Local 1522, Electrical WorkersDownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsDec 15, 1969180 N.L.R.B. 131 (N.L.R.B. 1969) Copy Citation LOCAL 1522, ELECTRICAL WORKERS Local 1522 , International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO ( Western Electric Company, Inc.) and Dorothy E. Keiser . Case 4-CB-1520 December 15, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND ZAGORIA On September 2, 1969, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provision of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case and finds merit in Respondent's exceptions. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act by causing the Company to discharge Dorothy Keiser for failure to pay dues at a time when she was not obligated to do so under the terms of the existing collective-bargaining agreement. In so finding, the Trial Examiner rejected an arbitration award which concluded that Keiser failed to resign from the Union and therefore her nonpayment of periodic dues constituted legitimate grounds for her discharge under the applicable maintenance of membership clause. Without passing upon the merits of the alleged unfair labor practice, we find that the Trial Examiner erred in not honoring the arbitration award, and on the basis thereof, we shall dismiss the instant complaint. The facts show that on January 21, 1967, a collective-bargaining agreement between Respondent Union and the Company expired. Thereafter, a new contract was agreed upon, which became effective on February 9, 1967. That agreement included a maintenance of membership clause substantially the same as that contained in the recently expired contract. The maintenance of membership clause provided that employees who were members of the Union on the effective date of the new bargaining agreement were required to pay dues as a condition 131 of employment. In December 1966, before the expiration of the old agreement, and Keiser, who had been a union member since 1959, discussed the possibility of resigning with several other employees. Keiser testified that she and the other employees inquired of a Union steward as to how they could perfect a resignation from the Union. The steward advised that this could be accomplished by sending a checkoff deauthorization form letter to the Company and the Union. Although the other employees sent letters clearly manifesting their intention to resign, Keiser on February 7, 1967, merely sent the checkoff deauthorization to the Company, with a copy to the Union. That letter contained no reference to a withdrawal from union membership. The Union, by letter of February 21, 1967, informed Keiser that her resignation was not timely with respect to the contract and that she must continue to pay dues to the Union. Keiser's dues were no longer checked off by the Company and she did not remit them directly to the Union. Subsequently she was informed by Keenan, chief of the Company's public relations department, that the Union had demanded her discharge, along with 3 other employees, unless her dues were paid up. Keiser stated that she had resigned from the Union on a timely basis and that the Union had accepted her resignation. Keenan then asked Keiser and the other employees to bring him written evidence of their resignations as well as the Union's replies thereto. Later, Keiser was informed that the Union was taking her case, and that of the other employees, to arbitration. Keenan advised her that the Company was going to uphold her position at the hearing. Although Keiser subsequently asked her supervisor if she would attend the arbitration hearing and was told that the supervisor did not think so, she does not claim to have made any request of any management representative that she be permitted to attend. On July 1, 1968, the arbitrators issued their decision finding that the three employees, other than Keiser, had resigned from the Union on a timely basis and that the contract did not support the Union's demand for their discharge. Concerning Keiser, the arbitrators found that Keiser's letter contained "nothing about resigning from the Union," and in rejecting the Company's claim that the deauthorization form was the "laymen's way of resigning," concluded that said letter "plainly discloses no desire or even remote intent to resign . . Accordingly, the award found that Keiser was a member of the Union on the critical date, and therefore under the maintenance of membership clause the Union could insist upon her discharge for nonpayment of dues. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the basic issue before the arbitration panel was identical to that raised by the instant unfair labor practice 180 NLRB No. 18 132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD complaint; i.e., whether Keiser effected a resignation from the Union prior to the effective date of the new contract? In refusing to accept the award's resolution of this issue, the Trial Examiner correctly concluded that the failure of Keiser to appear at the hearing was not fatal to the award as the Company "adequately resisted the union's efforts to remove Mrs. Keiser from the job." He nonetheless rejected the award because no evidence was introduced to the arbitration panel concerning Keiser's conversation with the Union steward and her reliance thereon, nor was it argued that the Union understood that her deauthorization letter was intended as a revocation of membership. In the circumstances of this case, neither of the above factors furnish sufficient basis for departing from the Board's established policy of giving binding effect to arbitral determinations made in proceedings to which all parties have acquiesced, where the proceedings are fair and regular on their face, and where the results are not repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.' In the instant case there is no claim of fraud or collusion in the arbitral process. Mrs. Keiser was notified that her attempted resignation would be the subject of arbitration and that the Company would defend her position. In her several conversations pertaining to the impending hearing, she does not claim to have mentioned the conversation with the Union steward to any management official. Although she was informed that her presence probably would not be required at the hearing, she made no request that she be permitted to attend nor did she object to representation by the Company.2 In these circumstances, it is our opinion that to disregard the award merely because certain evidence was presented and contentions advanced in the unfair labor practice proceeding which were not presented in arbitration, would do violence to the Board's policy of encouraging the finality of settlements reached through voluntarily agreed-upon dispute settlement machinery. For these reasons, and as the award resolved the very issue that is determinative of the instant complaint, we conclude that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to respect the award and dismiss the complaint herein in its entirety.' 'Spielberg Manufacturing Co.; 112 NLRB 1080, 1082. 'See e.g. Eazor Express . 172 NLRB No. 201. 'The position upon which Member Zagoria stands in his dissent has been rejected by they Beard and the court in International Harvester, 138 NLRB 923, enfd . 321 F.2d 784 (C.A. 7). In that case , as here, the union requested an employee's discharge under a union-security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement , because of default in dues payments The employer rejected the request . The union then filed a grievance which ultimately went to arbitration The arbitrator upheld the union 's grievance that the employer had failed to discharge its contract obligation to discharge the employee for nonpayment of union dues . The Board majority decided that it should honor the award even though the employee was not given notice of the arbitration proceeding . The Board said If complete effectuation of the Federal policy is to be achieved, we firmly believe that the Board , which is entrusted with the administration of one of the many facets of national labor policy , should give hospitable ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. MEMBER ZAGORIA, dissenting: For the reasons stated by the Trial Examiner, I would adopt his Decision. I would note moreover, that Keiser was "represented" at the arbitration proceeding by the Employer, while the Union, which would normally represent employees, opposed her position. Where, as here, the normal roles are thus reversed, I would inspect carefully the adequacy of representation, to insure that the equities of the dischargee's position were fully presented to the arbitrator. acceptance to the arbitral process as "part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself," and voluntarily withhold its undoubted authority to adjudicate alleged unfair labor practice charges involving the same subject matter, unless it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings were tainted by fraud , collusion , unfairness , or serious procedural irregularities or that the award was clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. The Board held that , although the employee was not given notice of the arbitration hearing , his interests were vigorously defended by the employer, and therefore there was no procedural infirmity in the arbitration proceeding. International Harvester is thus squarely diapositive of the reasoning in Member Zagorta 's dissent TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION Statement of the Case JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Trial Examiner: This is an unfair labor practice case brought pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. 29 U.S.C. 160(b). It was initiated by a complaint issued on May 15, 1969, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, through the Regional Director for Region 4 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). That complaint is based on a charge filed on August 29, 1968, by the Charging Party, Dorothy E. Keiser. Named as the Respondent in the charge is Local 1522, Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. In substance the complaint alleges that Local 1522, herein also called Respondent or the Union, has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2), and that such conduct affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act. Respondent has answered admitting some facts but denying that it committed any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice given to the parties this case came on to be heard, and was tried before me, on July 17, 1969, at Allentown, Pennsylvania. All parties were represented at and participated in the trial, and were granted full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, submit briefs and argue orally. When the General Counsel rested Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. I reserved ruling on that motion. It is hereby denied on the ground that the General Counsel has made out a prima facie case. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: LOCAL 1522, ELECTRICAL WORKERS 133 FINDINGS OF FACT I AS TO JURISDICTION Western Electric Company, Inc., the employer involved in this proceeding, is a Delaware corporation with its principal office located in New York, New York. Although it operates plants in various States of the United States, only its plant at Allentown, Pennsylvania, is involved in this case. At its Allentown plant Western Electric manufactures and produces telephone and electrical equipment and components. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint herein said Allentown plant purchased goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 from, and shipped materials valued in excess of $50,000 to, points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. I find that Western Electric Company, Inc., is an employer as defined in Section 2(2), and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction over this proceeding. Ii. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local 1522, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, i s a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES This case presents the following issues: (1) Whether Dorothy E Keiser resigned from or withdrew membership in Local 1522, the Union in which she admittedly was a member. (2) If she did resign or did withdraw such membership, whether Dorothy E Keiser did so at an appropriate time, so that she was no longer under an obligation to pay dues to Local 1522 in order to keep her job. (3) Whether the maintenance of membership clause in the collective-bargaining contract of February 1967, between Local 1522 and Western Electric required Dorothy E. Keiser to remain a member of the Union in order to keep her fob. (4) Whether the request of Local 1522 that Western Electric discharge Dorothy E. Keiser for nonpayment of dues was lawful. A. General Counsel's Evidence provides that I (a) Each employee who is a member of the Union on the effective date of this Agreement, and who is also a member of the Union on or after the 10th day following the effective date of this Agreement, and (b) each employee, other than (a) above, who is a member of the Union on or after the 30th day following the beginning of his employment or on or after the 30th day following the effective date of this Agreement, whichever is later, shall as a condition of employment, pay or tender to the Union an amount equal to the monthly membership dues . . 2. The Company may inform employees and applicants for employment of their rights and obligations under the provisions of this Article Said contract of November 22, 1963, expired on January 21, 1967. However, at no time while it was in force did Keiser see a copy of this contract. Some time in December, 1966, Keiser and a few other female employees discussed resigning from Local 1522 among themselves and also with the union's shop steward, George Drosdak. In their interlocution with Drosdak some of the girls asked him "when and how to resign from the union." He replied "it was ten days before and sometimes ten days after," and that it could be accomplished by using a letter form from "the union booklet." Although the girls present had no "booklet" they did have with them there, and showed to Drosdak, the form "letter from the booklet." Drosdak then told the group to "copy this letter and send one to the company and one to the union - and then you would be resigned." This form "letter" is in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 2, and reads as follows. AUTHORIZATION TO DISCONTINUE PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS PLEASE PRINT IN INK Name . . E. Number Last First Middle Initial Section No. To: WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY,In 1959 Dorothy E. Keiser was hired by Western Electric as a dispatcher and bench hand in Department 8165. On the same day she became a member of Local 1522. Her dues to the Union were paid by means of a checkoff which she executed, that is, Western Electric deducted them from her pay and transmitted them to the Union pursuant to her written authorization The record is silent as to when Western Electric first recognized the Union as collective-bargaining agent of the unit in which Mrs. Keiser was employed. However, the parties entered into a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in said unit on October 31, 1963, effective November 22, 1963, and running for a period of 38 months from said November 22 unless sooner terminated by appropriate notice in accordance with Article XXXV thereof. See General Counsel's Exhibit 5. Among other things said contract contains a checkoff clause, (Article VI) and a maintenance of membership clause (Article VII). In pertinent part said Article VII INCORPORATED ALLENTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA I hereby direct the WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INCORPORATED, to revoke any existing AUTHORIZATION TO MAKE PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS made by me with respect to Union membership dues It is understood and agreed that the WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INCORPORATED, assumes no responsibility or obligation hereby, other than to discontinue all deductions in accordance with this authorization. Signature of Employee., 134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TO BE FILLED IN BY THE COMPANY the Union and the Company of his withdrawal from Date received by the Company . . . . . . . . . memberhsip in the Union ." And Article 6 describes the Date Effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . manner in which an authorization for deduction of union This form is also to be found in the collective - bargaining dues may be revoked. contracts in evidence as General Counsel ' s Exhibits 5 and Some time after Mrs. Keiser received the letter of 6. Mrs. Keiser had with her a copy of said "letter" in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 2 during the above talk with Drosdak. After the above conversation with Drosdak, Mrs. Keiser copied said letter "word for word" and mailed a "certified letter" to Western Electric and another identical one to the Union. This letter is in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 3A and reads as follows: January 23, 1967 Keiser Dorothy H. 11013 8165 Last First Initial E . No. Section To Western Electric Co., Incorporated Allentown, Pa. I hereby direct the W. E. Co., Incorp. to revoke any existing Authorization to make Payroll deduction made by me with respect to Union membership dues. It is understood and agreed that the W. E. Co., Incorp. assumes no responsibility or obligation hereby, other than to discontinue all deduction in accordance with this authorization. (signed ) Dorothy H. Keiser Mrs. Keiser mailed a copy 10 days before and another l day after "the strike was over" to Western Electric. One of these letters was also mailed to the Union on February 7, 1967. See General Counsel's Exhibit 3B. By letter dated February 21, 1967, the Union wrote to Mrs. Keiser that: Your letter of resignation was not timely in accordance with the contract with the Western Electric Company. If you have canceled your payroll deduction of Union dues you must then pay your dues to the Local Union Office as a condition of employment. This was signed by "Albert E. Otto, Financial Secretary" of Local 1522. See General Counsel's Exhibit 4. After receiving this letter from the Union Mrs. Keiser did not pay any further dues to it. Nor did anyone from the Union at any time thereafter speak to Mrs. Keiser about her membership or nonmembership in the Union. On February 4, 1967, Local 1522 and Western Electric executed a new collective-bargaining contract covering the employees in the unit in which Mrs. Keiser was employed. See General Counsel's Exhibit 6. Article 35 thereof provides that the contract "shall become effective February 3, 1967, but only if ratified by the union membership and approved by the International office of the Union on or before February 10, 1967," and shall terminate 36 months after said effective date unless sooner terminated at a stated time upon appropriate notice. Among other provisions this contract contains a checkoff clause (Article 6) and a maintenance of membership clause (Article 7). Said Article 7 in part provides that an employee "may terminate his obligation to tender periodic Union dues to the Union as a condition of employment by notifying both February 21, 1967, from the union, she was called to the office of Mr. Keenan, chief of Western Electric's public relations department. Keenan told her that the Company had received a letter from the Union stating that the Union would have her and three others fired if their dues were not paid up by a certain date. Continuing, Keenan stated that the Union claimed the letters of these four were untimely, but said that the Company replied that these letters "might have been timely." Keiser claimed that her letter was timely and that "they had accepted her resignation." Keenan also asked the four employees to bring him any written evidence of their resignations and written replies thereto by the Union. Keiser turned over to Keenan the Union's letter of February 21, 1967, to her. See General Counsel's Exhibit 4. Later Mrs. Keiser learned that her case, as well as those of the three other employees mentioned in the preceding paragraph, was being taken to arbitration on March 8, 1968. Although she asked her supervisor whether she would attend the arbitration hearing he replied that, while he did not know, he did not think so. However no representative of Western Electric or the Union ever requested her to attend it. Accordingly, Mrs. Keiser did not go to the arbitration hearing. Keenan told her that the Company was going to uphold her position at that hearing. On July 3, 1968, Western Electric informed Keiser that the arbitrators had decided on July 1, 1968, that the Union could have her fired or demand all back dues, and that the Union had asked the Company to discharge her. See Respondent's Exhibit 6 for the Arbitration Opinion and Award of July 1, 1968. On August 9, 1968, Western Electric terminated Mrs. Keiser. She was rehired by Western Electric on May 15 or 17, 1969. In its Opinion and Award the Arbitration Panel found that the contract of February 4, 1967, became effective on February 9, 1967, when the International President of the Union approved it. That Panel also found that (a) Keiser did not resign because her "letter" was "written in clear and technical language and plainly discloses no desire or even remote intent to resign ," (b) that she was a member of the Union on February 9, 1967, and (c) that since she was delinquent in her dues the Union could ask for her discharge or require that she pay all back dues and all future dues as long as she remained a member of the Union. B. Respondent's Evidence 1. The testimony of Ed Brobst Ed Brobst, the union's president, was Respondent's only witness. His testimony is detailed below. Contracts between Local 1522 and Western Electric have been available to employees at all times. Employees have been informed by Brobst at monthly union meetings that such contracts can be obtained by them at the local union office. In addition, notices posted on the union bulletin boards (about 20 in all) in the plant advise employees that contracts may be had at the local union office. Prior to the investigation by the NLRB of Mrs. Keiser ' s charge in this case Brobst was not aware that LOCAL 1522, ELECTRICAL WORKERS Local 1522 had written to Mrs. Keiser a letter (G.C. Exh. 4) dated February 21, 1967, informing her that her letter of resignation was untimely. He first learned of General Counsel's Exhibit 4 from the NLRB. Nor did Brobst instruct the union's clerical secretary, employed at the union office as a full-time employee, to mail to Keiser the letter in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 4. In fact Keiser "should not have received a letter of this nature." Nevertheless General Counsel's Exhibit 4 was signed by an officer of the Union, Albert E. Otto, its financial secretary. Among Otto's duties is the obligation "to take care of the . . . financial end of the local union . [including] dues [and] . the collection of dues." However, General Counsel's Exhibit 4 was a "form letter" sent to Keiser and 43 other employees who "had taken a position along the line of sending letters to the Local on the basis of terminating their dues, their revocation of dues, or a letter resigning from the local union." The collective-bargaining contract which is in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 5 contains no provisions pertaining to resignations or withdrawals from membership in the Union. 2. Documentary evidence On June 13, 1967, Local 1522 filed a written grievance with Western Electric demanding that five employees, one of whom is Dorothy Keiser, be terminated "in accordance with Article 7, Section l.b, of the Agreement." (This Section relates to maintenance of membership in the Union as a condition of employment.) In pertinent part Western Electric's reply to said grievance, typewritten thereon, avers that "The Company was advised by . . . Dorothy Keiser ... [and two other employees] that they were not members of the Union on the effective date of the General Agreement and, therefore, are not obligated to tender to the Union periodic union dues as a condition of employment." See Respondent's Exhibit 2. Thereafter the grievance was submitted to arbitration. A transcript of the arbitration hearing is in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 4. Keiser did not participate therein. Nor did anyone testify at the arbitration hearing that the union job steward, George Drosdak, had informed Keiser and other employees that they could use the form presented to him, i.e., General Counsel's Exhibit 2, as a vehicle of withdrawing or resigning from the Union. Nor did Western Electric's only witness, George Lee, its "bargaining agent," testify that Keiser ' s letter (G.C. Exh. 3A) was considered by Lee to constitute a withdrawal or resignation from the Union . In fact Lee did not mention said letter in his testimony. However, Western Electric argued or contended that said letter amounted to a resignation from the Union. On July 1, 1968, an Opinion and Award was rendered by the Arbitration Panel deciding (a) that Keiser had not effectively resigned or withdrawn from the Union, and (b) giving the Union the option of having Keiser terminated or requiring her to pay all back dues immediately and current and prospective dues as they became payable. See Respondent's Exhibit 6. As recited above the Union elected to have Keiser discharged ; and she was discharged on August 9, 1968. C. Concluding Findings and Discussion 1. As to whether Mrs. Keiser withdrew or resigned from the Union It is my opinion , and I find, that the document in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 3A constitutes a 135 resignation or withdrawal from Local 1522 by Mrs. Keiser. While neither the words "withdraw" nor "resign" are used in said instrument, I find that all parties affected thereby (i.e., Mrs. Keiser, the Union, and Western Electric) understood that it was intended to take effect as a withdrawal or resignation by Mrs. Keiser from the Union and so treated it. The foregoing finding that the above instrument in writing amounts to a withdrawal or resignation is based upon the entire record and the following factors, which I also find as facts: (a) When a group of employees, one of whom was Mrs. Keiser, asked George Drosdak, the union's shop steward when and how to resign from the Union, he replied that this could be accomplished by executing a letter form found in "the union booklet," and mailing one copy to the Company and one to the Union. I find that Drosdak acted as an agent of the Union on this occasion when his advice was sought; that he was acting at least within the apparent scope of his authority as such agent in uttering these words; and that the employees, including Keiser, were warranted in relying on Drosdak's statements and adopting the procedure outlined by him. Cf. Hughes Aircraft Company, Tucson Division, 164 NLRB No. 6. This letter form is in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 2. (b) Western Electric, the Employer, construed the letter (G.C. Exh. 3A) as a resignation from the Union, and not only informed the Union thereof but in addition so contended at the arbitration hearing. While the employer's construction is not binding upon me or the Union, it nevertheless is significant on the issue of whether General Counsel's Exhibit 3A is capable of conveying to another person Keiser' s message that she desired thereby to sever her connection with the Union. (c) Local 1522 interpreted the letter as a resignation and so informed Mrs. Keiser. Thus it wrote to Mrs. Keiser on February 21, 1967, that "Your letter of resignation was not timely . . ." See General Counsel's Exhibit 4. I find that the union's letter was signed by Albert E. Otto, its financial secretary, and that said Otto had authority as an agent of the Union to issue and sign said letter. Moreover, Keiser's communication to the Union was to the attention of "A. E. Otto." See General Counsel's Exhibit 3B. It is true that Ed Brobst, the union 's president, testified that not until much later did he become aware of the contents of General Counsel's Exhibit 4, that he did not instruct anyone to mail this letter, and that Mrs. Keiser "should not have received a letter of this nature." But I expressly find that Otto had at least apparent authority to issue , sign , and transmit such a letter, especially in the light of Brobst's testimony that Otto was vested with authority to "take care of the financial end of the local union ... [including] dues [and] the collection of dues," and the further fact that Otto's name appeared on the envelope addressed to the Union by Keiser. See General Counsel's Exhibit 3B. Further, even on Brobst's own testimony it is clear that General Counsel's Exhibit 4 was a "form letter" sent to Keiser and 43 other employees who had sent notices to the Union "terminating their dues, their revocation of dues, or . . . resigning from the local union." It is thus patent that, regardless of the particular wording on the employee letters to it, the Union regarded all 44 of them as notices of resignation and replied in the same vein to these 44 employees. No reason appears in the record why a 136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD different form of reply could not be or was not used for those notices worded as revocations of checkoffs. This deliberate use of a form reply, when another could have been used , is persuasive on the question of how the Union looked upon or regarded Keiser 's letter in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 3A. (d) The 1963 collective-bargaining contract between Western Electric and Local 1522 (G.C. Exh. 5), the last in effect before February 9, 1967, contains no provision prescribing the manner in which resignations or withdrawals from the Union may be consummated. In the absence of such guidance it is reasonable to expect that employees like Mrs . Keiser, who are unfamiliar with the precise language necessary to achieve a desired result, will word a notice of resignation in nontechnical language. That is precisely the course which Mrs. Keiser pursued. I find that it is a reasonable course designed to express her intention to resign , especially when evaluated along with the union 's job steward 's advice that such language was proper to attain that end. 2. As to whether Mrs. Keiser' s resignation from the Union was timely Shortly after her employment Mrs. Keiser became a member of the Union and remained such for a considerable period of time. Under the provisions of Article VII of the collective- bargaining contract of November 22, 1963, between Western Electric and Local 1522 she was required to maintain said membership and pay dues as a condition of employment . See General Counsel's Exhibit 5. However, said contract expired on January 21, 1967. Thereafter she was free to resign from Local 1522 provided she did so before a new contract was executed by the parties containing an effective maintenance of membership clause. It is my opinion , and I find, that a new contract was executed by the parties on February 9, 1967, when the International Office of Local 1522 approved the contract agreed upon by Western Electric and Local 1522. See General Counsel's Exhibit 6, p. 61. Said agreement in Article 35 expressly conditions the contract's viability or genesis "only if ratified by the Union membership and approved by the International office of the Union on or before February 10, 1967." Although it was executed on February 4, 1967, and ratified by the membership on February 6, 1967, I find that the contract did not bind the parties and come into force until it was approved by the International ' s president on February 9, 1967. Western Roto Engravers, Inc., 168 NLRB No. 142, is distinguishable. While said Article 35 of the contract states that it shall become effective February 3, 1967, I find that this retroactive feature bound only the parties thereto and did not affect third parties like Mrs . Keiser. Standard Molding Corporation, 137 NLRB 1515, 1516. Accordingly , I find that no contract existed between the parties from January 21, 1967, when one contract expired (General Counsel's Exhibit 5) and February 9, 1967 (General Counsel's Exhibit 6). Further, I find that any employee in the unit covered by said contract - and Mrs. Keiser was included in said unit - was free to resign or withdraw from the Union during the period from January 21, 1967, to and including February 9, 1967. May Department Stores, Inc., 133 NLRB 1096, 1097; The Boeing Company, 173 NLRB No. 71, p. 6. In addition , as narrated above , I find that Mrs. Keiser withdrew or resigned from the Union and that she mailed an instrument to this effect , properly addressed to Local 1522, on February 7, 1969. See General Counsel ' s Exhibit 3B. It was received by the Union on February 9, 1967. No different result is dictated simply because the Union by letter dated February 21, 1967, wrote to Mrs. Keiser that her letter of resignation was not timely . The words "was not timely" are but a conclusion not based on any evidence in the record and are not binding on me. Accordingly , I find that Mrs. Keiser ' s letter of resignation from the Union became effective not later than February 9, 1967, and, therefore , she resigned or withdrew from the Union before the new contract (G.C. Exh. 6 ) became operative and obligated members of the Union employed in the unit to maintain their membership in the Union . U.A. W. Local 899, AFL-CIO, 137 NLRB 901, 904. 3. Whether the NLRB will defer to the arbitration award As recited above an arbitration award was rendered on July 1, 1968, upon a grievance instituted by Local 1522. In pertinent part this grievance demanded that Mrs. Keiser be terminated in accordance with Article 7, Section l.b, of the current contract (in evidence as G.C. Exh. 6) on the ground that she never resigned from the Union, and that she was delinquent in paying her union dues as a condition of employment . See page 4 of Respondent's Exhibit 6 . That award decided that Mrs. Keiser had not resigned from union membership and granted Local 1522 the option of requesting that Mrs. Keiser be terminated or requiring her to pay past and prospective dues. See page l1 of Respondent ' s Exhibit 6. Local 1522 elected to have her discharged ; and she was discharged accordingly on August 9, 1968. Upon this aspect of the case the question is whether the Board will defer to said arbitration award and recognize it as defeating Keiser's right to reinstatement and backpay. It has been the Board 's policy to stimulate settlement of labor disputes and, to this end, the Board has held that it will honor or recognize an arbitration award provided (a) all parties have acquiesced in referring a dispute to arbitration and (b) the proceedings appear to have been fair and regular , all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the Arbitration Panel is not palpably wrong or plainly repugnant to the Act. Spielberg Manufacturing Company , 112 NLRB 1080, 1082. Nevertheless an arbitration award will be disregarded by the Board unless the issue to be resolved by the Board must have been fully and fairly litigated before an impartial arbitrator. Otherwise the Board will not honor the award . Rotax Metals, Inc., 163 NLRB 72, 78; International Harvester Company , 138 NLRB 923, 928; affd . 327 F.2d 784 (C.A. 7); cert . denied 377 U.S. 1003. It is my opinion , and I find, that the arbitration award in evidence as Respondent ' s Exhibit 6 does not meet one of the standards prescribed by the Board as a condition of accepting the award . Cf. Pride Candy and Tobacco Company , 178 NLRB No . 16, fn. 2 . In this connection I find that , although Keiser did not participate in the arbitration proceedings, this alone is not fatal to accepting the award as a valid disposition of the issue before the Board . This is because Western Electric adequately resisted the union 's efforts to remove Mrs. Keiser from the job. International Harvester Company , 138 NLRB 923, 928. In one respect , however, as related above, the proceedings before the Arbitration Panel fail to conform LOCAL 1522, ELECTRICAL WORKERS 137 to the standards promulgated by the Board as a prerequisite to upholding arbitration awards deciding issues later before the Board Thus I find that the issues of whether Mrs. Keiser was advised by the union's job steward as to the form to use in resigning from the Union, whether she relied on such advice, whether she used such a form intending it to constitute a resignation, and whether the Union construed her letter as a resignation, were neither tried nor argued before the Arbitration Panel. Hence I find that such Panel did not have before it, nor did it pass upon the question, now submitted to the Board, of whether Mrs. Keiser was warranted in using a form of resignation recommended to her by an agent of the Union, and whether the Union considered such form as a resignation. Accordingly I find that these issues were not presented to the Arbitration Panel and therefore the arbitration award is not an impediment to the Board's passing upon them in the instant proceeding. Rotax Metals, Inc , 163 NLRB 72, 78-79. It follows, and I find, that the arbitration award should not be followed by me because the Arbitration Panel did not have before it evidence touching upon the questions of whether a union agent led Mrs Keiser to believe that the form she used was adequate to amount to a resignation from the Union, that she relied on such belief, and that the Union construed her letter as a resignation. Cf Ford Motor Company, 131 NLRB 1462, 1463-64. Accordingly, I have disregarded the arbitration award which decided that Mrs. Keiser had failed to resign from the Union, and have given no weight to it. Cf. U.A. W. Local 899, AFL-CIO, 137 NLRB 901, 905, fn 7. Elsewhere in this decision I have found that she timely resigned her membership in Local 1522 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section 111, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Western Electric Company, Inc., have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY As Respondent has been found to have engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take specific affirmative action, as set forth below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Since Mrs. Keiser has returned to work for Western Electric, no provision will be made regarding reinstatement to her former position there. Because Mrs. Keiser remained out of work for a period of time, I shall recommend that Local 1522 make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered by her discharge by paying her a sum of money for such loss. Said sum shall be equal to such compensation as she would have earned as wages from the date of her discharge by Western Electric to the date she returned to work for such Employer, less her net earnings during such period. Any backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum pursuant to the formula adopted in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716. Respondent's conduct does not demonstrate general hostility to the policies of the Act. Accordingly, I find that a broad Order is not warranted on the record in this case. I find that only a narrow Order is justified limited to preventing the recurrence of the unfair labor practices found herein Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I Local 1522 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) and 8(b) of the Act. 2. Western Electric Company, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act 3. By attempting to cause and causing the Employer, Western Electric Company, Inc., to discriminate against Dorothy E. Keiser, an employee thereof, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, Local 1522 has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.. 4. By misleading Dorothy E. Keiser as to how she may withdraw from membership in the Union at an appropriate time, causing her to submit an improperly worded withdrawal of membership, Local 1522 has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. (See Hughes Aircraft Company, Tucson Division, 164 NLRB No 6.) 5. The above-described unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act [Recommended Order omitted from publication. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation