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–75–06
Hammond, IN

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities

WE WILL NOT ask employees why they need a union or tell employees that we can give them
good benefits.

WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights protected by the Act.

Mickey’s Linen & Towel Supply, Inc.
(Employer)

Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
209 S. LaSalle Street, Suite 900
Chicago, IL 60604
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
312-353-7570
.THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER-312-353-7170