Local 217, United Assn. of Journeymen, Etc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 16, 1965

152 N.L.R.B. 1672 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

1672 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Sec-
tion 8 ( a)(3) of the Act , as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY,
Dated August 30, 1963 By ( S) W. C. Patton,
W C L'ATTON, Plant Manager , ALodegto
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office , 830 Mai-
ket Street , San Francisco, California, Telephone No YU 6-3500, Extension 3191.
APPENDIX E
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS
Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement approved by the Regional Director of Region
20 in Case No 20-CB-1116 National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectu-
ate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act we hereby notify our members
that.
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Campbell Soup Company, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, to discriminate against newly hired employees by
requiring them to execute membership applications and/or dues checkoff author-
izations for us, of for any other labor organization, prior to the expiration of the
30-day grace period provided for in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent
that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959
WE WILL jointly and severally with the above named Company reimburse
employees of Campbell Soup Company for any dues and/or initiation fees
obtained in contravention of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the
Laboi-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN
OF NORTH AMERICA, UNION LOCAL 127, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated 8/29/63 By (S) R. Lautermilch, Secty.
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 830 Market
Street, San Francisco, California, Telephone No. YU 6-3500, Extension 3191.
Local 217, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of
the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S. and Canada,
AFL-CIO and Its Business Agent, Martin F. Joyce and The
Carvel Co.
Local 217, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of
the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S. and Canada,
AFL-CIO and The Carvel Co. Cases Nos. 1-CC-425 and 1-CE-16.
June 16. 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
This proceeding is brought under Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended. On July 10 and August 26, 1964,
152 NLRB No. 166.
LOCAL 217, UNITED ASSN. OF JOURNEYMEN, ETC. 1673
The Carvel Co. filed charges in the above-numbered cases with the
National Labor Relations Board and timely served copies upon the
Respondents. On August 21,1964, the Regional Director issued a com-
plaint and notice of hearing in Case No. 1-CC-425, and on August 27,
the Respondent filed an answer denying the commission of any unfair
labor practices and requesting that the complaint be dismissed. On
September 21, 1964, the Regional Director issued an order consolidat-
ing cases, amended complaint, and further notice of hearing which was
duly served upon the parties.' In the amended complaint it was
alleged, inter alia, that the Respondents by certain described conduct
violated Sections 8 (b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) and 8 (e) of the Act. There-
after, the General Counsel filed a motion with the Board requesting
that the cases be transferred and continued before the Board pursuant
to the terms of a stipulation entered into by the parties on October 5,
1964, and attached to the motion. In the stipulation the parties agreed
that the charges, order consolidating cases, amended complaint and
further notice of hearing, as amended, the stipulation of facts and
exhibit 1, constitute the entire record in the case. The parties further
waived a hearing before a Trial Examiner, the making of findings of
fact and conclusions of law by a Trial Examiner, and the issuance of
a Trial Examiner's Decision, and requested the making of findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and issuance of an order directly by the Board.
On October 29, 1964, the Board issued its order granting motion,
approving stipulation and transferring cases to the Board. There-
after, the General Counsel and Respondents filed briefs with the Board.
Upon the entire record in these cases, the Board makes the following
findings of facts and conclusions of law.
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANIES
The Carvel Co. maintains its principal office and place of business at
365 Park Avenue, Portland, Maine, and is now and has been continu-
ously engaged at and from that location in the installation, servicing,
sale, and distribution of plumbing, heating, piping, and related prod-
ucts. During the past fiscal year, Carvel in the course of its operations
pu chased and received pipe, plumbing, and heating fixtures and mate-
rials from suppliers located outside the State of Maine valued in excess
of $50,000. Accordingly, Ave find that Carvel is an employer within
the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Ballard Oil and Equipment Company is a heating and air condition-
ing contractor at Portland, Maine, and Kibler and Storer Company,
a general contractor in the construction industry at Yarmouth, Maine.
Each company annually receives from outside the State of Maine goods
IOn the following day the Regional Director issued an amendment to the amended
complaint which was duly served upon the parties.
789-730-66-vol. 152-107
1674 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and materials valued in excess of $50,000. Consequently, we find that
Ballard and Kibler and Storer are each engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondent Union has been and is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and at all times material
Respondent Joyce has been a business agent of the Union, acting in its
behalf, and its agent within the meaning of Section 2 ( 13) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Carvel is a plumbing contractor and is a member of the Pipefitting
Contractors Association of Maine, herein called the Association. The
latter is the representative of its employer -members for purposes of
collective bargaining with the Union as the representative of its mem-
bers' employees. On or about May 1, 1964, the Association and the
Union entered into a bargaining agreement effective from May 1, 1964,
to April 30,1966. The contract, section X, paragraph 4, contained the
following clause :
The Employer agrees that no journeyman or apprentice who is a
member of Local 217 ... will be assigned to work or expected to
work or required to work, on any job or project on which a worker
or person, is performing any work within the jurisdiction of
Local No. 217, if said worker or person is performing such work
for wages , or hours or under any conditions of employment, which
are different from those established by this agreement.
The contract also provided that it covered employees of the various
employer signatories engaged generally in plumbing and pipefitting
work.
Kibler and Storer was the general contractor for an addition to a
bank building in Portland , Maine, and subcontracted certain of the
work thereon to various subcontractors . Carvel received the subcon-
tract for the plumbing work, while the heating and air conditioning
work was subcontracted to Ballard Oil and Equipment Company. On
or about June 3, 1964, the Respondent Joyce told Carvel that under
section X(4) of the contract its employees could not work on the bank
job while Ballard's employees were working there. On or about
,Time 22,1964, and at various times thereafter, the Union, again relying
on section X(4), refused to allow Carvel's employees to work on the
bank job.
Ballard's employees were not members of the Union and did not work
under conditions established by the Union's contract with the Associ-
ation. Further, the Union has never sought to organize, or demanded
recognition for, Ballard 's employees.
LOCAL 217, UNITED ASSN. OF JOURNEYMEN, ETC. 1675
The Section 8 (e) Issue
The General Counsel contends that the above-quoted section X(4)
of the Union's contract contravenes Section 8(e) of the Act.2 He
argues in substance that: (1) the clause is an unlawful secondary pro-
vision in that it is not limited to protecting work covered by the con-
tract through restrictions on the contracting out or subcontracting of
such work; and (2) although the construction industry proviso may
save certain otherwise unlawful secondary clauses, it is not applicable
here because the provision is not restricted to the subcontracting or
contracting out of work to be performed at the construction site. The
Respondent Union contends, inter alia, that the disputed clause is
primary and, thus, lawful in that its principal effect and purpose were
to protect the integrity of the terms and conditions of employment of
employees covered by the contract.
Section X(4) of the contract is intended, as its terms plainly show,
to prevent Carvel's doing business on a construction jobsite where any
employees of any employer on the jobsite who are doing work within
the Union's jurisdiction have terms and conditions of employment
other than those established by the agreement between the Union and
the Association. Thus, the disputed provision is an implied agreement
within the meaning of Section 8(e) to cease handling the goods of, or
to cease doing business with, another employer .3 Furthermore, there is
nothing in the language of the provision to suggest that its impact is
limited to the contracting out, or subcontracting of work for which the
Association or its members may hold a contract or subcontract. The
fact, as found hereinafter, that the Union struck Carvel, because Bal-
lard, who dealt directly with the general contractor, did not meet the
Union's standards, demonstrates to us that the Union did not construe
the clause as being so limited. We conclude, consequently, that Sec-
tion X(4) is essentially a secondary provision 4 and, therefore, unlaw-
2 Section 8 ( e) of the Act provides in part that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement , express or implied , whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling , trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person , and any contract or agreement entered
into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection ( e) shall apply to
an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction in-
dustry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site
of the construction , alteration, painting, or icpair of a building , structure, or
other work . . . .
3Muskegon Bricklayers Union #5, Masons and Plastereis International Union of
America (AFL-CIO) (Greater Muskegon General Contractors Association), 152 NLRB
360
4 Compare, Teamsters Local Union No. 413, etc v. N L R B., 334 F 2d 539 (C A D C
1964 ) ; Meat and Highway Drivers, Dockmen , etc, Local Union No 710 etc . (Wilson A
Compaii0 ) v.AT LI?B,335F 2d 709 (CADC 1964)
1676 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ful under Section 8(e) of the Act, unless protected by the construction
industry proviso.
As the disputed provision is limited to work on a construction indus-
try jobsite, we cannot agree with General Counsel that the proviso is
inapplicable solely because the contract provision does not specifically
refer to the "contracting out"' or "subcontracting" of unit work. To
hold the proviso applicable only where a contract provision copies the
statutory language, even though the situation falls squarely within the
one contemplated by such language, would in our opinion, sacrifice
substance to form.5 Additionally, the application of the proviso does
not, in our view, depend on the precise relationship between Carvel
with whom the Union has a contract and other employers and persons
on the job, in this instance the general contractor and Ballard, who may
be affected by the enforcement of the contractual proviso. The ]an-
guage of the proviso itself does not limit its applicability to the "con-
tracting out" or "subcontracting" of work by the employer with whom
a union has an agreement within the scope of Section 8(e). Indeed,
were the proviso given such a limited applicability, it would be of little
effect, for aside from the general contractor on a job, the various firms
involved normally have control only of "unit" work-that is, the par-
ticular work for which they hold a subcontract. Restrictions on the
right to subcontract such work could well be primary, and thus ]awful
without reference to the construction industry proviso, because they
are wholly outside the scope of 8 (e).6 Significant on the scope of this
proviso is the statement of Senator Kennedy, in his report for the Sen-
ate Conferees on the 1959 Amendments to the Act, that :
The first proviso under ... 8(e) ... is intended to preserve the
present state of the law with respect to the validity of agreements
relating to the contracting of work to be done at the site of a con-
struction project.
Agreements by which a contractor ... promises not to subcon-
tract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear
to be legal today. They will not be unlawful under Section 8(e).
The proviso is also applicable to all other agreements involving
undertakings not to do work on a construction site with other con-
tractors or subcontractors regardless of the precise relation
between them.? [Emphasis supplied.]
5 The General Counsel in support of his position that the proviso is not applicable cites
Southern California District Council of Hod Ca;rims (Suiniining Pool Gunite Gioup,
et at ). 144 NLRB 978, where the Board stated at page 984 that the proviso is applicable
only if a provision "relates to contracting or subcontracting of work." However, in con-
struing this statement as requirine that a disputed provision specifically mention
contracting or subcontracting, the General Counsel has given it an unw.uianted, nar-
row construction.
d Track Drivers Union Local No. 413, etc. (Patton Warehouse, Inc ) v N.L R.B , 334
F 2d 539, 548 (C A D C )
7105, Daily Congressional Record 10415, September 3, 1959. But see Congressman
Barden for House Conferees, ibid at 10630 , September 4, 1959.
LOCAL 217, UNITED ASSN. OF JOURNEYMEN, ETC. 1677
Consequently, we conclude that the failure of section X(4) to refer
specifically to "contracting out"' or "subcontracting" and the fact that
it may affect persons and employers with whom Carvel has no con-
tractual relationship does not bar application of the proviso here.
The construction industry proviso is, nevertheless, inapplicable
for other reasons. Thus, section X(4) incorporates into the contract
self-enforcement terms providing that employees may refuse to work
if their employer assigns them to work on a jobsite where any employ-
ees within the Union's jurisdiction are working for any other employer
under terms and conditions other than those established in the Union
contract. In an analogous situation in our recent illuskegon decision,s
we concluded that the construction industry proviso was not intended
to protect contracts with such self-enforcement provisions. It follows,
therefore, and we find, that the construction industry proviso does not
protect section X(4) from the proscription of Section 8(e) of the Act.
As the Respondent Union on May 1, 1964, entered into an agreement
containing the above unlawful provisions, we find that it thereby vio-
lated Section 8(e) of the Act.
The Section 8(b) (4) (B) Issue
As set forth above, the stipulated facts show that Ballard's employees
did not work under conditions established by the contract between the
Respondent Union and the Association; that after the heating and air
conditioning work had been subcontracted by Kibler and Storer to
Ballard, Respondent Joyce told Carvel that tinder section X(4) of the
contract its employees could not work on the bank job while Ballard"s
employees were working there; and that subsequently, the Respond-
ent Union, in reliance on section X (4) of the contract, refused to permit
Carvel's employees to work on the bank job. From these stipulated
facts we infer and find that the Respondent Union struck Carvel
because Ballarcl's employees were working within that Union's juris-
diction without observing the conditions established by the contract
between the Union and the Association.
8Muskegon Bricklayers Union #5, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International
Union of America (AFL-CIO) (Greater Muskegon General Contractors Association),
supra The contract in the Muskegon case provided, like the one before us, that employees
need not work under certain circumstances. However, unlike the instant clause, it addi-
tionally provided that an employer could not discipline an employee for exercising his
contractual right not to woik Such specific protection from employer discipline does
not distinguish in any material way the Muskegon situation from the present one. This
is so because the existence of a contractual right not to work implicitly includes freedom
from employer discipline for exercising such right
The fact that the instant provision may also be implemented by court action does not
warrant our dissenting colleague ' s conclusion that it is not self-enforcing within the
meaning of the Muskegon decision As we there stated, it is the presence of the con-
tractual right to invoke self -help, and not alone the absence of a right of access to the
courts, which removes a provision such as this from the protection of the Section
8(e) proviso.
1678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Union argues that the strike was primary and, thus, lawful
because it was intended to force Carvel to abide by the provisions of
section X(4) of its agreement. The primary or secondary nature of
a strike is not, however, determined by contract language.° Rather, we
must look to the Union's conduct to ascertain the object of such eco-
nomic pressure. Here, the Union's conduct was clearly directed either
at Ballard, because of its failure to meet union standards,10 or at Kib-
ler and Storer because it subcontracted to a firm failing to meet such
standards, or at both of them. Carvel was clearly not the target as it
had no control over Ballard or the work allotted to Ballard, or over
the working conditions of Ballard's employees, or indeed over the sub-
contracting of the heating and air conditioning work by Kibler and
Storer to Ballard or to anyone else.
It is clear from our prior findings herein that the Respondents
induced and caused Carvel's employees to engage in a strike and also
threatened and coerced Carvel. It is further apparent from other find-
ings herein that such conduct had as an object forcing Carvel to cease
doing business with, or handling the goods of, Kibler and Storer and
Ballard, or forcing Kibler and Storer to cease doing business with Bal-
lard. We therefore conclude that, by the foregoing conduct, the
Respondents violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The activities of the Respondents set forth above, occurring in con-
nection with the business of the companies involved, have a close, int i-
mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in unfair labor
practices, we shall order that they cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Carvel Co., Ballard Oil and Equipment Company, and Kib-
ler and Storer Company are engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
0 Local No. 5 , United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Industry, etc (Arthur Venners Co ) v NLRB, 321 F 2d 336, 369
(C A D.C.).
11 In their brief the Respondents state they would have been satisfied if Ballard met union
contract standards
LOCAL 217, UNITED ASSN. OF JOURNEYMEN, ETC. 1679
2. Local 217, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of
the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S. and Canada, AFL-
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act and Respondent Joyce is an agent of Local 217.
3. Section X(4) of the 1964-66 contract between the Respondent
Union and the Pipefitting Contractors Association of Maine is an
agreement prohibited by Section 8 (e) of the Act.
4. Respondent Union, by entering into and giving effect to section
X(4) of the Pipefitting Contracts of Maine, violated Section 8(e) of
the Act.
5. Respondents by inducing and causing Carvel's employees to
engage in a. strike in the course of their employment and by threatening
and coercing Carvel, with an object of forcing Carvel to cease doing
business with, or handling the goods of, Kibler and Storer and Ballard,
or with an object of forcing Kibler and Storer to cease doing business
with Ballard, violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
Respondent Local 217, United Association of Journeymen and Appren-
tices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S. and Canada,
AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, including Respond-
ent Martin J. Joyce, business agent of Respondent Union, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Entering into, enforcing, or giving effect to section X(4) of the
1964-66 contract between the Respondent Union and the Pipefitting
Contractors of Maine or any other contract or agreement expressed or
implied, whereby The Carvel Co. ceases or refrains, or agrees to cease
or refrain, from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise
dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or from doing
business with any other person in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act.
(b) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual
employed by The Carvel Co. or by any other person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in a strike or
refusal in the course of his employment to use, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods or materials, or perform any services, or threaten-
ing, coercing, or restraining The Carvel Co., or any other person
engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce, where an
object thereof is to force or require The Carvel Co., to cease doing busi-
1680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ness with Kibler and Storer or with Ballard Oil and Equipment Com-
pany or to force or require Kibler and Storer to cease doing business
with Ballard Oil and Equipment Company.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(c) Post at its business offices and meeting halls in Portland, Maine,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 11 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 1, shall,
after being duly signed by Respondent Union's representative and by
Respondent Joyce, be posted by the Union immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Union to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to the aforesaid
Regional Director for forwarding io The Carvel Co. for information,
and, if it is willing, for posting by it at all locations where notices to its
employees are customarily posted.
(e) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps Respondents have taken to
comply herewith.
MEMBER FANNING, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in so much of the majority opinion as finds that section X,
paragraph 4, of the contract between the Respondent and the Pipefit-
ting Contractors Association of Maine is an implied agreement, within
the meaning of Section 8 (e) of the Act, requiring Association members
to cease doing business with other employers whose employees do not
receive terms and conditions of employment comparable to those pro-
vided under the agreement between the Association and the
Respondent.
I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion that its holding
in Greater Muskegon General Contractors Association 12 requires a
n In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" the words "a
Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order "
I:ilushegon Bricblaycis Union #3 etc (G)cater Muskegon General Cost,acto,s Asso-
ciation ), 152 NLRB 360.
I note that my colleagues concede that the Union may enforce the contract's restric-
tions on the right of the Employer to assign certain work to its employees by appropriate
court proceeding. While they also perceive an implied right on the part of the Union
and/or employees to invoke self-help in case of the employer ' s breach of the clause, the
fact remains that the clause does not so state and, in view of the fact that such self-help
enforcement is forbidden by Section 8(b) (4) (B ), as this very case demonstrates , I ques-
tion the correctness of my colleagues ' construction of the clause in this respect We have
been cautioned by the Supreme Court that "In the absence of provisions calling explicitly
for illegal conduct, the contract cannot be held illegal because it failed affirmatively to
LOCAL 217, UNITED ASSN. OF JOURNEYMEN, ETC. 1681
finding that the clause involved herein is not within the building and
construction industry proviso to Section 8(e), and that, therefore, the
clause violates that section of the Act. For here, unlike the clause
involved in Greater Muskegon, members of the Association violate the
literal wording of section X, paragraph 4, when they assign work to
their employees, the performance of which requires such employees to
work along side employees not receiving "union" conditions of employ-
ment. Upon such an assignment, the Respondent can go into court to
enforce section X, paragraph 4, which provides that employees will
not be "assigned to work, or expected to work, or required to work, on
any job or project" where work within Respondent's jurisdiction is
being performed under conditions of work different than that provided
in Respondent's agreement with the Association. Inasmuch as the
clause is silent as to what steps employees may take if their employer
breaches the clauses by assigning them work which the contract says
they will not be assigned, or expected, or required to perform, it seems
perfectly obvious to me that it cannot be said that this clause is self-
enforcing within the meaning of the Greater Muskegon decision.
However that may be, and assuming, arguendo. that the majority
rationale in Greater Muskegon requires a finding that the clause is not
within the building and construction industry proviso to 8 (e), I dissent
from such a holding on the basis of the principles set forth in my dis-
senting opinion in the Greater Muskegon case. Applying those prin-
ciples, I find that section X paragraph 4, is a valid restriction on the
Association Members' right to contract for work on construction proj-
ects where nonunion conditions prevail for employees performing work
within the Respondent's jurisdiction. I would therefore dismiss the
8(e) allegations of the complaint.
Though I have found section X, paragraph 4, to be a valid clause, I
find that Respondent's refusal to furnish employees to The Carvel Co.
on the bank building job was an attempt to enforce the clause by eco-
nomic means, and that such conduct violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) and
(ii) (B) of the Act.13 I therefore join in the Order to the extent it
relates to this violation of the Act.
MEMBER ZAGORIA took no part in the consideration of the above Deci-
sion and Order.
disclaim all illegal objectives " NLRB. v News Syndi cate Compan y, Inc, etc, 365
U.S. 695 I am unwilling to assume that the Respondent and the Association have intended
a construction of their contract which will violate the Federal law, particul arly nhere a
lawful construction is entirely in keeping with the actual language used by the parties
to the contract.
is See for example , Northeastern Indiana Building and Construction Trades Council
(Centlivre Village Apartments ), 148 NLRB 854, Essem County and Vicinity District
Council of Can pentei s, etc. v . NLRB , 332 F 2d 636 (C.A 3)
1682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL OUR MEMBERS AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES
OF THE CARVEL CO.
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby give notice that :
WE WILL NOT enter into, give effect to, or enforce or threaten to
enforce section X (4) of the 1964-66 contract between Local 217
and the Pipefitting Contractors of Maine, or any other contract or
agreement, expressed or implied, whereby The Carvel Co. ceases or
refrains, or agrees to cease or refrain, from handling, using or
otherwise dealing in the products of or from doing business with
Kibler and Storer or Ballard Oil and Equipment Company or any
other employer or person in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT engage in or induce or encourage any individual
employed by The Carvel Co., or by any other person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a
strike or refusal in the course of his employment to use, or other-
wise handle or work: on any goods or materials, or perform any
services, or threaten, coerce, or restrain The Carvel Co., or any
other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce, where an object thereof is to force or require Carvel Co. to
cease doing business with Kibler and Storer or with Ballard Oil
and Equipment Company or to force or require Kibler and Storer
to cease doing business with Ballard Oil and Equipment Company.
LOCAL 217, UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN
AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPE-
FITTING INDUSTRY OF THE U.S. AND CANADA,
AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative) ( Title)
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Martin J. Joyce, Business Agent)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date
of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, Boston Five Cents Savings Bank Building, 24 School Street,
Boston, Massachusetts, Telephone No. 523-8100, if they have any ques-
tions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.