Lyncoach and Truck Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 29, 1970

183 N.L.R.B. 1296 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

1296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lyncoach and Truck Company, Inc. and District
Lodge No . 75, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.
Case 15-CA-3578
June 29, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND JENKINS
1. Delete paragraph 2(a) and substitute the fol-
lowing:
(a) Offer the employees named below im-
mediate and full reinstatement each to his former
position or , if those jobs no longer exist , to one sub-
stantially equivalent thereto , without prejudice to
his seniority and other rights and privileges enjoyed
by each , and make each whole for any loss of pay
he may have suffered by reason of his discharge,
with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent:
On February 9, 1970, Trial Examiner James V.
Constantine issued his Decision in the above-enti-
tled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and de-
sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. The Trial Examiner also found that Respon-
dent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended dismissal as to those allegations.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Coun-
sel filed exceptions to certain portions of the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner as modified
below and hereby orders that Respondent, Lyn-
coach and Truck Company, Inc., Troy, Alabama,
its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order as so modified.
' Respondent 's exceptions directed to the credibility resolutions of the
Trial Examiner are without merit The Board will not overrule the Trial Ex-
aminer's resolutions as to credibility unless a clear preponderance of all
relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect On the entire
record, such a conclusion is not warranted herein Standard Dry Wall
Products, Inc , 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3)
Max Shaw
James H. Cannon
James David Doster
James Lewis Doster
Howard W.
McLendon
William D . Layton
Joe L. Layton
Captain C. D.
Downing
Willie D. Downing
David H. Slawson
Hilliard K. Davis
Benjamin F. Godwin
2. Delete the seventh indented paragraph of the
notice and substitute the following:
WE WILL offer to each of the following em-
ployees immediate and full reinstatement to his
former position or, if those jobs no longer ex-
ist, to one substantially equivalent thereto,
without prejudice to his seniority and other
rights and privileges enjoyed by each. We will
also pay each whatever loss he may have suf-
fered as a result of his discharge by us, with in-
terest at 6 percent per annum:
Max Shaw
James H. Cannon
James David Doster
James Lewis Doster
Howard W.
McLendon
William D. Layton
Joe L. Layton
Captain C. D.
Downing
Willie D. Downing
David H. Slawson
Hilliard K. Davis
Benjamin F. Godwin
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Trial Examiner: This is
an unfair labor practice case litigated pursuant to
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended , herein called the Act (29 U.S.C.
160(b)). It was initiated by a complaint issued on
September 19, 1969, by the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board, herein called
' In agreeing with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the statement of
employee Regal Hamm , son of the plant manager, to employee Willie D
Downing regarding the wearing of union buttons was not coercive, we note
that there is no showing in the record that Hamm was either a supervisor or
agent of the Respondent and he appears to have the same employee status
as Downing
183 NLRB No. 133
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK COMPANY,
the Board , through the Regional Director for Re-
gion 15 ( New Orleans , Louisiana ), naming Lyn-
coach and Truck Company , Inc., as the Respon-
dent . That complaint is based on a charge filed on
June 27 , 1969, and two amended charges filed on
August 4 and 21, 1969 , respectively . The charge
and amended charges were filed by District Lodge
No. 75, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers , AFL-CIO, herein called the
Union or IAM.
In essence the complaint alleges that Respondent
has violated Section 8 ( a)(1) and ( 3) and that such
conduct affects commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent has
answered , admitting some facts but denying it com-
mitted any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to due notice , this case came on to be
heard, and was tried before me , on November 18
and 19 , 1969, at Troy, Alabama . All parties were
represented at and participated in the hearing and
had full opportunity to introduce evidence, ex-
amine and cross -examine witnesses , file briefs, and
offer oral argument . Briefs have been received from
Respondent and the General Counsel.
This case presents the following issues: (1)
whether Respondent engaged in several acts
declared to contravene Section 8 ( a)(1) of the Act;
and (2 ) whether Respondent discriminatorily
discharged 12 employees for engaging in union and
other protected activity.
Upon the entire record in this case , and from my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. AS TO JURISDICTION
Respondent, an Alabama corporation, is engaged
at Troy, Alabama, in manufacturing truck bodies
and vans. During the year preceding the issuance of
the complaint in this case Respondent purchased
and received goods and materials valued in excess
of $50,000 which were shipped to it directly from
points located outside the State of Alabama. I find
that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to as-
sert jurisdiction over Respondent in this proceed-
ing.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. GENERAL COUNSEL'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interference , Restraint , and Coercion
It was stipulated at the trial that Respondent
posted on its bulletin board a notice reading as fol-
lows:
INC. 1297
Notice: No badges, buttons, or placques [sic]
may be worn on the premises of this company,
except those provided by the company.
[signed] Nelson Hamm, manager.
Employee Max Shaw testified that this was
posted after he was discharged on June 6, 1969,
and that he never was aware of such a rule before it
was so posted. Shaw saw employee Roy Davis wear-
ing a large nonunion badge before June 6, 1969,
but no supervisor asked Davis to remove it.
About May 1969, Supervisor Dick Davis hired
16-year-old Ronnie Westbrook, a cousin of a union
official. On this occasion Davis asked Ronnie if he
was related to Union Official Westbrook. In addi-
tion Davis explained to Ronnie "the company ru-
les" and said "they didn't have a union and they
didn't see any need for one." Although the remarks
of Davis to Ronnie indicate union animus by Davis,
and I so find, I nevertheless expressly find that they
do not constitute an unfair labor practice. For an
employer may under Section 8(c) of the Act
proclaim or announce his aversion or dislike of
unions , and such utterances opposing a union do
not contravene the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Threads, Inc.,
308 F.2d 1, 8 (C.A. 4).
Fletcher Spivey, a former employee of Hender-
son, Black, and Greene, in Troy, applied for work
with Respondent when Henderson laid him off.
Prior to so applying Spivey "testified in an 8(a)(1)
trial ... in 1966 and filed two charges with the
NLRB that were subsequently dismissed." On the
occasion when he last applied for work with
Respondent, i.e., May 20, 1969, Spivey spoke to
Plant Manager Nelson Hamm . This time Hamm
told Spivey that he, Hamm, "did not want some-
body coming in there a'trying to start something."
Hamm also told Spivey to pay no attention to any-
one who "come to [Spivey] with a card to sign." I
find that Hamm's statements are not coercive and,
therefore, do not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. N.L.R.B. v. Threads, Inc., supra at 8.
Soon Supervisor Dick Davis joined the two and
spoke to Spivey. Among other things, Davis said
that "they didn't want nobody out there a'starting
no union." Davis also mentioned that he worked at
Dorsey Trailer Company in Troy, Alabama, where
they had a union but he did not like the union.
Davis also asked Spivey if Henderson fired Spivey
"on account of the union" and if Spivey "actually
was taking part in it." Spivey answered in the affir-
mative. Davis further observed that the Union had
never done anything for anyone. I find that these
remarks of Davis do no more than evince hostility
to unions but that they are protected by Section
8(c) of the Act because they contain no threat of
reprisal.
Spivey was hired by Respondent. He wore a
union pencil clip while at work, and he also wore it
when interviewed for a job by Supervisor Davis.
One day while at work Spivey was asked by Super-
visor Davis whether this pencil holder was a union
badge. Spivey replied that it was. Thereupon Davis
1298 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
informed Spivey that it was against company rules
to wear a union badge in the plant. Spivey an-
swered that he was unaware of such a rule. A short
while later Spivey placed the pencil in his pocket. A
day or two later Respondent posted a "no badge ru-
le" on the bulletin board.
B. The Discharge of Max Shaw
Shaw began his latest employment with Respon-
dent in December 1968. He was then hired as a
welder and burner by Superintendent Dick Davis
and Plant Manager Nelson Hamm . On June 3,
1969, Shaw signed an authorization card for the
Union. Later Union Representative Westbrook
asked Shaw to serve on the Union's committee or-
ganizing Respondent's plant. Shaw agreed to this.
The next day Respondent received a letter from the
Union stating that Shaw and employee Hustis Lee
were serving on that organizing committee.
On June 4 Shaw wore a union badge at the plant
and in addition succeeded in his nonworking time
in inducing some employees to sign union
authorization cards. At least two other employees,
Captain Downing and James David Doster, all wore
union buttons on that day. Supervisor Cotton Ellis
told Shaw to remove the latter's union badge or
Shaw would be fired.
Some of Shaw's June 4 soliciting of employees to
sign authorization cards took place on the parking
lot adjacent to the highway at a point about 100
yards from the front door to Respondent's office.
While so engaged Shaw noticed that Supervisors
Davis, Hamm, and Carroll Hughes and Lloyd Wil-
liams, who "work in the office," were observing his
actions. They were situated in front of the office
door about 150 yards away. This parking lot was
enclosed by a fence. Shaw was soliciting outside the
fence.
About June 5 Shaw obtained more signatures to
authorization cards. He wore six union buttons on
this day. Again he was watched as he was so en-
gaged by Company Supervisors Hamm , Davis, and
Hughes. On one occasion, as Shaw was so engaged,
Hamm walked within 10 or 15 feet of the place
where Shaw was standing. Other employees were in
the immediate vicinity.
On June 6 Shaw again wore six buttons at the
plant. This time Hamm and Davis watched Shaw
while he was working at the plant. Supervisor
Goodson also was with Hamm and Davis at the
time. About 2:55 p.m. Herman Maulden, Shaw's
foreman, directed Shaw to come with him to Good-
son's office. Goodson then informed Shaw that,
pursuant to Plant Manager Hamm's instruction,
Goodson as of 3 p.m. would consider Shaw no
longer to be employed by Respondent. When he
asked for a reason for this Shaw was told his work
was "unsatisfactory."
Shaw had been criticized but once, about 6 to 8
weeks before he was discharged, when Davis and
Goodson complained to him that his production
was low. Shaw told them he was performing at his
best and that if it was inadequate they would "have
to find somebody else." However Shaw's immediate
supervisor, Herman Maulden, told him that Shaw
"worked as hard as any man in there."
On cross-examination Shaw testified that on
Respondent's premises he read signs in substance
warning employees to "keep out unless employed
and on duty," but that he was not in the plant or in-
side the fence when he solicited authorization
cards. However the area where he did solicit may
have been part of the Company's premises. Further,
he denied drinking liquor at any time just before he
came to work.
Also on cross-examination Shaw testified that he
sometimes solicited "before work" in the plant and
"inside the fence," and in the parking lot "during
dinner and after work," but that most of such ac-
tivity took place "outside the fence."
C. The Discharge of James Henry Cannon
Cannon was hired by Respondent about January
9, 1969, to tag U bolts under the trucks. He worked
under Carroll Hughes, whom I find to be a super-
visor under Section 2(1 1) of the Act.
About June 4, 1969, Plant Manager Hamm com-
plained to Cannon that Hamm was tired of Can-
non's "drag assing around." This was the only time
a supervisor criticized Cannon's work or work
habits. When Cannon asked Carroll Hughes, his su-
pervisor, what Hamm meant by this, Hughes
replied, "On account of damn mess you all were
signing yesterday." However, Cannon insisted he
had "signed nothing."
On June 6, 1969, Hughes told Cannon and em-
ployee Willie Jones to see Hughes "after the whistle
blow." They did so. When they called on Hughes
he told them to gather up their tools because
Hughes would not need them any longer. Prior to
this Cannon had asked employee Willie Jones if
Jones was going to join the Union.
D. The Discharge of James David Doster
Doster was hired by Respondent about January
24, 1969, to put together truck bodies. A few days
later he was sent to Respondent's California plant
for about 4-1/2 months, after which he returned to
the Troy plant.
About June 3, 1969, Doster signed a union
authorization card. The next 3 days he wore two
union buttons while at work. Supervisors Hamm,
Dick Davis, and Robert Golden noticed this. At no
time prior to this was he cognizant of any company
"no buttons and no badge rule." Doster obtained
the signature of employee William Layton to a
union card on June 5, 1969, as I credit Layton as to
the date. I find that Doster is mistaken when he
testified that this occurred after he was fired on
June 6, 1969.
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK COMPANY, INC. 1299
About 2:50 p.m. on June 6, 1969, Supervisor
Robert Golden told Doster that "come 3:00 o'clock
[Doster] wouldn't be employed with Lyncoach any
more." No reason was assigned for this result.
Doster knew of no employee being discharged be-
fore this. Except for punching a company door with
his fist in California, Doster had not engaged in any
censurable conduct. However, Supervisor Dick
Davis once told Doster that the latter was attaching
decals too close to the front of the trucks and al-
lowing bubbles to form in a few decals. And Doster
denies he was ever drunk on the job.
E. The Discharge of Joe L. Layton
Joe Layton was hired on the third shift by
Respondent about January 22, 1969 , to put on de-
cals. His foreman was Robert Golden . On some oc-
casions thereafter Supervisor Davis reprimanded
Layton for irregularity in working habits. Layton
replied that this was unavoidable because his
mother was hospitalized . As a result Davis trans-
ferred Layton to the first shift so that Layton could
visit the hospital at night . Thereafter Davis was
satisfied that Layton came to work regularly. But
Layton was not criticized for any other alleged
shortcomings . Finally , Layton testified he never
wandered from his work area during working hours.
On June 4 , 1969, about a month after he was as-
signed to the first shift , Layton signed a union
authorization card about 3:05 p.m., right after
quitting time . It was given to him by employee Max
Shaw in Respondent 's parking lot by the side of the
road . Supervisors Hamm and Davis were close by at
the time . Other employees were signing cards for
Shaw at the same time.
Layton worked overtime on Saturday , June 7,
1969. About 11 a.m. Supervisor Davis said to
Layton , " I won't need you any more .... We're
going to employ college students .... You can tell
your brother [ William] we won't need him either."
This occurred as the season for college summer va-
cations approached.
During the time Layton was employed by
Respondent no employees had been fired prior to
June 6 , 1969, when Shaw and Doster were
discharged.
F. The Discharge of William David Layton
watching. Layton also testified that he knew of no
rule against wearing buttons of any kind and that he
had no knowledge that any employee had been
fired from the time he was hired to June 1, 1969.
About 2 weeks before June 7, 1969, when the
welder did not come to work, Layton sought to
weld a door, but "it didn't work out." His super-
visor, Robert Golden, instructed him "not to do it
any more" and to ask for a "certified welder"
thereafter when welding work was needed.
Layton found he was being discharged from his
brother, Joe.
On cross-examination Layton testified that Su-
pervisor Dick Davis scolded him for being away
from his work station . But Layton defended his ac-
tivity on the ground that he did so only when he
was caught up in his work and had "nothing to do
any more." And even at that Layton claimed that
he "wandered around" trying to find "something to
do, put mirrows [sic] on trucks or something like
that."
G. The Discharge of Howard W. McLendon
About March 1969, Respondent hired McLen-
don to install certain parts on trucks, and assigned
him to work under Foreman Shelby McLeod. On
June 4, 1969, he signed a union authorization card
at the request of employee Max Shaw. At no time
had McLendon heard of a "no badge rule" or read
one.
On June 6, 1969, McLendon wore a union but-
ton for roughly 2-1/2 hours. Supervisors McLeod,
Davis (erroneously called David at p.68 of the
transcript), and Hamm passed by during the time
McLendon was wearing the button. He did not
wear it on the next day, a Saturday.
As he was clocking out on Saturday, June 7,
1969, Supervisor Dick Davis fired McLendon. Yet
McLendon's work had never been criticized. For
about 2-1/2 weeks prior to this McLendon had
been training Preacher Horton on the job. Horton
was neither fired nor laid off. To McLendon's
knowledge no one had been fired before "Shaw and
the rest of them got fired out there" in early June
1969. When McLendon was discharged Supervisor
Davis told him that the working force "was reduced
by one shift at that time." Nevertheless McLendon
was "the onliest one fired at 12 o'clock that Satur-
day" as the employees were clocking out.
William Layton was hired by Respondent about
April 1, 1969. At that time Supervisor Dick Davis,
who hired Layton, mentioned that "they didn't
have" a union. I find this is not coercive and, there-
fore, does not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On June 5, 1969, Layton signed a union authoriza-
tion card at the request of employee James David
Doster. This occurred across the road from the
plant. No company officials were in the area.
Layton's brother, Joe, signed a union card on
June 4, 1969, at a point in the parking lot by the
side of the road where company officials were
H. The Discharge of Willie D . Downing
Downing began employment with Respondent
about the middle of January 1969. On June 4,
1969, he signed a union authorization card which
was given to him by Max Shaw. Supervisors Nelson
Hamm and Dick Davis , and Nelson Hamm's son,
Regal , were not too far away from the place where
Downing signed said card and "were looking down
our direction where we were signing the cards." A
couple days later Downing wore a union button on
1300 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
top of an army cap at work. Company Officials
Hamm and Davis noticed this button as they
walked by. He wore it thereafter every day at work
until he was fired.
About 7:30 or 7:35 a.m. on June 5, 1969, Super-
visor Hamm asked Downing where Downing had
been that morning, claiming that he had been look-
ing for Downing for an hour. Downing replied that
he had been at work but a half hour. Despite this,
Hamm accused Downing of loafing and invited him
to the office
So Hamm and Downing proceeded to the office
where they found Supervisor Dick Davis seated
there. Then Hamm complained that Downing "had
been sloughing off" and asserted that if Downing
did not want to work he should quit. When Hamm
asked Downing if the latter was going to quit, he
answered in the negative. Continuing, Hamm asked
Downing if Downing "was doing the work" which
Downing "was being paid for." Downing replied in
the affirmative.
Shortly before Downing was discharged Regal
Hamm, the son of Plant Manager Hamm, told
Downing that if Downing did not remove the union
button which Downing displayed on a hat "it would
get [Downing] in trouble." But Downing stated that
he would wear it as long as he desired. Yet no one
prior to this had told Downing that it was against
company rules to wear a badge.
On June 9 Supervisor Carroll Hughes requested
Downing to see him about 2:50 p.m. McLeod com-
plied. About 2:54 p.m. Hughes told Downing that
Supervisor Dick Davis told Hughes that Downing
"wanted to get fired or laid off." Continuing,
Hughes stated that Davis "had to let [Downing]
go," and that "it wasn't his [Hughes'] doing."
Finally, Hughes told Downing "they" were laying
off Downing.
Prior to Max Shaw's discharge Downing had
never heard of any employees being fired. "Every
time just quit," Downing testified.
1. The Discharge of Captain C. D. Downing
Downing was hired by Respondent in December
1968. On June 4, 1969, he signed a union
authorization card upon the solicitation of Max
Shaw. Not long after this Downing daily wore one
or two union pins at work.
About 2 days before June 17, 1969, Supervisor
Dick Davis demanded that Downing remove the
two union pins the latter was wearing. Davis added,
"We don't allow them being worn in here."
Thereupon Downing answered, "Yes sir." A few
minutes after this Davis directed Downing to ac-
company him to the office. Downing did so.
When they arrived at the office Davis com-
plained that Downing had not removed the buttons
and commented that he, Davis, had not expected
Downing "would do this to us after we give you a
raise ." Downing defended his action by saying that
since "the rest of them" wore buttons he, Downing,
"just as well wears one." When Davis demanded
that Downing take off the buttons Downing refused
on the ground that "my buttons holds my britches
on." Thereupon Davis said, "You're fired ... for
wearing those pins." But Downing had never heard
of a company rule forbidding the wearing of badges
until shortly after June 4, 1969, when he read a
notice on the bulletin board prohibiting them.
In the past Downing not only had been free of
criticism regarding his work, but he also had
received a raise of 5 cents an hour, and also, upon
his insistence, was assigned to "a lot of overtime"
work. The foregoing raise had been granted ap-
proximately 3 weeks before Downing was
discharged.
J. The Discharge of James Lewis Doster
Doster began his employment with Respondent
in 1967. On June 4, 1969, he signed a union
authorization card at Max Shaw's home. Doster
also wore a union badge beginning about 2 weeks
after June 4, 1969. Not long after he started to
wear it, Doster was ordered by Supervisor Davis to
cease doing so. Doster obeyed this command. Yet
prior to this Doster was not aware that the wearing
of such buttons was proscribed by Respondent.
On June 23, 1969, Doster renewed his wearing of
the union button. Again Supervisor Davis directed
Doster to take it off. Since Doster did not im-
mediately do so, Davis instructed him to "clock
out " Instead of clocking out Doster asked if he had
been fired. Davis replied in the affirmative. There-
upon Doster punched the clock and soon left. At no
time had Doster's work been criticized.
K. The Discharge of Benjamin F. Godwin
Godwin was last hired by Respondent in late Oc-
tober 1967. On June 4, 1969, he signed a union
authorization card upon being requested to do so
by employee Max Shaw. Shortly after employee
Captain Downing was fired, Godwin suggested to
Supervisor Hamm that Downing was discharged
"about the Union." But Hamm replied, "Well, it
was against the company rule ... it was just like an
order not to take a torch and cut something."
Not long after Max Shaw was discharged a group
of about 30 employees, of whom one was Godwin,
decided to wear union buttons at work. A few days
later Godwin observed Supervisor Davis "taking
the buttons off" some employees in Godwin's "im-
mediate department." Soon Davis informed God-
win that "it's against the state law to wear those
buttons on company property and I'll have to ask
you to take them off." Godwin replied that he was
ignorant that this was "against the state law." Then
Godwin addressed himself to Supervisor Hamm
who was nearby.
When Godwin told Hamm that Supervisor Davis
considered the wearing of "these buttons" on com-
pany property as contravening "state law," Hamm
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK COMPANY, INC. 1301
replied, "Yes, you're going to have to take them
off." This caused Godwin to remark, "What are
you all trying to do, get the buttons off a bunch of
us so you can fire a bunch of us?" Hamm denied
that he wanted to "fire anybody else about this
union business." To this Godwin answered that "we
need all these guys here at work," and that "the
more that gets fired the harder it makes the job on
us." Hamm agreed that "we need them all to work.
Yes, there's plenty of work to do." Prior to this
Godwin had not heard of a company rule against
wearing badges.
Although Godwin then removed his badge or
button he again wore it on the following Monday,
June 23, 1969. About 9:30 a.m. on that day Super-
visor Dick Davis asked Godwin and employee Ken-
neth Davis, both of whom were wearing buttons, if
the latter two had read the bulletin board. Both an-
swered that they did. Then Supervisor Davis in-
sisted that it was "against the company rules to
wear those buttons," and demanded that Godwin
and Kenneth "take them off." After further discus-
sion Godwin and Kenneth Davis replied that they
would "think about it." Thereupon Supervisor
Davis ordered Godwin and Kenneth "to clock out."
When, a few minutes later, the two asked Super-
visor Davis why he directed them to clock out, he
replied, "Okay, we'll fire you then. Go clock out
and bring your cards to the office." About an hour
later Supervisor Hamm told them, "You boys' work
is satisfactory; just those pins." Although Godwin
asked that Hamm express his foregoing oral state-
ment in writing, Hamm did nothing about it. Soon
Supervisor Davis came to Godwin and informed the
latter that such written statement would not be
given but that he, Davis, would send the "proper
forms" filled out for any other employer who might
consider Godwin for employment.
Godwin also testified that no one other than Max
Shaw and other union adherents had been
discharged in the few months preceding the
discharge of Godwin. Finally, Godwin denied that
he had been criticized for inattention to his work
assignments.
L. The Discharge of Hilliard K. Davis
This employee, also known as Kenneth Davis,
was hired by Respondent approximately 3 months
before June 23, 1969, to work in its welding depart-
ment. At that time Supervisor Dick Davis, who is
not related to him, told Kenneth, "I'm going to let
you know from the start ... we don't want no
union here. We're too young and too small." Then
Dick Davis asked if Kenneth had ever belonged to a
union . Kenneth replied that he belonged to the
[AM at Dorsey Trailer in Elba, Alabama.
On June 4, 1969, Kenneth signed a union
authorization card which he received from em-
ployee Max Shaw. On June 23, 1969, Kenneth
wore an IAM pin at work. About 9:40 a.m. Super-
visor Dick Davis informed Kenneth that company
rules forbade the wearing of "these badges" and
directed Kenneth "to pull it off." But Kenneth
refused. When Kenneth still refused a second time
a few moments later Supervisor Dick Davis
directed Kenneth "to clock out."
A few minutes later Kenneth asked Supervisor
Dick Davis what the latter meant "about this
clocking off; are we fired or what?" To this inquiry
the latter replied, "Yes, you're fired." Employee
Godwin was with Kenneth at the time . Soon Ken-
neth asked Supervisor Hamm what caused the
discharge of Godwin and Kenneth. Supervisor
Davis answered , " For breaking company rules and
disobeying direct orders." When Kenneth asked
Hamm whether Kenneth was being fired for un-
satisfactory work or lack of work, Hamm answered,
"No, it's solely for breaking company rules and dis-
obeying direct orders."
At this point Godwin requested from Hamm a
signed statement that Kenneth and Godwin were
being fired for breaking a rule against wearing
union buttons and not for unsatisfactory work.
Without answering, Hamm left to answer a
telephone call. Soon Supervisor Davis came to
them and told them that, as Hamm was busy,
Hamm would not return to see them. Kenneth
Davis testified he never heard of a company rule
prohibiting the wearing of badges until employee
Max Shaw first wore one. And neither Kenneth's
work nor work habits were ever pronounced in-
adequate by anyone prior to his discharge. In fact
Kenneth was given a 10-cent-an-hour raise twice in
the 3 months he worked for Respondent.
M. The Discharge of David H. Slawson
This employee was hired by Supervisor Dick
Davis in January 1969 At that time Davis told him
that the only way "to get fired was firing myself
[Slawson]." In fact no one was fired from that time
until "Max Shaw and those people" were
discharged in June 1969.
Slawson signed a union authorization card on
June 4, 1969, upon being solicited therefor by em-
ployee Max Shaw. A day or two later Slawson wore
an IAM badge but discontinued this the following
day because he heard others had been fired for
wearing the same. Nevertheless he resumed wear-
ing it on June 11, 1969. Company Officials Hamm
and Davis, as well as Foreman Goodson, observed
him wearing it. He knew of no rule forbidding the
wearing of badges.
At no time was Slawson's work criticized. In fact
a few days before June 11, 1969, Slawson's
foreman, Goodson, recommended him for a raise in
pay. However, on June 11, 1969, about 2:50 or
2:55 p.m., Foreman Goodson informed Slawson
that Slawson would be through at 3 p.m. because
the latter's work performance was "insufficient."
Slawson denied this accusation and added that he
was "putting out as much as the night shift."
1302 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Once , when Slawson asked for a raise from
Foreman Goodson , Slawson told Goodson , " I'm not
fixing to work my tail off for the money I'm
getting ." Although Goodson called Slawson's work
unsatisfactory on this occasion , Goodson did grant
Slawson a raise of 10 cents an hour.
IV. RESPONDENT 'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES
William Gunter is employed on Respondent's
first-shift door department. The first week of June
1969 he talked during working hours and also at
lunchbreak to employees Max Shaw, James H. Can-
non, Fletcher Spivey , Howard McLendon , Captain
Downing , and Benjamin Godwin . They often asked
him to " take the button " and to join a union , claim-
ing it would bring "a better price ." Sometimes their
request was made to him in the bathroom during
working hours . Gunter reported these conversa-
tions to Plant Production Manager Dick Davis a
few days later . Gunter further testified that he did
not know it was against company rules to wear an
IAM badge.
Donald Mills, a preacher , works for Respondent
on the first shift . While so employed during the first
week of June 1969, Mills was asked during working
hours by employee Howard McLendon to "sign
that thing "; i.e., a "union card ." Later Mills con-
veyed this conversation and its content to his
foreman , Shelby McLeod, and Production Manager
Dick Davis.
Employee William Henry Grissette is a foreman
on Respondent 's second -shift assembly line. This
shift, together with the first shift, works overtime
generally on Saturday from 7 a . m. to 3 p.m. On
Saturdays during April , May, and the first week of
June , 1969, Grissette "several times " smelled al-
coholic beverages on Max Shaw . The first time or
two Grissette "did say something " to Shaw about
this but did not report it to any official of the Com-
pany . However , since Shaw continued "on Satur-
days to come in there smelling of alcohol ," Gres-
sette referred the matter to Supervisors Nelson
Hamm and Dick Davis.
Part of Grissette 's duties involve security of the
plant . This aspect of his responsibilities often took
him to the parking lot and other outdoor areas
within the boundaries of Respondent 's premises.
About June 5 , 1969, Grissette saw employee Max
Shaw , a first-shift employee , just after dark inside
Respondent 's fence . Yet the gate of the fence was
locked at the time . The first shift is dismissed at 3
p.m. A sign is attached to the gate bearing the
legend " Keep out unless employed and on duty."
Another identical sign is posted at the intersection
of a public road and Respondent 's private road
leading to said gate.
Upon seeing Shaw , Grissette hollered at him.
Thereupon Shaw "run back over the fence ," which
is "close to head high ," entered a parked car, and
departed in that car . Grissette reported this in-
cident to Hamm, his superior , by leaving a note on
Hamm's desk. Grissette knew that the IAM at the
time was trying to organize the plant.
Shelby McLeod is a foreman of Respondent's
shipping and decals department. Employee James
David Doster worked under him as a decal man.
But Doster so applied the decals to trucks that the
decals "had a lot of blisters and bent up places."
Although a machine is available to correct this de-
fect, and employees were instructed how to operate
it, Doster never used it. Also, Doster "put on ...
lots of decals crooked." One day, when McLeod
smelled alcohol on Doster, the latter dropped de-
cals on the ground and walked on them. This odor
"probably was hangover."
Evaluating the "overall quality" of Doster's
work, McLeod rated it as "not too good." In fact
McLeod recommended to Davis, his superior, that
Doster be fired.
Employee McLendon also worked under
McLeod. But McLendon could never be found
"half the time we needed him." McLeod warned
McLendon about this and "complained" to an
unidentified person about it. In addition, when
McLendon did work he "left off ... some hubome-
ters" needed by the trucks. As a result, Respondent
at its own expense had to ship to the truck
purchasers and have installed on the trucks hu-
bometers which McLendon omitted to install.
On another occasion employee Donald Mills in-
formed McLeod that McLendon solicited Mills "to
sign a union card on company time." McLeod
passed on this information to Davis, his superior.
Often McLeod found "a bunch of men" gossiping
in the bathroom when they should have been at
work. Among those McLeod found thus "killing
time" were employees James H. Cannon, James
David Doster, James Lewis Doster, Howard
McLendon, William D. Layton, Joe Layton, Cap-
tain Downing, Willie Downing, David Slawson, Hil-
liard (Kenneth) Davis, Ben Godwin, and "other
men."
On cross-examination McLeod conceded that for
at least 2 years "people goofing off in the
bathroom" has been a problem. In fact "that [the
`goof off'] has been told to us all the time" by
management.
Another witness who testified for Respondent is
Collen Ellis. An abridgment of his testimony fol-
lows. Ellis, who is foreman of the first shift of
Respondent's fabricating shop, knows Max Shaw.
But Ellis denies that he told Shaw to take off an
IAM button from Shaw's clothing.
Roy F. Davis is foreman over Respondent's paint
shop and one of its welding crews. James Lewis
Doster worked under him as a welder and Benjamin
Godwin, from another foreman's crew, was loaned
to Davis for "a day or so." On a Tuesday about 2
months before Doster was fired, he told Davis that
he, Doster, was quitting on the following Friday. So
Davis "turned in" Doster's "notice" to Goodson,
the superior of Davis. However, Doster did not quit
then or later.
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK COMPANY, INC. 1303
Thereafter, not being given a raise, Doster lost
interest in his work as a welder and he started
"griping about this or that and another," and he also
"stood around talking a lot." But Davis does not
know why Doster was fired; it was not on the
recommendation of Davis.
Roy Davis knows Captain Downing. One day,
while at the premises of a friend, Davis encoun-
tered Downing. During a conversation which en-
sued, Downing said that, because he had no money
to pay for "a wreck," he, Downing, might get fired
within a day or two. Thus, said Downing, if he got
fired he would be out of a job and "they couldn't
collect the money out of him . . . if they got a
judgment." And, according to Davis, Downing "did
[get fired] within a few days.
Respondent's line foreman in its welding depart-
ment is W. P. Goodson. One of the employees
working in that department was Max Shaw. On one
occasion Goodson told Shaw that Shaw was capa-
ble of doing more work. But Shaw insisted that he
would not produce more unless he received a raise
in pay. At a later time Goodson warned Shaw to
stop leaving his work station and thus "killing time"
or "one [of us] was going to have to leave."
James Lewis Doster also worked under Goodson
"for a while." Although Doster's work was good, he
nevertheless often "just stood and not do
anything," according to Goodson. The same
evaluation, in Goodson's judgment , applies to em-
ployee Captain Downing, who also worked under
Goodson. On the other hand, employee David H.
Slawson, who worked for Goodson, "at first worked
all right" but soon "just lost interest and got to
where he ... just wouldn't work and spent so much
time just looking." In fact Slawson complained that
he "wouldn't work his ass off when the other wel-
ders were making more money than he was." And
Hilliard K. Davis, who also worked for Goodson,
often "killed time standing talking" to any one who
"would come and stand ... and talk" with Hilliard.
Continuing his testimony Goodson evaluated
Benjamin Godwin, who worked under him, as one
who "just killed time" whenever another employee
"came over there and talked to him." Goodson ob-
jected to this and so informed not only Godwin but
also all others mentioned above who "just killed
time ." He did this because production in Goodson's
department was falling off "close to one-third."
Goodson recommended that Max Shaw and
James David Doster be fired, but he did not recom-
mend that Captain Downing, David Slawson, or
Hilliard Davis be discharged. However, prior to the
June 1969 discharges, Goodson does not recall any-
one being fired or laid off in 1969.
Still another witness who testified for Respondent
is Herman Maulden, who is employed by it as a
welder-foreman. On June 6, 1969, Maulden
brought Max Shaw to Goodson, their superior.
Goodson then discharged Shaw. At no time did
Maulden tell Shaw that the latter's work was
satisfactory; in fact, in Maulden's opinion Shaw's
work was not satisfactory. Yet Maulden never com-
plained to Supervisor Goodson about Shaw's work.
Nevertheless Shaw was compensated at the "top
dollar" rate given to Respondent's certified wel-
ders.
C. A. Washburg, the supervisor of Respondent's
second shift, in substance, testified as follows.
Washburg saw Max Shaw, who works on the first
shift, i.e., from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., "several times after
3 p.m. talking to second shift men in the welding
shop." Thus Shaw "detained" these employees
from their work, sometimes for "maybe close to an
hour." Further, Washburg insisted that employee
Godwin "was just very slow" and also talked to em-
ployees when he should have been working.
Over a period of 8-1/2 years Washburg observed
on the bulletin boards "several times" a notice
reading "No badges, no buttons, or placques [sic]
may be worn on the premises of this company, ex-
cept those provided by the company. Nelson
Hamm, Manager." See Respondent's Exhibit 2.
However such notices often disappeared and then
would be replaced.
One night in early June 1969, Washburg called
Plant Manager Hamm to report that several cars
were blocking both driveways leading to the plant.
Soon Hamm arrived on the scene. Respondent's
counsel stated that Hamm will "connect" these
cars. But Hamm did not mention them in his
testimony.
Respondent's production manager since January
1, 1966, has been Leroy D. Davis, who is also
known as Dick Davis. His testimony in essence is
recited below. During the time he has served in
such capacity Respondent has had a rule "regard-
ing the wearing of badges or medallions" and such
rule has been posted periodically on the bulletin
board in this period. From "time to time" these
particular notices "would disappear off the bulletin
board. "
During the spring of 1969 Respondent was
operating three shifts which employed about 450
men. As of November 19, 1969, when he testified
in this case, Respondent had but one shift employ-
ing "over 200."
The third shift was eliminated about June 6
because "production was falling awful bad ... so
we decided to eliminate the third shift and take
men off that shift and switch them to other shifts
and see if we couldn't build up production again."
Since some layoffs became inevitable , only "the
men that were producing or trying to produce"
were retained on the two remaining shifts. In Sep-
tember 1969 the second shift was abolished. In
determining whom to keep on the remaining shift
"it was determined" to use those who were
"producing or trying to produce."
Davis, who knows employee Max Shaw, in-
structed Supervisor Goodson to terminate Shaw.
About a week before this Davis was present when
Goodson warned Shaw about Shaw's low produc-
tion and poor work habits. Goodson on that occa-
1304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sion told Shaw that Shaw would " have to ... go to
work and produce or you or me one will have to
leave."
A few moments before Shaw was discharged on
June 6 , 1969, Davis noticed that Shaw was wearing
a button or badge . When Davis asked Shaw
whether the latter had read the rules and regula-
tions of the Company forbidding the wearing of
badges, buttons , and medallions " not issued by the
company ," Shaw replied that he had . Davis then
asked Shaw to "conform with the rules ." Not long
after this , when Davis inquired of Supervisor Good-
son whether Shaw was working " like he ought to,"
Goodson answered in the negative . Thereupon
Davis ordered Goodson to "terminate" Shaw
because " we've got to get production." Sometime
prior to discharging Shaw , Davis saw Shaw talking
to employees on working time.
Further , Davis testified that James Cannon was
discharged because Cannon "was always gone from
his place of work" and "you couldn 't find him."
James David Doster was discharged because his
work was not satisfactory on the decal crew.
On June 6, 1969, when the third shift was
eliminated , Shaw, Cannon , and James David Doster
were terminated , according to Davis. In addition 67
to 70 other men were also terminated between June
5 and 7 , 1969. Included in said group were Howard
McLendon , who was released for "very unsatisfac-
tory " work because he (a) failed to install hubome-
ters and (b ) often wandered away from his work
area ; William D. Layton , whose derelictions were
"the same " as those of James David Doster; Joe
Layton , with whom " the same problem " arose in
connection with his work of installing decals; and
Willie D . Downing , who "was always gone" from
his work station.
Other employees terminated about this time
were : David H. Slawson on June 11 because "he
would not produce " and stated he would not "work
[his] tail off" at current wages; Captain Downing
on June 17 for the reason that he " slacked off in his
work a lot and was doing a lot of talking"; Hilliard
K. Davis and Benjamin Godwin on June 23 because
"they were doing a lot of standing and talking" and
also because Hilliard insisted on wearing a union
button or badge contrary to company rules and
regulations ; and James Lewis Doster because "he
did a lot of standing and talking" and "just lost in-
terest in the work or something."
Davis insisted that many union adherents were
not affected by the reduction in force , mentioning
Fletcher Spivey as an example . It is not stated how
Davis knew who were the union adherents.
Respondent's final witness, Nelson Hamm, its
plant manager , testified substantially as set forth in
this paragraph . Business considerations required
that the third shift be abolished. When this was ac-
complished "we had taken the best workers we felt
to give us production and fill in." Between June 5
and 7 , 1969, 72 employees were terminated under
this arrangement . On September 12, 1969 , Respon-
dent was forced to operate with only one shift.
Another 124 were then laid off . But Hamm does
not know how many of them "had signed union
cards. "
v. CONCLUDING FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. As to Interference, Restraint , and Coercion
Respondent 's answer admits , and I therefore find,
that at all times material , it maintained and en-
forced the following rule:
Solicitation of membership , pledges , subscrip-
tions , and/or the participation in any organiza-
tional activity of any kind on the Company's
premises and/or Company time without per-
mission from the Superintendent , or posting of
unauthorized signs , notices , pictures, hand
bills, or other materials on bulletin boards
and/or other places is strictly prohibited.
Absent evidence showing the necessity for such an
extensive prohibition , I find it is invalid because it
interferes with the rights of employees to engage in
union and other protected activity during nonwork-
ing time . The Shelby Manufacturing Company, 155
NLRB 464, 471.
Respondent also admittedly posted on its bulletin
board a rule proscribing the wearing of buttons,
badges , or plaques. Some question has arised as to
when this rule was adopted . I find that it was for-
mulated at least by the year 1966 , but that posted
notices describing it were systematically removed
from the bulletin boards by unidentified persons.
However , I further find that Respondent did not im-
partially enforce it, because I find that occasionally
an employee wearing a nonunion button was not
required to remove it . Thus I find that the rule was
disparately applied to union buttons or badges and,
therefore , violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In
any event , I find the rule itself invalid , regardless of
how it was administered , because it interfered with
rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the
Act. Brewton Fashions , Inc., 145 NLRB 99, 101.
Respondent 's evidence specifically concedes that
some of its supervisors ordered employees to
remove their IAM badges . This violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find . Webb Furniture
Corporation , 158 NLRB 1003 , 1004. A contrary
result is not required by dicta in Fabri-Tek Incor-
porated, 148 NLRB 1623, 1630, as I consider such
dicta to be distinguishable.
Shortly before Willie D. Downing was discharged
on June 9 , 1969, Regal Hamm , the plant manager's
son, told Downing that if Downing did not remove
the union button which Downing wore on a hat, it
would get Downing in trouble. I find this is not
coercive , as it merely apprised Downing of com-
pany policy and did not consitute a threat by Regal
to cause or attempt to cause trouble for Downing.
Although some supervisors , while on company
premises, observed or watched employees signing
cards on the parking lot, I find that this is not sur-
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK COMPANY, INC.
veillance . For I find that company officials may
direct their vision in any direction they wish while
on company property . Taylor Manufacturing Com-
pany , Incorporated , 83 NLRB 142, 163 ; Salant &
Salant, Incorporated, 92 NLRB 417, 446; N.L.R.B.
v. Davidson Rubber Co., 305 F.2d 166, 169-170
(C.A. 1); N.L.R.B. v. Public Service Co -ordinated
Transport, 177 F.2d 119, 121-122 (C.A. 3). In my
opinion, Tex Manufacturing Company, 180 NLRB
808, is distinguishable.
About 3 months before June 23, 1969, at the
time when Supervisor Dick Davis hired Hilliard K.
Davis , Dick told Hilliard , " we want no union in
here. We're too young and too small." On this oc-
casion Dick also asked Hilliard if Hilliard ever be-
longed to a union . This question is coercive, and I
so find , since no legitimate purpose is shown for
such inquiry . Orkin Exterminating Company of
South Florida, Inc., 136 NLRB 399. And the illegal
question renders the remaining statement coercive,
although such statement is probably itself noncoer-
cive. N.L.R.B. v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1, 8 (C.A.
4); N.L.R.B. v. T. A. McGahey, Sr., et al., d/b/a
Columbus Marble Works, 233 F.2d 406, 409 (C.A.
5). For the Board has held that " conversations
must be viewed in their entirety " and "cannot be
fragmentized." Astro Container Company, 180
NLRB 815.
B. As to the Discharge of Max Shaw
It is my opinion, and I find, that Shaw was
discharged for union activity, and that the reasons
advanced by Respondent to justify said discharge
are a pretext to disguise the real reason . This ulti-
mate finding is based on the entire record and the
following facts which I hereby make as subsidiary
findings:
1. Respondent had knowledge of Shaw 's union
activity, not only because he wore an IAM button,
but also because Respondent received a letter from
the Union informing it that Shaw had been ap-
pointed to the Union 's organizing committee.
2. Shaw was very active and played an important
part in the Union's campaign at Respondent 's plant.
"Obviously the discharge of a leading union ad-
vocate is a most effective method of undermining a
union." N.L.R.B. v. Longhorn Transfer Service,
Inc., 346 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.A. 5).
3. Respondent abruptly discharged Shaw without
prior warning. While it is true that about 6 to 8
weeks before he was discharged Shaw was told his
production was low , and I so find, nevertheless I
find that Respondent condoned or overlooked this
alleged fault until the advent of the Union and
Shaw's strenuous efforts on its behalf. An abrupt
termination during a union 's organizational cam-
paign is significant . Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Com-
pany, 142 NLRB 1083, 1085-1086. It warrants the
inference-which I draw-that Shaw's union activi-
ty entered into the decision to discharge him.
N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 'Inc., 242
1305
F.2d 497, 502 (C.A. 2), cert denied 355 U.S. 829;
Texas Industries, Inc., 156 NLRB 423, 425. See
N.L.R.B. v. Mira-Pak, Inc., 354 F.2d 525, 527
(C.A. 5) Moreover, Shaw was compensated at the
highest pay rate Respondent gave to its certified
welders. Unsatisfactory employees do not receive
"top" pay . Thus I find pretext in claiming Shaw was
unsatisfactory , since he was paid at such highest
rate.
4. Respondent entertained antiunion hostility. In
itself this is not sufficient to establish an unfair
labor practice. N.L.R.B. v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d
1, 8 (C.A. 4). Nevertheless union animus is a factor
which may be considered in ascertaining the true
reason motivating a discharge . Maphis Chapman
Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 368 F.2d 298 , 304 (C.A.
4); N.L.R .B. v. Georgia Rug Mill , 308 F . 2d 89, 91
(C.A. 5).
Respondent also committed other unfair labor
practices, as enumerated in paragraph V, A, above.
This conduct has probative weight in determining
the actual basis for a discharge.
5. Finally, I find that it is not necessary that
union activity be the only reason prompting Shaw's
discharge . It is sufficient in establishing a discharge
to be discriminatory that union activity is a motivat-
ing or substantial reason for such termination.
N.L.R.B. v. Lexington Chair Company, 361 F.2d
283, 295 (C.A. 4); N.L.R.B. v. Whitin Machine
Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (C.A. 1).
In arriving at the foregoing findings I have not
overlooked Shaw 's admission that he read signs
posted by Respondent ordering employees to keep
off the premises "unless employed and on duty."
But such signs are so broad that they prohibit union
activity during nonworking hours on company pro-
perty . Hence I find that such signs are invalid. It
follows that Shaw could not lawfully be discharged
for disregarding such signs when he solicited on
company premises during nonworking hours. I ex-
pressly find, not crediting Respondent 's evidence in
this connection , that Shaw did not engage in union
activity during working time . In addition , I specifi-
cally find that Shaw did not come to work under
the influence of liquor . Hence I do not credit
Respondent's evidence inconsistent with this last
finding.
C. As to the Discharge of James Henry Cannon
I find that Cannon was discharged "on account
of damn mess you all were signing yesterday." And
I find that this refers to the signing of a union card.
Hence I find that Cannon was terminated because
Respondent believed that Cannon signed a union
card , although apparently he did not . But discharg-
ing an employee in the mistaken belief that he had
signed a union card constitutes a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and ( 1), and I so find.
Further, I find that the reasons given by Respon-
dent to support its termination of Cannon are a pre-
text to disguise the real reason . Additionally, I find
1306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that Cannon did not engage in blameworthy con-
duct , so that I do not credit Respondent 's evidence
in this regard.
Finally , it is significant that Cannon was abruptly
discharged during an organizational campaign by
an antiunion employer who also engaged in other
unfair labor practices . If, as contended by Respon-
dent , a reduction in force necessitated a layoff of
employees who were the lowest producers, as was
Cannon, according to Respondent , it is reasonable
to expect that those selected for layoff would have
been given some advance notice . Failure to give
Cannon such notice carries some weight in per-
suading me that he was chosen to be terminated
because he was thought to have signed a union
card.
D. As to the Discharge of James David Doster
Doster in my opinion was discharged for engag-
ing in union activity, and I so find . In addition, I
find that Doster did not commit any acts warranting
his discharge , and that, even if he did, such conduct
was seized upon as a pretext to conceal the real
reason . This ultimate finding is based on the entire
record and the following subsidiary facts, which I
hereby find:
1. Respondent had knowledge that Doster's sym-
pathies favored the IAM, as I find that Supervisors
Hamm , Dick Davis , and Golden saw Doster wear-
ing two IAM buttons. Doster also served on the
IAM organizing committee , but Respondent did not
know this until June 7, 1969, the day after he was
discharged.
2. Respondent had an aversion to unions and
committed other unfair labor practices.
3. Doster was abruptly discharged without any
reason given to him . A precipitate discharge war-
rants the conclusion that it is based upon antiunion
motives, and I so find . Further, failure to give a
reason " alone would be enough to support an in-
ference that the layoff was discriminatory."
N.L.R.B. v. Griggs Equipment, Inc., 307 F.2d 275,
278 (C.A. 5); N.L.R.B. v. Plant City Steel Corp.,
331 F.2d 511, 515 (C.A. 5); Virginia Metalcrafters,
Incorporated, 158 NLRB 958, 962; Sutherland
Lumber Company, Inc., 176 NLRB 1010, TXD.
4. It is not necessary that union activity be the
only reason leading to Doster's discharge . Such ter-
mination may be found to be discriminatory if the
decision to make it is based substantially upon the
union activity of Doster. And I find that such activi-
ty was a motivating or substantial reason for his
discharge.
E. As to the Discharge of Joe L. Layton
I find that Layton was discharged for union ac-
tivity, and that he did not engage in blameworthy
conduct . In this respect I credit Layton and do not
credit Respondent 's evidence insofar as it con-
tradicts Layton . Hence I further find that the
reasons advanced by Respondent are a pretext to
cover up the real reason for Layton's discharge.
In arriving at this ultimate finding , I have relied
upon the whole record and the following subsidiary
facts, which I hereby find:
1. Respondent harbored hostility toward unions,
committed other unfair labor practices, and
abruptly discharged Layton during the height of the
Union's drive.
2. Respondent had knowledge of Layton's pro-
union sympathies in that Supervisors Hamm and
Davis were close by when Layton signed a union
card.
3. Finally, I credit Layton that he was told by Su-
pervisor Davis that Layton was being laid off to
make room for college students . But I find, in the
absence of evidence by Respondent thereon, that
no college students were hired. Hence I find that a
false reason was given to Layton regarding his
layoff.
"Proof ... that the reason given [for a termina-
tion] was false warrants the inference that some
other reason was being concealed .... If the em-
ployer is independently shown to have an antiunion
animus which the discharge would gratify , it may be
a fair inference that this was the true reason."
N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Antell, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883
(C.A. 1). I draw the inference that by giving a false
reason Respondent was concealing union activity
by Layton as the true reason for his discharge.
F. As to the Discharge of William David Layton
I find that William Layton signed a union
authorization card and was discharged for union ac-
tivity, and that this violates Section 8 ( a)(3) of the
Act. Further , I find that Respondent 's reasons given
at the trial are a pretext intended to cover up the
real reason for Layton's discharge.
Although I find that Layton signed a union card,
I find that Respondent had no direct knowledge
thereof. However , I find that William was
discharged at least for the same reasons as his
brother, Joe. Those reasons are hereby incor-
porated by reference . It is reasonable to infer
knowledge therefrom, and I do so. Virginia Metal-
crafters, Incorporated , 158 NLRB 958, 961; Texas
Industries , Inc., 156 NLRB 423, 425-426.
Further, I find that, since William was discharged
for the same reasons as his brother , Joe, William
was discriminatorily discharged in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3). In this connection I find that,
although William was criticized by Supervisor Dick
Davis for leaving his work station, this was over-
looked or condoned by Davis because William was
retained notwithstanding this inattention to duty by
Layton. " It is reasonable to assume that the com-
pany would have discharged him at or near the time
of the incident, instead of waiting until the union
movement began to discharge him for that reason."
N.L.R.B. v. Griggs Equipment , Inc., supra. And
Layton's incompetent welding of a door , which I
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK COMPANY, INC.
find did occur, likewise was disregarded or con-
doned by Supervisor Golden. N.L.R.B. v. Griggs
Equipment, Inc., supra.
In addition it is difficult to understand why Wil-
liam was discharged by a message given to Joe, his
brother, and conveyed to William by Joe. While not
conclusive, this failure by a supervisor to inform
William that the latter was discharged amounts to a
failure to give a reason. And failure to state a
ground for discharge "alone would be enough to
support an inference that the layoff was discrimina-
tory." N.L.R.B. v. Griggs Equipment, Inc., supra;
N.L.R.B. v. Plant City Steel Corp., supra.
G. As to the Discharge of Howard W. McLendon
McLendon was discharged for union activity and
I so find. Although I find that, about the same time,
Respondent did lay off some employees when it
eliminated a shift, selecting McLendon for layoff
was discriminatory because it was generated sub-
stantially by antiunion considerations.
This ultimate finding is based on the entire
record and the following subsidiary findings, which
I hereby make:
1. Respondent entertained antiunion hostility
and also committed other unfair labor practices.
2. Respondent had knowledge of McLendon's
union activity, as I credit him that Supervisors
McLeod, Davis, and Hamm observed his wearing a
union button. Also, I credit Gunter and Mills,
Respondent's witnesses, that they reported to
management that McLendon asked each to join a
union.
3. McLendon's work had never been criticized.
In this respect I do not credit Respondent's
evidence inconsistent with this finding.
4. McLendon alone was abruptly terminated as
he clocked out on Saturday, June 7, 1969. No
reasonable explanation is discernible in the record
why a shift is suddenly eliminated without prior
notice to an employee affected thereby, or why
only McLendon should be singled out to be
abruptly terminated as he clocked out. It is
reasonable to infer-and I do so-that such
precipitate action as to a single employee was
prompted by hostility to the employee' s union ac-
tivity.
In this connection I expressly find that the shift
was lawfully abolished. But, as found above, I
specifically find that McLendon was selected for
layoff principally for being prounion.
5. Finally, it is not a condition precedent to find-
ing an unlawful discharge that antiunion hostility be
the sole reason for the termination . Even though a
lawful reason , such as an economic layoff, exists to
terminate an employee, the termination neverthe-
less will be unlawful if it is motivated substantially
by antiunion hostility. And I find that McLendon's
termination was substantially motivated; i.e., he was
in effect selected for layoff because he engaged in
union activity.
1307
H. As to the Discharge of Willie D. Downing
It is my opinion, and I find, that Downing was
discharged for union activity, and that the reasons
recited at the trial are a pretext to mask the true
ground. This conclusion or finding is based on the
entire record and the following facts which I hereby
make as findings:
1. Downing engaged in union activity. Respon-
dent had knowledge thereof as Supervisors Hamm
and Davis saw him sign a union card and observed
him wearing a union button.
2. Respondent displayed antipathy to unions and
also committed other unfair labor practices as
found above.
3. Although Respondent accused Downing of
"sloughing off," I find, crediting Downing , that this
criticism was unjustified. Respondent 's contrary
evidence is not credited. Further, I find that ad-
vancing this reason for discharging Downing is a
pretext.
4. Further, if Downing has "sloughed off" in the
past, I find that Respondent had condoned or over-
looked this alleged dereliction of duty by doing
nothing about it over an appreciable length of time.
5. Downing was abruptly discharged during the
workweek. Nothing in the record points to any op-
probrious conduct by Downing requiring his sud-,
den, immediate discharge . It is therefore reasonable
to believe, and I find, Downing's discharge was sub-
stantially motivated by antiunion considerations.
6. Finally, no reason was given to Downing when
he was terminated. On this issue I credit him and do
not credit Respondent's evidence inconsistent
therewith. And I find, further, that failure to give a
reason for a discharge warrants the inference,
which I hereby draw, that antiunion motives
prompted the discharge.
1. As to the Discharge of Captain C. D. Downing
Like the others heretofore discussed, Captain
Downing also was discharged for union activity and
I so find. This ultimate finding is based upon the en-
tire record and the ensuing subsidiary facts, which I
also find:
1. Downing engaged in union activity and
Respondent was aware of this. Respondent's
knowledge flows from the fact, which I find, that
Downing wore two union pins which Supervisor
Dick Davis demanded that Downing take off; and
also because employee Gunter informed Supervisor
Davis that Downing asked Gunter to join a union.
2. Downing was discharged for refusing to
remove the said union buttons. Respondent's
evidence inconsistent with this finding is not
credited, and I credit Downing's testimony that
Davis told him, "You're fired ... for wearing those
[IAM] pins."
3. It is no defense that Davis also told Downing
that pins were not allowed to be worn in the plant,
and that Downing did not heed the command of
427-258 O-LT - 74 - 84
1308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Davis to remove the union buttons. For I have
found that the right to wear buttons is protected by
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that an employee
may not be discharged for refusing to obey a com-
mand that he honor a plant rule forbidding the
wearing thereof. Portage Plastics Company, 163
NLRB 753.
4. If material, I find that the reasons advanced at
the trial to justify Downing's discharge are a pre-
text. This is because Downing's work had not been
criticized in the past; he received a raise in pay only
3 weeks before he was discharged; and he was as-
signed to considerable overtime at his request.
Patently unsatisfactory employees do not receive
such favorable treatment. Respondent's contrary
evidence is not credited.
J. The Discharge of James Lewis Doster
Like Captain Downing, Doster was fired for
wearing an IAM button and I so find. And I further
find that discharging Doster therefor constitutes a
termination for union activity. This ultimate finding
is based on the entire record and the following ad-
ditional facts, which I hereby find:
1. Doster engaged in union activity and Respon-
dent knew this because I credit Doster that Super-
visor Davis ordered Doster to stop wearing a union
badge.
2. Doster was discharged for rewearing a union
button after he had been instructed to, and he did,
remove it. Evidence by Respondent inconsistent
with this finding is not credited.
3. It is no defense that Respondent had a rule
against the wearing of pins not approved by it.
Portage Plastics Company, supra.
4. The reasons advanced at the trial to support
the discharge of Doster are a pretext, and I so find.
In particular, I find that Doster's work had never
been criticized. Respondent's evidence to the ex-
tent that it is not consonant with this finding is not
credited.
K. As to the Discharge of Benjamin F. Godwin
Godwin is another one of those who was
discharged for wearing an IAM button and I so
find. Additionally, I find that exhibiting such a but-
ton on clothing is a protected union activity. Also, I
find that Godwin asked employee Gunter to sign a
union card. Accordingly, I find that Godwin was
unlawfully discharged for engaging in union activi-
ty. This ultimate finding is grounded on the entire
record and the following facts, which I hereby find:
1. Godwin engaged in union activity and
Respondent knew it. Such knowledge is founded on
the fact, which I find, that Supervisors Davis and
Hamm each instructed Godwin to remove the IAM
button which Godwin was wearing, and Gunter told
Davis that Godwin asked Gunter to join a union.
Evidence of Respondent inconsistent therewith is
not credited.
2. Godwin was specifically discharged by Super-
visor Davis for failing to comply with the request of
Davis to take off the IAM button which Godwin
was wearing. On this issue I credit Godwin and do
not credit Respondent's evidence which may clash
with it.
3. Godwin's work was satisfactory and had not
been subjected to adverse criticism. Additionally, I
do not credit Respondent 's evidence indicating a
conclusion clashing with this finding.
4. Even if Godwin's work was not satisfactory, I
find that Respondent did not warn him about it.
And I further find that such work, if it may be
characterized as below par, was advanced at the
trial as a pretext and was not a substantially
motivating reason for his discharge.
L. As to the Discharge of Hilliard K. Davis
Hilliard Davis also was discharged for union ac-
tivity and I so find. This ultimate conclusion is
based on the entire record and the following facts,
which I hereby find:
1. Hilliard, also known as Kenneth, engaged in
union activity of which Respondent was aware.
Thus I find that, when Kenneth wore a union pin,
Supervisor Dick Davis told him that company rules
prohibited the wearing of such paraphernalia and
ordered Kenneth to pull it off. Patently this
establishes company knowledge of Kenneth's union
activity.
2. Since the company rules mentioned in the
preceding paragraph have been found to be unlaw-
ful, Kenneth was within his rights in refusing to
obey Dick's order.
3. Kenneth was discharged for not responding to
Dick's command to take off Kenneth's pin. On this
issue I credit Kenneth's account of the facts per-
taining to his discharge, and do not credit Respon-
dent's contrary evidence. However, Supervisor
Davis testified that one factor entering into the
decision to fire Kenneth was the latter's insistence
on wearing a union button or badge contrary to
company rules and regulations.
4. Respondent explained at the trial as to why
Kenneth was discharged, but I do not credit its
evidence on this issue insofar as it is inconsistent
with Hilliard's. Further, even if Kenneth did not
perform satisfactory work, as contended by
Respondent, I find that this inadequacy is a pretext,
for two reasons:
(a) I credit Kenneth that he had not been
warned prior to his discharge that he faced termina-
tion because of unsatisfactory work. Thus any defi-
ciency in his performance had been condoned or at
least not been treated as exposing him to the risk of
losing his job.
(b) Kenneth had been granted a 10-cent-an-hour
raise twice in the 3 months that he worked for the
Company. Manifestly an unsatisfactory employee is
not rewarded with two increases in wages during a
3-month period of employment.
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK COMPANY, INC.
M. The Discharge of David H. Slawson
Slawson , in my opinion , was discharged for en-
gaging in union activity, and I so find. This conclud-
ing finding is based on the entire record and the
facts narrated below, which I hereby find:
1. Respondent fostered a dislike for unions. In
addition , Respondent engaged in other unfair labor
practices as found herein.
2. Slawson engaged in union activity . That part
of it which consisted of wearing an IAM badge
came to the attention of Company Officials Hamm,
Davis, and Goodson, as I find that they observed
Slawson wearing it. Thus I find Respondent had
knowledge of Slawson 's union activity.
3. Slawson was abruptly discharged in the mid-
dle of the workweek without prior warning . Cf. Tex
Manufacturing Company, 180 NLRB 808. In this
respect I credit Slawson and do not credit Respon-
dent 's evidence inconsistent with Slawson's
testimony . While it is true , and I find , that Slawson
was told by Foreman Goodson that Slawson was
being terminated because Slawson 's work was "in-
sufficient ," I find nothing in the record other than
Goodson 's said general characterization to support
a determination that Slawson 's work was insuffi-
cient . Hence I find that relying upon insufficiency
was a pretext . But even if Slawson 's work was insuf-
ficient , I find that he was never put on notice that
he could lose his job on account of the quality of
his work . Further , he was given a raise of 10 cents
an hour and was recommended for another raise.
This points to a pretext and I so find.
4. Further, I find that Slawson at some time prior
to his discharge, in reply to Slawson 's request for an
increase in pay , was informed by Foreman Goodson
that Slawson 's work was unsatisfactory . But I do
not regard this as a warning that Slawson was in
danger of losing his job because his work was un-
satisfactory , and I so find . Hence I find that
Slawson was precipitately discharged without prior
warning that his work needed improvement and
that he was hazarding loss of his job if he did not
render better work.
5. When Slawson asked for the raise described in
the preceding paragraph he told Goodson , " I'm not
fixing to work my tail off for the money I'm
getting ." While I find that Slawson thereby exposed
himself to a lawful discharge for cause , nothing was
done about it. In fact he was given a raise of 10
cents an hour and recommended for another raise a
few days before he was discharged. Hence I find
that this conduct of Slawson was overlooked or
condoned . It follows , and I find , that relying on
Slawson 's said conduct is a pretext and said con-
duct does not reflect the true ground for discharg-
ing him.
6. Regardless of whether lawful cause existed to
release Slawson from employment , his termination
will be unlawful if a motivating or substantial indu-
cement producing his discharge is his union activi-
ty. See N.L.R.B. v. T. A. McGahey, Sr., 233 F.2d
1309
406, 413 ( C.A. 5). 1 find that his union activity sub-
stantially motivated or induced Slawson's
discharge . In this connection I have not overlooked
the axiom , not only as to Slawson , but as to all the
discharged employees above mentioned, that
neither union membership nor union activity, nor
both , will shield or insulate an employee against
discharge for cause . N.L.R.B. v. Bangor Plastics,
Inc., 392 F .2d 772, 776-777 (C.A. 6); Mitchell
Transport , Inc., 152 NLRB 122, 123, set aside sub
nom. Charles L. Hawkins v. N.L.R.B., 358 F.2d 281
(C.A. 7); N.L.R.B. v . Redwing Carriers , Inc., 284
F.2d 397, 402 (C.A. 5). And I rule that the General
Counsel has the burden of proving that all said em-
ployees were illegally discharged.
VI. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
Those activities of Respondent set forth in sec-
tion V, above , found to constitute unfair labor
practices occurring in connection with its opera-
tions described in section 1, above, have a close, in-
timate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States , and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
VII. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices prohibited by Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that
the National Labor Relations Board order it to
cease and desist therefrom and to take specific af-
firmative action , as set forth below, designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act. Since the
discharges found to be illegal go "to the very heart
of the Act" (N.L.R.B. v . Entwhistle Mfg. Co., 120
F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4)), I shall recommend that
the relief provided in the Board 's Order be broad
enough to prevent further infraction of the Act in
any manner . R & R Screen Engraving , Inc., 151
NLRB 1579, 1587.
As Respondent has discriminated against the 12
employees mentioned in section V, above, in
discharging them , I shall further recommend that it
offer to them immediate and full reinstatement
each to his former position or one substantially
equivalent thereto , without prejudice to the seniori-
ty and other rights and privileges previously en-
joyed by each , and to make each whole for any loss
of earnings he may have suffered by reason of his
discharge . In making each whole Respondent shall
pay to each a sum of money equal to that which he
normally would have earned as wages from the date
of his discharge to the date of reinstatement, as the
case may be , less his net earnings during such
period. Such backpay shall be computed on a quar-
terly basis in the manner provided in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and shall include
the payment of interest at the rate of 6 percent cal-
1310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
culated according to the method set forth in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. I shall
also recommend that Respondent preserve and,
upon reasonable request, make available to the
Board or its agents all pertinent records and data
necessary to ascertain whatever backpay may be
due.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
and upon the entire record, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Respondent is an employer as defined in Sec-
tion 2(2), and is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of
employment of the 12 employees mentioned in sec-
tion V, above, thereby discouraging membership in
the Union, a labor organization, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices condemned by
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By engaging in the following conduct Respon-
dent has engaged in unfair labor practices
proscribed in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: (a) main-
taining and enforcing a rule prohibiting solicitation
by employees in furtherance of protected activities
on company property during nonworking times; (b)
maintaining and enforcing a rule against wearing
union buttons, badges, or plaques; (c) ordering em-
ployees to remove union insignia while on company
property; and (d) coercively interrogating em-
ployees regarding their membership in a union and
informing employees that it wants no union in the
plant.
5. The above-described unfair labor practices af-
fect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent has not committed any other un-
fair labor practices as alleged in the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record
in this case, I recommend that the Board enter an
order that Respondent, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in the Union, or
any other labor organization, by discharging em-
ployees or otherwise discriminating in any manner
in respect to their tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
(b) Maintaining and enforcing any rule prohibit-
ing solicitation by employees in furtherance of pro-
tected activities on company property during non-
working time.
(c) Maintaining and enforcing any rule against
wearing union buttons, badges, or plaques.
(d) Ordering employees to remove union insig-
nia while wearing such on company property.
(e) Coercively interrogating employees regard-
ing their membership in a union and informing em-
ployees that it wants no union in the plant.
(f) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of rights safeguarded to them by Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer the employees named below im-
mediate and full reinstatement each to his former
position or one substantially equivalent thereto,
without prejudice to his seniority and other rights
and privileges enjoyed by each, and make each
whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by
reason of his discharge, with interest thereon at the
rate of 6 percent.
Max Shaw
James H. Cannon
James David Doster
James Lewis Doster
Howard W.
McLendon
William D. Layton
Joe L. Layton
Captain C. D.
Downing
Willie D. Downing
David H. Slawson
Hilliard K. Davis
Benjamin F . Godwin
(b) Notify each of said employees, if presently'
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of
his right to full reinstatement upon application in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Recommended Order.
(d) Post at its plant at Troy, Alabama, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 15, after signed by a duly
authorized representative of Respondent, shall be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read " Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK COMPANY, INC.
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15,
in writing , within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision , what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.2
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint
be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not specifically found herein.
2 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read " Notify said Regional Director, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
We hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Dis-
trict Lodge No. 75, International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization, by
discharging employees or otherwise discrimi-
nating in any manner against them in regard
to their tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce any rule
prohibiting solicitation by employees in
furtherance of protected activities on company
property during nonworking time.
WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce any rule
against wearing union buttons , badges, or
plaques.
WE WILL NOT order employees to remove
union insignia while wearing such on company
property.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate em-
ployees concerning their membership in a
union and informing employees that we want
no union in the plant.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the
1311
exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer to each of the following em-
ployees immediate and full reinstatement to his
former position or one substantially equivalent
thereto, without prejudice to his seniority and
other rights and privileges enjoyed by each.
We will also pay each whatever loss he may
have suffered as a result of his discharge by us,
with interest at 6 percent per annum:
Max Shaw
James H. Cannon
James David Doster
James Lewis Doster
Howard W.
McLendon
William D. Layton
Joe L. Layton
Captain C. D.
Downing
Willie D. Downing
David H. Slawson
Hilliard K. Davis
Benjamin F. Godwin
WE WILL notify each of said employees, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States , of his right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selec-
tive Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
All our employees are free to become members
or, if already members, to remain members of said
District Lodge No. 75 , IAM, or any other labor or-
ganization . They are also free to refrain from
becoming members or , if already members, to
refrain from remaining members of said District
Lodge No. 75, IAM.
LYNCOACH AND TRUCK
COMPANY, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced , or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board 's Office, T6024 Federal Building (Loyola),
701 Loyola Avenue , New Orleans , Louisiana
70113, Telephone 504-527-6361.