KONO-TV-Mission Telecasting Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 12, 1967

163 N.L.R.B. 1005 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

KONO-TV-MISSION TELECASTING CORP. 1005
facts are "relatively simple and for the most part not
in dispute," and incorporates the statement of facts
in the request for review insofar as that statement is
consistent with the Regional Director's findings.
For purposes of our Decision herein, we find it
unnecessary to resolve the factual conflict as to
whether the two employees could have interrupted
their work to cast their ballots. In the special
circumstances of this case, bearing in mind
particularly: (a) the brief duration of the voting
period; (b) the fact that the Board agent was aware
that Carrell and Gonsalves had earlier presented
themselves to vote; (c) the fact that they again
sought to vote only minutes after the polls were
declared closed, and that the ballot box had not been
opened nor the tally of ballots started at that time,
we are of the opinion that the Board agent, in the
proper exercise of his discretion, should have
permitted Carrell and Gonsalves to cast ballots.
Therefore, and as the addition of two valid ballots of
the employees in question may have affected the
results of the election, we conclude that it would
best effectuate the policies of the Act to hold a new
election. Accordingly, we hereby sustain the
objection, and we shall set aside the election and
direct that a new one be conducted.
ORDER
dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General
Counsel and Charging Party filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision with supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions' and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board orders that the complaint herein be,
and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
' The Charging Party incorporated in its exceptions a motion to
amend the complaint and a motion to remand and reopen the
record to take evidence thereon. As the motions to amend and
reopen are lacking in merit, they are hereby denied.
It is hereby ordered that the election conducted
herein on July 15, 1966, be, and it hereby is, set
aside.
[Text of Direction of Second Election' omitted
from publication.]
' An election eligibility list, containing the names and
addresses of all the eligible voters, must be filed by the Employer
with the Regional Director for Region 20 within 7 days after the
date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the Regional
Director. The Regional Director shall make the list available to all
parties to the election. No extension of time to file this list shall be
granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary
circumstances. Failure to comply with this requirement shall he
grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper objections
are filed. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 NLRB 1236.
KONO-TV-Mission Telecasting Corporation
and International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, Local 2206, AFL-CIO/
CLC. Case 23-CA-2395.
April 12,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND BROWN
On December 1, 1966, Trial Examiner Sydney S.
Asher, Jr., issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the, Respondent had not
engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommending that the complaint be
163 NLRB No. 137
- TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
SYDNEY S. ASHER, JR., Trial Examiner: On May 20,
1966, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 2206, AFL-CIO/CLC, herein called the Union, filed
charges against KONO-TV-Mission Telecasting
Corporation, San Antonio, Texas, herein called the
Respondent. On June 29, 1966, the General Counsel
issued a complaint alleging that since on or about May 16,
1966, the Respondent, by certain specified conduct, has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees;
and that at all times since June 29, 1965, the Respondent
has failed and refused to bargain collectively with the
Union as the bargaining representative of its employees in
an appropriate unit, although a majority of the employees
of the Respondent in the unit had, prior thereto, selected
the Union as their bargaining representative. It is alleged
that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec.
151, et seq.), herein called the Act. Thereafter the
Respondent filed an answer admitting that the unit set
forth in the complaint was appropriate and that the Union
is, and at all material times has been, the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in that unit, but
denying that it had committed any unfair labor practices.
Upon due notice, a hearing was held before Trial
Examiner Syndey S. Asher, Jr., on October 4, 1966, at San
Antonio, Texas. All parties were represented and
participated fully in the hearing. At the close of the
hearing the Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint in
its entirety, for lack of proof. Ruling on this motion was
reserved. For reasons appearing below, this motion is now
granted. After the close of the hearing, the General
Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs. These have be en
duly considered.
1006 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The complaint alleges, the answer admits , and it is
found that the Respondent is, and at all material times has
been, an employer engaged in commerce as defined in the
Act, and its operations meet the Board's jurisdictional
standards ;' and that the Union is, and at all material times
has been , a labor organization within the meaning of the
Act.
A. Introduction
On July 20, 1965, the Union was certified by the Board
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for
the Respondent's employees in the unit described
hereafter. (Case 23-RC-2425.) The first negotiating
session between the Union and the Respondent took place
on September 10, 1965. There have been more than 20
such sessions since then. As of the time of the hearing
herein, the parties were still engaged in collective
bargaining, but had not, as yet, reached agreement on all
issues.
B. Alleged Interference, Restraint , and Coercion
1. The decertification petition
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on or
about May 18,2 the Respondent "prepared and caused to
be circulated among Respondent's employees a
decertification petition in order to induce employees" to
abandon their union affiliation. The only evidence offered
by the General Counsel on this allegation was as follows:
In early April Tom C. Doss, a rank-and-file employee of
the Respondent in the unit described below, went to see
Bob A. Roth, president of the Respondent. Doss stated
that he, and the other employees in the unit so far as he
could tell, had decided that they did not want to be
represented by a union. He asked Roth: "Is there anything
we can do ... to have the Union out of the picture?" Roth
replied: "I don't know," but added that he could find out.
Doss requested Roth "as soon as you find out ... let us
know." Roth remarked that probably the person to contact
would be Clifford Potter, the Board's Regional Director.
After Doss left, Roth telephoned the Respondent's
attorney, then telephoned Doss, probably the same day.
About this telephone conversation, Roth testified:
Q. What did you tell Mr. Doss, if anything?
A. I told him that he was to write Mr. Clifford W.
' The Respondent is, and at all material times has been, a
Texas corporation with its principal office in San Antonio, Texas,
where it operates television studios and transmission facilities It
is a member of the Associated Press wire services and is the
originating station for three major broadcasting networks, for
presidential conferences and other telecasts that are released
from the LBJ Ranch During the 12 months prior to June 29, 1966,
the Respondent 's gross income exceeded $ 100,000 , of which more
than $50,000 was derived from the sale of network time for
commercial advertising of national brand products
2 All dates hereafter refer to the year 1966, unless otherwise
noted
3 Compare Martin Theatres of Georgia, Inc, d/b/a WTVC, 126
NLRB 1054, 1057-58, Atlas Storage Division, P & V Atlas
Industrial Center, Inc , 112 NLRB 1175, 1178, and Alice B Hazen,
C P Jaeger, et at , Co-Partners, doing business as Hazen & Jaeger
Funeral Home, 95 NLRB 1034, 1036
Potter ... at the N.L.R.B. office in Houston, and let
him know what he wanted to do.
Q. Did you tell him what to say in any way?
A. Tom asked me to give him an example of what
would be apprapo [sic] to say, and I gave him my idea
of what I would say if I were writing that type of letter.
Q. Did you use the word decertification by any
chance?
A. I probably did because I probably learned about
that word when I called Mr. Duke [The Respondent's
attorney] .
The Board's records, of which I take official notice at
the General Counsel's request, show that a petition was
filed with the Board on June 6 seeking to decertify the
Union as collective- bargaining representative of the
Respondent's employees in the unit described below, that
this petition was dismissed on June 21 because it had been
filed within a year of the certification, and that the
dismissal was not appealed. (Case 23-RD-149.)
The General Counsel, in his brief, contends that in the
two above-described conversations with Doss, "Roth went
far beyond the grounds of permissive conduct and it
certainly must have appeared to the other employees that
the decertification petition had Roth's stamp of approval,
if, in fact, they did not regard it as being his." On the other
hand, the Respondent in its brief argues that "the only
information given to Doss by Roth was in direct response
to questions asked by Doss and . . the Respondent did not
in any manner solicit Doss or any other employee to
renounce support of the Union."
I find merit in the Respondent's defense. The
Respondent neither initiated nor participated in either the
preparation or circulation of the petition It did not solicit
any employees to sign. It did not assist in forwarding the
completed petition to the Board. Indeed, the record does
not even show that the Respondent knew of the petition's
existence prior to the time it was filed with the Board. So
far as the record demonstrates, the preparation,
circulation, and signing of the petition constituted the free
and uncoerced act of the employees concerned. I conclude
that the proof falls short of the types of employer conduct
which the Board has held to be proscribed and is
insufficient to support this allegation of the complaint.-"
2. The alleged promises of promotions and wage increases
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on or
about May 16 and again on or about May 18 Roth
"promised employees promotions and wage increases if
they refrain" from adhering to the Union "or in order to
induce then to do so." The General Counsel introduced no
evidence in support of this allegation.' However, on cross.
In his brief the General Counsel cites Cumberland Shoe
Company, 160 NLRB 1256, River Togs, Inc , 160 NLRB 58, W B
Johnston Grain Company, et al , 154 NLRB 1115, enfd 365 F 2d
528 (C A 10), Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation, 151 NLRB
1503, 1507-08, 1510, and Continental Desk Company, 104 NLRB
912 I have examined these cases and, in my opinion, each is
distinguishable on its facts from the instant case
" After the close of the General Counsel's case, the following
colloquy took place
TRIAL EXAMINER Where is the evidence of the promise in
the record 9
MR LEVY There is no evidence of promise in the record
TRIAL EXAMINER All right So you admit there is no
evidence to support [the paragraph of the complaint quoted
above]then9
MR LEVY That is the promise, yes, sir
KONO-TV-MISSION TELECASTING CORP. 1007
examination by the Respondent's attorney of A. R. Burton,
an agent of the Union, the following was developed: On the
morning of May 19 Burton had a conversation with
Raymond Bean, then a rank-and-file employee within the
unit and a member of the Union's bargaining committee.
In this conversation Bean stated that on the previous day,
May 18, he had been contacted by Kuleza, the
Respondent's chief engineer, who "indicated that if he
[Bean] were to visit Mr. Roth, there was considerable
likelihood that he would end up with a wage increase."
Burton told Bean: "Hell, yes, get it. If it is there for you,
take it." He asked Bean to call him after Bean visited
Roth. Accordingly, later that day Bean telephoned Burton.
With regard to this call, Burton testified:
Q. He told me that he had visited with Mr.
Roth.... They talked about an hour and a half.
Q. Did at that time Mr. Bean tell you that he was
being promoted or had been offered a job of a
supervisor?
A. Sometime-I guess that was it. It is not
completely clear, but I was wondering about him
being a supervisor with no one to supervise inasmuch
as he worked alone at the transmitter.
It will be assumed, without deciding, that this hearsay
evidence is sufficient to support a finding that on or about
May 18 Kuleza indicated to Bean that if Bean were to visit
Roth there was considerable likelihood that he would end
up with a wage increase, that Bean accordingly conferred
with Roth the next day, and was then offered a supervisory
job.5 I perceive nothing in such testimony suggesting that
either Kuleza or Roth promised Bean any economic
benefits in order to undermine his allegiance to the Union.
3. The promotions and wage increases
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on or
about May 16, and again on or about May 18, Roth
promoted and granted wage increases to employees "in
order to induce them to refrain from" supporting the
Union.
The parties stipulated that on May 16 Clifford Kret was
given the position of a supervisor, and that on May 23
(after the filing of the charges herein), Raymond Bean was
promoted to transmitter supervisor. The record is clear
that both had been rank-and-file employees on hourly pay
before their status was changed, that each thereafter was
placed on a weekly salary which resulted in a pay increase,
and that prior to May 23 Bean had been a member of the
Union's bargaining committee.
In support of his contention that these promotions
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the General Counsel
states in his brief: "the record is void as to why Roth
picked May 1966, as the time to increase the `supervisory'
staff...." Pointing out that Roth testified "that in 1964 a
demand for increased supervisory personnel arose "'6 the
General Counsel asks: "Why did Roth wait until May
1966, if not to dissipate the Union?" The General Counsel
thereby seeks to place the burden of explanation on the
Respondent. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has said:
Rotation in personnel is a common thing. The
employer does not enter the fray with the burden of
explanation. With discharge of employees a normal,
lawful legitimate exercise of the prerogative of free
management in a free society, the fact of discharge
creates no presumption, nor does it furnish the
inference that an illegal-not a proper-motive was
its cause. An unlawful purpose is not lightly to be
inferred. In the choice between lawful and unlawful
motives, the record taken as a whole must present a
substantial basis of believable evidence pointing
toward the unlawful one.7
What was there said about discharges, of course, applies
equally to promotions and wage increases. Examining the
facts here, I can find nothing suspicious about the timing
of the promotions approximately 10 months after the
Union's certification. It was not, under the Board's
"certification year" policy, an appropriate time for the
Union's representative status to be challenged.' And the
record does not show by any convincing or probative
evidence that the decertification petition was then being
circulated, this petition not having been filed until June 6.0
The General Counsel also attacks the choice of
individuals, saying in his brief "the record is void as to ...
why either Kret or Bean were any more qualified as
supervisors than any other of Respondent's employees."10
He does not, however, suggest that other, better qualified,
employees were passed over. On this subject, we turn
again to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit:
But as we have so often said: management is for
management. Neither Board nor Court can second-
guess it or give it gentle guidance by over-the-
shoulder supervision."
Moreover, there is no indication that union sympathies
were involved at least so far as Kret was concerned, for the
record fails to reveal whether he was an adherent of the
Union. In addition, although the General Counsel in his
brief intimates that the promotions were merely "a guise
so as to dissipate the Union," this is not supported by the
record. Indeed, both men underwent a substantial change
of duties, and have continued to act in their new capacities
ever since the promotions. Finally, the General Counsel
argues that "unlawful motivation in unilaterally promoting
and granting wage increases to Bean and Kret in order to
dissipate the Union [is] further evidenced by its unlawful
assistance to employee Doss in the decertification
5 The hearsay evidence regarding the Bean-Kuleza and Bean-
Roth discussions was elicited from General Counsel's witness on
cross-examination without objection by the General Counsel As
the General Counsel points out in his brief, hearsay evidence not
objected to "is to be considered and given its natural probative
effect as if it were in law admissable " Diaz v United States, 223
U S 442,450
Roth testified that he told Bean of his promotion, but that this
took place on the day the promotion took effect.
I It will be assumed, without deciding, that this accurately
summarizes Roth's testimony on this subject
N L R B v T A McGahey, et al , d/b/a Columbus Marble
Works, 233 F 2d 406, 413
" See Ray Brooks v N.L.R.B , 348 U S 96
0 The General Counsel's brief, in fn 11, mentions a letter by
Doss to the Board, bearing date of May 18, which accompanied
the decertification petition But the date on the letter is not
necessarily conclusive, as it apparently did not reach the Board
until June 6
10 This overlooks the undemed testimony of Roth that both Kret
and Bean were recommended for promotion by supervisors
Furthermore, the record shows that Kret was, in Roth's words "a
very long time employee, and the best projectionist that we had,
the one with the most knowledge of this equipment "
I N L.R B v McGahey, supra
1008 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
petition." The short answer is, of course, that no such
"unlawful assistance" has been proved.
The Board has stated:
It is well settled that the test of interference, restraint,
and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not
turn on the employer's motive or on whether the
coercion succeeded or failed. The test is whether the
employer engaged in conduct which, it may
reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free
exercise of employee rights under the Act.'2
Applying this test, I conclude that the General Counsel
has failed to prove that the promotion of either Kret or
Bean, or the accompanying wage increases, reasonably
tended "to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights under the Act "
C. Alleged Refusal to Bargain
1. The appropriate unit and the Union's majority status
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is
found, that all employees employed by the Respondent in
its engineering department, including transmitter
operators, control operation technicians, projectionists,
audio operators, video switchers, and camera control
operators, employed by the Respondent at its studio at San
Antonio, Texas, and also including the employees at
Respondent's transmitter site in the San Antonio vicinity,
excluding all employees employed in Respondent's
production department, its general office staff,
announcers, office clerical employees, watchmen, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
As noted above, on July 20 the Union was certified by
the Board as the representative of the employees in this
unit. It is accordingly found that the Union is, and at all
times since July 20, 1965, has been, the exclusive
representative of all employees in the above-described
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
2. The alleged refusal to bargain
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that at all
times since June 29, 1965, although the Union requested
the Respondent to bargain collectively with it as the
exclusive representative of these employees regarding
wages, hours, and other working conditions, the
Respondent refused to do so by "unilaterally and without
bargaining with, or notification to, the Union [making]
changes affecting the wages and working conditions of
employees in said unit."" The General Counsel pins his
ii American Freightways Co, Inc, 124 NLRB 146, 147,
followed in Exchange Parts Company, 131 NLRB 806, 812, affd
375US 405
"Specifically that on May 16, and again on May 18, the
Respondent "granted wage increases " and "changed the job
classifications of several of its employees in said bargaining unit
14 These findings are based on Roth's undenied testimony
15 The General Counsel, in his brief, cites N L R.B v United
Dairies, Inc , 337 F 2d 283 (C A 10), for the proposition that the
Board "will pierce the veil of 'paper supervisors "' Suffice it to
say that, in my opinion , Kret and Bean became actual, not
"paper," supervisors
ie On this subject Brewton testified
Q (By Mr Duke ) is it your experience , Mr Brewton,
that as negotiable item that the company bargain with the
union for promotions out of the bargaining unit9
allegation to the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., d/b/a Williamsburg
Steel Products Co., 369 U.S. 736, that unilateral action by
an employer, bypassing the employees' statutory
bargaining representative, amounts to a refusal to bargain
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The record
demonstrates without question that Kret and Bean were,
at the times of their respective promotions, within the
appropriate unit, and that the Union was not notified in
advance of either promotion, nor offered an opportunity to
bargain about them. There remain two questions: (1) did
Kret and Bean become supervisors as the result of their
promotions? and (2) if so, were their promotions a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining?
It is undisputed that, before the promotions, neither
Kret nor Bean possessed authority to hire or fire, or any
other indicia of supervisory status. After his promotion,
Kret was placed in charge of the projection maintenance
work, and supervised three and sometimes four
projectionists. He was expressly given authority to hire
and discharge the employees under him. Bean was given
the title of transmitter supervisor, with three employees
under his supervision. He assumed complete
responsibility for the "entire plant and physical facilities"
at the transmitter site, 17 miles from the Respondent's
downtown studio and offices. It is undenied that he was
endowed with authority to hire and discharge the
employees under him, that he "has actually been involved
in the dismissal of one man" and that he personally has
interviewed and hired two new engineers.14 I conclude
that Kret became on May 16, 1966, and Bean became on
May 23, 1966, and both have since continued to be,
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act "
The only remaining issue is whether there is a statutory
obligation on an employer to bargain with the union
certified as the bargaining agent of his employees
regarding his nondiscriminatory choice of supervisory
personnel. Neither the General Counsel nor the Union
seems to press this matter vigorously.ie In any event, the
size and composition of an employer's supervisory staff, in
my opinion, must be regarded as falling within the area of
management prerogative." It is accordingly concluded
that the promotions of Kret and Bean to supervisory
positions, and the pay increases which formed an integral
and necessary concomitant thereof, were not mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining. Therefore the General
Counsel has failed to demonstrate that the Respondent's
refusal to bargain with regard thereto constituted a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and on the
entire record in this case, I make the following:
A It's not my position that this is necessary
"In Fetzer Television, Inc , 131 NLRB 821, enfd 299172d845
(C A 6), the employer failed to bargain about the promotion of two
individuals The Board rejected the employer's argument that the
individuals in question had been made supervisors , and found an
illegal refusal to bargain The implication is, of course, that had
the employer proved that these individuals in fact became
genuine supervisors, this would have been a complete defense
Nor does anything said in Katz require a different holding What
the Supreme Court said there must be read in the light of the facts
of that case, and cannot properly be related to a situation, such as
we have here, where promotions to supervisory positions
occurred, and therefore different considerations apply
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
BI-LO. INC. 1009
1. KONO-TV-Mission Telecasting Corporation is, and
at all material times has been, an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act
2. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 2206, AFL-CIO/CLC, is, and at all material times
has been, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All employees employed by the Respondent in its
engineering department, including transmitter operators,
control operation technicians, projectionists, audio
operators, video switchers, and camera control operators,
employed by the Respondent at its studio at San Antonio,
Texas, and also including the employees at Respondent's
transmitter site in the San Antonio vicinity, excluding all
employees employed in Respondent's production
department, its general office staff, announcers, office
clerical employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. The Union is, and at all times since July. 20, 1965, has
been, the exclusive representative of all employees in the
above-described unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of
employment, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent is
engaging in or has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) or (5) of the Act
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and on the entire record in this-ease,
the Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint in its
entirety is granted.
Bi-Lo , Inc., and Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen of North America,
Local 442, AFL-CIO. Case 11-CA-3007.
April 12, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND ZAGORIA
On December 22, 1966, Trial Examiner John H.
Eadie issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
163 NLRB No. 138
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the Respondent's exceptions
and brief, and the entire record in this case, and
hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Bi-Lo, Inc., Green-
ville, South Carolina, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.2
i The Respondent 's exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision are in large part directed to his credibility resolutions
We will not overrule a Trial Examiner 's credibility resolutions
unless a clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence
convinces us that they are incorrect Such a conclusion is not
warranted here Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc , 91 NLRB 544,
enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3). We also find no merit in the
Respondent's charge of bias and prejudice on the part of the Trial
Examiner
2 Add the following immediately below the signature line at the
bottom of the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision-
Note We will notify John C George and Charles E Hilton if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of
their right to full reinstatement , upon application, in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed
Forces
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN H. EADIE, Trial Examiner: This proceeding was
held before me in Greenville, South Carolina, on August 2
through 4, 1966, on the complaint of the General Counsel
and the answer of Bi-Lo, Inc., herein called the
Respondent.' The complaint alleges violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations act, as
amended. The Respondent's answer admits the
jurisdictional allegation of the complaint, but denies the
commission of any unfair labor practices. After the
hearing the General Counsel and the Respondent filed
briefs with me.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a corporation with offices at
' The charge was filed on April 8, 1966 An amended charge
and a second amended charge were filed on April 18 and 29, 1966,
respectively The complaint issued on May 19, 1966