Jersey City Welding & Machine Works, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 5, 1950

92 N.L.R.B. 510 (N.L.R.B. 1950)

In the Matter Of JERSEY CITY WELDING & MACHINE WORKS, INC. tla
GENERAL WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION, LOCAL 892, AFFILIATED WITH
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS, WARE-
HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL
Case No . 2-CA-1214.-Decided December 5, 1950
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 25, 1950, Trial Examiner William E. Spencer issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Respondent also requested oral argument. This request is hereby
denied because, in our opinion, the record, exceptions and brief ade-
quately present the issues and positions of the parties.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed.2 The Board has considered the
Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in the case and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions and
modifications :
'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b)- of the Act , the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [ Members Houston , Murdock,
and Styles].
2 At the hearing the Respondent moved to dismiss the instant complaint , on the ground
that the Regional Director had dismissed an earlier charge filed by the Union , embodying
allegations similar to those contained in the charge . filed herein , and no appeal was taken
by the Union from that action . The Trial Examiner denied the motion and the Respondent
excepts to this ruling . The Respondent argues, in this connection , that : ( 1) The Re-
gional Director ' s prior action constitutes res adjudicata ; and (2 ) the Union was estopped
from filing a new charge because it was acting in bad faith to circumvent the Board's
Rules and Regulations . We find no merit in these contentions . With respect to (1),
the doctrine of res adjudicata is clearly not applicable where as here, the prior charge
was dismissed before the conduct of a hearing and without opportunity for adjudication
of the merits . Gibbs Corporation , 74 NLRB 1182 ; cf. Rathbun Molding Corporation,
76 NLRB 1019 . And as to (2), the filing of the new charge was not in contravention
of the Board 's Rules and Regulations , and the record , in our opinion , fails to establish
that such filing was actuated by bad faith . Accordingly , the Trial Examiner ' s ruling is
hereby upheld.
92 NLRB No. 85.
510
JERSEY CITY WELDING & MACHINE WORKS, INC. 511
We agree with the Trial Examiner that on and after October 17,
1949, the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the
Act.
The Respondent seeks to justify its refusal to bargain on October
17, 1949, less than 1 year after the Union's certification by the Regional
Director, on the grounds that the Union, on May 14, 1949, refused
to execute a written contract with the Respondent," and thereby for-
feited the protection of the usual presumption of continued majority
status. However, it is well established that a union's representative
status is conclusively presumed for at least 1 year following certifica-
tion,4 and, in our opinion, no circumstances are present to render
such presumption inapplicable in the instant case.
The Respondent further argues that, in any event, its action was
justified because it entertained a good faith doubt that negotiations
with the Union concerning a new agreement would result` in a signed
contract. We do not agree. Significantly, in its letter to-the Union
on October 17, the Respondent advanced its alleged doubt concerning
the Union's majority status as the sole reason for refusing the Union's
request to bargain, and, indeed, added that if "the Union is certified
in this [new] election ... we are ready immediately thereafter, to
enter into negotiations with you." The Respondent reaffirmed this
position in its letter to the Union on October 19 .5 Although a rep-
resentative of the Respondent testified that later in a telephone con-
versation with the Union's attorney on about October 20, he mentioned
the Union's previous unwillingness to sign a contract as a basis for
the Respondent's action," such statement, even assuming it was made,
was manifestly an afterthought. Moreover, in view of the circum-
stances surrounding the earlier negotiations, as fully detailed in the
Intermediate Report, and the lapse of over 4 months at the time the
Union again requested bargaining on September 16, we are of the
opinion that the Respondent was without reasonable ground for as-
suming that the Union would adamantly refuse to execute any new
contract resulting from negotiations?
8 The agreement reached by the parties on May 14, 1949, was thereafter treated as an
"oral" contract and apparently expired, by its terms , on November 12, 1949.
4 United States Gypsum Company, 90 NLRB 964; Sussex Hats, Inc. , 85 NLRB 399. Con-
trary to the implication of the Trial Examiner, the duty to bargain with a certified
representative prevails . during this period without regard to whether the Employer in
"good faith " doubts its majority status.
'The Trial Examiner inadvertently finds that the Respondent failed to reply to the
Union's renewed request to bargain made on October 18, 1949. However, as related above,
the Respondent , by letter dated October 19, replied that its position was unchanged from
its letter of October 17, and that it intended to file a petition for an election.
6 As indicated in the Intermediate Report, the union representative , who initiated the
conversation, categorically denied this testimony.
' Unlike the Trial Examiner , we do not here decide whether , if the Respondent had a
good faith doubt as to the Union 's willingness to sign a collective bargaining contract, it
512 DECISIONS OF :NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Accordingly, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that on and after
October 17, 1949, the Respondent refused to bargain with the Union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, in violation
of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section .10
(c). of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Jersey
,City Welding & Machine Works, Inc., Jersey City, New Jersey, and
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with General Warehousemen's
Union, Local 892, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, AFL, as
the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance em-
ployees at its Jersey City, New Jersey, plant, excluding office clericals,
draftsmen, engineers, guards, watchmen, professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act; .
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organiza-
tion, to form labor organizations, to join or assist General Warehouse-
men's Union, Local 892, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL,
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activi=
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities,, except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8. (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the, Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act : -
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with General Warehouse-
men's Union, Local 892, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL,
as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate
unit described above, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment ;
would nevertheless be under an affirmative "duty" to seek clarification from the Union
before rejecting the latter 's request for bargaining.
JERSEY CITY WELDING & MACHINE WORKS, INC. 513
(b) Post at its Jersey City, New Jersey, plant, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked Appendix A ." Copies of said.notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Second Region, shall, after
being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for
sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material ;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region, in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond-
ent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with. GENERAL
WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION, LOCAL 892, affiliated with INTER-
NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSE-
MEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL, as the exclusive representa-
tive of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein with
respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other
terms or conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The
bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees at our Jersey
City, New Jersey, plant, excluding office clericals, draftsmen,
engineers, guards, watchmen, professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization, to join or assist the above-named union, or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from. any or all of such activities,
8 In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted in the notice , before the words, "A Decision and Order," the
words, "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
514 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
JERSEY CITY WELDING & MACHINE WORKS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated -------------------- By ------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
A. J. Sullivan, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Harold Krieger, Esq., Jersey City, N. J., for the Union.
August W. Heckman, Esq., Jersey City, N. J., and David H. Werther, Esq.,
Jersey City, N. J., for the Respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on February 23, 1950, by General Warehousemen's Union,
Local 892, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL, herein called the Union, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,' by the Regional
Director of the Second Region (New York, New York), issued his complaint dated
July 18, 1950, against Jersey City Welding & Machine Works, Inc., Jersey City,
New Jersey, herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act.
Copies of the charge, the complaint, and a notice of hearing were duly served
on the Respondent and the Union.
With. respect to unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance that
the Respondent refused to bargain with the Union, the duly designated repre-
sentative of a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit, in violation'
of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act.
In its duly filed answer, the Respondent admitted the jurisdictional allegations
of the complaint, the appropriateness of the unit alleged in the complaint, and
that the Union was on or about November 12, 1948, designated by a majority
of employees in the appropriate unit as their representative for purposes of
collective bargaining, but denied the commission of the alleged unfair labor
practices.
Pursuant to, notice a hearing was held at New York, New York, on August 8
and 9, 1950, before William E. Spencer, the undersigned Trial Examiner duly
designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. All parties were represented by counsel
and participated in the hearing where full opportunity to be heard, to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues
was afforded them.
After the introduction of the formal papers, the Respondent moved to dis-
miss the complaint on the ground that an earlier charge, identical with the
I The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing will be called herein the
General Counsel ; the National Labor Relations Board, the Board.
JERSEY CITY WELDING & MACHINE WORKS, INC. 515
charge on which the complaint issued, was dismissed by the Regional Director.
Because,of this, it was argued, the principle of res adjudicate should be applied.
It was ruled that the refusal by the Regional Director to issue a complaint on
the earlier charge was an administrative matter and not an adjudication of
the issue such as would bring it within the rule of res adjudicata. The motion,
accordingly, was denied.
Upon the completion of the evidence, unopposed motions to conform the plead-
ings to the proof were granted. There was oral argument before the Trial
Examiner participated in by the General Counsel and the Respondent. The
parties though duly advised of tlieir privileges in the matter, waived the filing
of briefs and/or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law with the
undersigned.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witness,
I make the following:'
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent maintains its principal office, place of business, and plant at
Jersey City, New Jersey, where it is engaged in metal fabrication, welding,
machine work, plate and boiler work, and the production of stacks, boiler parts,
tanks, hoppers, parts of special machinery, angle rings, dryers, bent sections,
and related fabrics.
During the calendar year ending December 31, 1949, the Respondent purchased
steel and other materials valued at in excess of $50,000, of which approximately
33 percent was transported to the Jersey City plant from outside the State of
New Jersey, and during the same year processed at its Jersey City plant products
valued at in excess of $250,000, of which approximately 33 percent was trans-
ported to States other than the State of New Jersey.
It is found that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
General Warehousemen's Union, Local 892, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
AFL, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the
Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain
The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, and it is found, that :
1. All production and maintenance employees of Respondent employed at
its Jersey City plant, exclusive of office clericals, draftsmen, enginbers, guards,
watchmen, professional employees, and all supervisors as defined in Section 2 (11)
of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the. Act;
2. On or about November 12, 1948, a majority of the employees in the appro-
priate unit described above, by a secret election conducted under the supervision
of the Regional Director for the Second Region of the Board, designated the
Union as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining;
3. On or about September 16, 1949, and on or about October 18, 1949, the
Union requested the Respondent to bargain collectively with it as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the unit described above.
516 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is further found that on and at all times since November 12, 1948, and,,
specifically, on September 16, 1949, and October 18, 1949, the dates on which it
admittedly requested the Respondent to bargain with it, the Union was, by
virtue of an unrebutted presumption of a continuing majority, the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate unit.
On October 17, 1949, the Respondent in reply to the Union's September 16.
written request for bargaining negotiations, stated that the Respondent was
of the opinion that the.Union did not presently represent a majority of em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, and accordingly, the Respondent intended to•
petition the Board for an election to determine the matter of the Union's ma-
jority. The Respondent invited the Union to join with it in "seeking an early
date for the election." By letter dated October 18, the Union protested the
Respondent's refusal to bargain with it, and renewed its demand for bargaining
conferences. The Respondent did not reply to this letter. In a telephone con-
versation between a. representative of the Respondent and the Union on or
about October 20, the Respondent reiterated its refusal to bargain with the
Union.
It is found that on October 17, 1949, and at all times since, the Respondent
has refused to bargain with the Union as representative of its employees in an'
appropriate unit. Inasmuch as the Union was then, prior thereto, and still
is the duly constituted bargaining representative of these employees, the Res-
pondent's refusal was violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act, unless
there are circumstances peculiar to the case which justified its refusal.
The Respondent's contention that the Union had lost its majority status is
clearly without merit. The presumption of a continuing majority within the
certification year is a long established principle and bne which the Respondent
apparently does not contest. It offered no evidence to rebut the presumption.
It is equally well established that, except under unusual circumstances, the duty
to bargain with a certified union continues for the certification year.2 Indeed,
the Board has held that the mere raising of the question of a union's majority
status as a condition precedent to bargaining within the certification year,
amounts to a violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act 8
The Respondent's princip?l defense is that in bargaining conferences between
it and the Union which occurred in May 1949, an agreement was reached on a
bargaining contract and reduced to writing but the Union refused to sign it for
reasons of policy, thereby rendering futile any further negotiations on a contract..
These are the facts. On or about March 15, 1949, the Union called a strike
of Respondent's employees and operated a picket line in front of Respondent's
plant.. On a date in May, the strike was called off and the picket line withdrawn.
On May 9 and May 14 respectively, at the Union's request, bargaining confer-
ences took place between the parties. The first of these conferences on the
morning of May 9 took place at the office of the Union's attorney, Harold Krieger.
A second conference on the afternoon of the same day, was held at the office
of the Respondent's attorney, August W. Heckman. At the morning conference
Krieger, on behalf of the Union, submitted a proposed agreement and discussion
centered on it. The discussion was continued at the afternoon conference.
2 See West Fork Cut Glass Company, 90 NLRB 944 , and cases cited therein.
8 Vulcan Forging Company, 85 NLRB 621.
4 The strike was preceded by a number of bargaining conferences occurring in late 1948
and early 1949 , which apparently reached a stalemate occasioned by the Union 's insistence
on a preferential hiring clause. The Union withdrew this demand prior to the opening
of the May 1949 conferences.
JERSEY CITY WELDING & MACHINE WORKS, INC.. 517
Representing the Union at the afternoon conference were George Kane, business
manager of the Union, and a committee of employees ; representing the Re-
spondent were Attorneys Heckman, David H. Werther, John N. Ellsworth, then
associated with Heckman, and officials of the Respondent. At this conference,
according to Heckman, Ellsworth, and Werther, witnesses for the Respondent,
an agreement on a contract was reached and it, was agreed that Werther would
prepare a draft of the agreement for submission to the parties. Werther did
prepare a draft of a contract which was submitted to the parties, and on May
14 it was the topic of discussion at another conference at Heckman's office at-
tended by representatives of the parties.
At the May 14 conference, the draft of the proposed contract was discussed
item by item and certain changes were made. While these changes may have
been of a somewhat minor character, they were changes of substance. There-
fore, whatever agreements were reached at the May 9 conferences, they lacked
finality in the sense of a completed contract. The Respondent contends, however,
that complete and final agreement on the terms of a contract was reached at
the May 14 conference, but that Kane refused to sign it. Heckman testified:
"He did not give any reason other than that his was a Teamsters' Union, as I
recollect it, and this was a welding shop, and they did not want to have a signed
contract like this in their files." There was corroborating testimony by other
witnesses for the Respondent.
Kane testified that while there was agreement on most of the terms of the
contract, there were certain items, such as the seniority clause, upon which
there was no final agreement. He denied that he stated that for policy reasons
he would refuse to sign a contract.
A particularly difficult problem of credibility is encountered here for none
of the witnesses impressed this trial examiner as persons who would deliberately
give.false testimony. I am convinced, however, that of the witnesses testifying
concerning the bargaining conferences of May 9 and May 14, Heckman's recol-
lection of events, refreshed by notes made contemporaneously with the meet-
ings, was the most accurate. I conclude that at the conclusion of the May 14
meeting there was substantial accord between the parties on an agreement. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that following the conference of May 14,
the strike was called off, the pickets removed 6 and by the further fact that in
a prior proceeding on a representation petition filed by the Respondent, Kane
admitted that an "oral" agreement was reached in May.
I am also convinced, and find, that at the May 14 conference, Kane expressed
the wish that the agreement be "unilateral" and otherwise signified his refusal
to execute the draft of the agreement by signing it.
It does not follow, however, that because of the Union's refusal to execute an
agreement with it in May 1949, the Respondent was justified in refusing in Sep-
tember and October to meet with the Union in further negotiations of a contract e
I am convinced that Kane was mistaken in his testimony that the strike was called
off and the pickets removed prior to the May 14 conference, his testimony in this respect
being in conflict with that of all other witnesses who testified on the topic.
6 The Respondent apparently relies on the Tines Publishing Company case (72 NLRB
676), but it should be noted in that case that the Board pointed out that although "con-
temporaneous conduct of a union in connection with bargaining may well be a factor
to be considered in determining if an employer has refused to bargain, the Act plainly
does not contemplate that a refusal by a union to bargain at one time operates to absolve
an employer from obeying the mandate of the Act to bargain collectively on any subse-
quent occasion." It should be noted further, that since the decision in this case the
Act has been amended to make it mandatory upon unions as-well as employers to bargain
518 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I do not believe that the Union's refusal to execute the agreement of May 14 was
of a character from which the Respondent could reasonably infer that this repre-
sented an-adamant policy on the part of the Union from which it would not recede
in future bargaining conferences. The negotiations in May were sparked pri-
marily by a desire both on the part of the Respondent and the Union to terminate
'the strike and get the employees back to work. Realistically viewed, the agree-
ment then reached was scarcely more than an interim agreement, of less than 6
months duration, and doubtless the settlement of the strike was uppermost in the
minds of both parties. While the language used by the Union's representative
relative to the signing of the May 14 agreement was unfortunate, I do not believe
that it represented a fixed' attitude on the part of the Union, nor do I believe that
this was the motivating factor in the Respondent's refusal to meet with the Union
in September and October for the negotiation of a new contract. '
In its letter of refusal, the Respondent did not raise the question of whether or
not the Union would execute a bargaining contract once it was agreed upon, as it
assuredly would have if it had entertained serious doubts in the matter, but chal-
lenged the Union's majority and assigned as its sole reason for refusing to grant
the Union's request for renewed negotiations, that it doubted that the Union any
longer represented a majority. If it had raised the question of the Union's posi-
tion relative to executing a bargaining contract, and had been advised contempo-
raneously by the Union that it would not execute such an agreement, its defense
would have a persuasiveness-not present under the existing state of facts. It
seems to me that if the Respondent had been sincerely desirous of fulfilling its
obligations under the Act to bargain with the Union, and had a bona fide doubt of
the Union's willingness to enter into a binding agreement, at the very least it
would have broached the matter with the Union, thus affording it an opportunity
to clarify its position, before refusing to meet and bargain with it.
I can place but little reliance on the telephone conversation between Krieger
and Werther which occurred shortly after the Respondent had failed to reply
to the Union's letter of October 18. In this conversation, according to Werther's
testimony-denied by Krieger-he, Werther, advanced the Union's refusal to
sign the May 14 agreement as a reason for the Respondent's unwillingness to
meet with the Union for further negotiations. If the Respondent had enter-
tained a bona fide doubt on this score, it would have made mention of it in its
letter rejecting the Union's request for negotiations, and, in any event, was
under a duty to afford the Union an opportunity to clarify its position relative
to signing a contract before rejecting its request for negotiations. As to the
telephone conversation itself, initiated by the Union's representative, it is clear
that Werther made no commitment that the Respondent would be willing to
resume negotiations upon the Union's assurance that it would sign an agreement
arrived at through collective bargaining, and the Union already had before it
the Respondent's letter in which it assigned loss of majority as its sole reason
for refusing the Union's request.
I conclude that the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union was not
based upon a bona fide doubt either as to the Union's majority or as to the
Union's willingness to sign a collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, it
is found that the Respondent's refusal on October 17, 1949, and at all times
since, to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative
in good faith, and therefore the Respondent was not without recourse if it believed that
the union would not bargain with it. It could have filed a charge of unfair labor practices
against the Union.
JERSEY CITY WELDING & MACHINE WORKS, INC . 519
of its employees in an appropriate unit, was, and is, violative of Section 8 (a)
(1) and ( 5) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section I, above,
have a close , intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce
among the several States , and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices violative
of Section 8 (a) (1) and ( 5) of the Act , the undersigned will recommend that
it cease and 'desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit,
the undersigned will recommend that the Respondent, upon request, bargain
collectively with the Union as such representative , and if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record
in the case , I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. General Warehousemen 's Union, Local 892 , affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent employed
at its Jersey City plant, exclusive of office clericals , draftsmen , engineers,
guards, watchmen , professional employees , and all supervisors as defined in
Section 2 (11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. On November 12 , 1948, General Warehousemen 's Union , Local 892, af-
filiated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America , AFL, was, at all times since has been, and now
is, the representative of a majority of Respondent 's employees in the appropriate
unit described above for purposes of collective ' bargaining within the meaning
of Section (9) (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing on and after October 17, 1949, to bargain collectively with this
union as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate
unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 ( a) (5) of the Act.
5. By the said refusal , the Respondent interfered with, restrained , and coerced
its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and
thereby has engaged in , and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 ( a) (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and ( 7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]