Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 28, 1967

163 N.L.R.B. 651 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

JEWELL SMOKELESS COAL CORPORATION
equipment and machinery in the production area.
The Employer has no formal apprenticeship
program. The record establishes that the line of
progression to tool-and-die maker has been by
promotion through machinist and tool and cutter
grinder, and 6 of the 23 toolroom employees formerly
were production employees.
While the parties agree that toolroom work
requires specific skills and that the incumbent
employees possess those skills, other employees in
related crafts possess and exercise comparable
skills in such classifications. as tool and purchase
inspectors , test equipment mechanics , maintenance
mechanics , and machinists working in engineering.
All skilled employees work in close proximity with
other employees, sharing the same facilities,
working the same hours under similar working
conditions, and enjoying the same benefits. None of
the skilled employees at the plant are represented in
separate craft units.
As noted above, collective bargaining in the
plantwide unit has demonstrated its workability by
producing relatively stable labor relations for some
12 years. Further, the record indicates that this
bargaining has been so oriented as to give
recognition to such special interests and differing
problems as craft employees may have. In those vast
areas where toolroom employees share a substantial
community of interests with other employees in the
existing bargaining unit, they are covered by
common provisions . On the other hand, the seniority
and bumping rights of skilled employees are
governed by special provisions in the contract
between the Intervenor and the Employer.
Moreover, representatives of toolroom employees
have served on the negotiating committee of the
Intervenor, and toolroom employees have
participated in formulating contract demands.
It appears that the formation of the Petitioner
arose as a result of an intraunion dispute . In July
1965 a group of dissidents decided to resign from the
Intervenor and seek separate representation.
Toolroom employees as well as general maintenance
employees and machinists were invited to join in this
effort. Only in December 1965, upon the advice of
counsel to give the appearance of specialized
representation so as to qualify for craft severance,
was participation restricted to toolroom employees.
Petitioner has neither a constitution nor bylaws,
lacks formal organization , and has never
represented any employees for collective-bargaining
purposes. Although this does not detract from its
status as a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, it lends no support to Petitioner's claim to
qualify as a "traditional" craft representative. Thus,
aside from its own assertion as to its intent and
purpose in support of the instant petition, there is no
evidence to establish that Petitioner is particularly
qualified to deal with the special problems of
651
craftsmen, a factor which we consider material,
though not alone determinative.
We view the functional interrelationship of
toolroom employees with other phases of the
Employer's production operation, the frequent
contact and common interests shared with
production employees as well as with other skilled
employees, the 12-year history of successful
bargaining on the broader basis which allowed
flexibility to accomodate any special craft needs,
and the questionable qualifications of the Petitioner
as a specialist in craft representation, as compelling •
considerations for continuing the current bargaining
pattern. Therefore, we conclude that it would not be
appropriate to permit severance of toolroom
employees from the existing production and
maintenance unit. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the
petition.3
ORDER
It is hereby ordered that the petition herein be,
and it hereby is, dismissed.
3 Holmberg, Inc., 162 NLRB 407.
Jewell Smokeless Coal Corporation and Kyle
Reed , an Individual . Case 5-CA-3504.
March 28,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
On November 18, 1966, Trial Examiner A. Bruce
Hunt issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the Respondent's exceptions
and brief, and the entire record in this case, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
163 NLRB No. 82
652 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Jewell
Smokeless Coal Corporation, Vansant, Buchanan
County, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. BRUCE HUNT, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, in
which the charges were filed on June 6 and 24, 1966, and
the complaint was issued on July 29, 1966, involves
allegations that the Respondent, Jewell Smokeless Coal
Corporation, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et
seq. On August 30, 1966, I conducted a hearing at
Abingdon, Virginia, at which the General Counsel and the
Respondent were represented. On October 5, 1966, the
Respondent filed a motion to correct the transcript, and no
objection thereto has been received. The motion is
granted. Upon the entire record and my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Jewell Smokeless Coal Corporation, a Virginia
corporation, has its principal office in Knoxville,
Tennessee, and is engaged at Vansant, Virginia, in
processing coal and manufacturing coke. The Respondent
annually purchases materials valued in excess of $50,000
which are shipped to it directly from points outside
Virginia, and it annually ships products valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to points outside that Commonwealth.
There is no dispute, and I find, that the Respondent is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNION
United Mine Workers of America, District 28, is a labor
organization which admits to membership employees of
the Respondent . It is not a party to this case , however.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
On May 27, 1966, the Respondent discharged Kyle
Reed, the Charging Party, and on May 30 it demoted Glen
H. Roberts, another employee. Reed was a union
adherent, although not a member, and Roberts was neither
an adherent nor a member. The General Counsel
contends, and the Respondent denies, that Reed's
discharge violated both Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and that
Roberts' demotion violated only the latter section.
' These findings are based upon the uncontradicted testimony
of the two employees On cross -examination of Blankenship, he
testified that he did not recall a conversation about the Union with
Additional issues are whether certain conduct of
supervisors and certain improvements in working
conditions violated Section 8(a)(1).
B. Background
The data below respecting elections has been obtained
from the Board's records, of which I take official notice.
On August 16, 1963, in Case 5-RC-4243, an election was
conducted in a unit of the Respondent's production and
maintenance employees. Of approximately 101 eligible
voters, 52 cast ballots against representation by the Union
and 29 voted in favor of such representation. On
August 21, 1964, in Case 5-RC-4766, another election was
conducted. There were approximately 84 eligible voters,
and the vote was 42 to 33 against union representation. On
September 3, 1965, in Case 5-RC-5259, still another
election was conducted. The approximate number of
eligible voters was 88, and the vote was 51 to 22 against the
Union.
The Board's records in the 1963 case list the
Respondent's address as Whitewood, Virginia. The
records in the subsequent cases list the address as
Vansant, Virginia. Whitewood and Vansant are
communities in Buchanan County. Insofar as the instant
case discloses, the Respondent processes coke at Vansant
only.
C. The Alleged 8(aXl) Conduct Other Than Reed's
Discharge and Roberts' Demotion
There is testimony that the Union began another
organizational campaign soon after the election in 1965.
The record discloses little about the campaign and nothing
about its progress, but it is clear that the Union was a
subject of conversation among employees.
About April 1966, R. E. (Bliss) Blankenship, the
Respondent's superintendent, questioned two employees
about the Union. The questioning is not alleged in the
complaint as an unfair labor practice, but at the hearing
the General Counsel asserted that it had been unlawful,
and opportunity to litigate the matter was afforded. One of
the two employees is C. M. Silba. The name of the second
employee is a subject of confusion in the transcript,
although I recall no problem of identity at the hearing. My
trial notes identify the man as Rex Spencer, and he is
listed in the transcript and in its index under that name.
Also, he was referred to by counsel in oral argument as
Spencer. I shall use that surname. On the other hand, the
transcript quotes the individual as having testified, "My
name is Rex Smith," and it quotes Silba as having spoken
of him as "Rex Smith." Turning to Blankenship's
questioning of the two employees, he approached Silba at
work and asked what could be done "to keep the union
quiet." Silba replied that it was "a little too late."
Blankenship approached Spencer and said that he was
"not trying to be nosey" but that he wanted to learn how
the man felt about the Union. Spencer began a reply by
saying that it was "hard to tell what they might do come
election time," and Blankenship interrupted to say, "You
ask eight or ten different questions, you are going to get
quite a few different answers."' I find that Blankenship's
questioning of Silba and Spencer violated Section 8(a)(1).
an employee named Mason Smith Assuming that Spencer's real
surname is Smith, it nevertheless is clear from the duties of
Mason Smith and Spencer that they are different individuals
JEWELL SMOKELESS COAL CORPORATION 653
On May 3, 1966, the Respondent's president, B. R.
Thompson, mailed to each employee a mimeographed
letter in which the Respondent announced (1) a general
wage increase of 20 cents per hour effective at the
beginning of the week immediately preceding, (2) an
additional general increase of $1 per day to become
effective during September 1966, (3) an increase in each
employee's vacation payment, (4) an increase in accidental
death and dismemberment coverage from $5,000 to
$20,000, and (5) an increase in weekly sickness and
accident benefits from $25 to $50. The complaint alleges
that the Respondent granted these increases as
inducements to employees to refrain from union activities.
Nothing in the mimeographed letter supports this
allegation, nor is there evidence that the Respondent
orally connected the increases with union activity.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Union's
organizational campaign was in a significant stage on or
about May 3. On the other hand, there is reliable evidence
that the Respondent 's motive in granting the increases
was economic. Thompson gave uncontradicted testimony
concerning certain construction projects in Buchanan
County which had exhausted the supply of labor. He
testified also that the increases were necessary because of
the "competitive situation that existed in our industry."
Frank Wood, an officer in several companies in Buchanan
County which are competitors of the Respondent, and at
which there has been no organizational activity in recent
years, testified that there was a scarcity of labor in the
area and that on May 1 his employees were given an
increase of 15 cents per hour. I conclude that the
Respondent did not engage in an unfair labor practice by
granting the increases mentioned above.
The final incident to be discussed under this heading is
a remark which was made by Blankenship or Warren
(Pete) Matney, a foreman, to Hobart Honaker, an
employee, a day or two after the work stoppage on May 27,
discussed below. According to Honaker's uncontradicted
testimony, Blankenship or Matney said to him, "your work
here is satisfactory. You had better watch what you say
because you know you are only temporary here." Honaker
did not reply, and nothing else was said . The record does
not disclose whether Honaker had been talking to anyone
about anything, but he did testify that he had not been
talking about the work stoppage and that he had not been
at work at the time of the stoppage. The record will not
support a finding that the warning to Honaker was invalid.
D. Reed's Discharge and Roberts' Demotion
In making coke, employees of the Respondent put coal
into large ovens, burn it, remove it, and quench it. The coal
is transported to the ovens on conveyor belts. The coke is
transported from the ovens in cars that travel on rails.
After coal has been put in the ovens, one step preparatory
to burning it is to seal the edges of the doors to the ovens in
order to prevent air from entering and heat from escaping
the ovens. The sealing is done with mud which is applied
to the doors by hand, often amid very high temperatures.
About January 1, 1966, Reed, who had been an employee
of the Respondent for about 7 years, was assigned the
duties of making mud and applying it to the doors. About
April 1, 1966, Roberts, who had begun work for the
Respondent about 8 months earlier, became a mudder.
Both Reed and Roberts worked on the morning shift as
members of the "charging crew."
On the morning of May 27, 1966, the day of Reed's
discharge, the operator of a locomotive, used to haul coke,
did not report for work and Foreman Matney tried
unsuccessfully to induce an employee on the night shift to
continue at work that morning. Having been unsuccessful,
Matney assigned Reed to operate the locomotive. The
removal of Reed from the charging crew left that crew a
man short, and Roberts soon decided that he could not
apply the mud without assistance. Roberts asked Reed to
tell Matney that help was needed, and Reed did so. After a
short time in which help did not arrive, Roberts went to
Matney and said that he needed a helper. Matney asked
Roberts to continue at work, adding that maybe Matney
could obtain a helper for him. Roberts replied that he
would "mud four or five" more doors by which time
Matney should find someone to 'help. Roberts returned to
the ovens and told employees of his conversation with
Matney. At that point, "Shorty" Culbertson, whose job
was to level coal in the ovens, called a man in a tower who
controlled the flow of coal on the conveyor belts.
Culbertson told the man to send enough coal for five ovens
and then to stop the flow. A work stoppage soon occurred
at the ovens, but prior thereto other operations of the
Respondent were halted. A quench car broke down and a
welder was called to repair it. Cables were laid across
tracks so that the welding equipment would function at the
point where the quench car had stopped. Because the
quench car was essential in quenching coke, and because
locomotives and cars could not travel over cables which
had been laid across tracks, Reed and some other
employees were forced to cease work. By the time the
welding operation had been completed, Roberts and other
employees in the charging crew had stopped work to await
the arrival of a man to help Roberts do the mudding.
Additional employees, including Reed, Culbertson,
pushers who push cars of coke, the welder, and the
operator of the quench car, stopped work in sympathy.
Matney directed Reed to resume work, but Reed refused,
saying that he would work "when these fellows here gets
their differences straightened out." 2 Soon Superintendent
Blankenship appeared on the scene with a helper for
Roberts. Blankenship saw Reed and said that the work
stoppage was not a matter of concern to Reed, who
answered that he was concerned because it was his job as
a mudder which had been vacant and which had caused
the charging crew to cease work. With a helper for
Roberts, work was resumed. Within a matter of minutes,
Matney told Blankenship of Reed's refusal to obey
Matney's direction to work, and together Blankenship and
Matney went to Reed. Blankenship said to Reed, so
Blankenship testified for the Respondent, that Reed had
terminated his employment by refusing to work at
Matney's direction. Reed picked up a lump of coke and
threatened to mar Blankenship's face so much that
Blankenship's wife would not recognize him, but Reed did
not attack Blankenship. Soon Reed resumed work, partly
at the suggestion of a fellow employee, hoping that
Blankenship would change his mind, but Blankenship told
2 The quotation is from Reed's testimony Matney testified for
the Respondent that Reed said , " I won't [ work ] because I am
with these boys "
654 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Reed that the latter's pay had been stopped and that there
would be no compensation for additional work.3
The next day, May 28, a Saturday, was a day off for
Roberts. He was scheduled to work on May 29, but on the
28th he received word from both Blankenship and Matney
not to report for work until the 30th. Upon returning to
work, Roberts was transferred by Matney to a construction
crew on which Roberts had worked before being assigned
to the ovens. The transfer constituted a demotion because
lower wages and fewer benefits were received by members
of that crew. Soon after Roberts' transfer, he asked
Blankenship the reason for it. Blankenship said that the
Respondent did not need a man at the ovens who could not
do his job. Blankenship then asked whether Roberts could
"mud more than four or five doors." Roberts, whose work
on the ovens had been complimented by Matney,
answered in the negative, meaning, but not explaining,
that he could not mud more doors under the
circumstances that existed on May 27.4
On or about June 1, Reed talked with Blankenship,
seeking reinstatement . Reed's version need not be recited.
It suffices to quote Blankenship's testimony: "I
[Blankenship] told him [Reed] in view of the
circumstances that he had refused to take direct orders
from his foreman [Matney] and had refused to do the job
to which he was assigned, and had associated himself with
a problem with which he had no concern, I felt justified" in
having discharged, and in refusing to reinstate, him.5
On June 6 and 24, Reed filed the charges in this case.
On August 1, a copy of the complaint was served upon the
Respondent. On August 17, Roberts was summoned to
Blankenship's office where he talked with Blankenship
and one of the Respondent's attorneys. He was offered
reinstatement to his job-at-the ovens, at the rate of pay
provided for that job, and there was an inconclusive
discussion concerning his claim for backpay; i.e., the
amount he would have earned at the ovens less the amount
he earned on the construction crew from May 30 through
August 17. On the next day, August 18, Roberts returned
to work at the ovens. At the time of the hearing, he had not
received any backpay.
In ascertaining the Respondent's position concerning
Roberts' transfer on May 30, difficulty is encountered
because of errors in the transcript. If I correctly
understand that position, it is that (1) the men in the
charging crew had a justifiable grievance on May 27 and
were entitled to stop work pending the arrival of a man to
help Roberts, but (2) Roberts was not transferred to the
construction crew on May 30 because of the work
stoppage, and (3) he was transferred instead because, on
that day, the construction crew was "short-handed and
needed help," and because he indicated to Blankenship
9 In resuming work, Reed drove the locomotive An employee
standing nearby was caught between cars of hot coke in Reed's
cargo and like cars in another cargo The employee sustained
some burns from steam but he attended to the burns himself and
did not need the services of a physician This incident need not be
discussed further because it was not a factor in Reed's discharge
nor in the Respondent 's subsequent refusal to reinstate him
The findings concerning the conversation between Roberts
and Blankenship are based upon the former's reliable testimony
On the other hand, Blankenship testified that on May 30 an
additional man was needed on the construction crew, that Roberts
had worked on that crew, that Blankenship "asked him if he felt
like, on the morning of the incident of May 27, that if four or five
doors was all that he felt like he was physically able to mud," that
that he could not mud enough doors during a day.6
Additionally, the Respondent contends that (1) Reed had
no right to join the work stoppage because he was not a
member of the charging crew on May 27, and (2) Reed was
validly discharged because of his refusal to work. The
facts do not support the Respondent's contentions
concerning Roberts, and the Respondent is mistaken in its
understanding of the law that is applicable to Reed's
discharge. The record is clear that representatives of the
Respondent, particularly Foreman Matney, were upset by
the work stoppage. It was the first one within Matney's
experience althougl. there had been occasions when a
crew under Matney's supervision had worked with less
than a full complement of men. With respect to Roberts,
we have seen that on May 28 he was told not to report to
work on May 29, and that promptly after he reported on
May 30, Matney assigned him to the construction crew.
There is no evidence that on May 28 the Respondent knew
that the construction crew would be "short-handed" 2
days later, and, assuming such knowledge, it would have
afforded no basis for depriving Roberts of a day's work at
the ovens on May 29. Moreover, it was after Roberts began
work with the construction crew on May 30 that he gave a
negative answer to Blankenship's question whether he
could "mud more than four or five doors." Thus, Roberts'
answer played no part in the Respondent's earlier decision
to transfer him. The record dictates the conclusion that he
was transferred because he initiated the work stoppage.
Section 7 of the Act provides, insofar as pertinent, that
"[e]mployees shall have the right .. to engage in ...
concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or
protection ...... There can be no question that the work
stoppage was concerted activity, the purpose of which was
the participants ' mutual aid or protection against a
working condition in the charging crew which they
regarded as objectionable. The law also is clear that
Reed's participation in the stoppage was protected. Reed
was temporarily a locomotive operator and not a member
of the charging crew, but it would be immaterial if his
regular employment had been to operate the locomotive. I
need cite only one case, Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc.,
et al. v. N.L.R.B., 358 F.2d 411 (C.A. 9), and add that the
principal cases which govern here are discussed in the
opinion in the cited case. The court, quoting from its own
opinion in an earlier case, Salt River Valley Water Users'
Association v. N.L.R.B., 206 F.2d 325, 328 (C.A. 9), said at
358 F.2d 413 that "'concerted activities for the purpose of
... mutual aid or protection' are not limited to union
activities." Quoting also from N.L.R.B. v. Peter Cailler
Kohler Swiss Chocolates Company, Inc., 130 F.2d 503, 505
(C.A. 2), the court said at page 414:
When all the other workmen in a shop make common
cause with a fellow workman over his separate
Roberts answered affirmatively, and that Blankenship then told
him to continue at work with the construction crew
s During the conversation between Blankenship and Reed, the
former did not advance, as a reason for refusing reinstatement,
the fact that Reed, immediately upon being discharged, had
threatened to mar Blankenship's face with a lump of coke The
General Counsel, citing cases in oral argument, contended that
Reed's threat should not bar his reinstatement Counsel for the
Rspondent, arguing next , did not mention the subject (No party
filed a brief) I deem it unnecessary to discuss the matter further.
6 The issue here is not whether the Respondent had an
obligation to give Roberts a helper, but whether Roberts was
transferred because he led a work stoppage to enforce his demand
for a helper
JEWELL SMOKELESS COAL CORPORATION 655
grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they
engaged in a "concerted activity" for "mutual aid or
protection," although the aggrieved workman is the
only one of them who has any immediate stake in the
outcome. The rest know that by their action each one
of them assures himself, in case his time ever comes,
of the support of the one whom they are all then
helping; and the solidarity so established is "mutual
aid" in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts....
I find that the Respondent, by discharging Reed and by
transferring Roberts, interferred with, restrained, and
coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1).
The final issue involves the allegation of the complaint
that the discrimination against Reed discouraged
membership in the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(3). I
shall not resolve the issue because a resolution would not
alter the remedy set forth below. I note, however, that the
Union was not involved in the work stoppage and that
Blankenship denied knowing that Reed was a union
adherent.
IV. THE REMEDY
necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay and the right
to reinstatement under the terms of this Recommended
Order.
In order to make effective the interdependent
guarantees of Section 7 of the Act, I shall recommend
further that the Respondent cease and desist from
infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in
said section. N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312
U.S. 426; N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532
(C.A. 4).
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the
entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend
that it cease and desist therefrom, and that it take
affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. As
recited, Roberts was reinstated to his job as a mudder on
August 18, 1966. I shall recommend the usual order
concerning reinstatement, however, in order to assure that
Roberts shall not lose any vacation or other rights because
of the discrimination against him. Accordingly, I
recommend that the Respondent offer Reed and Roberts
immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs as
members of the charging crew, or to substantially
equivalent positions (The Chase National Bank of the City
of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB
827), without prejudice to their seniority or other rights or
privileges, and that the Respondent make each of them
whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result
of the discrimination against him, by payment to him of a
sum of money equal to that which he normally would have
earned from the date of the discrimination to the date of a
proper offer of reinstatement,' less his net earnings
(Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440, 497-498) during
said period, the payment to be computed on a quarterly
basis in the manner established in N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up
Bottling Company of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344, with
interest at 6 percent per annum, Philip Carey
Manufacturing Company, etc. v. N.L.R.B., 331 F.2d 720
(C.A. 6).8 I shall recommend also that the Respondent
preserve and make available to the Board or its agents,
upon request, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
Backpay for Roberts shall begin on May 29, 1966, his first
regular workday after the work stoppage Backpay for him shall
be tolled as of August 18, the date upon which he was reinstated
as a member of the charging crew.
8 If Reed should currently be serving in the Armed Forces of
the United States, the Respondent shall notify him promptly of his
right to full reinstatement upon application after discharge from
the Armed Forces in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended
Backpay to Reed shall be tolled for the period of his military
service
9 Although the Respondent committed unfair labor practices
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, I hereby recommend that the Respondent,
Jewell Smokeless Coal Corporation, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging, transferring, or otherwise
discriminating against employees because they engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection.
(b) Interrogating employees concerning their union
activities.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the. Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Kyle Reed and Glen Roberts immediate and
full reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights or privileges, and make each of them whole, in
the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents, all payroll and other records, as set forth in said
"Remedy" section.
(c) Post at its places of business in Buchanan County,
Virginia,9 including all places where notices to employees
customarily are posted, copies of the attached notice
marked Appendix.10 Copies of said notice, to be furnished
only at Vansant , Virginia, it is reasonable to infer that its
employees in the nearby community of Whitewood became aware
of its conduct
10 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice In the further eyent that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a
Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order "
656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed
by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for
at least 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.''
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said
Regional Director, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT discharge , transfer , or otherwise
discriminate against you because you engage in
concerted activities that are protected by the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you concerning your
union activities.
WE WILL NOT violate any of the rights which you
have under the National Labor Relations Act to join a
union of your own choice and to engage in union or
concerted activities, or not to join a union and not to
engage in such activities.
WE WILL offer Kyle Reed immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job or an equivalent one.
WE WILL pay Kyle Reed and Glen Roberts backpay
to cover the earnings which they lost because we
discriminated against them.
JEWELL SMOKELESS COAL
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
NOTE: If Kyle Reed should currently be serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States, we will notify him of
his right to full reinstatement upon application after
discharge from the Armed Forces in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 6th Floor, 707
North Calvert Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202,
Telephone 301-752-8460, Extension 2159.
Louisiana Bunkers, Inc. and Surprise, Inc.,
Successor to Patterson Menhaden Corp.
and Fish , Seafood , Agricultural and Allied
Workers Union No. 300 , Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, AFL-CIO. Cases 15-CA-2716
and 15-CA-2717.
March 28,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On November 3, 1966, Trial Examiner W. Edwin
Youngblood issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondents had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, Respondents jointly filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rqlings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions , the brief, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondents, Louisiana
Bunkers, Inc., and Surprise, Inc., Successor to
Patterson Menhaden Corp., Cameron, Louisiana,
their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding arises upon the consolidated
complaints of the General Counsel issued February 28,
1966 , in Cases 15-CA-2716 and 15-CA-2717 upon charges
filed September 28, 1965, by Fish , Seafood , Agricultural
and Allied Workers Union No. 300 , Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFL-CIO , herein called the Union . The complaint in Case
163 NLRB No. 83