Kellwood Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 29, 1967

166 N.L.R.B. 251 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

HAWTHORN COMPANY 251
Hawthorn Company, A Division of Kellwood Com-
pany and Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO
New Haven Manufacturing Company and Textile
Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO. Cases
14-CA-3876 and 14-CA-3906
June 29, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On August 9, 1966, Trial Examiner Thomas A.
Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondents had en-
gaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that they cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. The Trial Examiner further found that the
Respondents had not engaged in certain other un-
fair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and
recommended that those allegations be dismissed.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and Respondent
Hawthorn filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and briefs in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with these cases to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in these cases. and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the follow-
ing additions, modifications, and exceptions.
A. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
Respondent Hawthorn violated Section 8(a)(1) by
engaging in surveillance of its employees' union ac-
tivities and by its showing of the film "And Women
Must Weep," and violated Section 8(a)(3) by
discharging John Oliver and suspending William
Cooke from work. We find merit, however, in the
General Counsel's exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's findings that the following conduct did not
constitute further violations of the Act by Respond-
ent Hawthorn.
1. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent
Hawthorn did not engage in further unlawful sur-
veillance when, during the period of union organiza-
tion, Foreman Hagedorn adopted the practice of
sitting at employee tables in the cafeteria, instead of
the foremen's table, during the coffee breaks.
Hagedorn testified that he did so in order to hold
the men to their 10-minute limit for coffee breaks,
and the Trial Examiner noted that "on other occa-
sions foremen had intensified their immediate su-
pervision for one reason or another." It is not
shown, however, that it was necessary in this in-
stance to do so by moving over to the employees'
tables, particularly as the foremen's table afforded
a clear view of the men during their coffee breaks.
We conclude, upon the entire record, and particu-
larly the timing of the adoption of this practice, that
Hagedorn's conduct was motivated by a desire to
inhibit the employees from using their coffee breaks
for purposes of self-organization, and that Re-
spondent Hawthorn thereby engaged in further
unlawful surveillance in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The Trial Examiner found that the record
does not support the allegation that a statement
read by Respondent Hawthorn's supervisors to
small groups of employees was violative of the Act.
The statement opens with the assertion that "We do
not want the union in our plant. This is the official
position of your company." It then warns of
trickery by union agents, the danger of deceptive
entrapment into obligations to pay fines and assess-
ments, and the intent of the Union to "call a strike
to try to force their demands on the company and in
the process they can cause our employees to lose
their jobs." The statement further warns the em-
ployees that "this union can very well destroy the
jobs of our employees and inflict suffering upon
them and their families." The record also shows
that, during the reading of this statement by one of
the supervisors, in response to a question by one of
the employees as to whether they would lose their
jobs if they signed union cards, the supervisor
replied that "if the union got in there and the com-
pany could not comply with their demands, it is a
possibility that the plant would shut down and
everybody would lose their jobs."
In our opinion, the statement read by the super-
visors to the employees, considered in the context
of the conduct hereinbefore found unlawful, clearly
conveyed to the employees the threat that selection
of the Union would endanger their jobs. Under all
the circumstances of this case, this statement con-
stituted interference with, and restraint and coer-
cion of, employees, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.I
B. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
Respondent New Haven violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by threatening and interrogating employees
concerning their union activities. We find merit,
however, in the General Counsel's exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's findings that the following
conduct did not constitute further violations of the
Act.
Walter Meyer had been employed by Respondent
New Haven as a truckdriver for more than 3 years
before his discharge on February 21, 1966.
IJ C. Penney Co., Inc., 160 NLRB 279
166 NLRB No. 20
252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Meyer's work while he was employed by Respon-
dent New Haven took him regularly to Respondent
Hawthorn's plant. Both Respondents learned that
Meyer had joined the Union. As the Trial Examiner
found, on the basis of uncontradicted or credited
testimony of Meyer, Poynter, general foreman of
New Haven, told Meyer that all he was going to get
out of his union activity was "a lot of trouble," and
Monzyk, the president of New Haven, told Meyer
that he would be "automatically fired" if he "sent
one of those union cards in."
The incident that gave rise to Meyer's discharge
occurred when he was at the Hawthorn plant on
Friday, February 18, and stopped to speak to his
son-in-law who was employed there. The record
shows that Meyer had stopped to speak to em-
ployees at Hawthorn on prior occasions without
any objection on the part of Hawthorn supervisors.
When Foreman Hagedorn saw Meyer on this occa-
sion, however, he seized Meyer forecefully by the
arm and told him to leave. It was at this point that
Meyer used obscene language to Hagedorn.
As set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision,
Hawthorn's plant manager reported this incident to
New Haven, and as he testified he told New Haven
that "some disciplinary action should be required
and I certainly didn't want the fellow down there
until some action was taken, I mentioned that cer-
tainly an apology was in order." On the following
Monday, however, as the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion states, President Monzyk "did not give Meyer
a chance to apologize; he took the extreme measure
instead." Monzyk discharged Meyer without giving
him any opportunity to explain or apologize.
In the light of these facts, and while we do not
condone the obscene language used by Meyer, we
conclude and find that Respondent New Haven's
president seized upon this incident to carry out his
threat to discharge Meyer if he became a union
member, and that the discharge of Meyer was there-
fore violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Hawthorn en-
gaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, in addition to the incidents found unlawful by
the Trial Examiner, we shall order that it cease and
desist from such conduct.
Having found that Respondent New Haven has
discriminated against employee Walter Meyer in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, we shall
order it to offer him immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former or substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to his seniority or other
-rights and privileges, and to make him whole for any
loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him.
ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
7. By threatening employees with reprisals,
Respondent Hawthorn has engaged in and is engag-
ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. By discharging employee Walter Meyer for
discriminatory reasons, Respondent New Haven
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.
ORDER
A. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended , the National
Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
Respondent , Hawthorn Company, a Division of
Kellwood Company, New Haven , Missouri , its of-
ficers, agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging , laying off, or otherwise dis-
criminating against employees because of their ex-
ercise of the right to self-organization or to join
labor organizations.
(b) Discouraging membership of its employees
in Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO,
or any other labor organization , by threatening its
employees with discharge if they join or engage in
activities on behalf of the said Union or any other
union ; by engaging in surveillance of the union ac-
tivities of its employees ; by showing employees the
moving picture film "And Women Must Weep"; or
in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization , or of any of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which
the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer to John Oliver immediate and full rein-
statement to his former or substantially equivalent
position , without prejudice to his seniority and
other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and
make whole John Oliver and William Cooke for any
loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them , in the manner referred
to in the section of the Trial Examiner 's Decision,
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Notify John Oliver if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to
full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request , make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security pay-
ment records , timecards , personnel records and re-
HAWTHORN COMPANY 253
ports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amounts of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Post at its plant in New Haven, Missouri, co-
pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A."2
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 14, after being duly
signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.
B. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
Respondent, New Haven Manufacturing Com-
pany, New Haven, Missouri, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging, laying off, or otherwise dis-
criminating against employees because of their ex-
ercise of the right to self-organization or to join
labor organizations.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge if
they sign union cards, interrogating employees in a
coercive manner concerning their union activities,
or in any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, or of any of their rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which
the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer to Walter Meyer immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniori-
ty and other rights and privileges previously en-
joyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay he
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him, in the manner referred to in the section
of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "The
Remedy," as modified herein.
(b) Notify Walter Meyer if presently serving in
the Armed Forces of the United States of his right
to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security pay-
ment records, timecards, personnel records and re-
ports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Post at its plant in New Haven, Missouri, co-
pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."3
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 14, after being duly
signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges viola-
tions not found herein.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate
the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discharge, lay off, or dis-
criminate against any of our employees in re-
gard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any
term or condition of employment, because they
have engaged in union or concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by
threatening our employees with discharge if
they join or engage in activities on behalf of the
said Union or any other Union; engaging in
surveillance of the union activities of our em-
ployees; showing employees the moving pic-
ture film "And Women Must Weep"; or in any
other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing our employees in the exercise of their
2 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals En-
forcing an Order."
3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals En-
forcing an Order."
254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
right to self-organization, to form labor or-
ganizations, to join or assist Textile Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in, or to refrain from engaging in,
any and all of the activities specified in Section
7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer John Oliver immediate and
full reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
WE WILL make John Oliver and William
Cooke whole for any loss of pay they may have
suffered by reason of the discrimination against
them.
Dated By
HAWTHORN COMPANY,
A DIVISION OF KELL-
WOOD COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
Note: In the event the above-named employee is
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, we will notify him of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Milita-
ry Training and Service Act, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by. any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 1040 Boatmen's Bank Building, 314 North
Broadway, St. Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone
622-4156.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate
the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discharge, lay off, or other-
wise discriminate against any of our employees
because they have engaged in concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization, by
threatening employees with discharge if they
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sign union cards, by interrogating employees
in a coercive manner concerning their union ac-
tivities, or in any other manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing our employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form labor organizations, to join or assist Tex-
tile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in, or to refrain from
engaging in, any and all of the activities
specified in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Walter Meyer immediate and
full reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent positio a, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Walter Meyer whole for any
loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of
the discrimination against him.
NEW HAVEN MANUFAC-
TURING COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
Note: In the event the above-named employee is
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, we will notify him of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Milita-
ry Training and Service Act, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 1040 Boatmen's Bank Building, 314 North
Broadway, St. Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone
622-4156.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner: A hearing in the
above-entitled proceeding was held before the duly
designated Trial Examiner on June 7, 8, and 9, 1966, at
Washington, Missouri, on complaint of the General
Counsel against Hawthorn Company, a Division of Kell-
wood Company, the Respondent in Case 14-CA-3876,
and against New Haven Manufacturing Company, the
Respondent in Case 14-CA-3906. The issues litigated
are whether the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act. Briefs were received from the General
Counsel and both Respondents.
HAWTHORN COMPANY 255
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
witnesses. I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENTS
leged joint illegal object by the two companies in the dis-
crimination against Meyer, that the two
cases- 14-CA-3876 and 14-CA-3906- were con-
solidated and a single complaint issued . In its separate
answer each Respondent denied the commission of any
unfair labor practices.
Hawthorn Company operates three plants and is a divi-
sion of Kellwood Company, a multistate business. One of
its plants is located in the city of New Haven, Missouri.
where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribu-
tion of l ents. tarpaulins, sleeping bags, insulated un-
derwear, and related products. During the calendar year
1965, a representative period, Hawthorn purchased and
caused to be delivered to its New Haven plant goods and
materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
located outside the State of Missouri, and manufactured,
sold, and distributed from this plant products valued in
excess of $50,000 to out-of-State locations.
New Haven Manufacturing Company, a Missouri cor-
poration, maintains an office and place of business in the
city of New Haven, Missouri, and is also engaged in the
manufacture and sale of camping supplies, tents, and re-
lated products. It. too, annually receives materials valued
in excess of $50,000, from out-of-State sources. It has an-
nually sold products valued in excess of $50,000 to enter-
prises in the State of Missouri which in turn annually sell
over $50,000 worth of products to customers located out-
side the State of Missouri.
I find that both these companies are engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effec-
tuate the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction
herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union , is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Late in the year 1965 the Union started an organiza-
tional campaign among the employees of both the
Hawthorn and the New Haven companies, whose plants
in the city of New Haven are situated one-half mile apart.
Ninety percent of the business done by New Haven is
with Hawthorn. Hawthorn was firmly opposed to self-or-
ganization by its employees and instituted its own pro-
gram to prevent the success of union activities. The com-
plaint charges illegal coercive conduct to management
representatives of both companies. It also alleges that
Hawthorn discriminated against two of its employees-
William Cooke and John Oliver- for the purpose of
discouraging their union membership. There is a further
allegation that Walter Meyer, an employee of New
Haven, was discharged in consequence of both that Com-
pany's union animus and because of pressure by
Hawthorn, upon New Haven, aimed at furthering
Hawthorn's antiunion resolve. It is because of this al-
i At one point in the record there seemed to be a stipulation that
Meyer's card is dated September 9 In his testimony, which came later,
Meyer, speaking of his earliest acquaintance with any agent of the Union,
said "The first time was the 7th or 8th of December, 1965 ... I got a
letter that Danny Cripe was passing out with a card, and I sent the card
Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
Daniel Cripe, union organizer, testified that he came to
New Haven to begin the organizational campaign "In
November or December, around that area." The first
signed union authorization card he obtained at Hawthorn
is dated November 15; the first employee to sign at the
New Haven company was Walter Meyer who signed on
December 9.1 From this period through February 21.
1966, 93 employees of the 450-500 total complement at
Hawthorn had signed union cards, and 2 of the 32 em-
ployee total at New Haven had done the same. The
Union distributed leaflets and other organizational litera-
ture at the Hawthorn plant entrances, and at the homes of
employees; it held employee meetings, both in private
homes and in a public hall. Its literature was of the usual
kind, explaining the benefits assertedly flowing from con-
certed action and in union membership, advising em-
ployees not to heed belated promises of future benefits,
disparaging comments about unions, or threats of reprisal
that might be circulated by employers.
Hawthorn reacted with its own literature, some placed
in the hands of employees, some posted about the plant
premises. The Company also had its foremen call their
employees together in groups of three to eight and read a
printed statement to all of them. The statement was
placed in evidence and starts with the unequivocal phrase
"We do not want the union in our plant." It then warns,
in a long series of paragraphs, of trickery by union agents,
misrepresentation. the danger of deceptive entrapment
into obligations to pay fines and assessments, intent by
the Union to "strike" and possibly cause employees "to
lose their jobs," and the destruction of jobs and suffering
inflicted upon employees and their families in con-
sequence of signing union cards. "The union people are
here to make trouble and nothing else." The statement
also lists benefits previously enjoyed in this Company
without union representation.2
About January 25 Hawthorn assembled its employees
in groups in the plant, and, during paid working hours,
showed all of them a moving picture entitled "And
Women Must Weep." It is a frightening and fearful por-
trayal of human misconduct in a story, real or fancied,
built about the events associated with a strike in a distant
location 10 years earlier. The Board has had occasion to
consider the use of this professionally produced film, with
its contrived script, by employers determined to keep
their employees from turning to a collective-bargaining
agent as a way of life. No need here to describe, in minute
detail, the picture sequences, the actors' words, the terri-
fying sound effects. As Chairman McCulloch said in an
earlier decision: "It pictures a labor dispute as one in
which Americanism. religion, family, motherhood, and in-
in." The card itself was not placed in evidence and I find Meyer signed it
on December 9, and not in September.
2The record does not support the General Counsel's contention that
the statement read by the supervisors , as received in evidence , is in itself
violative of the Act.
256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
nocent childhood are arrayed on one side, and goons,
brutes, and murderers on the other or prounion side."3
Twice the Board has ruled that the mere showing of
this picture suffices for setting aside the results of a Board
election, on the ground that it improperly interferes with
an untrammeled expression of choice by employees.4
And only recently it held-"under the circumstances of
this case"--that the showing of this film was an unfair
labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5
I make the same finding here.
There is some testimony that with the advent of the
Union, Hawthorn supervisors started to watch the men
more closely at their work stations, and to sit near them
during lunch and coffee breaks in the plant cafeteria. The
suggestion here is that the Company used the technique
of increased pressure of supervision as a form of retalia-
tion, and had supervisors spy on the employees in the
cafeteria to overhear their union talk and single out the
adherents. Thus employee Cooke said Hagedorn, his
foreman, started coming to look closely at his work
"more frequently" than in the past, and took to sitting
near him at coffee. Employee William testified "... it
looked like Earl [Hagedorn] was kind of following him
[Cook] around wherever he would go." Connor, who
also worked under Hagedorn, said that after a union
meeting the foreman was "kind of getting rough ... he
kept getting on me."
Hagedorn denied he ever spied on the employees; he
did admit that about this time he took to sitting at the
same tables with the men in the cafeteria, but explained
he did so because there had been orders to hold the men
to the established 10 minutes for coffee breaks, in the in-
terest of production needs. The record does show that
such crackdowns had occurred from time to time in the
past to curb recurring lapeses by the employees generally.
There is also indication that on other occasions foremen
had intensified their immediate supervision for one
reason or another. I do not deem this evidence sufficient
to rest a finding of illegal surveyance of employees in the
building or of coercive conduct in the course of produc-
tion work.
Shortly before January 23, 1966. the Union distributed
an invitation to a union meeting scheduled for that day at
the Stoney Hill hall. Employee Holliman showed it to
Hagedorn, who took it and said he "wanted to show it to
somebody else." Hagedorn did recall having received
the letter and testified he showed it to Plant Superinten-
dent Rothmeyer. While the union meeting , attended by
about 30 Hawthorn employees, was in process at the
Stoney Hill hall, Lola Cooke, an employee waiting for her
husband there, saw Supervisor Victor Hoerstcamp ride
slowly along a side road, which flanked the building off
the main highway, three times during an 18-minute
period. Hoerstcamp lived 12 miles away and he did not
testify. I find, as alleged in the complaint, that Hoerst-
camp that evening engaged in illegal surveyance of the
employees' union activity and thereby committed an un-
fair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act chargeable to Respondent Hawthorn.
A further precise complaint allegation is that Respond-
ent Hawthorn violated the statute by maintaining in ef-
fect a broad no-solicitation rule which illegally prohibited
distribution of union literature in the plant outside of
working hours. The proof for this charge is found in a
company booklet long given all employees as they are
hired, which read as follows: "The Company does not
permit soliciting or posting of notices asking for contribu-
tions for any purpose at any time on its property except
upon permission of management."
The following facts are also undisputed. On October
15, 1965, Hawthorn posted a notice on all its bulletin
boards modifying that rule and reading, in pertinent part:
Employees should not engage in any type of solicitation,
selling, or other nonwork activity during worktime." At
the same time the Company placed a stamp on all the
reserve booklets in its possession with the phrase "no
longer in effect" across the wording of its old no-solicita-
tion rule. Thereafter all booklets given employees carried
that stamp. In March 1966 new booklets were printed
and contained the precise language of the new no-dis-
tribution rule posted in the plant the previous October.
The original charge in this proceeding was filed on
January 24, 1966, 3 months after the impropriety of the
old rule had been cured. There is no reason to believe the
Company then anticipated a union organizational cam-
paign, or that the restrictive terms of the old rule were en-
forced against such conduct or that any occasion arose to
do so. In the circumstances, no useful or pertinent pur-
pose would be served by making a finding now of illegali-
ty.
There is also considerable testimony respecting two
other pinpointed allegations of the complaint, each charg-
ing Hawthorn with direct economic action aimed at brib-
ing its employees into resisting the Union's solicitation
toward membership. About a week after January 1, 1966,
the Company announced a new pension plan paid entirely
by the Employer, to the bulk of its employees in New
Haven, who never previously enjoyed such a benefit.
Evidence, both documentary and oral, and all uncon-
tradicted and therefore credible, shows that the an-
nouncement was an incidental aspect of a long-planned
companywide innovation. For more than a year the Kell-
wood Company, of which Hawthorn is one division, had
been studying the advisability and cost of a company-ad-
ministered pension arrangement for the employees of its
30 plants throughout the country. The study culminated,
with the cooperation and integration of certain insurance
companies, in a resolution by the Kellwood Company
board of directors to establish the plan and to place it in
effect as of January 1, 1966. It was decided centrally to
announce the plan to employees soon after that date, and
this was done, at the New Haven plant of Hawthorn, the
first week in January, and at the other Hawthorn Com-
pany locations-one in Missouri and one in Utah-later
that month. Instructions were issued in December to all
but three of the remaining plants of Kellwood for the
manager of each to do likewise throughout the Company.
At three plants in Arkansas announcement was withheld
because Board-ordered elections were shortly to be held.
In these circumstances I conclude that the General
Counsel has not satisfied the affirmative burden of prov-
ing that announcement of the new pension plan at this
New Haven location was intended to or necessarily con-
stituted illegal coercion upon the employees in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.6
It has long been a basic policy of the Hawthorn Com-
3 Carl T. Mason Co., Inc, 142 N LRB 480
4 Carl T. Mason Co , Inc, supra, and Plochman and Harrison-Cherry
Lane Foods Inc., 140 NLRB 130.
5 South Wire Company, 159 NLRB 394.
6 United Screw and Bolt Co., 91 NLRB 916; cf. Bata Shoe Co, 116
NLRB 1239.
HAWTHORN COMPANY 257
pany to grant satisfactory hi _ly rated employees a
5-cent-per-hour raise after 3 months' employment, and
successive 5-cent-per-hour raises every 6 months
thereafter. One employee, Marvin Williman, testified that
although he had received such a raise in February 1966,
he was thereafter given two further 5-cent raises within
the 4 months preceding the hearing in June. The com-
plaint alleges that such departure from past practice, with
wage increases thus accelerated, was a device to imple-
ment the Company's intent to discourage membership in
the Union.
Williman was only one of many hourly paid employees
who received accelerated raises during the period of the
union organizational campaign. The General Counsel
subpenaed, and the, Respondent produced, a detailed
chart reflecting every instance- over the 6-month
period, October 1965 through March 1966 - where an in-
dividual hourly rate was changed. There appear upward
of 250 separate entries. Included are a number of items
unrelated to raises; these show employees who changed
to or from piecework, and thereafter had their base rate
altered upwards or downwards. There are also reflected
a number of instances of regular raises that simply fell
into the old established pattern of 3-month and 6-month
raises under the old system. Precisely how many of the
raises shown were quickened increases that would not
have been granted had the Respondent merely continued
its former merit raise methods, cannot be ascertained
from the machine record as made.
Concededly the number of employees who received ac-
celerated raises during the 6-month period is very sub-
stantial, and from this one fact the General Counsel ar-
gues that the Company engaged in a broadside effort to
combat the Union's campaign by means of such raises.
The Respondent uses the same objective record of so
widespread and extended a program of wage
changes-starting as early as October-as partial proof
of its contention that the changes had nothing to do with
the employees' union activities. In further support it
called Morris Tillman, personnel manager, and Thomas
Nolan, vice president of Hawthorn and plant manager of
the New Haven plant, who testified that the rates were so
broadly changed in consequence of an areawide study,
long antedating the inception of the union campaign. Both
testified that in May 1965, the Company felt its wage
structure was too low in comparison with rates prevalent
in comparable industry in the area. Noland said he caused
a survey to be made, and Tillman said he did this. They
said they decided it was necessary to "adjust iniquities,"
both among their employees and between Hawthorn's
work force and workmen of other companies. To this end,
according to their oral testimony, they decided both to
shorten the period between raises for certain employees,
and to raise the base rate-by further successive
raises-for others, and that they began the program in
October with the hope of completing it by June or July
1966.
In the sense that general self-serving explanations gain
persuasion by hard facts, there is much to be desired in
both the oral testimony and the record of raises offered by
the Respondent. The personnel manager, who said he had
much to do in evolving the direct mechanics of the
revised wage structure, was indefinite and evasive as to
how the selection of individuals for increases was made;
he said it was not a matter of job categories, work of one
kind or another that had to be raised generally, nor an
across-the-board flat increase for everyone. He spoke of
studying the wage structure of other plants in the same in-
dustry, but it then developed there are really none such;
he called it all the "textile" industry, although clearly the
various companies in the area produce fundamentally dif-
ferent end products. In the end all that remained of his en-
tire story, so far as concrete statements are concerned,
was that the Company selected at random as fancy dic-
tated, giving raises to some and not to others. Further, it
is not possible, from a study of the exhibit charts, to tell
which of the many raises were only applications of the old
system, and which attributable to the alleged revised
companywide program. There are certain pencil checks
placed next to a number of the recorded rate changes; at
one point Tillman said these indicate which of the raises
were the result of the overall plan at the time to lift the
plant level of wages. No written records were produced
to give body to the management representatives'
testimony in explanation of all these unexpected raises
received by the employees while they were being so-
licited to join the Union. And while the testimony that
wage rates elsewhere were examined and changes made
here for the purpose of eliminating "iniquities" went
unchallenged, it is in the nature of such testimony that it
cannot be contradicted.
It is nevertheless true that a great many individual
raises were given during this period, for the General
Counsel also makes that assertion. And although the
printed records do not plainly identify which raises fell
into which category, the substance of Tillman's uncon-
tradicted testimony that his pencil checks tell the story
was seemingly accepted by the General Counsel. From
this it would appear that during October, 16 such new
type increases were granted, and that during the sub-
sequent 4 months they totaled 51, 39, 42, and 54 succes-
sively. In some instances several of these raises went to
a single employee, all within the 5-month span. Whatever
frailties in the general proof said to support the Respond-
ent's contention as to why these raises were given, the
fact that so many were granted in October, and perhaps
25 more in the first half of November, inevitably weakens
the inference sought by the General Counsel that the un-
derlying explanation was a reaction to the union activity.
Organizer Cripe said clearly he only arrived in the city of
New Haven late in November or December. The first
card signed by any employee is dated in the middle of
November. No amount of suspicion can alter the fact that
the general sweep of the raises began over a month before
any events which can be said to have alerted the Re-
spondent to the Union's later activities. The burden
is upon the General Counsel to prove affirmatively
that the raises were intended as a coercive device. On
this record I cannot make the finding.'
The Suspension of William Cooke
By February 1966, William Cooke had been employed
by Hawthorn for over a year; he was a very outspoken
proponent of the Union. About a week after January 26,
when the Company showed its film "And Women Must
Weep" to the employees, Cooke wrote a long nine-para-
graph statement "to my fellow workmen at Hawthorn" in
order, as the document reads, to "speak out against this
attempt by management to instill fear of unionism." He
charged the Company with paying low wages and making
7 True Temper Corp, 127 NLRB 839 , 842-44
258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
excessive profits, promised improved pay and better liv-
ing conditions through the Union, assured the employees
of Government protection against threats and reprisals,
and then generally, in very forceful language, urged all to
sign up. Cooke signed his name to the document as a
"Member of Hawthorn Employees' Organizing Commit-
tee." The paper was widely distributed among the em-
ployees.
The Respondent reacted on February 9 by posting a
notice on the bulletin boards and at other locations
throughout the plant. It starts with: "One of our em-
ployees recently distributed a union leaflet which he
signed as a member of the `Hawthorn Employees' Or-
ganizing Committee.' We have not been notified of any
other employees belonging to this so-called `committee'
but we do want everyone to clearly understand that no
employee is going to receive any preferred or special
treatment just because he joins or becomes a part of a
union `organizing committee."' It continued by saying
that participation in an organization committee was no as-
surance "the company can no longer take any action
against them," that no one would receive preferred treat-
ment, but would be subjected to "the same rules, policies
and regulations as everyone else," and that union mem-
bership would never be a condition of employment.
A copy of this notice was posted on the door to a small
shop, 100 feet from the main plant, where Cooke and one
or two other employees worked at making miniature
tents. When Cooke arrived that morning he removed it
and put it in his pocket. At the hearing he explained he did
so because it was raining and the notice had become wet
and illegible. An hour later his foreman, Hagedorn, came
to the shop, asked for the notice, and brought Cooke to
the office of Rothmeyer, Hagedorn's superior. The mana-
ger had already consulted the personnel director and it
had been decided to impose a 3-day suspension on Cooke
in discipline. They asked Cooke to sign a warning notice
reading: "Willfully removed company notice, posted on
company property without permission, in outright defi-
ance of company rules." He refused to sign. Cooke lost
3 days' pay because of his suspension.
I find, as alleged in the complaint, that Hawthorn
suspended Cooke from work for the purpose of
discouraging union membership among the employees
and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Its
resentment against union activities of any kind is clear on
the record, even to the extent of resorting to illegally
coercive conduct. As of that moment Cooke was perhaps
the most outspoken employee assisting Union Organizer
Cripe. If any of his behavior up to that point could be
called "defiant" in the opinion of management, it was cir-
culation of his prounion statement only a few days
earlier. Indeed the notice whose removal from a door so
offended the Company that day was aimed precisely at
him. In the teeth of its own promise that very morning
to everybody that even prounion employees would be
"subject to the same rules" applicable to all, the Com-
pany took away from Cooke the written assurance
against excessive discipline long given all workmen.
There is a 39-page booklet entitled "Welcome to Haw-
thorn" placed in the hand of every employee who joins'
the Company. One of the subjects explained is "discipli-
nary procedure," and as the least serious offenses lists 14
mistakes a man can make, one of them being "removing
notices or signs on bulletin boards or elsewhere on com-
pany property without permission." As to these offenses
the booklet precisely provides discipline as "verbal
warning" for a first offense, "written warning" for a
second offense, and "written warning and suspension"
for a third offense. Cooke's foreman, Hagedorn, testified
he had once warned the man verbally for overstaying his
coffee break, but it is admitted he had never committed
any other offense or ever been given a written notice of
any kind. Personnel Manager Tillman said the em-
ployees had a right to rely upon the regulations set out
in the booklet. Asked why in this instance the Company
ignored its plantwide rules and inflicted the greater pun-
ishment for the lesser offense, all he could say was he
thought the man "merited the three-day suspension." On
the record as a whole I can make no other finding but
that the real reason was to punish Cooke, not for re-
moval of the notice, but for having presumed to criticize
the Company in its antiunion campaign and to urge
his fellow workmen to join.
The Discharge of John Oliver
Oliver was hired by Hawthorn on November 15, 1965,
and assigned to learn how to make miniature tents; he
worked together with Cooke in the small building
separate from the main plant. Throughout his employ-
ment he was also used, as need arose, to load trucks, paint
boards, and package finished tents. The Company has a
90-day probationary period, and Oliver knew this when
he started.
He favored the Union; he signed a card himself in
December and solicited several other employees at their
homes. On February 23, 1966, while sitting at coffee dur-
ing a rest break, he found Zastrow, assistant foreman of
the shipping department in which Oliver worked, next to
him at a table in the cafeteria. The two talked about the
union campaign, Oliver starting the subject and even hop-
ing to convince Zastrow. The assistant foreman ridiculed
the idea, saying he thought the Union would not succeed,
"If they do they will be a strike ... Everybody will be let
off and it will be a long, drawed-out affair ... Everybody
will be laid off and they have the warehouses full and they
will start shipping anyway." That same afternoon Oliver
was discharged.
The General Counsel's theory of complaint respecting
this employee is that Hawthorn learned that day of
Oliver's attempts to win adherents to the Union, and, in
furtherance of its desire to defeat the organizational cam-
paign, decided to release him to curb such activities by
the employees. Hagedorn, Oliver's foreman, who par-
ticipated in the discharge decision, said he did not know
of the man's union sentiments at the time; in affirmative
defense the Respondent asserts Oliver was released
because his probationary period was up and his produc-
tion not satisfactory.
I am satisfied that by the afternoon of February 23
Respondent Hawthorn had learned of Oliver's prounion
attitude. Whether or not Zastrow, the assistant foreman,
was a supervisor within the technical definition of the
Act, as the General Counsel contends and the Respond-
ent Hawthorn disputes, is a close question. Part of the
time he does physical work, such as driving and loading
trucks; his major duties are doing the paper work of the
shipping department, keeping records, answering
telephones, and generally seeing to it that the proper
trucks are loaded at the right time. Zastrow did not testi-
fy, but Hagedorn, his immediate superior, said the
assistant tells the men what to do, orders them to "change
from one job to another" when Hagedorn "is away," and
HAWTHORN COMPANY
is told to "look after" the department at certain times.
Hagedorn is in charge of 23 men and every day spends
some time at two other locations in the city where some
of these are regularly assigned. Unlike the foremen, Zas-
trow is hourly paid, and there is conclusionary testimony
that he has no authority to hire or discipline others, or
recommend such action, or to grant time off. Hagedorn
also said, however, that Zastrow reported to him when-
ever any employee "might be goofing off or something,"
and "always" told the foreman if any men did not follow
the assistant's instructions.
With Zastrow thus used as watchman over the men,
with Respondent Hawthorn's resolve to combat the
union campaign at every turn, with the reason advanced
by this Company in explanation of the discharge clearly
false (as will appear shortly), and with the discharge fol-
lowing so precipitously, before quitting time, upon
Oliver's attempt to persuade the assistant foreman
toward the Union that morning, the inference is amply
warranted both that management learned quickly through
Zastrow of Oliver's attitude and that this was the true
reason for the discharge.
To prove that Oliver was not competent and was
released for that reason, the Respondent started with the
testimony of Personnel Manager Tillman, who offered
into evidence a paper on which are listed 43 dates, and
opposite each certain numbers called "amount
completed" (of miniature tents) and "hours on miniature
tents," meaning time devoted that particular day to
produce the number of tents indicated. It will be remem-
bered that Oliver also did other work, either entire or full
days. The entire purport of Tillman's testimony on this
point is that Oliver's deficiency was that he did not
produce an average of one miniature tent per hour, said
to be the norm requirement in the plant. Tillman also
produced certain daily reports, prepared in Oliver's hand,
from which he said he took the data to prepare his list ex-
hibit.
Cross-examination reveals clearly that the summary
sheet, the alleged basis for discharge, is not a reliable
summary of Oliver's miniature tent production. Shown
two of the reports -from which he had recorded 9 hours
as spent producing only one tent each day, Tillman
pointed to a certain .09 entry, and said this meant to him
9 hours of tent-making work in a single day. He then con-
ceded it did not, and could not mean 9 hours of work, that
these cards gave no inkling of the time so devoted, and
finally that he simply had no idea what that entry meant.
It is also a number .09 that appears on many other forms
he used. Tillman finally added that because Oliver had
prepared the data report haphazardly the summary sheets
were no more than his, Tillman's, "interpretation" of the
original entries. Four daily reports were placed in
evidence, each used by Tillman for his summary, and
each so written that there is no coherent way of reading
the number of hours devoted to tent making.
Foreman Hagedorn followed Tillman to the stand to
support the alleged ground of discharge for cause. He said
he was asked to help explain the daily reports to Tillman
when the latter prepared the summary sheet. His
testimony as to the meaning of certain entries is equally
confusing and incomprehensible. There is another box on
the daily report designated "hours worked"; most of the
cards show a number 9 there. Hagedorn started by saying
this entry shows how many hours Oliver worked on
miniature tents. But some of the cards bear the statement
across the face that Oliver that day also did other work.
Hagedorn then said that under the heading "Number of
259
units or hours," he had told Oliver "he could put the
style - anything." The fact is Oliver prepared his reports
slovenly, and they do not, as Tillman attempted to say,
make possible any reliable picture of his true tent produc-
tion against hours on that particular work.
Hagedorn also persisted in the story that it was the in-
sufficient quantity of tent production by Oliver that the
Company deemed unsatisfactory. He was then referred
to Tillman's summary, where for 14 workdays in Februa-
ry Oliver produced about as many tents as the document
charges hours against him. A number of times it shows
eight tents against 9 hours, seven against 8, five against 5,
and six against 6. Hagedorn countered with saying it was
the 3-month average that showed only 50 percent produc-
tion by Oliver. He ended with a final admission: "At last
he was- at last he could, or he was getting one out an
hour ...... With this from Oliver's foreman, the total af-
firmative defense that Oliver was discharged because he
had not learned to produce enough tents collapsed
completely. The whole purpose of a probationary period
concept is that a man must show, within the time allotted,
he has developed the requisite skill, and therefore logi-
cally, whatever his inadequate production may have been
back in November when Oliver started, is totally irrele-
vant here.
After all this emphasis at the hearing on quantity, I
must credit Oliver where he said that in the discharge
conversation with Tillman on February 23 the personnel
director said nothing about the quality of his work. In-
deed as a witness Tillman made no contrary contention.
Hagedorn's belated attempt, at the hearing, to inject criti-
cism of Oliver's quality of work as a collateral cause, is
supported by nothing more than the office record of a
45-day interview with Oliver when his work was
discussed in the middle of his probationary period. Here
the element of quality is checked off as "fair."
On the record in its entirety I find that Respondent
Hawthorn discharged Oliver on February 23, 1966, to
discourage his union activities and thereby violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
The Discharge of Walter Meyer
Walter Meyer worked for 3-1/2 years for Respondent
New Haven Company; he was normally a truckdriver,
and sometimes janitor and watchman. His truck duties
regularly took him to the Hawthorn plant to make deliv-
eries or pickups. He signed a union card about December
9.
New Haven also was opposed to union representation
for its employees. Meyer testified that on December 11,
as he was showing a letter from the Union to employee
Holliman at the Hawthorn location, Foreman Hagedorn
passed by and looked at it. When Meyer returned to his
base, later in the day, and entered the office to turn in his
tickets, Marvin Poynter, the New Haven general
foreman, was just completing a telephone conversation
and told him: "Walter, all you are going to get out of this
is a lot of trouble." Three days later, still according to
Meyer, Robert Monzyk, president of New Haven, ap-
proached him in the lunchroom to ask "If I had sent one
of those union cards in." When Meyer said yes, Monzyk
said: "You know you are automatically fired when you
send that card in." In disbelief Meyer asked did Monzyk
really mean what he was saying, and the officer reaf-
firmed his statement. A month later, about January 23,
Robert Monzyk again approached Meyer in the
lunchroom and said: "I hear you are going to have a union
260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meeting," and then added: "All you are going to do, you
are going to spoil everything for us."
Poynter was not called as a witness. Monzyk gave a
different version of his talk with Meyer on the 14th. He
said he had heard Meyer "was helping a union to try to
organize the Hawthorn plant." and therefore asked him
"if he had received literature from the union organizer"
and "Do you intend to follow it up?" When Meyer said he
did propose to pursue the matter, Monzyk, still according
to his own testimony, answered he was indifferent on the
subject but that if Meyer were caught distributing union
literature during working hours in the shop "he was sub-
ject to being automatically discharged." Later in his
testimony Monzyk admitted that before talking to Meyer,
he "did not have any idea he was distributing literature
during working hours," and that he had also told Meyer
that day: "You might make hardships on some of the fel-
lows in the shop."
I credit Meyer. Monzyk's inquiry was no idle curiousi-
ty about one man's attitude; he wanted to know what
Meyer was going to do with respect to the rest of the em-
ployees. He intended to watch him and wanted the em-
ployee to know it. Meyer had given no cause for concern
to the Company about interfering with production by soli-
citing during working hours, and Monzyk had no basis
for expecting he might do so. Under the circumstances,
talk of discharge and hardship to employees could only
have been intended to coerce. I find Monzyk did say the
Company would discharge employees if they signed
union cards, and interrogated Meyer concerning his union
activities in a coercive manner, and that by such conduct
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Meyer was discharged 2 months later, on February 21.
1966. He exchanged words with Foreman Hagedorn on
Friday. higher management persons then complained to
New Haven about the driver's conduct and asked that he
no longer be permitted to come to the plant, and the fol-
lowing Monday, New Haven discharged him. The reason
stated at the time was the Friday incident, and there was
no mention of the Union during the terminal conversa-
tion. The theory of the General Counsel in this case is
that Hawthorn seized upon the incident as a convenient
excuse to curb Meyer's union activities, urged New
Haven to dismiss him for this reason, and is therefore
jointly responsible with the latter company for a direct
discrimination in employment violative of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act. While there is ground for suspicion. I do not
believe the relevant facts, in toto, warrant the conclusion
that New Haven discharged this man for a proscribed
purpose, or that Hawthorn Company urged his dismissal
because of his union activities.
Hawthorn's general union animus is clear, and its
foreman, Hagedorn, did learn in December that Meyer
had something to do with the Union when he saw the
letter the employee had recieved. On the other hand,
there was no mention of the Union by any of the partici-
pants in the incident of misbehavior on Friday, and there
is no evidence that during whatever conversation took
place between agents of the two companies the Union
was referred to at all.
In defense, New Haven maintains Meyer was
discharged because he was essentially an outdoor man, he
could no longer be used for deliveries to Hawthorn- his
regular duties- and as Hawthorn was its principal
customer, its officials had to be respected. A weakness in
this assertion is that while Hawthorn people may have
asked Monzyk, of New Haven, what the company "was
going to do about it," they did not ask for outright
discharge. Indeed, Thomas Nolan, Hawthorn's plant
manager, testified that all he told the other company was
"it was a pretty serious matter and that some disciplinary
action should be required and I certainly didn't want the
fellow down there until some action was taken, I men-
tioned that certainly an apology was in order." But Mon-
zyk did not give Meyer a chance to apologize; he took the
extreme measure instead. Maybe this was because while
they talked in the office Meyer became a little offensive
to Monzyk too. Or could it have been because Monzyk
had threatened Meyer with discharge 2 months earlier, in
a certain conversation about the Union?
All this notwithstanding, it remains a fact that Meyer
gave cause both for complaint from Hawthorn and for
discharge by New Haven. He wandered away from
where his truck was to be loaded on the Hawthorn
premises and went to speak to his son-in-law, an em-
ployee, about a personal matter. Foreman Hagedorn saw
him talking to still another workman who was on duty. He
told Meyer to remove himself from that area because he
did not belong there. Hagedorn said he just touched the
other's arm to attract his attention in the noise. Meyer
said the foreman wrenched his arm and twisted his back.
Who will ever know? No other person present were
asked to describe the extent or nature of the physical con-
tact. What is sure is that Meyer spoke in very vile lan-
guage to Hagedorn. No need for detail, for while at some
points in his testimony he attempted to deny it. Meyer
also twice admitted "I may have" called Hagedorn
a . . . The very weak testimony intended to establish
that obscene language was not unusual among Haw-
thorn's employees is entirely unpersuasive. I have no
reason to find that dirty language was the order of the
day in that plant, or that any significant bad language was
excused.
Meyer had no business being where he was talking to
busy employees, and his behavior was offensive and
justly subjected him to criticism. The complaint to the
New Haven supervisors came immediately that same
day, and he was in fact disciplined by discharge the very
next workday. I conclude that the General Counsel has
not proved a prima facie case supporting the complaint
allegations regarding the discharge of Walter Meyer.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set out in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
Respondents set out in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have committed
certain unfair labor practices. I shall recommend that
they be ordered to cease and desist from such conduct
and to take certain affirmative action designed to dis-
sipate its effect The Respondent Hawthorn having il-
legally discharged John Oliver, it must be ordered to rein-
state him to his former or equivalent position. The
Respondent Hawthorn must also be ordered to make
whole Oliver and William Cooke. who was suspended
from work illegally, for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered in consequence of the illegal discrimination
HAWTHORN COMPANY 261
against them in their employment. Backpay shall be com-
puted in accordance with the formula prescribed by the
Board in F.W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and
the assessment of interest shall be computed in the
manner prescribed by the Board in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. In view of the unfair labor
practices committed by Hawthorn, the commision of
similar and other unfair labor practices by that company
may reasonably be anticipated. I shall therefore recom-
mend that Hawthorn be ordered to cease and desist from
in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to its
employees by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondents are employers within the meaning
of Section 2 of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging John Oliver and by suspending from
work William Cooke, Respondent Hawthorn has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the foregoing conduct, by showing employees
the moving picture film "And Women Must Weep." and
by surveying the union activities of employees, Hawthorn
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By threatening employees with discharge if they
signed union cards and by interrogating them concerning
their union activities, Respondent New Haven has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
308-926 0-70-18