Mail Handlers Local 307 (Postal Service)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 7, 2003

338 N.L.R.B. 1154 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1154
Local 307, National Postal Mail Handlers Union, a
Division of the Laborers’ International Union of
North America, AFL–CIO (U.S. Postal Service)
and Vicky Lynn Kaseta. Case 7–CB–12192(P)
May 7, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS WALSH
AND ACOSTA
On December 26, 2000, Administrative Law Judge C.
Richard Miserendino issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent
with this Decision and Order and to adopt the recom-
mended Order as modified.1
We affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it failed to inform Kaseta
of the time of her grievance hearing.2 We reverse the
judge’s finding, however, that the Respondent also vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by charging Kaseta for photo-
copies of her union files.
The facts relevant to the photocopies finding may be
briefly stated. Kaseta sent the Union a letter dated Au-
gust 22, 1999, requesting copies of: (1) her union files
for the past 6 months, (2) a December 9, 1998 Letter of
Warning, and (3) an April 19, 1999 Letter of Suspension.
Kaseta had made previous requests for copies of her un-
ion files in February 1997, and in January 1999. The
earlier copies were provided to her at no cost.
One month later, when Kaseta still had not received
the requested copies, she sent the Union a second letter
dated September 20, reiterating her request. Kaseta then
sent a third letter, dated October 4, 1999, complaining
that she still had not received the copies and revising her
request to include all grievances, complaints, notes, and
memos in her files since December 1, 1998. Union
President Glenn Shelton responded to both letters, advis-

1 We shall substitute a new notice with remedial language that more
closely conforms to the violation found.
2 In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent’s failure to in-
form Kaseta of the time of her grievance hearing violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(A), we do not rely on the judge’s conclusion, in sec. III,H of his
decision, that the “evidence supports a reasonable inference that [the]
failure to notify Kaseta was willful.”
The Union has filed a request that the Board supplement the record
with the final decision in Kaseta’s grievance. We deny the request as
the final decision is irrelevant to the Board’s determination in this case.
ing Kaseta that her files were being compiled and that
she would be notified when they were ready.
On October 13, 1999, Shelton sent Kaseta a letter ex-
plaining that her files were compiled and ready for in-
spection, and that copies would cost $.10 a page. Shel-
ton testified that there would be a charge for the copies
because he had been told that Kaseta was making a du-
plicative request for copies of her union files, that this
was the first time anyone had made a duplicative request
for copies, and that he believed that anyone else who
made a duplicative request for copies would have re-
ceived the same response, i.e., that the copies would cost
$.10 a page.
In finding the imposition of charges for the photocop-
ies of Kaseta’s union files unlawful, the judge observed
that there was no evidence that other unit members had
ever been charged for copies of their union files, nor was
there evidence that the Union had an established policy
of charging for duplicative copy requests. The judge
further observed that, even if the Union had such a pol-
icy, Kaseta’s requests were not duplicative of earlier
ones.
A union breaches its duty of fair representation when
its conduct towards a unit member is arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or in bad faith. The review of a union’s perform-
ance must be “highly deferential” and mere negligence is
not a breach of the duty. See Letter Carriers Branch
529, 319 NLRB 879, 881 (1995) (citing Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Airline Pilots Assn. v. O’Neill,
499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991)). A union’s conduct is arbitrary
where, in light of the legal and factual landscape at the
time, its behavior is so far outside the range of reason-
ableness as to be irrational. Id. Contrary to the judge, we
find that the Union’s action of charging Kaseta for what
it believed were duplicative copies of her union files, and
imposing the copying charge without first establishing a
formal policy for imposing such charges, did not breach
its duty of fair representation. Any mistake by the Union
regarding whether Kaseta’s request was for duplicative
copies was negligence, but not more. Furthermore, the
Union’s act of imposing copying charges on the first
person that it believed had requested duplicative copies
of union files, even though it did not have a preexisting
formal rule imposing charges for duplicative copies, was
certainly not unreasonable. Thus, we find, contrary to
the judge, that the Union’s actions towards Kaseta were
not arbitrary, discriminatory, or taken in bad faith, and
therefore did not violate the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Local 307, National Postal
338 NLRB No. 179
MAIL HANDLERS LOCAL 307 (POSTAL SERVICE) 1155
Mail Handlers Union, a Division of the Laborers’ Inter-
national Union of North America, AFL–CIO (Local
307), its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take
the action set forth in the Order as modified below.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
“(a) Refusing to inform employees of the times of their
step 1 grievance meetings.”
2. Delete paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a) and (b), relettering
the subsequent paragraphs.
3. Substitute the following for relettered paragraphs
2(a) and 2(b):
“(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its union offices and hiring halls in Detroit, Michigan,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.26” Cop-
ies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 7, after being signed by the Respon-
dent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately on receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees and members are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
“(b) Furnish signed copies of the notice to the Re-
gional Director for Region 7 for posting by the United
States Postal Service (USPS), if willing, at all locations
where notices to members are customarily posted.”
4. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

CHAIRMAN BATTISTA, concurring.
I agree that the Respondent Union breached its duty of
fair representation (DFR) by its failure to notify Kaseta
of the September 30 grievance meeting. I note that she
asked to be notified, and the Union failed to explain the
lack of notification. The result of that meeting was that
the discipline of Kaseta was upheld, albeit reduced from
14 days to 8 days. On Kaseta’s complaint about exclu-
sion, another meeting was held, attended by Kaseta. But
the 8-day discipline was still imposed. The Union argues
that, in Section 301 hybrid cases (alleging breach of DFR
by union and breach of contract by employer), the plain-
tiff must show, inter alia, that the grievance outcome was
affected by the breach of the DFR. I believe that there is
wisdom in harmonizing the law of DFR in Board cases
with the law of DFR in hybrid Section 301 cases. How-
ever, even accepting that principle, I note that the Union,
having breached its DFR in regard to the first meeting,
was the wrongdoer. It therefore had the duty to disen-
tangle the consequences of its unlawful conduct. The
Union has not shown that the result that was reached at
the second meeting was not affected by the result reached
at the first meeting. Accordingly, I concur in the viola-
tion.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to inform any unit em-
ployee of the date, time, and place of a Step I grievance
meeting when that employee has specifically requested
or has a right to be so informed.

LOCAL 307, NATIONAL POSTAL MAIL
HANDLERS UNION, A DIVISION OF THE
LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH
AMERICA, AFL–CIO (U.S. POSTAL SERVICE)
Dwight R. Kirksey, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Barbara Harvey, Esq., of Detroit, Michigan, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
C. RICHARD MISERENDINO, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Detroit, Michigan, on April 25 and 26, 2000.
The charge was filed by Charging Party Vicky Lynn Kaseta
(Kaseta) on September 17, 1999,1 and amended on January 10,
2000. The complaint was issued on January 11, 2000, and was
amended at trial. (Tr. 67, 74, 182.) It alleges that on various
dates between May–October 1999, Local 307, National Postal
Mail Handlers Union, a Division of the Laborers’ International
Union of North America, AFL–CIO (Union) failed to represent
Kaseta for unfair, arbitrary, and invidious reasons in breach of
its fiduciary duty to bargaining unit employees in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
The Respondent’s timely answer denied the material allega-
tions of the complaint.2

1 All dates are 1999, unless otherwise indicated.
2 The Union moved at trial to dismiss par. 8(h) of the complaint on
the grounds that the subject grievance was resolved during the griev-
ance procedure. (Tr. 7–8.) I reserved ruling on the motion, which I
now deny for the reasons stated in this decision.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1156
The parties have been afforded a full opportunity to appear,
present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and
file briefs.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Union, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent admits, and I find, that the Board has juris-
diction over the United States Postal Service (Postal Service)
pursuant to Section 1209 of the Postal Reorganization Act.
The Respondent also admits, and I find, that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Respondent’s Motions to Dismiss
1. The 10(b) issue
In her brief at page 21, the Respondent’s counsel argues that
paragraph 8(c) of the complaint, alleging that on August 11,
1999, Chief Union Steward Georgia Butler failed to represent
Kaseta in an EEO matter, is time barred by Section 10(b) of the
Act. The Respondent asserts that the claim first appeared in the
amended charge, which was filed on January 10, 2000, more
than 6 months after date of the alleged violation.
In Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115 (1988), the Board identified
certain factors for determining whether the allegations arising
from a charge, which is otherwise untimely, can be added to a
complaint based on their close relationship to the allegations in
a timely filed charge. Under the “closely related” test, it must
be determined whether the otherwise untimely allegations in
the complaint (1) involve the same legal theory as the timely
allegations in the charge; (2) arise from the same factual cir-
cumstances; and (3) entail the same or similar defenses by the
Respondent. In assessing each of these factors, the evidence
shows that the original charge filed on September 16, 1999,
expressly alleges, among other things, that “the union represen-
tatives at the GWY Detroit, Michigan has (sic) knowingly re-
fused to represent me.” Thus, I find that the allegations in para-
graph 8(c) of the complaint, which are based on the amended
charge, relate to the same legal theory of the underlying charge.
I further find that the alleged failure of Chief Union Steward
Butler to represent Kaseta at the EEO matter is part of the same
factual sequence addressed in the original charge, involving
Union Steward Bruce Lewis and Union Steward J.C. Holmes in
August 1999. Finally, I find that the Respondent’s defense
with respect to the otherwise untimely allegation in the
amended charge is similar to the defense concerning the other
alleged failures of the Union to represent Kaseta.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the allegations of para-
graph 8(c) of the complaint is denied.
2. The duty of fair representation in the investigation
of grievances
The Respondent also argues that paragraph 8(d) of the com-
plaint, alleging that Union Steward Bruce Lewis refused to
meet with Kaseta concerning a potential grievance, should be
dismissed as a matter of law because the duty of fair representa-
tion does not arise in the investigatory stages of the grievance
procedure, but only at the formal grievance level. I disagree. It
is well settled Board law that “a union owes all unit employees
the duty of fair representation, which extends to all functions of
the bargaining representative.” Letter Carriers Branch 529,
319 NLRB 879, 881 (1995). Few could argue that it is not a
function of a union steward to meet with a bargaining unit
member to discuss a potential grievance against management.
In addition, I find that the Respondent’s reliance on Team-
sters Local 307, 238 NLRB 1450, 1454, (1978), is misplaced.
In that case, the General Counsel argued that the Respondent
did not properly act as an “advocate” for the Charging Party
during an internal union hearing to investigate allegations
against a union representative. Relying on Truck Drivers, Oil
Drivers, Local 705, 209 NLRB 292 (1974), the administrative
law judge reasoned that there was an implication that the “duty
of advocacy” arises at the formal grievance level, not at the
investigative level. 238 NLRB at 1454. That conclusion falls
far short of stating that the “duty of fair representation” does
not attach until the formal grievance level. Indeed, in Service
Employees Local 579, 229 NLRB 692 (1977), which is another
case cited by administrative law judge in the Teamsters Local
307 decision, a union representative undertook to review the
personnel file of a recently discharged employee as part of the
union’s “investigation” of the basis for the discharge, even
though a grievance had not been filed. In determining that the
union acted arbitrarily in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act by failing to inquire into the validity of the stated reasons
for the discharge, the administrative law judge particularly
noted that when the union representative reviewed the dis-
charged employee’s personnel file, she undertook, intentionally
or otherwise, to represent the discharged employee at step one
of the grievance procedure.3 Having undertaken that responsi-
bility, the union representative became obligated to represent
the discharged employee “fully and fairly and to function as her
advocate.” 229 NLRB at 695.
Thus, I find that a union’s duty to fully and fairly represent
an employee arises at the investigatory level of a potential
grievance. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss paragraph 8(d)
of the complaint is denied.
3. The subsequent resolution of a grievance
The Respondent argues that paragraph 8(h), alleging that Un-
ion Steward J.C. Holmes failed to properly advise Kaseta of the
date and time of a step-1 grievance meeting, should be dis-
missed because the step-1 meeting was redone and ultimately
the discipline was rescinded. I find that adequacy of Respon-

3 In Service Employees Local 579, supra, the union representative
steadfastly maintained that the discharged employee had told her that
she did not want to file a grievance. The administrative law judge
discredited the union representative’s testimony and found that the
union representative acted arbitrarily by not acknowledging the dis-
charged employee’s “intention” of filing a grievance. Similarly, the
undisputed evidence here shows that in the early morning of August 14,
1999, Kaseta told Union Steward Lewis that she wanted to file a griev-
ance and sought him out to do so.

MAIL HANDLERS LOCAL 307 (POSTAL SERVICE) 1157
dent’s subsequent representation is irrelevant to the issue of
whether or not Holmes acted arbitrarily in failing to keep
Kaseta informed of the status of her grievance. Steelworkers
Local 3029, 250 NLRB 813 (1980).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss paragraph 8(d) of the
complaint is denied.
B. Background
The Union represents the mail handlers employed by the
Postal Service at the downtown Detroit general mail facility
and the Detroit metro airport airmail facility. The current 2-
year collective-bargaining agreement contains a four-step
grievance procedure. (R. Exh. 34, p. 69–74.) An employee,
who has a dispute with management, can file a complaint with
a union steward, which becomes the underlying basis for a
grievance. The employee has a right to be present at the step-1
grievance meeting, but the contract gives the local union stew-
ard the authority to settle or withdraw a grievance at the step-1
meeting. If the matter is not resolved at step 1 of the procedure,
it can be appealed to step 2.
Employees do not have the right to be present at the step-2
meeting. In most cases, the local union steward attends these
meetings alone and is authorized by the contract to settle or
withdraw the grievance as a result of discussions or compro-
mise at this step. If an unresolved grievance is pursued to step
3, it is handled by a regional union representative assigned by
the Union’s national office. Employees do not have the right to
be present at the step-3 grievance meeting and under the con-
tract the regional union representative has authority to settle or
withdraw the grievance at this stage.4 (Tr. 261–262.)
Employees may also grieve equal employment opportunity
discrimination (EEO) claims as a violation of the contract’s
nondiscrimination clause. (R. Exh. 34, p. 3, sec. 2.1.) Alterna-
tively, an employee may file an administrative EEO charge
under the Postal Service’s internal administrative EEO proce-
dure. Occasionally, the Union will authorize a union steward to
represent an employee in the Postal Service’s internal adminis-
trative EEO process in which case the Union pays for the union
steward’s lost worktime. If a union steward undertakes to rep-
resent an employee without authorization from the Union,
which happens from time to time, it is done on a voluntary
basis without compensation from the Union.
Charging Party Vicky Lynn Kaseta, a longtime employee,
has worked for the Postal Service for 23 years. From 1992 to
September 25, 1999,5 Kaseta worked as a mail handler at the
downtown Detroit general mail facility. During this tenure, she
was a prolific letter writer, who often followed up her missives,
with grievances protesting the Postal Service’s alleged failure
to adhere to the contract, as well disciplinary actions taken
against her. Kaseta was also openly critical of the level of rep-
resentation by her local union, and eventually developed the
view that the Union and management were conspiring against
her. This case focuses on a series of incidents, which occurred

4 The provisions of step 4 of the grievance procedure are not impli-
cated in this case.
5 On September 25, 1999, Kaseta voluntarily transferred from the
downtown Detroit general mail facility to the Detroit metro airport
airmail facility.
between May–October 1999 in which Kaseta asserts that the
Union failed to properly represent her.
C. The 7-Day Suspension
On Friday, April 16, 1999, Kaseta was working on the south
dock of the downtown Detroit facility loading airmail onto
trucks. Welders were working nearby. The following day, she
missed work due to a corneal abrasion. Over the next few days,
she was treated by an eye specialist, who diagnosed her condi-
tion as an arc welding burn apparently caused by the nearby
welding.
On Thursday, April 22, Kaseta told her immediate supervi-
sor, Natalie Day, that her eye condition was work related. Day
asked Kaseta to complete a workers’ compensation form, but
Kaseta declined stating that she had to leave to go to a doctor’s
appointment. The next day, Friday, April 23, Kaseta submitted
the necessary form. On April 30, she received a disciplinary
notice and a 7-day suspension for failing to promptly report a
work related injury as required by the Postal Service Labor
Relations Manual. (GC Exh. 2.)
Kaseta filed a written complaint with Union Steward J. C.
Holmes, who filed a grievance protesting the disciplinary sus-
pension notice. (Tr. 22–23. ) A short time later, Holmes,
Kaseta, and her immediate supervisor, Day, met for a step-1
grievance meeting, but were unable to resolve the matter to
Kaseta’s satisfaction. The Union pursued the grievance to step
2 without success.
At the step-3 meeting held on or about July 23, 1999, Re-
gional Union Representative Dawson Lewis settled the case on
the basis that the 7-day suspension would be removed from
Kaseta’s employee record on October 30, 1999, provided
Kaseta incurred no infractions resulting in discipline between
July 23 and October 30, 1999. (GC Exh. 4.)
One week later, Kaseta received a copy of the step-3 griev-
ance resolution. She immediately went to see Holmes to ex-
press her dissatisfaction with the settlement. Kaseta opined that
her grievance was a cut-and-dried case, which if handled prop-
erly at the local level should never have gotten to step 3. She
also was upset because she was not notified about the step-2 or
step-3 grievance meetings. Finally, Kaseta was upset because
at the time of the grievance resolution, she had a pending griev-
ance concerning a prior discipline and therefore thought that the
prior pending discipline might ultimately trigger the 7-day sus-
pension under the latest grievance resolution. (Tr. 34.)
D. The Sick Leave Grievance
On Friday, April 30, Kaseta gave a sick leave slip to her su-
pervisor, Natalie Day, seeking advance approval of 8 hours of
sick leave for a dental appointment on Wednesday, May 4. No
medical documentation was submitted with the sick leave slip
as required by the Postal Service Employee and Labor Rela-
tions Manual (ELM). (R. Exh. 36.) The next day, May 1,
Kaseta asked Day about the status of her sick leave request.
Day testified that she marked the leave slip “disapproved,”
because there was no medical documentation submitted, but
told Kaseta that she would change the leave slip to “approved”

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1158
if Kaseta submitted the proper documentation before May 4.
(Tr. 189.)6
Kaseta nevertheless complained to Union Steward Holmes.
(GC Exh. 6.) She was concerned that she might receive a “red
mark” on her attendance record because Day had marked the
time slip “disapproved.” Holmes testified that he told Kaseta
that management was not required to approve advance sick
leave without any documentation. He nevertheless arranged a
meeting that day between Supervisor Day, Kaseta, and himself.
According to Holmes’ credible testimony, Day told Kaseta that
if she submitted the medical documentation, the sick leave
would be approved as scheduled leave. Day likewise testified
that she told Kaseta and Holmes that she would give Kaseta
scheduled leave if Kaseta brought in the documentation. (Tr.
191.) In contrast, Kaseta testified that she never met with Day
and Holmes to discuss the sick leave request. For demeanor
reasons, I credit the corroborative testimony of Holmes and
Day.
On May 5, the day after she took sick leave, Kaseta returned
to work and gave Day the medical documentation. According
to Day’s unrebutted testimony, she whited out the term “disap-
proved” and retroactively approved the leave as she promised
to do, even though the documentation was submitted late. (Tr.
193.) Day further testified that she never placed a red mark on
Kaseta’s attendance record in the first place. There is no evi-
dence to the contrary.
Holmes testified that he did not file a grievance because
there was no contract violation and because he thought it was
obvious from the discussion between he, Kaseta, and Supervi-
sor Day that the matter had been resolved. (Tr. 227.) He fur-
ther testified that after their meeting, Kaseta did not tell him
that she wanted to pursue a grievance. In contrast, Kaseta testi-
fied that within the 2-week timeframe for filing a grievance, she
asked Holmes about the status of filing a grievance. Kaseta
stated that although Holmes stated he would look into it and get
back to her, he never did. (Tr. 41.)
E. The EEO Complaint
On or about May 25, 1999, Kaseta requested an appointment
with a Postal Service EEO counselor to discuss her concern that
she was being treated differently by management because of
her race and age. On June 9, 1999, Kaseta submitted an EEO
information form to management which explained in writing
the basis for her EEO concern. Although Kaseta indicated on
the form that Chief Union Steward Georgia Butler would repre-
sent her in the EEO matter (GC Exh. 7), she had not previously
discussed the EEO matter with Butler nor obtained Butler’s
permission to list her as a representative.
Three weeks later, on June 24, Kaseta met with Butler to dis-
cuss other work-related complaints that Kaseta had pending
against the Postal Service. In that meeting, Kaseta asked Butler
if she would represent her in the EEO matter. Kaseta testified
that Butler told her that she had a very hectic schedule and that
she might not be able to do it. (Tr. 47.) Kaseta stated that But-

6 Kaseta essentially corroborated Day’s testimony. She testified at
trial that Day told her that she was disapproving the request for sched-
uled leave, but that she would approve in advance 4 hours of sick leave,
if Kaseta provided the requisite medical documentation. (Tr. 124.)
ler also told her that she would speak to Administrative Vice
President (AVP) James Gettys about obtaining a representative.
In contrast, Butler testified that she unequivocally told Kaseta
on June 24 that she would not be able to represent her at the
EEO meeting and explained why. (Tr. 313.) Butler stated that
she told Kaseta to contact someone like AVP Gettys or Union
Representative Glenn Berrien. Butler’s version of what was
discussed was corroborated by Union Steward Holmes, who
was present during the meeting.7 (Tr. 240.) Holmes testified
that Butler told Kaseta that she would not be able to represent
her and that she suggested other representatives that could help
her. He recalled Butler mentioning AVP Gettys, Union Repre-
sentative Deramus, and another individual named Glenn Ber-
rien. For demeanor, and other reasons, I credit Butler’s testi-
mony that she told Kaseta on June 24, 1999, that she would not
be able to represent her in the EEO matter.
Kaseta did not advise the Postal Service that Butler would
not be her representative. On Friday, August 6, 1999, Butler
received a copy of a letter from the Postal Service EEO office
to Kaseta advising that Kaseta’s EEO appointment was sched-
uled for August 12. On Monday, August 9, Butler wrote to
Kaseta reiterating that, “I will not be able to represent you for
your EEO appointment.” (GC Exh. 8.)
Kaseta received Butler’s letter on August 11.8 The next day,
August 12, she rescheduled her EEO appointment for August
25, 1999. (Tr. 49–51.) Kaseta also complained to Union Stew-
ard Lewis that Butler failed to represent her in the EEO matter.
He arranged a meeting for Kaseta to discuss the matter with
AVP Gettys.
That night, Kaseta wrote a letter to Butler stating that she
was disappointed because no one from the Union followed
through with respect to her EEO appointment, which had to be
rescheduled. The letter also stated that Kaseta had asked Union
Representative Leroy Deramus to be her representative at the
rescheduled EEO meeting and that he would be handling all of
her future complaints and grievances. (GC Exh. 10.)
On August 25, Kaseta’s rescheduled EEO meeting took
place. She was represented by Deramus, who continued to
work on her EEO case. (Tr. 55.)
F. Kaseta’s Inability to Find a Union Representative
On August 14, Kaseta asked her supervisor, Natalie Day, for
permission to see a union steward because Day refused to as-
sign Kaseta to a tow motor driver position.9 Day phoned Union
7 Kaseta was unable to recall whether Butler was present at the June
24 meeting, but thought another union steward named “Loretta” was
present in the union office. (Tr.134.)
8 At first, Kaseta testified that she never received the Postal Ser-
vice’s certified letter, dated August 6, that was mailed to her advising
that her EEO appointment was scheduled for August 12. (Tr. 154.)
However, on cross-examination, she was shown the return receipt card,
dated August 16, and clarified her testimony by stating that she meant
to state that she did not receive the Postal Service’s letter in time for the
meeting. (Tr. 344.) For demeanor reasons, I find that her inaccurate
testimony was not a mere oversight.
9 The complaint alleged that the incident took place on August 14,
1999. At trial, counsel for the General Counsel asserted that the inci-
dent actually took place on August 12. He therefore amended the com-
plaint to substitute August 12 for August 14. On review of the record, I

MAIL HANDLERS LOCAL 307 (POSTAL SERVICE) 1159
Steward Lewis and asked him to come to the floor. When
Bruce Lewis arrived, Kaseta explained the problem. Lewis told
her that there was no contractual violation because it was
within management’s discretion to assign or not assign some-
one to drive the tow motor. (Tr. 137–138, 207.) When Kaseta
insisted on filing a complaint against management, Lewis
walked away.10
A short time later, Kaseta got permission from Day to go to
the union office, even though Day told her that the union repre-
sentative was unavailable. According to Kaseta, when she
arrived at the union office the door was locked and the office
was dark. (Tr. 58.) She paged Union Steward Lewis twice, but
he did not respond. Kaseta went back to work. Kaseta testified
that she returned to the union office every 15 minutes or so,
knocked on the door, and got no answer. At lunchtime, she left
a note for Lewis on the door of the union office.
Mail Handler Kenton Parker testified that shortly after 9 a.m.
on August 14, he went to the union office to file a complaint.
(Tr. 184.) A few days before, on August 6 and 7, Parker
missed work because of car trouble. His request for 16 hours of
annual leave was denied by his supervisor. On August 14,
Parker went to see Lewis to file a grievance. He testified that
he and Lewis spent about 2 hours that morning in the union
office preparing a statement explaining the circumstances.
Parker and Lewis then went to see Parker’s supervisor in an
attempt to resolve the matter, but were unable to do so. They
returned to the union office to complete the paperwork and
filed a grievance. Parker stated that during the entire time that
he and Lewis were in the union office, Kaseta did not come by.
(Tr. 185.)
After finishing with Parker, Lewis took a lunchbreak.
Shortly before 2 p.m., he returned to the union office where he
found the note from Kaseta expressing her displeasure with the
fact that he was not available to meet with her. Lewis became
very upset. He approached Kaseta who was working on the
ramp with coworker Eric Short. Kaseta testified that Lewis
called her a liar and told her that he had been working in the
office. He told her that he was entitled to a lunchbreak. Ac-
cording to Kaseta, Lewis told her “that the union doesn’t care
about Vicky Kaseta and you can go ahead and do whatever you
want to do because money is not coming out of my pocket.”
(Tr. 60; GC Exh. 14, p. 2.)
Lewis testified that Kaseta told him that she did not want
him to represent her. He stated that she told him that he was a
new steward, who did not know anything, so she would not
want him to represent her anyway. (Tr. 218.) He testified that
he responded by stating “if you don’t want me to represent you,
it’s not like its taking money out of my pocket just because I

find that the evidence viewed as a whole reflects that the incident in
question occurred on Saturday, August 14, 1999. (Tr. 65, 184, 206–
207; R. Exh. 5, pp. 1 and 3.)
10 In her direct testimony, Kaseta completely omitted the fact that
Lewis came to the floor first thing in the morning, listened to her con-
cerns, and explained to her that it was not a contract violation. Only on
cross-examination did she give a complete account of what occurred on
August 14, but testified that she could not recall if Lewis also told her
that there was no contract violation. (Tr. 139.) Kaseta’s failure to relay
all of the facts on direct examination taints her credibility.
don’t represent you, but the Union will represent you.”11 (Tr.
217.)
Short testified that Lewis appeared angry while Kaseta re-
mained calm. He stated that as Lewis approached Kaseta, he
called her a liar. Short recalled Lewis telling Kaseta that he
was in the office most of the day, which Kaseta disputed. (Tr.
148.) Short testified that Lewis also told Kaseta that “he wasn’t
going to represent her. Something along the lines of the whole
Post Office doesn’t revolve around what Vicky’s problems are
and the whole world (sic) doesn’t have to stop based upon what
her problems are and what she is going through, along that
line.” (Tr. 150.) At that point, Lewis “stormed off.” Short did
not recall Lewis pulling his pockets out of his pants. (Tr. 151.)
I credit Kaseta’s testimony that Lewis told her that the Union
did not care what she did and it was not any money out of his
pocket if he did not represent her. Her testimony to a large
extent was corroborated by Short and is also consistent with a
contemporaneous letter that she wrote to Local Union President
Glenn Shelton on the day of the incident. (GC Exh. 12.) In
contrast, Butler impressed me as someone with something to
hide. He unpersuasively sought to downplay his emotional
reaction to the situation. I find it more likely than not that
Lewis scolded Kaseta out of anger and in the same vein told her
that the Union did not care whether or not she was represented.
Ten minutes later, Lewis returned with a pass for Kaseta to
go to the union office at 2:30 p.m. Lewis told her “here’s your
pass to the union office. I’ll be here. You can feel free to
come.” (Tr. 218.) Kaseta looked at the pass and put it into her
pocket. She testified that she did not go to the union office at
2:30 p.m. because she thought it would take more than 15 min-
utes to file a complaint and she did not want to use her washup
time at the end of her shift (2:45–3 p.m.). (Tr. 63.) In addition,
Kaseta testified that she did not go to the union office after 3
p.m. because she thought that she had to see the union steward
on her tour and she was unsure whether Lewis would be in the
union office after the tour ended. Lewis credibly testified that
he waited in the office for Kaseta and that he would have re-
mained beyond 3 p.m. to work on her complaint as he has done
numerous times for other employees. (Tr. 219.)12
11 Lewis sought to minimize the impression that he was upset by
Kaseta’s note. He denied that he raised his voice. Rather, he asserted
that it was noisy on the ramp so he had to talk over the machinery in
order to be heard. For demeanor reasons, I find this part of his testi-
mony to be unconvincing.
12 A great deal of extraneous testimony was presented at trial con-
cerning phone conversations, meetings, and discussions that took place
after August 14 between Kaseta and Union President Shelton or Kaseta
and AVP Gettys concerning her complaints against Supervisor Day and
Union Steward Lewis. I find that this evidence is not germane to the
issue of whether or not Butler’s statement to Kaseta on August 14
would have a reasonable tendency to restrain or coerce her in the exer-
cise of statutory rights, including the right of access to the Board’s
processes. Boilermakers Local 686, 267 NLRB 1056, 1057 (1983).
See also Steelworkers Local 3029, 250 NLRB 813 (1980) (the ade-
quacy of Respondent’s prior and subsequent representation of the
charging party is irrelevant in determining the tendency of the state-
ment to have a coercive effect).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1160
G. The Wastepaper Can Incident
Six days later, on August 20, Kaseta phoned Union Stewart
Holmes from the work floor telling him that she wanted to file
a complaint against Supervisor Day, as well as another com-
plaint against Union Steward Lewis. Holmes asked her to
come to the union office, where he gave her the requisite forms
to complete. Kaseta filed a complaint against the Postal Ser-
vice concerning Day’s refusal to assign her to the tow motor
driver position. (GC Exh. 11.) She also filed a complaint
against Union Steward Lewis (GC Exh. 14) for unprofessional
conduct on August 14. When Kaseta asked Holmes when a
step-1 grievance meeting would be held, he told her he had to
take it under advisement. There are two different versions of
what occurred next.
According to Kaseta, as Holmes reviewed the completed
forms, he mumbled something that sounded like “this is bull-
shit.” Kaseta testified that she asked Holmes for a copy of the
completed complaint forms, he told her he would bring it to her
later. (Tr. 77.) Kaseta stated that she asked Holmes if she
could wait for the copies, he told her, “No,” and to get out of
his office. Kaseta testified that as she turned to walk out of the
office, she saw Holmes throw her complaints into the garbage
can. (Tr. 78.)
At trial, Holmes acknowledged that Kaseta filed two com-
plaints, one against Lewis and one against Supervisor Day. He
testified that because he was not in a position to file a grievance
under the collective-bargaining agreement against a fellow
union officer, he informed her that he would take it under ad-
visement, which meant that he would have to consult AVP
Gettys. (Tr. 242.) Holmes testified that he took the complaints,
told Kaseta that she could go back to work, and that he would
bring her a copy. Holmes stated that he had to go to another
office to make copies and that it was against union policy to
leave someone alone in the union office. After he made copies,
he brought a copy to Kaseta at her workstation. (Tr. 143.)
Holmes denied telling Kaseta that the complaint about Lewis
was bullshit. (Tr. 243.) He denied throwing her complaint in
the garbage. He also denied telling Kaseta to get out of the
office. For demeanor reasons, I credit Holmes version of what
was discussed.
H. Shelton’s October 1 Response to Kaseta
On September 20, 1999, Kaseta sent a letter to Union Presi-
dent Glenn Shelter complaining that she had not received re-
quested copies of her union files and that no action had been
taken on her complaint about Supervisor Day. Kaseta then
focused on the confrontation with Union Steward Lewis on
August 14. She wrote, “[t]he grievance against Mr. Lewis had
better be addressed.” (GC Exh. 18.) After acknowledging that
AVP Gettys had met with her on August 28 to discuss the Day
grievance and the Lewis grievance, Kaseta implied that Gettys
had lied about speaking to coworker Eric Short about the Au-
gust 14 confrontation. She accused the Union and management
of conspiring against her, which resulted in her losing griev-
ances at steps 1 and 3. In the penultimate paragraph of the
letter, Kaseta stated:

This union at the GMF has been given enough time to correct
their wrong doings. I have stated before you all work for me.
Because of my color, race and what I represent wrongdoings
are still being done to me. Therefore, I have taken my com-
plaints elsewhere.13

On the same date, September 20, Kaseta sent a separate letter
to AVP James Gettys, raising several questions and concerns
about the bidding procedure followed by the Postal Service.
The letter stated that management had eliminated certain posi-
tions and questioned why an updated seniority list had not been
issued.14 (R. Exh. 9.)
By letter, dated October 1, 1999, Shelton acknowledged re-
ceipt of the September 20 letter, and assured Kaseta that he was
not ignoring her concerns.15 With respect to her complaints
about Union Steward Lewis and the Union’s level of represen-
tation, Shelton responded that “Local 307 has been instructed
by our counsel to refrain from answering the accusations in
your letter until your NLRB charge has been resolved.” (GC
Exh. 19.) The letter stated, however, that the files Kaseta re-
quested were being complied and that she would be notified
when they were ready. (Tr. 104.)
I. Updating Kaseta on the Status of her Grievance
On September 15, Kaseta received a 14-day suspension no-
tice purportedly for taking a smoking break when she should
have been at her workstation. (GC Exh. 16.) She gave the
suspension notice to Union Steward Holmes and filed a com-
plaint against the Postal Service. Kaseta, however, did not
inform Holmes that she was transferring from the downtown
Detroit general mail facility to the airmail facility at the airport.
(Tr. 230.) When he learned indirectly that Kaseta was transfer-
ring, Holmes attempted to schedule the step-1 meeting before
she transferred to other location.
On September 22, Holmes scheduled a step-1 meeting with
Kaseta’s supervisor for the following day, September 23, with-
out telling Kaseta.16 He testified that he assumed she would be
at work on September 23 and that her supervisor would send
her to the step-1 meeting, which is normally how grievance
meetings are facilitated. Unfortunately, Kaseta was off sick on
September 23, her last day at the downtown facility, and was

13 Four days earlier, on September 16, 1999, Kaseta filed a charge
with the Board’s Regional Office concerning essentially the same criti-
cism of the Union that she addressed in this letter. (GC Exh. 1(a).)
Thus, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the statement,
“I have taken my complaints elsewhere,” refers to the charge that she
filed.
14 Gettys responded to Kaseta by letter, dated September 30, 1999,
effectively addressing in detail all of the issues raised in her letter. (R.
Exh. 12.)
15 Inexplicably, Shelton sent Kaseta another letter, dated October 6,
1999, stating that he did not receive a September 20 letter from Kaseta,
but instead was given a copy of that letter by AVP Gettys. (R. Exh.
23.) In addition, Shelton reiterated that union counsel had instructed
him to refrain from responding until her NLRB charge has been re-
solved and that her files were being complied and would be provided.
16 Kaseta testified that between September 15 and 25, she asked
Holmes several times when her step-1 meeting would be held, but he
never gave her an answer. (Tr. 93.)

MAIL HANDLERS LOCAL 307 (POSTAL SERVICE) 1161
scheduled to start her new job at the airmail facility on Septem-
ber 25. The step-1 meeting, therefore, had to be postponed.
Because the deadline for scheduling the grievance meeting
was September 29, Holmes phoned Kaseta at home on Septem-
ber 27 asking for written authorization to hold a step-1 meeting
without her. Kaseta declined to waive her right to be present at
the step-1 meeting. Holmes testified that when he explained to
Kaseta that he needed to hold a step-1 meeting as soon as pos-
sible, she became angry and hung up the phone. (Tr. 94.) A
few minutes later, Kaseta called back asking Holmes to send
her a letter stating when and where her step-1 meeting would be
held.
Holmes therefore consulted Chief Union Steward Butler.
She told him to keep the grievance timely by having the step 1
without Kaseta, which he did, even though he knew that she
had a right and had expressed a desire to be present.17 (Tr.
249–250.) The next day, Butler phoned Kaseta at the airmail
facility to explain why they were proceeding with the step-1
meeting. Kaseta testified that she did not take Butler’s phone
call because she was taking her lunchbreak. At the end of her
lunch period, Kaseta phoned the union office and spoke to
Holmes, who told her that the step-1 meeting would take place
the next day no matter what. Kaseta asked him to let her know
the time so she could attend. Although Holmes told her he
would get back to her with the time, he never did.
The step-1 meeting was held the next day without Kaseta.
The discipline was reduced from a 14-day to a 7-day suspen-
sion, which Holmes considered unacceptable. He therefore
submitted the grievance to step 2. About 2 weeks later, Holmes
notified Kaseta of the outcome of the step-1 meeting by leaving
a message on her answering machine at home. (Tr. 97, 99.)
Kaseta subsequently phoned Local Union President Shelton
complaining that her rights had been violated because she was
not permitted to attend the step-1 meeting. Eventually, the
grievance was remanded to step 1 and redone with Kaseta pre-
sent. The result was the same. The grievance was appealed by
the Union and eventually the disciplinary action was fully re-
scinded. (GC Exh. 17A.)18
J. Charging Kaseta for Photocopies of Documents
By letter of August 22, 1999, Kaseta summarized the content
of a telephone conversation she had earlier that day with Local
Union President Shelton concerning the conduct and perform-
ance of local union stewards, including Union Steward Lewis
and Chief Union Steward Butler. (GC Exh. 15.) The letter also
pointed out that Kaseta had made a written request for copies of
her union files for the past 6 months and that Shelton told
Kaseta that her request and that in the interest of time her spe-

17 Butler testified that Holmes told her that he was running out of
time on the grievance (Tr. 337) and based on that she “assumed” that he
had obtained one extension and did not want to ask for another because
he was concerned it would affect the outcome. (Tr. 334.) In reality,
Holmes had not sought an extension of time to hold the step-1 griev-
ance. (Tr. 249.) He merely had postponed the previously arranged step-
1 meeting to a date within the contractual time limits.
18 Kaseta testified that the grievance was appealed to step 2 where
Union Steward Kromer succeeded in having the suspension completely
rescinded. (Tr. 174.)
cific request for “a December 9, 1998, Letter of Warning and
the April 19, 1999 Letter of Suspension would be sent to me by
certified mail in a speedy manner.”
One month later, on September 20, Kaseta wrote again to
Shelton stating:

This letter is a follow-up to my letter dated August 22, 1999.
I had requested copies of all my union files for the past six
months. But because of the length of time needed I requested
the files for December 9, 1998 and April 19, 1999 be sent as
soon as possible.

(GC Exh. 18.)

On October 1, Shelton responded to the September 20 letter
stating, among other things, “I have received your letter of
September 20, 1999, and write to assure you that I am not ig-
noring it . . . [w]e are compiling your files and will let you
know as soon as they are ready for you either to pick up from
the Union hall or from your AVP, James Gettys, whichever is
more convenient for you.” (GC Exh. 19.)
On October 4, Kaseta wrote to Shelton again stating, “I have
written two letters19 requesting my union files. To date you and
your office have not complied! In accordance with the Freedom
of Information Act and the Privacy Act I am hereby requesting
all grievances, complaints, notes and memos in my file since
December 1, 1998, in ten (10) days. If my request is not made
legal litigation will follow.” (GC Exh. 22.)
By letter of October 6, Shelton replied that he did not receive
Kaseta’s September 20 letter directly, but was given a copy by
Gettys. The balance of the letter reiterated what was stated in
Shelton’s October 1 letter, including “[w]e are compiling your
files and will let you know as soon as they are ready for you
either to pick up from the Union hall or from your AVP, James
Gettys, whichever is more convenient for you.” (GC Exh. 23.)
On October 13, 1999, Shelton advised Kaseta that the files
were ready to inspect, but she would have to pay for copying.
Specifically, it stated:

Your grievance files are ready for you to inspect. You may
request copies at $.10 per page, or you simply request copies
of all grievance material and we will prepare the appropriate
copying bill. The Freedom of Information Act does not apply
to labor organizations. We are providing you access to your
official grievance file materials just as we provide to all other
bargaining unit employees. Please call the office and make an
appointment to review and/or pick up your grievance files.
Thank you.

(R. Exh. 15)
III. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A. The Applicable Legal Standard
In Letter Carriers Branch 529, 319 NLRB 879, 881 (1195),
the Board stated the broad legal standard that governs this case.

19 Kaseta was referring to her letters of August 22 and September 20,
1999 (GC Exhs. 15 and 18) in which she asked for her union file and
certain grievance documents.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1162
A union owes all unit employees the duty of fair representa-
tion, which extends to all functions of the bargaining repre-
sentative. When a union’s conduct toward a unit member is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, it breaches its duty of
fair representation. But a union must be allowed a wide range
of reasonableness in serving the unit employees, and any sub-
sequent examination of a union’s performance must be
“highly deferential.” Mere negligence does not constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation. And a union’s con-
duct is arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal land-
scape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior
is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irra-
tional. [Footnotes omitted.]
B. The Alleged Refusal to Process the 7-Day
Suspension Grievance
Paragraph 8(a) of the complaint alleges that in May 1999 the
Union refused to process Kaseta’s grievance concerning her 7-
day suspension. The undisputed evidence shows that the alle-
gation is completely false. The Union pursued the grievance
from step 1 through step 3, and obtained a step-3 settlement
which removed the disciplinary action from Kaseta’s record
after October 30, 1999, provided she incurred no infractions
resulting in discipline between July 23–October 30, 1999.
There is no evidence that the 7-day suspension was not re-
moved from her file on or after October 30.
Kaseta essentially admitted at trial that the Union did not re-
fuse to process her grievance as alleged in the complaint. (Tr.
116.) Rather, she testified that the gravamen of her complaint
was that (1) she did not participate in the step-2 and step-3
meetings; (2) she requested, but did not receive documents
pertaining to the steps-1 and -2 outcomes; and (3) she was un-
able to obtain an explanation of the settlement from the Union.
The undisputed evidence shows that an employee, like Kaseta,
does not have a right to be present at a steps-2 and -3 grievance
meeting, and that under the contract the union representative
(either a local union steward or regional union representative)
has full authority to resolve the grievance. The unrebutted
evidence shows that Kaseta was present at the step-1 meeting
and therefore knew the substance of the discussion, the out-
come of the meeting, and the fact that the grievance was being
pursued to step 2. While there is no evidence that Kaseta was
kept abreast of the step-2 outcome, there is no evidence that she
was prejudiced in anyway by this omission.
In addition, the credible evidence shows that Kaseta was
provided a copy of the step-3 settlement in a timely fashion (Tr.
30, 33) and that Kaseta spoke to AVP Gettys about not being
completely satisfied with the step-3 outcome. (Tr. 299.) Gettys
credibly testified that he explained to Kaseta that once a griev-
ance is pursued to step 3, it is out of the local union’s hands.
Gettys stated that he nevertheless phoned the union representa-
tive, Dawson Lewis, who handled Kaseta’s case, and was told
by Dawson that although he attempted to obtain a complete
rescission of the disciplinary action, the best he could do under
the circumstances was a conditional rescission. (Tr. 300.)
Thus, there is no evidence that the Union’s conduct was arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or that it acted in bad faith. Accordingly,
I shall recommend that the allegations contained in paragraph
8(a) of the complaint be dismissed.
C. The Alleged Refusal to Process Kaseta's Sick
Leave Grievance
Paragraph 8(b) of the complaint alleges that on or about May
16, 1999, the Union refused to process a grievance for Kaseta
concerning the denial of sick leave by the Postal Service. The
undisputed evidence shows that Kaseta was not denied sick
leave. Rather, on or about May 5, Supervisor Day retroactively
approved 4 hours of sick leave for Kaseta for May 4, even
though Kaseta provided the prerequisite medical documentation
after her dental appointment. Also, the evidence shows that
Day explained to Kaseta on or about May 1 in the presence of
Holmes that she would approve Kaseta’s advanced sick leave
request if she brought in the necessary medical documentation
as required by the Postal Service’s ELM. There is no evidence
that Kaseta’s attendance record was adversely affected in any
way (Tr. 40, 42) or that the Postal Service violated the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
Counsel for the General Counsel does not dispute that
Kaseta’s attendance record was not adversely affected or that
she did not receive any discipline. Rather, he argues on page 5
of his posthearing brief that the failure of Holmes to “get back
to Kaseta” about the status of filing a grievance is a violation of
the Act.20 I do not agree. While Holmes should not have as-
sumed that Kaseta understood that the matter had been satisfac-
torily resolved, the evidence shows that Kaseta did not follow
through on the matter by asking her supervisor if a red mark
had been placed in her record or by checking her attendance
record herself, which she could have done. The evidence as a
whole does not establish that the Respondent’s conduct was
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Accordingly, I shall recommend the dismissal of the allega-
tions in paragraph 8(b) of the complaint.
D. The Alleged Refusal of Georgia Butler to Assist Kaseta
with an EEO Complaint
Paragraph 8(c) of the complaint alleges that on August 11,
1999, Chief Union Steward Georgia Butler refused to assist
Kaseta with an EEO complaint against the Postal Service. The
credible evidence shows that Butler told Kaseta on June 24 that
she would be unable to represent her at the EEO meeting and
gave her the names of other union representatives who were
qualified to handle an EEO matter. At that time, Kaseta men-
tioned Leroy Deramus, and Butler told her that he was capable
of handling an EEO matter. Butler credibly denied telling
Kaseta that the Union would not represent her. (Tr. 316.) But-
ler’s testimony is corroborated by Union Steward Holmes.

20 At the hearing, Kaseta also testified that she was upset because ul-
timately she was given only 4 hours of approved sick leave for a dental
appointment, rather than 8 hours. She stated that a week earlier another
employee received a full 8 hours of sick leave for a dental appointment.
Counsel for the General Counsel does not address this issue in his brief
nor is there any credible evidence in the record showing that employees
typically were allowed 8 hours sick leave for medical/dental appoint-
ments, while Kaseta was denied the same treatment.

MAIL HANDLERS LOCAL 307 (POSTAL SERVICE) 1163
The evidence also shows that Kaseta was not prejudiced by
Butler’s inability to represent her at the EEO meeting. Kaseta
rescheduled the meeting and contacted Deramus, who repre-
sented her at the EEO meeting on August 25 and continued to
represent her in that matter.
Thus, the evidence viewed as a whole shows that Chief Un-
ion Steward Butler did not refuse to assist Kaseta with her EEO
matter on August 11, but had told her on June 24 that she
would not be able to represent her and why. Accordingly, I
shall recommend that the allegations of paragraph 8(c) of the
complaint be dismissed.
E. The Alleged Refusal by Union Steward Lewis to Meet
with Kaseta on August 14, 1999, and the Remark that
it Would be Futile to File a Grievance
Paragraph 8(d) of the complaint alleges that on August 14,
1999, Union Steward Bruce Lewis refused to meet with Kaseta
about a potential grievance by leaving his office and evading
her when she came to the union office. The credible evidence
shows that Lewis met with her on the work floor in the early
morning of August 14 to discuss her complaint and to explain
why there was no contractual violation. (Tr. 137–138.) The
credible evidence also shows that Lewis was in the union office
for the greater part of the morning with another employee,
Kenton Parker, working on Parker’s grievance. Parker credibly
testified that during this time no one, including Kaseta, came to
the union office. While it is conceivable that Kaseta went to
the union office when Lewis and Parker were meeting with his
supervisor or photocopying Parker’s records, there is no evi-
dence that Lewis was aware that Kaseta was trying to reach him
or that he was intentionally attempting to avoid Kaseta. Al-
though Kaseta testified that she paged Lewis, his unrebutted
testimony is that there is no speaker in the union office and that
he cannot hear the speakers on the floor when the union office
door is closed.
Accordingly, I shall recommend that the allegations of para-
graph 8(d) be dismissed.
Paragraph 8(e) of the complaint alleges that on the same date
Lewis told Kaseta that it would be futile for her to file any
grievances because the Union did not like her. The credible
evidence shows that Lewis told Kaseta “that the union doesn’t
care about Vicky Kaseta and you can go ahead and do whatever
you want to do because money is not coming out of my
pocket.” On its face the statement could be reasonably con-
strued to mean that the Union would not support Kaseta if she
persisted in filing a grievance. It further reflects hostility to-
ward Kaseta which may have a reasonable tendency to discour-
age Kaseta and the other employee present, Eric Short, from
seeking union representation or filing a grievance. However, I
find that the implication that filing a grievance would be futile
was dispelled almost immediately when Lewis returned 10
minutes later with a pass from Kaseta’s supervisor authorizing
her to go to the union office at 2:30 p.m. to fill out a complaint.
It was also dispelled by Lewis’ statement to Kaseta in the pres-
ence of Short “here’s your pass to the Union office. I’ll be
here. You can feel free to come.” (Tr. 218.) See Teamster
Local 279, 218 NLRB 1392 (1975).
Accordingly, I shall recommend that paragraph 8(e) of the
complaint be dismissed.
F. The Alleged Refusal by Holmes to Process Kaseta’s
Complaints Against Lewis and Day
Paragraph 8(f) of the complaint alleges that on August 20,
1999, Union Steward Holmes refused to process a grievance
from Kaseta, ordered her to leave the office, and threw the pa-
perwork in the trash. The undisputed evidence shows that
Kaseta told Holmes on the phone that she wanted to file a com-
plaint against Supervisor Day and a complaint against Union
Steward Lewis. It further shows that even though he knew
what the complaints involved, he told her to come to the union
office, gave her the necessary forms to complete, reviewed
them in her presence, subsequently provided her with copies,21
and referred both complaints to AVP Gettys for further investi-
gation. Holmes credibly explained that there is no provision
under the collective-bargaining agreement for processing a
complaint against a union steward so he referred the matter to
his superior, which was AVP Gettys.
The evidence shows that a week later, on August 28, Gettys
met with Kaseta and Lewis, lectured them about being respect-
ful to each other, and explained why Day did not violate the
contract by not assigning Kaseta to the driver position.22 The
credible evidence also shows that Gettys told her that there was
no grievance against Lewis under the collective-bargaining
agreement, but that he would review the matter to determine the
extent, if any, of any improprieties.
Thus, the evidence falls short of showing that Holmes re-
fused to process Kaseta’s complaints on August 20, 1999, or
that he threw her complaints in the trash. Rather, the credible
evidence shows that Holmes did none of the above and that he
articulated legitimate reasons for referring the grievances to
AVP Gettys. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the allega-
tions of paragraph 8(f) be dismissed.
G. The Alleged Refusal to Respond to Kaseta Complaints
About Working Conditions at the Detroit GMF
Paragraph 8(g) of the complaint alleges that on or about Sep-
tember 20, 1999, Union President Shelton unlawfully refused to
address Kaseta’s concerns about working conditions at the
downtown Detroit general mail facility because she filed a ULP
charge. On its face, the allegation is factually inaccurate. First,
there is no evidence that Shelton communicated with Kaseta on
or about September 20. Rather, the evidence shows that on
September 20, Kaseta wrote to Shelton. (GC Exh. 18.) Sec-
ond, a fair reading of Kaseta’s September 20 letter reflects that
it does not address working conditions. Kaseta makes only a
passing reference to her grievance against Supervisor Day re-

21 The fact that Holmes provided Kaseta copies of her complaint, as
promised, makes it unlikely that he threw the complaints in the trash.
22 Kaseta denied that Gettys explained that there was no contract vio-
lation concerning the driver assignment and further denied that Gettys
told her that there was no grievance against Lewis under the collective
bargaining agreement. (Tr. 144–146.) For demeanor reasons, I credit
Gettys’ testimony on this point.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1164
garding the tow motor assignment.23 Instead, the principal fo-
cus of the letter is on Kaseta’s grievance against Lewis and her
accusations of a conspiracy between the Union and manage-
ment against her. In the penultimate paragraph, Kaseta un-
equivocally states that “[t]his union at the GMF has been given
enough time to correct their wrong doings. . . . Therefore, I
have taken my complaints elsewhere.” I find that the latter is
an obvious reference to the charge filed by Kaseta on Septem-
ber 16 against the Union.
The evidence shows that on October 1, Shelton responded to
Kaseta’s September 20 letter telling her that “Local 307 has
been instructed by our counsel to refrain from answering the
accusations in your [September 20] letter until your NLRB
charge has been resolved.” (GC Exh. 19.) Shelton informed
Kaseta that the files she had requested were being compiled and
that she would be notified as soon as they were ready.
I find that a fair reading of incoming and outgoing letters
does not show that Shelton refused to answer any inquiry by
Kaseta about working conditions as alleged in paragraph 8(g)
of the complaint.
The evidence does show, however, that on September 20,
1999, Kaseta wrote a letter to AVP Gettys expressing her con-
cerns about the bidding procedures (i.e., working conditions) at
the downtown Detroit GMF. (R. Exh. 9.) Notwithstanding the
fact that a charge had been filed against the Union, Gettys re-
sponded to those concerns in detail by letter, dated September
30. (R. Exh. 12.) This evidence lends credence to Shelton’s
testimony that he was not refusing to answer questions about
Kaseta’s working condition, but was refusing to answer accusa-
tions about union representation which were part of her Board
charge. (Tr. 276. )
Notwithstanding the above evidence, Counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel inexplicably argues at page 9 of his posthearing
brief that “the Union’s refus[ed] to respond to CP’s concerns
about bidding procedures as set forth in her August 22 letter
because she had filed a ULP charge.” First, the argument is
totally inconsistent with the inaccurate allegation in paragraph
8(g) which designates September 20 as the operative date.
Second, it totally ignores the credible evidence showing that the
Union did respond in detail to Kaseta’s concerns about the
bidding procedure.
Accordingly, I shall recommend the dismissal of the allega-
tions contained in paragraph 8(g) of the complaint.
H. The Unlawful Refusal to Advise Kaseta of the Time
of her Step-1 Grievance
Paragraph 8(h) of the complaint alleges on September 28,
1999, Union Steward Holmes refused to properly advise Kaseta
of the date and time of a step-1 grievance regarding the 14-day
suspension that she received on September 15. The undisputed
evidence discloses that Kaseta had a right to be present at the
step-1 meeting, that she had refused to waive that right, and that
she insisted on being present at the step-1 meeting. (Tr. 249–
250.) The unrebutted evidence further shows that on Septem-

23 The credible evidence shows that on August 28, 1999, AVP Get-
tys explained to Kaseta that there was no contract violation giving rise
to a grievance against Supervisor Day. (Tr. 296.)
ber 29 Kaseta spoke with Holmes on the phone at which time
he told her that the step-1 meeting would be held the next day
no matter what.24 (GC Exh. 20.) When Kaseta asked Holmes
what time would the step-1 meeting be held, he told her that he
would not know the time of the meeting until after he spoken
with the Postal Service supervisor. The unrebutted evidence
shows that Kaseta asked Holmes to call her back with the time
of the meeting, but he never did. The next day, Holmes held
the step-1 grievance meeting without Kaseta, even though he
knew that she wanted to be there. (Tr. 250.)
Holmes did not explain why he never called Kaseta back
with the time of the step-1 meeting. He also did not explain
why he did not request an extension of time to hold the meet-
ing. Rather, he testified that he knew that Kaseta wanted to
attend the step-1 meeting, but nevertheless went ahead with the
meeting without her. Under the circumstances, I find that his
conduct was outside a wide range of reasonableness so as to be
irrational. Letter Carriers Branch 529, 319 NLRB 881 (1995).
In addition, there is no evidence, nor argument, that Holmes
inadvertently failed to advise Kaseta of the time of the step-1
meeting. Thus, the evidence supports a reasonable inference
that his failure to notify Kaseta was willful. The Board has
stated that a union’s duty of fair representation includes the
duty to neither willfully misinform employees about their
grievances nor to willfully keep them uninformed. Postal
Workers Union, 328 NLRB 281, 282 (1999).
Accordingly, I find that Holmes violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act by willfully denying her the right to attend her step-1
grievance.
I. The Arbitrary and Disparate Treatment of Kaseta
Paragraph 8(i) of the complaint alleges that on or about Oc-
tober 13, 1999, Union President Shelton disparately and arbi-
trarily required Kaseta to pay for photocopies of the union files
that she had requested. I agree. First, there is no evidence that
the Union had an established policy of charging members for
copies of their files, duplicate or otherwise. Shelton testified
that he never made a general announcement to the union mem-
bership or made it known to the local union stewards that there
would be a charge for duplicate copies of files. (Tr. 285.) Sec-
ond, there is no evidence that the Union has charged other
members for photocopies of union files or duplicates of them.
Rather, the only evidence of anyone being charged is Kaseta.
Finally, the Union’s explanation that it charged Kaseta’s re-
quest for files because it was a duplication of files that were
previously provided is unsupported by the evidence. Rather,
the undisputed evidence shows that in 1997, Kaseta requested a
copy of all her complaints and grievances from October 1995 to
February 3, 1997. (R. Exh. 31.) In January 1999, she asked for
copies of unspecified past complaints and grievances filed prior
to January 1999. (Tr. 162; R. Exh. 32.) When the Union did
not provide those files by February 8, 1999, Kaseta filed a com-
plaint protesting the Union’s untimely delay in providing the
documents. (R. Exh. 33.) Butler admitted that there was a
delay in providing the latter files, which she attributed to the
24 Holmes testified that he never requested an extension of time to
hold the step-1 meeting. (Tr. 249.)

MAIL HANDLERS LOCAL 307 (POSTAL SERVICE) 1165
relocation of the Union’s offices. (Tr. 326.) Although Butler
testified that those files (i.e., those sought by Kaseta in her
February 16, 1999 complaint) were provided to Kaseta, Kaseta
denied receiving these files from the Union. (Tr. 324, 340.)
For demeanor reasons, I credit Butler’s testimony on this point.
Thus, the evidence shows that Kaseta requested and was pro-
vided complaints and files up to January 1999.
The evidence also unequivocally shows that the files sought
by Kaseta in her August 22 letter to Shelton were “for the past
six months” (i.e., March–August 1999) with the exception of a
December 9, 1998 Letter of Warning. (GC Exh. 15.) The re-
quest was reiterated in the opening paragraph of her September
20 letter to Shelton in which Kaseta stated, “This is a follow-up
to my letter of August 22, 1999. I had requested copies of all
my union files for the past six months.” (GC Exh. 18.) There
is no evidence that Kaseta was provided with a copy of her files
for the period March–August 1999, and therefore, there is no
evidence that her recent request was duplicative of an earlier
request. Thus, I find that even if there was evidence that the
Union had a policy of charging members for duplicative re-
quests for files, which there is not, Kaseta’s request did not fall
into that category.
Accordingly, I find that the Union violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by arbitrarily and disparately charging
Kaseta for photocopies of the files she requested in her August
22, 1999 letter to Shelton.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The United States Postal Service (Postal Service) is sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 1209(a).
2. Local 307, National Postal Mail Handlers Union, a Divi-
sion of the Laborers’ International Union of North America,
AFL–CIO (U.S. Postal Service) is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Local 307 has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by
failing to inform Vicky Lynn Kaseta of the time of a step-1
grievance meeting and by charging her for photocopies of her
union files, including disciplinary actions taken against her by
the Postal Service, and complaints and grievances that she has
filed against the Postal Service.
4. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor prac-
tice not specifically found here.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. I shall recommend that the Respon-
dent provide Vicky Lynn Kaseta with copies of her union files
for the period of March to August 1999, inclusive, as well as a
copy of a December 9, 1998 warning letter and reimburse her
for all monies, if any, paid by Vicky Lynn Kaseta to the Re-
spondent in order to obtain the copies, plus interest as com-
puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended25
ORDER
The Respondent, Local 307, National Postal Mail Handlers
Union, a Division of the Laborers’ International Union of North
America, AFL–CIO (Local 307), its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to inform Vicky Lynn Kaseta of the time of her
step-1 grievance meeting.
(b) Charging Vicky Lynn Kaseta for photocopies of her union
files.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing Vicky
Lynn Kaseta or any other employee in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Provide Vicky Lynn Kaseta with copies of her union files for
the period of March to August 1999, inclusive, as well as a copy of
a December 9, 1998 warning letter.
(b) Reimburse Vicky Lynn Kaseta for all moneys, if any, paid
by Vicky Lynn Kaseta to the Respondent in order to obtain copies
of her union files for the aforesaid period, plus interest as computed
in accordance with the remedy above.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its union
offices and hiring halls in Detroit, Michigan, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”26 Copies of the notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately on receipt and maintained for 60 consecu-
tive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees and members are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own ex-
pense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time since Septem-
ber 28, 1999.
(d) Furnish signed copies of the notice to the Regional Director
of Region 7 for posting by the United States Postal Service, if will-
ing, at all locations in the Detroit, Michigan metropolitan area,
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Re-
gional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a
form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respon-
dent has taken to comply.

25 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
26 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”