Merrimack Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 15, 1941

31 N.L.R.B. 900 (N.L.R.B. 1941)

In the Matter of MERRIMACK MANUFACTURING COMPANY and TEXTILE
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
Case No. C-1802.-Decided May 15, 1941
. Jurisdiction : textile manufacturing industry.
Unfair Labor Practices.
Interference, Restraint, and Coercion: anti-union statements.
Discrimination: charges alleging the discharge of an employee because of his
membership and activity on behalf of the union and because he assisted an agent
of the Board in investigating charges filed against employer, dismissed.
Remedial Orders : employer ordered to cease and desiist unfair labor practices.
Practice and procedure : employer's claim that Board is without jurisdiction
to determine whether discharge of an employee constituted a violation of the
Act because the employee had not complied with the grievance procedure pro-
vided for in a contract with union held without merit in view of Section 10 (a).
Mr. Alexander E. Wilson, Jr., and Mr. John C. McRee, for the
Board.
Benners, Burr, McKamy A Forman, by Mr. Borden Burr and
Mr. Grady Patterson, of Birmingham, Ala., for the respondent.
Mr. R. H. Brazzell, of Atlanta, Ga., and Mr. H. S. Williams, of
Huntsville, Ala., for the Union.
Miss Mary E. Perkins, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges and amended charges duly filed by Textile Workers
Union of America, herein called the Union, the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director
for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued its complaint dated
December 2, 1940, a' ainst Merrimack Manufacturing Company,
Huntsville, Alabama, herein called the respondent, alleging that the
respondent had engaged and was engaging in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and
(4) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint,
31 N. L. R B., No. 152.
900
MERRIMACK MANUFACTURING COMPANY 901
accompanied by notice of hearing, were duly served upon the
respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged
in substance that the respondent : (1) on October 25, 1939, discharged
Herbert E. Foster and thereafter refused to reemploy liim, because
lie had joined and assisted a labor organization, because he had
earlier filed charges against the respondent in this case, and because
he had assisted agents of the Board in the investigation of said
charges; and (2) by these, and various other enumerated acts, inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees ii ` the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The respondent filed
its answer dated December 16, 1940, denying that it- had engaged in
any unfair labor practices. The respondent in its answer admitted
that it discharged Foster, alleging, however, that it did so solely
because of Foster's inefficiency and insubordination; 1 and further
asserted that the Board is without jurisdiction to determine whether
the discharge constituted a violation of the Act because Foster, had
not complied with the grievance procedure provided for in a con-
tract, in existence at the time of his discharge, between the respondent
and the Union. This contention the Board finds to be without merit,
in view of the fact that Section 10 (a) of the Act confers on the
Board exclusive power to prevent unfair labor. practices, unaffected
by any other means of adjustment established by agreement or
otherwise.2
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Huntsville, Alabama, on
December 16 and 17, 1940, before William B. Barton, the Trial Ex-
aminer duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board
and the respondent were represented by counsel and the Union by its
State Director; all participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to
be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. At the begin-
ning of the hearing counsel for the respondent objected to proceeding
unless he was given certain particulars as to the allegations in the
complaint charging the respondent with violating Section 8 (1) of
the Act. The Trial Examiner ruled that such allegations were suffi-
ciently specific and that the hearing should proceed, reserving to the
respondent the right to show later, as to any particular matter, that
it has been duly surprised.3 At the close' of the Board's case,
1 At the close of the hearing , the respondent 's counsel stated that he was relying on
inefficiency only as included in insubordination.'
a National Labor Relations Board v. Newark Morning Ledger Company, decided April
17, 1941 (C. C. A 3)
3 After this ruling there was discussion off the record between counsel for the Board and
counsel for the respondent . Although counsel for the respondent did not withdraw his
request,for a bill of particulars, he did not after this discussion urge such request.
902 DECISIONS OF - ATI'O\AL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
counsel for the Board moved to conform the pleadings to the proof
with respect to the spelling of names, dates and other minor matters,
and the Trial Examiner granted this motion without objection by the
other parties. At the close of the Board's case and again at the end
of'the hearing, counsel for the respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on the ground that there was no relevant or substantial evidence
to support it. The Trial Examiner reserved his ruling on this motion
and in so far as it was inconsistent with his findings and conclusions,
denied it in his Intermediate Report. During the course of the hear-
ing the Trial Examiner made other rulings on motions and on ob-
jections to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed the
rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial errors
were committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed.
On January 24, 1941, the Trial Examiner filed his Intermediate
Report, copies of which were duly served upon the respondent and the
Union, in which he found that the respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, wi,nin the
meaning of Section 8 (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and
recommended that it cease and desist from such practices and post no-
tices stating that it will do so. He further found that the respondent
had not engaged in any unfair labor practice by discharging Herbert
E. Foster, and recommended that the charges in the complaint relating
to this discharge be dismissed. On March 5, 1941, the Union and the
respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and briefs in
support of their exceptions, and on March 14, 1941, the respondent
filed its brief in answer to the exceptions of the Union.
The respondent, on March 5, 1941, filed a motion to reopen the hear-
ing to take further evidence in explanation or denial of certain state-
ments of Wright and Cook, supervisory employees of the respondent,
which were relied upon in part by the Trial Examiner to support his
finding that the respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8 (1) of the Act. In support of its motion, the
respondent asserted that it had failed to introduce evidence to contro-
vert that of the Board because it believed, during the hearing, that
the Board had offered testimony concerning these statements solely
for the purpose of furnishing a background. for the charges of dis-
crimination against Foster. - We think the evidence, itself, in con-
junction' with the complaint, afforded ample notice of the" purpose
for which it was offered. The respondent failed to specify any
grounds for its asserted belief, or to avail itself of the right accorded
by the Trial Examiner to show, as to these matters, that it had been
surprised. The motion is hereby denied.
On April 10, 1941, pursuant to notice duly served upon the re-
spondent and the Union, a hearing for the purpose of oral argument
11
MERRIMACK MANUFACTURING COMPANY 903
was held before the Board in Washington, D. C. The respondent was
represented,by counsel, and participated in the hearing. The Board
has considered the exceptions and briefs filed by the respondent and
the Union, and, to the extent that the exceptions are inconsistent
with the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order set forth
below, finds them to be without merit.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The respondent was incorporated under the laws of the State of
Massachusetts in 1822 and is licensed to do business in the State of
Alabama. It is engaged in the manufacture and sale of cotton cloth.
The respondent's principal office is located at Boston, Massachusetts.
It owns mills at Lowell, Massachusetts, and Huntsville, Alabama ;
only its Huntsville mills, however, are here involved.
The principal raw material used by the respondent at its Hunts- o
ville mills is cotton. The cotton is purchased by the Boston office
of the respondent through brokers, some of whom have Boston
representatives from whom the purchases are made. Approx
imately 25 per cent of the cotton comes from Alabama, and- approx-
imately 75, per cent of it comes from points outside the State. Ninety
per cent of the machinery used in the Huntsville mills is obtained
from outside the State-of Alabama: -
During the year 1939, the respondent produced at its Huntsville
mills approximately 7 million pounds of cloth, of which approxi-
mately 90 per cent was shipped out of the State of Alabama.
The total employment at the Huntsville Mills 4 is approximately
950 persons including spare men. Of this number, approximately
35 are supervisory and clerical employees.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America is a labor organization: It
is affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations and main-
tains at Huntsville a local union, No. 38,a which admits to member-
ship employees of the respondent.
4 The respondent 's Huntsville mills are known as Mill No 1 and Mill No 2, respectively.
It appears that the organization of the respondent 's Huntsville employees since 1933
has in effect been the same , but has undergone changes in affiliation. In March 1937, the
Textile Workers , Organizing Committee succeeded the United Textile Workers of America
In May 1939 , the Textile Workers Union of America in turn became the successor organi-
zation Local 38 has been affiliated with each of these organizations in turn.
904 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS, BOARD
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
0
A. Interference, restraint, and coercion
In 1933 the United Textile Workers of America organized a local,
No. 38, among the respondent's employees at Huntsville and there
has been such a labor organization at the Huntsville plant ever since.
In 1937 bargaining 'negotiations took place between the respondent
and Textile Workers Organizing Committee, after a consent election
in July of that year by which a majority of the employees had desig-
nated that labor organization as their representative for purposes
of collective bargaining. A contract was put in final form by Decem-
ber 1937, and was approved and signed by Textile Workers Organiz-
ing Committee representatives, but was never signed by the
respondent. On December 18, 1937, the respondent's Huntsville
mills ceased operations and did not resume operations until January
2, 1939. During this interval the Textile Workers Organizing Com-
mittee and an American Federation of Labor local union each made
claims to the respondent that it represented a majority of the Hunts-
ville employees, the contention being resolved in favor of the former
organization by an election held at the direction of the Board on
October 24, 1938.° Thereafter, on December 3, 1938, the respondent
and that labor organization executed a contract.7 This contract
among other provisions set up certain standards by -which the
respondent should select its personnel when it resumed operation of
the Huntsville mills, and assigned the task of making such selection
to W. H. Ivey, who appears to have been an agent of the Alabama
State Employment Service. As stated above, the Huntsville mills
reopened on January 2, 1939. Ivey completed selecting the personnel
by about May 1939: Ever since that time the Union has contended
that the respondent did not comply with the contract with respect
to the employees it rehired.8
In the spring of 1939 after the mills had resumed operations,
Mrs. Nelia Golden, an employee under one Wright, overseer of the
spinning and spooling department, went with her sister-in-law, also
an employee under Wright, to see him about ' the kind of work
assigned to Golden. Golden had earlier been taken off her regular
job and put on the extra board .9 She had then presented through
the Union's grievance committee a claim that the respondent should
8 Matter of Merrimack Manufacturing Company and American Federation of Labor;
Matter of Merrimack Manufacturing Company and Textile Workers Organizing Committee,
9 N L R B 173
° This contract expired December 31, 19;9.
8 See footnote 15, infra.
- e Persons on the extra board are subject to call for extra work when it is available.
MERRIMACK MANUFACTURING COMPANY 905
put her back to work. Pursuant to a settlement, apparently follow-
ing the grievance procedure provided for in the contract of December
3, 1938, the respondent had her put back to work; but after 2 days
"they had taken her off the job she could run and put her on one she
couldn't run." Golden then asked Wright for her old job back.
Wright told her that if she could not handle the job to which she
had been assigned he would have to put her back on the extra board.
Golden then said, referring to the Union's grievance committee, that
she would "take it up with the committee again" and Wright replied,
"Committee, indeed. That is what is the matter today., I am not
working under any committees or taking any committee's orders:
I am running this myself. This is my business." There was no
denial of this conversation as above stated.
Four or five months after the mills reopened in January 1939,
Elbert G. Foster,10 an employee of the respondent and an officer in
the Union, while at work in the respondent's mill No. 2, asked Tom
Cook to make payment on a note Cook had given Foster. Cook, a
"second hand," or supervisory employee,11 at the No. 1 mill, had bor-
rowed the money during the shut-down of the mills in 1938. To
Foster's request for a payment, Cook replied, "If it hadn't been for
you keeping me out of work, perhaps I would have had the note-all
paid off. . . All the unions ever did is to cause trouble." Foster
then said to Cook, "You mean to say that you don't aim to pay me
because I am a union man? If you do, just say so." Cook replied,
"Th at is the way I feel about it." 12 Foster's testimony to the above
effect is undenied.
Lark R. Davis, an employee of the respondent for 15 years and
a member of the Union, testified that during the summer of 1939 he
had a conversation on the job with Henry D. Mullins, overseer
of the weaving and slashing department. Davin described this
conversation as follows :
Me and Mr. Mullins was standing there talking. We were cur-
tailing. I asked him was there anything in sight, of us getting
any more time? He says, "No, nothing I can see."' He says, "if
it wasn't for the damnable CIO and John L. Lewis this country
wouldn't be in the shape it is in."
Davis also testified that about 3 months prior to the hearing, while
she was at work, James E. Marks, his supervisor'13 brought one May-
10 Elbert G. Foster is a brother of Herbert E Foster, discussed hereinafter.
Cook's duties and degree of authority were not described
Foster testified that Cook later paid part of the note.
'a Marks, like Cook, bore the title of "second hand." He was in charge of weaving and
slashing on two floors at No. 2 mill on the 2 to 10 p. in. shift, and in the evening, after
Mullins, overseer of weaving and slashing in both mills, had gone home, was left in charge
of mill No. 2.
906 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIO\'S BOARD
burn Neill to Davis to act as the latter's helper. Mayburn Neill's
brother, Jim Neill, was recording secretary of the Union, and signed
the contract of December 3, 1938, as 'such. Davis testified that Marks
said on this occasion, "Jim 'Neill went CIO crazy around here.
Mayburn don't deal with it. He is a pretty good fellow."
Both Mullins and Marks testified that they had engaged in the
conversations referred to -by Davis; each, however, denied that he
had made the statements attributed to him by Davis as set forth above.
On the basis of his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner
found that'these conversations took place as testified by Davis; and
the Board, upon the basis of the Trial Examiner's finding and the
entire record in the case, also so finds.
The remarks of both Mullins and Wright were made at times when
the employees to whom they were directed were especially susceptible
to employer pressure by reason of the uncertainty of the continuation
of their employment; the necessary effect of the statements of all four
named supervisory employees of the respondent was to notify the
employees that the respondent was hostile to the Union and to
discourage them from engaging in activities on the Union's behalf.
We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that by the remarks of Wright,
Cook, Mullins, and Marks set forth above, the respondent has inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of-
their rights to self-organization, to-form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
B. The alleged discrimination against Herbert E. Foster
- Herbert E. Foster began work for the respondent early in the year
1930. After about 3 months as a learner he was assigned work as a
weaver at which he was employed continuously until the mills closed
in December 1937. On or about January 24, 1939, after the mills had
reopened early that month, Foster again received employment with
the respondent as a weaver and worked as such until the termination of
his employment or or about October 25, 1939.
Foster had been a union member continuously since 1933, being one
of the charter members of the local 14 in the Huntsville mills. For some
time prior to March 1936, Foster "was chairman of the shop committee,
in the weave room," but at that time he discontinued as chairman of the
shop committee to become vice president of the local and he served as
14 It appears that the same local had had affiliation with the successive labor organiza-
tions described in Section II, supra.
MERRIMACK MANUFACTURING COMPANY 907
vice president during the balance of the year 1936. During his term
as vice president, Foster also served on the grievance committee for the
entire mill. In 1938, the local union elected Foster a trustee and he was
r:erving as such at the time his employment was, terminated.
During September and October 1939, Stewart Meachem, a field
examiner for the Board, went to Huntsville and spent several weeks
investigating a charge which had been filed against the, respondent, the
charge alleging that the respondent had discriminatorily refused to,
reemploy 180 named persons on January 2, 1939.15 Foster was one of
three or four employees who assisted Meachem in making this investi-
gation. He and William F. Splawn, another employee, used Splawn's
automobile while they were off shift during the mornings, over a period
of about 2 weeks during the time Meachem was in Huntsville, to call on
various employees, and brought a number of such employees to see
Meachem for the purpose of making statements to the latter relevant
to the charge which had been filed 16 Foster also took Meachem to see
certain employees.
Thereafter, on October 25, 1939, about 6 p. M."17 Foster was standing
at the end of the looms" in that portion of the plant where he worked
and was talking to Agnes Greene, another employee whose job it was to
keep filled with yarn the batteries which hold the yarn used by the
'looms. Marks, the second hand and Foster's superior, entered the room
while Foster was talking with Greene. Foster described what happened
after Marks entered the room as follows :
Well, he walked by me. I think he had a Coca-Cola bottle in
his hand. I won't be sure. He walked over to the rack, the
Coca-Cola bottle rack was just on the right of me. He walked
around there and set that bottle up and came back by me and
punched me in the back. He says, "I thought I told you not to
be talking when you had looms stopped." ' I said, "Mr. Marks
I haven't any looms stopped." Mr. Marks pointed out a loons
that was stopped. I says, "Mr. Marks, that loom has a pick-out
on it." is
After some other discussion Marks said, "There is some other
looms over there," referring to certain other looms that were stopped.
15 This charge was filed on September 21, 1939 , and appears , at least indirectly, to
embody the contention of the Union that the respondent did not comply with the contract
mentioned above as to hiring employees after the mills reopened on January 2, 1939.
10 It appears that most of these calls were made in Merrimack Village, a community
of homes owned and maintained for its employees by the respondent near its Huntsville
mills.
17 Six p in . was during working hours and about the middle of Foster ' s work period
Is A pick-out is a defect in the cloth which, when discovered , must be repaired before the
loom is operated further. When the weaver discovers a pick -out it is his duty to shut
down the loom until the factory hand that takes care of them has had an opportunity to
repair it.
908 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABORS RELATIONS BOARD
Foster then contended and Marks denied that these looms had stopped
during the time Marks was talking to Foster. During this con-
versation Foster, was part of the time gesturing by shaking the
forefinger of his right hand at Marks a few inches from the latter's
face. Marks slapped down Foster's hand. Foster pushed Marks
"back against the beam truck," not hard enough to push Marks
clown, but hard enough to make him stagger. About this time Marks
pulled a knife approximately 4 inches long out of his pocket. He
held it unopened in his hand and Foster apparently never saw it,
although he told Marks not to take anything out of his pockets.
Foster testified that as part of the above episode, Marks told Foster
that he was fired and he should get his money "down at the gate
office." Marks denied that he made such a statement and testified
that he said to Foster, Now, if this is the best you can do, the gate
is the place for you, standing up here and arguing and not running
your work." The same day Marks made a memorandum of what had
taken place and later gave it to Mullins, overseer of weaving and
slashing and the superior of Marks and Foster. On the basis of
this memorandum, his observation of Foster and Marks as witnesses,
and the entire record, the Trial Examiner was convinced, and found,
that Marks on this occasion made the statements testified to by Foster,
substantially as stated above; and the Board, on the basis of the
Trial Examiner's finding and the entire record also so finds.19
A few minutes after the above events, Foster said to Marks in
"the big room" of the mill to place somebody else, on his work,
and left the mill.
The next day Marks reported to Mullins his version of the above
events. Mullins then called Foster to his office and interviewed
Foster. He also interviewed the other employees ivho had been in
the room at the time, taking their signed statements. He turned these
statements over to Hart, plant superintendent. After making this
investigation, Mullins informed Foster that he could not return to
work, stating tliat Foster "had walked out on the job." At the hear-
ing Mullins testified. ". . . I had no opportunity to discharge
Mr. Foster, because he quit before I saw him, and he wanted to go
back to work, and the fact that he had been guilty of direct in-
subordination is grounds for not allowing him to return to work,"
It is extremely doubtful if Mullins thought on October 26, 1939, that
Foster had quit work. It is difficult to reconcile such contention with
the painstaking investigation made by Mullins after the controversy
19 The Respondent contends that Marks had no power to discharge Foster. Since
Mullins later upheld Marks in the controversy with Foster and refused to place Foster
back at work , it becomes unnecessary to determine whether Marks as a usual thing had
power to discharge employees under his supervision.
MERRIMACK MANUFACTURING COMPANY 909
between the latter and Marks on October 25. Had Mullins actually
thought that Foster had quit work there would have been no point in
his ever starting such a meticulous inquiry into the merits of the
controversy . Moreover , the respondent 's answer alleges that Foster
was discharged . We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the respond-
ent by the conduct of Marks on October 25 , 1939, discharged Foster and
that Mullins by his ,conduct thereafter approved of the discharge by
Marks. '
The sole question remaining is whether the respondent in the action
taken by Marks and Mullins discriminated against Foster because of
Foster's membership and activity on behalf of the union and because
of the assistance rendered by him in the investigation being made by
Meachem as described above. Both Mullins and 'Marks vigorously
denied that Foster's union affiliations entered into their consideration
in their action against him . Mullins denied having any knowledge
at the time of his action against Foster that the, investigation by
Meachem had been made. Marks at first also denied any such knowl-
edge, but later admitted that he had known some kind of investigation
was being made. The record fails to establish, however, either by
this testimony of Mullins and Marks or in any other manner that the
respondent at the time of Foster 's discharge , had knowledge of the
assistance Foster himself had shortly before rendered to Meachem as
described above. Moreover , we are impressed by the fact that on
two other occasions prior to October 25, 1939, Marks had spoken to
Foster with reference to the latter 's talking with other employees
while on the job.
We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that by discharging Herbert
E. Foster on October 25 , 1939, the respondent did not discriminate in
regard to his hire and tenure of employment and did not discharge
or otherwise discriminate against him on account of his filing charges
or assisting agents of the Board in investigating charges filed against
the respondent.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
We find that the activities of the respondent, set forth in Section
III, A , above, occurring in connection with the operations of the,re-
spondent described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States , and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
910 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has interfered with, restrained,
and coerced , its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act , we shall order the respondent to cease and desist
from its unfair labor practices and to take certain affirmative action
which we find necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the respondent has not discriminated ill regard
to the hire and tenure of employment of Herbert E. Foster, we shall
dismiss the complaint as to such charges.
- Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. Textile Workers Union of America is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. The respondent, by interfering with, restraining, and coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1)- of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
4. The respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices , within
the meaning of Section 8 (3) or (4) of the Act.
-ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in the case , and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board
hereby orders that the respondent, Merrimack Manufacturing Com-
pany , Huntsville, Alabama, and its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection , as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
\
MERRIMACK MANUFACTURING COMPANY 911
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post immediately in conspicuous places at its plant, and main-
tain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date
of posting, notices to its employees stating that the respondent will
not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered to cease and desist
in paragraph 1 of this Order;
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be; and it hereby is,
dismissed in so far as it alleges that the respondent engaged in any
unfair labor practices by its discharge of Herbert E. Foster.