Jewish Center for the Aged

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 3, 1975

220 N.L.R.B. 98 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Jewish Center for the Aged and Service and Hospital
Employees, Local 50, affiliated with Service Em-
ployees International Union , AFL-CIO. Case 14-
CA-8129
September 3, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO
On April 30, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Jen-
nie M. Sarrica issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent Jewish Center for the Aged,
St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board 's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge' s resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc. 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3. 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing her findings
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JENNIE M. SARRICA , Administrative Law Judge: Upon
due notice, this proceeding under Section 10(b) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 USC § 151, et
seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was tried before me
at St . Louis, Missouri , on February 24, 1975, pursuant to a
complaint issued on November 8, 1974 ,' based on charges
filed September 16 by Service and Hospital Employees,
1 All dates are in 1974 unless otherwise indicated.
Local 50, affiliated with Service Employees International
Union , AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union,
presenting allegations that Jewish Center for the Aged,
hereinafter referred to as Respondent , committed unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) and
(5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On November 19,
the Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it com-
mitted the violations of the Act alleged . Representatives of
all parties were present and participated in the hearing.
Based on the entire record including my observation of
witnesses , and after due consideration of the arguments
presented in the briefs filed by the General Counsel and
the Respondent , I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a Missouri corporation with its principal
office and place of business at 4815 Blair Avenue, St.
Louis, Missouri, during all times material herein is and has
been engaged in the operation of a proprietary professional
care nursing home. During the 12-month period ending
October 31, a representative period, Respondent had gross
revenues from such operations in excess of $100 ,000. Dur-
ing that same period Respondent purchased goods and ma-
terials valued in excess of $10,000 and caused same to be
shipped to its Blair Avenue facility from points located
outside the State of Missouri. Respondent admits, and I
find, that it is now, and has been at all times material here-
in, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Charging Party is, and has been at all times material
herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issue
Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by insist-
ing upon negotiating with respect to recognition of the in-
cumbent employee representative and with respect to the
scope of the established contract unit.
B. Background
Respondent has operated a nursing home at the 4815
Blair Avenue address where the Union since approximate-
ly 1968 has represented an overall unit described in the
July 14, 1971, 3-year contract as follows:
Section 2 RECOGNITION
The Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive
bargaining agent for all employees of the Employer,
including employees in the Dietary , Laundry and Cen-
tral Supply, Housekeeping and Nursing Departments
but excluding maintenance employees , office clerical
220 NLRB No. 21
JEWISH CENTER FOR THE AGED 99
employees, professional employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act; and patients who for ther-
apeutic reasons perform certain services otherwise
performed by those in the bargaining unit.
The Union gave timely notice under the termination
provision to renegotiate the 1971 contract, and submitted
written proposed changes for a number of contract sections
but not including section 2 quoted above or section 23,
which was a duration clause providing for a 3-year term
automatically renewable for 1-year periods in the absence
of timely notice for termination. Nine negotiating sessions
followed, beginning on May 23.2 At these sessions the Re-
spondent was represented by one or the other of its two
attorneys. Before negotiations began the Union became
aware that Respondent was contemplating a move of its
facilities to another location.
C. The Negotiations
At the first meeting, in addition to the previously men-
tioned written contract changes, the Union proposed add-
ing to the contract a "successorship clause." The proposal
was discussed but no agreement was reached.
Respondent's attorney, Timothy Heinsz, informed the
Union negotiators that Respondent had already sold its
Blair Avenue facility and therefore the proposed successor-
ship clause, which contemplated contract assumption,
would be impossible to implement. Heinsz advised that Re-
spondent was still occupying and operating the facility but
would be phasing its patients out of the nursing home at
some indefinite future and ceasing its management opera-
tions there. The Union withdrew the successorship propos-
al at the June 4 session and on June 18 submitted a revised
successorship clause.3
Respondent presented its written proposals at the June
26 meeting. Among the contract changes requested were
revisions of both section 2 and section 23. The change pro-
posed in section 2 was to designate the existing provision as
"(a)" and insert therein, before the word "including" at the
beginning of the third line as quoted above, the phrase,
"located at its facility at 4518 Blair Avenue, St. Louis, Mis-
souri 63107." A new subparagraph to be added to this sec-
tion was to read as follows:
(b) In the event the Employer ceases its operations of
caring for the elderly at its facility located at 4518
Blair Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63107, the parties
agree that they will be bound in every way by the
principles regarding successorship as announced by
the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board
vs. Burns International Security Service, 406 U.S. 272,
80 LRRM 2225 (1973), and by all other laws and cases
2 The parties stipulated that such meetings were held on the following
dates: May 23, June 6, 18, and 26, and July 3, 5, 6, 13, and 14-15. At all
meetings up to and including the June 26 session, Attorney Heinsz was
Respondent's negotiator. Thereafter, Attorney Michael Tannler represented
Respondent in bargaining. The Union was represented by its research and
negotiations specialist, J. Clinton Gwin, Ann Spears Givens, a business rep-
resentative, and an employee committee.
3 At these meetings the parties had reached agreement on a number of the
Union's proposed changes.
of the courts of the United States and the National
Labor Relations Board in this regard.
With respect to section 23 (Duration of Agreement), Re-
spondent proposed a revised part (a) to read:
(a) This agreement shall take effect as of the 14th day
of July, 1974, and shall continue in effect with the
express terms and conditions herein set forth until the
Center ceases its operations described in Section 3(a)
above, at its facility located at 4518 Blair Avenue, St.
Louis., Missouri 63107, or for a period of years,
whichever occurs first; provided, however, if this
Agreement is still in force and effect on
and if either party hereto shall desire a change, the
party so desiring such change shall notify the other
party in writing at least sixty (60) days prior to the
expiration date of this agreement.
The union negotiating committee discussed the new di-
mension injected into the negotiations by Respondent's
proposals relating to section 2 and section 23. Gwin and
Givens testified that the Union rejected the changes pro-
posed for section 2(a), whereas Heinsz testified that the
Union stated it had no objection to that revision. All agree
that Gwin rejected the proposed changes for section 2(b)
and section 23(a). Gwin testified he advised Heinsz he
would take Respondent's proposed successorship provi-
sion, 2(b), to the union attorneys for advice. As to section
23, he stated that whether their contract was for I or 3
years was not particularly important to the Union but that
it would not agree to "this new dimension" to terminate
the agreement upon a cessation of operations by Respon-
dent at the Blair Avenue address. Heinsz testified that it
was the proposed revisions to section 23 which Gwin stated
he would seek legal advice on.
At the July 3 meeting the Union proposed a requirement
for transfer of employees and for recognition on a card
check in the event of relocation of Respondent's patient
care operation. The Respondent's representative rejected
the card check idea but suggested a private election proce-
dure at any new location. Along with a new contract revi-
sion proposal, the Respondent again presented a revision
to section 23 which, aside from editorial revisions and the
insertion of the specificity of a 3-year term, was identical to
that previously presented. Tannier, who took over negotiat-
ing for the Respondent on this date, testified that because
of union problems with the language of its proposed sec-
tion 2(b) incorporating a case citation, the Respondent
negotiators decided to concentrate on the termination
clause . Union representatives agree that this proposal was
rejected by Gwin without discussion. Respondent's repre-
sentatives testified it was their understanding that this.pro-
posal was accepted.4
Meetings of July 5 and 6 were devoted to other contract
provisions. At the July 13 meeting, the transfer and recog-
nition problem was again discussed. The parties agreed to
the right of employees to transfer to any new location and,
The witnesses are in disagreement as to whether or not Heinsz was
present at this meeting . Due to the fact that Heinsz admittedly was absent
from all succeeding negotiating sessions due to a prolonged illness , and for
various other reasons including those hereinafter indicated , t am convinced
that Heinsz did not attend this meeting.
100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in principle, to utilize a private election procedure for rec-
ognition purposes upon a 30-percent card showing checked
by an arbitrator. Also at this meeting Tannier informed the
union negotiators that any agreement Respondent' s negoti-
ators made was subject to approval by Respondent's
board.
The session spanning July 14-15 was devoted primarily
to economic matters. Around midnight Tannler, accompa-
nied by 6 or 7 boardmembers for whom Board President
Shapiro was spokesman, presented the Union with
Respondent's final offer. At the same time Shapiro rescind-
ed the agreement with respect to the right of employees to
transfer to any new location because of the Respondent's
alleged commitment to the purchaser of the premises to
leave a staff with the successor when it ceased functioning
at that address .5 The Union advised that it would present
Respondent's final offer to its membership.
Several days later the union membership voted to accept
the Respondent's final offer as presented,to them by the
negotiating representatives,6 and Gwin then proceeded to
draft the new contract in accordance with his under-
standing of the agreed-upon changes. This was presented
to Respondent for signature by Givens near the end of July
and referred by it to the attorneys who participated in the
negotiations.
In early August Heinsz, who at that time returned to
work, reviewed the contract draft from the standpoint of
his recollections and information supplied him by Tannler
and called Givens stating that there were certain editorial
and language errors in the contract as drafted as well as an
error in some of the figures in the pension provisions.
Heinsz testified that the problem areas were "primarily just
language or misunderstandings": shall to will; clarification
of lunch periods; pension figure mistake, etc., and that he
told Givens that since he was not present at many negotiat-
ing meetings they had better have a meeting of the negotia-
tors. On August 11, Heinsz brought the draft to Givens to
go over the desired changes' According to Givens, she told
Heinsz she saw no problem with his suggested changes but
wished to clear them with Gwin who was not then avail-
able. When Gwin later told her there was no problem pre-
sented by Heinsz' suggestions Givens attempted to reach
Heinsz several times but was advised that he was ill. Final-
ly, the matter was turned over to the Union attorney to
obtain a meeting with Respondent to complete execution
of the agreement . A meeting was obtained by a mediation
service enlisted by the union attorney.
At the meeting held September 3, in addition to the edi-
3 At one of the earlier meetings , Respondent had advised union negotia-
tors that a commitment had been made to the purchaser to leave a staff
available for its operation of the home after Respondent ceased to function
at that location, and therefore present employees would have a job with the
new employer if they wanted it.
6 The parties had not reduced to writing their agreement on the various
changes but depended upon recall of oral understandings.
7 At that time, according to Heinsz , he brought with him and gave to
Givens a copy of Respondent's July 3 duration proposal and she took it to
the union president , reporting back that he would never agree to such a
clause . Givens testified that no mention was made at this time of any revi-
sion to sec . 2 or sec. 24 (the old sec. 23) of the contract draft. Hemsz
admitted that he did not raise any question relating to sec. 2, asserting that
this was due to an oversight.
tonal and language problems on which no difficulties were
encountered, Respondent raised the "hotter issues" of the
recognition and termination clauses and the absence of the
private election understanding. Consequently, other areas
of discrepancy or needed clarification were not thoroughly
explored. With respect to the private election agreement,
the Union expressed its willingness to reduce that under-
standing to writing and even to incorporate it into the con-
tract if Respondent so desired. However, contrary to
Respondent's negotiators, Gwin insisted that there had
been no agreement to change section 2 and the former
section 23 while Tannler stated that without them Respon-
dent would not sign the agreement. According to Tannler,
the parties got hung up on the recognition and termination
clauses and after this meeting the Respondent's negotiators
just sat back to see what would happen. They were, howev-
er, staying in touch with Respondent to see what was de-
veloping in connection with relocation.'
C. Analysis and Findings
Contrary to Respondent's contention, I view the evi-
dence as a whole as establishing that the union negotiators
did not agree to Respondent's proposed section 2(a), in-
serting in the recognition clause Respondent's current ad-
dress, on June 26 or on any other date. In this respect, I
find both Gwin and Givens wholly credible witnesses on
the basis of both demeanor and the internal consistency of
their testimony and actions in contrast to those of
Respondent's negotiators. Further, this was not a situation
in which there was no comprehension of the impact of the
suggested language . The parties were acutely aware
throughout negotiations of the fact that a drastic change in
the Respondent's normal operation was about to take
place, directly affecting employees and specifically related
to Respondent's continued operation at the established
premises. The fact that the Union was made aware that the
Respondent was considering many alternative courses of
action, and the continuing uncertainty of what course it
would elect, of necessity operated as a red flag for any
proposal that might diminish employees rights and benefits
which the Union was commissioned to protect. The alert-
ness of the Union to this situation is underscored by the
fact that its research and negotiations specialist was pre-
sent with its business representative and actively partici-
pated at every negotiation meeting.
Further, it is clear that this proposal, along with two
related proposals which together were clearly designed to
terminate not only the contract but also the recognized
status of the employees' representative, was the subject of a
caucus by the union bargaining committee. Admittedly,
the Union rejected the other two proposals after it had
caucused. A different answer with respect to proposed sec-
tion 2(a) involving the same problem is entirely inconceiva-
ble.
8In this respect, proffered testimony to establish what discussions took
place thereafter and what the further developments were with respect to
Respondent 's operation was rejected as having no relevancy to the issue of
whether a negotiating impasse was reached on September 3 because of
Respondent's position on the provisions of these two sections and whether
the impasse in bargaining was brought about on a nonmandatory subject
JEWISH CENTER FOR THE AGED 101
That the Union in fact rejected this proposal as well is
further indicated by other events and testimony. Thus,
Tannler testified that in view of the Union's difficulty with
its proposed revision to the section 2 recognition clause,
subsection (b), Respondent's negotiators decided to con-
centrate upon accomplishing their objective in the reword-
ing of the termination clause. And, significantly, Heinsz,
who was the sole negotiator for Respondent at the June 26
meeting and who testified that the Union accepted the sec-
tion 2(a) change, when he reviewed the proposed contract
draft for any discrepancy and discussed these with Givens,
was able to find problems with matters negotiated in his
absence by Tannler but completely failed to mention the
absence of his proposed section 2(a), while at the same
time allegedly resubmitting Tannler's later proposed revi-
sion of the termination clause.
In view of the significance of the Respondent's impend-
ing change of location and operations throughout the ne-
gotiating period, I find it unbelievable that the language of
this section would have been overlooked by him in review-
ing the contract draft , as testified to by Heinsz.9
Turning now to the duration clause assertedly accepted
by the Union, Respondent's witnesses testified that this oc-
curred when, on July 3, Respondent's negotiators submit-
ted their revised proposals for changes in section 23. As
noted above, aside from rephrasing, the only change made
in the proposal which had been rejected by the Union was
the insertion of the 3-year term designation in the place of
blanks. On the earlier occasion, the Union had indicated
its satisfaction with either a 1- or a 3-year contract. Here
again, Respondent contends that the Union accepted its
proposal and I find to the contrary.
Union representatives testified that they rejected this
proposal without discussion and I credit their testimony.
Gwin indicated it was his recollection that there was very
little discussion of anything at that meeting because of
Tannler's urgency to get away for the July 4 holiday.
Respondent's witnesses did not present testimony suggest-
ing that there was any real discussion of this provision on
that date: Tannler merely stating, "My recollection is that
at that meeting Clint Gwin agreed to the proposal" and
Heinsz testifying there was a detailed status report on
Respondent's anticipated relocation and the uncertainties
involved preceding the proposal, a union caucus, and
Gwin's statement upon return that he agreed to the propos-
al.10 There is no indication of why, if this proposal had
9 In this respect, I place no reliance upon the marginal notations appear-
ing in Respondent 's copy of the June 26 proposals or on the related testimo-
ny without regard to any comparison with the handwriting sample present-
ed by the Union I note , moreover , that even those notes are inconsistent
with Tannler's indication that it was the proposed change for contract Sec
2(b) and not that relating to Sec. 23 which Gwin was willing to discuss with
the union attorneys . In addition to all the foregoing , there is the matter of
inconsistency between Heinsz' testimony and the information contained in
the statement supplied by him to the Board Regional Office during the
investigation of the case . Together, these considerations convince me that at
the very least Heinsz' recollection was faulty and that his testimony cannot
be relied upon.
10 On the basis of matters referred to supra and in In . 9, above, and the
contrary testimony of union negotiators , I find that , consistent with his
Board statement in contrast to his testimony , Heinsz was not present at the
July 3 meeting. Similarly, I make no finding as to who placed notations in
the margin of Respondent's proposals , when such notations were made,
been accepted as he asserts, Heinsz would have brought to
Givens for consideration a copy of this proposal when he
met with her to go over the so-called editorial, language
and figure changes in the contract draft submitted by the
Union and not then assert that this was a significant omit-
ted change agreed upon during negotiations. As this case
proves, this was not a minor matter to the parties which
would qualify as mere editorial, language or figure
changes.
In its brief, Respondent contends that the contract lan-
guage on which it insisted involved issues as to the unit
covered, successorship, relocation, and subcontracting,
that these are mandatory bargaining subjects as are dura-
tion clauses and, in any event, refusal to sign the Union's
proffered agreement does not establish that there was an
impasse; there was merely disagreement as to what had
been agreed upon. In addition, Respondent points to the
General Counsel's failure to establish that after it refused
to sign the contract, Respondent "subsequently refused
any Union request to bargain for a new contract or over its
future status."
The section titles utilized in a contract are not in them-
selves definitive of the nature of the bargaining subject
placed under them by the parties and do not determine
whether the issue on which bargaining founders is a man-
datory or nonmandatory subject. Thus, the mere fact that
the language which Respondent wished to insert in section
2(a) would fall in the bargaining unit description does not
establish the subject matter it was intended to affect as
purely a unit issue any more than the existence of the unit
description in the recognition clause establishes all unit dis-
putes as recognition issues. Similarly, the revisions sought
by Respondent in the duration clause, although designat-
ing a condition under which the contract could terminate
before expiration of its initial period, were not necessarily
limited to contract duration in their impact, and therefore
to that subject.
The proposals and the positions of the parties must he
evaluated in light of the objectives and real issues raised,
keeping in mind the circumstances facing the negotiators,
i.e., a removal of Respondent's function to another loca-
tion-not the cessation of Respondent's operations or the
work involved. Clearly Respondent was not contemplating
abandonment of its institutional purpose, but was pursuing
the objective of relocation because of a changing neighbor-
hood setting. Respondent fully intended to continue the
care of patients of the ethnic group to which its operations
were dedicated. Having sold its established facility to the
Urban League, Respondent was continuing to operate the
home on a contract basis during the transition period while
phasing into the present facility patients of the purchasers
organization and at the same time searching for facilities
for its own clientele. In the latter respect, Respondent was
exploring the possibility of purchasing an appropriate ex-
isting patient care facility or building a new one, and was
considering contracting its patients to other existing facili-
ties until it could obtain a suitable location in which to
reestablish its normal function. In such circumstances, em-
what meaning they may have, or even whether they have any bearing upon
the negotiating discussions
102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees and their representatives are vitally interested in
protecting their jobs as well as residual rights.
Treating employees as property to be sold with the facili-
ty, the Respondent committed them as a staff to the pur-
chaser along with the sale of the premises and sought to
assure performance of that commitment by seeking,
through the proposed contract revisions involved, to de-
prive employees of continued employment when their jobs
with the Respondent were relocated, of any residual con-
tract rights, and of continued representation by their statu-
tory bargaining representative. In this light, I find merit in
the General Counsel's contention that the proposed
amendments to the recognition and termination clauses,
considered together, had the effect of limiting
Respondent's recognition of the Union as the representa-
tive of its employees, and of terminating those representa-
tive rights on a basis not consistent with the principles es-
tablished by law.1 [
This raises the question of whether Respondent insisted
upon these changes to the point of impasse and, on the
basis of the facts herein, I find that it did. All parties agree
that it was their understanding that agreement had been
reached, and this is supported by Respondent's final offer,
in the presence of its board members whose approval was
required, which was accepted by the employee vote, and
the drafting of the completed agreement by the Union.
Thereafter, any matter preliminary to execution of a writ-
ten agreement was subject only to clarification of contract
language or mutual agreement. Instead, Respondent at-
tempted to force inclusion of previously rejected proposals
and took the stance that Respondent would not execute a
contract which did not contain such changes. Since the
subject matter or issue involved in those clauses was, in
reality, a limitation of recognition, and not a mandatory
subject of bargaining, the impasse created thereby was un-
lawful.12 The fact that some clarification of contract lan-
guage on agreements reached remained to be discussed be-
fore they had a draft of a written contract which the parties
could execute does not detract from the existence of an
impasse .13 Nor was the Union required to initiate further
negotiations after it had accepted Respondent's final of-
fer,14 or to request bargaining for a new contract. And,
certainly, at no time was it required to bargain with Re-
spondent over "its future status."
Accordingly, I find that Respondent bargained to im-
passe with the Union over Respondent's obligation to rec-
11 The termination of a written contract does not terminate a union's
representative status, nor does it deprive employees of their employment
status or of residual rights in the contract or to representation. Although the
parties may, by agreement, change an existing unit description or set a date
or eventuality for abandonment of the representative status of the Union,
these are matters concerning which neither party may insist upon to the
point of impasse.
i2 See Shell Oil Company, and its divisions Shell Chemical Company and
Shell Development Company 194 NLRB 988, 995 (1972), Sall River Valley
Water Users'Association, 204 NLRB 83 (1973), and cases cited therein. Also
see Newspaper Production Company, 205 NLRB 738 (1973)
13 In view of my holding herein, I do not pass upon General Counsel's
alternative position that Respondent's insistence upon those clauses was
unlawful even if factually it were found that initially the Union had agreed
to the clauses in dispute then refused to include them in a written contract.
i4 See Rasco Olympia, Inc., d/b/a Rasco 5-10-25e 185 NLRB 894, 897
(1970).
ognize the Union, and thereby engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All employees of the Employer, including employees
in the Dietary, Laundry & Central Supply, Housekeeping
and Nursing Departments, excluding maintenance employ-
ees, office clerical employees, professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and patients
who for therapeutic reasons perform certain services other-
wise performed by those in the bargaining unit, constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material the Union has been and is the
exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining with-
in the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By insisting upon inclusion in the written contract of
its proposals for changes in the recognition and duration
clauses which in substance were limitations upon the
Union's representative status, and thereby causing an im-
passe in bargaining on a nonmandatory subject, Respon-
dent refused to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act, and has thereby interfered with employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having
found that Respondent unlawfully insisted upon clauses
limiting the Union's representative status and thereby
caused an impasse on a nonmandatory subject, thus fore-
closing the parties from reducing to writing the bargaining
agreement reached in negotiations, I shall recommend that
Respondent be ordered to meet with the Union to resolve
language differences and to incorporate their under-
standing in a signed contract, upon request by the Union. I
shall also recommend that the Respondent be required to
post at its place of business the notice attached to this
Decision marked "Appendix."
Upon the foregoing findings, of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
JEWISH CENTER FOR THE AGED
ORDER 15
Jewish Center for the Aged, St. Louis, Missouri, its offi-
cers , agents , successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively by insisting upon in-
clusion in the written contract of its proposals for changes
in the recognition and duration clauses which in substance
were limitations upon the Union's representative status,
thereby causing an impasse in bargaining on a nonmanda-
tory subject.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Recognize and bargain with the Union as to the ex-
clusive representative of its employees in the appropriate
unit and, upon request, meet with the Union to resolve
language differences and incorporate the resulting under-
standing in a signed contract.
(b) Post at its offices and place of business copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 16 Copies of said no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's represen-
tative, shall be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
15 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
16 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
103
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which all parties had the opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we, Jewish Center for the Aged, violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post
this notice and keep the promises we make in this notice.
WE WILL, upon request, meet with Service and Hos-
pital Employees, Local 50, affiliated with Service Em-
ployees International Union, AFL-CIO, as the collec-
tive bargaining representative of:
All employees of the Employer, including employ-
ees in the Dietary, Laundry & Central Supply,
Housekeeping and Nursing Departments, excluding
maintenance employees, office clerical employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act; and patients who for therapeutic
reasons perform certain services otherwise per-
formed by those in the bargaining unit,
to resolve language differences we may have and in-
corporate the resulting understanding in a signed con-
tract.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with your
bargaining representative by insisting upon inclusion
in the written contract our proposals for changes in
the recognition and duration clauses which in sub-
stance were limitations upon the Union's representa-
tive status, thereby causing an impasse in bargaining
on a nonmandatory subject, or in any like or related
manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
JEWISH CENTER FOR THE AGED