461 U.S. 424 (1983) Cited 22,124 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding a civil-rights plaintiff can recover attorney's fees for claims that "involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories," even if only one of those claims arises under a fee-shifting statute
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1087-90 (2d Cir. 1982), the Second Circuit went so far as to assess the reasonableness of the government's stance in settlement negotiations, finding seven months of discussion to arrive at a stipulation covering a few discrete issues unreasonable.
Blocking recovery of attorneys fees in agency actions which were resolved prior to Act's effective date, although relying on a different interpretation of the Act
In Goldhaber v. Foley, 698 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1983), we held that EAJA entitles a plaintiff to "charge the United States with that portion of the expenses attributable to its unjustifiable positions," id. at 197 (footnote omitted), and not with "the entire expense of litigation," where the United States has prevailed in at least one aspect of the action, id. The district court must determine which portion of the prevailing party's fee application is related to litigation over the government's unjustified position.
Holding that the NLRB was "substantially justified" in seeking the overruling of a controlling, ten-year-old Sixth Circuit precedent (which had been rejected by two other circuits), reasoning that "the position taken by the Board was a reasonable attempt to reopen a closed question"
Holding that an application was not filed with the NLRB until it was received, noting that "[t]his interpretation is consistent with cases holding that a document is filed in a court only when it is received, not when it is mailed"
42 U.S.C. § 1988 Cited 22,166 times 45 Legal Analyses
Finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 defines the term "costs" as used in Rule 54(d) and enumerates the expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under the discretionary authority granted in Rule 54(d)