L. C. Cassidy & Son, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 8, 1970

185 N.L.R.B. 920 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

920 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
L. C. Cassidy & Son, Inc. and Miami Valley Carpen-
ters District Council , the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO.
Case 9-CA-5419
October 8, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND BROWN
On April 30, 1970, Trial Examiner Sidney J. Barban
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recom-
mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner further
found that Respondent had not engaged in certain
other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint,
and recommended that such allegations be dismissed.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Decision and a supporting brief. The Respondent
requested oral argument.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are here-
by affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent here-
with.
As more fully set forth by the Trial Examiner,
the Union was certified on April 19, 1968, and from
June 26, 1968, through May 7, 1969, the parties
met and negotiated on 19 separate occasions. The
parties executed a 2-year agreement on May 7, 1969,
shortly before an unfair labor practice hearing upon
a complaint against Respondent was scheduled to
commence.
At issue herein is the Respondent's sick pay policy
which was not included in the contract and was
discontinued by the Respondent without notification
to the employees after the contract was signed on
I The Respondent 's request for oral argument is hereby denied as,
in our opinion , the record , including the Respondent 's exceptions and
brief, adequately presents the issues and positions of the parties
May 7, 1969. Prior to the execution of the contract,
it was the Respondent's policy to pay an employee
employed more than 2 years, upon his presentation
of a doctor's certificate, up to 7 days' sick pay a
year.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent, since
the early part of June 1969, has failed and refused
to pay employees sick leave pay, as was the custom
and practice prior to May 7, 1969. Such conduct,
the complaint alleges, constitutes a violation by the
Respondent of Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the
Act.
The Trial Examiner found that prior to the execu-
tion of the contract on May 7, 1969, the Respondent
had a practice, at its Vandalia operation, of paying
the employees for time lost due to sickness, and
of paying its warehouseman, but not the other employ-
ees, for certain holidays during the year,' and that
the Respondent by unilaterally discontinuing its previ-
ous practice and refusing to pay sick pay to its
employees after May 14, 1969, violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act.' The Respondent excepts to these
findings, contending, in essential part, that Respond-
ent's discontinuance of sick pay was not a unilateral
act on the part of the Respondent, but that it was
bilateral, resulting from contract negotiations; that
sick pay was part of the total wage package which
had been negotiated; and that the record is devoid
of any request at any time on or after May 7, 1969,
by the Union representatives to negotiate the question
of sick pay. We find merit in these exceptions.
The Union presented its first proposed contract
at a bargaining meeting on September 5, 1968, and,
although the contract contained proposals to retain
insurance and uniform benefits, and provided for
six paid holidays, there was no proposal for sick
pay. At that time the Respondent noted that the
contract did not contain a wage proposal, and that
the contract would have to be a total package.
At the next meeting on October 4, 1968, Blakeley,
the secretary for the Union, pointed out that the
Respondent's sick pay benefits had been left out of
the Union's proposed contract, and that the employees
wanted to retain the existing sick pay benefits. Kristler,
the Respondent's attorney, indicated that he did not
know about the sick pay policy. Trimbach, the new
branch manager, explained the Respondent's sick pay
policy to Kristler, at which time he shrugged his
shoulders and raised his hands. At the close of the
' No exceptions were filed to the Trial Examiner 's finding that the
Respondent did not engage in conduct violative of the Act by discontinuing
and refusing to pay holiday pay to its warehouseman after May 14,
1969 1,
' The Trial Examiner held that inasmuch as it would not affect the
remedy, it was unnecessary to consider whether the Respondent also
violated Sec 8(a)(3) by such conduct and recommended that this allegation
of the complaint be dismissed
185 NLRB No. 134
L. C. CASSIDY & SONS, INC.
meeting the Respondent presented its first proposed
contract containing provisions with respect to wages,
insurance, and uniforms. There was no provision for
sick pay.
The parties met again on October 9, 1968, and
attempted to discuss each article in the two proposed
contracts. Kistler informed Blakeley that the Union
had not submitted a total wage package.
On October 23. 1968. Blakelev sent a letter to
Kistler setting forth nine separate demands, including
wages of $5.62 per hour plus fringe benefits, holidays,
insurance, and uniforms. There was no mention of
sick pay in these demands.
Blakeley stated at the November 6, 1968, meeting,
that he had met with the employees and that they
would insist on holidays and seniority rights as set
forth in their proposal, and that they would agree
to continue the policies in effect relating to uniforms,
sick pay, and vacations. The Respondent rejected
the Union's demands on the grounds that, in addition
to the top carpenter hourly rate, the Union was
asking for more than the carpenters because they
were asking for sick pay benefits and holiday benefits
which the carpenters did not get.
Smedstad, the Union's attorney, attended his first
bargaining meeting on December 11, 1968. At that
time, he emphasized that the two major problems
were piece rates versus hourly rates and the question
of union shop. The same issues were discussed at
the January 3, 1969, meeting.
At the January 15, 1969, meeting, Smedstad stated,
in reference to the Respondent's proposed manage-
ment rights clause, that if the Respondent did not
give up the piece rate. all the other fringe benefits,
including sick pay did not matter. Although the parties
met again on nine occasions, they limited their discus-
sions to contract language.
After an exchange of telephone calls on May 6,
1969, the parties indicated that they might reach
agreement on some matters. Hammaker, the business
representative, met with some of the employees on
the evening of May 6, 1969, to discuss the terms
of an agreement which had been communicated by
Kistler. Hammaker read the proposal to the men
and they raised questions about the absence of provi-
sions for sick pay, holiday pay, and insurance. Ham-
maker called Kistler and asked if the holiday pay,
sick pay, and insurance benefits were included in
Kistler's proposals. According to Hammaker's testi-
mony, Kistler answered that his understanding was
that it would all be taken care of in the contract.
Kistler also stated that the contract was being drawn
by Russell, the Respondent's counsel, that he would
do what he could, and asked Hammaker to extend
his best efforts with the men to accept the proposal
being drafted by the Respondent.
921
Prior to the opening of an unfair labor practice
hearing involving the Respondent on the morning
of May 7, 1969, the parties met and Russell presented
to Smedstad the Respondent's proposed contract.
Smedstad asked if there were any "tricks" in the
contract. Russell answered that there were no tricks
in it, but suggested that Smedstad read it. Thereafter,
Smedstad took the contract to the employees and
informed them of its contents. Hammaker testified
that the employees raised questions concerning the
absence of reference to sick pay in the contract.
Smedstad informed the employees that if he had
time he would mention the absence of a sick pay
provision in the contract when he returned to the
meeting with the Respondent's attorneys. Smedstad
stated that he understood that the Union had not
bargained away such benefits, and, in the absence
of a "zipper clause" in the contract, the Respondent
could not lawfully terminate prior benefits without
negotiation with the Union. However, Smedstad failed
to mention the sick pay matter to the Respondent's
attorneys and Blakeley signed the Respondent's pro-
posed contract, notwithstanding that there was no
provision therein with respect to sick pay.
The contract contained several precontract benefits
including, with only minor changes, vacations, uni-
forms, and insurance. Although the vacation policy
was spelled out in the contract, the articles dealing
with uniforms and insurance stated that the Respond-
ent's present policy would be continued.
Pursuant to a request by Smedstad, the Respondent
sent a letter to Smedstad on May 14, 1969, setting
forth the Respondent's present policy on uniforms
and insurance in detail to avoid future difficulties.
Highly significant is the fact that Smedstad failed
to ask for the Respondent's statement of policy on
sick pay.
There is testimony that the employees became aware
of the Respondent's discontinuance of its sick pay
policy in late May or early June, when the Respondent
refused sick pay to employees Snapp and Menke.
When questioned by the employees about sick pay,
Trimbach, the Vandalia manager, and Davis, the
supervisor, stated that the Respondent would no long-
er provide sick pay because there was no sick pay
provision in the contract. Although Hammaker also
queued Trimbach concerning the discontinuance of
sick pay, he did not ask to bargain about the matter.
As a general rule, a union's statutory right to
be notified and consulted concerning any substantial
change in employment may be waived only if such
waiver is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms,
and such waiver will not lightly be inferred. However,
in view of the foregoing, we find, after an evaluation
of the negotiations, that the Union and the Respondent
fully discussed the sick pay issue at various times
922 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
during negotiations prior to the execution of the
contract on May 7, 1969, and that the Union unmis-
takably waived its rights concerning sick pay.
As noted above, at the time the Union presented
its proposed contract it failed to include sick pay
benefits; although the Union presented the sick pay
issue at several meetings, the Respondent never agreed
to its inclusion in the contract or its continuance
as a policy; the Union's letter to the Respondent
setting forth its nine "demands" made no mention
of sick pay; the Respondent specifically rejected the
Union's attempt to continue the sick pay policy while
the Union insisted on an hourly rate equivalent to
that of the carpenters; Smedstad stated at the January
15, 1969, meeting, that if the Respondent did not
give up the piece rate, all the other fringe benefits
including sick pay did not matter; the employees
pointed out to Hammaker on the evening of May
6, 1969, that the Respondent's proposed contract
did not contain provisions for sick pay, holiday pay,
and insurance, but Hammaker was unable to gain
the Respondent's approval for their inclusion; Smeds-
tad was asked by the Respondent to read its proposed
contract on May 7, 1969, and, thereafter, Smedstad
read the contract to the employees, and they noted
the absence of the sick pay provision in the contract;
Smedstad, after advising the employees that he would
mention the sick pay provision to the Respondent's
attorneys, failed to do so; and Blakeley signed the
Respondent's proposed contract, notwithstanding
there was no provision therein with respect to sick
pay. The record evidence supports a finding that
the Union was concerned, not with the continuance
of the sick pay policy, but with the Respondent's
change from a piece rate to hourly rates, as stated by
Smedstad.
Additionally, we find that the record supports a
finding that the Respondent bargained with the Union
concerning the sick pay plan, and that it was the
intention of the parties that the Respondent's sick
pay policy, although bargained for, would not be
included in the contract, and would not be continued.
The parties included the Respondent's vacation policy
in the contract, and the articles dealing with uniforms
and insurance clearly stated that the Respondent's
present policy would be continued. Significant also
is the request by Smedstad to the Respondent, after
the contract was signed, asking for clarification of
the Respondent's present policy on uniforms and
insurance, but not asking for clarification of the
Respondent's sick pay policy. Finally, the Union,
when confronted by those employees who were denied
sick pay by the Respondent in May and June 1969,
did not ask the Respondent to bargain about its
sick pay policy.
We conclude, therefore, that the Respondent's con-
duct did not constitute, under the circumstances here-
in, a violation of Section 8(a)(5).
ORDER
It is hereby ordered that the complaint herein
be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SIDNEY J. BARBAN, Trial Examiner This matter was
heard at Dayton, Ohio, on February 17 and 18, 1970. The
complaint, issued on January 15, 1970, based on charges
filed on November 14, 1969, alleges that the above-named
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act,
by failing and refusing to grant employees in the unit
represented by the above-named Charging Party, herein
called the Union, holiday pay and sick pay as was
Respondent's custom and practice prior to May 7, 1969.
Respondent's answer, as amended at the hearing, denies the
commission of any unfair labor practices and asserts that
the allegations of the complaint are barred by the provisions
of Section 10(b) of the Act, because the conduct complained
of allegedly occurred more than 6 months prior to the filing
of the charge.
Upon the entire record in this case, from observation of
the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Respondent, the Trial
Examiner makes the following-
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT ; STATUS OF THE
UNION
Respondent is an Indiana corporation with its headquar-
ters at Indianapolis, Indiana, engaged in the building and
construction industry as an insulation contractor at eight
locations, some of which are shown by the record to be
in Indiana and Ohio. Only Respondent's operation at Vanda-
lia, Ohio, is involved herein It is admitted that Respondent,
during a recent representative 12-month period, purchased
products of a value in excess of $50,000, which it caused
to be shipped in interstate commerce from points outside
the state of Indiana to its operation at Indianapolis, Indiana,
at which it maintains its main office. Respondent's answer
to the complaint denies that it is an employer engaged
in commerce or in operations affecting commerce within
the meaning of the Act. However, upon consideration of
the totality of Respondent's operations, including its multi-
state activities, it is found that Respondent's operations
are in and affect commerce within the meaning of the
Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act
to assert jurisdiction in this matter. See Siemons Mailing
Service, 122 NLRB 81, 84.
L. C. CASSIDY & SON, INC.
The Union, a labor union within the meaning of the
Act, was selected in April 1968, as the representative of
Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining with Respondent', as the
result of a secret ballot election conducted by the Board,
and since May 7, 1969, has been party to a collective-
bargaining agreement with the Respondent covering wages,
hours, and working conditions of employees in that unit.
II. SUPERVISORY STATUS OF WILLIAM DAVIS
The complaint alleges and Respondent denies that William
Davis is a supervisor of employees in the unit covered
by the contract within the meaning of the Act. It appears
from the record that while David Trimbach is the local
manager of Respondent's Vandalia operation, the employees
primarily receive their instructions, directions, and orders
from Davis, to whom they normally report The employees,
except possibly the warehouseman, usually work at places
removed from Respondent's premises, alone or in very
small groups, without immediate supervision. If they
encounter a problem or require assistance, the employees
call Davis. He does not, however, normally do the work
performed by members of the unit, and only recently was
given permission by the union shop steward to perform
unit work in special circumstances at places inconvenient
for regular workers. Davis also inspects the work of employ-
ees when complaints are made by customers
Unit employees, though paid on a piece work basis
(except for the warehouseman who is hourly paid), punch
a timeclock. Davis does not. The evidence is that Davis
reprimanded one employee to the effect that if the employee
did not like the way Davis "was handling the work, he
could go home." On another occasion, in response to a
complaint by an employee about the manner the work
was being done (which complaint is none too clear in
the record), Davis gave the employee specific instructions
as to how Davis wanted the work done, with which the
employee complied.
Davis did not testify, and Respondent offered no evidence
as to Davis' duties and authority. Upon the record as
a whole, it is found that Davis, at a minimum, has authority,
in the interest of the Respondent, to discipline or responsibly
direct employees using independent judgment and discretion,
and is thus a supervisor within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
After the Union was certified, in April 1968, as the
exclusive bargaining representative of Respondent's employ-
ees in the appropriate unit, the Respondent and the Union
' The complaint alleges and the Respondent agrees that the following
constitutes an appropnate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Sec 9 (b) of the Act
All employees classified as warehouseman , probationary trainee, help
er, senior hoseman, junior hoseman , senior blanket installer, and
junior blanket installer at the Respondent 's Vandalia, Ohio operation,
excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act
923
met and negotiated on 19 separate occasions from June
26, 1968, through May 7, 1969. At that time a collective-
bargaining agreement was executed, and an unfair labor
practice hearing upon a complaint against Respondent
scheduled for the same date, was called off.
General Counsel does not here complain of Respondent's
conduct during these bargaining negotiations, but asserts
that Respondent has violated the Act by discontinuing
its prior practice at Vandalia of paying sick pay to employees,
and by stopping its prior practice of paying its warehouse-
man at Vandalia for certain holidays, after the execution
of the collective-bargaining agreement, without notification
to the Union or negotiation with respect to these changes
prior to putting them into effect.
Respondent's president, Donald Cassidy, testified that
he was aware that there had been a practice at Vandalia
of paying sick pay to employees, in accordance with
Respondent's established policy2, but indicated a lack of
knowledge of the circumstances of the discontinuance of
this practice. The testimony of employees and of Richard
J. Hammaker, business representative of the Union, estab-
lishes that, when asked, both Trimbach, the Vandalia manag-
er, and Davis, the supervisor, stated that the Vandalia
operation would no longer pay sick pay, upon instructions
from Respondent's Indianapolis headquarters, because there
was no provision for sick pay in the contract. Thus, Ham-
maker testified that when he queried Trimbach concerning
the discontinuance of this benefit, after receiving a complaint
from the union shop steward about this, Trimbach "said,
well, he would like to pay it, but. . . . unless it was
okayed through the company he couldn't go ahead and
pay it . . . . And he said they told him he could not
pay it because it was not in the contract . . . He just
said it was orders from Indianapolis, were that he would
not pay it." This change in policy became known to the
employees when Respondent refused sick pay to employee
Thomas Menke sometime after May 22, possibly in early
June 1969.'
At the Vandalia operations, only the warehouseman
received pay for holidays prior to the execution of the
collective-bargaining agreement. Although Cassidy asserted
that he was not aware that any of Respondent's employees
had ever received holiday pay, the evidence clearly shows
that this was the practice at Vandalia, with respect to
the warehouseman prior to May 7, 1969, the date of the
contract. After that date, Respondent ceased paying the
warehouseman for holidays. When the present warehouse-
man, David Scott Hodges, inquired of Trimbach whether
he would thereafter receive holidays, in accordance with
' Respondent 's brief, in arguing that this matter should be controlled
by' certain precedents , argues that this practice was "vague , and the
benefits were paid only at the discretion of the Vandalia manager However,
the record is clear that each employee with more than a year's service
was paid for absences due to illness, up to seven in a year, attested
by a doctor 's certificate . It is further manifest that though the manager
had a discretion whether to put this policy into effect at Vandalta,
he had exercised his discretion to do so
' Though Menke at the hearing indicated unconcern about being paid, I
was not impressed by his disavowals He seemed to testify under some
restraint In any event, the record as a whole shows that Respondents' failure
to pay Menke after he submitted the customary doctor's certificate was a
matter of concern to the employees
924 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's practice, Trimbach replied, "No." Hammaker
also spoke to Trimbach about this, but the conversation
is not developed in the record.
Respondent argues that it was justified in its actions
in discontinuing holiday pay for the warehouseman, and
sick pay for the unit employees, in effect, on the basis
that 1) these benefits were bargained away during the
negotiations, 2) by terms of the contract the Union had
conceded to the Respondent the right to take unilateral
action with respect to these matters of employment condi-
tions, and 3) the Union had an opportunity to bargain
on the issues but did not do so. It is further asserted
that, in any event, these changes took effect on May 7,
1969, the date of the agreement, more than 6 months
before November 14, 1969, when the charges in this matter
were filed, and thus are barred by Section 10(b) of the
Act. The course of bargaining will be considered first.
A. The Negotiations Generally
The evidence indicates that, almost to the end, the bargain-
ing negotiations were marked more by controversy than
agreement. In dispute were matters such as wages and
the manner in which they were to be computed (Respondent
wished to continue on a piece work basis and the Union
desired payment on an hourly basis ), union shop, check-
off, and the Union's jurisdiction (the Union's proposals
were limited to its geographical jurisdiction, which would
require Respondent to conform to conditions established
by other local unions when unit employees performed work
outside that geographical area).
In the last stages of the negotiations, Respondent was
principally represented by John Kistler, one of its attorneys,
and the Union was represented mainly by Hammaker.
Between April 9, 1969, the last official negotiation meeting
between the two parties, and May 7, 1969, when the agree-
ment was signed, contact between Kistler and Hammaker
was informal and apparently over the telephone. As a
result of these contacts and from discussing the matter
with officials of Respondent during the course of preparation
for the Labor Board hearing scheduled for May 7, Kistler
stated that "I felt that perhaps we really could, for the
first time, get a contract, a total contract" On May 6,
Kistler communicated this to Hammaker, and advised that
he was having other Respondent counsel draw up an agree-
ment based on the negotiations to that date. Hammaker
thereafter discussed this with employees in the unit and
later spoke with Kistler on the telephone, as detailed herein-
after. The following morning, during a three hour recess
granted prior to the opening of the hearing, the parties
engaged in a discussion, considered hereinafter, which result-
ed in the execution of the document presented by the
Respondent, without substantial change.
B. Discussions of Holidays and Sick Pay
Neither the matter of holidays or the question of sick
pay figured prominently in the negotiations. In the Union's
original contract proposal (which lacked a wage proposal
and was considered incomplete), submitted at the meeting
of September 5, 1968, the Union proposed the grant of
6 holidays to all employees in the unit on the active
payroll. There was no reference to sick pay. Respondent's
contract proposal, submitted at the meeting of October
4, 1968, made reference to neither benefit.
While the testimony of the witnesses appears somewhat
at variance with respect to the times when these two
subjects, or either of them, was brought up during the
negotiations, this is not crucial to the resolution of the
issues herein. Kistler, using notes made about that date,
places the first mention of sick pay at the negotiation
meeting of October 4, 1968. That date is accepted Ralph
Blakeley, union business agent, who recalled that the matter
of sick leave came up only once while he was in the
negotiations but was not sure of the date, on cross-examina-
tion indicated that this occurred before his letter of October
23, 1968, to Respondent. Hammaker, who placed the inci-
dent later, is probably mistaken as to the date.
At this meeting, the union representatives inquired of
the employees present on their committee, Orville Taylor
and Harvey Cox, whether there were any other working
conditions which the men desired. After some minutes
of consideration, according to Hammaker, "they said they
had sick pay before, and wanted to know if this was
going to be in the contract And I don't think John [Kistler]
had heard of it before, and he turned and asked Dave
[Trimbach] about sick pay, and Dave said it had been
a custom, and he [Kistler] just made some sign like, oh,
it was kind of immaterial to him, or something." Hammaker
stated that the subject was dropped from that time until
the evening of May 6, 1969 The testimony of Blakeley
and Kistler was consistent with this testimony, although
Kistler recalls the manner in which sick pay was first
raised somewhat differently, and states that the matter
was also briefly mentioned in later meetings, as considered
below. Kistler does confirm that when the matter of sick
pay was first raised, he did inquire as to the custom,
and when informed, shrugged his shoulders and raised
his hands, palms up, indicating that this was not a matter
of importance between the parties.
On October 23, 1968, Blakeley sent Respondent a letter
setting forth eight items, which he asserted the employees
had instructed him to submit as "demands ... in regard
to contract negotiations." Significant among these demands
for the purposes of this case are the following (the numbers
given are those in the letter): "1. Wages - $5.62 per hour
plus fringe benefits"; "5. Holidays as written in the contract
proposal"; 7. "Insurance (To be paid by the Company)";
"8. New Uniforms (Furnished by the Company-1 every
year) "0 There was no specific reference to sick pay. This
document was submitted in response to Respondent's
demand upon the Union that it complete its prior contract
proposal.
According to Kistler there was also a brief reference
to holidays at the meeting of October 9, 1968 (Blakeley
wanted to further discuss this with the employees), and
a mention of sick leave and holidays at the meeting of
November 6, 1968. At the latter meeting, in the course
It appears that as to insurance and uniforms, as well as wages and
holidays, the Union was asking for increases or improvements over
Respondent's prior practices
L C CASSIDY& SON, INC
of setting forth the Union's demands, in apparently final
form, for wage rates, union shop, overtime, and the like,
Blakeley stated that "They would insist on holidays as
set forth in their proposed contract. They would agree
to continue the policies in effect relating to uniforms, sick
pay, and vacations." Respondent also argued, at some point
during the negotiations, that the Union's proposals would
result in the employees receiving rates paid to top journey-
man carpenters, although they had not served the 4-year
apprenticeship, and, in addition, the Union wanted even
more for Respondent's employees than the carpenters were
getting, because they were, as Kistler stated, "asking for
sick pay benefits and holiday benefits, . that the carpenters
do not get. This was pointed out to Mr Blakeley. He
did not deny it."
Although sick pay was mentioned in passing during
succeeding meetings (it was mentioned at the meeting of
December 11, 1968, in connection with a paper drawn
up by Respondent showing payments to employees at certain
times, and again at the meeting of January 15, 1969, when
Smedstad, the Union attorney, said the Union would like
to have fringe benefits such as sick pay and the like,
but the Respondent's insistence upon piece rates undercut
their value), it is clear that no meaningful negotiations
with respect to sick pay occurred at any negotiation meeting
after November 6, 1968.
In addition to the above, both Blakeley and Hammaker
testified that at one meeting (Blakeley indicated it to be
early in the negotiations, while Hammaker placed it after
the strike which ended on February 5, 1969), the Union
demanded 2 holidays (the employee's birthday and the
first day of hunting season) in addition to the 6 in the
Union's original proposal. Both indicated that the Respond-
ent treated the proposal with ridicule and rejected it. Ham-
maker states that "we just took it that that was a refusal
on the two days, and we understood that the others would
remain as they were."5 Blakeley asserts that Respondent
"said they would pay . . . what they had paid before
but they wouldn't pay hunting season and their birthday."
Kistler's testimony does not refer to this testimony of
Blakeley and Hammaker.
To the extent that this testimony, or other testimony
in the record, may seem to indicate that the parties were
negotiating for holidays for the warehouseman specifically
(which had been the only prior practice as to holidays),
rather than for the unit as a whole, or that Respondent
during the negotiations agreed to continue its past practice
in this regard, it is not credited. The record as a whole,
including the events of May 6 and 7, 1969, considered
immediately hereinafter, is convincing that the Union was
seeking holidays for all of the unit employees in its proposed
contract, a substantial new economic benefit, and that
Respondent throughout the negotiations resisted this
demand, which Respondent finally rejected in its last con-
tract proposal made on May 7, 1969.
' Hanmaker also stated that at an earlier meeting, when the Union read
off its holiday proposal, "they said it had been a practice , and it was like no
big thing , they didn't really care about it "
C. The Events of May 6- 7
925
As previously noted, a hearing had been scheduled for
May 7, 1969, upon a complaint issued by the Regional
Director of the Board against the Respondent on charges
filed by the Union During the course of preparation for
this hearing, Kistler was in communication with Hammaker
with respect to the possibility of agreement upon contract
terms At Kistler's request, Hammaker met with some
of the employees in the unit on the evening before the
hearing, May 6, 1969, and discussed terms of agreement
which had been communicated by Kistler. After Hammaker
read "the proposition" to the men, they raised questions
about the absence of provisions for sick pay, holiday pay,
and insurance, to which Hammaker replied that he would
call Kistler As Hammaker testified, after calling Kistler,
"I asked him was all the fringe benefits in there that
he hadn't mentioned when he called, the holiday pay,
the sick pay, and the insurance benefits. And he said
his understanding was that it would all be taken care
of, in the contract." Kistler's testimony is not in conflict
with Hammaker's on this point, though he recalls Hammak-
er being concerned over other matters in addition to those
named by Kistler. Kistler advised that the contract was
being drawn by other counsel for Respondent, that he
would do what he could, and asked that Hammaker exert
his best efforts with the men to get them to accept Respond-
ent's proposal being drafted.
The next morning, prior to the opening of the hearing,
the Union's counsel, Smedstad, met with Respondent's coun-
sel, and was given Respondent's complete contract proposal,
represented as what the Respondent was willing to sign.
This was taken to a lower floor on which Hammaker
and some of the employees were gathered, where Smedstad
appraised them of the contents of the document. According
to Hammaker, the employees raised questions concerning
the lack of reference to sick pay and holidays in the
proposed agreement (Smedstad recalled reference to sick
pay only), to which Smedstad commented that he under-
stood that the Union had not bargained away such benefits,
and, particularly in the absence of a "zipper clause" in
the agreement, Respondent could not lawfully terminate
prior benefits without negotiation with the Union.' The
agreement was thereafter executed by the Union and the
Respondent, apparently without significant change. The
scheduled unfair labor practice hearing was not held, evi-
dently on the basis of the Union's withdrawal of charges
against Respondent.
D. Analysis and Conclusions
From the above findings of fact, it is clear that prior
to the execution of its collective-bargaining agreement with
the Union, the Respondent had a practice and custom
at its Vandalia operation of paying employees employed
more than a year for time lost due to sickness up to
' In art XXI and XXII of the agreement, Respondent specifically agreed
to continue its prior policies with respect to uniforms and insurance, which
were further clarified by letter from the Respondent as requested by the
Union on May 7, 1969, at the time of the execution of the contract
926 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7 days a year, where such absence was attested by a
doctor's certificate, and also paid its warehouseman, but
not the other employees, for certain holidays during the
year. This is not seriously disputed. Nor does it seem
to be disputed that after the execution of the agreement,
Respondent, without notification to or discussion with the
Union, discontinued such benefits. Respondent's actual
refusal to pay these benefits occurred on a number of
occasions after the end of May 1969, and continued to
the time of the hearing.
Respondent contends that this change in practice actually
became effective on May 7, 1969, when the contract was
signed without provision for holidays or sick pay. It is
asserted that the present complaint is therefore barred
under Section 10(b) of the Act, because the charge in
this matter was not filed until November 14, 1969, more
than 6 months after May 7. Respondent further contends
that the Union, in any event, waived any right to object
to Respondent's unilateral action in ceasing to pay for
holidays or for absences due to illness, (1) because the
Union, after seeking to have these matters included in
the contract, executed an agreement without these benefits,
(2) because the Union, assertedly knowing of the changes
and having an opportunity to discuss them with Respondent,
did not do so, and (3) because the Union assertedly, in
granting Respondent the right to "control wages",' also
granted Respondent the right to control sick leave pay
and holiday pay, which Respondent argues are encompassed
within the term "wages."
a The application of Section 10(b) to this proceeding
With respect to the contention that this matter is barred
by Section 10(b) of the Act, it is argued that the Union
and the employees were put on notice as of May 7, 1969,
that Respondent had decided to discontinue sick leave
benefits and holiday pay because these benefits did not
appear in the bargaining agreement. However, the mere
fact that an existing benefit is not mentioned in the bargain-
ing agreement does not invest the employer with the right
to unilaterally alter or discontinue that benefit, Leeds &
Northrup Co. v. N.L.R.B., 391 F.2d 874; General Telephone
Co. of Florida v. N.L.R.B., 337 F.2d 452, nor does it
necessarily constitute clear notice of such intent. Indeed,
the record is barren of evidence as to when Respondent
actually made its decision to withdraw these benefits Plant
Manager Trimbach's comments to Union Representative
Hammaker in June concerning the decision to discontinue
sick leave benefits might indicate that he learned of this
decision only when the issue was raised in late May or
early June. Tnmbach did not testify.
In any event, in the absence of other circumstances
which would make Respondent's course of action plain,
7 Art VI, " Management Rights", sec 3, of the bargaining agreement
provides , in pertinent part, "Employer shall at all times subject to provisions
of this agreement , shall have full control of matters relative to the
management, personnel and the conduct of its business The management
shall control and direct its working forces, the methods of production , wages,
care and use of its machinery and materials , and retain the right to promote
and transfer employees " ( matter emphasized is relied upon by
Respondent in this connection)
the employees and their representative were entitled to
clear notice of Respondent's adverse action before the statute
of limitations would begin to run. See Russell-Newman
Manufacturing Company, Inc., 167 NLRB No. 156. More-
over, notwithstanding any prior intention to discontinue
these benefits in the future, the actual alteration in the
preexisting working conditions occurred when Respondent
refused to pay these benefits in circumstances in which
they had previously been paid. See Swift Service Stores,
et al, 169 NLRB No. 33. It is these refusals, which gave
the first clear notice that Respondent had withdrawn holiday
and sick leave benefits, that the complaint alleges violated
the Act. Since these matters occurred within the 6-month
period prior to the filing of the charge herein they are
clearly not barred by Section 10(b) of the Act.
b. The contention that the Union waived any right to
notification or bargaining about changes in sick leave and
holiday pay policies
It is now well established that an employer is not only
under a duty to bargain exclusively with the chosen repre-
sentative of its employees concerning the terms and condi-
tions of their employment, but is under the correlative
obligation not to unilaterally change established employment
conditions without consultation and bargaining with the
representative of its employees, in the absence of circum-
stances excusing or justifying such unilateral action.
N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736. The Respondent contends,
however, that the Union, by the course of the bargaining,
the terms of the bargaining agreement, and by other conduct,
waived any right to be consulted or to require bargaining
with respect to the withdrawal of sick leave and holiday
benefits previously granted.
It is, indeed, well settled that, in appropriate situations,
a union may waive the right to be consulted in the case
of employer unilateral action concerning a bargainable sub-
ject. However, such waiver, in derogation of rights granted
by the statute, will not be lightly implied, but must be
clear and unmistakable. N.L.R.B. v. Perkins Machine Co.,
326 F.2d 488; The Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
325 F 2d 746. In fact, it has been held that an employer
violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act if it takes unilateral
action or refuses to bargain on a term or condition of
employment, "unless it can be said from an evaluation
of the prior negotiations that the matter was `fully discussed'
or `consciously explored' and that the Union `consciously
yielded' or clearly and unmistakably waived its interest
in the matter." See Proctor Manufacturing Corporation,
131 NLRB 1166; C & C Plywood Corporation, 148 NLRB
414. See also, Peterson v. S. S. Wahcondah, 331 F.2d
44, at 48, defining waiver of statutory rights as "the inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right with both the knowl-
edge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it."
Respondent contends that "[h]oliday pay and sick pay
were thoroughly discussed and consciously explored between
" In this connection, Respondent cites, inter alia, Intermountain
Equipment Co, v N L R B, 239 F 2d 480, and N L R B v Nash-Finch
Co.211F2d622
L. C. CASSIDY & SON, INC
[the] negotiators" in their attempt to arrive at a "complete
contract" and a "total wage package" (Brief p 6), from
which Respondent argues, in effect, that an agreement
of the parties leaving these matters to Respondent's unilater-
al discretion should be inferred from the silence of the
contract on these issues. Indeed, Respondent seems to argue
that in such circumstances, as a matter of law, "[t]he
exploration of a subject and a union's insistence that it
be put into a written contract precludes the union from
any right to bargain on that subject during the term of
the agreement." (Brief p. 6)e The issue, however, is clearly
one of fact, to be determined in each case upon the whole
record. As the Court stated, in Leeds & Northrup Co.
v. N.L.R.B., supra, at 878, "the parties may implicitly
agree that a particular subject shall be left to the unilateral
decision of the employer. Whether such an implied agree-
ment existed is a factual question." See also Henry I.
Siegel Co., Inc., 147 NLRB 594, 595, fn. 2, where the
Board referred to "The Timken Roller Bearing Company
v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746 (C.A. 6), and N.L.R.B. v. Perkins
Machine Company, 326 F.2d 488 (C A 1) which hold
that an employer's obligation to bargain on a matter arising
from a union's statutory right is not extinguished by the
fact that the parties have considered in their negotiations,
and have thereafter omitted, a provision with respect thereto
in their written contract," and continued, stating that "A
relinquishment of a statutory right . . . must be in clear
and unmistakable language, and silence in the bargaining
agreement does not amount to such relinquishment."
Respondent's action in respect to each of the two benefits
will be considered separately, since on the basis of the
entire record, I find a rather significant distinction between
the course of bargaining with respect to the issue of sick
leave and that involving holidays Though the evidence
is meager, the record is nevertheless clear that the parties
never reached a real confrontation with respect to the
issue of sick pay. On the one or two occasions when
the Union during the formal negotiations brought up the
subject, it never sought more than the continuation of
the status quo in respect to sick pay, and the record
as a whole is convincing that Respondent during the negotia-
tions evidenced no resistance to this request.'
On the other hand, it is equally clear throughout the
negotiations that the Union was actively seeking holiday
benefits as a substantial new and increased economic benefit
for all unit employees. There is not credible evidence that
Respondent ever indicated acquiescence in the Union's holi-
day demands in whole or in part during the bargaining
negotiations. The tenor of the record as a whole indicates
that Respondent resisted such demands.
In the state of this record, it is clear to me that when
the Union signed the collective-bargaining agreement, which
s Respondent's acquiescence in this request of the Union at the October 4
meeting was never disavowed Though Kistler states that he thereafter on one
occasion argued that the Union was asking for benefits (including sick pay)
that it did not have in other contracts, this argument in the course of
bargaining hardly rises to the point of rejection Significantly, when Kistler
was advised by Hammaker on May 6, 1969, that the employees desired
continuation of the sick leave policy, Kistler made no claim that this had
been rejected in the bargaining negotiations, nor did he indicate any intention
to alter the existing practice
927
made no provision for holidays for the employees, it made
a conscious concession on that point. Whether or not
the Union was conscious that the warehouseman was already
receiving holiday pay, they must be held to know that
he was part of the unit , and therefore their conscious
relinquishment of holiday benefits for the unit, as a part
of the bargain made, necessarily applies to the warehouse-
man.
The same cannot be said with respect to the sick pay
issue. The Respondent never, so far as this record shows,
indicated during the bargaining a desire to take any benefits
away from the employees." Indeed, in the matter of sick
pay the Respondent evidenced acquiescence in the Union's
request that it be continued. Respondent's failure to include
the sick pay benefit in its final bargaining proposal, in
the circumstances of this case, is perfectly consistent with
a desire on its part to retain the freedom to reconsider
this practice during the term of the agreement rather than
be bound to continue it unchanged for the duration of
the contract. On the record in this case, it cannot be
said that this issue was fully and consciously explored
during the negotiations to the point that the Union by
executing the agreement proffered by Respondent clearly,
unmistakably, and consciously yielded to Respondent the
right to unilaterally alter the existing sick pay policy ii
Respondent further asserts that the Union relinquished
its right to bargain over the discontinuance of sick pay
because it assented to Respondent's contract proposal with
respect to management's rights, including the right to "con-
trol wages," on the basis that sick pay is part of "wages,"
or the "wage package." However, it is far from clear
what Respondent intended to include in the term "wages"
in its contract proposal, and less clear what was meant
by the right to "control wages." It is difficult to conceive
that the Union, by acceding to Respondent's proposal,
thereby meant to permit unilateral alteration of wages or
other conditions. Since Respondent drew the document,
it was incumbent upon it to make clear what was intended.
In the absence of any explanation, it is found that this
language does not clearly and unmistakably evidence the
Union's conscious intent to relinquish to Respondent the
right to unilaterally alter wages or other benefits.t2 Cf.
Weltromc Company v. N L R B , 419 F.2d 1120 (C.A 6)
As the Board and the Courts repeatedly have had occasion
to note, the vice in such unilateral action with _ respect to a bar-
gainable matter, or' other attempts to deal with' employees
directly about their working conditions in derogation of
° it is noted that in those instances in which the Union had originally
sought increases in existing benefits (as to insurance and uniforms), the
Respondent, in an apparent effort to encourage acceptance, provided in the
agreement that they would continue their past practices for the term of the
agreement
'i It is noted that Respondent's refusal to pay sick pay after the execution
of the agreement generated sufficient concern among the employees that
employee Snapp questioned Trimbach and Davis, Respondent's local
supervisors, about this, and caused Shop Steward Taylor to complain to
Hammaker, who also spoke to Trimbach about this, indicating that
Respondent's action was not what had been expected
11 Respondent apparently so understood, for in one instance since the
execution of the agreement in which Respondent desired to alter wages to
cover a situation not specifically covered in the agreement, it gave the Union
notice and an opportunity to bargain thereon
928 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the employees' bargaining representative, is that it obstructs
the policies of the Act favoring collective bargaining,
N.L.R.B. v. Katz, supra; J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321
U.S. 332; Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B.,
321 U.S. 678, and has "as a normal and foreseeable conse-
quence" the "impairment of the Union's prestige," see
Insulating Fabricators, Inc., 144 NLRB 1325, 1332, and
tends to "undermine the authority of the certified bargaining
representative." See Armstrong Cork Co. v. N.L.R.B., 211
F.2d 843, 847. For these reasons, an employer may normally
satisfy its obligation to deal with the employees' representa-
tive about changes in working conditions, rather than direct-
ly with the employees, only by notifying the representative
before making the change and giving a reasonable opportuni-
ty to bargain about the proposed change. As the Court
stated in Armstrong Cork Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra at 847,
"Good faith compliance with Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act presupposes that an employer will not alter existing
`conditions of employment' without first consulting the
exclusive bargaining representative selected by his employ-
ees, and giving it an opportunity to negotiate on any pro-
posed changes."
Though Respondent contends that the Union was given
ample notice and opportunity to negotiate with respect
to Respondent's discontinuance of sick pay benefits, and
that the Union took no action thereon, the record compels
a different conclusion. It is clear that when the Union
first learned that Respondent was refusing to pay sick
pay in accordance with its past policies, the Union was
presented with an already executed decision, a fait accompli,
put into effect and made plain first to the employees.
It is also evident that when this was brought to Hammaker's
attention by the shop steward, he took prompt action
by going to Plant Manager Trimbach about this. Tnmbach's
reply on the subject was not such as to encourage further
discussion on the subject. Nor did Respondent offer or
afford the Union a reasonable opportunity to discuss
Respondent's unilateral action with those members of man-
agement who were responsible for the decision, which patent-
ly did not include Trimbach."
On the basis of the matters discussed above, and the
record as a whole, it is found that Respondent, by unilateral-
ly discontinuing its previous practice and refusing to pay
sick pay to its employees after May 14, 1969, violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act Inasmuch as it would
not affect the remedy herein, it is considered unnecessary
to consider whether the Respondent also violated Section
8(a)(3) by such conduct, and it will be recommended that
this allegation of the complaint be dismissed It will also
be recommended that the allegations of the complaint that
Respondent violated the Act by discontinuing and refusing
to pay holiday pay to its warehouseman be dismissed
" The precedents cited in Respondent's brief (Tucker Steel Corp , 134
NLRB 323, Lakeland Steel Co, 130 NLRB 1365, Floyd R Richard Son,
Inc. 109 NLRB 136, Frohman Mfg Co, 107 NLRB 1308), as well as the
Board's most recent decision (Holiday Inn Central, 181 NLRB No 160)
dealing with circumstances in which it has been held that reasonable
opportunity for bargaining was afforded, have been carefully considered
These cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant matter
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act, which, at all times material,
has been and continues to be the exclusive representative
of Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit set forth
in footnote 1, hereinabove, for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) and (b)
of the Act.
3. By discontinuing its prior practice of paying its employ-
ees in the appropriate unit sick pay and by refusing to
pay such employees sick pay after May 14, 1969, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
4. Respondent did not engage in conduct violative of
the Act by discontinuing and refusing to pay holiday pay
to its warehouseman after May 14, 1969
THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies.
In order that the employees may be restored as nearly
as possible to the rights which they would have enjoyed
absent Respondent's actions in violation of the Act, it
is appropriate that Respondent be ordered to reimburse
the employees for sick pay which they would have received
except for Respondent's unilateral action in discontinuing
and refusing to pay such benefits after May 14, 1969.
See Leeds & Northrup Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra. Though
some eligible employees continued to submit doctor's certifi-
cates required for the payment of sick pay, the record
indicates that other employees did not do so because they
reasonably concluded from Respondent's conduct that fur-
ther attempts to secure sick pay would be futile. These
employees should not be disqualified because of Respond-
ent's conduct. It will therefore be recommended that
Respondent reimburse each of its employees in the
appropriate unit set forth hereinabove who has submitted
or hereafter submits a doctor's certificate, or other credible
proof of illness, and who is otherwise qualified under
Respondent's prior practice, for sick pay for absence due
to illness since May 14, 1969, until the occurrence of
one of the following: (1) the parties have come to an
agreement on the subject, or (2) the parties have reached
an impasse on th subject after good-faith collective bargain-
ing, or (3) the Union has failed or refused to bargain
on the subject after being afforded a reasonable opportunity
to bargain thereon. Interest on such sick pay withheld
shall be computed at the rate of six percent per annum.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and upon the entire record in this matter, its
recommended that Respondent L C Cassidy & Son. Inc ,
L. C. CASSIDY & SON, INC
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1 Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union with
respect to sick pay or any other term or condition of
employment by unilaterally effectuating changes in, or
eliminating, such conditions of employment of its
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit found herein
in derogation of the rights of the labor organization selected
by the employees as their exclusive bargaining
representative.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with the
rights of employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Pay to its employees in the appropriate unit sick pay
for absence due to illness in the manner set forth above in
the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
recotds necessary to analyze and compute the amounts due
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(c) Post in conspicuous places at its operation located at
Vandalia, Ohio, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted, copies of the notice
attached hereto and marked "Appendix."14 Copies of said
notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region
9, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent, be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days
thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision what steps it
has taken to comply herewith 15
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed as to any alleged violations of the Act not found
herein.
14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes in the event that the Board's
Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the
words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor
Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
929
15 If these Recommendations are adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Miami Valley Carpenters District Council, The
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, AFL-CIO, by unilaterally refusing to pay
sick pay to qualified employees, or making any other
changes in working conditions in derogation of the
rights of the Union or our employees under the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT engage in any like or related conduct
which interferes with, restrains , or coerces you in the
exercise of rights guaranteed you in Section 7 of the
National Labor Relation Act.
WE WILL pay sick pay to qualified employees in
the appropriate unit absent from work because of illness
since May 14, 1969, until such time as an agreement
is reached with the Union, or we may otherwise lawfully
change this practice. The appropriate unit is:
All employees classified as warehousemen,
probationary trainee , helper, senior hoseman,
junior hoseman , senior blanket istaller , and junior
blanket installer at the Comapny's Vandalia,
Ohio, operation, excluding all office clerical
employees, professional employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
L. C CASSIDY & SONS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative)
(Title)
This is an offical notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room
2407 Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati,
Ohio 45202 Telephone 513-684-3686.