L & M Ambulance Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 4, 1993

312 N.L.R.B. 1153 (N.L.R.B. 1993)

1153
312 NLRB No. 184
L & M AMBULANCE CORP.
1 On July 6, 1993, Administrative Law Judge Joel P. Biblowitz
issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
In adopting the judge’s finding that the General Counsel estab-
lished that the Respondent had a past practice of granting employees
yearly wage increases in October, we rely solely on the
uncontradicted evidence that employees received wage increases in
October 1990 and October 1991 as well as the Respondent’s ac-
knowledgment of that practice in its August 24, 1992 memorandum
to employees and its November 5, 1992 letter to the Union.
3 In light of the undisputed record evidence that the amount of the
Respondent’s October 1992 wage increases would have varied from
4 percent to 7 percent depending on the evaluations of the employ-
ees, we disagree with the judge’s recommended Order that the Re-
spondent give an across-the-board 7-percent wage increase to em-
ployees. Rather, we will order, as we traditionally do in such cases,
that the Respondent make the employees whole for the wage in-
creases they would have received in October 1992 by payment to
them of the differences between their actual wages and the wages
they would otherwise have received. Daily News of Los Angeles, 304
NLRB 511 (1991), remanded 979 F.2d 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Allied
Products Corp., 218 NLRB 1246 (1975).
L & M Ambulance Corporation and Greater Hart-
ford Emergency Medical Technicians Associa-
tion. Case 34–CA–5963
November 4, 1993
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
The issue in this case is whether the judge correctly
found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5), (3),
and (1) of the Act when, pending certification of the
Union after a Board-conducted election, it did not fol-
low its usual practice of granting pay increases in Oc-
tober of each year.1
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions
and brief and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order as modified.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below, and orders that the Respondent, L &
M Ambulance Corporation, West Hartford, Connecti-
cut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the actions set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b).
‘‘(b) Make whole the employees in the appropriate
unit for any monetary losses they have suffered by rea-
son of the Respondent’s unilateral withholding of an-
nual wage increases which the employees would have
received by paying them the differences between their
actual wages and wages they would have otherwise re-
ceived, with interest.’’
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT make unlawful unilateral changes in
our employees’ wages without first bargaining collec-
tively with Greater Hartford Emergency Medical Tech-
nicians Association (the Union) for our employees in
the following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time emergency
medical technicians, including EMT-A’s, EMT-
Intermediates, EMT-Paramedics, and all complaint
writers and dispatchers employed by the Respond-
ent at or out of its facility; but excluding all other
employees, all casual employees, all office cleri-
cal employees, all guards, professional employees
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT deny a regular wage increase to our
employees in the above-described unit because of their
support for the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights.
WE WILL make whole the employees in the above
appropriate unit for any monetary losses they may
have suffered by reason of our unilateral withholding
of the annual wage increases they would have received
by paying them the difference between their actual
wages and the wages they would have otherwise re-
ceived, with interest.
WE WILL bargain with the Union about this as well
as future wage increases for these employees.
L & M AMBULANCE CORPORATION
Thomas E. Quigley, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Morton W. Appleton, Esq. (Appleton & Appleton), for the
Respondent.
David M. Fackelmann, for the Charging Party.
1154 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 Unless indicated otherwise, all dates referred to relate to the year
1992.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL P. BIBLOWITZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard by me on May 24, 1993, in Hartford, Connecticut.
The complaint herein, which issued on February 9, 1993, and
was based upon an unfair labor practice charge filed on De-
cember 29, 1992,1 by Greater Hartford Emergency Medical
Technicians Association (the Union), alleges that L & M
Ambulance Corporation (Respondent) violated Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by failing to grant a wage
increase to certain of its employees on about October 1.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation with its principal office and
place of business located in West Hartford, Connecticut (the
facility), has been engaged in the business of providing am-
bulance services. During the 12-month period ending January
31, 1993, Respondent purchased and received at its facility
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points lo-
cated outside the State of Connecticut. Respondent admits,
and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE FACTS
Professional Ambulance Service, Inc. (Professional) has
been in the ambulance business in the Hartford, Connecticut
area since, at least, the early 1980s. It is owned by Harvey
Kagan and Morton Appleton. Its employees are represented
by the Union; the most recent collective-bargaining agree-
ment covering these Professional employees covers the pe-
riod 1991 through 1994. In the spring of 1988, Kagan and
Appleton purchased the Respondent whose employees were
not represented by any union. Respondent and Professional
have since been found to constitute a single employer, al-
though they have continued to operate as separate units, one,
Professional, unionized, and the other, Respondent, with
about 80 unit employees, and no recognized union. This
changed in August when, at a Board-conducted election, the
tally of ballots established that 43 votes were cast for the
Union and 15 were cast against the Union. The Respondent’s
objections to this election were overruled and the Union was
certified on February 2, 1993, in the following appropriate
unit:
All full-time and regular part-time emergency medical
technicians, including EMT-As, EMT-Intermediates,
EMT-Paramedics, and all complaint writers and dis-
patchers employed by the Employer at or out of its
West Hartford, Connecticut facility; but excluding all
other employees, all casual employees, all office cleri-
cal employees, and all guards, professional employees,
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Professional has had some prior experience in Board pro-
ceedings. In August 1988, Administrative Law Judge Julius
Cohn issued a decision wherein he found that Professional
violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act by discharg-
ing an employee because of his union activities and for hav-
ing given testimony under the Act. These findings were not
appealed and were adopted by the Board. On June 4, 1990,
Administrative Law Judge Raymond Green issued a decision
in which he found that Professional violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act by discharging three employees and by
refusing to transfer an employee during this same period.
Other violations were also found, including threats of the
loss of overtime because of employee’s union activities and
Weingarten violations. No exceptions were filed to this deci-
sion and it was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, also without exceptions.
David Fackelmann, president of the Union and an em-
ployee of Professional since 1986, testified that shortly after
the Board-conducted election in August, he asked Nirmal
Singh, vice president of Respondent and Professional, to bar-
gain with the Union since they won the election. Singh re-
fused, saying that Respondent would be filing objections to
the election. By letter to Singh dated January 8, 1993,
Fackelmann repeated this request. Respondent and the Union
commenced bargaining after the Board’s certification issued
in February 1993; no contract had been agreed to at the time
of the hearing.
The allegation is that there had been a practice at Re-
spondent prior to 1992 for the employees to be given yearly
wage increases in about October. Admittedly, Respondent
granted no wage increases to its unit employees at that time
in 1992; it is alleged that the omission of these wage in-
creases violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.
Fackelmann testified that although he works for Profes-
sional, because he ‘‘worked literally side by side’’ with Re-
spondent’s employees, he was aware of Respondent’s wage
increase policy: ‘‘The practice is they’re granted annual
wage increases specifically in the Fall, more specifically . . .
usually in October every year.’’ However, he had no direct
knowledge of the amount of the wage increase given to the
employees. Received in evidence was a memorandum dated
August 24, 1990, from Kagan to Respondent’s employees re-
garding their benefits. As regards wage increases, the memo-
randum states:
Within the next 30 days, all L & M employees will
be evaluated for proficiency and effective October 1,
1990 a wage increase of 4% cost of living plus up to
a 3% additional increase may be given depending on
your evaluation.
Fackelmann testified further that on about October 28 he
went to Singh’s office and asked him what he was going to
do about the October wage increase for Respondent’s em-
ployees. Singh told him to get out of the office as he was
not supposed to be there. Singh also said that the certifi-
cation was in the Board’s hands and he couldn’t do anything
until it was settled by the Board. By letter to Singh dated
October 13, Fackelmann wrote:
1155L & M AMBULANCE CORP.
2 Apparently, the large amount of this increase was due to the fact
that his classification was changed from EMT Intermediate to para-
medic.
1. Any day now, the National Labor Relations Board
will put an end to your petty, contrived allegations of
an unfair election of union representation.
2. As you know, unilateral changes in working con-
ditions are prohibited pending certification.
3. L&M employees have historically enjoyed annual
raises in October, as a term and condition of employ-
ment.
4. You have ten days to announce and implement an-
nual raise for L&M employees. GHEMTA shall pursue
this issue as retaliatory and retribution for electing
union representation using all resources.
By letter to Fackelmann dated November 5, Singh wrote,
inter alia:
Coming now to the question of L&M raises. Yes,
L&M employees have been receiving merit raises in
varying amounts based on evaluation of their perform-
ance by Management, generally around fall. If
GHEMTA had not committed all those serious irreg-
ularities in the August 14, 1992 election, the issue
would have been clearly decided long back. With the
outcome of the L&M election up in the air, if we had
announced and implemented the raises on our own,
GHEMTA would surely have filed charges alleging im-
proper influencing or refusal to bargain. Since we did
not, you are up with your bravado, rough talk, and ulti-
matums. If we do at your behest, going by past experi-
ence, you would or you would get somebody on your
behalf to file charges on the quantum and process of
raises claiming improper influence or retaliation de-
pending on how the individual views his/her raise.
Respondent posted this letter at the facility and it remained
posted for about 3 months. As stated above, bargaining did
not begin until after the Board’s certification issued in Feb-
ruary 1993.
John Anderson has been employed by Respondent since
1982. He began as an EMT Intermediate and in about 1986
he became a paramedic. He testified that prior to 1986, Re-
spondent granted wage increases to employees twice a year,
in April and October. Beginning in about 1986 wage in-
creases were given every year, solely in October, except for
increases warranted by change in job classifications, such as
Anderson’s promotion to paramedic in about 1986. From
about 1986 through 1991, in October of each year Respond-
ent gave cost-of-living increases of 4 percent, plus up to an
additional 3-percent increase dependent upon the employee’s
evaluation. However, there was a ‘‘cap,’’ and if the employ-
ee’s salary had reached that amount, he would receive no
more even if his evaluation recommended the full additional
3 percent. Anderson’s pay stubs for 1990 establish that his
hourly rate went from $14 an hour for the week ending Sep-
tember 29, 1990, to $14.56 an hour for the week ending Oc-
tober 6, 1990, with a pay date of October 11, 1990. He testi-
fied that he did not get the full 7 percent because he reached
the ‘‘cap.’’ His pay stubs for 1991 establish that his hourly
rate for the payroll period ending October 26, 1991, was in-
creased to $15 an hour again, apparently, because he reached
the ‘‘cap.’’ The pay date for this workweek was October 31,
1991. He testified that as far as he knows all of Respond-
ent’s employees received wage increases at these times in
1990 and 1991. He received no wage increases anytime in
1992 and was never told anything by Respondent as to why
no increases were given.
Singh testified on behalf of Respondent. He has been em-
ployed by Respondent since November 1989. He testified:
[T]he raises were given at practically different times of
the year. There has been no consistency as to the time-
liness or the time at which raises were given. The only
period of consistency that I find is . . . October of ’90
and October of ’91, for which, of course, there were
reasons why it was done.
He testified that the ‘‘consistency’’ was caused by the fact
that after Professional purchased Respondent in 1988, Re-
spondent’s operation was moved to Professional’s location
(the facility) and Respondent had to ‘‘ensure that . . . there
is equity, there is fair play between the raises of employees
for the two companies.’’ He learned that the wages of Pro-
fessional’s employees (represented by the Union) were high-
er than the wages of Respondent’s employees. The final year
of the contract between Professional and the Union 1990 was
and it provided for a 6-percent wage increase. A new con-
tract was signed in 1991 and provided for a 7-percent in-
crease in June 1991, a 10-percent increase in June and no in-
crease in 1993. In 1991, Respondent determined that it
would establish wage increases for Respondent’s employees
that would be fair as compared to Professional’s employees
and strive to have equality between the companies by 1994.
In this regard, Respondent determined that it would give Re-
spondent’s employees a 4-percent cost-of-living increase with
an additional increase of up to 3 percent dependent upon an
evaluation of their work.
Respondent introduced into the record the payroll records
of Anderson and Ernest Handau. Handau’s record establishes
the following wage increases:
June 1, 1986 to $6.51 an hour.
February 9, 1987 to $9.50 an hour.2
February 14, 1988 to $10.79 an hour.
August 14, 1988 to $11.79 an hour.
December 4, 1988 to $12.00 an hour.
October 1, 1989 to $12.90 an hour.
April 24, 1990 to $13.50 an hour.
October 1, 1990 to $14.41 an hour.
Handau has been employed as a casual since about that time.
Anderson’s payroll records state that he received a $1 raise
to $12.99 an hour in August 1988. Unfortunately, they estab-
lish nothing else other than that he received an excellent
evaluation in July 1988.
No raise was given to Respondent’s unit employees in Oc-
tober. Singh testified that after consulting with labor counsel,
Dave Anderson, Respondent decided not to give these raises:
We were agonizing over this question. It was a very
difficult issue for us . . . . Our problem was that Dave
Anderson said, hey, given the history of whatever has
been happening, you’re damned if you do, you’re
1156 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
damned if you don’t because you give the raises, this
union has a history of fighting charges over everything
that happens. In the last two years, maybe 10, 15
charges have been filed and each one of them has been
with drawn . . . the Board has refused to issue a com-
plaint except this is the only charge where the com-
plaint has been issued. No other charge—for no other
charge the complaint has been issued.
There is a history of filing charges and grievances by
this union. So Dave Anderson’s advice was this, maybe
it’s a safer course not to give the raises. Because you
give the raises, they’ll come back and they’ll get you
and why did you give this much, why didn’t you give
this much, you gave so much to so and so and you
gave so little to so and so. And they will get you on—
in a number of charges which you will in no way be
able to explain. That was our problem.
We had no difficulty—in giving raises, in fact, we
started the process of evaluation . . . . We started
doing the evaluations, but we really could not go ahead
with it. We were prepared to give the raises, but we
could not go ahead with it because we had this particu-
lar problem. That if you do it we will be caught. If you
don’t do it, perhaps you’ll be caught.
The other possibility was we would have done it and
we would have been involved for another 15 charges,
not one in this case, but maybe 15 charges; we don’t
know.
And so that is the reason, that was the compulsion
why the company’s management decided that maybe let
us have on the safer side. It was not with an intent to
deny the raises. It wasn’t at all.
IV. ANALYSIS
Respondent did not give wage increases to its unit em-
ployees in about October while its objections to the Board
election were pending. It is clear that increases were given
to these employees, at least, in October 1990 and October
1991. The issues that have to be decided are how long Re-
spondent had been granting these wage increases and why it
did not give the increases in October.
Anderson testified in a brief and concise fashion, sup-
ported by his paystubs, to establish that wage increases were
given by Respondent in October of each year, beginning in
about 1986. Singh’s testimony, on the other hand, was
vague, conclusionary, and unending, with little substantive
support. I have no difficulty crediting Anderson’s testimony.
Further, there is additional evidence supporting Anderson’s
testimony. Respondent’s August 24, 1990 memorandum stat-
ed that effective October 1, 1990, all of Respondent’s em-
ployees would receive wage increases of between 4 and 7
percent. In addition, Singh’s letter to Fackelmann dated No-
vember 5, which remained posted at the facility for about 3
months, states: ‘‘Yes, L&M employees have been receiving
merit raises in varying amounts based on evaluation of their
performance by Management, generally around fall.’’ The
only evidence Respondent produced to refute the General
Counsel’s allegation of a pattern of wage increases in about
October was Handau’s personnel record to establish that
prior to 1989 he received wage increases at other times, as
well, and that in April 1990 (as well as October 1990) he
received a wage increase, and Anderson’s payroll records to
establish that he received a wage increase in August 1988.
Respondent employs approximately 80 employees in the bar-
gaining unit obviously, if evidence existed that the pattern al-
leged by the General Counsel did not exist, Respondent
would have produced this evidence. That Respondent pro-
duced only Handau’s payroll records and the 1988 payroll
records for Anderson leads me to the inescapable conclusion
that there is nothing else to support their argument. I therefor
find that, at least since about 1986, Respondent has granted
yearly wage increases to its unit employees in October of
each year.
In Mike O’Connor Chevrolet, 209 NLRB 701, 703 (1974),
the Board stated:
The Board has long held that, absent compelling eco-
nomic considerations for doing so, an employer acts at
its peril in making changes in terms and conditions of
employment during the period that objections to an
election are pending and the final determination has not
yet been made. And where the final determination on
the objections results in the certification of a representa-
tive, the Board has held the employer to have violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) for having made such unilateral
changes . . . . It is well established . . . that, whether
unlawfully motivated or not, an employer violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) where it makes changes in terms
and conditions of employment during the pendency of
objections to an election which eventually results in the
certification of the union.
In Toyota of Berkeley, 306 NLRB 893 (1992), the Board
stated: ‘‘the employer who wishes to make unilateral changes
runs the risk that the union will be deemed the winner of the
election and the changes will be deemed unlawful. Hence,
under Mike O’Connor, the changes here were unlawful.’’
In the instant matter, Respondent changed its pattern of
granting wage increases to its unit employees by not granting
any increases in October without negotiating with the Union
about this subject. No economic defense is raised to this
change. The Respondent’s objections were eventually over-
ruled and the Union was certified. This change therefor vio-
lates Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Venture Packaging,
Inc., 294 NLRB 544 (1989).
It is further alleged that, by not granting the regular wage
increases in October, Respondent also violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Peabody Coal Co., 265 NLRB
93, 99 (1982), states:
[A]n employer violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) when it
varies from its established practices of granting wage
increases and other benefit improvements because of
the pendency of a representation campaign or because
a labor organization has been elected by its employees
to represent them for collective bargaining purposes.
In Parma Industries, 292 NLRB 90, 91 (1988), the Board
stated:
The good-faith postponement of benefit increases
otherwise due is lawful when the employer is careful to
explain that its purpose is to avoid the appearance of
interference with employees’ organizational efforts. The
1157L & M AMBULANCE CORP.
3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
employer, however, may not seek to shift to the union
the onus for the postponement of such increases.
In the instant matter, Singh testified that Respondent didn’t
grant the wage increase under the theory: ‘‘Damned if you
do, damned if you don’t,’’ in that if it granted the increase
the Union would have filed charges about the wage increase.
He testified that in the last 2 years the Union has filed 10
or 15 charges and the instant matter is the only one in which
a complaint has issued. These arguments are too transparent
to require much comment. Firstly, it seems highly unlikely
that the Union would have filed a charge if Respondent had
granted the raise in October because Fackelmann, by letter
of October 13 and in person on about October 28, asked
Singh to grant the employees their regular expected raises.
In addition, as to the Union’s alleged propensity to file
worthless unfair labor practice charges, the decisions of
Judge Cohn and Judge Green establish that the Union has
good reason for filing many of its charges, and further estab-
lishes union animus on the part of Respondent. Further evi-
dence of Respondent’s union animus is established by
Singh’s November 5 letter to Facklemann, which was posted
at the facility, and put the blame on the Union, and its al-
leged ‘‘serious irregularities’’ at the election, for the lack of
the October wage increase. I therefor have no difficulty dis-
crediting Singh’s testimony about the reason Respondent did
not grant the usual wage increase in October. Based upon the
failure of Respondent to establish a valid reason for its fail-
ure to pay the regular wage increase in October, together
with its union animus demonstrated in the prior Board deci-
sions, and its posted letter of November 5, 1992, which
blames the Union for the lack of a wage increase, I find that
it was in retaliation for the employees’ vote in August at the
Board-conducted election. It therefor violates Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act, as well as Section 8(a)(1) and (5) as pre-
viously found.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, L & M Ambulance Corporation, is en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees of Respondent constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time emergency medical
technicians, including EMT-A’s, EMT-Intermediates,
EMT-Paramedics, and all complaint writers and dis-
patchers employed by the Respondent at or out of its
facility; but excluding all other employees, all casual
employees, all office clerical employees, and all guards,
professional employees, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the
Act by failing to grant to its employees in this unit an annual
wage increase on about October 1, 1992.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative ac-
tion designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
I shall recommend that Respondent restore the employees
to the position in which they would have been absent the
violation i.e., by reimbursing them for the lost wage increase
of October 1, 1992. This is difficult to determine, because,
if Respondent had granted the increases, as it was legally ob-
ligated to do, they would have been in the range of 4 to 7
percent depending upon the evaluation that the employee re-
ceived. The Board’s long established policy is that it is the
wrongdoer, rather than the innocent victim, who should bear
the hardships of the unlawful action. Mashkin Freight Lines,
272 NLRB 427 (1984). I shall therefor recommend that Re-
spondent be ordered to make all the unit employees whole
by giving them a wage increase of 7 percent, retroactive to
October 1, 1992, with interest computed in accordance with
New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). See
generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Addi-
tionally, because of Respondent’s past violations, and the ob-
vious nature of this violation, a broad cease-and-desist order
is warranted here. Fire Fighters, 304 NLRB 401 (1991).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended3
ORDER
The Respondent, L & M Ambulance Corporation, West
Hartford, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withholding wage increases, previously given, in retal-
iation for its employees, activity in voting to be represented
by the Union.
(b) Unilaterally discontinuing its prior policy of granting
yearly wage increases to its unit employees in October with-
out first bargaining collectively with the Union, the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of its employees in the above-
mentioned appropriate unit.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or co-
ercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union with regard to the
amount of wage increase to be given to the employees, effec-
tive October 1, 1992, and if an understanding is reached em-
body that understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Retroactively put into effect a 7-percent wage increase
for all unit employees employed on October 1, 1992, and pay
to those employees the amount of back wages accrued since
October 1, 1992, all with interest on the increases, and con-
tinue to grant annual 7-percent wage increases to these em-
ployees on October 1 of each year until it bargains in good
1158 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
faith with the Union, or the Union refuses to bargain in good
faith over cessation of such increases.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due to the unit employees here under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at all of its facilities in the Hartford, Connecticut
area, copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’4
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 34, after being signed by Respondent’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately on receipt and shall be maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other ma-
terial.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken
to comply.